European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Matthew Pennycook]

I do not think that is necessarily the case, for several reasons. First, there is no reason why a withdrawal agreement cannot be reached, perhaps even sooner than October 2018—

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

You told us it would take a long time.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I think it will take a long time. The Minister can confirm this, but I assume the Government would be pleased to conclude the withdrawal agreement before October 2018, if possible. However, there are several things that might happen, one of which is that the Government go back to the negotiating table and try to improve on the deal. I cannot see what is unreasonable about filling in the gaps or asking for revisions, were that the expressed will of the House.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Joanna Cherry]

Dr O’Brien did indeed make that point, and I think that anyone interested in the detail of why removing the charter from domestic law would take away rights would be well advised to read her evidence.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

The number of cases in which the charter is cited— 248 in England and Wales—does not mean that it has had the slightest practical effect on the outcome of judgments, as the hon. and learned Lady knows quite well.

[Joanna Cherry]

I do know that, because I have sat through cases—so, too, has the hon. and learned Gentleman, I suspect—in which case law has been cited and it is hard to see its relevance. However, Dr O’Brien made her point advisedly, having taken care to prepare for the Select Committee hearing, so it is not an isolated point—as the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) has indicated, there was quite a bit more to her evidence. She touched in some detail on data protection issues, but I will leave it to other Members to discuss those, because the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) had a very interesting exchange with her on these issues and will no doubt address them later, because he has tabled an amendment.

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[Mr Cox]

The most familiar rejoinder of a judge when one cites the charter in the High Court is, “What does it add?” The most familiar response of counsel is, “Nothing.” The most familiar course of the judge thereafter is to ignore it completely, in 95% to 99% of cases.

[Joanna Cherry]

The hon. and learned Gentleman is no doubt commenting on the English jurisdiction, and I cannot comment on that because I have not appeared here, except in the UK Supreme Court. But certainly in Scotland it is sometimes referred to, and sometimes it is relevant and sometimes it is not, but that applies to all references made in cases. However, to counter his point, there are hard examples of where the charter has made a huge difference. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield referred earlier to the Benkharbouche case, which concerned the rights of an employee in an embassy in London, and another against the embassy of the Republic of Sudan. The individual complained of unlawful discrimination and a breach of working time regulations, and she would have been denied remedy had it not been for the charter.

One may forget Dr O’Brien’s evidence about the number of references if one wants to, but look at the hard examples of where the charter has made a difference. We have also heard about the tobacco packaging legislation. There are many examples relating to data protection, perhaps the most celebrated one being the litigation of the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union.

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[Wera Hobhouse]

I thank the hon. Lady for making that valuable point. As someone who is not a legal expert, I believe this is about having a safeguard. We are keeping the law in the charter because it fills a gap that we would have otherwise. That is why we should retain the charter.

Let me give an example: the charter provides specific rights for children that are not replicated elsewhere in UK-wide human rights law. It requires that the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration in all actions relating to children; that children’s views may be expressed and shall be taken into consideration; and that children have a right to maintain a personal relationship with both their parents, unless this is contrary to their interests. The latter right was used in a case relating to two British children, whose father’s deportation was successfully challenged by focusing on the major negative impact on the children of loss of contact with a parent. Cases of this kind might become more common if Britain leaves the EU and EU nationals lose the automatic right to reside in the UK, with the consequent risk of family separation.

The charter also contains a prohibition on child labour which is not replicated elsewhere in UK human rights law. Another example of the charter providing greater protection is on disability rights. Disabled people would no longer be able to use the charter to support their right to independence, integration and participation in the community. This interpretive tool in the charter goes much further than the non-discrimination provisions in the Equality Act 2010. On healthcare, as we have heard, the charter was decisive in ensuring that bans on tobacco advertising were permitted. The list goes on, so why not retain the charter? Let me be a bit flippant here: I cannot help but wonder whether the Government are making this obvious omission from our statute books because some time ago the Prime Minister, when she was Home Secretary, had a ding-dong over the charter when she unsuccessfully tried to extradite Abu Qatada and this is a bit of late comeback.

To be serious again, what I worry about most in all the discussions about Brexit is that everything is being done in a big hurry because some eager Brexiteers would rather leave the EU tomorrow and not think about any consequences, even those that would mean real harm for this country. New clause 78, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), would specifically provide an overarching domestic guarantee of non-discrimination by the state. It would be a domestic replacement for the safety net for equality rights currently provided by EU law. The new clause would serve a distinctive and different purpose from the rights protected by the Equality Act 2010, and I urge the Minister to consider it again. It would provide a guarantee that our laws must be non-discriminatory in their purpose and effect, along with a mechanism to challenge them if they were. Currently, that cannot be done under the Equality Act.

Providing greater protection of our human rights has nothing to do with losing sovereignty but everything to do with doing the right thing by our own people. I am fed up with being branded undemocratic or unpatriotic for merely pointing out that the Government will be failing their own people if the Bill passes unamended.

[Mr Cox]

What exactly would the new clause add to the rights that already exist under article 14 of the European convention on human rights?

[Wera Hobhouse]

The new clause has been promoted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission. I take it that the commission has done careful research into how it would provide an extra guarantee that is not currently provided. The hon. and learned Gentleman should look at it carefully to understand how it is meant to work, but it is an overarching tool that, as I understand it, we currently do not have. As I said before, as a non- legal person, for me the most important thing is the safe- guarding of our equality laws and the need to match what has been done so far at European and international level.

Brexit is increasingly nothing to do with what leave politicians promised to the people. I fear it is becoming an ideologically driven process to turn this country into some sort of deregulated free-for-all, in which the progress we have made over the past four decades to protect individuals from exploitation and discrimination, in tandem with our European neighbours, is sacrificed on the altar of sovereignty. The British people did not vote to give away their fundamental rights and protections. If Parliament does not amend the Bill, let nobody claim that this is the will of the people.

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As I have said, the Bill, as it stands, does not protect those environmental principles, and environmental protection after exit day will not be as strong and rigorous as it was before exit day. I seek the Minister’s reassurance that he intends to make sure that that does not happen.

[Mr Cox]

Broadly speaking, there have been two means of protecting human rights in international law. The first, which is generally followed by civil and continental law systems, has been to adopt charters of general rights with very broad statements of those rights and then to turn over to the courts the interpretation, in specific circumstances, of how those rights should be applied. The second, which is generally followed by common-law traditions, has been to proceed not by general statements of rights, but by specific statutory remedies in defined circumstances and by case law that defines the facts and allows the remedy to be extended by analogy with the facts of the particular case.

With due respect to Opposition Members, it seems to me as though some of them have made a mistake in equating the need for the incorporation of the charter with the protection of fundamental rights in this country. Article 7 of the universal declaration of human rights provided in 1948 that all subscribing nations to the United Nations should respect the principle of equality. But it has never been suggested that the United Kingdom, because it did not incorporate that principle into a general statement of an equality right, was not compliant with its obligation in international law, under the declaration and subsequently the covenant, to respect equality.

That is because there are two ways in which one can protect human rights. One can either adopt a general statement of rights and leave the protection of it to the courts, or one can adopt specific remedies in given circumstances that cumulatively and substantively protect those rights. Nobody has suggested that because the Soviet Union incorporated a right to equality into its constitution, equality rights were better protected there than they were in this country, which did not. Therefore, the absence of a general statement of rights, such as that in the charter—I do not say that there is not a function for such statements, but let us begin with first principles—is not to be equated with the protection of human rights. We have to look at the substantive effect of the cumulative common-law and statutory protections in our law.

That is why my right hon. Friend the Member for Forest of Dean (Mr Harper) suggested that the Government’s approach should not be to incorporate this charter of wide, broad and, quite frankly, vague general statements of rights and allow courts to take those statements, which are often rich with value judgments, and apply them to the facts. That is why the approach of my right hon. and learned Friends on the Front Bench is right and, I suggest, consistent with the common-law tradition of this country.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am wondering which country the hon. and learned Gentleman is talking about, because the common-law tradition melds with the civilian tradition in Scotland. I take nothing away from his erudite explanation of the background to all this, but the point that hon. Members seek to make is that, as is the case with the Human Rights Act, having the charter of fundamental rights as part of our law gives ordinary citizens and businesses the opportunity to go to court to enforce those rights, which this Bill will take away from them.

[Mr Cox]

No such charter existed with binding legal force before 2009, even in the European Union, but let us look at the circumstances. I contend that there are two ways of proceeding, of which the first is to have a broad and general statement of human rights—indeed, extended human rights under the charter—and to allow the courts simply to interpret them in given circumstances.

Some Government Members and—I think—some Opposition Members believe that the proper place to resolve moral dilemmas is not necessarily in a court. As someone once said, why should a majority of five or nine judges take precedence over a majority of the 650 Members of this House on questions of moral dilemma? Many of these—

[Joanna Cherry]

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Cox]

No, I am not going to give way again. This will become a debate between lawyers, and that is not the point.

[Joanna Cherry]

It is actually on a moral point.

[Mr Cox]

No, no. [Interruption.]

[The Temporary Chair (David Hanson)]

Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman is not giving way.

