European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

Unfortunately, even the European Parliament cannot change the exit date. It would have to be agreed by all the other member states. To predicate our negotiating position on our ability to persuade the 27 member states—and the Commission and the negotiating team in Brussels—to extend the date would be completely wrong.

Any Members who intend to vote against this date must be really confident that they can change a date that has already been set by the European Union treaties. The whole point about the deal/no deal scenario is that—as I have already said to the right hon. Member for Knowsley—either we accept the deal, and the House votes on it, or there is no deal. That is the choice that is available to the House. The House cannot veto Brexit—[Interruption.] I wish to conclude my speech.

Any Members who voted for the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill are obliged to support the amendment, because that is the date for which they implicitly voted when they voted for the Bill, and for a two-year period. Any Members who voted for article 50 but now do not wish to fix the date are open to the charge that they do not actually want us to leave the European Union—[Interruption.] Let me say this to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. He has suggested that if we do not have a deal we will be jumping into “a void”, and that fixing the date will constrain our negotiations and disenfranchise Parliament. I respect the sincerity of my right hon. and learned Friend’s passion, but he calls the cut-off date barmy when he voted for that date by voting for the article 50 Bill. This amendment rumbles those who have not really accepted that we are leaving the EU.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

My hon. Friend knows that I share his fundamental beliefs about the need for us to leave the European Union, but is there not merit in the suggestion of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) that we need not have a fixed date? After all, our own negotiators might wish to have an extension; this is curtailing the flexibility and room for manoeuvre of our own negotiators. My right hon. and learned Friend has proposed an ingenious and commendable solution: that we write into the Bill the date, but we create exceptions for circumstances in which the negotiators might need it. I urge my hon. Friend, and all my hon. Friends who share my view on the EU, to reflect carefully on the suggestion made by my right hon. and learned Friend; it is a commendable one and it requires careful reflection.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am still seized of the truth that if we beg the EU to extend the time because it has run us up against the timetable—after all, it is the EU that is refusing to negotiate on the substantive issues at the moment, not us—that is the position and responsibility it must face. We should be clear and strong that if the EU does not reach an agreement with us by a certain date, we are leaving without a deal. That would put us in a stronger negotiating position than ever.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

Order. There is very little time left and many people still want to speak. I cannot regulate the length of speeches, but hon. Members can do so if they do not want to incur the wrath of their colleagues who will not get a chance to speak if speeches are too long.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

I will try to be brief, Mrs Laing. I wish to address some of the constitutional implications of this extraordinarily important Bill. I suppose that this is the most important constitutional Bill that this House has considered in many years. It is difficult to think of a Bill as important as this one, certainly since 1972.

This is not the first time that this task has been accomplished by sovereign nations. Provisions such as clauses 1, 2, 3 and 4 are to be found, in a simpler form, in the constitutions of a number of Commonwealth countries to which this country granted independence after the second world war. Invariably, those constitutions contained provisions that seek to preserve the laws as at the date that those nations became independent.

Now, they are simpler provisions because the complexity of our laws and the European Union’s laws, with the legal federalism that the EU implies, is much higher. But the essential task that those nations faced was not dissimilar from that which we face. When they became independent and the legal source of their laws changed from being the Queen in Parliament to a constitution, the task that the courts faced was not dissimilar in that, while retaining the body of the law that had existed up to the date of independence, they then became free to interpret those provisions and principles in the light of the new constitutional fact of their independence. And that will be the case for our own Supreme Court. The Bill intends to preserve continuity up to the point of exit day, and to allow the Supreme Court, under clause 6, to diverge where it thinks appropriate and to develop its own jurisprudence over successive years.

I have sat and listened throughout the debates yesterday and today, and it seems to me that we have done something of an injustice to the draftsmen of the Bill. Some very careful thinking has gone into the way in which the provisions have been balanced. I am not saying to Government Front Benchers that it is not possible to tighten some of those provisions and to provide greater safeguards, particularly in respect of the width of the powers permitted under clauses 7 and 17. But I can quite understand the policy and principle behind those provisions in the manner in which they are thus expressed.

Clause 4—we are speaking to the question of whether clause 4 stands part—is obviously an important provision, which seeks to mirror the wording of section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) asked what the word “allowed” meant in clause 4(1)(b) of the Bill. I would propose that, under that clause, the word means to admit, acknowledge or accept into our law. The word “allow” does not only mean to permit. It also carries the connotation of acceptance or admission; it certainly did in 1972. It seems obvious what clause 4 is intended to achieve: to ensure that a law that was enforced, available, recognised and allowed continues beyond exit day, in so far as that has not already been provided for by clauses 2 and 3.

I suggest to the Committee that the provisions introduced by clauses 2 to 4 are sensible, coherent and logical. I am not saying to the Government Front Bench that they cannot be improved, but I certainly understand their import. It is under section 2(1) of the European Communities Act that all the case law, the general principles and the decisions of the European Court of Justice on the interpretation of treaty provisions become admissible and admitted into our law. I take it that clause 4 is intended to achieve precisely that.

Although I accept the need for, perhaps, some tightening, I do not accept that the Bill is as wanting or as deficient as has been suggested. For example, I do not think that clause 7, which we will come to debate at a later stage, is as broad an invitation to the Executive to abuse their discretion as some right hon. and hon. Members have suggested. It is governed by three critical factors. The first is the fact that there has to be a deficiency caused by the withdrawal from the European Union. Now, if the power of the Government is limited by the fact that they have to be curing a deficiency caused by the withdrawal from the EU, it is difficult to see how they thereby gain a licence to interfere with fundamental rights or rights that have been acquired over many years in the decision making of the European Court of Justice.

My general point to those on the Front Bench is this: some parts of the Bill would benefit from some tightening, and perhaps some expression of the limitations on the discretion that is being conferred on the Executive, but I do not accept—I say this to my right hon. and hon. Friends—some of the more exaggerated and, frankly, hysterical analyses of the Bill. It seems to be a reasonably well-judged, measured and balanced set of provisions. Yes, it allows a lot of legal points to be taken, but, frankly, when a legal order is being changed to the extent that this one is, it is not surprising if lawyers are likely to have a field day.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Joanna Cherry]

Dr O’Brien did indeed make that point, and I think that anyone interested in the detail of why removing the charter from domestic law would take away rights would be well advised to read her evidence.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

The number of cases in which the charter is cited— 248 in England and Wales—does not mean that it has had the slightest practical effect on the outcome of judgments, as the hon. and learned Lady knows quite well.

