draft Data Protection Privacy and electronic communications (amendment etc.) (EU exit) regulations 2020

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Wednesday 25th November 2020 General Committees

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, Mr McCabe, to serve under your chairship for this important statutory instrument. I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. I also state for the record that although I was as dismayed as most people by all the emails that invaded our inboxes from organisations explaining their data privacy policies when the general data protection regulation took effect in 2018, I was pleased that data protection was finally beginning to be taken seriously and coming to the attention of the vast majority of people—even in that most irritating way.

Data is the business model of the internet age. It is often referred to as “the new oil”. I do not like that because we have seen what oil extraction has done, both to the environment in countries such as Nigeria and to the planet with carbon emissions. We want to make sure that the impact of data is more constructive in the short and long term. It is certain that there is an impact. As more and more aspects of our lives move online—and the pandemic has accelerated that migration—we all excrete a trail of data and create a data doppelgänger, which can be used to empower and inform us or to control, sell to and disempower us. Data privacy, data rights and data flows are therefore of critical importance to all of us.

Depending on any deal, which may or may not be signed —we still do not know—by the Government when the UK leaves the transition period, our data and data protection will no longer be subject to the European Union’s GDPR law. Instead, we will have transposed EU GDPR into UK GDPR. The direction in which the UK takes GDPR will have a wide-ranging impact. Cross- border data flows are now an absolute requisite of trade, with businesses reliant on their ability to transfer personal data about their customers or workforce to offer goods or services and run even basic internal processes such as cloud-based email or file storage. Those all involve data flows, but that is especially true of digitally intensive sectors—telecommunications and financial services, which account for 16% of UK economic output and a quarter of total exports, according to techUK.

As the Minister set out, the SI amends and revokes areas of legislation to ensure that the European Union’s GDPR law is translated into UK GDPR law in time for the end of the transition period, as agreed under the withdrawal agreement. The EU GDPR will become UK legislation on IP completion day and, as such, will become the UK’s GDPR. It is then immediately corrected by today’s SI.

As the Minister set out, the SI seeks to ensure that the legal framework for data protection within the UK continues to function correctly after the transition period. The changes in the SI update the date on which the DPPEC come into force from the start—exit day—to the end of the transition period, IP completion day, in effect applying EU case law during the past nine months, ensuring that personal data can continue to be transferred to third countries as it could immediately before exit day. And they set out revised transfer provisions for law enforcement data to include the addition of EEA countries.

The current transitional mechanism does not apply for any EU adequacy decisions that are repealed or suspended immediately before IP completion day, as amended by this instrument. On 16 July 2020, in case C-311/18, commonly referred to as Schrems II, the Court of Justice of the European Union declared one such decision, the Privacy Shield agreement with the USA, to be invalid. Therefore, the transitional mechanism will not apply for that decision, and this SI removes Privacy Shield from the list of transitional adequacy provisions that the UK will roll over.

The SI incorporates European Union decisions on the adequacy of third party countries in UK domestic law. Data adequacy is a status granted by the European Commission to countries outside the European economic area that provide a level of personal data protection comparable to that provided by European law. When a country has been awarded the status, information can pass freely between it and the EEA without further safeguards being required.

However, despite the UK’s application of the GDPR and implementation of the law enforcement directive under the Data Protection Act 2018, there is no guarantee that we will be awarded an adequacy decision. The European Court of Justice, which can strike down any adequacy decision approved by the Commission, has already twice ruled that the UK’s handling of personal data is not in line with European Union law, so can the Minister tell me what discussions he has had with the European Union about the likelihood of the UK receiving data adequacy recognition? I am sure that he recognises that many businesses are very concerned to have some reassurance and some certainty in this regard.

Even if the UK does manage to secure an adequacy agreement before the end of the transition period, there is no guarantee that we will keep it. It will be vulnerable to being overturned by the European Court of Justice, so can the Minister promise us that the UK’s handling of personal data will remain in line with our legal obligations that arise from any agreement with the European Union, and can he set out what impact he envisages—I know that he is well versed in these areas—European Court of Justice rulings might then have on UK GDPR law? Will they, as it were, remain supreme following the end of the transition period?

Those are the things that the SI does, but there are some things that it does not do. The Government have not been clear or forthcoming about their data management strategy. The shift of public sector data management from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to No. 10 in July—as I understand it, at the behest of Dominic Cummings, no longer of this parish—raised many questions as to the direction of the Government’s handling and use of public data.

The national data strategy, which is undergoing a consultation that closes next week, talks a lot about the role that data can play in driving economic growth, but there is nothing about data rights, duties and obligations on the huge tech platforms that use and misuse so much of our data, or discussion of a regulatory framework for data. Content created by the tech platforms uses people’s data to promote disinformation, fake news, extremism, hatred and other harmful material, while data-driven business models place ever more extreme content in front of our eyeballs.

I recognise that the statutory instrument is limited, but it would be helpful if the Minister said something about the extent to which he sees our GDPR evolving, addressing in particular the issue of data rights. That would help us to understand its impact. The SI does nothing to address long-term alignment and divergence decisions. The explanatory memorandum mentions “UK GDPR”. Does that language indicate that the Government intend to diverge from European Union GDPR?

As the UK begins to sign trade deals across the world, UK GDPR may be altered. The recent Japan trade deal made reference to facilitating data transfers and could allow them to go via third countries such as the US, which might have different data regulations. Will the Minister commit to ensuring that data protections and treatment are not traded away and that our data protection regulations remain in line with European Union minimum standards, to ensure validity for third-nation adequacy benefits?

That is already an issue, as the privacy shield adequacy agreement with the US has been invalidated, and the European Union adequacy agreement with Japan, as I understand it, has no practical effect in the UK. How, then, will adequacy be reflected in our ability to negotiate future trade agreements? Are further decisions of this type likely and how will they be reflected in UK law?

Finally, the Labour party is passionate about ensuring that our citizens have control of their own data. We have proposed a digital charter to put people’s real selves back in control of their digital selves. I would appreciate it if the Minister told us how he plans to ensure that agreements with other nations do not provide a back-door way to undermine GDPR. We will not oppose the instrument as it is necessary, but we have concerns about the specifics, and we think assurances must be given to businesses and others about our data privacy and control.

[Mr Whittingdale]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for indicating that the Opposition do not intend to oppose the regulations and for her remarks. I am tempted to say that we should stop meeting like this, but I think we may be doing so again in further Committees.

The hon. Lady and I absolutely agree about the importance of data in fuelling economic growth and innovation. She does not like the expression “new oil” in that context, and I understand why, but I am not sure that her suggestion about people going around excreting a trail of data was much more preferable an analogy. Nevertheless, data is of increasing importance, and the Government are keen to ensure that we reap the maximum benefit from it to create an economy driven by innovation and growth, based on the free flow of data. At the same time, we absolutely recognise the importance of data protection, which is, as she said, underpinned by GDPR, a set of EU regulations.

The hon. Lady referred to the fact that we are still in negotiation with the EU Commission about adequacy. In our view, there is no reason that we should not be granted adequacy—after all, our data protection regime is one that the EU formulated—but that is a matter ultimately for the Commission to decide. Certainly, the time left before the end of the transition period is reducing and this is therefore challenging, but we are still optimistic that it can be achieved. We have indicated to business that it is sensible to put in place the mechanisms necessary to ensure that data can continue to flow from the EU to the UK should adequacy not be achieved.

I am sure the Committee would have been disappointed if the hon. Lady had not mentioned Schrems II, which we all think about a great deal. Schrems II resulted in some quite tricky decisions, not just for the UK, because we are bound by the Schrems II judgment that negated the privacy shield, but it creates equal challenges for the EU, which is something the EU is working on; the Information Commissioner’s Office is still in conversation; and we hope to find a mechanism to allow the flow of data between EU member states, the UK and the USA to continue.

The hon. Lady is right that, even if we achieve adequacy, this is an ongoing process. We would not be negotiating as hard as we are to achieve adequacy if we intended to do anything shortly afterwards that resulted in our losing it again. On the other hand, we wish to take advantage of the fact that we will be responsible for our own data protection regime, and we wish to explore ways to facilitate the flow of data between companies and to drive growth forward. That is an opportunity, since we will no longer be bound by the Court of Justice of the European Union rulings, although in terms of adequacy decisions we will need to watch developments in the EU. Should those rulings change things, there might be implications for its attitude to our adequacy.

We certainly have no intention of doing anything that results in a loss of adequacy. The national data strategy mentioned by the hon. Lady is intended to consult very widely all those who potentially have an interest in the matter—companies that use data, privacy campaigners, stakeholders and so on—to find ways in which we might improve the UK’s data regime. She referred to the Opposition’s suggestion of a digital charter. I hope she has responded to the national data strategy, as we are obviously interested in any ideas that she has.

On trade agreements, which the hon. Lady also talked about, it is true that, for instance, the UK-Japan trade agreement contains data provisions that go beyond the EU-Japan agreement, and we regard that as a considerable achievement. However, nothing in the agreement undermines the data protection regime in this country. Indeed, the agreement makes it absolutely clear that both sides are able to maintain a legal framework that provides for the protection of personal information. The trade agreement with Japan will, we hope, result in a freer flow of data between the UK and Japan, but at the same time not undermine GDPR and our existing protection.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for his responses and his genuinely seeking to answer my questions, which is something of an experience for me. We have an agreement with Japan, which means data will be allowed to go to Japan. Japan has an agreement with the US, so data is allowed to go to the US. That undermines our conditions on data flowing from the UK to the US if they do not meet the European Union adequacy rules. That is what I meant by a back door.

[Mr Whittingdale]

I understand the hon. Lady’s concern, but I do not think it is justified. There is nothing forcing any company to transfer data from the UK to Japan or any other third country. We seek to remove unnecessary obstacles that impede that flow, but that does not undermine the requirements on UK-based companies to comply with the existing data protection regime. Indeed, that is spelt out clearly in the agreement. We do not believe that that is a risk, but it is something we continue to attach priority to, and we will keep it in mind for the future trade agreements that we are hopeful of striking.

I hope I am answering the points that the hon. Lady made. The point she made at the end of her remarks was about the obligations on the tech platforms, and she talked about disinformation and fake news. As she will be aware, the Secretary of State had a recent roundtable specifically to talk about the efforts made by the tech platforms to address the problem of disinformation about a potential covid vaccine. She will also know that the issue of obligations on tech platforms will be addressed through the online harms legislation that we still expect in the near future.

I hope I have answered the hon. Lady’s questions and I commend the regulations to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

5G Network

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Tuesday 24th November 2020 Westminster Hall

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to be here to serve under your chairship for the first time, Ms Eagle. I thank the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) for securing this really important debate, and it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to talk about such an important subject. I am very grateful to him for that, and for his opening comments: rarely have I heard a speech from the opposing ranks with which I agreed so fully, and almost entirely. I appreciate his comments about the importance of 5G and its opportunities; I also appreciated his reference to Dr Andy Sellars, who is making important advances in this area, and his comments on photonics in the north-east of England. There has always been closeness between the north-east and Wales, and leading in the diversification of the telecoms supply chain would simply be another example of that.

I should also declare an interest: as some Members may know, I worked as a telecoms engineer for 23 years before coming into Parliament, and my very first job was with a telecoms equipment supplier called Nortel—Northern Telecom—who, when I joined it, had just bought one of the last two British telecoms suppliers, that being STC; Marconi stayed around a little bit longer. It is a real shame that having worked for Nortel, and having spent my entire career in telecoms, I never went on to work for a British telecoms supplier. That was a consequence of the industrial strategies pursued under the then Government, Thatcher’s Conservative Government, and under the current Conservative Government, with not enough having been done in the intervening Labour years.

I agree with both the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan and the hon. Member for Wakefield (Imran Ahmad Khan) in their characterisation of the opportunities presented by 5G, which we hope can transform and bring broadband to every corner of our country—which is so much lacking now—and allow us to have real on-the-go mobile broadband, together with the opportunities presented by the internet of things and the vast increase in connected devices that we will see. That is why it is such a shame that the Government find themselves in such a 5G mess. I understand that they are happy to pass the cost of their mistakes, indecision and poor planning on to the operators, stating, for example, that the costs of removing Huawei are

“commercial decisions that are for the mobile operators to make”—

costs that the sector worries could top £7 billion and cause delays of up to three years to 5G roll-out, harming growth and innovation. We should not accept such a delay, which harms UK productivity and sends a message to innovators that they should look elsewhere. Can the Minister confirm that there will be no delay to the target of rolling out 5G to the majority of the country by 2027?