[Mr Cox]

The point is that these broad and general rights are ripe with value judgments. Quite often, they are not appropriately dealt with by six or seven elderly white judges in a Supreme Court; they are better resolved on the Floor of this House and by a democratic vote in this Parliament.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Cox]

If my hon. Friend will forgive me for a moment, I need to develop an argument, because I want to move on.

Let us accept for the moment that there is a second and perfectly legitimate way, which international law accepts. International law does not require subscribing nations of the United Nations to adopt a Bill of Rights, and neither does the European Court of Human Rights—it never did require us to do so. It looked at the substantive and practical effect and how those rights were substantively protected in the jurisdiction. If we accept that for a moment, why should we not proceed by means of the Government’s proposed policy of examining specific statutory remedies and specific rules of common law, and considering whether the right is satisfactorily protected?

Some of us believe that the courts are not always the right place in which to deal with these matters. For example, article 20 of the charter of fundamental rights simply contains a right to equality before the law. That right has been enshrined in the common law in this country for centuries. Why should we have it in the charter of fundamental rights? Some say that there will be a problem between the two charters—

[Lady Hermon]

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Cox]

I will give way to the hon. Lady, but not now.

Some say that there will be a collision. I am not sure that I buy the argument that there will be too much of a conflict or collision between the charter and convention. Quite frankly, my experience in the courts is that when both are relied on, the judge usually ignores the charter. As I said to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), the judge asks, “What does it add?” One may hum and haw, and try to come up with something, and the judge thereafter says, “Well, let’s concentrate on the Human Rights Act and the convention, shall we?”

The truth of the matter is that I do not deny that a modest—I repeat, a modest—extension in the courts has been effected in very recent years by the charter. The case of Benkharbouche is an example of an applicant being able to set aside part of the immunity from suit that the State Immunity Act 1978 conferred on a foreign embassy. Article 6 of the convention did not apply to the employment context, but article 47 of the charter, which guaranteed an effective remedy and a fair hearing in circumstances covered by the scope of European Union law, allowed that lady to argue that part of the statute should be set aside, and it was set aside.

Similarly, in the Vidal-Hall data protection case, the restriction under section 13 of the Data Protection Act 1998, which this House had imposed—it said that if people wanted to bring an action for damages under the Act, they had to show they had actually suffered damage—was set aside by the court on the basis that the data protection directive contemplated cases in which people suffered not merely damage, but distress. However, whether somebody should be able to sue the state or anybody else for damages because they have suffered distress or has to prove that they have suffered pecuniary distress is a matter for this House.

That is what I mean when I say that these matters are resolvable in numerous ways. Many Members on both sides of the House would disagree on the question of whether it was a legitimate public policy judgment that we should restrict an action for the breach of the Data Protection Acts to cases where actual damage was suffered or whether distress was enough. Why should it be resolved by a court? Why should it not be resolved by the House? That is part of the reason why Members on both sides of the House voted to leave the European Union in the first place. We believed that those kinds of decisions needed to be taken here, not by courts and not by the imposition of a law in which we did not have a majority say in this kind of question.

I want to develop what I hope is a coherent argument. I was addressing the question of whether or not there was a conflict between the human rights order—a disharmony imposed by the convention—and that which might be imposed by the incorporation of the charter. There could be real problems ahead. There will be cases in the broad and expansive definitions of European Union law, under which the charter applies when it falls within the scope of EU law, when a moral dilemma confronts a court that is asked to disapply an Act of Parliament. The supremacy principle is retained, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) observed, by the Act. In cases in which it is covered by the charter, and in which such a dilemma has arisen, the Act is set aside because of Benkharbouche and Vidal-Hall. If the charter is incorporated, its vague and general statement of rights will have binding force, so the Act will be set aside.

If I bring a case under the convention and I say that the Act should be set aside because I have suffered inhuman and degrading punishment, or some of the worst violations of human rights that could be conceived by a state, I cannot have the Act of Parliament set aside, which introduces an element of absurdity in our law. Apparently one can torture someone and not have the Act of Parliament set aside, but I cannot have my workplace rights infringed: in that case, I can have the whole caboose set aside—a whole Act of Parliament and statutory apparatus. It makes no sense, and it will bring our law into disrepute if we tolerate for long a situation in which a court faces a moral dilemma when a case is brought under a general statement of human rights. In some cases that are litigated, the court can set aside Acts of Parliament, but in other cases, it cannot do so, even when it involves the most serious violations of human rights imaginable.

Everyone accepts that the Bill legislates for an unsatisfactory situation—we can all agree on that. I tell my friends on the Conservative Benches with whom I have far more in common than that which divides us, even though we may have been on different sides of the debate on the question of belonging to the European Union, we can all agree on some fundamental things. It cannot be right to go on for long with a body of law in our overall legal order that permits and allows higher, special and better rights in certain circumstances. Incorporating the charter will exacerbate that problem. The protection of the rights that Opposition Members have rightly identified as worthy of protection can be accomplished by a different means. The right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms), who is not in his place, spoke so well on data protection. It is absolutely right that we need to make certain that our data protection laws are no less important that those we find on the continent, but we do not need to do that by incorporating a general statement of a right and leaving it to the courts to enforce.

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[Anna Soubry]

I thank my hon. and learned Friend for giving way. He makes a very passionate and highly informed speech, which explains so much about the basis of law and the merits of the common-law system. Surely the point he did not address, however, is this: the Bill enshrines EU law into domestic British law. Therefore it does not make sense not to incorporate the charter. That is the contradiction that concerns many.

[Mr Cox]

It does make sense, because all that does is restore us to a position pre 2009 in the European Union. The general principles will still apply. There is no inconsistency by allowing the general principles—subject to amendments, which I am not speaking on; I have some sympathy with the amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield —but I am convinced that incorporating the charter would be wrong and unwise. As a matter of policy, I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends and Opposition Members not to vote for that.

[Brendan O'Hara (Argyll and Bute) (SNP)]

I rise to participate in this debate as something of a rarity: a non-lawyer. I will try to keep my comments within the allotted time of between 10 and 12 minutes.

I wish to follow the compelling and intelligent case made by the right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms), and I am delighted to speak in support of his amendment 151, which highlights, in particular, the consequences facing millions of British citizens and thousands of companies if the UK’s data protection legislation cannot be reconciled with EU law post Brexit. If clause 5 is passed unamended, and should the UK crash out of the EU on 29 March 2019 without a deal, I fear that the UK will find itself non-compliant with EU law and the charter of fundamental rights, and that therefore the framework that affords us the unencumbered free flow of data—not just within the EU, but with the safe nations with which the EU has reciprocal deals, including the United States—will immediately be under threat.

The consequences for the businesses and individuals who rely every day on that free flow of data across international boundaries—a free flow that needs to occur safely and without delay, cost or detriment—are unthinkable. As the Software Alliance said in its recent report,

“The benefits of cross-border data transfers are vital, not only for the technology sector but also for financial services, manufacturing, retail, healthcare, energy and most other sectors”.

The Data Protection Bill impact assessment, published last month, recognised the huge economic importance of the UK being able to guarantee effective unrestricted data flow and predicted that being at the forefront of data innovation could benefit the UK economy by up to £240 billion by 2020. Despite the warnings of businesses and their own impact assessment, however, the Government, in implementing clauses 5 and 6, seem determined to make the UK some kind of digital island, cut off from the rest of the global digital economy.

One would have thought, at a time of so many data breaches and cyber-attacks, that ongoing data co-operation with our European partners and others was not just desirable but essential post-Brexit. If creating a digital island is not the Government’s aim, I strongly suggest they make securing a workable compliant data protection deal with the EU one of their main priorities. It is not enough for them simply to assume that we will attain the status of adequacy by default—because we will have implemented general data protection regulations—or that, come what may, the minute we leave the EU our data protection laws will automatically be harmonised with the EU’s. That is simply not the case.

As we heard from the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), the right hon. Member for East Ham and others, the European Court of Justice has already ruled, in both the Watson and Tele2 cases, that the implementing of a GDPR simply is not enough automatically to secure an adequacy by default agreement from the EU. The only avenue I can see for the Government, therefore, if they wish to achieve adequacy by default status, which they claim to desire, is to secure a deal with the EU that complies with European law before we leave. To do that, we would require a transitional period, during which we could negotiate a deal while remaining inside the single market and customs union and under the jurisdiction of the ECJ. That is one way for the Government to find time to negotiate the adequacy by default status. Of course, the other, and much more straightforward, option would be for the Government to commit to the UK remaining inside the single market and customs union and under the jurisdiction of the ECJ, given that no one in the UK ever voted to leave the single market or the customs union.

To be clear, the consequences of the UK crashing out of the EU without a deal would be catastrophic, particularly for businesses in the telecommunications and financial sectors, which are heavily reliant—almost entirely dependent—on the unrestricted free flow of data. The right hon. Member for East Ham detailed the importance of data to the UK economy. In the decade to 2015, the amount of cross-border data flow increased twenty-eightfold in the UK, and currently digital and data-intensive sectors of the economy account for 16% of UK output and 24% of our total exports. But as the clock ticks down to Brexit, I know that businesses that rely on the free flow of data are becoming increasingly concerned. They need to know now what is happening: they cannot plan for the future simply on the basis of a vague Government promise that somehow it will be all right on the night. I fear that, if they do not have guarantees about exactly what is happening well ahead of Brexit, they will vote with their feet and leave, like the European Medicines Agency, which announced last night that it was moving 900 high-tech, high-value jobs from London to Amsterdam.