[Joanna Cherry]

I do know that, because I have sat through cases—so, too, has the hon. and learned Gentleman, I suspect—in which case law has been cited and it is hard to see its relevance. However, Dr O’Brien made her point advisedly, having taken care to prepare for the Select Committee hearing, so it is not an isolated point—as the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) has indicated, there was quite a bit more to her evidence. She touched in some detail on data protection issues, but I will leave it to other Members to discuss those, because the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) had a very interesting exchange with her on these issues and will no doubt address them later, because he has tabled an amendment.

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[Mr Cox]

The most familiar rejoinder of a judge when one cites the charter in the High Court is, “What does it add?” The most familiar response of counsel is, “Nothing.” The most familiar course of the judge thereafter is to ignore it completely, in 95% to 99% of cases.

[Joanna Cherry]

The hon. and learned Gentleman is no doubt commenting on the English jurisdiction, and I cannot comment on that because I have not appeared here, except in the UK Supreme Court. But certainly in Scotland it is sometimes referred to, and sometimes it is relevant and sometimes it is not, but that applies to all references made in cases. However, to counter his point, there are hard examples of where the charter has made a huge difference. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield referred earlier to the Benkharbouche case, which concerned the rights of an employee in an embassy in London, and another against the embassy of the Republic of Sudan. The individual complained of unlawful discrimination and a breach of working time regulations, and she would have been denied remedy had it not been for the charter.

One may forget Dr O’Brien’s evidence about the number of references if one wants to, but look at the hard examples of where the charter has made a difference. We have also heard about the tobacco packaging legislation. There are many examples relating to data protection, perhaps the most celebrated one being the litigation of the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union.

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[Wera Hobhouse]

I thank the hon. Lady for making that valuable point. As someone who is not a legal expert, I believe this is about having a safeguard. We are keeping the law in the charter because it fills a gap that we would have otherwise. That is why we should retain the charter.

Let me give an example: the charter provides specific rights for children that are not replicated elsewhere in UK-wide human rights law. It requires that the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration in all actions relating to children; that children’s views may be expressed and shall be taken into consideration; and that children have a right to maintain a personal relationship with both their parents, unless this is contrary to their interests. The latter right was used in a case relating to two British children, whose father’s deportation was successfully challenged by focusing on the major negative impact on the children of loss of contact with a parent. Cases of this kind might become more common if Britain leaves the EU and EU nationals lose the automatic right to reside in the UK, with the consequent risk of family separation.

The charter also contains a prohibition on child labour which is not replicated elsewhere in UK human rights law. Another example of the charter providing greater protection is on disability rights. Disabled people would no longer be able to use the charter to support their right to independence, integration and participation in the community. This interpretive tool in the charter goes much further than the non-discrimination provisions in the Equality Act 2010. On healthcare, as we have heard, the charter was decisive in ensuring that bans on tobacco advertising were permitted. The list goes on, so why not retain the charter? Let me be a bit flippant here: I cannot help but wonder whether the Government are making this obvious omission from our statute books because some time ago the Prime Minister, when she was Home Secretary, had a ding-dong over the charter when she unsuccessfully tried to extradite Abu Qatada and this is a bit of late comeback.

To be serious again, what I worry about most in all the discussions about Brexit is that everything is being done in a big hurry because some eager Brexiteers would rather leave the EU tomorrow and not think about any consequences, even those that would mean real harm for this country. New clause 78, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), would specifically provide an overarching domestic guarantee of non-discrimination by the state. It would be a domestic replacement for the safety net for equality rights currently provided by EU law. The new clause would serve a distinctive and different purpose from the rights protected by the Equality Act 2010, and I urge the Minister to consider it again. It would provide a guarantee that our laws must be non-discriminatory in their purpose and effect, along with a mechanism to challenge them if they were. Currently, that cannot be done under the Equality Act.

Providing greater protection of our human rights has nothing to do with losing sovereignty but everything to do with doing the right thing by our own people. I am fed up with being branded undemocratic or unpatriotic for merely pointing out that the Government will be failing their own people if the Bill passes unamended.

[Mr Cox]

What exactly would the new clause add to the rights that already exist under article 14 of the European convention on human rights?

[Wera Hobhouse]

The new clause has been promoted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission. I take it that the commission has done careful research into how it would provide an extra guarantee that is not currently provided. The hon. and learned Gentleman should look at it carefully to understand how it is meant to work, but it is an overarching tool that, as I understand it, we currently do not have. As I said before, as a non- legal person, for me the most important thing is the safe- guarding of our equality laws and the need to match what has been done so far at European and international level.

Brexit is increasingly nothing to do with what leave politicians promised to the people. I fear it is becoming an ideologically driven process to turn this country into some sort of deregulated free-for-all, in which the progress we have made over the past four decades to protect individuals from exploitation and discrimination, in tandem with our European neighbours, is sacrificed on the altar of sovereignty. The British people did not vote to give away their fundamental rights and protections. If Parliament does not amend the Bill, let nobody claim that this is the will of the people.

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As I have said, the Bill, as it stands, does not protect those environmental principles, and environmental protection after exit day will not be as strong and rigorous as it was before exit day. I seek the Minister’s reassurance that he intends to make sure that that does not happen.

[Mr Cox]

Broadly speaking, there have been two means of protecting human rights in international law. The first, which is generally followed by civil and continental law systems, has been to adopt charters of general rights with very broad statements of those rights and then to turn over to the courts the interpretation, in specific circumstances, of how those rights should be applied. The second, which is generally followed by common-law traditions, has been to proceed not by general statements of rights, but by specific statutory remedies in defined circumstances and by case law that defines the facts and allows the remedy to be extended by analogy with the facts of the particular case.

With due respect to Opposition Members, it seems to me as though some of them have made a mistake in equating the need for the incorporation of the charter with the protection of fundamental rights in this country. Article 7 of the universal declaration of human rights provided in 1948 that all subscribing nations to the United Nations should respect the principle of equality. But it has never been suggested that the United Kingdom, because it did not incorporate that principle into a general statement of an equality right, was not compliant with its obligation in international law, under the declaration and subsequently the covenant, to respect equality.