The right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan and the hon. Member for Wakefield were right to emphasise the opportunities of an effective diversification strategy. I have put many questions to the Minister on this point, and he has confirmed that the Government plan to prioritise open source and Open RAN technologies, which the right hon. Member mentioned, as part of their plan to build market resilience. However, we still lack any clear strategy for the diversification of our telecoms infrastructure. Yes, we have the names of those on the telecoms taskforce, but no telecoms systems developers are among them. The Minister said that was because the focus was on cyber-security; I should say that while we are taking steps to hopefully secure our network, we need a network that is innovative, effective and resilient as well as secure. The absence of any telecoms systems developers on the telecoms taskforce is a real loss, as is the lack of any representation for any organisation or person from north of Bristol. Can the Minister set out how he intends to ensure that we have a truly representative task force, able to make use of the talents and innovation throughout the relevant sectors and throughout the country?

The Telecommunications (Security) Bill was published this afternoon. I have not had time to assess all its clauses in full, but it does not seem to refer to the diversification strategy that we are promised. The official Opposition welcome the measures taken to secure our network, but without the diversification strategy, our network will not be secure because we will be so dependent on perhaps two vendors. We have to have a diversification strategy, not only to ensure the opportunities in different sectors and different parts of our country in terms of economic development, but to make that network secure. Where is the diversification strategy? How can we have a Bill that does one thing, which is to secure the network, that is so dependent on a strategy that does not appear to be mentioned?

I turn to the opportunities in Open RAN defence and international collaboration. I thank the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan for the explanation of Open RAN. The market is estimated to be worth £47 billion by 2026 and the UK can gain a significant amount of that if we build on our existing strengths, such as compound semiconductors, radios and software for disaggregated networks.

The decision to remove Huawei from the network was based on national security, exhibiting one of the many synergies between telecoms and defence, with many UK companies supplying both the telecoms and defence markets. For example, semiconductor fabricators II-VI, a north-east company based in County Durham, or INEX Microtechnology, in Sedgefield, provide critical infrastructure to both the telecoms and defence markets.

We will see immediate action from operators to replace high-risk vendors and a long-term replacement strategy in UK 5G infrastructure, opening doors for businesses. Japanese firms such as NEC, which the hon. Member for Wakefield mentioned, have already agreed to set up a UK telecommunications centre to help provide immediate alternatives to high-risk vendors, providing NEC with a springboard into the European market. This is a good opportunity for many smaller UK firms, but it cannot be a one-off. What is the Government’s strategy to ensure that UK firms can forge strong partnerships with international firms?

It takes investment as well as strategic vision to diversify our supply chain after so many years. I am afraid that both of those seem to be sadly lacking. Will the Minister take the chance to tell us today how much additional funding the Government will provide for telecoms research, development and innovation? At the same time, can he say how much will be going to the north?

We have excellent science-based and technological opportunities to be found. Indeed, in March, as a constructive Opposition, I offered the Minister a five-point plan to help diversify our supply chain. I called for a communications Catapult centre, and for next-generation research and development projects. BT used to have a major lab, developing and looking far ahead at new telecommunications technology. Is the Minister considering something like that? Can he give us more details? I also called for support for standards development, to support interoperability. We have heard nothing about that. He needs to look at non-5G wireless technologies. What is the Minister doing to support those in all the regions of the UK?

The UK has an opportunity to build a highly resilient, secure and diversified 5G network, unlocking opportunities for business and innovation across the country. Further- more, when we think about the next generations—6G and 7G—the UK has the opportunity to lay the foundations to make us a leading telecommunications country once again. Let us remember that we invented both fibre and the web in the UK. I urge the Minister to obtain the political will and set out the plan that ensures our diverse telecoms sector has the confidence and the investment that it needs to grow and to lead the world.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Eagle. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) for securing a debate on a genuinely important topic, which would have perhaps attracted a significantly bigger crowd on other days—I take that as a sign that the Government are going in the right direction in lots of ways. It is none the less a critical topic for the Government, and it has been my focus for the last few months, to say the least.

I begin by paying tribute to the work of the Catapult and Dr Andy Sellars, already mentioned by my right hon. Friend and others. It is a £43.5 million Government project supported by UKRI, and it is important to say that £12 million from the Welsh Government is an important contribution. Some 1,500 people are already employed as part of the project and, as my right hon. Friend said, we expect thousands more to come as part of that investment. It is as though he read some of my speech, because he mentioned that we are already seeing clusters forming from the clusters. The close collaboration with the private sector in the north-east, Cambridge, Bristol and elsewhere shows that Britain is beginning to take the opportunity by the horns and make the best of it that we can. We do that in collaboration with our other international partners, but ultimately the opportunity is due to a wealth of expertise in this country, as the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) highlighted. That private sector collaboration will only continue to grow.

As my right hon. Friend highlighted, we have plenty more work to do. One of the things that we will seek to do through our diversification strategy is to shape the market and set the direction in a way that works genuinely with our private sector partners, because he is right to say that although there is much that we should leave to the market, we have to work collaboratively in the interests of national security, and we have to do it in way that ensures that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past. Ultimately, we are in the position that we are in with Huawei because of decades of wrong decisions, albeit with the best intentions.

My right hon. Friend also observed that not every Government project is as joined up as it could be. I can tell him that the diversification strategy will be one of the most joined-up Government projects he has yet seen—I do not know where that sets the bar in his expectations.

I am glad that we are having the debate, but I rather wish we were having it at this time tomorrow, because I will be able to say significantly more after the Chancellor has made his statement. To some extent, that will also tie in with the diversification strategy. As the Secretary of State has said, we will publish the diversification strategy alongside the Bill that so many colleagues have referred to. As the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central knows, we have published the Bill today, so she will not have to wait long for her salvation. She mentioned the international angle, the need to put money behind it, the need to focus on standards and the need to focus on a specific institution, if not specifically a lab. In some form or another, those things will all be of great interest to her when she reads the diversification strategy, which she will be able to do in due course.

[Chi Onwurah]

I appreciate the Minister’s comments and look forward, as always, to the publication of the Bill. Will the diversification strategy have the same legislative structure, content and meaning as the Telecommunications (Security) Bill? Will it have legislative power that is binding on the Government?

[Matt Warman]

It is a crucial complement to the Bill introduced by us today. We will be putting in place all the right incentives to ensure that the requirements being imposed by us through primary and secondary legislation can be met, or even beaten, within the timescale that we will be laying out. We cannot impose requirements on individual companies to make specific procurement decisions through legislation, but we can make sure that they are as secure as they need to be, and that the programme fits in a way that works for the market and for our national security. I know that the hon. Lady will take a close interest in both the primary and the secondary legislation, which will fill in some of that picture.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan was right to imply that while we are now more dependent as we move away from Huawei, we have an opportunity to work both with the existing incumbents—primarily Nokia and Ericsson—and new incumbents. We are already working towards increasing the presence in our markets of those incumbents and, crucially, towards that Open RAN future of interoperability and far greater opportunities for our companies to thrive.

[Matt Warman]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is why the Government have been working as fast as they can on the 5G supply chain diversification strategy, which not only meets our short-term needs but prioritises the bold and ambitious approach that, as we both agree, makes it possible for our companies to make the most of their place in a global market, not just the UK. To reiterate what has already been said, that approach is built around supporting incumbents and attracting new suppliers, and also around accelerating the development and adoption of the Open RAN interoperable standards. They are all major opportunities, both nationally and internationally.

As discussed, the decision taken on high-risk vendors means that the UK is more resilient in respect of Nokia and Ericsson, and although 5G is now available in over 90 towns and cities with the support of those two companies, we need to seize the emerging opportunities to grow that number as rapidly as we can. That is why the Government are looking through a series of R&D interventions of the sort that the catapult has been so pivotal in accelerating.

Of course, we also want to bring new suppliers into the UK market. It is worth saying, as the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central did, that the presence of the NEC global centre of excellence in the UK is not just an important sign of what is already there, but an important signal of the esteem in which the global supply chain holds the UK’s enthusiasm for adopting 5G.

I will take the opportunity to say that we have no intention whatsoever to delay the 2027 target for the majority of the UK population to be covered by 5G. It is already in 100 towns and cities, and the figure is increasing all the time. I also take the opportunity to point out that the chair of the taskforce mentioned by the hon. Lady, which is expert in both commercial and academic senses, is Lord Livingston of Parkhead. I am sure she knows that Parkhead is a part of Glasgow and is some way north of Bristol, but we are keen to focus on the diversity and expertise of that taskforce. Ultimately, we have prioritised expertise in the taskforce rather than the geographic location. She makes a fair point but, as I say, Glasgow is consistently north of Bristol.

[Chi Onwurah]

Will the Minister give way?

[Matt Warman]

I think we have covered the geography of Glasgow.

We are working to remove the barriers for new market entrants, and the taskforce is a crucial part of that, but our ambition will not stop there. We will be keen to make sure that our global ambitions are a part of the work of both the taskforce and the diversification strategy, and that will persist well beyond the process that we go through with the Telecommunications (Security) Bill and with the diversification strategy.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan noted our existing expertise and mentioned Open RAN, which will be hugely important in future. He will know that Vodafone has already launched a trial in Wales. That is the first, we think, of a significant improvement in the percentage of Open RAN, and we will seek to ensure that that persists. He also mentioned the potential of the low earth orbit satellite and OneWeb. It is important that we are open-minded when it comes to what technologies can be developed both through the Catapult and elsewhere. As the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said, we should not simply look at 5G when it comes to making sure we connect as much of the country as we possibly can.

I will address the comments made on behalf of the Scottish National party. The hon. Member for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn) is completely right that when we talk about 5G, it is important not to forget that significant parts of the country need a step change in their connectivity. The shared rural network, a £1 billion partnership between the UK Government and the mobile networks, will see 4G connectivity, particularly in Scotland, accelerate rapidly between now and 2025. That is hugely welcome, as he and others in this Chamber are keenly aware. Scotland is challenging geography to wire up, but it is crucial that we do so as rapidly as we can.

My hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Imran Ahmad Khan) was absolutely right to mention the opportunities for us in this project. We should see the next few years as a crucial opportunity to grow a really important UK market. The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said that she had never had the opportunity to work for a major British telecoms company. I say to her that the night is young.

If we get this right, opportunities will come in Britain and elsewhere. All of this will require investment, and the Government will put forward an initial funding package, to be set out in the spending review tomorrow, along with a boost to the Ofcom budget to reflect its enhanced security role under the Bill that we have laid today. The funding package will drive early progress and ensure that our diversification strategy not only bolsters the resilience and security of our digital infrastructure, but creates opportunities for competition, innovation and prosperity in all four nations. It is a huge opportunity that I hope we will be able to seize rapidly over the next few years, not just in 5G but through the UK’s gigabit programme as well.

This country already benefits hugely from the digital economy. This programme and this debate are part of doing that better. They are part of building back better, and I am confident that we will look back and say that we took a decision about Huawei that improved our national security and drove our ability to seize economic opportunities. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan for securing the debate.

Online Harms

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Thursday 19th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Backbench Business Committee, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright), the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) and my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) for stepping in where the Government have failed by bringing forward this debate and for the excellent opening contributions. Indeed, we have heard excellent remarks from all parts of the House in this debate, and I am sorry that I do not have time to do justice to them all—I have just noted how much time I have.

As a chartered engineer, I spent 20 years building out the networks that have become the internet. I am proud of that work and of what it has become. As we have heard, we are increasingly living our lives online, and the ongoing pandemic has accelerated that. For those who are not digitally excluded, social media platforms such as Facebook, Google, YouTube, Instagram and Twitter are all now woven into the fabric of our lives and, together with the vast array of online apps for everything from video conferencing to healthy eating, they are a critical enabler of an active life for citizen, consumer and economic contributor. None the less, as Members have shown so acutely, the internet can be a dark, challenging and inhospitable place. Content is curated by tech platforms that allow the spread of disinformation, sexual exploitation, fake news, extremism, hatred and other harmful content. September saw the highest number of public reports of suspected child sexual abuse material ever received in a single month by the Internet Watch Foundation. On TikTok, the #vaccinesaredangerous has had almost 800,000 views, with almost no misinformation warnings. Incredibly, we have yet to have a debate in Government time on online harms. Hon. and right hon. Members have expressed many concerns in this place in written and oral questions over the years, but Government have done nothing. Regulation has not kept pace with technology, crime or consumers, leaving growing numbers of people increasingly exposed to significant harms, but it did not have to be this way.

In 2010, the then Labour Government saw the growth of new communications technologies and undertook a comprehensive forward-looking review. The result was the Communications Act 2003 and a new regulator, Ofcom, with the power to ensure that these issues were resolved in the public interest. That regulatory framework had a 10-year lifespan—I know because I was head of technology at Ofcom at the time. In 2012, the Conservative-led Government saw the growth of our online lives—social media and big data—and did nothing. The 2012 review of online harms may be the most important review that we never had. It was not until April 2019 that they finally began a consultation since which legislation has been promised repeatedly and yet it comes not, leaving big tech in control of our online lives.