Businesses cannot afford the risk of finding themselves outside the EU data protection area, and they cannot and will not wait until the last minute to find out what is happening. That is not commercially viable. Contracts would have to be rewritten and bills renegotiated, and things like that do not happen overnight. I fear that, if there is no agreement on an issue as fundamental as data protection, many large, high-net-worth companies which provide high-value jobs will begin to seek the stability that they need outside the United Kingdom.

As I said earlier, I seriously question whether maintaining a frictionless cross-border data flow is attracting enough of the Government’s attention during their Brexit negotiations. My alarm bells began ringing a number of weeks ago, when the Minister for Digital told the House that the Government were seeking “something akin” to an adequacy agreement. I had absolutely no idea what he meant then, and I am no closer to understanding now. “Something akin” to an adequacy agreement simply does not exist. An adequacy agreement is a formal legal position. It cannot be bent, moulded, or used as a quick fix to get a country, or a Minister, out of a sticky situation. The leading data protection lawyer Rosemary Jay said of adequacy agreements that the EU

“has to go through a legislative process. It is not simply within its gift to do it in some informal way”.

EU law is very clear: an adequacy decision can only be given to a “third country”— a country that is outside the EU and the European economic area—to allow it to operate securely and freely within the framework of the general data protection regulation, and an adequacy decision can only be given to a third country that meets the European Union’s high standard of data protection and whose domestic legislation is deemed compatible with the European Union’s charter of fundamental rights. The most obvious difficulty is that an adequacy decision is designed for third countries. The UK is not—yet—a third country, and it will not be a third country until the very end of the Brexit process.

There is a whole lot more to be considered. I cannot see how, without negotiating and securing a deal before leaving the EU, the UK can qualify for any sort of adequacy agreement, whether by default or otherwise. Even if the Prime Minister does secure a transitional period and is given time to sort out the UK’s adequacy problems, there is still no guarantee that adequacy by default will be achieved, because before granting an adequacy decision to a third country, the European Commission is obliged to consider a variety of issues such as the rule of law, respect for human rights and legislation on national security, public security and criminal law. That means that any deal that we reach with the EU will have to require at least a complete reworking—and, at best, a complete ditching—of the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act. In its present form, the Act leaves UK law incompatible with the charter of fundamental rights, which, as we have often heard, includes a chapter on the fundamental right to data protection.

On that basis alone, I am almost certain that the Act, which has already been accused of violating EU fundamental rights, will seriously call into question the UK’s ability to receive a positive adequacy decision. Eduardo Ustaran, a respected and internationally recognised expert on data protection, has said:

“What the UK needs to do is convince the Commission—and perhaps one day the European Court of Justice—that the Investigatory Powers Act is compatible with fundamental rights. That’s a tall order”.

The Government are understandably desperate to secure an adequacy decision by default or otherwise, but the harsh reality is that, at the very least, a lengthy and challenging legal process will almost certainly have to be undertaken before that can happen. That is why it is essential that the Government first secure the transitional period to keep the UK within the single market, the customs union and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. We have to redraft the Investigatory Powers Act to make it comply with the charter of fundamental rights—if that is even possible, given the current form of the Act. Should that not happen, we will crash out of the European Union without a data protection deal, with all the devastating consequences that that would have for individuals and businesses.

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[The Solicitor General]

As the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) has mentioned, the Government will, on 5 December, publish their full analysis of the sources of the rights that we have been talking about. I remind my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the underlying principles of EU law from which the charter has been developed will be part of the body of law that we bring down to the UK, and will be able to be relied upon.

[Mr Cox]

Is not the answer to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the rights might not be replicated in our existing law but the protections will be? The fact that a general statement of a right is not replicated verbatim in our law does not mean that those rights are not otherwise protected adequately and fully by our laws.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, but I feel as though I am about to become a proxy in a debate between him and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, so I will now develop my point.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jenkin]

Unfortunately, even the European Parliament cannot change the exit date. It would have to be agreed by all the other member states. To predicate our negotiating position on our ability to persuade the 27 member states—and the Commission and the negotiating team in Brussels—to extend the date would be completely wrong.

Any Members who intend to vote against this date must be really confident that they can change a date that has already been set by the European Union treaties. The whole point about the deal/no deal scenario is that—as I have already said to the right hon. Member for Knowsley—either we accept the deal, and the House votes on it, or there is no deal. That is the choice that is available to the House. The House cannot veto Brexit—[Interruption.] I wish to conclude my speech.

Any Members who voted for the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill are obliged to support the amendment, because that is the date for which they implicitly voted when they voted for the Bill, and for a two-year period. Any Members who voted for article 50 but now do not wish to fix the date are open to the charge that they do not actually want us to leave the European Union—[Interruption.] Let me say this to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. He has suggested that if we do not have a deal we will be jumping into “a void”, and that fixing the date will constrain our negotiations and disenfranchise Parliament. I respect the sincerity of my right hon. and learned Friend’s passion, but he calls the cut-off date barmy when he voted for that date by voting for the article 50 Bill. This amendment rumbles those who have not really accepted that we are leaving the EU.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

My hon. Friend knows that I share his fundamental beliefs about the need for us to leave the European Union, but is there not merit in the suggestion of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) that we need not have a fixed date? After all, our own negotiators might wish to have an extension; this is curtailing the flexibility and room for manoeuvre of our own negotiators. My right hon. and learned Friend has proposed an ingenious and commendable solution: that we write into the Bill the date, but we create exceptions for circumstances in which the negotiators might need it. I urge my hon. Friend, and all my hon. Friends who share my view on the EU, to reflect carefully on the suggestion made by my right hon. and learned Friend; it is a commendable one and it requires careful reflection.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am still seized of the truth that if we beg the EU to extend the time because it has run us up against the timetable—after all, it is the EU that is refusing to negotiate on the substantive issues at the moment, not us—that is the position and responsibility it must face. We should be clear and strong that if the EU does not reach an agreement with us by a certain date, we are leaving without a deal. That would put us in a stronger negotiating position than ever.

Policing and Crime Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Antoinette Sandbach]

I rise to add my support to new clauses 7, 8 and 9. In particular, it is important that people who are not seen as a risk when holding firearms—I declare that I hold a shotgun certificate—do not suddenly become a risk overnight because their certificate has expired. New clause 7, and particularly subsection (5), is a sensible amendment to firearms legislation.

If an application to renew a certificate has been received by the local firearms team but it has been unable to deal with it in time, it seems wrong that members of the public who have exercised their responsibilities appropriately and within the terms of their licence should be criminalised overnight by the failure of the police force to deal with that application in time. I urge the Minister to take that into account. New clause 7 would make matters administratively simpler for the police, and avoid unnecessarily criminalising people who have otherwise done nothing wrong.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that in that situation, one way forward that the shotgun licence holder is given is to apply for a temporary permit? Yet that application is made to the same firearms department, which is already overburdened with work, and it requires the same amount of work as issuing a permanent permit. We need some mechanism such as that proposed in the new clause.

[Antoinette Sandbach]

I totally agree. The new clause would remove that unnecessary duplication of effort and allow the police to concentrate on getting through a backlog of licence renewals, or processing them quickly and effectively.

Let me highlight some of the anomalies behind new clause 9. As a landowner I could lend somebody a gun that is lawfully in my possession and that I am authorised to hold. Many children are taught to walk around with unloaded guns for many years, so that they learn how to use shotguns safely. Those guns are never loaded, but children are taught how to carry one, how to keep other people safe, and how to cross fences. That is a valuable part of training, and it makes a nonsense of the current unclear legislation on the term “occupier”—my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) spoke about how different police forces interpret that term, which indicates that there is something of a postcode lottery regarding where someone lives and how the law is applied.

The new clause brings much needed clarity to the process, and I urge the Minister to consider taking the matter further. If he cannot accept the new clause today, perhaps he will commit to it being considered in the other place. It is clear that these new clauses do not involve further risk—or indeed any risk—to the public.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) mentioned the police funding formula. In many areas, rural policing is like rural schooling and delivery of services. The policing formula does not support delivery of policing in rural areas—indeed, it tends to favour metropolitan areas. I have many examples of that. I know from previous experience that North Wales police were underfunded by £25 a head. It would be quite wrong, therefore, to give the impression that the leafy shires are better funded than metropolitan areas; that simply is not the case. The difference, particularly in Dyfed–Powys or indeed Cheshire, has been the way the PCC has allocated resources to frontline policing.

Human Rights Act

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Tuesday 30th June 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

If it is so impossible to have a British Bill of Rights alongside adherence to the convention, why is it the case that Germany, France and almost every other European country have their own constitutions with enshrined charters of rights that sit quite comfortably alongside adherence to the convention?