That is because there are two ways in which one can protect human rights. One can either adopt a general statement of rights and leave the protection of it to the courts, or one can adopt specific remedies in given circumstances that cumulatively and substantively protect those rights. Nobody has suggested that because the Soviet Union incorporated a right to equality into its constitution, equality rights were better protected there than they were in this country, which did not. Therefore, the absence of a general statement of rights, such as that in the charter—I do not say that there is not a function for such statements, but let us begin with first principles—is not to be equated with the protection of human rights. We have to look at the substantive effect of the cumulative common-law and statutory protections in our law.

That is why my right hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) suggested that the Government’s approach should not be to incorporate this charter of wide, broad and, quite frankly, vague general statements of rights and allow courts to take those statements, which are often rich with value judgments, and apply them to the facts. That is why the approach of my right hon. and learned Friends on the Front Bench is right and, I suggest, consistent with the common-law tradition of this country.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am wondering which country the hon. and learned Gentleman is talking about, because the common-law tradition melds with the civilian tradition in Scotland. I take nothing away from his erudite explanation of the background to all this, but the point that hon. Members seek to make is that, as is the case with the Human Rights Act, having the charter of fundamental rights as part of our law gives ordinary citizens and businesses the opportunity to go to court to enforce those rights, which this Bill will take away from them.

[Mr Cox]

No such charter existed with binding legal force before 2009, even in the European Union, but let us look at the circumstances. I contend that there are two ways of proceeding, of which the first is to have a broad and general statement of human rights—indeed, extended human rights under the charter—and to allow the courts simply to interpret them in given circumstances.

Some Government Members and—I think—some Opposition Members believe that the proper place to resolve moral dilemmas is not necessarily in a court. As someone once said, why should a majority of five or nine judges take precedence over a majority of the 650 Members of this House on questions of moral dilemma? Many of these—

[Joanna Cherry]

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Cox]

No, I am not going to give way again. This will become a debate between lawyers, and that is not the point.

[Joanna Cherry]

It is actually on a moral point.

[Mr Cox]

No, no. [Interruption.]

[The Temporary Chair (David Hanson)]

Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman is not giving way.

[Mr Cox]

The point is that these broad and general rights are ripe with value judgments. Quite often, they are not appropriately dealt with by six or seven elderly white judges in a Supreme Court; they are better resolved on the Floor of this House and by a democratic vote in this Parliament.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Cox]

If my hon. Friend will forgive me for a moment, I need to develop an argument, because I want to move on.

Let us accept for the moment that there is a second and perfectly legitimate way, which international law accepts. International law does not require subscribing nations of the United Nations to adopt a Bill of Rights, and neither does the European Court of Human Rights—it never did require us to do so. It looked at the substantive and practical effect and how those rights were substantively protected in the jurisdiction. If we accept that for a moment, why should we not proceed by means of the Government’s proposed policy of examining specific statutory remedies and specific rules of common law, and considering whether the right is satisfactorily protected?

Some of us believe that the courts are not always the right place in which to deal with these matters. For example, article 20 of the charter of fundamental rights simply contains a right to equality before the law. That right has been enshrined in the common law in this country for centuries. Why should we have it in the charter of fundamental rights? Some say that there will be a problem between the two charters—

[Lady Hermon]

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Cox]

I will give way to the hon. Lady, but not now.

Some say that there will be a collision. I am not sure that I buy the argument that there will be too much of a conflict or collision between the charter and convention. Quite frankly, my experience in the courts is that when both are relied on, the judge usually ignores the charter. As I said to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), the judge asks, “What does it add?” One may hum and haw, and try to come up with something, and the judge thereafter says, “Well, let’s concentrate on the Human Rights Act and the convention, shall we?”

The truth of the matter is that I do not deny that a modest—I repeat, a modest—extension in the courts has been effected in very recent years by the charter. The case of Benkharbouche is an example of an applicant being able to set aside part of the immunity from suit that the State Immunity Act 1978 conferred on a foreign embassy. Article 6 of the convention did not apply to the employment context, but article 47 of the charter, which guaranteed an effective remedy and a fair hearing in circumstances covered by the scope of European Union law, allowed that lady to argue that part of the statute should be set aside, and it was set aside.

Similarly, in the Vidal-Hall data protection case, the restriction under section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998, which this House had imposed—it said that if people wanted to bring an action for damages under the Act, they had to show they had actually suffered damage—was set aside by the court on the basis that the data protection directive contemplated cases in which people suffered not merely damage, but distress. However, whether somebody should be able to sue the state or anybody else for damages because they have suffered distress or has to prove that they have suffered pecuniary distress is a matter for this House.

That is what I mean when I say that these matters are resolvable in numerous ways. Many Members on both sides of the House would disagree on the question of whether it was a legitimate public policy judgment that we should restrict an action for the breach of the Data Protection Acts to cases where actual damage was suffered or whether distress was enough. Why should it be resolved by a court? Why should it not be resolved by the House? That is part of the reason why Members on both sides of the House voted to leave the European Union in the first place. We believed that those kinds of decisions needed to be taken here, not by courts and not by the imposition of a law in which we did not have a majority say in this kind of question.

I want to develop what I hope is a coherent argument. I was addressing the question of whether or not there was a conflict between the human rights order—a disharmony imposed by the convention—and that which might be imposed by the incorporation of the charter. There could be real problems ahead. There will be cases in the broad and expansive definitions of European Union law, under which the charter applies when it falls within the scope of EU law, when a moral dilemma confronts a court that is asked to disapply an Act of Parliament. The supremacy principle is retained, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) observed, by the Act. In cases in which it is covered by the charter, and in which such a dilemma has arisen, the Act is set aside because of Benkharbouche and Vidal-Hall. If the charter is incorporated, its vague and general statement of rights will have binding force, so the Act will be set aside.

If I bring a case under the convention and I say that the Act should be set aside because I have suffered inhuman and degrading punishment, or some of the worst violations of human rights that could be conceived by a state, I cannot have the Act of Parliament set aside, which introduces an element of absurdity in our law. Apparently one can torture someone and not have the Act of Parliament set aside, but I cannot have my workplace rights infringed: in that case, I can have the whole caboose set aside—a whole Act of Parliament and statutory apparatus. It makes no sense, and it will bring our law into disrepute if we tolerate for long a situation in which a court faces a moral dilemma when a case is brought under a general statement of human rights. In some cases that are litigated, the court can set aside Acts of Parliament, but in other cases, it cannot do so, even when it involves the most serious violations of human rights imaginable.

