Armed Forces Bill (First sitting)

David Reed Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Tuesday 24th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Al Carns]

I will triple down on what was said and say thank you very much to an amazing team, first, for putting together great evidence sessions and, secondly, for approaching this in a positive and pragmatic way. I also thank the Opposition parties for also being pragmatic in the way we move this forward in the best keeping of our armed forces.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Armed forces covenant

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 2, page 3, line 19, at end insert—

“‘due regard’ means that specified bodies should think about and place an appropriate amount of weight on the principles of the Armed Forces Covenant when they consider all the key factors relevant to how they carry out their functions.”

This amendment defines due regard for the purposes of interpreting section 2 of the Armed Forces Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 5, in clause 2, page 6, line 37, at end insert—

“343AZC National protocol for consistent access to public services

(1) The Secretary of State must prepare and publish a national protocol for consistent access to public services for service people and relevant family members.

(2) The national protocol must set out standardised procedures and expectations for the persons specified in section 343AZA(4) regarding the exercise of their functions in relation to the matters specified in section 343AZA(5).

(3) In exercising a public function to which section 343AZA applies, a person specified in section 343AZA(4) must act in accordance with the national protocol.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the national protocol before each House of Parliament no later than six months after the day on which the Armed Forces Act 2026 is passed.

(5) The Secretary of State may from time to time revise the national protocol and must publish and lay before each House of Parliament any revised version.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to create and publish a national protocol to ensure Armed Forces Families receive consistent access to essential public services.

[David Reed]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. Amendment 8, standing in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends, is a straightforward but important amendment. Its purpose is simple: to place a clear and consistent definition of “due regard” on the face of the Bill. I know that many colleagues will agree with that.

At present, due regard sits at the very heart of how relevant authorities will interpret and apply their obligations under the armed forces covenant. It is the mechanism through which the intentions of Parliament will be translated into real decisions on the ground and yet, as the Bill stands, the term itself is not defined. That creates a problem. Where Parliament relies on a concept without defining it, we leave room for inconsistency, uncertainty and, ultimately, uneven delivery.

Different authorities may take different views about what due regard requires of them. Some may interpret it robustly and act with care and diligence; others may, perhaps unintentionally, adopt a narrow reading and do the minimum necessary to demonstrate compliance. That cannot be what we want. If the covenant is to mean anything in practice, it must be applied consistently across the country. Service personnel, veterans and their families should not face a postcode lottery in how their needs are considered. The principle of fairness that underpins the covenant demands that we get this right and, I hope, get it right first time.

[Pam Cox (Colchester) (Lab)]

Would the hon. Gentleman agree that due regard is a long-established legal concept that lots of public bodies already understand? It is already routinely applied in practice, and to change the definition for the purposes of the Bill would be to go down an erroneous path.

[David Reed]

I thank the hon. Member for her intervention; she is an expert in these areas.

National Governments have legal teams to help them interpret the concept of due regard and apply it evenly across their Departments. When we get down to the local council level—I think we have all experienced this—that might be more inconsistent because the skills might not be there to bolster that support. We need to make it clearer. It might not be a case of changing the nature of due regard but of making it more explicit so that councils can interpret it.

[Ian Roome (North Devon) (LD)]

I would like to draw the Committee’s attention to the Defence Committee report on the armed forces covenant, which is based on evidence from witnesses. It says:

“As the current duty of ‘due regard’ is inconsistently interpreted, the extended duty must be accompanied by clear guidance so that the duty is clearly understood and is not treated as a tick-box exercise.”

It goes on to say:

“We heard many examples where the Covenant was not working as designed, resulting in people who have served being financially disadvantaged, unable to access medical care, or unable to find an appropriate school for their children as a result of their service.”

That was all due to the wishy-washy interpretation of due regard.

[The Chair]

That is a long intervention, and we have an amendment on that subject.

[David Reed]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He has a lot of experience in local government, so I take his view on this topic and look forward to hearing his substantive speech on it.

Amendment 8 does not introduce a new or burdensome requirement. It simply reflects existing guidelines and established practice, and provides clarity, not complication. By setting out what due regard means in the Bill, we ensure that everyone is working from the same understanding from the outset. In practical terms, placing a definition in the Bill would make it clear that local authorities and other relevant bodies must consciously consider the needs of the armed forces community when making decisions in scope of the covenant. It would require more than a cursory acknowledgment; it would require proper thought, proper sentiment and a willingness to adjust decisions where appropriate. That is not an unreasonable expectation. Local authorities already operate within similar frameworks in other areas of public policy, and the duty to have due regard is well understood in some areas and councils.

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that we may be jumping the gun slightly? The covenant’s statutory guidance will explain in detail what due regard means in practice.

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[David Reed]

I would rather have it in the legislation from the outset. We could take a position where we hope that local authorities will sit down and read through the legislation but, as we have seen over the last few years, that has not been applied in the current understanding of the covenant. I would rather the definition be explicit for local authorities. That would also provide a nice feedback loop, because if it is not working, it can go straight back to the Ministry of Defence and we can work on making amendments to the overall legislation.

[Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)]

When coming to a definition that everybody can agree on, it often ends up being very narrow, because that is what the group can agree on and apply. Does the hon. Member agree that if we end up defining due regard in the Bill, the definition will be narrow and, by its very nature, bodies will apply it in a very narrow sense in practice, to the detriment of veterans and service personnel?

[David Reed]

I thank the hon. Member for her intervention, and she makes a good point. But who defines “narrow”? From what we have seen with local authorities, most councils want to go above and beyond the covenant, because people in the council might have served in the military or had military families and they want to do more than what is already stated. Having the base, narrow explanation in the Bill will give everyone the base requirement, and it is a powerful thing to include—it is important to be explicit.

The amendment simply ensures that the same level of care is applied, and it is also about accountability. Without that clear definition, it becomes hard to assess whether an authority has fulfilled its duty. A defined standard provides a benchmark against which performance can be measured. It gives confidence to service families and ensures that their circumstances are properly considered; it also gives clarity to authorities about what is expected of them.

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[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

Yes, on this particular point.

[David Reed]

Promises, promises.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

That was a lawyer’s promise; the Minister can read it as he wills.

Does the Minister not think that having a definition of due regard in the Bill would assist the courts in interpreting its application in cases where a public body’s decision is challenged by a member of the armed forces community?

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[Al Carns]

I completely agree. I served for 24 years, and I did not know what the covenant was until I left and became the Minister for Veterans and People. That is the honest reality. I am sure that others who are serving also do not know what the covenant is. There is an educational requirement within the military, but also—I say this ever so gently—they are so focused on their operational roles and responsibilities that they are not necessarily interested in what comes next, or in understanding the benefits of the covenant to their families and loved ones while they are serving, which is a crying shame. I completely agree that we must make a more conscious effort to ensure that the covenant is understood by those serving, those who have left, and importantly—perhaps in some cases more so than for any other group—the families of veterans or of those serving. There is a huge amount of support out there, but it is often untapped because of the lack of education.

The legal duty is set up so that bodies can make decisions that are right for the local context and circumstances, including the devolved Governments. I would argue that a one-size-fits-all approach could inadvertently hinder tailored solutions that best meet the needs of armed forces personnel and their families. Instead, the covenant duty is supported by robust statutory guidance that acts as a clear point of reference for public bodies. Therefore, further expectations are unnecessary. This guidance ensures that the needs of the armed forces community are properly considered, while allowing for local discretion and responsiveness. Furthermore, transparency and accountability are maintained through the armed forces covenant annual report, which monitors progress and highlights areas for improvement.

In summary, mandating a national protocol risks imposing unnecessary rigidity and could limit the ability of public bodies to respond effectively to local circumstances—a point that I keep coming back to. We believe the current approach strikes the right balance between consistency, flexibility and accountability. I hope that reassures hon. Members, and I ask them not to press amendments 8 and 5.

[David Reed]

Given the strength of the argument this morning, I would like to test the will of the Committee and press amendment 8 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Mr Francois]

No, Mr Efford, and I was just going to say why not. I tipped my hand earlier and said that I probably would not press it. I will accept the Minister’s kind offer of a meeting to discuss the issues in amendments 11 and 12. I hope I have managed to convince the Committee that I have done my homework, if nothing else. I will not press either amendment.

[David Reed]

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 2, page 6, line 37, at end insert—

“343AZC Armed Forces Covenant Action Plans

(1) Within six months of the passage of the Armed Forces Act 2026, the Secretary of State must make regulations requiring a local authority to which the Armed Forces Covenant duty applies to prepare and publish an Armed Forces Action Plan.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must specify that an Armed Forces Action Plan set out—

(a) the steps the authority intends to take to fulfil its duties under the Armed Forces Covenant,

(b) how the authority will assess local need within the Armed Forces community, and

(c) how resources will be allocated to support delivery of those duties.

(3) A relevant local authority must, at least once in each reporting period, publish a report on progress made against its action plan.

(4) In preparing an action plan and report under this section, a relevant local authority must have regard to any guidance or outcomes issued by the Secretary of State.

(5) The Secretary of State may issue guidance, including indicative outcomes or measures, for the purposes of supporting consistent implementation and assessment of the Armed Forces Covenant duty.”

This amendment would require local authorities subject to the Covenant duty to prepare and publish an Action Plan setting out how they will deliver the duty.

The amendment, which stands in my name and in the name of my right hon. and hon. Friends, would place a clear and consistent obligation on local authorities to produce an armed forces covenant action plan. At present, there is no standardised mechanism for assessing how local authorities are delivering their covenant duties, nor is there a consistent framework for evaluating the effectiveness of delivery in practice. The absence of such a structure makes it difficult to form a clear picture of how the covenant is being implemented across the country. Without a defined framework, delivery is likely to vary among authorities, a point that has been raised today in relation to other amendments.

Some local authorities, particularly those with an established focus on armed forces issues, may continue to provide strong and proactive support. They may already have effective partnerships in place with local services charities, good engagement with their armed forces communities, and a clear understanding of local need. In some areas, local authorities are already producing plans or strategies, often working closely with the local armed forces network and charities. The amendment would build on that existing good practice, rather than starting from scratch.

Other authorities, facing a wide range of competing pressures, may find it more difficult to give their covenant commitments the same level of attention. That is not necessarily due to a lack of willingness; rather, it reflects the reality of limited capacity and competing priorities.

The result can be a variation in provision across different areas, whereby the consistency of available support may depend in part on where an individual lives. That sits uneasily with the intention behind the armed forces covenant, which is to provide a consistent commitment to those who serve or have served and to their families. The amendment is intended to support the duty by helping to ensure that the covenant is delivered in a more consistent and transparent way at a local level.

In practical terms, the absence of a structured approach presents some challenges. First, it can limit the ability of local authorities to assess the scale and nature of their armed forces community. Without a clear expectation that information will be gathered and analysed, there is a risk that need will not be fully identified. That may relate to housing, access to healthcare, employment support or the specific needs of service families who move frequently. It may also include the needs of veterans who are less visible and are therefore less likely to come into contact with services unless there is a proactive effort to reach them. If need is not clearly understood, it becomes more difficult to design services that respond effectively.

Secondly, without a clear planning framework, resource allocations can become less strategic. Decisions may be taken on a reactive basis, responding to immediate issues as they arise rather than being guided by a longer-term assessment of the need. Given the financial pressures facing local authorities, that is understandable. However, it increases the risk that covenant-related activity will not be prioritised consistently, particularly when it is not clearly set out alongside other statutory responsibilities. A more structured approach would allow better co-ordination of support between services, including housing, healthcare and employment support, where needs often overlap and require a joined-up response.