[Andy Slaughter]

That question is for the Minister to answer, because we have seen literally nothing from the Government to explain any compatibility. As for the question about “taking into account” raised by the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) and how we square the circle between the judgments of the Strasbourg Court, our own higher courts and the sovereignty of Parliament—none of that is in issue any more. The question really, if I may put it back to the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox), is this: what is wrong with the existing system that allows the law to evolve and the judiciary in this country to influence judgments of the European Court, often in an entirely beneficial way because of the quality of such judgments? Why are we seeking to retreat from, rather than to advance the cause of international law? Why are we seeking not to have the benefit of international law? It seems to be a little England, or little UK approach, and when the hon. Gentleman reflects on it, he might find himself on the side of those who believe that little needs to change, instead of throwing out an honourable tradition of human rights drawn up over many centuries.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Chris Grayling]

I have set out a number of examples. On Second Reading I referred to cases where essential infrastructure projects have been delayed by judicial reviews that have been brought for reasons that we do not regard as acceptable. I have experienced in the Department attempts by third parties to delay necessary reforms through judicial reviews brought on technicalities. This is a reform that is needed. Comments made over the years by Ministers in the last Government also underlined that they themselves believed that reform was necessary.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for listening most carefully to some of the matters that were raised in this House and the other place in relation to the clause. I can see the way in which he is considering alleviating some of those problems, but is there any particular precedent for the phrase “exceptional public interest”? I cannot find it in any previous statute, nor am I familiar with it as an example in any other legislation. I am not quite certain what it means. I can understand that there might be exceptional circumstances, which might lead a judge to find that those in the public interest meant that the matter should be allowed leave to proceed, but the phrase “exceptional public interest” has caused me some difficulty. What is the model on which he has founded this approach?

[Chris Grayling]

My judgment was that a conventional level of judgment against public interest was not sufficient in this circumstance. We have discussed it extensively in the Department among my ministerial team and with our advisers. I have no qualms about setting a higher test. It will be a matter for the judges to decide how and when that test should apply. As my hon. and learned Friend would expect, rightly, the judges should have the discretion to do that. But I do not think it is unreasonable for this place to say that it wants a test that is a bar higher than the conventional public interest test and that this should be used only in exceptional circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

I am genuinely sorry that for ideological reasons rather than logical or financial ones the Lord Chancellor has marshalled his forces against the right of the citizen to challenge the state. It is a worrying trend that becomes more explicit the longer the Government remain in power. The Liberal Democrats do nothing to alleviate it. A Labour Government after May will restore judicial review to its rightful place in the constitution and as an effective weapon against bad governance. In the meantime, we will vote to retain their lordships’ position and we will vote against the Government’s nugatory amendments. I hope that their lordships will feel emboldened to renew their opposition when the Bill returns to their House.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

I will, I hope, be very brief. As the Secretary of State knows, it was in response to me that he made the mistake for which he has graciously and fully apologised to the House. I, for one, accept that it was entirely inadvertent.

However, I have two real points on the original clause 64 and amendment 102B in lieu. First, when my right hon. Friend wrote to me on 4 December 2014, he said in his concluding paragraph:

“I would like to make it clear that the clause as introduced strikes an appropriate balance, and where there is any real doubt that there could have been a substantial difference for the applicant, the court will be able to find that the threshold had not been met and can grant permission to proceed with judicial review.”

What that arouses in me is this reflection: the current rule developed by the courts is that where the outcome was “inevitable”, the court is enabled under the current authorities to decline a remedy. I ask my right hon. Friend, when he concludes this debate, to point out where there is a difference. If he is correct in saying that where there is any real doubt, the court will still be able to grant leave, how does that differ from the current situation? If the position is inevitable, the court will not grant a remedy now. Where there is any real doubt, it will grant a remedy. It is therefore difficult to see whether the common law test on whether the outcome is “inevitable”, despite the procedural defect, is affected very much by being changed from “inevitable” to “highly likely”. I am therefore puzzled about why we need this particular change.

I am relieved to have heard the tone of the speech of the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) from the Opposition Front Bench, because I am able much more easily to agree with him that there are substantial problems with the clause as drafted, specifically the one I have pointed out previously: it places judges in the invidious position of effectively having to take the decision themselves. They go from being reviewers of a decision to being decision makers. If we are asking somebody to say what would have happened had the facts not been as they are and how a decision is likely to have been taken, the judge is inevitably going to have to ask, “What would I have done, based on the evidence that is being put before me? What would a reasonable person have done?” That places the judge in the invidious position of being much closer to a decision maker.

The courts studiously avoid doing that. They adopt the position of being reviewers of a decision and they are enabled at the moment to decline a remedy when a matter is utterly obvious and inevitable because that does not put them in the position of having to second-guess the decision of the proper constitutional authority that has made the decision they are reviewing. When it is obvious and inevitable and when no reasonable person could come to any other conclusion but that the decision would have been the same, the courts are not in the position of having to speculate about how a reasonable person—how they, the judge—would have approached the problem in the same circumstances based on the evidence.

That is why I think the provisions represent a fundamental change constitutionally. It is one that Conservatives should lament, because instead of the courts allowing the proper body—the Executive—to take the decision, the Executive are inviting the court to place itself in the position of taking that decision. As a result of frustration with procedural defects that seem to the Executive not to be particularly meritorious and to hold up Executive decisions, they are saying to the judge, “Well, you take the decision. You can take the decision and you can say that it would have been the same anyway.” That is constitutionally wrong and it is something that the courts have avoided—in my submission, rightly. That is why I voted against the Government on the last occasion and why I am afraid that unless my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor can persuade me today I shall vote against the Government again. This is a point of principle and an important one and it is not affected by the Government’s amendment in lieu, which I otherwise welcome.

As for amendment (a) in lieu, I have never come across the expression “exceptional public interest” and I do not understand what it means. Every public interest is exceptional and the only public interest that is likely to be at stake is the public interest in fair and decent governance. Fair, consistent, rational administration is the public interest at stake in allowing somebody or an Executive authority simply to avoid the consequences of an unfair procedure. What other public interest would there be but that? It would simply be a case of someone saying, “I think this is so unfair that even though I think I probably would have decided it in the same way had the procedural defect not taken place, I still think leave should be granted.” That seems nonsense with which to confront a court, and my regretful submission —regretful, because I find it extremely difficult to diverge from the Government, particularly as I believe that my right hon. Friend ought to be commended for rethinking this and considering his new amendment—is that I would like him to consider whether it might not be better drafted. For example, I really do not understand why it could not have said something like, “There are exceptional circumstances that make it in the public interest for the application for permission to be granted.” I do not understand what is meant by “exceptional public interest”. Although I applaud the sentiment behind the amendment, I am not able to support it as drafted.

In the previous debate I adumbrated my concern about the proposal to put judges in the position of decision maker and to make applications for permission cumbersome and evidence-heavy. Public authorities will be induced to bombard the judge with all the reasons, even if they are wrong about the defect in procedure, that the decision would inevitably have been taken or, in this case, highly likely to have been taken. The judge will then have to embark on an inquiry at permission stage into whether or not it is highly likely that the decision would have been taken. That will induce evidence to be submitted by the other side, and so permission hearings will be unwieldy.

For all those reasons, I shall listen attentively to what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State says in concluding the debate, but I regret to say that it will take considerable persuading to induce me to vote with the Government on this occasion.

[Chris Grayling]

With the leave of the House, I shall say some brief words in response to the two contributions.

First, the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), argued that the reforms are wrong. I simply remind him that, time after time when Labour was in government, we heard Ministers arguing about the impact of judicial review on Government and the need for change. It is interesting that Labour takes a very different view now that it is in opposition.

What Labour is actually arguing for is anonymity for people who provide financial backing to a judicial review. That anonymity would apply not just to a small backer, but, for instance, to a tobacco company using a third party to judicially review the Government’s public health policy. I simply do not understand why Labour would oppose the idea of a court knowing who is funding a judicial review to a major degree. We will simply have to disagree on that.

It was interesting to hear the shadow Minister say that if, heaven help this country, Labour finds itself in government in May, it would restore judicial review to its current position. I did not hear him commit to introducing primary legislation to reverse our measure. I would wage the usual fiver that, in the unhappy event of the Labour party being in government again, it will not seek to reverse our reforms.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) and I are clearly not going to agree. The point about the amendment on procedural defects is that it ensures that a public authority cannot commit a major breach of procedure. It also ensures that a public body that commits a minor and unimportant breach of procedure cannot then face a substantial bill as a result of someone using that breach to bring a case when there is little likelihood of a different decision being taken. That simply ties up the costs and staff time of public bodies for weeks on end on a matter that is only really ever brought for campaigning or delaying purposes. I assure my hon. and learned Friend that the Government see regular examples of cases being threatened or brought on precisely that premise.

My hon. and learned Friend mentioned the stipulation of exceptional public interest. Put simply, there are many matters that are of general public interest and we are seeking to set the bar higher. It seems to me to be a simple proposition to say that a court must certify that a matter is of exceptional public interest—which might relate to a major, fundamental and worrying breach of procedure by a public body—rather than of general public interest. As a Government and, I hope, a Parliament, we are consciously setting the bar one notch higher. That is what the measure is designed to do.

I am afraid that I do not agree with my hon. and learned Friend’s point about judges being forced to make or evaluate a decision themselves. If a judge is able to decide whether a ministerial decision is irrational, quash a Government decision and send a major policy matter back to the drawing board, surely they can also decide that a matter is so minor that it would not have led to a different decision being taken. That is the purpose of the measure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Grayling]

The whole purpose of the reforms is to protect public bodies against cases brought on a technicality. One of my concerns that has not been addressed is about secondary legislation. I have severe doubts about whether secondary legislation should be subject to judicial review, but it is; Parliament itself can be judicially reviewed.