Everyone accepts that the Bill legislates for an unsatisfactory situation—we can all agree on that. I tell my friends on the Conservative Benches with whom I have far more in common than that which divides us, even though we may have been on different sides of the debate on the question of belonging to the European Union, we can all agree on some fundamental things. It cannot be right to go on for long with a body of law in our overall legal order that permits and allows higher, special and better rights in certain circumstances. Incorporating the charter will exacerbate that problem. The protection of the rights that Opposition Members have rightly identified as worthy of protection can be accomplished by a different means. The right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms), who is not in his place, spoke so well on data protection. It is absolutely right that we need to make certain that our data protection laws are no less important that those we find on the continent, but we do not need to do that by incorporating a general statement of a right and leaving it to the courts to enforce.

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[Anna Soubry]

I thank my hon. and learned Friend for giving way. He makes a very passionate and highly informed speech, which explains so much about the basis of law and the merits of the common-law system. Surely the point he did not address, however, is this: the Bill enshrines EU law into domestic British law. Therefore it does not make sense not to incorporate the charter. That is the contradiction that concerns many.

[Mr Cox]

It does make sense, because all that does is restore us to a position pre 2009 in the European Union. The general principles will still apply. There is no inconsistency by allowing the general principles—subject to amendments, which I am not speaking on; I have some sympathy with the amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield —but I am convinced that incorporating the charter would be wrong and unwise. As a matter of policy, I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends and Opposition Members not to vote for that.

[Brendan O'Hara (Argyll and Bute) (SNP)]

I rise to participate in this debate as something of a rarity: a non-lawyer. I will try to keep my comments within the allotted time of between 10 and 12 minutes.

I wish to follow the compelling and intelligent case made by the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms), and I am delighted to speak in support of his amendment 151, which highlights, in particular, the consequences facing millions of British citizens and thousands of companies if the UK’s data protection legislation cannot be reconciled with EU law post Brexit. If clause 5 is passed unamended, and should the UK crash out of the EU on 29 March 2019 without a deal, I fear that the UK will find itself non-compliant with EU law and the charter of fundamental rights, and that therefore the framework that affords us the unencumbered free flow of data—not just within the EU, but with the safe nations with which the EU has reciprocal deals, including the United States—will immediately be under threat.

The consequences for the businesses and individuals who rely every day on that free flow of data across international boundaries—a free flow that needs to occur safely and without delay, cost or detriment—are unthinkable. As the Software Alliance said in its recent report,

“The benefits of cross-border data transfers are vital, not only for the technology sector but also for financial services, manufacturing, retail, healthcare, energy and most other sectors”.

The Data Protection Bill impact assessment, published last month, recognised the huge economic importance of the UK being able to guarantee effective unrestricted data flow and predicted that being at the forefront of data innovation could benefit the UK economy by up to £240 billion by 2020. Despite the warnings of businesses and their own impact assessment, however, the Government, in implementing clauses 5 and 6, seem determined to make the UK some kind of digital island, cut off from the rest of the global digital economy.

One would have thought, at a time of so many data breaches and cyber-attacks, that ongoing data co-operation with our European partners and others was not just desirable but essential post-Brexit. If creating a digital island is not the Government’s aim, I strongly suggest they make securing a workable compliant data protection deal with the EU one of their main priorities. It is not enough for them simply to assume that we will attain the status of adequacy by default—because we will have implemented general data protection regulations—or that, come what may, the minute we leave the EU our data protection laws will automatically be harmonised with the EU’s. That is simply not the case.

As we heard from the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), the right hon. Member for East Ham and others, the European Court of Justice has already ruled, in both the Watson and Tele2 cases, that the implementing of a GDPR simply is not enough automatically to secure an adequacy by default agreement from the EU. The only avenue I can see for the Government, therefore, if they wish to achieve adequacy by default status, which they claim to desire, is to secure a deal with the EU that complies with European law before we leave. To do that, we would require a transitional period, during which we could negotiate a deal while remaining inside the single market and customs union and under the jurisdiction of the ECJ. That is one way for the Government to find time to negotiate the adequacy by default status. Of course, the other, and much more straightforward, option would be for the Government to commit to the UK remaining inside the single market and customs union and under the jurisdiction of the ECJ, given that no one in the UK ever voted to leave the single market or the customs union.

To be clear, the consequences of the UK crashing out of the EU without a deal would be catastrophic, particularly for businesses in the telecommunications and financial sectors, which are heavily reliant—almost entirely dependent—on the unrestricted free flow of data. The right hon. Member for East Ham detailed the importance of data to the UK economy. In the decade to 2015, the amount of cross-border data flow increased twenty-eightfold in the UK, and currently digital and data-intensive sectors of the economy account for 16% of UK output and 24% of our total exports. But as the clock ticks down to Brexit, I know that businesses that rely on the free flow of data are becoming increasingly concerned. They need to know now what is happening: they cannot plan for the future simply on the basis of a vague Government promise that somehow it will be all right on the night. I fear that, if they do not have guarantees about exactly what is happening well ahead of Brexit, they will vote with their feet and leave, like the European Medicines Agency, which announced last night that it was moving 900 high-tech, high-value jobs from London to Amsterdam.

Businesses cannot afford the risk of finding themselves outside the EU data protection area, and they cannot and will not wait until the last minute to find out what is happening. That is not commercially viable. Contracts would have to be rewritten and bills renegotiated, and things like that do not happen overnight. I fear that, if there is no agreement on an issue as fundamental as data protection, many large, high-net-worth companies which provide high-value jobs will begin to seek the stability that they need outside the United Kingdom.

As I said earlier, I seriously question whether maintaining a frictionless cross-border data flow is attracting enough of the Government’s attention during their Brexit negotiations. My alarm bells began ringing a number of weeks ago, when the Minister for Digital told the House that the Government were seeking “something akin” to an adequacy agreement. I had absolutely no idea what he meant then, and I am no closer to understanding now. “Something akin” to an adequacy agreement simply does not exist. An adequacy agreement is a formal legal position. It cannot be bent, moulded, or used as a quick fix to get a country, or a Minister, out of a sticky situation. The leading data protection lawyer Rosemary Jay said of adequacy agreements that the EU

“has to go through a legislative process. It is not simply within its gift to do it in some informal way”.