I consider myself a tech evangelist. I believe that tech is an engine of progress like no other. I believe that it can improve the lives of my constituents and enable a more equal, more productive and more sustainable skills-based economy through a fourth industrial revolution, but people need to be protected and empowered to take control of their lives online. The Government need to be on the side of the people and not tech lobbyists. This Government have failed us to a degree that is historically negligent, as this debate shows.

Members have highlighted how Government are failing in their duty to safeguard children from child abuse. Other Members have focused on the economic harms and the existing tech giants business model, which means that Google and Facebook have control of the online high street, even as Amazon unfairly competes the high street in our real-world towns out of existence. Ninety seven per cent of UK consumers consult reviews when buying products online, yet investigations by Which? have repeatedly exposed fake and misleading reviews. How will the Government address these online harms in economic terms and enable real competition? We have also heard about online advertising, which is the driver of the business model. It is unregulated, leaving television companies at a disadvantage and driving more and more extreme content in front of viewers. My understanding is that the Government plan to ban all advertising of unhealthy foods on the internet. Is that the case, and why will the Government not act more broadly to address the failings of the advertising model?

As a constructive Opposition, we have proposals as well as criticisms. Self-regulation has failed—this debate has made that clear—but, robust, reasonable, rational, forward-looking and principles-based regulation can succeed. It is shocking that in all this time, the Government have not established what those principles should be. Our ability to build back from covid depends on a successful vaccine, and we have had fantastic news about that recently, but, as we have heard, misinformation on vaccines as well as on 5G, the holocaust and so on is freely available. That is why Labour is calling for emergency legislation on anti-vax disinformation. Will the Government commit to that?

Labour has made it clear that we need a digital bill of rights and a legal duty of care to give more powers and protection. We need a statutory regulator for online platforms to crack down on the harm, the hate and the fake. We also need a public debate on what our online future should look like, and that is why we launched the consultation “Our Digital Future” to build consensus on the underlying principles. We are now analysing the over 600 responses that we have received, and we will publish our report soon. We are committed to eradicating the digital divide—indeed, the many new digital divides—as a result of which marginalised peoples have become increasingly excluded from the online world.

Many bodies, including the NSPCC, Big Brother Watch, the Carnegie UK Trust, Which? and the Institute of Alcohol Studies have contacted me and asked me to raise their concerns. I cannot do them all justice or spend time talking about algorithms, artificial intelligence, the internet of things and all the other emerging potential harms. Government must set out a clear plan to address these online harms and give people back control of their online lives, if our lives are to flourish online without fear or favour.

Draft Audiovisual Media Services (Amendment) (Eu Exit) Regulations 2020

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Tuesday 17th November 2020 General Committees

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stringer. I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. I declare an interest; as the Minister is aware, before I entered Parliament, I spent six years working for Ofcom as head of technology. Ofcom had responsibility for regulating broadcast audiovisual services and some responsibility for online audiovisual media services at a time when they were beginning to grow in importance, not always legally it must be said.

Online audiovisual media services were then nowhere near as widespread or as important as they have since become. They have been especially critical during these pandemic months. Of those, video-sharing platforms, or VSPs, which are the focus of the SI, have become a major presence in the lives of many in this country. VSPs are online services that enable users to upload and share videos with members of the public. Popular VSPs such as YouTube and Facebook allow users to engage with a large range of content. They have been of especially critical importance in recent months, although sometimes for worrying reasons. September saw the highest number of public reports of suspected child sexual abuse material ever received in a single month by the Internet Watch Foundation. The National Crime Agency estimates that there are at least 300,000 individuals in the UK who pose a sexual threat to children through contact abuse or online. On TikTok, the hashtag ‘#vaccinesaredangerous’ has had almost 800,000 views, with almost no mis- information warnings. Given that we hope to see a vaccine distributed very soon, the importance of appropriate action on misinformation is clear. Online advertising continues to be rampant on social media, and much of it is weakly regulated in terms of the protection offered to children in particular. The scale, speed and range of possible harms and misinformation facilitated through VSPs are vast. Yet, there is an acute sense of what those very platforms can offer for good—just ask the millions of school and university students who have continued to learn throughout the pandemic with the aid of online educational videos and video-based social engagement. I know many parents in particular who are very grateful to Joe Wicks stepping up to take on the role of the nation’s PE teacher during lockdown.

Done right, and regulated well, VSPs can be a boost to wellbeing, social engagement, education and business, and I am a big believer in technology’s positive impact on the world, especially well-regulated technology’s positive impact. As the Minister said, today’s SI is a seemingly narrow fix for deficiencies in the AVMS directive and the audiovisual media services regulations in the light of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It aims to define the scope of businesses that will be under UK jurisdiction for VSP regulation beyond the transition period—the end of the year, and sets the precise date of the end of the transition period for broadcasting regulation.

On jurisdiction, the SI maintains existing thinking on jurisdictional scope as being based on effectively country of origin principles. A VSP will come under UK jurisdiction if it has the required connection with the UK, the terms of which are narrow and limited to the two cases. First, a VSP will come under UK jurisdiction if it has a fixed establishment in the UK and the centre of its economic activity relating to the relevant service is based in the UK and not in another EU member state. Secondly, if the VSP is not established in the UK and no EU member state has jurisdiction over it, it will come under UK jurisdiction if the VSP has a group undertaking established in the UK. That seemingly narrow fix has wide implications and major deficiencies. It does not remedy failings in jurisdiction nor does it provide a level playing field for online and offline video services, and it does not protect our citizens from harmful content.

The scope of jurisdiction is the central issue relating to effective regulation. The SI continues to require a measure of establishment in the UK, and not in a EU member state, for a VSP to be under the UK’s regulatory scope. The SI has been introduced in accordance with the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which is intended, as I am sure the Minister would agree, to deliver British control of laws to Britain. Analysis commissioned by the Government themselves, however, suggests that under the existing ‘establishment’ test, continued under the SI, the largest VSPs—YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, dailymotion and Twitter—are outside of the UK’s regulatory scope. Many of those platforms will be under Irish and broader European jurisdiction. From my engagement with the media and technology industry, I know that that arrangement is deeply insufficient for the protection of our citizens and for the provision of a level playing field for British innovators. Fundamentally, it fails to retain, or regain, British regulatory sovereignty. Industry concerns mirror my concerns for child and public protection.

Given the millions of British children and members of public who use VSPs and seek protection from harm, what assurance can the Minister provide to suggest that his regulatory regime will protect them, especially when the Government are handing regulatory control to the EU? Looking beyond the immediate horizon, how does he intend to bring the largest VSPs under effective UK regulatory scope? Under his watch, he has taken back control on VSP regulation, only to give it right back again.

The SI is an incomplete plug to address a policy vacuum on VSP regulation. It is accompanied by temporary guidance from Ofcom on the VSP regulatory obligations, which will be supplemented by further detailed guidance introduced next year. As the Minister said, both sets of guidance will be replaced by an online harms Bill, which he told us to expect next year. That Bill has been expected imminently just about every week in this year, and further reassurances that it is on its way is hardly sufficient at this time.

Between now and the publication of next year’s final guidance, Ofcom has said that it will

‘prioritise only the most serious potential breaches’.

Why will the UK leave the transition period with no distinct regulation of grave harms that might be suffered by UK citizens? We urgently need an assurance from the Minister that the policy and enforcement vacuum will not endanger the wellbeing of citizens who use online VSP services. When will we have legislation to address that policy hole so that our citizens will be protected from online harms? When will the online harms Bill be brought before Parliament?

Video-sharing platforms continue to profit from content that is harmful and, in some cases, illegal. Online advertising, which the Minister mentioned, drives the VSP business model, and that of the content providers, for example, influencers. That advertising is almost entirely unregulated by statute and that obviously places television companies at a disadvantage, given that their advertising is regulated. It also has implications for our democracy as political advertising is also unregulated online. When will the Minister introduce the appropriate regulation of online advertising? Has any assessment been made of the uncertainty created for media businesses as a result of the Government’s constant policy catch-up? At the heart of this, when does he intend to fill the gaping gulf between regulation and the Government’s constant catch-up?

Although the SI poses pressing questions about risk and regulation, there are also persisting questions about long-term policy direction. At the fore of that, we will need a VSP regulatory regime that is effective at home and aligned with policy abroad, especially as we diverge from European legislation. That provides some scope for regulatory standards that offer robust protection to British citizens, but it also creates a need to ensure continuity, clarity and consistency for businesses. How does the Minister plan to ensure ongoing alignment with Europe on VSP regulation?

It is worth noting that the online harms Bill is a response to a two-year-old consultation, but the pace of technology, social change and the impact of covid-19 will make some of the consultation’s conclusions either obsolete or inadequate in the face of future threats. It would be nice to have a forward-looking regulatory regime as opposed to a backward one. Has the Minister consulted consumer groups and relevant VSPs to ensure the creation of a thought-through policy that is domestically effective and internationally aligned for the UK regulation of VSPs? I fear that the voice of consumer groups is unheard; the big tech companies have many lobbyists and excessive profits to pay for them. In this debate the voice of the consumer and the citizen is not as loud as that of the big tech companies.

The Government have been a static spectator as the debate on and the reality of VSPs’ online harms have passed them by. It is deeply concerning that Ministers are failing on such a matter. That failure places businesses in uncertainty, blocks innovation and gives away British regulatory sovereignty, but most of all, it threatens our children and members of the public from unchecked harms, misinformation and unregulated advertising. Despite that ongoing failure, the Government are still playing catch-up and are only now bringing in an SI on VSP regulation beyond the transition period, when there is barely less than a month before that period ends. And even then, they are introducing an SI that merely continues a highly imperfect scenario, in which British regulators cannot regulate to protect British consumers of VSP services. We deserve much better from our Government.

The Opposition will not oppose the SI because we do not think that the Government could now respond quickly enough to fill the gaps in regulation that the SI’s failings will leave. I note that the Minister is smiling, but he must take seriously the deficiencies in our regulatory framework that are left unaddressed by the SI. I hope that he can assure us that the Government will finally wake up and deliver effective regulation against harms, misinformation and unregulated advertising on VSP through immediate additional legislation.

[Mr Whittingdale]

I was smiling simply because after the catalogue of failure and disaster that the hon. Lady recounted in describing the SI, she then said that the Opposition will not oppose it, which obviously I welcome very much.

[Chi Onwurah]

I must say as respectfully as I can that there are many catalogues of disaster and inadequacy in the Government’s legislative framework, so we are not, unfortunately, able to address each of them given the time that remains before the end of the transition period.

[Mr Whittingdale]

Nevertheless, I welcome the Opposition’s decision not to vote against the SI.

I agree with a number of the points raised by the hon. Lady. She is right that particularly in the past few months, when, sadly, so many people have been forced to remain at home, the internet generally, but VSPs in particular have become a much greater feature of people’s lives. I have been known to watch and even go along with Mr Wicks, although that may be hard for some to believe, but I have done so, as have many in this country. Educational provision online, as well as entertainment, have been really important in getting us through this.

The hon. Lady is right that although VSPs and the internet generally offer a lot of benefit, there are harmful aspects, which the Government are keen to address. We share her concern about the rising reports of the number of incidents of child abuse online, and we are determined to tackle that. She will be aware that the Secretary of State recently had a meeting with the big platforms to discuss how to address the problem of anti-vaccine misinformation. I am pleased that the platforms have agreed to take action to ensure that nobody can profit from such material, and to remove it as quickly as possible.

Things are going on, but this particular set of regulations is, as the hon. Lady knows, required under the terms of the withdrawal Act, because the regulations were introduced during the transition period, and therefore we are required to put them into UK law. We believe that they are important in that they ensure that Ofcom has full responsibility for regulating VSPs. She is right that the regulations do not go far enough, and that there are certain deficiencies. She specifically highlighted the issue of jurisdiction. Because the regulations are derived from a new directive it is not surprising that the force of that directive is to impose EU regulations. Ofcom, as currently the regulator within scope of the regulations, regulates those platforms that are established in the UK, and those platforms that are established elsewhere in the EU are regulated by the relevant country regulator there.

The hon. Lady mentioned in particular TikTok. It is an interesting one because it is established in China, but it does have a presence in quite a number of EU countries. At the moment, it is not yet been determined which country should have responsibility for the EU regulation of TikTok, but undoubtedly one of the member states will have that role.

The hon. Lady spoke about how the regulations do not take back control and how we are still subject to EU regulation. At the end of the transition period, we will no longer be bound by the decisions of regulators elsewhere in Europe. At the moment we recognise that in each case the EU regulates the platforms or providers in a particular country, and we trust it to do that. That will not be the case after the transition period comes to an end, and we will be introducing further legislation, as the hon. Lady said. Under that legislation, Ofcom will have responsibility for the regulation of all those providing services into the UK. That will go further than the scope of the existing AVMS regulations. To that extent, the regulations we are debating are a stopgap. They are intended to ensure that the European standard of regulation continues to apply after the end of the transition period, but we intend to go further and to ensure that any platforms that are providing content to UK consumers come within the scope the UK regulatory regime.