The reforms are not designed to undermine the core purpose of judicial review. They will ensure that we apply common sense to the process, and that decisions are taken by the courts only when appropriate. They will ensure that public bodies cannot be in effect blackmailed by a judicial review, and that campaign groups cannot use judicial review to string out a process or to delay change to make a political point.

[Mr Cox]

I would be most grateful if my right hon. Friend addressed the point I raised. What is the difference between the current common law test, which enables courts to allow leave or a remedy in a case of inevitability —in other words, if it is obvious and inevitable that the decision will be the same, the courts already have the power to say, “No, you can’t have leave or a remedy”—and his proposed test, in clause 64, about whether it is “highly likely” that the decision will be the same?

[Chris Grayling]

My hon. and learned Friend mentions the common law approach. When it was introduced in 1974, judicial review was a limited remedy for individuals who felt they had been badly wronged by a decision made by a public body, central Government or local government. Over the years since, it has become very different, and it is now overtly used by campaign groups and third parties to seek to disrupt the process of government. He is absolutely right to say that the common law approach exists, but our judgment as a Government—I hope and believe that, at the end of the debate tonight and of the one to follow in the House of Lords, it will also be the judgment of Parliament—is that Parliament needs to set in place some tramlines within which the courts can operate. We do not want to undermine, remove or destroy judicial review; we want it to be used in the right and proper way for which it was originally intended, and that is what the reforms are designed to achieve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Grayling]

Let me give an example of one consultation response that we received when we put forward our thoughts about the changes that are needed. A group of local residents who were challenging a planning decision formed a limited company, with a small number of directors each paying £1 to the company funds. The respondent considered that by doing that the directors aimed to avoid any adverse cost consequences if the challenge was unsuccessful, and that could have meant significant costs to the taxpayer in terms of defendant legal costs that might otherwise have been recovered from a losing claimant. The respondent also said that other local residents were horrified that that small group could hold up democratically agreed development at such small financial risk to themselves.

There are two parts to that example. First, there is the financial element, and one thing I would expect us to do in the consultation is consider the use of shell companies—a shell company was used in the much discussed Richard III case. There is also the point about exceptional public circumstances. I listened carefully to and talked after the last debate to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox), who suggested possible forms of words to use. We looked at that option and discussed others, and decided that the exceptional public interest threshold best achieved the goal. It may not have existed in legislation until now, but that is no reason for it not to exist henceforth. These are straightforward terms in the English language, and we are simply setting the bar one step higher than public interest. A routine matter can generally be deemed to be of public interest, and we are discussing introducing an exceptional level to that.

[Mr Cox]

Does the Secretary of State mean what he said a few minutes ago, which is that cases of really egregious unfairness might afford a basis for declining to dismiss the case, even when the outcome is likely to have been the same? Is that what he is thinking of, because a few moments ago he mentioned something that is a serious or grave departure from fair process. If that is what he means, there is a better way of encapsulating it than the current drafting.

[Chris Grayling]

We will probably beg to differ on that, but my hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. One of the circumstances in which I could envisage the amended clause being used is if a public body has blatantly flouted the way in which consultations should be managed and procedure handled, but it is likely that the ultimate decision would have been the same. It is reasonable for a court to then say that that is simply unacceptable—that it is a matter of exceptional public interest that a public body of this kind should be able to behave in such a completely cavalier way—and it will therefore allow the case to go forward. The amendment gives the judge the freedom to take that decision. It was our judgment that it accorded that freedom, but it also achieves our goal of ensuring that permission is not given for technicalities, which is particularly important.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Monday 1st December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Chris Grayling]

In that particular case, we fulfilled the orders of the court after the first judicial review hearing. I did not agree with the judge in that initial ruling. I considered an appeal, but looking at the detail of the ruling, I decided that it was more in the interests of the system that we were trying to protect and develop to move ahead with a further period of consultation. That is what we did, and we have published our responses arising from that consultation. We took the opportunity to revisit our original decisions and to look at whether any further changes needed to be made. That was embodied in the document that we published last week.

There are three simple principles in the areas of debate covered by these motions. I challenge the Opposition to explain why they so strongly disagree with those principles. First, parties should not be able to use minor technicalities in process as an excuse to bring a judicial review in order to delay an essential decision when there is very little likelihood that the outcome would be affected by that technicality. It is a simple principle. There is an exceptional circumstances clause which still allows judicial discretion in cases where there is a particularly distinctive characteristic, but this is designed to stop organisations judicially reviewing a process on the basis of a minor flaw in process, only to have the effect of delaying a difficult change—delaying for financial reasons and trying to push a change back a few months so that the financial impact is not felt as soon.

That is the reality of what is happening, and this proviso seems a perfectly sensible means of ensuring that the Government can take decisions in a timely and necessary way. In the unhappy event that the shadow Secretary of State finds himself in my chair or his colleagues find themselves in other Ministers’ chairs, they will think that it is sensible and logical way to make sure that the wheels of government move at an appropriate pace.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

I hope that my right hon. Friend accepts that some Government Members, and I include myself, have some concern about the reforms he is promoting. Will he help me to resolve a very difficult dilemma by telling me and the House what he regards as a minor technicality? Judges do not generally grant leave for judicial review on minor technicalities—it has to be based on matters of serious abuse of fair process—so I am concerned and troubled by what he considers a technicality.

[Chris Grayling]

I hate to disabuse my hon. and learned Friend, but such cases happen all the time and very regularly. Very early in this job, I faced a judicial review—we eventually won it after a hearing, but only following a delay and some considerable cost—from a representative group that argued that changes to a part of the compensation system should not proceed because of a technical detail concerning how the consultation had been carried out. It went to a hearing, which we won, but it cost the taxpayer substantial amounts of money and delayed the process. It was on a technicality, and there was no likelihood of there being a different outcome. If he talks to Ministers from across the Government, he will find that such cases happen regularly—for example, if a nuance of a consultation has not been done thoroughly or properly, or if it was fractionally shorter than the precedent for similar consultations. I am afraid that such cases do happen, and they delay the wheels of government. Let me talk about the other two areas, because they are also acute problems.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Slaughter]

I give up with the Secretary of State. We are talking about interveners, who are there to assist the court and broaden the issue where it is helpful for matters of public policy. If he cannot see that after having discussed the Bill since February, I really do give up on him.

The Government proposals would prevent judicial review if they can persuade a court that it is highly likely that an unlawful act would have been lawful if done differently. That is a recipe for poor decision making. They will hobble the attempts of people to raise the considerable funds needed to bring a case and weaken their ability to have protection from the Government’s costs if they lose. Most bizarrely, they discourage the intervention of expert bodies, such as charities and civil society organisations, which often assist the court in making the right decision. Under pressure on this last point, or to give the usual fig leaf to the Liberal Democrats, a series of last-minute amendments have been tabled by the Lord Chancellor on interveners, but the opinion of experts who have looked at them is that, if anything, they make the Bill worse.

Labour MPs will therefore vote to uphold judicial review and the rights of the individual against the state. We will oppose the motion to disagree with each and every one of the Lords amendments in this group. We will vote against the Government’s amendments in lieu. We may, I hope, be joined by one or two libertarian Tories, although I am not holding my breath. It will be interesting to see how many Liberal Democrats, so keen to shout about their love of liberty before voting for legal aid cuts in secret courts, will join us in the Lobby.

[Mr Cox]

I regret the tone of the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), which fell beneath the standards the House is entitled to expect on so important a matter. The tone was cynical and frankly insulting to those of us on the Government Benches who have spent many years of our lives fighting for the rights of individuals in the courts.

I should, before I begin, draw the attention of the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I appear in courts, specifically in the administrative court, quite frequently. [Interruption.] I hear the hon. Gentleman, from a sedentary position, hurling yet another insult. I do not know what he was like in the legal profession, but if he won as few arguments by his gracelessness and charmlessness as he is winning this evening, no doubt he switched professions with very good reason indeed.

In substance, many of the points the hon. Gentleman makes—they are not, I think, his; he is merely puppeting and gibbeting the points made by his betters and those more equipped than he to make the criticisms—are, I have to say, correct in the substance of the matter. That is why I say to the Secretary of State that, although one cannot always choose one’s friends in this House on specific topics, I am extremely troubled by what he is introducing. I sympathise with and understand the frustration that, he feels with the industry, it may well seem to those in charge of the Executive, that judicial review has become. I understand that, but my concern is that the measures my right hon. Friend is introducing are not well targeted or adjusted to the mischief he is seeking to suppress.

One of the examples I give is the provision to introduce a likelihood test as to the outcome of any judicial review. The problem with this measure is that it does two things, unintended no doubt in their consequence by the Secretary of State. First, it will turn permission hearings, and substantive hearings if permission is granted, into an immensely detailed and cumbersome process of trawling through fact and evidence so as to equip the judge to take a decision on whether it was more likely than not that the decision would have been taken anyway, and in order to demonstrate that it would have been taken anyway if the flaw had been identified by the judge. The presupposition is that the judge has identified a technical flaw, as my right hon. Friend would call it, either in consultation, natural justice or perhaps even discrimination. The public authority will then seek to justify its position by saying, “Well, it would have made no difference and you, the judge, on all of the evidence, can take the view yourself that this would have made no difference.” That converts the judge into the decision maker.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Grayling]

The “exceptional circumstances” provisions would allow a judge to say, “This is a flagrant case and must be heard.”