EU law is very clear: an adequacy decision can only be given to a “third country”— a country that is outside the EU and the European economic area—to allow it to operate securely and freely within the framework of the general data protection regulation, and an adequacy decision can only be given to a third country that meets the European Union’s high standard of data protection and whose domestic legislation is deemed compatible with the European Union’s charter of fundamental rights. The most obvious difficulty is that an adequacy decision is designed for third countries. The UK is not—yet—a third country, and it will not be a third country until the very end of the Brexit process.

There is a whole lot more to be considered. I cannot see how, without negotiating and securing a deal before leaving the EU, the UK can qualify for any sort of adequacy agreement, whether by default or otherwise. Even if the Prime Minister does secure a transitional period and is given time to sort out the UK’s adequacy problems, there is still no guarantee that adequacy by default will be achieved, because before granting an adequacy decision to a third country, the European Commission is obliged to consider a variety of issues such as the rule of law, respect for human rights and legislation on national security, public security and criminal law. That means that any deal that we reach with the EU will have to require at least a complete reworking—and, at best, a complete ditching—of the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act. In its present form, the Act leaves UK law incompatible with the charter of fundamental rights, which, as we have often heard, includes a chapter on the fundamental right to data protection.

On that basis alone, I am almost certain that the Act, which has already been accused of violating EU fundamental rights, will seriously call into question the UK’s ability to receive a positive adequacy decision. Eduardo Ustaran, a respected and internationally recognised expert on data protection, has said:

“What the UK needs to do is convince the Commission—and perhaps one day the European Court of Justice—that the Investigatory Powers Act is compatible with fundamental rights. That’s a tall order”.

The Government are understandably desperate to secure an adequacy decision by default or otherwise, but the harsh reality is that, at the very least, a lengthy and challenging legal process will almost certainly have to be undertaken before that can happen. That is why it is essential that the Government first secure the transitional period to keep the UK within the single market, the customs union and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. We have to redraft the Investigatory Powers Act to make it comply with the charter of fundamental rights—if that is even possible, given the current form of the Act. Should that not happen, we will crash out of the European Union without a data protection deal, with all the devastating consequences that that would have for individuals and businesses.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

As the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) has mentioned, the Government will, on 5 December, publish their full analysis of the sources of the rights that we have been talking about. I remind my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the underlying principles of EU law from which the charter has been developed will be part of the body of law that we bring down to the UK, and will be able to be relied upon.

[Mr Cox]

Is not the answer to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the rights might not be replicated in our existing law but the protections will be? The fact that a general statement of a right is not replicated verbatim in our law does not mean that those rights are not otherwise protected adequately and fully by our laws.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, but I feel as though I am about to become a proxy in a debate between him and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, so I will now develop my point.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 6th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Ian Paisley]

I only go so far with that point, because it is wrong in this sense: every issue that comes before this House—whether a minor constituency petition or a major European withdrawal Bill—is important to the people we speak for, and we must give it the full weight and dignity that it therefore deserves.

I was delighted that tonight the Minister from the Dispatch Box nailed the fallacy that new clause 70 would bring about—the fallacy that that new clause is the only way that Her Majesty’s Government can show their commitment to the Good Friday agreement. That is common unnecessary grievance; this matter does not need to be brought before the Committee, as the Minister explained well. In fact, I would venture to suggest that the lives of soldiers and police officers, and the money from taxpayers from across the whole of the United Kingdom, as well as an international treaty, have in many ways demonstrated the Government’s commitment to the Good Friday agreement—the Belfast agreement—and the follow-on agreements. It is wrong to support this grievance culture that we are so good at in Northern Ireland. The Government are clear that they do support the Good Friday agreement, and it would be wrong to add it to this Bill. It diminishes an international treaty to say it has to be reinforced again in a Bill to which it is not relevant.

The Belfast agreement makes scant comment and reference in all of its 35 pages to the EU and its activities. It makes several references to the European convention on human rights, which is outwith the EU, and it is right to do so, and it makes one reference to the process of d’Hondt—a European mathematical mechanism for electing people in a particular way and sharing out political office—in its 35 pages, but there is no reference whatsoever to key elements of the EU.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a logical and thoughtful case. Does he not agree that all the substantive protections that were intended after 1998 to protect the Belfast agreement in Northern Ireland’s domestic law were introduced either in the Northern Ireland Act, or in specific statutes that still apply or will apply in retained law as a consequence of this legislation, and that all the substantive protections will therefore still exist? The declaratory or mandatory provision that would be introduced by new clause 70 would simply cut across those protections and introduce significant legal uncertainty.

[Ian Paisley]

The hon. and learned Gentleman has nailed it extremely well. By agreeing to this proposal, we would be diminishing the principles that many colleagues say they are signed up to and support, because we would be limiting the provisions to a few words on the front of this Bill. That would be unnecessary and the wrong way to treat an international treaty signed by Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of the Republic of Ireland.

No case has been made that demonstrates that the Belfast agreement will be directly impacted by this withdrawal Bill. People have talked about its impact tangentially, but no specific case for a direct impact has been made. That is because, as I have said, the claim that the agreement is in some way under threat from the Bill is a made-up grievance by the Irish. It is not under threat. It is irrelevant to the Bill. To entertain that claim plays into the domestic politics of the Republic of Ireland, and it is not our place to do that in this House. We should stay well away from that.

I do not often quote David Trimble—Lord Trimble, as he now is—but I am going to make an exception tonight, given that he was one of the authors, principal negotiators and signatories to the agreement. His words are extremely helpful. He has said:

“It is not true that Brexit in any way threatens the peace process. There is nothing in the Good Friday Agreement which even touches on the normal conduct of business between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Leaving the European Union does not affect the agreement because the EU had nothing to do with it—except that Michel Barnier turned up at the last moment for a photo opportunity. The European Union does have a peace and reconciliation programme for Northern Ireland but there is no provision for it in the EU budget. It is financed from loose change in the drawer of the European Commission.”

It is also the case that Her Majesty’s Government have committed to provisions for a reconciliation programme, which they will take forward post-Brexit. That will probably be a much more targeted and beneficial fund for many of the representatives of the third sector who are knocking on the doors of Northern Ireland Members of Parliament to demand that the money should be used a lot better. That helpful insight from David Trimble should be borne in mind by all Members on both sides of the House.