That will be achieved through the online harms Bill. The hon. Lady has drawn attention to the fact that that legislation is some time in the coming, and she is right to that extent. I would simply say that it is absolutely essential that we get it right. She pointed out that this is an area where technology is developing very fast, and we need to ensure that legislation is forward-looking and can take account of future developments. It is vital that we put in place a regulatory regime that protects vulnerable people, young people particularly, from illegal and harmful content. At the same time, we want to be very conscious not to inhibit the growth of technology companies and innovation in the digital sector, which the Government are keen to encourage. Equally, we need to safeguard freedom of speech, freedom of expression and to provide proper safeguards to ensure that professional journalistic content is not caught up in the regulatory regime.

The Government are determined to meet those objectives. It is still the case that the Government will be publishing a response to the consultation paper very shortly, and that we will be introducing draft legislation next year. The hon. Lady referred to the need to consult, and I can promise her that we are already consulting widely, and will continue to do so. I have regular discussions with all the various stakeholders, as does my colleague the Minister for Digital and Culture. Consumer groups will certainly have the opportunity to make their voice known.

Although I recognise the hon. Lady’s unhappiness that this SI is a mere EU regulation that does not go as far as she would like and, indeed, as we would like, I can reassure that we will be bringing forward UK legislation to establish a pioneering UK regime very shortly. On that basis, I invite the Committee to approve the regulations.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Electronic Communications and Wireless Telegraphy (Amendment) (European Electronic Communications Code and Eu Exit) Regulations 2020

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2020 General Committees

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq.

I thank the Minister for his opening remarks on this very important SI relating to our critically important telecoms sector. The UK telecoms industry contributes £32 billion to the economy, directly provides nearly a quarter of million jobs and has an impact on all of our lives, as we have really experienced during the pandemic. It is so important that we get regulation right for a sector that contributes so much to our economy, as well as to our work and social lives. I have to declare an interest, Dr Huq; before becoming an MP, I worked as head of telecoms technology at Ofcom, the communications regulator, where I literally spent six years with the Communications Act 2003 on my desk, as I worked on competition and investment in broadband networks. I could spend a lot of time discussing the provisions of the SI, but I will not detain the Committee longer than is necessary.

The framework that I worked with was a function of four EU directives, namely the framework, access, authorisation and universal service directives, all of which have been in effect in EU nations since 2002. Today’s SI implements aspects of the European electronic communications code, which I shall refer to as the EECC. That combined and revised the former four directives in line with the UK’s obligations under the withdrawal agreement, negotiated and signed by the Government.

As the Minister said, the EECC aims to promote infrastructure deployment and take-up of very high capacity networks through emphasising the necessity

‘to give appropriate incentives for investment in new very high capacity networks that support innovation in content-rich internet services and strengthen the international competitiveness of the Union’.

The EECC’s general objective in article 3 states that the national regulatory authority, in our case Ofcom, should

‘promote connectivity and access to, and take-up of, very high capacity networks, including fixed, mobile and wireless networks, by all citizens and businesses of the Union.’

Ofcom’s principle duty, as I am sure the Minister is aware, is to

‘further the interests of citizens and consumers, where appropriate by promoting competition.’

As I said, I had the 2003 Act on my desk, and consulted it regularly to understand what Parliament was aiming for when it set out that Act. What assessment has the Minister made of how the new duty with regard to investment will work alongside Ofcom’s existing duties? For example, how does investment and the citizen interest interact? I know that when Ofcom is looking at potential conflicts of interest, shall we say, between investment in networks and citizens’ rights and duties, it will want to refer to this debate as well as to the SI to understand what Parliament was driving at. Has the Minister assessed how the new duty will interplay with existing duties?

The EECC also aims to promote competition and to develop further the digital single market. During my six years at Ofcom, it was established that it is infrastructure competition, in which I am a great believer, as opposed to services competition that really drives investment, innovation and choice.

[Matt Warman]

indicated assent.

[Chi Onwurah]

I see that the Minister is nodding, so that implies that he agrees that infrastructure competition is the aim.

The powers introduced by the EECC are designed to shift the market from reliance on access to the incumbent providers’ infrastructure, in our case Openreach, to an environment that can better support investment from both incumbents and new entrants to the market. To achieve that, article 67 sets out a recommendation for Ofcom to carry out market analysis, including provision to increase the maximum review cycle from three years, as it was when I worked there, to five years. Am I right in thinking that the intention is that that will promote competition by providing more time for network operators to earn returns on their investment, thus boosting investment and therefore competition? Is that effectively the only strategy to promote competition? Is that based on the belief that investment alone will lead to a greater and more competitive market? I am not sure that is the case. What guidance will be offered on how the returns on that investment should be regulated?

I am concerned that the emphasis on promoting investment incentivised by high returns may damage consumer interest, because it is the consumers who will be paying those returns, and citizens in the case of services from Government and so on. Can the Minister assure me that that will not be the case? That comes back to how the duty to promote investment will play with the duty to promote the interests of the consumers and citizens. Can he effectively say that the interests of the consumers and citizens will always take priority and be paramount, and that we do not seek to promote investment simply by ensuring excessive returns, so that companies invest in networks as opposed to other investments that may have higher returns, for example in financial services? I hope that we can hear about what consumer groups have said on that point.

I am pleased to see that end-to-end provisions of the code seek to protect consumers with wide-ranging consumer rights. As the Minister said, articles 98 to 116 provide protections against cybercrime, enhance user rights when switching internet access services, ensure minimum standards across member states, establish a universal service, which ensures the availability of broadband and voice communications, and ensure that all users have free access to the universal European 112 emergency services number.

Given that we have left the EU, and indeed the transition period ends on 31 December, am I right in thinking that the price cap for intra-EU calls will no longer be enjoyed by UK consumers, and that as we are no longer in the EU, there will be no price cap on calls to the EU from UK phones?

The terms of the SI do a lot, but as the Minister implied, the measure does not fully implement the EECC requirements. In July, the Government stated that they would ‘deprioritise’ aspects of the EECC, including key consumer and market issues due to the pandemic. Those issues include all obligations relating to number-independent interpersonal communication services—NI-ICS—the requirement for communications service providers not to discriminate against end-users access to telecoms on the basis of their nationality and provisions regarding Ofcom’s independence and powers to issue penalties. The Government have stated that some of these measures are already covered by existing law, but can the Minister confirm to me today that the deprioritisation of such obligations is not in breach of the withdrawal agreement? Does this divergence from European Union law constitute a statement from the Government that they are ruling out future participation in a digital single market? Will these deprioritised services become a priority once the pandemic is over, or are the Government ruling out adopting these measures completely?

As a result of the adoption of the EECC measures, Ofcom will be granted many new powers, which the Minister referred to, such as network forecasting, promoting gigabit-capable networks, co-operation and competition in hard-to-reach areas, easier switching for consumers and improved regulation of bundled contracts, and oversight of the pro-investment aims that the Government and the EECC have publicised. These measures were confirmed by the Government in July, but they did not tell us what further resources Ofcom would be provided with as it takes on these responsibilities. Has the Minister spoken with Ofcom about additional resources? Will he confirm today that Ofcom will be provided with what it needs to meet those obligations? How will Ofcom be measured against its duty to promote connectivity in gigabit-capable networks? Will that fall under the Minister’s direct oversight or will he leave it to the board? Will we have a report of some kind to Parliament?

In the UK, this SI is only part of the implementation of the EECC. We must also acknowledge Ofcom’s general conditions, which will be amended to reflect the obligations. In its statement of 27 October, Ofcom set out the end-user consumer protections and confirmed the UK’s intention to

“ban mobile providers from selling locked mobile devices”

by December 2021, to extend rules on accessibility for disabled customers by December 2021, to introduce new rules for bundles that include other services or equipment sold with a communication service by December 2021, to ensure better contract information and stronger termination rights by June 2022, and to introduce improved switching processes for broadband by December 2022. Will the Minister reaffirm that these plans will remain in place following the end of the transition period and will not be rolled back on, as it were?

I finish on a point raised with me by telecoms experts, representatives of the industry and business. This SI and the transposition into UK law are obligatory under the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, but after 1 January 2021, once the transition period has ended, they will no longer be obligatory and could be overwritten. Will the Minister give a clear commitment that that will not happen? Will the Government set out an updated long-term digital strategy, providing stability and security in the sector?

The importance of working closely with our friends and partners in the European Union cannot overstated, particularly in telecommunications, for communication providers and in the burgeoning social media and application sectors. Our economy, businesses and consumer protections are reliant on our close relationship with the European Union, and our telecoms services benefit from access to European Union markets. While we might not be able to holiday in many places at the moment, we all look forward to the time when we will be making phone calls from France, Denmark or wherever. As we leave the transition period, our future remains uncertain, as the Government’s botched negotiations have left us somewhat in limbo. The Government have presided over 10 wasted years for UK telecoms infra- structure, whereas the previous Government—I will not labour this point—understood the importance of supporting investment and infrastructure competition, which led to the greatest expansion in infrastructure competition, with unbundled local loop.

The intentions behind this SI, and behind the EECC, are good and we will not oppose it, but the Government must take charge and upgrade our telecoms infrastructure, and provide reassurances on our consumer protections. I thank the Minister in advance for his answers. I know that I have asked a lot of questions. If he cannot answer them all today, I hope he will agree to write to me, because I am very interested to know the answers and it is in the interests of scrutinising this legislation that they should be responded to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Warman]

I am tempted to take up the offer made by the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and say that I will write to her on everything. I will not do that, but I shall try to rattle through a lot of what she asked.

In short, the regulations crystallise the existing factors, with which she is so familiar, that have to be taken into account when assessing whether a market has competition problems and would require Ofcom intervention. As she knows, that requires Ofcom to consider innovation, competition and future networks when imposing those conditions. Much of this is about crystallising in legislation the good practice that we already see in Ofcom.

The hon. Lady is right to say that longer review periods potentially promote greater certainty around the really significant investment in infrastructure that we are seeing and would like to see more of. There is an important balance as to making sure that we do not entrench monopolies, and that we get the right and fair degree of certainty for investors so that they can make a return, but she is right to ask: are consumers at the heart of everything that Government and Ofcom do? Of course they are, and they will continue to be so. It is in consumers’ interests to have sustainable companies making pragmatic investment decisions, but ultimately it is the consumer that has to be at the heart of all of this.

The hon. Lady asked briefly about mobile roaming. She is right that when we leave the European Union we will be under different rules. In theory that will leave companies able to make decisions on roaming that they are not currently able to make, but the Government will continue to engage intensively on that. We have no indication from companies—they themselves have said it publicly—that they have any intention of changing the landscape in the near future.

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the Minister for his approach in responding to my questions. Intra-EU phone calls are about making calls from one European country to another, and not necessarily about roaming. Will he also confirm that he has discussed that point, or will be discussing it, with providers in the UK so that we can retain that benefit if possible?

[Matt Warman]

Yes. The hon. Lady is absolutely right that that is also the case, and we continue to take an interest in exactly that. On that front, there are no indications of immediate changes either.

The hon. Lady mentioned what we call ‘over the top’ services—number-independent services that translate to calls via WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger and the like. As I said, we are not dealing with the matter immediately, but we are looking at the best way forward for those with Ofcom. Similarly, where issues have been deprioritised during the pandemic, that is not to suggest that they are not important. As I said in my opening remarks, the UK was key to the original negotiations and we would not seek to deprioritise them other than in the exceptional circumstances in which we find ourselves.

The hon. Lady asked about the resources for Ofcom. In close collaboration with Ofcom, we have asked what, if any, further resources it feels it needs; at this stage, the answer is that it is content with what it has. Obviously, we want it to be resourced properly, and we will make sure that it continues to be so.

The hon. Lady also asked about gigabit roll-out and that is something on which the Government work closely with Ofcom. It is ultimately my responsibility and that of Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, and indeed a priority for this Government, to see that roll-out go as far and as fast as it possibly can. To that end, no, we will not be rolling back on any of the provisions in the draft regulations as soon as we end the transition period. We welcome the measures and are proud to have played a significant part in negotiating them with the EU, because we believe that they will drive forward important ambitions for this country and for all our citizens who, as we have heard, increasingly rely on digital connectivity.

[Chi Onwurah]

On Ofcom’s resources, and I have declared an interest, I am somewhat surprised that it will take on the additional powers and responsibilities under the SI without any additional resources. We know that at some point, when we get the online harms Bill—again at some point—Ofcom will be involved in the regulation of high risk vendors. A number of additional requirements are being placed upon it, so will the Minister discuss the need for additional resources in the round with other Ministers whose responsibilities come under Ofcom’s purview? I am quite convinced that Ofcom does not have the resources it needs to take up all those additional duties.