Thirdly, the absence of a requirement to set priorities or to publish reports on progress makes it harder to assess how covenant duties are being delivered in practice. It becomes more difficult for central Government to understand what is happening at a local level; it is also more difficult for local stakeholders, including service charities and armed forces families, to see what support is available and how it is being developed. Those issues were reflected in earlier evidence sessions, in which concerns were raised about the lack of consistent metrics and the difficulty of comparing delivery between authorities.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My hon. Friend is making a very powerful speech. Does he not consider one advantage of these action plans to be shared learning across local authorities, as those with more experience can aid those with less experience in improving the standard and delivery of support for veterans and the armed forces community?

[David Reed]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. Looking across the Committee, I see Members who have served in local government, some of whom may have had military experience before doing so. They would have been able to apply their experience, and that of their families, to their work as elected councillors. However, that is not standard across the country, which takes us back to my central point: given the financial pressures and other statutory pressures, we can see why, without a requirement for a clear plan, implementation becomes difficult for a local authority that does not have experience.

The lack of comparability limits our ability to identify where approaches are working well and where improvements may be needed. It also makes it harder to share learning among areas. Amendment 13 seeks to address those points in a proportionate and practical way. It would not impose a detailed or overly prescriptive model, as it is not bureaucratic in nature, and it would not remove flexibility from local authorities; authorities that want to do a lot more could do so, which would perhaps be fed back into central Government. Instead, it would establish a clear expectation that each authority take a structured approach to delivering its covenant responsibilities.

It is important to be clear about what the amendment would not do. It would not impose a complex or resource-intensive new burden. Many local authorities are already undertaking elements of this work; the amendment would simply bring that activity into a clearer and more consistent framework. It would require local authorities to produce an armed forces covenant action plan, which I am sure would be developed in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence, bringing together experience from where it is being done well in local government. That plan would set out in clear terms the steps that the authority intends to take to meet its obligations. It would provide a more coherent framework for delivery, bringing together activity that might otherwise be spread across different services.

Importantly, amendment 13 would also require authorities to assess the level and nature of the need within their local armed forces community. This key element would ensure that planning is informed by evidence, rather than assumptions. It would also encourage engagement with those directly affected, including service personnel, veterans and their families, as well as the organisations that support them. In addition, the amendment would require authorities to set out how resources would be allocated to meet that identified need, helping to create a clearer link between assessment and delivery. It would support more transparent decision making and would help to ensure that commitments are reflected in practice.

The requirement to report on progress is another important part of the amendment. It would introduce greater transparency, allowing central Government, local partners and the armed forces community to understand how the covenant is being delivered in particular areas. That transparency would support activity and accountability; allow local authorities to demonstrate the work that they are undertaking, including where progress has been made and where further development is needed; and provide a basis for identifying effective approaches and sharing good practice.

I will wrap up, because I am conscious of time. Amendment 13 is an important amendment. It would give local authorities a framework to work with central Government to carry out their new statutory duties, while managing their workload across competing priorities.

[Al Carns]

Amendment 13 would require local authorities to prepare and publish detailed action plans within six months of the passing of the Act. The Government are fully committed to strengthening the delivery of the covenant at a local level. The Bill represents a significant step forward by placing the duty on an improved statutory footing, extending the policy areas that are in scope from three to 12.

Mandating detailed action plans risks imposing a rigid bureaucratic process that may not reflect the diverse circumstances of local government, geography or the composition of armed forces communities across the country. For example, mandating an action plan for areas with little to no armed forces footprint could divert valuable resources away from practical support and into compliance activity.

Delivery of the covenant at a local level is already supported through established mechanisms, including the Covenant Community Action Group, the annual covenant conference and a dedicated covenant website that promotes good practice, shared learning and engagement across the system, which are areas that the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East mentioned. We are also investing in improved awareness and understanding of the covenant across both the armed forces and service providers, including through the new regional Valour centres and field officers.

Rather than mandating prescriptive local action plans, we are taking a proportionate and flexible approach, supporting bodies in scope with extensive guidance and practical tools aimed at improving outcomes for the armed forces community. My officials are creating a suite of materials for service providers to give clear guidance and practical support. The Valour regional officers will be able to provide tailored advice at a local level up and down the United Kingdom.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

That is a really good question. I will come back to the Committee with the exact detail, but lots of councils have engaged and have gold, silver and bronze standards. Some of them are exceptional. Some of them—this goes back to the point about the postcode lottery—do not necessarily need to sign up, because their community does not have a huge number of veterans or armed forces. I will endeavour to come back to the Committee with the detail.

There is already an established statutory duty to report to Parliament on the delivery of the covenant. There is therefore no need to establish a new reporting mechanism. The hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East is welcome to come and have a discussion with the Minister for Veterans and People and me about what that report looks like so that we can move it in the right direction. However, we believe that a proportionate, flexible approach, supported by guidance and ongoing engagement, is the best way to ensure that local authorities deliver meaningful support to the armed forces community without unnecessary administrative burdens.

I hope I have clarified the situation, reassured the Committee and offered up a brief for the Minister for Veterans and People and me on the annual report and what it consists of. I ask the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East to withdraw amendment 13.

[David Reed]

I thank the Minister for his wind-up. In the light of his answer, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Christian Wakeford.)

Armed Forces Bill (Third sitting)

David Reed Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Thursday 26th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 3, page 7, line 16, at end insert—

“(4) The Defence Housing Service will operate within a budget which must be set out in any Defence Investment Plan published by the Secretary of State.”

This amendment would ensure that Defence Housing Service’s budget is set out in any Defence Investment Plan published by the Secretary of State.

Good morning, Mr Efford. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again as we move on to clause 3, which concerns the proposed new Defence Housing Service and associated matters. I will speak to amendment 17 in my name. There are no Liberal Democrats in the room yet, but I am sure they will be joining us at some point.

We have been assisted in examining this topic by our very helpful evidence sessions with Mr David Brewer, the putative head of the new Defence Housing Service, and Ms Natalie Elphicke Ross, a former parliamentary colleague of ours on both sides of the House, who has materially assisted the Government with their review and the creation of their new plan. We acknowledge her efforts.

We also had a very informative Defence Infrastructure Organisation briefing during our visit to Portsmouth, where we visited a number of dwellings in a military patch outside the wire. That included houses representing both before and after, as it were: those that had been refurbished to an obviously good standard, and those that were still awaiting that work. I place on record our thanks to members of the DIO and to the Clerks for what was, as I hope the whole Committee will agree, an extremely informative visit.

Before we get into the meat of the debate, I will take it as read that all members of the Committee share the same objective: an improved quality of service family accommodation for our valued armed forces personnel and their families. Again, for the record, we thank them for their service. We would also like to see good-quality accommodation for senior service personnel. The debate is therefore not so much about the objective, which I think we all share, as about the best way of achieving it. That is where we may have some genuine differences of opinion this morning, but hopefully for the right reasons.

Amendment 17 focuses on the budget for the proposed new Defence Housing Service. Its essence is that the Defence Housing Service’s budget should be clearly set out in any defence investment plan published by the Secretary of State. [Interruption.] Good morning! The Liberals are now with us.

There is an obvious historical context for the amendment. I think it is fair to say that down the years, under Governments of both colours—three colours, if we include the coalition Government of 2010 to 2015—there has been a constant tension in the funding of the defence housing estate. On the one hand, there has been a desire to provide capital to upgrade it; on the other hand, there have been general pressures on the defence budget. It has not been unknown for capital expenditure to be deferred from one year to another to free up resourcing for other operational priorities that were deemed more pressing or urgent by Ministers at the time.

The aims and objectives of the new Defence Housing Service are rightly ambitious, which raises questions about how to secure the money and what safeguards there are, if any, against any future Government raiding that substantial pot of cash for other priorities should the circumstances arise. Both Mr Brewer and Ms Elphicke Ross were very clear in their evidence on the subject on 4 March: they said that after considerable discussion with the Treasury, a sum of some £9 billion had been put aside to create the Defence Housing Service and enable it to achieve its objectives laid out in the Bill.

Nevertheless, during the same evidence session, it was established after some detailed—indeed, forensic—questioning from my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East that the money had not been formally signed off by His Majesty’s Treasury. That is because the sum is currently included in the defence investment plan, which itself has not been signed off by His Majesty’s Treasury.

As we all know, the defence investment plan has not been published, although Parliament was initially promised it by last autumn. I do not intend to labour—no pun intended—the point this morning, as we debated it at some length in the main Chamber on Tuesday evening. Suffice it to say that when the Government published the strategic defence review in July last year, they deferred many of the crunchy equipment and capability decisions to a subsequent defence investment plan. We were promised that it would be published in the autumn. We were then faithfully promised that it would be published by Christmas. We were then absolutely promised that it would be published fairly shortly thereafter. Here we are on 26 March, the day on which the House rises for the Easter recess, and still it has not been published.

That leads to an additional problem, including for the Defence Housing Service. Part of the DIP, presumably including service accommodation in Scotland and Wales, could be affected by the outcome of the forthcoming Scottish Parliament and Welsh Senedd elections, at least indirectly. If the DIP is not published extremely shortly, it is likely to be caught by the purdah rules on those national elections. The putative date for the King’s Speech seems to be settling on or around 13 May. That means that the DIP is unlikely to be published until the second half of May, nearly two months from now, by which time the Defence Housing Service is meant to be under way.

In essence, we are debating a plan based on a long-term budget that has not yet been agreed by the Treasury because, bluntly, the Ministry of Defence is at war with it. That is why the DIP has not been published. It is conceivable—although, for the record, I hope that this will not be the case—that whenever final negotiations are eventually concluded, the Treasury may insist on further reductions in the DIP, which in turn could lead to further reductions to the £9 billion currently allocated for the programme. That is why we tabled amendment 17, which states that the budget for the Defence Housing Service must be very clearly set out in the defence investment plan, whenever it is published, not least so that in subsequent iterations of the plan we can see whether the funding allocation is being reduced or increased.

Will the Minister guarantee to the Committee that, as of 26 March 2026, the £9 billion in the forward programme has been formally signed off by His Majesty’s Treasury? In other words, can he guarantee that it is ringfenced in the DIP? If he cannot, can he at least tell us when the DIP will finally be published? A fortnight ago, I said privately to a Labour peer that waiting for the DIP was like waiting for Godot. He replied, “Yes, Mark, but at least Godot finally turned up.” Will the Minister answer those questions so that the Committee can take a view on the surety of the funding on which this admittedly very ambitious plan undoubtedly rests?

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I wish to add some points to bolster the argument of my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford.

We were promised the DIP before Christmas, but right hon. and hon. Members do not need me to tell them that it is now the end of March and we still do not have it. It is all well and good talking about a 25% reduction in delivery costs and about improved military housing, but until those promises are reflected in a clear, costed defence investment plan, they will remain words, not guarantees.

That is precisely why my right hon. Friend’s amendment 17 is so important. It states that if the Government are serious about defence housing, the Defence Housing Service’s budget must be set out in the DIP. It would tie the rhetoric on forces housing, new helicopters and new military hardware to an actual budget line. If Ministers truly intend to deliver what they have promised, they should have no difficulty in writing it into a plan.