For those who say that they are so committed to the principles of the agreement, the Father of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), pointed out what he called the oxymoron of the border issue. The fact of the matter is that the Irish foolishly got the matter of the border into phase 1 of the agenda. I believe that they were wrong to do that. They should have made sure that they got it into phase 2 or phase 3, because the real issue that concerns them is trade. The Irish have overplayed their hand considerably. They need a trade deal more urgently than Northern Ireland does.

Let us look briefly at the cost to the Republic of Ireland of having no deal. That is something that is never done in this place. We are always looking at what the cost to us would be, but the cost to our partner would be significant. If the Republic of Ireland does not get a trade deal, its GDP will collapse by 4% almost overnight. That is the figure that has been produced in its own Dáil report. The Republic of Ireland’s largest trading partners are the United Kingdom—with which it will no longer have a free trade arrangement—the USA, Canada, India and Australia. Those trading partners are more important than the EU to the Republic of Ireland. In the area of fishing alone, 40% of the Republic’s fishing market is in our waters. If we close those waters to the Republic of Ireland, the Spanish and Portuguese boats and other boats from across the EU will be fishing in the Irish box rather than in our fishing waters. Ireland would soon find that its fishing trade had gone completely.

It is utter madness for the Republic of Ireland to make this a key issue, because a closed border would damage it more. It is not my party saying that it wants to build a border, and it is not the Unionists of Northern Ireland or Her Majesty’s Government. Who is going to build this border? Is it the Republic of Ireland? Is the EU going to instruct people to build it? We have indicated that there are other mechanisms by which we will control our border, and that is what we will do.

Finally, Mr Hoyle, much time has been taken discussing the regulatory consequences for Northern Ireland. Today at the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, industry representatives agreed that perhaps the tables should be turned on the Irish Government and they should follow UK regulations post-Brexit, rather than us following EU regulations. I suggest that maybe the Irish should be the ones who compromise. The hon. Member for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins) said that he supports regulatory alignment, but he seems to support it only if it applies to the whole UK, and not if it applies solely to Northern Ireland. I think that matter should also be nailed.

Finally, Mr Hoyle—[Interruption.] Those words often galvanise, Mr Hoyle. The utter confusion that the Labour party has shown on this matter is what confuses me most. The economic spokesman, John McDonnell, has said that we must leave the single market in order to respect the referendum result. The deputy leader, Tom Watson, has said that we should stay in the single market and the customs union permanently. Jonathan Ashworth and Jenny Chapman, the Front-Bench spokesman here tonight, have said that we have to leave the single market. [Interruption.] Diane Abbott has said that we should keep freedom of movement—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr McFadden]

I rise to support new clause 70, tabled by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon). Let me begin by paying tribute to her courage, and to her wonderful and moving speech at the start of this debate. The aim of the amendment is both simple and important: to place in the Bill the continuing importance of the Belfast or Good Friday agreement in the new post-Brexit context in which it will have to operate.

We have already seen the difficulties that contradictory red lines from the Government have caused; red lines on the single market, customs union and no border infrastructure have been jostling and competing with one another, producing the tensions we have seen this week. Fundamentally, this is a tension between two things. We can be part of a rule-based European-wide system, whatever language is used, be it “regulatory alignment”, “convergence” or some other form of words, in which case we keep the economic benefits from the UK and there is absolutely no need for a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Alternatively, we can make a decision to leave the system in its entirety, in which case we have different systems and regulations on either side, we have major consequences for our economy and we necessitate a border. We either have a border or we do not. It is not a negotiation—it is a decision. All the way through, this kind of decision will have to be confronted. If we get a deal and we get approval to move on to phase two of these negotiations in the coming days, this kind of decision will confront us more and more. Avoiding the decision and pretending it is not there or that we can simply pick and choose from what we like in both options is what produced the chaos and humiliation this week.

On the issue of the Good Friday agreement, the amendment seeks to ensure that any changes are only those arising directly as a consequence of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. It therefore places obligations on the Secretary of State and on Ministers in the devolved Assembly to act in line with the principles of the agreement. Those principles are hugely important. First and foremost was a rejection of violence and a commitment to exclusively peaceful means in the pursuit of political ends. Secondly, this was about consent. The agreement respects whatever choice the people of Northern Ireland make about their constitutional status and says

“it would be wrong to make any change in the status of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its people”.

That was hugely important, but the agreement is also a package. What it says about equality and the equal status of people from every community is very important.

[Mr Cox]

rose—

[Mr McFadden]

We are under some time pressure, so I would rather continue.

The agreement is also important in what it says about identity, and I wish to stress this point. It gets to the heart of the old problem that dogged Northern Ireland politics, which was the view that if one community gained, the other had necessarily lost. The tyranny of identity politics can be that it forces people to choose between multiple and overlapping identities—are they one thing or the other? When it comes to identity, the genius of the Good Friday agreement is that it does not force people to choose. Instead, it talks of

“the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both”.

Let us not forget the “or both", as it is very important. It gives everyone in Northern Ireland an equal status and a legitimate sense of belonging.

[Mr Cox]

rose—

[Mr McFadden]

I am going to continue. The point about identity is crucial, because we have to understand that the Good Friday agreement’s effects were not just economic or governmental, but profoundly psychological. By enshrining these principles, the agreement turned a page. The great danger is that Brexit is seen as going back, and we must not go back in any sense of the term. So if hon. Members want to know why the amendment is important and why it is necessary, I say to them that that is why it is necessary. It is because we must hold dear to these principles in a new political context, where, for the first time in history, one country is going to be outside the European Union and its neighbour is going to be inside it. We have never had that before.

When the agreement was signed, it was different: both countries were members of the European Union. Twenty years on, we must guard against any complacency that would see the agreement as a 20-year-old document that can simply be put aside. The agreement was the basis for a new normality, which has not only saved many, many lives—although it certainly has done—but led to a new normality in trade, in relations between the UK and Ireland, and in relationships within Northern Ireland and on both sides of the border. There is peace, but it must not be taken for granted, be treated harshly or be subject to complacency. Great care must be taken.

The Minister and Government Members have, essentially, put forward two arguments for not accepting the new clause: first, that it is technically flawed and, secondly, that it is declaratory and does not add anything. Both those things cannot be true. The truth is that if the Minister wanted to avoid a vote tonight, he should have accepted the new clause. That would have shown that he was willing to legislate for what he said at the Dispatch Box. The excuses he has given for not accepting it are out of the standard book of Ministers’ excuses for not accepting amendments. He said, “I agree with the sentiment, but it is technically flawed. I will give the hon. Member a meeting.” Ministers have been standing at that Dispatch Box saying that kind of thing for decades. The truth is that if he wants to avoid a vote, he has to go much further and guarantee that he will legislate to put in the Bill a commitment to the Good Friday agreement in the new post-Brexit context in which it will have to operate. By doing that, he would be making a statement confirming that we hold dear to the beliefs enshrined in the agreement.