[Matt Warman]

The hon. Lady makes an entirely reasonable point that Ofcom will be taking on a number of additional duties in the future, and considering its resourcing needs in the round is absolutely vital, but on this relatively narrow point, Ofcom is content with the resources it has.

In response to the hon. Member for Bristol North-West, the draft regulations give us the powers to consider what a mobile USO might look like. We do not immediately intend to take that forward, but it is a statement of the obvious that more and more households, especially with the growth of 5G, will be able to rely on a mobile service rather than anything else. Given that the USO is really important, the draft regulations give us the power to go further but we are not announcing anything as yet, but the hon. Gentleman’s Select Committee may wish to take an interest, I suspect.

I commend the regulations to the Committee. They are an important step forward, and I am pleased to hear that the Opposition do not oppose them, because I think there is real consensus across the House on the value of digital connectivity. The Government’s ambition is unashamedly extraordinary in going as far as we possibly can with gigabit connectivity. The regulations allow us to continue to drive that forward at the fastest pace we possibly can, and I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Communications Act (e-Commerce) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Tuesday 20th October 2020 General Committees

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. Like the Minister, I congratulate colleagues on being here and our team in particular, which is strong in knowledge, as we shall see. I must declare an interest inasmuch as I was tangentially involved in the regulation of the premium rate industry when I worked as head of telecoms technology for Ofcom before entering Parliament, so I may be going into a little bit more detail than members of the Committee would expect with regard to this statutory instrument.

As the Minister told us, the premium rate industry in the UK incorporates a range of services, from simple directory inquiries and 087 business information lines to innovative mobile games, competitions, charity giving and chat services. It is a diverse and complicated sector. Research commissioned by mobile insight specialists Mobilesquared found that in 2017, premium rate services contributed more than £700 million to the UK economy, with more than 22 million people using UK services.

However, as with every sector, there is risk; nearly 200,000 people a year suffer from text message scams, ITV faced a £70 million fine after phone-in competition winners were cheated out of millions, and we have all seen the regular news reports of children running up thousands in costs to their parents’ credit cards on mobile games. That is why it is so important that we get regulation, oversight and governance in this area right, providing consumers with the protections and confidence they need and good businesses with the regulatory environment to thrive. I myself have been on the end of a text messaging scam and had to complain to Ofcom in order to get it resolved. I put on record my thanks to Ofcom and the Phone-paid Services Authority for their continuing hard work. I am pleased that the this SI will give power to UK regulatory authority bodies to tackle key issues.

As you may have concluded from that, Mr Gray, we do not oppose the SI, but we do have some concerns and some questions. As the Minister has set out, the SI allows us to regulate services in the UK, bringing enforcement powers against EEA companies into line with UK companies. Currently, as we have heard, the country of origin principle is in force in the EEA. Article 3 of the directive—the internal market clause—provides that firms supplying online services are subject to the law of the member state in which they are established, not the law of the member state where the service is accessible. This is the country of origin principle.

As things stand, on 1 January 2021 at the end of the transition period, under the withdrawal agreement signed by this Government, UK businesses will no longer benefit from the country of origin principle when operating in the EEA and will therefore be subject to local regulations. The direct effect of retaining the country of origin benefits for EEA members in UK law would be that EEA businesses would continue to be exempt from UK rules, while the same benefits are not afforded to businesses operating in the EEA. This would give EEA-based information society services preferential market access, with no reciprocity from the EEA for UK businesses. The SI addresses this issue by removing that competitive disadvantage for UK-based companies.

I was pleased to hear the Minister set out that there would be little or no change for UK businesses. With so many businesses currently awaiting some kind of clarity on our trading arrangements with the EU, I know that they will appreciate that. I am also pleased that this SI effectively recognises the importance of regulatory purchase in protecting our citizens from communications technology harm.

As I said, Mr Gray, I previously worked for Ofcom. It is worthwhile remembering that the regulatory arrangements for premium rate services followed a self- and co-regulatory approach, until the celebrated “Richard and Judy” quiz “You Say We Pay” scandal of 2007, when I was working as head of telecoms technology at Ofcom. I remember well the public concern over the way in which premium rate services exploited consumers with unclear numbering systems and charges. At the time, the demand for regulation was criticised by some at the time as stifling innovation, but regulation was eventually put on a statutory footing to protect consumers.

It is unfortunate that mobile users still experience many harms that have no regulatory oversight. I do hope the Minister might say a word about when we can expect the long-awaited online harms White Paper to come before the House. I remind the Minister that the powers that he referred to give Ofcom the power to take enforcement action against those who persistently misuse the electronic communications network. Persistent misuse is defined as

“using a network or service in ways which cause or are likely to cause someone else, especially consumers, to suffer harm.”

We can all agree that there are many, many users of networks—Facebook in particular—that allow harm to be caused to consumers, yet we still do not have effective regulatory oversight.

Returning to the specifics, the SI raises some questions for UK firms. Could the Minister elaborate a little on his reasons for believing that there will be “little or no”—I believe those were his words—implications for UK companies that provide services in the EEA? Specifically, what is his view based on?

My concern is that firms will now feel that they have to research every regulatory requirement in every member state in which their services are accessible. Will the Minister cite the evidence on which he based his assessment? How are companies are being communicated with, so that they understand that the change, under which they are now subject to regulations in each of the EU countries in which they operate, will not put a burden on them? That burden could simply be researching lawyers’ fees in order that they feel confident to continue to operate, for example. Will all UK firms now have to work to 26 changing legislative agendas in practice? The Minister said that the regulatory regimes were similar, but for how long will that continue? If the European economic area rules change for UK companies providing premium services in member states, does he anticipate that UK law changes will reflect those changes? If not, how will the Government avoid divergence, creating increasing regulatory burdens in the future?

UK businesses must be protected—I am sure the Minister agrees—and they need to see some long-term thinking on this really important issue. Premium rate services play an important role in the UK economy, and I specifically emphasise their role in supporting UK charities. In 2018, the Phone-paid Services Authority found that the amount donated by typically generous UK citizens to UK charities by text messages grew by 30%; we might not have anticipated that, given that the text message is not the latest technology. In addition, it is estimated that a quarter of all donations to TV charity events, such as Red Nose Day or Children In Need, came from premium rate services.

Also, the PSA has stated that there is considerable potential for further growth for the charity sector. Charity sector fundraising has been adversely hit by covid-19, so I would like the Minister to provide, if he can, assurances that there will be no potentially negative impact on UK charities and jobs from firms seeking to relocate within the EEA to benefit from country of origin regulations. Also, will he say how many UK-based firms currently provide these services to the EEA and how many EEA-based firms provide services that are accessible in the UK, so that we can get an idea of the size of the market that this measure will have an impact on?

Finally, I was unable to find an impact assessment. Although I welcome the Minister’s words, have the Government carried out an impact assessment on the effects of these changes on UK firms, job and charities? If not, will they do so?

To conclude, we support bringing enforcement powers against EEA companies into line with those for UK businesses. This will ensure that UK companies do not suffer disproportionately from EU rule of origin laws. However, the Government should more effectively set out how they intend to maintain an open but properly regulated market in information services, both within the UK and between the UK and the European Union. I am very concerned that the Government seem to be working without an impact assessment in this area.

I thank the Minister in advance for his answers to my questions.

[Mr Whittingdale]

I am most grateful to the hon. Lady. It is always slightly alarming for a Minister to discover that the Opposition spokesperson is actually highly qualified on the subject being discussed—[Laughter.] She raises a number of very valid points.

First, I agree with the hon. Lady and welcome her recognition that premium rate services are not always malicious or designed to con people out of their money. They actually perform valuable services. They contribute a substantial amount to the economy and, as she said, they play an extremely important role in raising money for charity, which we are very keen to support.

Like the hon. Lady, I am of course aware of the dark side of premium rate phone messaging. While she was adjudicating on the “Richard and Judy” case, when she was at Ofcom, I recall that I was chairing the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee in this House, where we summoned ITV to account for some of its practices, which was making it a lot of money in ways that I think most people thought were not entirely appropriate, and indeed resulted in ITV being fined a considerable sum.

[Chi Onwurah]

I do not mean to dwell on “Richard and Judy” for too long in this Committee. To clarify, because of the way in which the regulatory regime was set up, I did not actually adjudicate on it, but we did develop the recommendations that led to stronger regulation of premium rates.

[Mr Whittingdale]

I congratulate the hon. Lady on her efforts at that time. She is right that this area obviously continues to evolve, and it is important that we maintain appropriate regulation and keep it up to date. I can tell her that the Phone-paid Services Authority is currently reviewing the code to strengthen standards across the market. It tends to try to prevent harm before it occurs. It actually issued a consultation document in February and is now drafting a revised code, which we expect shortly.

I said that we expect little or no immediate change for most businesses in this country. The hon. Lady raised the impact on business. I should of course make clear that this statutory instrument does not actually have any bearing on UK businesses; UK businesses will be outside the scope of the country of origin principle as a result of our leaving the European Union transition period at the end of December. The SI is creating the level playing field so that EEA-based businesses come within the scope of UK regulation, which they would not otherwise do unless we brought in these changes.

The hon. Lady asked what evidence we have on the impact on business. It is quite difficult. We have calculated that something like 75,000 businesses are potentially in the scope of the regulations, but for the vast majority of those, the difference will be relatively minor. They are already compliant with UK regulation, and UK regulation is in most cases is similar, if not identical, to that pertaining in other EU member states. The one piece of evidence we had was the Phone-paid Services Authority’s estimation of the number of derogation requests it gets each year from other EU member states, which is just a handful each year, indicating the small number of cases in which the regulations in another EEA member state are different from those that apply in the UK. On that basis, we are relatively confident that the number of companies that will have to make changes is relatively small.

We have sought to communicate. We have been engaging with sectors for at least the last six months, to alert them to this change when it comes. The Cabinet Office is conducting a communications campaign. Of course, in this case, this is not dependent on whether the UK obtains a comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union, since we do not actually wish to maintain the country of origin principle. At the end of the transition period, it will no longer apply, whether or not negotiations on a comprehensive agreement achieve a successful outcome.

We have not published an impact assessment for the reasons I say—it is difficult to assess in detail how these changes will work—but on the evidence I suggested, we are confident that the number of affected businesses will be small, not substantial. However, it will be the responsibility of businesses in the future, if they wish to operate in another EEA member state, to ensure that they are compliant with the regulations that apply there.

Finally, the hon. Lady raised the online harms legislation which, while a little way removed from the subject we are debating, is nevertheless a matter of great importance. I can tell her—she will have heard this before, but I say it with absolute confidence—that we will publish the Government’s full response to the White Paper consultation very shortly. It is almost in a state where it is ready for publication, and it is still our intention to introduce legislation to enact it early next year. We absolutely share her view that the matter is extremely important. We are determined to make the UK the safest place in which to conduct online activities and to do as much as possible to protect our children, and also to ensure that our regulatory framework is up to date and encourages innovation and growth, while at the same time installing the necessary safeguards.

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for indicating that the Opposition will not oppose the regulations, so I invite the Committee to approve them.

Question put and agreed to.

Online Harms

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Wednesday 7th October 2020 Westminster Hall

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Edward. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) on securing the debate and other Members on their contributions, which have been thoughtful, well-informed and passionate on this critical subject.

I also declare an interest: as a chartered engineer, I spent 20 years building out the networks that have become the internet. Over that time, but most particularly in the 10 years since I entered Parliament, our lives have been increasingly lived online, with 80% of UK adults using the internet daily or almost every day. Social platforms such as Facebook, Google, YouTube, Instagram and Twitter are woven into the fabric of our lives. Together with a vast array of online apps for everything from video conferencing to healthy eating, they are a critical enabler of an active life as citizen, consumer and economic contributor.

The covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the shift online. At the height of the lockdown, UK adults were spending on average over four hours a day online. For those not digitally excluded, it brought huge benefits, keeping us in touch virtually as physical touch became antisocial. However, as we have heard, particularly for my hon. Friends the Members for Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) and for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), the right hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) and the hon. Members for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Dr Cameron) and for Congleton (Fiona Bruce), the internet is at times an increasingly dark, challenging and inhospitable place. No matter how vulnerable or how well informed people are, they have little control over content, which is curated by tech platforms, allowing the spread of disinformation, sexual exploitation, fake news, extremism, hatred and other harmful content.

The importance and timeliness of today’s debate can be seen in the number of hon. Members in the Chamber, in yesterday’s United States Congress tech antitrust report and in today’s report from UBS, which reveals the eye-watering levels of wealth in the tech sector. Yet, as we have heard, the UK Government have done nothing. Regulation has not kept pace with technology, crime or consumers, leaving growing numbers of people increasingly exposed to significant online harms. It did not have to be this way.