Let us be clear with our service personnel and their families. We welcome investment when it is real, but we will not pretend that an uncosted statement is the same as a funded commitment. Until the Government publish the defence investment plan and the DHS budget is there in black and white, this House is being asked to take it on trust. That is not good enough.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)]

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I put on record my thanks to the DIO team, Natalie Elphicke Ross and the collective armed forces for helping us to design this well-thought-through and very effective defence housing strategy. I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for his amendment concerning the Defence Housing Service budget, and for his interest, as always, in the defence investment plan.

The defence housing strategy will be backed by £9 billion of funding to deliver a decade of renewal for defence family housing. Previously, military housing was subject to insufficient, stop-start funding that did not deliver value for money for the taxpayer or the improvements that service families deserve. I have lived in service family accommodation, as I am sure other hon. Members have. We have seen the oscillating budgets. We have seen, in some cases, the lack of value for money.

When this Government came in, one thing we said we would absolutely do was ensure that people can have safe, secure, dry homes to live in if their loved ones go overseas to protect the freedoms we enjoy. That is why we set out the defence housing strategy. We liaised with a plethora of individuals, from the families federations to housing associations, to ensure that we came up with a well-thought-through plan that is funded and looks at the medium and long term as well as the short term.

The Defence Housing Service budget will be clearly set out. It will account for its spending to Parliament via an annual report, so there will be accountability. As the Committee heard during the evidence sessions, there is nothing in the defence investment plan process that is stopping the Department getting work under way now. The Defence Housing Service can be up and running from April 2027, and the work of renewing the estate can continue.

[David Reed]

We have heard these arguments in Committee, we have had experts come in and we have visited defence housing. We need to get to the nub of this. The wording being used today is that there will be £9 billion in the budget and that we know it will be in the defence investment plan. As it is reported that the defence investment plan is sat on the Prime Minister’s desk at the moment, and I am sure the Minister will have seen the defence investment plan, can he confirm today that he has seen that £9 billion in the defence investment plan, and that it will be signed off with that £9 billion for housing?

[Al Carns]

I can confirm that £9 billion will be secured to ensure that we get the defence housing strategy and the Defence Housing Service up and running. We have said that in Parliament previously, and I reiterate it here.

It is worth noting the need for a Defence Housing Service and the professionalisation of our service as a whole, because some of the stats and facts from the time we came into Government were, I can only say, nothing short of shocking. In November 2023, there was a high of 4,200 complaints. Where is it in 2026? It is 400. We have already made improvements, we are heading in the right direction and we will continue to deliver in due course. We are getting on with the job of making improvements now for service families and preparing for the launch of the new Defence Housing Service so that we can go even further and faster to fix defence homes.

Setting a requirement in legislation, in the way that the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford suggests, is not only unnecessary but risks frustrating the vital work of the Defence Housing Service. His amendment 17, which specifies that the Defence Housing Service must operate within a budget set out in the DIP, risks constraining the service in the scenario in which investment is set in the defence investment plan but then has to rise thereafter. That could happen, for example, in the case of additional increases in personnel, or a change in the international situation that could require additional housing. Any additional spending would risk being in breach of the requirement unless and until a new defence investment plan is published. That would undoubtedly constrain the service’s ability to respond swiftly and appropriately to changing requirements. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the right hon. Member.

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[David Reed]

I am sure that many Members will recognise the unique situation that many armed forces personnel and their families face. Family life in service is often marked by prolonged periods of separation, frequent relocations and the operational demands that come with serving one’s country—I know many members of the Committee have experienced that life. Those pressures can place significant strain on relationships, particularly where families are no longer living together.

In those circumstances, maintaining meaningful contact between parents and their children can be especially challenging. I think we can all agree that, where it is safe and appropriate, children benefit greatly from having a consistent and positive relationship with both parents, regardless of whether one or both are serving. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford has laid out expertly how his amendment would not cut across what the courts have said. It seeks only to bolster the relationship between parents and children.

Amendment 15 would address a practical but important barrier to contact. By requiring service accommodation policies to make explicit provision for contact visits, it would recognise that the current system does not always adequately support separated families. Too often, there is no suitable space or arrangement in which a serving parent can spend proper quality time with their child, particularly where accommodation is limited, shared or not designed with family visits in mind, as we saw on our recent visit to Portsmouth.

Earmarking accommodation for this purpose would provide a clear and structured way to support those relationships. It would ensure that when a serviceperson seeks to maintain contact with their child, they are not prevented from doing so by logistical constraints or by a lack of appropriate facilities. It is a modest and proportionate step, but one that could make a meaningful difference to the wellbeing of service families.

Importantly, this is not about creating new entitlements without limits. It is about recognising a specific and foreseeable need, and ensuring that the system is equipped to meet it in a fair and practical way. It reflects our broader duty to support those who serve, not only in their professional capacity but in their family life.

[Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)]

Having had years of personal experience, I think it is a shame that the modernised accommodation offer did not go through, because that would have dealt with these situations. We are back to square one. The Minister will be aware that specific contact orders will have to be maintained, but we will have to build from a standing start after the disaster of the modernised accommodation offer.

[David Reed]

I recognise the hon. Member’s point. The service that she explains is not equitable across the whole system. I know that she speaks with experience. Having served myself, I have had friends in similar situations who have not received the type of support that she would have expected. I hope that progress can be made under the Bill. The amendment moved by my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford would push that agenda and make life, and having a relationship with their children, a lot easier for those who serve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Francois]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind comment—every dog has its day. Yes, I think it should, and that is partly the purpose for tabling the amendment.

For the avoidance of doubt, I accept in principle that, given the very large amounts of money we spend on equipment procurement—potentially more than £0.25 trillion over the next decade—paying someone quite a lot of money to get it to work is inherently not an unreasonable thing to do. Nevertheless, the appointment did raise eyebrows across the civil service.

To be fair, as I understand it, the chief executive of BAE Systems earns about £10 million a year—although if we look at what he has done to its share price, a shareholder might argue that it is a pretty good investment. Charles Woodburn is widely regarded in the industry as knowing what he is about, and is a highly professional leader of that company.

None the less, I have sympathy with the question posed by the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells. If this is part of the bonus arrangements, what are the metrics? If he were to get a bonus for the performance of Defence Housing Service, how do we know how much he will get? And how would we judge whether it is value for money, not just for the taxpayer but for the rent payers—the customers—of the Defence Housing Service? I hope the Committee will understand there is a genuine point at issue here.

We would be very interested to know what element, if any, of the NAD’s salary, and specifically the bonus payment, is related to the performance of the Defence Housing Service. By the same token—I hope the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells is with me here—if the Defence Housing Service were to underperform, what would happen to the NAD’s base salary? Would it be docked? It is a really serious question.

To summarise, could the Minister explain why the Department decided to manage it in this way? There must be a rationale, and the Committee would like to know what it is. Could he also explain how these bonus arrangements will work and how transparent all of it will be?

[David Reed]

My right hon. Friend has just laid out a very strong case for why amendment 16 needs to be incorporated into the Bill, and I hope the Minister has taken those points on board—I look forward to hearing his wind-up. This is a straightforward but important amendment that seeks to bring clarity, accountability and proper ministerial oversight to the way in which the Defence Housing Service reports on its performance.

At present, the reporting structure is, frankly, overly complex. Responsibility is diffused across multiple layers, making it difficult to establish who is ultimately answerable when and if standards fall short. That lack of clarity does not serve service personnel or their families, who depend on the system working effectively. We know from our visits and from Members’ own experience that there is an overly complex and convoluted reporting chain where nothing really gets sorted and things are passed up but never actually worked on. We now have the opportunity to improve that structure.

I do not think the current structure assists the House in carrying out its proper scrutiny of how public money is spent and how vital services are delivered. The amendment would put that right by establishing a clear and direct line of accountability, and it would require the chief executive of the Defence Housing Service to report directly to the Minister for the Armed Forces.

Going back to the point that my right hon. Friend just raised, incorporating the National Armaments Director and having that person accountable in this long chain does not breed the view that Parliament needs to be able to scrutinise what is going on. Given how much the Minister cares about this, and the fact that he is an elected representative, I know he would want to have that view unfiltered from the Defence Housing Service itself.

This is a sensible and proportionate step that ensures that responsibility sits at the appropriate level and that there is a named Minister who can be held to account by this House. More importantly, the public will ultimately hold the Minister to account anyway. If I were in his shoes, I would want that unfiltered view coming straight up to me. If we are talking about performance bonuses—and I have no reason to believe that that is the case with the National Armaments Director, but if it were to be the case—I would not want anything to be tarnished or moved around that was linked to performance bonuses. I would not want there to be any incentives like that.

There is also a practical benefit. A direct reporting relationship will help to ensure that the issues are escalated more quickly, decisions are taken more efficiently and there is greater transparency around performance, which is something we all want to see. It should also lead to better oversight, sharper focus on delivery and, ultimately, improved outcomes for those living in service accommodation.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Reed]

Referring back to the intervention of my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford, the bonuses are an important part of the Bill. If accountability for housing is now going through the National Armaments Director, and we are seeking to increase visibility so that we can scrutinise what is happening in the Defence Housing Service, that bonus part is important. Maybe this is an area for the Committee of the whole House, but we have to dig into it.

[Al Carns]

On the question of accountability, the board will report directly to the Secretary of State. There will be no filtering and no taint on any information coming up. Therefore, I do not necessarily agree with the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s intervention.

I will address new clause 7 in my closing remarks.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

Perhaps that is why we are not taking it forward now.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence heavily subsidises rents. There have been suggestions that the Defence Housing Service could borrow private finance off the balance sheet if it was a housing association rather than a public body. However, expert advice from the Treasury, the Cabinet Office and others confirms that is not the case. The exclusivity of the defence housing purpose and the scale of MOD payments mean that such financial arrangements are not feasible.

Equally important, and close to my heart, is the welfare of service personnel and their families. Evidence presented to the defence housing strategy review team revealed that local commands exercised significant discretion to support personnel in a plethora of difficult circumstances, such as bereavement. That welfare-based discretion is a cornerstone of armed forces culture, and moving housing management to a third-party provider could put it at risk, undermining this vital welfare function. Finally, the planned housing renewal programme demands very close working relationships with military commands to ensure that it supports operational effectiveness rather than undermining it. Such close collaboration is not realistically achievable through a private or third sector body.

[David Reed]

I refer the Minister back to amendment 16 on the line of accountability. He makes the point about adding an extra layer and removing accountability from the Minister for the Armed Forces. Does he not see that that is the point that we are trying to make? Making the CEO for DHS report directly to the Minister for the Armed Forces would give him an unfiltered view, so that he can do this work on bereavement or the state of housing. This direct line of accountability would give him that power.

[Al Carns]

There is some confusion here. The Minister for the Armed Forces does not deal with the housing, the people or the welfare; he deals with the operation and policy output. There is a clear understanding of that. Amendment 16 refers to

“ the Minister of State for the Armed Forces”.

That is the wrong role, so the amendment is wrong.

Let us just stick to the point. The board itself will be accountable to the Secretary of State. That is the cleanest way to provide a sharp and crisp command and control model, and to allow the Secretary of State to make sure that the board, which has family members on it, provides the best service. Let us not misunderstand some of the ranks, roles and responsibilities within defence.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Christian Wakeford.)

Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting)

David Reed Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford. Defence needs to protect itself from crime with security measures that will deter, detect and defeat criminal activities, including those directed by hostile states, that threaten its critical sites or operations. Currently, the only authorisation process that enables interference with drones that might be used to commit crimes that threaten defence operations and assets is in part III of the Police Act 1997. Only the civilian police can obtain such an authorisation to deal with these threats.