I return to the question of identity. Those in Northern Ireland should be able to choose freely to be British or Irish or both. Brexit must not become a divisive wall that separates those identities. It must not mean losing those all-important words “or both”, and all the beneficial consequences that have come from them.

--- Later in debate ---

I am wholly in sympathy with what the hon. Lady has proposed and I strongly support the proposal of my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry)—sadly, she is not in her seat; she would probably like to hear of that support. I came into the Chamber in the middle of the Minister’s comments. He was being very emollient. He should sit down with the hon. Lady and just see whether, by Report, we could not work into the text some mention of the Belfast agreement that is not justiciable.

[Mr Cox]

My right hon. Friend might well reflect on the fact that section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 creates quite a complex but rather delicate mechanism for the enforcement of many of the Belfast agreement principles. It relies not on a court, but on the Equality Commission, and the Secretary of State is at the apex, the decision maker, and decides whether or not a public authority is obeying the principles of equality in the Belfast agreement. If this new clause is introduced into Northern Ireland’s law, it will unquestionably create a situation of complex uncertainty as to how it sits with the Northern Ireland Act.

[Mr Paterson]

I am grateful that my hon. and learned Friend, who knows considerably more about the law than me, concurs with my comments that this new clause could be justiciable. On those grounds, I will not be supporting the hon. Lady’s new clause, but I hope that she has a satisfactory meeting with the Minister.

I am more concerned about the promise in the Prime Minister’s article 50 letter—it was in the position paper published in the summer—about the border:

“We want to avoid a return to a hard border between our two countries, to be able to maintain the Common Travel Area between us, and to make sure that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU does not harm the Republic of Ireland.”

That is absolutely spot on. As I see it, the real risk to the Belfast agreement comes from some of the developments over the course of this week. As the customs paper said in the summer, the border issue is soluble with technical measures. If we look at the figures: of Northern Ireland’s sales, 66% stay in Northern Ireland and 21% go to Great Britain. Therefore, 87% are within the UK—the single market of the UK. Only 5% of Northern Ireland’s sales go south of the border to the Republic of Ireland. Going the other way, only 1.6% of the Republic of Ireland’s exports go north over the border. That is according to the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency.

I am concerned that the issue of the border is being blown up out of all proportion in relation to the size of the problem. There is a border today—a currency, tax and excise duty border. It is a tax point; it is not a customs inspection border. The Government’s position paper, published in the summer, includes proposals such as electronic invoicing, authorised economic operators, and derogation for small businesses in the border area. “Farming Today” this morning reported that the majority of Northern Ireland’s milk goes to dairies in the Republic. It is milk from the same farmer in the same tanker on the same road and with same destination every day. The situation is manageable with modern technology and good will on both sides.

I know some members of the Irish Government. I went there regularly as the shadow Secretary of State and very regularly as the real Secretary of State. When I was Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, I worked closely with Simon Coveney, who I am delighted is the Tánaiste. He is a thoroughly practical and effective politician, who got a grip on the common agricultural policy around the time that Ireland had the presidency of the Council of the European Union, and drove the reform through with real determination.

I really hope that, with good will, the issue of the border can be settled. A hard border is completely impractical. It cannot work. Nobody wants it on either side. The problem can be resolved. The issue that blew up earlier this week is that there can be no difference in regulation between one part of the United Kingdom and another. Any change in regulation has to pertain to every part, including Northern Ireland, to keep the integrity of the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Leslie]

I see the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) nodding his head, so he agrees. He is an honourable gentleman, because he does believe in parliamentary sovereignty. Many hon. Members agree that the new clause is not about whether we believe in the single market or the customs union; it simply states that when the withdrawal agreement comes to fruition there needs to be a specific vote on the money, because it will come from the taxes collected by the Exchequer—by the Government—and authorised by Parliament. There needs to be authority. I want to see hon. Members who advocated the whole process, on both sides, having to put their mouth where their money is and go through the Lobbies to state an opinion about the amount of money involved.

[Mr Cox]

Has the hon. Gentleman considered whether his new clause would achieve that, because it is phrased so that a draft of the instrument authorising a payment must be approved, but that would not require a specific sum? It could simply be a framework regulation allowing for such a payment to be made. Surely his new clause is not to the point.

[Mr Leslie]

The hon. and learned Gentleman, who considers these matters in great detail, will understand that this matter relates to clause 12, which details financial provisions. Clearly it would be impossible for the Government to bring forward such a motion that did not have the clarity that the House expects. In my generosity, I drafted the new clause so as to make it as broad and flexible as possible. Any information would be better than no information. I know that he is urging me to be firmer with the Government on the issue—a manuscript amendment is always possible, so I look forward to that. Let us give the Government a chance to accept the new clause, because it is perfectly reasonable.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

Indeed. To that extent, it will, as I understand it, have sufficient flexibility and will, I hope, also be able to command enough confidence. These are difficult issues, but, as I say, I am mindful of the fact that my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, having been asked to consider this, have gone and done it in a conciliatory and sensible spirit. For that reason—we were talking earlier about trust—this is one matter on which I have trust in the way that they have responded and that this will be sufficient for the work we have to do.

In the longer term, this issue will not go away, and I feel strongly that this House ought to be thinking about how it can assert itself again to take a better system of scrutiny than that which we have at the moment. Heaven knows, I have sat through enough of these Committees to know their deficiencies. It is also noteworthy that, although some jurisdictions have specialist committees linked to each of their select committees to consider legislation, we do not—something I have always found mystifying. I also served for four years on the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. It was a very interesting Committee, but, again, it did not really have the necessary bite to correct what were sometimes egregious howlers, of the kind that my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham pointed out.

I turn now to the other way this matter can be looked at: by trying to constrain the powers the Government are taking. Of course, the vast majority of the amendments I have tabled along with my right hon. and hon. Friends concern constraining those powers. For example, amendment 2, which has been mentioned, would use a process first introduced in 2006 in seeking to constrain the powers set out by applying the concept of reasonableness and proportionality. Another example is my amendment 1, which would leave out the words

“(but are not limited to)”,

and so limit the deficiencies to the list of powers and functions set out in clause 7(2).