In 2002, the then Labour Government saw the growth of new communications technologies and undertook a comprehensive, forward-looking review of the issues they raised. The result was the Communications Act 2003 and a new regulator, Ofcom, with the power to ensure that these issues were resolved in the public interest. That regulatory framework was given a 10-year lifespan—I know that because I was head of technology at Ofcom at the time.

In 2012, the Conservative-led Government saw the growth of our online lives, social media and big data, and did—nothing. The 2012 review of online harms may be the most important review we never had. As we have heard, the Government cannot even respond to their own belated and limited online harms consultation in a timely manner, leaving it to big tech to continue to control our online lines.

I consider myself a tech evangelist. I believe that tech is an engine of progress like no other. I believe it can improve the lives of my constituents and enable a more equal, more productive and more sustainable skills- based economy through a fourth industrial green revolution. However, people need to be protected online and empowered to take control of their online lives. The Government need to be on the side of the people, not tech lobbyists.

Hon. Members have set out many of the critical issues, so I will focus my remaining remarks on four areas: children, finance, disinformation and regulation. As emphasised particularly by the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Carla Lockhart) and my hon. Friend the Member for Putney (Fleur Anderson), the Government are failing in their duty to safeguard children. Worsened by increasing social isolation due to the pandemic, online abuse is being normalised for a whole generation. The previous Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid), called the pandemic the “perfect storm” for child abuse. The UK Safer Internet Centre found 8.8 million attempts to access child sexual abuse in one month alone. How will the Government address that, and what will they do to support schools? The centre found that schools desperately need help and support in levelling up online safety. Will the Government replace the UK Safer Internet Centre’s EU funding, so that it can continue to do its good work as we leave the European Union?

On financing, the platform giants’ business model is driven by algorithms that serve up more and more extreme content, which drives extreme behaviours such as radicalisation and self-harm. The model depends on eyeballs and is financed through advertising. Google and Facebook control the online advertising market, which facilitates so much online harm. What plan do the Government have to address the failings of that model or to give the Competition and Markets Authority and the advertising regulators the powers to do so? It is despicable that, nearly three years after her death, the family of Molly Russell have had only limited access to her data and have been denied access to the algorithms and all the content that helped facilitate her suicide. Will the Minister ensure that that changes?

The tech giants’ model also means that Google and Facebook have control of the online high street, directing the traffic on it, even as Amazon unfairly outcompetes the high street in our real-world towns. How will the Government address economic online harms and enable competition?

Our ability to build back from covid will depend on the successful deployment of a vaccine. As we have heard from the hon. Member for Brigg and Goole (Andrew Percy) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ogmore (Chris Elmore), however, misinformation on vaccines—as well as on 5G, the holocaust and just about everything—is freely available and promoted on social media. The Government’s counter-disinformation officer has a full-time dedicated staff of zero. When will they take disinformation seriously, and what will they do about it?

We are a constructive Opposition. It might appear that I have been liberal in my criticism of the Government, but that is born from my experience, the experience of hon. Members present and, most importantly, the experience of constituents up and down the country. Far too many people’s lives are detrimentally affected by what they experience online. As a constructive Opposition, we have proposals as well as criticisms. The Government have been too slow to act, and tech giants have thought themselves unaccountable for too long. However, they can be made accountable. Self-regulation has failed, but robust, reasonable, rational, forward-looking and principles-based regulation can succeed. It is shocking that, in all this time, the Government have not established what those principles should be. Is anonymity a right, or is it a privilege? Is identity a right? How do we decide when legal online content becomes harmful?

Labour has made it clear that we need a digital bill of rights and a legal duty of care to give more powers and protections. We need a statutory regulator for online platforms to crack down on the harm, the hate and the fake. However, we have also launched the Our Digital Future consultation to build consensus on the underlying principles by which our online lives should be guided—it is still taking submissions, if hon. Members would like to contribute. We are also committed to eradicating the digital divide—indeed, the many new digital divides—as a result of which marginalised people have become increasingly excluded from the online world.

Many bodies have contacted me and asked me to raise their concerns about issues from dangerous goods online to data adequacy, small business competition to fake reviews, age verification to facial recognition, and antisemitism to intellectual property. I cannot do them all justice. The Government must outline a clear plan to address the multitude of online harms. It cannot be limited to the platforms simply policing their terms and conditions. Enforcement and redress are required, and I repeat the questions posed by my hon. Friends the Members for Halifax and for Bristol North West (Darren Jones), although I despair of answers. The Government must get a grip if our lives are to flourish online without fear or favour.

UK Telecommunications

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2020 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for giving me advance sight of his statement. All sides of the House agree that the first duty of any Government is to protect their citizens, and we have confidence in our national security services, which go to such lengths to keep us safe. It has been clear for some time that there are serious questions over whether Huawei should be allowed to control large sections of our country’s telecoms networks, yet the Government refused to face reality. Their approach to our 5G capability, Huawei and our national security has been incomprehensibly negligent. The current Education Secretary was sacked as Defence Secretary for leaking parts of the security services’ advice on Huawei, yet the Government went on to ignore large parts of it. In January, the Foreign Secretary said in a statement to the House that the Government would legislate at “the earliest opportunity” on high-risk vendors. They then refused to work with us and their own Back Benchers to enable that to happen. Will the Secretary of State tell us when he will bring forward the legislation on high-risk vendors, including the robust regulatory and enforcement powers required to limit or eliminate their part in our network? “As soon as possible” and “shortly” will not wash any more.

Will the Government publish the security advice on which today’s decision has been taken? What new information have they been given that was not available to them when the initial decisions were made? I would also like to ask the Secretary of State what discussions he has had with the Foreign Secretary and the Trade Secretary on likely retaliation. Where else are we dependent on Chinese suppliers—for example, in our nuclear sector—and how are we working with our democratic allies, including but not limited to the United States, to develop alternatives in these areas? The Secretary of State says that this change is being made in response to US sanctions, but in the past he has emphasised how closely he was working with the United States, so were the sanctions a surprise? Is our security policy being led by the US? Did the very visible human rights violations by the Chinese in Hong Kong and against the Uyghurs play no part in the decision?

The reality is that the original decision on Huawei was made because, over the past decade, this Government have failed to deliver a sustainable plan for our digital economy. Almost exactly a year ago, the “UK Telecoms Supply Chain Review Report” was published. It stated:

“We will develop and pursue a diversification strategy—including by working with our international partners—to ensure a competitive, sustainable and diverse supply chain.”

Now the Secretary of State claims to have set out a “clear and ambitious diversification strategy”. This will come as a surprise to anyone who has looked at the Government’s statements. I would like to ask the Secretary of State: what are the actions to implement the strategy—which has effectively been set out somewhere and which I have not seen—and can he tell me where it is set out?

This is a car crash for our digital economy, but one that could have been visible from outer space. BT and other vendors have put the cost of this decision in the billions. The Secretary of State says £2 billion. What is the basis for that estimate, and how will he ensure that the cost is not passed on to consumers? Today’s announcement refers to 5G, but what are the implications for our emergency services network—a saga even longer than this one, in which BT was planning to use Huawei?

Open standards such as open RAN limit dependence on any one supplier; what is the Secretary of State doing to mandate such standards and open our networks to UK companies such as Cambridge company ip.access and the north-east company Filtronic? Crucially, what proportion of the additional money that is spent will go to UK companies and how many jobs will be created here? The Government recently announced a £500 million investment in bankrupt American satellite broadband provider OneWeb; are similar investments planned for 5G or 6G companies?

Labour has repeatedly offered constructive ideas to get the UK out of the Huawei hole; we have consistently argued to end our national dependence on all high-risk vendors and improve corporate responsibility for global supply chains. This entire saga has shown that the Government cannot sort this mess out on their own. We need a taskforce of industry representatives, academics, start-ups, regional governments and regulators to develop a plan that delivers a UK network capability and secure mobile network in the shortest possible timeframe. Will the Secretary of State commit to that and return to the House regularly to update on progress?

Will the Secretary of State get a grip, get a plan and secure our critical communications infrastructure, our digital economy and our national security?

[Oliver Dowden]

The hon. Lady raised a large number of questions and I will address as many as I can.

The hon. Lady asked when the Bill will be brought back. I do not know if she was listening to my statement, but I said that would be in the autumn and that remains the case. Will we publish the security advice? Yes, we will publish a summary of the security advice; that will contain the essence of it. She asked what was new; the new fact was the US sanctions imposed post-January. That is why we sought the advice from the NCSC. She asked whether we would consider wider relations with and responses to China; of course, the National Security Council considered those matters, but she would not expect me to go into detail on that on the Floor of the House. She asked about working on alternatives; we are already working with all our Five Eyes partners on those alternatives.

The first thing we need to do is ensure that we protect the other two vendors in this market, Nokia and Ericsson. Secondly, we need to get new suppliers in; that starts with Samsung and NEC. My hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman), the Minister with responsibility for digital infrastructure, who is sitting next to me, has had constructive discussions with them, and we are now at the stage of having engagement at a technical level with their officials.

Of course the hon. Lady is entirely right to point to the future, which is an open RAN network. There is currently only one open RAN network in the world, and that is in Japan, and that was in a situation where it started the network from scratch. There are big barriers to doing this, but of course that is the objective we are working towards. That means working with our partners through international institutions to set the right common standards on which we can have an open RAN network, and it means working with the telecoms providers to provide the right incentives for them to switch from a single vendor to the open RAN network. But in the end an open RAN network is going to provide the opportunity for UK providers, alongside providers from other allies and other countries around the world, to start providing that telecoms infrastructure.

I must say however that I find it extraordinary that the hon. Lady spoke for several minutes but still has not said whether she supports the decision; will she be backing it, yes or no? She says that we were negligent, but I would gently remind the hon. Lady that it was the Labour Government that opened the door to Huawei in the first place; it is this Government who are closing it. It was the Labour party that left us reliant on a small number of suppliers; we are diversifying it. And indeed it was the Labour party, as late as 2018, which was advocating for high-risk vendors to be in the network; we have stopped that.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Thursday 4th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Oliver Dowden]

I can reassure my right hon. and learned Friend that almost as we speak, and on pretty much a daily basis, I am taking the decisions necessary to ensure we bring forward the response to the White Paper and then the Bill itself. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) is seeking to intervene from a sedentary position. I can reassure her and other Members: it will be in this Session, as we have said consistently. On the age appropriate design code, I am taking the necessary steps to lay the code, as required by statute. I recognise concerns raised by businesses and indeed hon. Members, however, which is why I have asked the Information Commissioner’s Office to produce an assessment of its economic impact, and I will be including frequently asked questions for the news media sector in the code’s explanatory memorandum when I lay it.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

With the exception of Parliament, we are all of us online now: grandparents and schoolchildren, businesses and book clubs, theatres and tea parties, scammers and paedophiles. Online fraud has risen 400%, and the former Home Secretary and Chancellor, the right hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid), described the pandemic as a perfect storm for child abuse, yet the Government refuse to introduce any draft legislation—neither the online harms Bill nor the age appropriate design code—although they have been discussed and announced, including in manifestos. The Secretary of State talks about bringing it forward in this Session, but we do not even know how long this Session will last. Parents, the NSPCC and three Select Committees all say we need legislation now. The tech giants say it would be burdensome. Whose side is he on? Can he give me dates for the code and the Bill?

[Oliver Dowden]

I have great respect for the hon. Lady, as she knows, but I fear she did not listen to my answer to the previous question. I am on the side of young people—I have a daughter myself who is just entering adolescence—and of course I understand completely the need for stringent regulation. That is why, as I said in my answer to the previous question—I am happy to reassure her again—that the age appropriate design code will be laid imminently, and as I have said repeatedly we will respond to the online harms White Paper and introduce legislation in this Session.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 10th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 1, page 2, line 3, after “lessee in occupation” insert

“, or a person who is a legal occupant of the property and who is in a contractual relationship with the lessee or freeholder,”.

This amendment is intended to expand the definition of persons who can request an operator to provide an electronic telecommunications service to include rental tenants and other legal occupants who may not own the lease to the property they occupy.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 1, page 2, line 16, at end insert—

“(f) the operator does not, after 31 December 2022, use vendors defined by the National Cyber Security Centre as high-risk vendors.”

Amendment 4, page 2, line 16, at end insert—

“(f) the operator does not use designated high-risk vendors, as defined by the National Cyber Security Centre, in newly deployed electronic communications services.”

This amendment would prevent vendors designated as high-risk being used by operators granted Part 4A orders.

Amendment 3, page 5, line 14, at end insert—

“(8) Any operator exercising Part 4A code rights is obliged to ensure that alternative operators can easily install the hardware needed to provide their own electronic communications service.

(9) The definition of ‘easily’ in sub-paragraph (8) is to be provided by Ofcom.”

This amendment is intended to ensure that tenants are not “locked in” to using services provided by a single operator and to encourage market competition.

Amendment 5,  page 5, line 14, at end insert—

‘(8) Any operator exercising Part 4A code rights must publish a plan setting out how they will remove high-risk vendors, as defined by the National Cyber Security Centre, from their network.”