The increase in drone activity around defence sites means that defence cannot rely on local police forces for its security requirements. The emergence, in Ukraine and elsewhere, of drones as a new frontier of warfare has brought into sharp focus the urgent need for defence to meet this rapidly developing threat, not only in operational theatres but here in the UK, to protect defence operations and bases. We must have ways to protect ourselves from the threats posed by drones, be they in the air, on land or on or under water.

Clause 4 will create a regime whereby defence personnel can obtain authorisation to use approved equipment to prevent drones from being used to commit criminal offences in relation to defence sites and property in the UK. The regime will consist of a two-stage approval process.

The first stage will consist of a senior person in defence—a two-star military officer or civil service equivalent—giving authorisation for the use of approved equipment to detect and prevent relevant offences. Applications for authorisations can be made only by defence personnel; before giving an authorisation, they will need to be satisfied that it is appropriate, in the interests of national security, that it be given. An authorisation can cover one or more defence areas, particular defence property or a description of property. This stage will ensure that appropriate areas and property can be protected using the appropriate equipment. Defence areas include sites in the UK used for the purpose of defence, as well as sites used by visiting forces. Defence property includes vehicles and vessels in the UK. It will be possible for an authorisation to cover a description of such property—royal naval vessels, for example—so that it is not necessary for each one to be individually identified.

To ensure that the new regime is agile, we have not specified the type of equipment that can be used under an authorisation, or taken a power to prescribe this in regulations. Instead, the Secretary of State will need to approve equipment before it can be used. This will allow new equipment to be used as swiftly as possible to protect defence interests. The approval process will be governed by defence policy, which will ensure that equipment is safe to use or test in the UK. An authorisation can last for up to 12 months and may be renewed; it can also be varied or revoked.

The second stage in the authorisation process involves a responsible person. Before approved equipment can be used, the responsible person must be satisfied that it will be used only in accordance with the authorisation that covers the area or property to which it relates. Furthermore, before equipment can be used to detect and defeat a drone, the responsible person must be satisfied that it is both reasonable and proportionate to do so. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. As we all know, drones and other uncrewed systems are rapidly reshaping modern defence and are already central to surveillance, logistics and frontline operations. Their importance will only grow in the years ahead. For our armed forces, they offer speed, precision and flexibility; for our adversaries, they present new and evolving threats that we must be ready to counter. That is why the clause matters.

My own limited experience was back in the early 2010s, when I saw drones brought into military service in our operations in Afghanistan. Those pieces of kit were really expensive and large, but we could see how they were reshaping the modern battlefield. Looking at how the technology has evolved over the years, the first signs that I saw were in how prisoners were working with criminal networks on the outside to deliver drugs and other contraband into prisons. They were using cheap, commercial, off-the-shelf drones to carry out those illegal acts. The barrier to entry for such products has fallen significantly. Our military now has to contend with protecting military sites, bases and other critical assets from people who can buy cheap drones that have a big operational effect, so new powers need to be given to our armed forces people.

We will have more opportunities to strengthen these powers. We support what the Minister proposes, but we will discuss new clauses at a later sitting. The success of clause 4 will depend on whether the wider system supports it. We have heard repeatedly from colleagues across the House about regulation issues with testing autonomous systems in UK airspace or waters. Multi-departmental efforts will be required to take away some of the regulation, so that we can give defence manufacturing and our armed forces the ability to test the new technologies and implement them in their operational output.

Our armed forces must be equipped with not just the tools, but the doctrine and training to use them effectively. We have a clear opportunity for change. The United Kingdom has the expertise and the industrial base to lead in uncrewed systems, which is good for the export market. Clause 4 provides part of the foundation, but it must be matched by practical action to ensure that the capabilities can be delivered at scale. If we get it right, we will strengthen our national security, our defence industry and our critical national infrastructure; if we fall behind, others will set the pace. The choice is ours.

[Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford, after the Easter recess. I believe that the Minister clarified this point, but I ask for confirmation: will the extension of anti-drone permissions extend to US bases such as RAF Croughton in my constituency?

--- Later in debate ---

New clause 12 is therefore not a departure from the Bill’s architecture; it would be a necessary reinforcement of it. It would ensure that the protective intent underpinning clauses 5 to 9 is not inadvertently weakened by narrow jurisdictional discontinuity. It would close a loophole that may be technical in appearance but potentially significant in consequence. Of course, legislation of this nature rarely turns on grand philosophical divergences in this House. More often, it turns on whether the statutory scheme works in practice as well as it does in principle. The question is not whether protective orders are desirable—they clearly are—but whether the system for imposing them is watertight. New clause 12 would ensure that it is. For that reason, and in the spirit of strengthening the Bill, I hope that it has widespread support.

[David Reed]

It is difficult to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley—he is a former Army officer, a doctor and a barrister—but I will attempt to add to the debate.

This issue is clear: under the present framework, a service court can only impose protective orders—such as a sexual harm prevention order, a stalking protection order, a domestic abuse protection order or a restraining order—if the individual remains subject to service law at the point of trial or sentence. Where an individual has left the forces before that stage, the court’s ability to impose those protections falls away, even where the alleged conduct took place during service and proceedings were properly brought on that basis. That creates an obvious and avoidable gap—my hon. Friend laid out the argument on this expertly. It presents a route that any competent legal adviser could identify.

Where proceedings are pending or a conviction is likely, there is a clear incentive to leave service before the point at which an order could be imposed. The individual who may present the greatest risk to a victim, who knows their workplace, shares the same base or moves within the same social network, can remove themselves from the reach of a protective order simply by leaving. That is not a remote possibility; it is a foreseeable consequence of the current structure, and it should be addressed.

New clause 12 addresses this consequence in a proportionate and coherent way. It provides that, where an individual was subject to service law at the time of the alleged conduct or at the point of charging decision, the service court retains the power to impose protective orders as though the individual remained subject to service law. It does not expand service jurisdiction into new territory, and it does not create new offences. It simply preserves an existing power at the point where it is most needed: at conviction or sentence.

New clause 12 also ensures that such orders have full effect. An order made in those circumstances is to be treated as though it was made by a civilian court of equivalent standing, which would provide clarity on enforcement, avoid any uncertainty between service and civilian systems, and allow a proper provision through the regulations for recognition, enforcement and variation. In practical terms, it gives the courts a power that is both meaningful and workable.

The Bill makes a serious effort to strengthen the experience of victims within the service justice system. We heard from many experts during the evidence sessions, and that really brought it home for many of us on the Committee. Measures such as protective orders, enhanced powers for service police and independent legal advocacy represent real progress. However, it is important that those provisions operate together effectively. At present, there is a clear weakness. Where leaving service provides a means of avoiding a protective order, that weakness will be exploited. The purpose of new clause 12 is to ensure that it cannot be.

Those most likely to benefit from this change are often the most vulnerable. Individuals affected by serious sexual offences, domestic abuse or stalking within close professional communities face particular risks, especially where working and social environments are closely intertwined. For them, a protective order is not a technical matter, but fundamental to their sense of safety and ability to continue in their role. Access to that protection should not depend on whether an individual leaves service at a particular moment.

[Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I welcome the clauses we are considering. This Government were elected to renew the nation’s contract with those who serve, and this Bill promises to do that. We cannot do it without ensuring that armed forces personnel are protected from sexual and violent behaviour, domestic abuse, stalking and harassment. We must ensure that, if such incidents do happen, justice is swift and victims are supported.

As far as possible, the service justice system reflects the provisions of the civilian justice system, and the Bill is modernising and improving victim support. It was extremely helpful to speak to those involved in the service justice process, and I thank the Chair for organising those visits, which helped to inform us all.

Among the key measures being introduced are the sexual harm prevention orders and the sexual risk orders, which can be issued in the service court in response to provost marshal. The Bill also allows for service domestic abuse protection notices to be issued by the service police, and for service domestic abuse protection orders and service stalking protection orders to be issued by the service courts. This will ensure better protection for personnel and civilians.

The Bill also solves the discrepancy that exists between service courts and civilian courts if an offender is sentenced by the service court when they have committed a serious offence. Currently, the transfer from the service courts to the civilian justice system is undertaken on a discretionary basis. The Bill will modernise that system, and bring offenders sentenced by the service courts into line with the civilian justice system. The Bill will better support victims of a service offence by streamlining the complaints procedure.

I have some sympathy with the arguments behind new clause 12 and a great deal of respect for the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford. However, in practice, individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded. Even after an individual has already left service, sections 57, 58 and 61 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. My argument in respect of new clause 12 is that it is simply not necessary. However, I think dialogue between the Minister and the right hon. Member would be welcome.

[Al Carns]

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling new clause 12, which seeks to ensure that service courts can impose protective orders on individuals who leave service before trial and preventing the avoidance of such orders simply by leaving the service. I recognise the good will and the sentiment behind new clause 12. However, it is not needed.

I want to be clear that individuals should not be able to evade accountability for their conduct and that safeguarding measures must not fall away simply by reason of service or leaving the armed forces. Protecting victims of domestic abuse, stalking and sexual harm is a clear priority of this Government. The reality is that individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings—they just cannot. It is actually relatively complicated to leave the armed forces. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded.

Importantly, if for some reason an individual were to slip through the net and leave the service, sections 57, 58 and 61(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. Such a charge may be brought within six months of their leaving service, or after six months with the consent of the Attorney General, ensuring that service courts can still exercise that jurisdiction when necessary.

The Government have engaged with experts, including the Home Office, the Defence Serious Crime Command and safeguarding teams in the design and creation of service protection orders to ensure that they are robust and effective. That includes ensuring that service protection orders will be recognised and enforceable within civilian courts. That means that where a protection order is made, the Bill provides for those orders to transition to the civilian justice system once an individual leaves service and provides enduring protection for victim-survivors. The reality is that people cannot just leave the military, especially if they are under investigation. Secondly, if they do, they are still subject and can be pulled back for a minimum of six months. Taken together, that approach provides continuity, confidence and protection beyond service.

[David Reed]

The Minister is laying out a very well-structured argument, and I see many of the points, but I wonder about certain circumstances. For instance, if a serviceperson took drugs and was kicked out—they have to abide by those rules, which we all know about in the armed forces—what would then happen?

[Al Carns]

If there were criminal proceedings, he would be held to account in the service justice system for up to six months after the case. It is relatively simple. As we know, it is quite hard to leave the military, and when someone does, they are still subject to service law for six months after they have left.

The Government do not believe that new clause 12 is necessary and I therefore invite the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford not to press it. I also commend clauses 5 to 9 and schedules 2 and 3 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 6 to 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Victims of service offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

This important change will align the rights of victims in the service justice system with the rights already guaranteed to victims in the civilian criminal justice system in England and Wales.

[David Reed]

Clause 10 is a necessary and proportionate step to ensure that victims of service offences are properly recognised and supported within the military justice system. Those affected by such offences often face distinct pressures linked to service life, including close living and working environments and concerns about reporting within the chain of command. Strengthening protections and support mechanisms helps to build confidence in the system, encourages reporting and reinforces the principle that service personnel are entitled to the same standards of justice and care as any civilian. This is an important measure in upholding both discipline and fairness across the armed forces.

Clause 11 strengthens the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in a practical and necessary way. By allowing victims to bring complaints directly to the commissioner, it removes unnecessary barriers and ensures that their voices are heard more clearly and promptly. This change reflects a sensible and compassionate approach, particularly in cases involving service offences, where the experiences of victims must be treated with seriousness and respect. It reinforces accountability while improving access to justice.