The Government have here an enormous menu of options by which the powers in clause 7, and indeed elsewhere in the Bill, can be constrained. I do not want to repeat some of the things we have said in earlier sittings of this Committee. The question for me is: how will the Government respond? There is a legitimate argument from the Government, which I have heard and listened to, that they ought to go away and consider the variety of amendments—mine are not the only ones; a great range of amendments have been tabled from across the House, and each, in my judgment, is valid. The Government have to come up with a response on how they can constrain the powers set out. At the moment, my opinion is that these powers are far too stark, far too great and not necessary. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), to whom I also always listen very carefully on these matters, approaches this matter from a slightly different angle, so I was interested to hear him say that he thought the powers were excessive and unnecessary—I hope that I do not paraphrase him wrongly.

In those circumstances, the Government have to think again. I do not want to be particularly prescriptive, because it seems to me that there are a range of ways in which this could be done. I want to hear from Ministers this afternoon broadly how they will respond to the amendments and give some thought to coming back on Report with a constraint on the powers set out. There are probably two ways this can be done—indeed, we could do both. The first is to accept some of the amendments. On my amendment 1, for example, I continue to be bemused that, in view of the extensive nature of subsection (2)(a) to (g), it is in fact necessary to provide a further power. I think that there are excessive jitters within Departments. Somebody ought to have the courage to say, “Find me some examples that fall outside the scope,” and if they can, they should add those to the list and take out the unlimited nature of the powers at the top of the clause.

I accept, picking up something that was said earlier in Committee, that the word “deficiency” provides some constraint. I take the view that if an attempt were made to extend the use of the powers outside of correcting a deficiency, it could be challenged in court, but we do not want to end up with court challenges. I say to Ministers that that would be the worst possible place to end up in January 2019—the clock ticking and people claiming the Government have used excessive powers. That would contribute to chaos rather than certainty, so the issue needs to be addressed.

The second issue, which has been highlighted by some of the other Members who have spoken, is whether the Government can sensibly identify areas of particular concern to the House, such as children’s rights, environmental law or equality rights, that can be safely cordoned off—or, in the case of children’s rights, specifically inserted—to reassure the House that these powers will not be used for a purpose other than that which was intended. That seems to me to be the challenge.

For those reasons, I am going to listen very carefully. I want to avoid putting any of my numerous amendments to the vote, but that will depend first on the answer that I receive from the Dispatch Box this afternoon and secondly on whether the answer is sufficiently clear and shows a willingness by the Government overall—we have debated this on previous days—to go away and consider the matter properly, and then come back with a sensible proposal on Report. I should be happy to wait until then, because that is exactly what the process of legislation is about—waiting to see what the Government come up with—but I put them on notice that if what they come up with is inadequate, the debate on Report will allow us to re-table amendments, or table them in a slightly different form. If necessary, we will vote on them, and I will vote to ensure that the powers are not as they currently appear. That is the challenge to the Government, and I expect a response. Provided that I receive that response, I will sit on my numerous amendments this afternoon.

Let me say one more thing, about a matter that has not been much touched on. My new clause 82 deals with tertiary powers. This is a little bit technical, but I do not like tertiary powers. I do not like them one little bit. They are, of course, powers that ultimately do not come to this place at all. I want to find out this afternoon what tertiary powers are actually for, and I want the Government to give some examples to justify their appearance in the Bill. I confess that I found it slightly difficult to see why they had crept in. One or two people have suggested some possible reasons, but I should like to hear rather more this afternoon; otherwise, again, I put the Government on notice that I shall return to this matter on Report. I do not think that the world would come to an end if they were to disappear from the Bill, although my hon. Friend the Minister may persuade me otherwise. As a result of the Government’s approach, we have already made great progress on triage. I am grateful to them for that, because it is exactly how the Bill should be dealt with. However, I want to see some progress on constraining the powers and making them less extensive, because I think that they are unnecessarily broad.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

As ever, I am considering what my right hon. and learned Friend is saying with enormous care. Much of it has enormous force and makes a great deal of sense. However, if his objective in amendment 2, which inserts proportionality and reasonable tests, is to avoid resort to the courts, I should point out that the insertion of a clause of that kind is more likely to encourage resort to the courts than to deter it.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. and learned Friend is right. Of course it is true that, although such measures have a history of being introduced into legislation, amendment 2 raises the risk of legal challenge, because ultimately these issues can usually only be resolved in courts.

[Mr Cox]

More often.

[Mr Grieve]

Such measures may act as a constraint, but once Ministers have taken the plunge, there will not be much that we can do. That is precisely why there is a menu of options. I personally would prefer Ministers to do a proper exercise of asking themselves whether they really need individual powers in their current extensive form. That would be the easier course, and it would provide much greater certainty and avoid the lawyers, although it might do my hon. and learned Friend out of a brief fee or two, but lawyers on the whole ought not to benefit from defective legislation in so far as possible. I am grateful to the House for listening, and I look forward to hearing the response of my hon. Friend the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for that intervention.

[Mr Cox]

I wonder whether my hon. Friend might be attracted by this idea. At the moment, as drafted, the clause gives an inclusive, non-exhaustive list of examples, but I wonder whether the principle of ejusdem generis might not assist us if it were slightly redrafted. One could draft it so that any extensions beyond the inclusive list had to be of the same kind or species as those that were listed. That might give some comfort, if they have to be of a similar character to those enumerated in the Bill.

[Mr Baker]

I am extremely grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, and I would be happy to meet him, our legal team and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield to take their suggestions on board. I am keen to address this, and I know that the Secretary of State is keen to do so, but I am not in a position today to have tabled or accepted an amendment. I ask them to bear with me and have further meetings with us and our legal teams to try to find a way through.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook]

I do not think that is necessarily the case, for several reasons. First, there is no reason why a withdrawal agreement cannot be reached, perhaps even sooner than October 2018—

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

You told us it would take a long time.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I think it will take a long time. The Minister can confirm this, but I assume the Government would be pleased to conclude the withdrawal agreement before October 2018, if possible. However, there are several things that might happen, one of which is that the Government go back to the negotiating table and try to improve on the deal. I cannot see what is unreasonable about filling in the gaps or asking for revisions, were that the expressed will of the House.