This amendment would ensure companies exercising part 4A rights have clear plans in place to remove vendors who are designated high-risk and a national security concern.

Amendment 6,  page 6, line 37, at end insert—

“Information on cyber security

27HH Any operator exercising a Part 4A code right must provide written information to new customers in the target premises on best practice on cyber security when using the electronic communications service that has been provided.”

This amendment would require operators to equip new customers with literature on how best to keep their home cyber secure, particularly in the era of the Internet of Things and with recent reports of hacked domestic devices such as baby monitors.

[Chi Onwurah]

I welcome the Secretary of State to his place. It is somewhat surprising to see him, as my hon. Friend the Member for Batley and Spen (Tracy Brabin) had expected to see him in the Commonwealth debate yesterday and I was expecting to see the Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman) today. As I understand it, after saying almost nothing over weeks in his post, the Secretary of State’s first moment at the Dispatch Box may be to reverse completely the Government’s position on part of the Bill. That raises the question: what information has changed and did the Government know what they were doing in the first place?

As we are taking all the amendments together, I shall consider the whole Bill. It is a great pleasure to speak on the Bill as shadow Minister for Digital. I have an interest to declare: before entering the House, I worked as a telecommunications engineer for 23 years, rolling out telecoms infrastructure in countries as diverse as Germany, Nigeria, Britain and Singapore. I am passionate about digital technology and the positive difference it can make; however, the 10 years for which I have been in Parliament have coincided with a rapid decline in the relative quality of our telecoms infrastructure under successive Conservative Administrations. Without the required ambition, this Government risk wasting a decade more.

The UK has a proud technological history, from the earliest days of the industrial revolution to the invention of the first fibre-optic cable and, of course, the worldwide web. That is why it was with such regret that on Second Reading I highlighted the fact that the OECD ranks us 35th out of 37 for broadband connectivity, even though ours is the fifth largest economy, and that 85% of small and medium sized enterprises said that their productivity was adversely affected by unreliable connections in 2019.

Sadly, our wasted 10 years in telecoms have not been limited to fixed infrastructure; both mobile and the online infrastructure of regulation have also been left to languish, reducing the impact of the Bill. Conservative Governments have entrenched the digital divide in the United Kingdom: 11 million adults lack one or more digital skills and 10% of households do not have internet access. At this rate, in 2028 there will be 7 million people without digital skills, which is tantamount to leaving one in 10 of our population permanently disenfranchised. Our part-time Prime Minister has changed his tune—[Hon. Members: “Oh!”]

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I suspect I am going to agree with some of the things that the hon. Lady says later in her speech, but before we get to that point, let us not be too prissy about the party political element of this matter. The original problem with our telecoms industry started with the asset stripping of the industry by the Labour Government under Gordon Brown, with the spectrum auctions. The hon. Lady should recognise that if she is to make a sensible case.

[Chi Onwurah]

I, too, look forward to the point at which we agree on something, but let us be absolutely clear about this: the telecoms infrastructure that the Labour Government oversaw was, in terms of competition and investment, an example for the world. If he does not believe that, the right hon. Gentleman can consult the figures.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is, of course, making her party point—I accept that—but in 2003 it was a Labour Government, under one T. Blair, who allowed Huawei into the UK in the first place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

The hon. Gentleman anticipates some of what this debate is about, but I point out to him that in 2003 there were no relevant powers or requirements on operators to notify when a foreign supplier became part of the network. More broadly, we are not, and I hope the hon. Gentleman is not, saying that the presence of suppliers from, or investment in our country by, different countries such as China—the Government have overseen huge investment in our infrastructure by the Chinese—is by definition wrong; we are saying clearly that we need to put in place plans to mitigate and manage that presence and investment. The Government are not doing that. The hon. Gentleman talks about avoiding party political debates, but he is making historical party political points.

[Damian Green (Ashford) (Con)]

May I gently point out to the hon. Lady that when she uses the Labour party sneer of the month about the part-time Prime Minister, she might like to look behind her and discover that there is precisely one person on the Labour Back Benches? She appears to be speaking for a part-time political party.

[Chi Onwurah]

I admire the fact that the right hon. Gentleman compares the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom with Back-Bench Labour MPs. I entirely agree that many Back-Bench Labour MPs contribute far more to the effective government of this country than the Prime Minister, who is not to be seen in our flood-devastated regions. I do not want to ask too much of Mr Speaker, so I will try to make some progress. First, though, let me say to hon. and right hon. Members that if they examine the record of the infrastructure competition that was in place until 2010—I was working for Ofcom at that time—they will see that there was far greater infrastructure competition then than there is now.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way on that point. In her time did she, by any chance, come across the Rifkind report that criticised the then Labour Government for the decisions that they had made? Did she read it in any way, or did she have any views on it when it was published?

[Chi Onwurah]

I have to say that I do not remember reading the Rifkind report, which suggests that it did not make a significant impression, as it was my job to look at the management of the network. The hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the Conservative Benches—there are many of them—are trying to accuse the last Labour Government of neglecting in some way our telecoms infrastructure, but it is totally clear that, over the 10 years of the last Labour Government, we rolled out broadband infrastructure to 50% of this country. If that is neglect, we would like to see a little bit more neglect like that at the moment.

[Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

rose—

[Chi Onwurah]

I wish to make some progress, but I will be happy to give way in a while.

What the Prime Minister promised was full fibre by 2025. Then he downgraded that pledge to universal “gigabit-capable” broadband, and then, in the Queen’s Speech, the pledge was watered down further to “accelerating the roll-out” of gigabit-capable broadband. I am pleased that, in this Bill, the Government appear to be acknowledging the limitations of a market free-for-all and now propose a number of minor measures to ease infrastructure build-out by giving operators more power to access apartment blocks when requested by tenants.

This is a mediocre Bill. On Second Reading, the Minister spoke of

“taking the first hammer blow to the barriers preventing the deployment of gigabit connectivity.”—[Official Report, 22 January 2020; Vol. 670, c. 358.]

This is not a hammer; it is not even a toy hammer. It is like one of those sponge hammers that may make you feel better, but actually does nothing at all. This Bill does not go far enough in solving the problems brought about by a wasted decade in which the Tories allowed the re-monopolisation of broadband infrastructure and failed to take advantage of the world-leading position left by the last Labour Government. If the Government genuinely believe in the levelling up of the UK’s broadband, the Prime Minister has to do far, far more than this.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Could the hon. Lady give the House some guidance on the amendment proposed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and the three different versions of something that looks similar in the name of the Leader of the Opposition? I would like to understand why the Opposition are taking a different line from that of my right hon. Friend, and what that amounts to.

[Chi Onwurah]

The right hon. Gentleman anticipates the point that I was about to make in my speech, and I will clarify the differences.

Despite the lack of ambition in this Bill, we will not be opposing it. The Government are taking baby steps when it comes to digital infrastructure, but we will not stand in their way. Indeed, we will help them. We will be pushing a set of practical amendments in line with the Government’s stated intentions on tenants’ rights, competition and excluding high-risk vendors from UK telecommunications networks in the absence of the management and mitigation plans that we have been promised. There is also an important amendment on cyber-security education.

Amendment 2 expands the definition of persons who can request an operator to provide an electronic communications service to include rental tenants and other legal occupants who may not own the lease to the property that they occupy. Although the Bill’s explanatory notes and comments from the Minister suggest that tenants can make the request, the Bill itself does not make that clear, referring to them as lessees. Many tenants are desperate for gigabit broadband to enable them to work from home or grow their business. What if the landlord is difficult to reach or indifferent to their situation? Should not the person who actually lives in the building have some rights?

I will not try your patience, Mr Speaker, by expounding at length on the dire state of both home ownership and leasehold—or fleecehold as it is more properly known. The Government could end the misery of millions if they took on the large landowners and followed Labour’s commitment to end leasehold altogether. The system is broken, and that is one reason home ownership rates among young people are a third lower than they were in the early noughties. There are 4.5 million households in the private rented sector. We know also that tenants can easily find themselves in precarious and insecure circumstances through no fault of their own, or even with nowhere to live as a result of a section 21 notice. We therefore have a large proportion of our population condemned to renting for life, but with few rights and less certainty. Although the Government seem unwilling to address the housing crisis, they could, at the very least, ensure that tenants benefit from this legislation, and that is what our amendment seeks to do.

Much of the publicity around today’s debate relates to amendments 1 and 4, which seek to limit or prevent operators with high-risk vendors in their networks from taking advantages of the provisions of this Bill. Mr Speaker, as this is an issue of national security, I do hope that you will forgive me if I take quite some time to discuss these amendments.

My first job when I left Imperial College was with Nortel, a Canadian world leader in the then emerging telecommunications sector. If someone had said to me that a couple of decades later we would be incapable of building a European telecoms network without a Chinese vendor, I would have been astonished. Essentially, though, that was the Government’s position when they confirmed that Huawei would be allowed to participate in the UK’s 5G network, despite national security concerns. Huawei is bound by China’s National Intelligence Law 2017 to

“support, co-operate and collaborate in national intelligence work.”

We are not Sinophobes or Chinese conspiracy theorists. We do not believe that trade and cultural exchange with China are a bad thing, as some have suggested. There are also many great people working for Huawei in this country dedicated to improving our national infrastructure.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

We are going to venture into this subject in depth, but I just wonder whether the hon. Lady agrees with me on the following. When we are developing a relationship with China—yes, perhaps we want China to do business on level terms with us—is it right that Huawei, as she has described, is able to be used by its intelligence services, but western companies such as Apple, Amazon and eBay are not even allowed to operate in China under the terms and conditions that they are freely able to operate in the west?

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He raises two important points: one of reciprocity between how Huawei acts and how vendors from Europe and the US are able to act in China; and also one of the risks associated with that potential relationship with the Chinese security services. It is a risk that has been examined by the National Cyber Security Centre.

[Jonathan Edwards (Carmarthen East and Dinefwr) (PC)]

I thank the hon. Lady for giving way. We are minded to support the Labour amendments because of the designation of the National Cyber Security Centre. However, what impact does she think that it will have on the roll-out of 5G? How much time are the UK Government likely to lose in terms of rolling out 5G across the UK?

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his proposed support. He raises another important point, which I will address immediately. First, we do not want to think that the involvement of Chinese companies in our network infrastructure is necessarily an unmanageable security risk—I am choosing my words very carefully— but we do believe that it represents a risk. We believe that because that is what our security services say. The National Cyber Security Centre has designated Huawei as a high-risk vendor. That is why it set up the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre. I thank the NCSC for meeting me and for giving the Opposition a detailed security briefing. I have also sought advice from industry experts.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David Davis]

May I draw the hon. Member back to the question of what we mean by a high-risk vendor? Quite rightly, she is focused on the security element, but in a throwaway line she talked about the attitude to trade with China. The whole concept of global trade requires a rules-based environment and proper behaviour by all the players. As far as we can tell, China seems to subsidise Huawei to the point that it can act in a predatory pricing mode towards western companies, with the clear aim of removing those companies from competitive pressure. Although that point is not as important as the national security issue, is it not still very important in its own right?

[Chi Onwurah]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a very important point, so I will deal with it in some detail. I am limiting most of my remarks to reflect the work of the National Cyber Security Centre because it has done a great deal of work in this area and it is an offshoot of our security services. We trust it. As our national security is in the hands of our security services, I place my confidence with them.

[Sir Mark Hendrick (Preston) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Chi Onwurah]

I will just finish addressing the previous point and then come back to my hon. Friend.

The point made by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) regarding the financial viability of the sector as a whole is incredibly important. If players in the sector—operators or vendors—fail, there will be an impact on the network and therefore on our security as it is part of our critical national infrastructure. The Huawei business model appears to be dependent on having really deep pockets, which means that it can undercut other vendors in tender processes.

[Bob Seely]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Chi Onwurah]

May I just finish this point?

There are two consequences of Huawei undercutting other vendors: market share, and the dependence of operators on Huawei as a vendor. The networks that Huawei offers or builds are genuinely vendor-specific and operator-specific, which increases dependence hugely. I recognise the point made by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, and I think it is important for national security as well as for our economic security.

[Sir Mark Hendrick]

As the shadow Minister will be aware, the Government made an announcement on 28 January that they were going to give a very limited role to Huawei in the development of the infrastructure. They have also taken advice from GCHQ and the NCSC about the level of involvement that Huawei should have. Why does she disagree with that? [Interruption.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Mark Hendrick]

I have written to every Member in this House inviting them to the reception next week, but it is not a declarable interest.

If there are no more points of order, may I just ask the shadow Minister why she does not feel that it is appropriate to take the outlined course of action, given the evidence from GCHQ and the NCSC about Huawei’s limited role and the management of risk?