[Al Carns]

Clauses 10 and 11, in reality, thicken out the service justice system and align it with the civilian justice system, providing greater freedoms and protections for anybody who is a victim within this system. I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Service policing protocol

--- Later in debate ---

[David Reed]

I acknowledge the intention behind amendment 6, and I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling it. It is designed to ensure that serious offences, including sexual violence and domestic abuse, are investigated by civilian police with the specialist expertise and resources that those cases demand. That is an objective that both sides of the Committee can support, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley has laid out, some of the wording and the blanket approaches that have been drawn into clause 12 need to be hammered out.

Public confidence in the handling of such grave matters is essential, particularly when they involve members of the armed forces. That said, it is important to examine whether the approach set out in the amendment is the most effective way to achieve that aim. There are practical considerations around how referrals would operate, how responsibilities would be divided and how we would ensure that victims experience a clear and consistent process from start to finish.

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

I find this a fascinating debate because we can all see the meaning of the amendment, but the hon. Gentleman mentioned victims. If he recalls, we all visited the Defence Serious Crime Command and the victim support unit, and it was made clear that the victim support service has made some real improvements over the past few years. In any crime investigation that is transferred from the service justice system to the criminal justice system, the victim support unit cannot support the victim. That is a concern to me, and it was raised with us. Does the hon. Member agree that is a considerable concern that we should look at?

[David Reed]

Yes, I completely agree. If a crime has happened and the victim engages with a support unit, having to move between civilian and military judicial systems, and switch between people that they have had trusted conversations with, is—if I were to put myself in their shoes—probably not what they want to do if they have been exposed to sexual violence or other violence. I completely understand the approach that the hon. Gentleman puts forward.

I am keen to continue constructive discussions with colleagues across the Committee, as well as with the Ministry of Defence, to ensure that our system for investigating and prosecuting offences continues to improve. I look forward to working with the Minister on those proposals.

[Al Carns]

I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for his views on the Bill, but before providing comment on amendment 6, I will first speak to clause 12.

Currently, under section 115 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, there is a duty on individual provost marshals to seek to ensure that all investigations carried out by the service police are free from improper interference. Clause 12 provides a power to create a protocol that will support the provost marshal in complying with that duty, but it also goes further than that. It will set out how all members of defence can support such investigations and improve the working relationship between key stakeholders in support of service policing. That power is loosely based on the equivalent power under which the civilian Policing Protocol Order 2023 was created in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. The civilian protocol sets out the operational independence and governance structure in civilian policing in England and Wales. There is currently no equivalent to that in defence and no clear articulation of investigative independence for service police to enable personnel in defence to ensure the support of investigations.

The effect of clause 12 is that, through the protocol that it provides for, it will be formally articulated to the whole of defence how people in defence should exercise, or refrain from exercising, functions in order to improve working relationships and ensure that investigations carried out by the service police are absolutely free from improper interference.

Amendment 6 seeks to amend clause 12 to override the victim’s preference. That is the key issue: to override the victim’s preference by making sure that all investigations and prosecutions take place in a relevant criminal justice system of the UK. That cannot be the right way forward. By overriding the victim’s preference, the amendment risks increasing the victim withdrawal rate. Noting the procedural differences between the two systems, 2024 administrative data on adult rape-flagged cases shows that the withdrawal rate from civilian police investigations is 59% compared with 24% from the Defence Serious Crime Command. We heard that from various witnesses in evidence sessions. The amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher in the civilian criminal justice system.

[David Reed]

We have talked a lot about the UK, but can the Minister give some clarity on when those offences happen abroad? Say, for instance, someone was on an overseas base in Cyprus, and the Cypriot police were to be involved. What would happen at that point and how would that affect the equation?

[Al Carns]

The hon. Member raises a very important point. I will have to come back to him with specific details and statistics on that, and I will write to the Committee.

As mentioned before, the amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher than in the criminal justice system. It also risks the loss or erosion of “golden hour” evidence and the safeguarding of victims in cases of sexual offending or domestic abuse. That is because the amendment does not place a duty on civilian police forces to accept the case. That could make delays in the civilian criminal justice system worse. In 2024, investigations of adult rape-flagged cases in the criminal justice system in England and Wales took 338 days. That is higher than the 148 days seen in the service justice system, even when taking into account the further 72 days until charge is directed.

To reassure the Committee, the Government are committed to making sure that each case, in particular those involving sexual offences or domestic abuse, is dealt with in the right jurisdiction. The prosecutors’ protocols therefore provide for decisions on jurisdiction to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the views of the victim. That is one of the most important points—the views of the victim and their preference. In the event that agreement cannot be reached in England and Wales, for example, the ultimate decision on jurisdiction lies with the Director of Public Prosecutions in the civilian system, so there is a fall-back mechanism. It is a priority for us that decisions on jurisdiction are made in a timely way and take into account the victim’s preference. That is why clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked their preference on jurisdiction.

There are two points I would like to come to. The first is the horrendous case of Gunner Jaysley Beck and what has been done since that incident, but also the Sarah Atherton review that took place in 2021. Since then, there has been a huge amount of work—under both the previous Government and this Government—to ensure that the service justice system, and indeed military culture, is transforming in the right direction. I will be really clear: when I joined, in 1999, LGBT individuals were still not allowed in the military. The culture has moved. It moved slowly, but it is moving faster, I think, in the last five years and in the last two years than I have seen it move in a long time.

There have been a couple of key milestones in that movement. The first one is zero tolerance to unacceptable sexual behaviour. That zero tolerance has trickled down to every rank in the military. I remember implementing that direction for my staff when I was the chief of staff for the UK carrier strike force. That took place across the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The Raising our Standards programme is a commitment to tackle unacceptable behaviours and to drive lasting cultural change—again, to try and move in the right direction. Importantly, the violence against women and girls taskforce change programme is now running in Catterick and Plymouth, something I launched when I was the Veterans and People Minister. There is also the tri-service complaint system.

All of those programmes are moving in the right direction to ensure that if anyone is a victim of sexual violence or harassment, they have a place to go to express their concerns. It also ensures that it is dealt with independent of the chain of command and allows the victim to raise issues and get them dealt with in the most effective and appropriate manner.

We are currently working on a formal information sharing agreement. Currently, information is shared with civilian police forces through local engagement during investigations. I am happy to continue dialogue and take that forward to make sure that that is more solidified, clear and standardised across various civilian police and military police elements.

The reality is that clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked for their preferred jurisdiction. Therefore, this Government maintain that case-by-case decisions taking into account the view of the victim—and that is critical, the view of the victim—is the best way forward. I hope that provides necessary reassurance to the hon. Member for North Devon, and on those grounds I ask him to withdraw the amendment. I commend clause 12 to the Committee.

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[David Reed]

These clauses deal with entry for purposes of obtaining evidence, arrest and detention by civil authorities, pre-charge custody, and time limits for charging certain offences. It is right that service police are given clear and effective powers to obtain evidence, as the Minister has laid out clearly, and that such powers are subject to proper judicial oversight. The provision to allow a judge advocate to authorise entry and search of relevant premises seems sensible to modernise the system and to help investigations proceed efficiently and lawfully. I also welcome the clarification around arrest and detention by civil authorities, and the extension of pre-charge custody arrangements in serious cases. The changes should help to ensure that serious allegations are dealt with more consistently and with the necessary urgency.

[Al Carns]

The clauses will enhance the ability of our military police forces and our provost marshals to enact service justice. These measures will make the forces safer, enable them to look after the victims, and support their freedom to operate within the military system.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 14 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Duty of commanding officers to report serious offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Al Carns]

Clause 17 will strengthen the duty of commanding officers to report allegations of serious offences to the service police. It removes an existing limitation where a commanding officer is obliged to report only a suspected schedule 2 offence committed by someone under their command. Under clause 17, where a commanding officer becomes aware that a serious offence may have been committed by any

“person subject to service law”

they must promptly refer the matter to the service police. However, the duty does not apply if the commanding officer reasonably believes that the service police or Defence Serious Crime Unit is aware of the matter. This is not a new process but an improvement to the existing duty, which will ensure that all serious allegations, including of sexual offences, are reported to the service police as promptly as possible. I commend clause 17 to the Committee.

[David Reed]

I welcome the clause, which seems a sensible and practical strengthening of the duty of commanding officers to report serious offences. The Minister, as a former commanding officer, will have experienced this duty at first hand, so I respect his judgment and expertise on the matter.

It is right that responsibility should apply wherever a commanding officer becomes aware of allegations concerning any person subject to service law, not only those within the officer’s direct chain of command. A broader duty will help to ensure that serious matters are not missed simply because of the structure of a unit or the form of command. At the same time, the safeguards in subsection (4), which mean that no further report is needed where the service police or tri-service serious crime unit is already aware, is a sensible way to avoid duplication and unnecessary bureaucracy. Taken together, the clause is a balanced reform that strengthens accountability, improves consistency and supports the proper investigation of serious offences across the services.

[Al Carns]

Commanding officers should always report an issue if they see one. With this change, they will have to and will be held to account.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Summary hearings: punishments available to commanding officers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Al Carns]

Clause 18 gives a commanding officer the power to award a punishment of service detention to a

“corporal, bombardier, lance sergeant or lance corporal of Horse in any of His Majesty’s military forces”.

Those are OR-4 ranks, according to the NATO military rank codes. The power may be used only by commanding officers with extended powers at summary hearing. Currently, commanding officers in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment cannot impose service detention on an OR-4 rank, whereas those in the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force can. This variation in powers risks delay and unnecessary cost to the service justice system through trials potentially being heard at the court martial rather than being retained for summary hearing.

Allowing service detention to be imposed at summary hearing on corporals in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment is also in line with the operational reality that our military capabilities are becoming more integrated and joint. It is therefore increasingly likely that OR-4s from across the armed forces will be jointly deployed or even in joint units. As a result, it is more likely that commanding officers may face situations in which OR-4s from different services are defendants at summary hearing in a single case or in linked cases.

Clause 19 will give a commanding officer the power to impose a deprivation order in combination with a punishment of service detention, forfeiture of seniority or reduction in rank or disrating. Such punishments are used in more serious cases seen at summary hearings. At present, a commanding officer can impose a deprivation order only alongside a fine or “minor punishment” such as an admonition. Where a charge has been proven at summary hearing or a conviction obtained in a service court, they can be used to deprive the offender of any rights to certain property—this is property that has been lawfully seized from an offender or was in the offender’s possession or control when apprehended or charged with an offence. That might be, for example, tools used to commit the offence, offensive weapons or controlled drugs. In the more serious cases that might be dealt with at summary hearing, clause 19 will enable commanding officers to impose punishments that are just and proportionate and that protect the public and other service persons—for example, so that the property cannot be used again to commit the same or similar offences.

[David Reed]

We welcome clauses 18 and 19 on summary hearings and deprivation orders with the punishments available to commanding officers. They represent a serious aim and a proportionate update to the summary hearing powers available to commanding officers. Clause 18 would promote greater consistency across the services, by enabling service detention to be imposed on corporals, as the Minister said, and equivalent ranks, bringing the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment into closer alignment with arrangements already in place elsewhere.

Clause 19 is likewise a practical step forward, as we heard in some of the evidence sessions. Permitting a deprivation order to be imposed alongside more serious summary punishments would give commanding officers a broader and more flexible set of options, while keeping matters within the summary system. That should help to ensure that sanctions are better tailored to the offence and the circumstances of the individual case. Taken together, the provisions enhance fairness, consistency and operational effectiveness, and we are pleased to support them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Roome]

It is important that we take on board the evidence from our visits. Otherwise, what is the point of going on them? That point was brought up when we debated a previous amendment, with reference to the use of the civilian or military justice system.