[Mr Cox]

I hear the Secretary of State, but the Bill does not refer to “minor technicalities”; as the Bill reads, the default position would be that any abuse of due process or power could be justified and defended on the basis that the decision would in any event probably have been taken. It is difficult to make “exceptional circumstances” clauses work, because the courts say, “Well, ‘exceptional circumstances’ cannot mean a lack of fairness or an abuse of power.” I have spent many years examining these kinds of clauses and arguing them in the courts, and I know that “exceptional circumstances” clauses are rarely invoked, because courts are reluctant to acknowledge them as a standard resort in such circumstances. It would take something extreme indeed for a court to be persuaded it was exceptional. On the other hand, abuses of power happen quite often, I am afraid, and the clause is likely to condone those abuses of power, whereas often where there is an abuse, it is right that the decision be taken again.

[Mr Elfyn Llwyd (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Lords amendments 97 to 102 were carried in the other place to ensure that courts maintained their discretion in determining whether to grant a judicial review by making use of the “highly likely” test. Groups such as Justice have rightly concluded that if these amendments are defeated, it will change the role of judges by inviting them to second-guess how decisions might otherwise have been taken. From his experience, the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) has detailed some very potent arguments why the amendments should be upheld. Parliament should never seek to undermine the courts’ discretion; courts should be free to determine whether to apply the “no difference” test, and to legislate otherwise would impede the integrity of our legal system. I therefore support these amendments.

Lords amendments 105 and 106 would allow the courts to consider the circumstances of individual cases in determining whether to grant an application for judicial review, even in cases where third-party information is not readily available. In clause 66, the Government have tried to find yet another means of limiting the circumstances where applications for judicial review can be heard. The amendments seek to ensure that applications can be heard in cases where third-party information is not easily available.

Judicial review is often the only means by which individuals can hold the Executive responsible for wrong -doing, yet the Government are trying to shut down that avenue for redress. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has said it sees no evidence to support the Government’s reforms, and neither does Justice, Liberty, JustRights, Human Rights Watch, the Howard League, Redress, Inquest, Mencap, Amnesty International—the list goes on. Can anyone report which groups actually support the Government in these changes? [Hon. Members: “The Whips.”] Yes, the Whips.

On clause 67, Lords amendment 107 would maintain courts’ discretion over whether to order an intervener to pay the costs of relevant parties and vice versa. As drafted, the Bill would compel the court to order interveners to pay such costs, other than in exceptional circumstances, as we have heard from the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon. The provisions in clause 67 are among the most disturbing in the Bill. Unamended, the clause would ensure that charitable organisations and individuals with expertise could no longer enrich the opinion of the courts by intervening in cases where their expertise would be of use because they could not justify the risk to their trustees, funders or members of supporting litigation. As the noble Lord Carlile asked in the other place:

“How could trustees reasonably agree to support an intervention when it could result in losing tens of thousands of pounds or more in costs, jeopardising, in some cases, the existence of small charities?”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 30 June 2014; Vol. 754, c. 1607.]

Yet the plans would still allow Departments and corporations with huge funds to intervene and hence play a pivotal part in the development of public law.

I ask the House to reconsider the Government’s proposals in the context of the various and—I am trying to avoid vitriol—crippling reforms to access to justice in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. As a result of the significant cuts in that Act, more individuals will be looking to charitable organisations for support in getting justice. It seems to me that clause 67 will take away this last resort. I am afraid the Government seem intent on restricting access to justice so that only those with the least to lose can gain redress. Why do they think it necessary to pursue this agenda, which will throw the baby out with the bathwater, despite the perceived misuses of the law relating to judicial review? The hon. and learned Gentleman, a far more experienced lawyer than me, has referred to the time-honoured practice of judicial review—the Wednesbury principles and so on—and the practices in place to ensure that Departments act reasonably in all circumstances. Why should we not uphold the individual’s rights to ensure that Departments act reasonably?

In conclusion, Justice said:

“Punitive and disproportionate, these measures are designed to deter any organisation with limited funds acting as an intervener. In practice, this means that – even in important cases with a constitutional impact which reaches far beyond the immediate interests of the parties - the court will no longer benefit from expert advice and information provided from cash-poor and experience rich charities and NGOs.”

I think that says it all. As we heard earlier, senior judges themselves are on the record as saying that the courts are enriched by the interventions of these people, who know exactly what they are talking about.

Church of England (Women Bishops)

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Wednesday 12th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

Having listened to the right hon. Members for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw) and for Birkenhead (Mr Field) and my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes (Martin Vickers), and having heard before from my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Sir Tony Baldry), I am filled with envy. I feel a little like the boy with his nose pressed against the pie shop window, looking inside at the good things within and feeling very excluded. I do not think that the right hon. Member for Exeter and those who have spoken in his support understand how fortunate they are. For them a decision on the issue—which has now confronted the Church for a number of decades—as to the acceptability, doctrinally and theologically, of women priests and women bishops is so obviously, decisively and clearly reached on one side.

They are extraordinarily fortunate to be able to reach a conclusion of such a decided kind, because some of us cannot do so, even after very careful and patient reflection. I fully respect the conclusion and the sincerity of the right hon. Member for Exeter, having listened to him today, and I ask him to accept that some of us cannot reach the same conclusion with the same decisive finality. Those of us who read the Bible and listen to what ancient texts say and hear the words of the Roman Catholic Church find it hard to conclude that the steps the Anglican Church has taken over recent decades are necessarily the right ones.

I know that the sentiments I express today are shared by many. I have received letters from people who feel the same way. Many of us also acknowledge that the decision taken some years ago to admit women priests to the Anglican Church is irreversible and the march of relentless logic will probably mean there should also be women bishops. However, that minority of whom the right hon. Gentleman spoke so critically includes many people of sincere Christian faith who wrestle daily with their consciences on this issue, and who appreciate with humility that there are hundreds or thousands—or possibly tens of thousands—represented on these Benches here today who have reached a contrary conclusion to that which their own conflict on this subject leads them to reach, and who feel that this is a matter so free from intellectual difficulty that they can reach such a conclusion.

In the presence of that, this minority feel some sense of humility but simply cannot bring themselves to dismiss the tradition of 2,000 years, the convictions of the Roman Catholic Church and the convictions of many millions of people around the world with the ease and facility that the right hon. Gentleman does. That they feel sincerely, I ask him to accept.

The right hon. Gentleman was critical, probably rightly, of the fact that when people divide into the trenches, as they have on this issue, mistrust breaks out. He expressed concern that the negotiating position of the conservative wing of the Church is not held sincerely and these people do not wish to reach a conclusion. I can talk only about the letters I have received from the laity in the rural areas I represent. Many of them agreed with the position that he takes, but some did not. Those letters do not resonate with entrenched obstructionism; they seek a way forward. They sound with a sense of authentic pain. They are from people trying to grapple with an issue on which they realise they are in the minority, and they are seeking a way forward. It will test the leadership—

[Susan Elan Jones (Clwyd South) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Cox]

Not just now. It will test the leadership of the Church, and I hope that this new leader of the Church is the God-sent thing he appears to be. I hope that he will be able to bring along the minority, among whose number I count myself, because the last thing that that minority wishes to do is see the Church they love riven by this issue. I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman, and others in the House who, understandably, support so passionately their view, to entertain Christian compassion for the minority, who do not seem to have much of a voice in the debate today, nor had much of a voice in the statement the other day.

[Mr Bradshaw]

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Mr Cox]

I will. I should give way to the hon. Member for Clwyd South (Susan Elan Jones) first, but I will do that in a moment, if I may.

[Mr Bradshaw]

I assume from what the hon. and learned Gentleman is saying—I hope he will forgive me if I am wrong—that the safeguards that already exist regarding women priests have kept him, and many others who did not and still do not want women priests, in the Church of England. What does he think was not adequate with the concessions being offered to the opponents of women bishops that would have prevented them from staying in the Church of England?

[Mr Cox]

I will come to that, because I intend to tackle the specifics in a moment. First, it is important that I set out the background to the remarks I intend to make, because I am approaching this, a matter relating to the Church, as beyond political propaganda and the crudity of political discourse; the things we are dealing with are precious to us all. They are part of our common bond of spiritual inheritance. For those who believe in the Church as I believe in the Church—an essential part of the fabric of our constitution that I cannot envisage ever being without—the fate of the Anglican Church is a crucial issue. We need to approach it in a spirit that tries to unite people, not divide them. The rules by which the decision of the Synod was reached the other day were created for a reason. Constitutionally weighted majorities are invariably introduced around the world, not only in the Church, but in countries, to protect minority opinions. That is why the Synod introduced the rule. People may argue with it now. They may say, “It is too high. It is unrealistically high. It puts into the hands of those who do not seek agreement too powerful a weapon”, but two-thirds majorities—weighted majorities—are there for a reason.

So fundamental a change after 2,000 years of tradition should receive a weighted majority. We cannot complain. We should not point the finger of accusation at the Church because those who conscientiously could not agree exercised their right not to do so. The rules were put in place by the Church so that decisions of this magnitude and gravity should be taken only with the overwhelming support of the Church; just because it failed to reach that threshold and the bar was not passed according to that majority, we should not complain. We should not say to the Church, “You have failed to do your duty.” The constitutional threshold was there for a reason: to ensure that when this change or any similar change on so fundamental a matter was introduced, it carried the overwhelming weight of the Church.