[Chi Onwurah]

My hon. Friend raises a really important point. It is worth clarifying that we support the position of the NCSC and I have said that the risks can be managed, but the fact is that we see no evidence that the risks are being managed. They are not being managed in the way in which the NCSC has said that they can, should and need to be managed. There is no evidence of that, and that is the key reason for amendment 4.

Amendment 1, in the name of the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), is similar in some ways to our amendment. The House will not be surprised to learn that I disagree passionately with him and many of his hon. Friends about many very important issues, but we have a shared concern for our national technological capability and our national security. Labour’s amendment 4 differs from his amendment in two ways. First, our amendment would apply with immediate effect, whereas amendment 1 would apply from 2023. Secondly, our amendment would only apply to newly deployed infrastructure, whereas amendment 1 —as I understand it—would apply universally, to all telecommunications network deployment.

I differ from some Government Members on the nature and level of the threat from Huawei. As I said, I follow the guidance of the National Cyber Security Centre, but the problem is that we have no indication that the Government are following that guidance. There is no legislation. There is no plan for legislation. There is no detail on the nature of the regulator. We understand that it is proposed that Ofcom would take up these regulatory powers, but what are the powers, and what are the resources at a time when Ofcom is also being asked to regulate not only the BBC but the internet? What are the resources, what are the powers and what are the enforcement mechanisms?

Meanwhile, people across the country are concerned. Constituents have written to me to ask if their data has to flow over high-risk infrastructure. They may be objecting on security grounds or, equally, on their understanding of the human rights and employment rights record of Huawei in China, but either way they do not understand the Government’s lack of action.

In tabling this amendment, we are not only, as it were, bringing problems to the Government—we are also offering solutions. I have made detailed proposals for potential ways in which we can diversify our telecoms supply chain: an industrial strategy for the telecommunications sector based around a five-point plan involving standards, research and development, a new catapult centre, working with the Department for International Development and with Commonwealth and emerging markets, and support for non-5G wireless technologies. All of this is to enable innovation around networks, business models and more.

The good news is that in tech you are never so far behind that you cannot leapfrog existing technology. The bad news is that it takes investment and strategic vision—qualities, I am afraid, that this Government appear to lack. Huawei is a test of both. Last week, in the Westminster Hall debate secured by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, I put 10 questions to the Minister, which he was unable to answer. I will not repeat them here, but—[Interruption.] The Minister appears surprised from a sedentary position. I did not receive an answer to my 10 questions. I could repeat them here, but I have written to him to give him the opportunity to encourage the Secretary of State to do so later. Truly, it astounds me that a Government who are, for ideological regions, apparently reluctant to take initiatives on UK state intervention seem so reluctant to set out how they are going to prevent Chinese state intervention in our industry and our economy.

Amendment 5 is related in that it seeks to ensure that operators who roll out infrastructure as a result of this Bill have clear and published plans in place to remove vendors who are designated high risk and a national security concern. Clearly—I think there has been some consensus on this in the debate—it is for the Government to bring forward the promised plans to manage the presence of high-risk vendors in the network. However, in the absence of such plans, the amendment places a duty of transparency on the operators to publicly report on their use of high-risk vendors and their plans to meet the target of 35% set out by the National Cyber Security Centre.

Amendment 3, which was also tabled in Committee, is critical and relevant to some of the earlier debate regarding the record of the Labour Government. We believe that we can go much further in broadband market competition. During my six years at Ofcom, it was established beyond doubt that telecoms infrastructure competition drives investment, innovation and choice. In relation to the previous debate on high-risk vendors, had we had greater competition, we would have had greater choice and would not be in the position of being dependent on two, or possibly three, suppliers. Under Labour, first generation—

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

Quite apart from the security aspect, does not coronavirus show how much more dependent we in the United Kingdom have to become on this sort of technology?

[Chi Onwurah]

Coronavirus shows the ways in which risks can come from different directions and can be unpredictable. That means, as the hon. Gentleman suggests, that not only are we dependent on technology, particularly with regard to working from home, but that the spread of misinformation around coronavirus creates the need for infrastructure that is not only secure but properly regulated.

It may seem strange for a Labour MP to be giving instruction to a Conservative Government in competitive markets, but I am afraid that my time in this place has taught me that certain Conservatives are all too willing to put vested interests before competitive markets. As the Bill stands, one operator can capture a building, roll out infrastructure to that building, and basically fleece the tenants there forever.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady knows that I have my own issues with various aspects of Government policy that I hope will be put right, but the idea that diversity and competition are not at the heart of the Government’s proposal is, I am afraid, simply not true. The Government are exactly trying to achieve the kind of competition that has fallen out of this market because of the domination of one particular player. While I welcome the Government’s intention, the only difference I have is on where we take the risk. So I think that welcoming a little bit of the Government’s competition strategy would be a good idea.

[Chi Onwurah]

In that case, I am sure that the Government will adopt this amendment, which means that the infrastructure that is put in place under the Bill has to be open to other competitors so that one operator cannot capture a building. That is the intention of the amendment; it is not the intention of the Bill. The amendment ensures that tenants are not locked into services provided by a single operator, requiring that the infrastructure can easily be shared.

Amendment 6 recognises the distressing recent reports of hacked baby monitors and suchlike, and poor cyber-security practices that leave many residential users open to cyber-attacks. The amendment is aimed at supporting customers and bedding in best practice for the era of the internet of things, which will increase citizens’ data trails exponentially, and therefore the opportunity for cyber-threats, digital surveillance and data exploitation. People, not technology and things, must be at the heart of the internet of things. Through this amendment, we want to ensure the distribution of materials on cyber-security education for new customers getting a telecommunications service as a result of the powers exercised under the Bill.

I started by saying that this is a mediocre Bill. On a scale of zero to 10, in terms of impact on our telecommunications infrastructure, it is about 0.5—with a good wind behind it. It does no harm, but it does very little good. Our amendments seek to change that, delivering for tenants, for competition and for national security.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I rise to speak to the amendment standing in my name and in those of my colleagues.

The reason we have tabled this amendment is that we are genuinely concerned, like the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), that this country has got itself far too bound into a process in which we are reliant on untrusted vendors—in this particular case, Huawei. We recently heard a Government Minister express the view that Huawei is a private company. Let us be absolutely clear at the outset: this company is not a private company. Ultimately, it is essentially almost completely owned by Chinese trade unions, and they, of course, are completely locked into the Chinese Government. This an organisation wholly owned by China.

It is often bandied around, including by some of the security guys the other day, that this is somehow all to do with market failure, as if out of nowhere companies from the west in the free markets—the free world—no longer wanted to get involved in this process. That is completely and utterly without foundation. The single biggest problem we have faced is that, nearly two decades ago, the Chinese Government set out to ensure that they dominated the market. As this organisation has access to nigh-on unlimited funds, it has spent that period underbidding every single time in these processes, from 2G through to 4G and now, as we understand it, 5G.

--- Later in debate ---

[Oliver Dowden]

I really feel that at this point I need to make a little more progress and deal with some of the other amendments, because I can see that you are concerned, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will happily take further interventions later on, though I feel I have dealt with a wide scope of them.

[Chi Onwurah]

rose—

[Oliver Dowden]

Yes, I will give way, as it is the Opposition Front-Bench spokesperson.

[Chi Onwurah]

This is clearly a question of great importance, yet unfortunately I hear nothing new. The Secretary of State seems to be committing to diversification, but what is the new commitment? Is it diversification of the supply chain, which was in the review, or is it diversification of the supply chain leading to the elimination of high-risk vendors, and if so by what date?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Paterson]

I shall be brief. I begin by thanking the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary for their great courtesy and the huge attention they have given to several of us to try to find a resolution, because unfortunately some of us find the Government’s position incomprehensible. They had a good narrative: they could have said, “We have inherited a very bad position from preceding Conservative and Labour Governments. We would like to reduce the current position, where we have a high-risk vendor implanted in our 4G and other networks, to zero over a period of time.” That would be a perfectly logical plan, and we are tantalisingly close to the Government saying that. They have acknowledged that Huawei is high risk. Having a limit of 35% is a bit of a nonsense: it is like saying prisoners are allowed to build 35% of a prison wall. If 35% is a risk, and we cannot go above 35%, the obvious, ineluctable conclusion is that we should go to zero over a period of time.

We know that the talk of lack of alternatives is a nonsense—we have been through this. We know Samsung is supplying Korea; we know France has gone for others; the United States has gone for Ericsson; and Australia, with a huge dependence on Chinese exports, has gone for other vendors. We know there are other vendors, so that is all a nonsense.

We know there is a real risk. It is worth looking at the National Cyber Security Centre report. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) quoted two lines from paragraph 5.5.2. I just want to quote one sentence:

“Any national dependence on a high risk vendor would present a significant national security risk.”

Having had the honour of serving on the National Security Council as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, I know that we must take that as the absolute first priority. I take the House back to the words of the Under-Secretary last week. He made it very clear:

“I conclude by saying simply that national security will always be at the top of our priorities and we will work to move towards no involvement of high-risk vendors.”—[Official Report, 4 March 2020; Vol. 672, c. 299WH.]

That was the Government’s position last week, and I am happy to support that position. What we need to have today is confirmation of how we get there.

The Secretary of State has moved a long way since the National Security Council. We will have a telecoms Bill in early summer. We will have a process with our Five Eyes partners, as proposed by the senators’ letter, which we all received last week. That is all thoroughly good stuff. All we need now is a commitment to say there will be an end date. We have to have from this debate a statement from the Government that there will be a point, in the reasonably near future, where there will be zero involvement of high-risk vendors. The briefing we had sent round to us this afternoon said that

“our intention is to further reduce the market share of high risk vendors so that we get to a position where we do not have to use a high risk vendor in our telecoms network.”

The Secretary of State said that we wanted to be a in a position where we do not have to use them at all, but that is where we are this afternoon. Nobody has to use this equipment: they are just driven to do so by commercial pressures, and it is only by doing what the United States, Australia, Japan and South Korea have done, which is to block and stop high-risk vendors, that we will allow other vendors to grow, to prosper and to supply.

I am delighted to see the Under-Secretary back in his seat and talking to the Secretary of State. They have time still to intervene on me and give a clear commitment that when the telecoms Bill comes through in the summer, it will contain a definitive commitment to a firm date by which all high-risk vendors will have been removed from our system.

[Chi Onwurah]

I am afraid that the Secretary of State’s so-called assurances have sown more confusion, rather than rectifying the situation. He says the Bill should include tenants, but he also said in the same speech that it would be disproportionate to extend the Bill to do so. I will therefore press amendment 2.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah]

We have had a very interesting and at times lively debate. On Third Reading, I would say that this Bill gives us baby steps towards rolling out the infrastructure that so many millions across this country are in desperate need of—full-fibre broadband infrastructure. This is no time for the Government to be patting themselves on the back. This is a mediocre Bill that, in addition, risks being derailed by the Government’s failure to take a longer-term view on our national networks, full-fibre, 5G and more. In terms of the Secretary of State’s responses, we will take forward the reassurances on tenants and hold the Government to account. Tenants should be able to access the provisions of this legislation. I fear that the Government do not understand the basis or need for competitive infrastructure, because the Bill does not support competitive access to multiple-dwelling units. We will hold the Government to account on that. We will also hold them to account on the assurances given on information and better dissemination of digital skills and digital guidance.

The big Huawei hole in which the Government find themselves has not been reconciled by today’s debate. The Secretary of State promised several things, including a new telecoms security Bill, but he could not give us any of the details. He promised a diversification strategy but, to be clear, that was the basis of the telecoms supply chain review report in July 2019, and we would hope that there would be some detail on what that strategy is. The Budget is tomorrow. Will we see funding for significant investment in the diversification of the supply chain that the Secretary of State promised?

Will we get greater clarity on what the diversification strategy is leading to? Is it leading to non-dependence on high-risk vendors within this Parliament or at some unspecified date in the future? We have heard little on the industrial strategy that will make diversification possible. Are we talking about UK capacity to deliver 5G and 6G in future networks, or are we talking about greater support for Japanese and Korean companies to enter our supply chain? Will the timetable for this diversification strategy be on the face of the telecoms security Bill?

Those questions all remain to be answered. It is an indictment of this Government’s support for our national security—and the clarity of that support for our national security—that at this stage so many Conservative Members feel it necessary to vote against their own Government, in order to press home the needs of our national security and, specifically, our technological capability in the key areas of 5G, 6G and future telecommunications. We are told that, in network design, it is always important to design in the possibility of breach, but the Government seem to be designing in breach of our entire network system.

[Matt Warman]

indicated dissent.

[Chi Onwurah]

The Minister shakes his head. In that case, I hope he will be able to say how we will ensure that we are not dependent on high-risk vendors before the end of this Parliament. Until we see a detailed plan, an industrial strategy and funding for all the different components of that, the Opposition will remain concerned that the Government are not prepared to make the interventions necessary to ensure that our national security is safeguarded.