The hon. and gallant Member for Solihull West and Shirley made an excellent speech about using retired officers. We heard from those who are recruiting that there are delays. We heard during a visit that a senior officer had struggled to find a panel, and the process had been delayed because permission from the then Secretary of State was needed to use an officer of a lower rank. We also heard that it would be much easier to find officers. It is difficult to find officers of an equivalent rank, particularly among the higher ranks, who have not served or trained together or do not know each other, and to be sure that they do not have any relevant interest in protecting someone or perverting the course of justice. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford also made a good point about who constitutes the panel. I support amendment 9, because what is the point of our going on visits if we do not act on what we have been told is an issue?

We also heard a point that has not been mentioned today, which is that those in the non-commissioned ranks, such as warrant officers who have 25 or 30 years’ experience in the job, could also sit on the panels. It is not addressed in the amendment, but we heard evidence that those with years of military service and a lot of experience could be used on the panels too.

[David Reed]

I will add to the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and the hon. Member for North Devon.

The Opposition’s recollections align very closely with those of our Liberal Democrat colleague. Although we did not hear about a system that is breaking, we definitely heard about a system that is under strain. If memory serves—please correct me if I am wrong—we were shown a really good presentation by the people we visited in Portsmouth that demonstrated how the service courts have expanded. We had just a few men before; more rules and regulations have now been introduced, and thankfully women are being included, but extra bureaucracy has been added to the system. As the hon. Member for North Devon articulated, being more senior and not knowing people you have served with from other units is for the birds. We are going to end up with bottlenecks.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

As the hon. Member will know, trying to speak to people about whether they know other people is exceptionally difficult. Trying to capture that in a data record would be even more difficult. The 200 officers in service at the moment do not include the reservist pool, which is quite large—and that is just one-stars, not two-stars, three-stars or four-stars, so the pool is actually far larger.

I will go back to the purpose of sentencing at court martial, because it is an important point. As I say, it includes punishment, maintenance, discipline and deterrence. It must also take into account the best interests of the service and the maintenance of operational effectiveness. I completely agree that experience cannot be taught, but sometimes experience can wane over time. An appreciation of the relevant factors comes with experience, but also with the responsibilities of rank, as the veterans community will understand, and with the exercise of leadership and command over others. In some cases, that will not come with the most up-to-date operational context, which could cause an issue on the court martial board.

[David Reed]

We want to strengthen the Bill by working with the Government and taking a collaborative approach. Having a shared reality, in any aspect of life, is massively important. Among Opposition Members, there is alignment on the shared reality that we heard about, when we went down to Portsmouth, from the people we empower to run the service justice system. Does the Minister know of any of the cracks or weaknesses, as we heard about on our visit? Does he acknowledge that there may be issues to address?

[Al Carns]

Listening to evidence and acting on it is critical. Understanding the context in which it sits is equally important. Did that individual know that there are 200 one-stars within defence? Did they have the authority and responsibility to allocate individuals in a short, timely and effective manner to a court martial board? Probably not. The problem is not capacity. It is perhaps that the Defence Serious Crime Command needs greater authorities and programming to pool individuals in a timely and effective manner to sit on a court martial board and deliver justice.

Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting)

David Reed Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)]

I would like to make a correction to an earlier statement about new clause 12, before I continue to address amendment 9. I would like to clarify a point that arose in the debate on new clause 12 in relation to service protection orders. The powers in the Armed Forces Act 2006 create a time limit for charging former members and ex-regular reservists with a service offence committed while subject to service law of six months from the date they ceased to be subject to service law.

After a period of six months from the date on which they ceased to be subject to service law, a person may be charged with a service offence, committed while subject to service law, with the consent of the Attorney General. They do not remain subject to service law once they have left the armed forces, and the same time period also applies to civilians subject to service discipline. If there are any questions about the detail of that, I am happy to write to the Committee on anything specific that is required.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

I will just pick up on a point I raised this morning, which I discussed with an hon. Friend who has experience in this space. Take, for example, a crime that is committed while a person is serving that is not serious enough to warrant their being remanded into custody—it goes over the six months because it is a knotty case. Because there is zero tolerance on drugs, someone might say, “Right, this is a knotty case. I am going to get into trouble for it, and I am going to get kicked out regardless, so I will just take some drugs. I will be kicked out within a very short space of time”. If they then let those six months elapse, what is the process for that?

[Al Carns]

I am always very reticent to get into the detail and legalities of the exacts, given there are multiple variables that we are discussing, whether it be drugs or whether it be a criminal offence. If a person is serving and a crime is committed, they will not be allowed to leave until the process for dealing with the justice of that case is well thought through, whether that be within the military system or transferred into the civilian justice system, because they cannot just leave the military while there is a case ongoing. However, if the hon. Member has a specific concern about a specific case with correct parameters, we will ensure we write to him on it and all of its different variables. It is quite difficult to provide the specifics on that now.

[David Reed]

I will make that intervention now, and then we can carry on that conversation. If there is zero tolerance of drugs, and if the person who has committed a crime knows they will be kicked out—as they should be—it would be good to hear from the Ministry of Defence if there is a loophole in which someone could say, “I will do this act knowing full well that I will be kicked out very quickly”. It would be good to understand what the process is. Does that person continue to be housed by the armed forces? Where do they stay? Are they still part of their unit? What happens to them?

[Al Carns]

The broader welfare of individuals who are dismissed for misuse of drugs is a separate issue to the original offence and the judicial system, which will be followed through whether they are serving or whether they have left or been removed from the armed forces. What I am specifically saying is that they can still be charged six months after. The Bill will ensure that any of those processes that are put in place for them while in the military can seamlessly transfer to the civilian justice system, so that justice can be carried through. However, if there is a specific issue, bracket it in parameters, give it to us and we will make sure that we respond.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

Clause 21 provides judge advocates with the power to impose post-charge conditions on adult defendants in the court martial or service civilian court, where the defendant is not held in service custody.

Currently, judge advocates can only set post-charge conditions on a defendant’s behaviour or movements if the defendant appears before them in service custody. If a defendant appears before them who is not in service custody, they are unable to set any conditions. That causes problems when risks occur, such as absconding, reoffending, or interfering with witnesses. The clause provides that the defendant must be informed in writing of the grounds for the application and be given notice of the hearing. The defendant will be able to attend the hearing, be legally represented and make representations to the judge advocate. Defendants will also have the right to apply for a variation or discharge of any conditions set.

Clause 21 provides commanding officers and the service police with arrest powers for breach of a condition. It also establishes a service offence of failing to attend a hearing concerning a judge advocate-imposed condition, without reasonable excuse, carrying a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.

Finally, clause 21 provides a judge advocate with the ability to impose urgent conditions where they consider it necessary, without the need for the defendant to have notice of the hearing or to be present. In that situation, the judge advocate must arrange for a hearing with the defendant present to take place as soon as practicable and the conditions will stop having an effect at the end of that hearing. By creating a new pathway for judicially imposed obligations with specific enforcement, the measure will contribute to ensuring attendance, preventing reoffending, protecting witnesses, and safeguarding defendants.

Clause 22 will enable a new procedure to be introduced into the court martial rules, allowing for the dismissal of a charge as well as a mechanism to enable a previously dismissed charge to be brought again under certain conditions. The clause simply enables court martial rules to replicate a procedure that currently exists in the criminal justice system, known as the voluntary bill procedure. Once updated, the court martial rules will allow the Director of Service Prosecutions, in exceptional circumstances, to seek the High Court’s consent to reinstate a charge previously dismissed where it is in the interests of justice to do so. While there is no exhaustive list of the circumstances in which the High Court can grant consent, case law provides some guidance. Cases where the voluntary procedure has been used are where there has been a substantive error of law that is clear or obvious; where new evidence has become available; or where there was a serious procedural irregularity.

Clause 23 will enable the courts martial to use mental health-related powers, equivalent to those already in the civilian system under the Mental Health Act 1983, which include the ability to make a hospital order on conviction as part of sentencing. Currently, in cases where the accused has been found not guilty by virtue of insanity or where the accused has been found unfit to stand trial and there is a finding that they did the act charged against them by the service court, a judge advocate is able to make a hospital order under the Mental Health Act 1983. A hospital order provides initial hospital treatment instead of imprisonment for a criminal offence.

However, there is no provision for cases where the accused is diagnosed as requiring mental health care while awaiting trial; before a finding of fitness to stand trial has been made; or the accused has been convicted of an offence and not yet sentenced. While the service justice system has very few cases where such a provision may be required, a recent case highlighted that these powers may be required when the accused is dealt with before a fitness to plead and/or a defence of insanity has not succeeded and the accused is found guilty.

The clause ensures that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline receive safe, lawful and appropriate care, and that defence meets its legal and moral obligations to protect those experiencing serious mental health difficulties while in service.

I move on to clause 24. The Armed Forces Act 2021 introduced powers, known as slip rules, for commanding officers in summary hearings, the summary appeal court and the service civilian court, equivalent to the powers that already exist in the court martial. Slip rule powers simply enable punishments or activation orders made in error to be varied or rescinded quickly without the matter having to be referred to an appeal. Clause 24 addresses the error so that secondary legislation can implement the activation orders power for the service civilian court as originally intended.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. Clauses 21 to 24 cover powers to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention.

We welcome these clauses as sensible, technical enforcement improvements to the service justice system. They address a number of anomalies and gaps, and will help to ensure greater consistency, clarity and fairness in how the system operates. Taken together, the measures strengthen the ability of the service justice system to deal with cases effectively, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for those involved. They also bring aspects of the system more closely into line with civilian practices where that is appropriate. Overall, these are practical reforms that improve the functioning of the system and we are happy and content to support them.

[Al Carns]

These are technical changes to enhance the service justice system that deal with some of those knotty issues such as mental health. I recommend that the Committee fully support them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25

Guidance on exercise of criminal jurisdiction

--- Later in debate ---

We should not be content with a system in which victims are merely asked for a preference; we should insist on a system in which that preference is informed, structured and supported by genuinely independent advice. If we can achieve that, I genuinely believe that we will not only improve clause 25 but strengthen confidence in the wider service justice system. In an area of such sensitivity, that should not be considered secondary—it is central to the legitimacy of the entire framework. For that reason, I hope that hon. Members will support these amendments.

[David Reed]

My hon. Friend has again laid out the argument in an extremely comprehensive way, and it will be difficult to add anything new to the argument that he has put forward, but I will give it a go.

Ensuring that a victim is properly informed before being asked to state a preference on whether their case is heard in the service justice system or the civilian courts is essential, and I think we can all agree on that. The principle of concurrent jurisdiction allowing a victim to have a voice is a positive one.

However, a preference given without adequate understanding is not a meaningful choice; it becomes a procedural step rather than a genuine expression of agency. It is important to recognise that. The two systems differ in significant ways, and we have heard that in a lot of the evidence sessions and during our Committee trip down to Portsmouth.

These systems operate under distinct procedures, timelines and support arrangements and can lead to different outcomes. Many victims will have no prior experience of either system, and some may be asked to make this decision while in considerable distress. Without a clear, neutral explanation of what each system entails, the process does not empower victims but risks forcing them to make an uninformed decision or leaving them susceptible to undue influence. To reinforce that point, although it may be easy to make the decision when you have a clear head, if you have been the victim of a crime and your head is all over the place, having to make an informed decision when the information on the two systems is not clear and you have not encountered either system before makes the situation even more troubling.