I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley), who spoke a moment ago and is no longer in his place, that it is inevitable that we shall have women bishops. The question is only how and when, but we must entertain the patience to allow the Church to make that decision on its own, for it will surely do so. We should not bully it or exert pressure on it. My hon. Friend the Member for Banbury will forgive me for saying that although he says he did not do so, when I listened to him in the urgent question the other day, he seemed to go perilously close—I will not say to bullying, because that would be unfair—to putting pressure on the Church. We have 2,000 years of tradition and we have been discussing the question of women bishops for 40. That is not long set against 2,000 years.

We should have the patience and the compassion to allow the Church to work this out on its own. For my part, I daily see the extraordinary devotion and dedication of women priests in my constituency. I am humbled by their dedication. I see them serve remote rural parishes and fight for their communities. I see the good that they do and I grapple with this question of whether we should have had women priests and have women bishops. I try to persuade myself that we should and I am acquiescent in the inevitability that it should happen—resigned. Perhaps I acknowledge too that the doubts I have on that score are wrong, but I simply ask that those who are so fortunate as to have such conviction on this subject to understand that this conflict is serious. It is perhaps more serious than anything in politics, because it affects one’s Christian faith. That is why I urge the House to pause before it takes the step of weighing in to determine this issue on behalf of the Church. Let us allow the Church, guided we must believe by God, to reach this decision on its own in its own time. I believe it will do so.

[Sir Tony Baldry]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Cox]

No.

If we have to wait until 2015, will it be so bad a thing?

[Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

Yes, it will be for those women.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cox]

I accept that those women will have to wait for another two or three years, but I cannot bring myself to believe that that is the presiding imperative set against the harmony and unity of the Church. Although I respect the work that they do, I repeat that I do not seek to hold out—

[Sir Tony Baldry]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Cox]

No, I will not.

[Sir Tony Baldry]

rose—

[Mr Cox]

No, not now.

Let me make it clear that I do not seek to prevent this step, but merely to argue that we should allow the Church to reach this conclusion and to heal itself on its own.

I repeat: it is no use complaining because a constitutional majority threshold was not reached. The liberals in the House and those in the House who believe in constitutionalism have no right to point the finger at the Church and say that somehow its systems are defective. That constitutional majority was not reached. It was set in place for good reason, to ensure that the whole Church, or as much of it as possible, was taken with the decision.

In 1998, the Lambeth conference resolved that those who could not bring themselves to accept the existence of women priests or bishops should nevertheless have rules created for them that allowed them to exist in the highest degree of communion with the Anglican Church. In 1993, the Ecclesiastical Committee, on which the right hon. Member for Exeter serves, accepted that rules should be created in perpetuity for those who took that view. We cannot break those promises but, equally, I agree with him that those who are on the conservative side must negotiate with sincerity. They must not set the bar so high that it is unacceptable to the majority. I appeal to those who have the good fortune to be in the majority to be tender towards those who are in the minority.

[Sir Tony Baldry]

Before my hon. and learned Friend concludes may I redirect him to answer the question that was put to him by the right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw)? What was it about the Measure, which had the overwhelming support of the archbishops and the House of Bishops, the vast majority of the House of Clergy and a clear majority in the House of Laity, that my hon. and learned Friend found objectionable?

[Mr Cox]

The Measure had the overwhelming support of the House of Bishops, the overwhelming support of the House of Clergy, but not the two-thirds majority required, in the laying down of which my hon. Friend must have participated. He cannot complain—

[Sir Tony Baldry]

That does not answer my question.

[Mr Cox]

I will come to my hon. Friend’s question. He cannot complain, and he certainly, in a genial and bluff manner, should not, as the Second Church Estates Commissioner, kick the Church into adopting a view that he represents when, in fact, the constitutional majority was not reached. That is the rule by which the Church agreed that the decision should be made. To begin to bully the Church into taking action to follow his convictions is wrong and unrepresentative of the Church as a whole.

To come to my hon. Friend’s question, first, the code that is supposed to exist was never written. How on earth can we vote something through, expecting protective measures to be written in future? Why did the Church not create the code, in draft at least, so that members such as me would be able to read it? It was not written. Secondly, there is an existing protection for Church councils to be consulted, including councils that have taken the view that they ought to be excluded from the jurisdiction in which women priests celebrate the Eucharist. The priest must consult the Church council before an invitation is extended to a woman to celebrate the Eucharist. That protection is to be removed under the current provision. How can we expect those on the other side, already feeling bruised as a minority and feeling that the Church does not necessarily want them—that may be the case, but it is certainly not the publicly professed view of the Church—to have confidence in Measures that are not written and which remove existing protections?

My hon. Friend asked for another example. As I understand it, if a Church council writes a letter of request asking to be excluded from the dominion of a particular bishop, a priest is able to veto that request. That does not give confidence to those parishes where a majority feel that they do not wish to be ministered to by a woman bishop. It cannot give confidence that they will be able to live according to their consciences.

I have given my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury three examples, and I hope that he will deal with them. First, the code was never written, so one is asked to accept a series of protective measures that have not even been given proper detail. Secondly, an existing protection is removed—these are only examples—and thirdly, the priest in charge can veto the Church council’s view on the dominion of the female bishop.

I say again that I have no wish to engage in expressing divisive or entrenched views. I accept that women bishops will come. As for my doubts on this score, perhaps I will find that I am wrong when I see the good that they do and the astonishing devotion of some that I know. I hope that I am wrong. I am willing to be wrong, and willing to accept that I am. I profoundly hope that others of my persuasion will come round to the idea, and that the Church’s unity can be maintained. I simply ask my hon. Friend for some patience. I know that he and others have been patient for a long time.

[Lyn Brown]

For 1,700 years.

[Mr Cox]

Yes, I know, but we are talking about a minority. The change will come; I ask only for a little further patience, so that we can get the settlement right, and so that those thousands of people who are, as I am, in a state of uncertainty and doubt, can be brought along.

I ask hon. Members to contemplate what it must mean for a member of the Church, who is brought up to it, celebrates it daily, and loves it as so many thousands of us do, to feel that the Church is leaving us behind, and moving away from us. I know that there are hon. Members who disagree and do not feel like that, but others do. Imagine how it must feel. We are wrestling to come to the conviction that other Members have reached. [Interruption.] I can only say to the hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown), who is commenting from a sedentary position, that I feel that I have already exposed far too much of my personal convictions, and have probably trespassed on her patience, but I did so because I believed, having listened to the debate, that this particular voice and body of opinion has not been represented in the House. I realised when I stood that what I said would not be popular, and would attract mirth, perhaps mockery; that some might be impatient with it; and that those on the other side of the debate have waited a long time.

I only ask that Members see the other point of view, and that the Church be allowed to reach this decision in its own time. I agree with the right hon. Member for Exeter that sincerity is necessary on both sides, and that the majority have come a long way in order to satisfy the concerns of the minority, but I ask for an extra effort. I ask for compassion. I ask for Christian patience.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

I am delighted to follow all the speakers in this excellent debate. In particular, I should mention the lecture in divinity from my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), who chose to wear purple. It is no accident that she represents a constituency called Bishop Auckland.

I was not born into the Church of England. I was born in Glasgow into a Congregationalist family, where I was privileged to have as my first minister the very first woman minister ever ordained in Scotland, Vera Kenmure. It took about nine years before I ventured south of the border, but I remember my first occasion in an English church. I thought, “What a funny lot you English are. You actually allow men to be priests!” I could not believe that a man was standing there in the robes of a minister. It was an image that always struck me as very odd.

The ministry I received from Vera Kenmure 50 years ago was exceptional, and it was probably what convinced me, from absolute infancy, of the value of women’s ministry in the Church. When I came to England and entered the Anglican Church, after a short period I joined the Movement for the Ordination of Women. In fact, my now wife—she was then my girlfriend—and I joined MOW together.

The Second Church Estates Commissioner, the hon. Member for Banbury (Sir Tony Baldry) will correct me if I am wrong, but I think the first occasion on which a vote was taken on the ordination of women was in 1978. I will never forget that Una Kroll, who led the Movement for the Ordination of Women, listened in silence and in shocked horror to the vitriol that came across in that debate. There was vitriol against women who dared ask to be allowed to serve in their Church, and I remember that at the end of the debate Una Kroll stood up and said, “We asked for bread and you gave us a stone.”

A year or so later I remember listening to Una on the radio. She was asked whether because of the nature of the debate she still had the vocation and calling to the ministry that she had felt previously. I remember that her voice stuttered and she had obviously not reflected on that point until that moment. She said she was not sure whether she could still say that she felt God’s calling.

I listened with great care to the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) and I acknowledge the sincerity of his views. He asked for tolerance, for provision to be made and for understanding, but that tolerance, provision and understanding was not made in 1978 or beyond. My girlfriend became my wife, and as we marched down the aisle, the “War March of the Priests” was our introit—at that point both of us wanted to be ordained as priests in the Church of England. However, because of the nature and vitriol of the debate, many of us felt that we had lost that sense of vocation and that calling. Therefore, when the hon. and learned Gentleman asks for patience now, he is asking for something that he must accept he and his colleagues in the debate back then did not afford to us.