The amendment would establish a basic standard to require that victims are given a clear, accessible and impartial explanation of both systems before any preference is sought. That explanation would cover how each process works, what support is available and the potential outcomes, and inform victims of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy and how to access it. Crucially, it would introduce a requirement for a written record detailing the information provided and, where preference is expressed, the reasons given.

[Al Carns]

I thank the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley for speaking to amendments 18 and 19. I acknowledge their sentiment, which is to ensure that the information provided to victims is appropriate and timely. The Government’s intention is to ensure that when a victim of an offence committed in the UK by a serviceperson is asked to indicate a preference on jurisdiction, they can do so in an informed way. The information provided must be accurate, helpful and, of course, objective, so I share the hon. Member’s objectives.

The Government have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand what information should be provided to the victim, how and when it should be provided, and who should provide it. That complex, detailed work involves stakeholders from across the criminal justice systems of England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, including the Victims’ Commissioners, and has so far highlighted the importance of seeking an informed view from the victim and that that information should be provided in a factual and impartial way. It has also highlighted that where a victim indicates a preference as to whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on, and that a record of the discussion of the victim’s preferred jurisdiction, and the reason given for it, must be kept.

Our work with stakeholders has also highlighted the importance of taking into account the needs and circumstances of the victim, and the circumstances of the offence, so the guidance must allow for a flexible, case-by-case approach. In some cases—as offences take place in different times and contexts—it may not be appropriate to confront a victim who only shortly before experienced a rape offence with many pages of written information to digest. In those cases, a more trauma-informed, verbal approach, under the statutory guidance and supported by a shorter leaflet or booklet, may work better.

In other cases, a victim may have a strong view from the outset that their case should be dealt with in the civilian criminal justice system. Asking that victim to go back through lots of information about the service justice system when it is already known that they have a strongly held preference would be unwelcome, and may prove counterproductive, as the civilian police investigator risks coming across as questioning or disbelieving the victim’s preference, undermining future co-operation with the victim and, ultimately, the successful investigation of the case. I absolutely understand the hon. Member’s intent, and I hope that I have provided some reassurance that guidance will facilitate access to support that is independent of the chain of command, policing and prosecutors.

Amendment 19 is, in some ways, linked to amendment 18, and seeks to ensure that victims have access to independent support before indicating a preference on jurisdiction. We have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand who can support victims to reach a preference on jurisdiction, which will vary across the UK and across the service justice system. Where the victim indicates a preference on whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on. For example, when initial contact is made with service police, victims of serious sexual offences may choose to seek support from the Victim Witness Care Unit, which is independent of the chain of command and of service policing. Alternatively, they might wish to discuss the matter with the lead service police investigator. Crucially, the guidance will facilitate access to alternative support in response to the wishes of the victim.

In February 2026, the Government announced that we would launch the independent legal advocacy support programme pilot, which will provide impartial legal support to anyone aged 18 or over, irrespective of whether they are a serviceperson or a civilian. Anyone who reports a sexual offence that has been committed by a serviceperson subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, when that is being investigated by the service justice system, will qualify for support under the scheme.

--- Later in debate ---

[Al Carns]

At present, service courts are empowered to make a driving disqualification order against an offender in proceedings for a service offence. However, there is no legal mechanism for service courts to reduce that period of disqualification from driving where the offender undertakes an approved course, unlike the civilian justice system. Clause 27 will enable the service courts—the court martial and the service civilian court—to make an order to reduce a period of disqualification from driving where the offender satisfactorily completes an approved course. This new power will be available to a service court where it convicts an offender of a certain road traffic offence, such as drink-driving, and imposes a driving prohibition of 12 months or more. These provisions address a gap in the existing legislation that has meant that the powers of service courts in relation to driving prohibitions are more limited than those of their civilian counterparts. It will ensure that the service courts have the same tools available to them as the civilian courts when dealing with these sorts of cases.

[David Reed]

Clause 27 aligns the service justice system with the civilian courts and introduces a constructive way for offenders to reduce their disqualification period through completion of an approved course. On our side of the Committee we see that as a practical and proportionate reform that supports rehabilitation, encourages personal responsibility and delivers greater consistency across both systems, and we are happy to support it.

[Al Carns]

These provisions address a gap in existing legislation, so I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Rehabilitation periods

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Al Carns]

I will begin with clause 28. The minor service sentences of reduction in rank or disrating, of forfeiture of a specified term of seniority or all seniority, and of service supervision and punishment orders all serve a useful purpose in punishing service personnel. However, these sentences are effectively made redundant by having no rehabilitation period. That undermines the purpose of the punishment, which by its nature is designed to have an impact on an individual’s career. The single services have no opportunity to consider whether administrative action should be taken against a serviceperson because the convictions are considered immediately spent. Administrative action has a range of options and may include assessing whether the nature of the conviction means that the individual is unsuitable for life in the service, or whether they are suitable for promotion during the period of rehabilitation. Considering these options following a conviction is vital to maintain operational effectiveness and the welfare and safety of others in the armed forces.

Clause 28 will establish rehabilitation periods of 12 months for these sentences. As a result, the rehabilitation periods will be harmonised with those for other minor service sentences: custody for one year or less, removal from His Majesty’s service, service detention, reprimand and severe reprimand and a fine. The clause also aligns the rehabilitation periods in Scotland with those in England and Wales. The required amendments relate to differences in terminology. Clause 28 will preserve the intended disciplinary effect within military administrative processes and maintain operational effectiveness and the welfare and safety of others in the armed forces.

I turn to clause 29. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 prevents the single services from taking administrative action when a conviction becomes immediately spent. Increasingly, the civilian police in England and Wales issue simple cautions for a wide range of offences, and those cautions are treated as spent right away. As a result, the services are unable to take administrative action in response to conduct that may still be relevant to a role in the armed forces. A single lapse in conduct, however minor it may appear in civilian terms, can have serious consequences in a military environment, where values, standards and cohesion are not optional but fundamental to keeping our people and our nation safe. As we continue to professionalise the armed forces and rebalance the demographic representation, the current approach is increasingly inappropriate, especially where the conduct resulting in a caution is incompatible with the high values and standards expected of our armed forces.

Clause 29 will create an exemption from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act that enables the single services to place a disclosure obligation on serving members of the armed forces to report spent cautions. Once it is disclosed, the single services will be able to consider the caution and, if necessary, take an appropriate approach to conduct associated with it.

Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to maintain the highest standards, ensuring that every incident is addressed appropriately, that victims are supported, and that we can better retain and recruit our personnel. At a time when we are committed to halving violence against women and girls and to driving up the integrity and professionalisation of our armed forces, this change is not only timely but essential.

[David Reed]

Clauses 28 and 29 are practical and proportionate reforms. Clause 28 defines rehabilitation periods for certain service punishments under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Sanctions such as reduction in rank, forfeiture of seniority and service supervision and punishment orders will no longer be treated as spent. Again, that is a good approach.

Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to require the disclosure of spent cautions issued to service personnel during their service period. I note the points that the Minister raised about the information that may be used by superior officers for administrative rather than disciplinary purposes or to support the maintenance of discipline, operational effectiveness and rehabilitation within the forces. The clause also provides clear definitions of “superior officer” and “administrative action” to ensure consistency in how the relevant provisions are applied. The Opposition support the clauses.

[Al Carns]

This is about improving our service justice system and, of course, the ability of our command chain to enact the highest standards. I commend clauses 28 and 29 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30

Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Reed]

I will expand on clause 30. I pay tribute to my near-ish neighbour in Cornwall, the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, for her work on the issue and how she has progressed it in the House of Commons. I think that clause 30, which will extend the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner to include the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, reflects a clearer understanding of the role of RFA personnel and the part they play in our national security. It will ensure that those who serve in this unique capacity are afforded a basic safeguard: an independent route through which serious welfare concerns can be raised and addressed.

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary occupies a distinctive and often misunderstood position within His Majesty’s naval service. Its personnel are civilian mariners who operate alongside the Royal Navy in demanding environments. They are not members of the armed forces in a strict legal sense, yet they deploy globally, support military operations and spend long periods at sea under conditions that closely mirror those faced by uniformed personnel.

I have spent nowhere near as much time in the military as the Minister, but I have spent a small amount of time on RFAs. It is difficult to distinguish between members of the RFA and those of the Royal Navy, and the professional standard across both organisations is definitely felt. That reality matters, because the pressures arising from such service are significant: long deployments, separation from family, fatigue and the strain of high-tempo operations can all take their toll. In a period of international conflict, with the multitude of issues coming down the track, I can see those ships and their crews being used even more. Getting this right in the Bill now is massively important.

There can also be issues relating to bullying, harassment and misconduct. Those are real concerns that affect morale and wellbeing. For too long, RFA personnel have lacked a clearly defined, independent mechanism for raising serious welfare concerns beyond existing civil service or employment processes. Clause 30 will address that gap in a proportionate way by providing a credible avenue for concerns to be examined where other routes may be insufficient.

Schedule 4 is key to making this reform workable. It sets out how the commissioner’s functions will apply in practice, including a duty to promote the welfare of RFA personnel and improve public understanding of the issues that they face. Greater visibility will strengthen accountability and support better outcomes. The schedule will also enable the commissioner to investigate general welfare matters affecting the RFA. That will ensure that their role is not limited to individual complaints and that they can identify wider patterns and systemic issues where they arise. That is how effective oversight should operate, and it is what we should expect of people who work with our military in such a close way.

The extension of powers has been designed with care. The RFA is a civilian-manned service, and the safeguards reflect that. The provisions on powers of entry are also essential. The commissioner must be able to visit vessels and premises, examine documents and speak to personnel. Without that, oversight would lack substance. Those powers are rightly subject to safeguards, including restrictions on grounds of national security or safety, and the protection of legal privilege.

I also welcome the amendments relating to reporting and governance. Including RFA functions in the annual reports will strengthen transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. Preventing RFA members from serving as deputy commissioners will help to preserve the independence of the office.

Taken together, these provisions form a coherent and practical framework. They extend meaningful protections to RFA personnel while respecting their unique status. Ultimately, the clause is about fairness and recognition, which is something I think we all agree on. It acknowledges the vital contribution of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and will ensure that those who serve have confidence that their welfare matters and their concerns will be properly heard.

[Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I feel I should say something about this, as I started it. I did so because I consider Falmouth to be the home of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Bay class ships, as it is where they are maintained and repaired, so the RFA personnel are in great part my constituents.

RFA personnel are fundamental to the Navy and to the military. In many cases, as has been pointed out, they allow them to do their job. Recently, they worked on operations relating to the shadow fleet and protecting cables. One of the Bay class ships became a hospital ship off the west coast of Africa during Ebola. The RFA has played multiple roles, often as the forgotten service; it slips between the civil service and the military. Many in the RFA feel that their work has not been appreciated, so I am pleased that the Government have picked up on that and put this clause in the Armed Forces Bill—it is much appreciated. It is the start of work on building recognition of the RFA and on retention and recruitment within the service, which has struggled of late. I appreciate this measure and am very pleased that it has been included.

Armed Forces Bill (Sixth sitting)

David Reed Excerpts

Select Committee stage
Thursday 16th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Al Carns]

Because of the decentralised nature of the military, some units, depending on reserve liability, will absolutely try to recruit those individuals into the reserve immediately. There is not carte blanche across the entire military, because in some areas we do not necessarily need those individuals in the reserves—if that makes sense.