[Mr Cox]

First, in 1978 I was 18 and I was not participating in such debates. I am sure the hon. Gentleman will accept that even if what he says is right—I deplore it if it were so and regret it profoundly—that is no excuse, reason or basis for not extending compassion and understanding now. That is simply to compound one sin with another.

[Barry Gardiner]

I accept what the hon. and learned Gentleman says and I do not hold him responsible for what happened then or for the loss of vocation that I or many others felt as a result. He is right to say that understanding and provision must be made within the Church now for those who cannot assent to the doctrinal excellence of the position that the Church has reached, which is that there is absolutely no distinction between the deaconate, the priesthood and the bishops. That is a fundamental theological principle. There are those who cannot accept it, and they have asked that provision should be made for them. Just as provision was made for those who could not accept the ordination of women in the first place, so it must be made for those who cannot accept the consecration of women bishops. However, that provision has been offered and rejected. It is now time for the Church to put its house in order and press forward with what it knows to be doctrinally accurate. That is why I greatly respected the speech that my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland made—she sought to base her arguments in theology.

The hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon talked about the issue that confronts the Church of the consecration of women bishops. That is not the issue that confronts the Church; it is poverty and injustice in the world. This is a sideshow that should not occupy the Church. We should not have to debate it over and over again, year after year. It is nonsense, and it is not what the Church should be about.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland spoke powerfully about the lessons from scripture. It seems to me that the fundamental heart of Christian theology is the power and the vision of the resurrection. I do not think anyone in the Church would deny that. Who were the witnesses to the resurrection? Women—it was the women who went into the garden and witnessed the resurrection, at a time when their word had no basis in Judaic law. They could not give testimony in a court, but our Lord had them as his witnesses to the resurrection to bear testimony to the entire world of the essential truth of the Christian faith. If that is not a vote for women to take up their place in the Church, I do not know what is.

[Mr Cox]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Barry Gardiner]

Not at the moment.

Two or three years ago, on Christmas eve, my wife and I went into our local church to celebrate midnight mass, and there was a woman celebrating. I have to say, she gave one of the worst sermons I had ever heard. It was dreadful. As we got into the car after the service, I turned to my wife and said, “You know, that was really quite inspiring.” She looked at me and said, “Are you mad? That was one of the worst sermons I have ever heard.” I said, “Yes, but just think—25 years ago, could we ever have imagined that we would be sitting in a conservative evangelical parish on Christmas eve listening to a woman priest give just as bad a sermon as any man? That is progress.” We went forward that Christmas eve with a renewed sense of faith, joy and possibility.

What happened a couple of weeks ago dashed that feeling and made us think, “For goodness’ sake, why can’t we get on with the purpose of the Church?” The purpose of the Church is to serve the world, not to keep looking in on itself. Fundamentally, the Church has made one great mistake in its history. It has always had a fixation with sex instead of love and power instead of service. I pray God that it will put it right quickly.

EU Criminal Policy

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Wednesday 25th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

The right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) said one very wise and pertinent thing. It was not the only wise and pertinent thing he said, but it was one that struck me, and that was that it is almost invariably the case that it is undesirable to introduce into a mature and well-developed legal system another layer of legislation that is already covered satisfactorily by domestic legislation.

I recall that in the 1990s I had practical experience of such an occasion, when the European Union introduced its own sanctions on Serbia. It introduced a directly applicable regulation in exactly the territory on which this country had already legislated under the United Nations Act 1946. I recall that the case in which I took part challenged the domestic legislative regime on the basis that it occupied territory in which the European Union had legislated and that the two regimes, minutely analysed, could not be seen to be compatible. Not only were they not compatible in their substance, but they were incompatible in the sense that it is well-established case law in the European Court of Justice that any legislative activity by the European Union must take precedence and primacy not only in the substance of its impact and effect but in its appearance. In other words, the legislative authority of any particular action in a member state, once the European Union has legislated, must be seen to emanate from the European Union. To that extent, it is an extremely intolerant legislative authority.

That means that one must examine extremely carefully—I see that the Secretary of State for Justice is doing so as regards the market abuse framework—whether the introduction of European Union law into a sphere that is already occupied by domestic legislation will cause such a complicated unintended consequence. I recall that the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry at the time was poised with an order to lay before the House in case the Lord Chief Justice in the Court of Appeal accepted the arguments that I and others were advancing. He was ready to go that morning, because of the chaos that would have ensued had the domestic legislation been struck down as incompatible with the European Union’s legislative action.

It is extremely undesirable that that should happen and, having listened to the various balances that have been struck by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) and my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash), who is so often proved, even after many years, to be right, I prefer the analysis of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. The Commission has a cavernous maw into which legislation is sucked into a black hole along with our rights, prerogatives and spheres of sovereignty. I am strongly concerned about the consequences for this Government if they continue with their policy of opt-ins, as was observed by the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed a few moments ago.

When a country opts in to a sphere of competence of the European Union, it does not opt in merely to a different wording or to some dilute or mild consequence of that kind. It opts in lock, stock and barrel to the hegemony of the European Union institutions, by which I mean the European Court of Justice, the Commission and the rest of it. That might attract complacent smiles on the Opposition Benches—and even on the Government Benches—but just think of what legislative territory is already included. Firearms control—which has not been mentioned so far, but which is covered by a series of European directives—organised crime, VAT, drug trafficking and money laundering are all covered by extensive directives and directly applicable regulations. There is not a Crown court in this country that is not, as we speak, preoccupied with such trials. If we opt in, we are opting in to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and enabling it to examine our procedures in our Crown courts and see whether they comply with the minimum rules that this policy will set down.

[Kate Hoey (Vauxhall) (Lab)]

I have listened to the hon. and learned Gentleman and I agree with everything he has said so far. Does he agree that the most iniquitous thing about all this continuing opting in and moving into an ever-closer European Union for this country is the fact that the British people have never given their permission for that to happen? Does he agree that that is what we should really be arguing for now?

[Mr Cox]

I do agree. The fundamental underlying principle that should exercise all Members of this House when it comes to criminal law powers being assumed by a supranational organisation is that what is or is not criminal, and what is or is not an action that puts an individual citizen of this nation beyond the pale of the criminal law, should be a matter for this House. It is to this House that citizens of this country entrust the moral judgments that underlie decisions about what should be criminalised and what should not. We are directly accountable to that citizenry, whereas the institutions of the European Union are not. That is why I have come to this debate to sound a note of caution and warning. That is also why, having listened to the different expressions of caution that have been so well made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed, who chairs the Select Committee on Justice, I prefer the analysis of my hon. Friend the Member for Stone.

There is no doubt but that a vast field is already occupied by the European Union, and if we see a panoply of institutional responsibility and jurisdiction introduced into the criminal law, we will be exposing our procedures, our rules of evidence and our very jury trial itself to challenge in the European Court of Justice as not complying with the minimum rules set down. That might not happen this year or the next, but the European Union thinks in terms not just of one decade, but of decades and decades; it proceeds slowly. That is why, like Cassandra, or like Balaam’s ass, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone so often stands in our way—or indeed, like the angel that prevented Balaam’s ass from going on, he beckons to us and indicates that we would do well to think very carefully before we simply approve policies of this kind without understanding that there is an underlying caution that we should always exercise.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Geoffrey Cox Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

I apologise to the right hon. Gentleman, but I must press on. Other Members wish to speak and I do not want to take up all the time.

I will turn to the sentencing provisions. We have gone through major reforms in sentencing that contain many common-sense measures, which have not been debated much but which are intended to simplify the system and give greater professional discretion in many cases. The biggest controversy has concerned the repeal of indeterminate sentences, which was accepted very readily by most Members yesterday. That is a much overdue reform. The introduction of indeterminate sentences never worked as people intended. It was a major mistake and a major blot on our justice system that would not have survived challenge in either the British courts or in Strasbourg if it had carried on much longer. We have put in place a system of long determinate sentences for the most serious criminals, which I think gives protection.

We have not debated the other difficult area, knife crime, over which there was some controversy. The Government are determined to get the message clearly across to the public that knife crime will not be tolerated. We wish to stop people believing that knife crime will not be punished properly in the criminal justice system. For that reason, we tabled proposals introducing a mandatory sentence of six months for adults who are guilty of threatening with a knife in circumstances where it might cause physical injury, which is a new offence we have created. That is in line with the six months already specified in the sentencing guidelines for that kind of offence, but it makes it clear that that sentence should normally be expected automatically for that offence, unless it would otherwise be unjust to do so.

Amendments were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North (Nick de Bois) and by the Opposition seeking to extend that proposal to juveniles. I am glad to say that, following discussions with my hon. Friends the Members for Enfield North and for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes)—the latter is a Parliamentary Private Secretary and so cannot table amendments—we finally agreed, that as 30-odd Back Benchers supported the amendments, to introduce a mandatory offence for 16 and 17-year-olds. Again, that sounds rather formidable, because I am not very keen on mandatory sentences for juveniles, but the offence is very serious, and it is only for 16 and 17-year-olds and—

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Clarke]

I will in just a second.

The offence also confirms that the court, at the same time, will have to have regard to the duties under the Children Acts, which mean—