Going back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble, there is a lot more work to do to make the transition much smoother. Clause 31 will reduce the huge bureaucratic hurdle of individuals having to leave the regular military to join the reserves. Over time, it should become seamless, so someone can also go from the reserves back to the regulars. We want to replicate a civilian job where, for example, if someone has welfare issues, they can leave and do a couple of years in the reserves, and then come back into the regulars far more seamlessly. That will also allow someone to pursue a career in the defence industry, for example, if they are a technical expert.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I raised a point about clearances when we first started discussing the Bill, and that is one of the sticking points we need to get right. If people have secured security clearances—enhanced developed vetting—in the military, but then go into an organisation that does not hold that clearance and it elapses after three, six or however many months, they are lost. If they then want to go into the defence industry where they might need developed vetting—and we want those people to be going into the defence industry—they have to start the process all over again. They might waste 12 or 18 months, or two years, getting cleared again. Can something be done to hold clearances in a sort of bucket—I know other organisations do that—to make that zig-zag process a lot easier?

[Al Carns]

I would like to return to the hon. Gentleman with the detail around that vetting process, but I will give an example of some of the complexities. If an individual leaves and goes to work overseas for another company, that may invalidate their DV status, so we need to take it case by case. However, he is absolutely right that we need to make it easier, if we are going to adopt a zig-zag career process, for vetting to follow suit, almost by exception, but individual cases need to be taken into consideration.

Clause 31 amends part I of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 and section 331 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, which concern the transfer between regular and reserve forces—something I just discussed. The changes to armed forces legislation will enable those of warrant officer rank equivalent and below to more easily transfer to the Volunteer Reserve. Further, they will permit a more seamless transfer into regular service for reserves. We will also amend the secondary legislation that covers officers, who are employed differently and therefore not covered by this legislation, so that the same effect is achieved for them.

To address the comments made by the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford, the Strategic Reserve is slightly different. I will be relatively honest: the reserve architecture that we have inherited, which has gone on for multiple Governments, is a continual layering of bureaucracy, to such an extent that I describe it as a spaghetti soup of terms and conditions of service, pension payments, liability, skills, qualifications and patronage. It needs simplifying. Alongside other clauses, clause 31 is one of the first steps in moving towards a more simplified process that will allow us to capture data more effectively and use the Strategic Reserve as and when required.

I give a couple of examples. The right hon. Member was right to mention that there are 2.1 million veterans out there. Most of them came from conscription or national service, and the reality is that we never kept records on any of those individuals. There are records on some pensions, but not all of them were entitled to pensions because the pension system was different. As a result, it is exceptionally difficult to map and track their skills and capabilities, and even how long they served. Those are some of the reasons why it takes so long to go through the claims process. There are warehouses full of documents and medical records that are still analogue, not digital. They require humans to go through big yellow pages of files to find data to cross-check with doctors and so on. The records and recording system have never been digitised, and it is exceptionally difficult to do so.

On the Strategic Reserve and the numbers, circa 15,000 people leave the military every year. At the moment, for those in the Army, Navy or Air Force, whether they are an officer, warrant officer or another rank, depending on how long they have served, there is a different liability for return to service. That means that when they leave the gates, they still have a return of service and they can be called on by the nation to serve again. That can be for four years, six years or 18 years in some cases—it depends. It might be more for an officer or less for another rank. It is, again, a complete mess. The Bill simplifies it. Everybody will do 18 years. Whether someone is an officer, another rank, Army, Navy or Air Force, they will do 18 years when they leave the military.

I am a marine, so Members should be careful of my maths, but 15,000 times 10 will give us 150,000 in the Strategic Reserve within 10 years. That is on top of what we already have—on top of those in the reserve and regular forces. That is probably two echelons of the Army. It is a fantastic clause that gives us more redundancy and resilience as a nation over the longer term, and ensures that we have a proper package.

The critical part, highlighted by the right hon. Member, is how we collect the data. How do we ensure that we can track and pull back the right skills at the right time to deliver the effect we need, whether that be a Typhoon pilot, a nuclear engineer, a chef or an infantryman? We are working through the details. There is something clever to be done with the veteran ID card, with pensions—although there is a GDPR issue there—and with the individual’s requirement to stay in touch with the military. It is a combination of all three, while accepting that some people who leave the military want nothing to do with the military ever again.

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[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Before I start, I should probably put it on record that I am on the RARO—Regular Army Reserve of Officers—list as a former Regular Army officer.

I joined my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford on the delegation to Ukraine, which was put together by UK Friends of Ukraine and during which we had some very interesting conversations, as he said, about the ability to mobilise reserve forces at a time of pressing threats.

I want to speak very briefly—I am sure other Members will be pleased that my contribution will be brief—on amendments 20 to 24. I will start with amendments 20 and 21, with amendment 21 being consequential on amendment 20. These appear to be sensible technical amendments that would bring the Bill in line with the civilian world. In the light of the facts that the retirement age is likely to be pushed forward as people are living longer, that we need to have a more flexible and resilient reserve force, and that the nature of warfare has changed, with many more technical roles, it seems sensible to increase the age of liability to 67.

On amendment 22, my right hon. Friend set out very clearly the growing threats. It is a daily occurrence for us in this place to be talking about the increasing and ongoing threats facing us across the world. In those circumstances, it seems wise to extend the duration of a recall order from 12 months to 18 months. That does not mean it would have to go up to the 18-month point, but it would provide more flex and resilience in the system.

Amendment 23, again, reflects the realities of life. Many individuals who have served in uniform go into roles that are vital for our defence, albeit are no longer required still to wear the uniform of His Majesty. In those circumstances, to lose their skillset by automatically requiring them to be recalled from those reserved occupations seems counterproductive to the aims we should be seeking to achieve.

Finally, amendment 24 recognises the reality of the situation we live in. We need more flexibility to respond with agility and speed to changing circumstances. Therefore, halving the notice period for recall from 180 days to 90 would seem a sensible and prudent approach.

I promised Members that my contribution would be short this time, and I have delivered on that promise.

[David Reed]

Given that my colleagues have very ably gone through amendments 21 to 24, I will just comment on amendment 20 before handing over to the Minister.

Amendment 20 would increase the maximum age for service in the reserve forces from 65 to 67, which is important in bringing the reserves in line with the age of retirement, which now sits at 67. Parliament has decided that is the threshold at which the working life of a British citizen typically ends, and it makes no obvious sense to retire reservists two years before the age at which we expect the rest of the working population to stop. As the Minister and other colleagues have said, the knowledge of a cyber specialist, a military medic or a logistics officer does not expire on their 65th birthday.

We are legislating at a moment when the security environment is more dangerous than at any point since the cold war, if not world war two. War has broken out across the European continent, and there are wars in the middle east and across Africa. Technological change is speeding everything up, and climate change is increasing volatility. The threats that we face, whether hybrid, cyber or conventional, are growing in scale and sophistication. The Armed Forces Minister himself, in introducing the Bill’s Strategic Reserve measures, said:

“we live in a…fragile environment”,

and the United Kingdom needs

“to be able to recall experienced people faster and more effectively”

should the country need to prepare for war. That is an honest assessment of where we are. If we accept that framing, as I think we should, the case for retaining every capable, willing and medically fit reservist for as long as possible follows directly from it. We should not be narrowing our pool of trained people by two years for no compelling reason.

The strategic defence review is explicit that we need to grow the reserves by 20%, but that ambition runs directly against the policy of letting experienced people go earlier than we need to. At a Royal United Services Institute event in December 2024, General Gary Munch described the current approach as “decommissioning” personnel—the same word that we use for retiring ships. He was making a pointed observation: we would not withdraw a capable platform from service simply because it has accumulated years, and we should apply the same logic to people. The amendment would not impose an obligation on anyone; it would remove an arbitrary ceiling. That is a proportionate ask.

[Al Carns]

I thank the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells for tabling amendment 1. We owe a debt of gratitude to those who serve, and of course we have an ongoing duty of care to those who have given service to their country but can no longer serve due to medical issues, especially if those issues were a result of their service. Statistics show that there were about 1,900 people medically discharged in financial year 2024-25—700 of those were for musculoskeletal issues, and 800 were for mental or behavioural issues.

Some of those individuals who have left—it could be for an Achilles injury, a break or a back problem—still wanted to serve, but they could not serve in their current role because of the medical requirements. That is not to say that they could not serve in another role at a later date when they had healed or recovered. Our current policies exclude those who have been discharged for a range of conditions from further service, but it would be wrong to exclude all personnel from further service permanently through a change in the law. Keeping these rules set out in policy and secondary legislation gives us a degree of flexibility. Should circumstances change and we require more of our ex-regulars—for example, in a war-like situation—we could give people who want to serve the opportunity to do so.

I understand the concerns of the hon. Member for North Devon about the effect that further service might have on those service personnel. I assure the Committee that any recall into service will be done on a case-by-case basis. We will consider the serviceperson’s service record, including their medical status. Indeed, there will also be regulars who left the service fully medically fit but who, in the intervening years, have unfortunately become unwell and therefore may not be able to undertake further employment with the armed services. Those cases would also have to be considered.

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for his views on the Bill, and I acknowledge his concerns about the flexibility and readiness of our reserves. On amendments 20 and 21, we are increasing the age limit for recall liability to 65 for other ranks across all three services. That will enable defence to draw on the valuable skills and experience provided by former service personnel aged 55 and above. Recently retired non-officer personnel in the 55-plus age range who have knowledge, skills and experience from a full career provide a useful latent capability to draw upon when needed.

Although I acknowledge the right hon. Gentleman’s proposal to raise the age to 67, which will shortly become the state pension age, my view is that it would not be the most prudent way forward. Recall liability in the reserves is a significant responsibility, because it demands that individuals balance their civilian lives with readiness to serve their country at potentially short notice, reflecting a profound personal and civic duty.

Further increases to the liability from 65 to 67 would be an imposition, given that the measure already addresses the gap in capability. We estimate that the proposed increase in liability will affect only 1.1% of personnel between the ages of 55 and 65 who left the regular forces during the financial year 2024-25. There were no UK regular forces or other ranks personnel who left during that financial year between the ages of 65 and 67.

It is worth noting that some individuals, depending on their service, can still serve up to 67. Therefore, the amendment would not achieve its intended effect, as it concerns a relatively small group of individuals already accounted for within the measure. Indeed, it undermines the balance between the responsibilities defence places on our serving personnel and the operational demands we face.

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I do not wish to try further the patience of the Committee—[Interruption.] What I am talking about is important. This bunch of young people want to benefit from being in the air cadets, but they are struggling to do so because of bureaucracy. I hope colleagues will forgive me, but this Committee seemed the perfect opportunity to raise that issue. If any hon. Members have any issues in their constituency, now is their time to voice them.

[David Reed]

To back up the shadow Minister’s point, I was an air cadet for a number of years—[Interruption.] I know he is laughing at that, but in my experience, it was not about recruitment or a pathway into the armed forces. It was really powerful to have, as a youngster, the opportunity to do adventure training, shooting and flying, and to have a link with the military. As we ask citizens across the UK for more taxes to increase armed forces spend, our young people having that link to the military will be important, so I completely agree with my right hon. Friend.

[Mr Francois]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s comments. He proves that the issue is not all about recruitment, as he was in the Air Training Corps but joined the Royal Marines. I thank him for his tri-service.