Monday 30th November 2020
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberTelecommunications (Security) Act 2021 View all Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text
The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Oliver Dowden)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Cutting-edge technology such as 5G and gigabit broadband have the potential to transform our lives and this Government are investing billions of pounds in their roll-out nationwide, but we can only have confidence in that technology if we know it is secure, and this Bill will create one of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world, one that will protect our networks even as technologies grow and evolve, shielding our critical national infrastructure both now and for the future.
This Bill acts on the recommendations of the United Kingdom telecoms supply chain review, which in turn was informed by the expert technical advice at the National Cyber Security Centre in GCHQ. First, it establishes a tough new security framework for all the UK’s public telecoms providers. This will be overseen by Ofcom and the Government, and they will have a legal duty to design and manage their networks securely. Rigorous new security requirements will be set out in secondary legislation, and codes of practice will set technical guidance on how providers should meet the law, and where providers are found wanting, Ofcom will have the power to impose steep fines. For example, under the current regime fines for failing to protect security are limited to just £2 million or £20,000 per day, while under the new regime they will rise significantly, to up to 10% of turnover or £100,000 per day. Under the current regime Ofcom has limited monitoring and enforcement powers. Under the new regime it will have the power to enter premises of telecoms providers, to interview staff and to require technical systems tests.
If we pass this Bill, few other countries in the world will have a tougher enforcement regime, and the point of this Bill is not just to tackle one high-risk vendor; it raises the security bar across the board and protects us against a whole range of threats. According to the NCSC, the past two years have seen malicious cyber-activity from Russia and China as well as North Korea and Iranian actors. While I know that telecoms providers are working hard to protect our networks against this hostile activity, the Government have lacked the power to ensure they do so. This Bill puts a robust security framework in place, guaranteeing the protection of our networks.
Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)
It feels like a long time since we had debates about Huawei at, I think, the beginning of the year, which perhaps started this national conversation about our critical national infrastructure. My right hon. Friend speaks about threats: what is the biggest long-term geostrategic threat facing the UK now?
Oliver Dowden
The purpose of this Bill is to give us flexibility so that we do not get bound by the particular circumstances of today, and we have designed it to give us that. The four big threats we consistently face in cyber in this country are, as my right hon. Friend knows, in relation to Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, and we are seeing an evolution in some of those threats, particularly in relation to China.
This new security framework is just one half of the Bill; the second half gives the Government unprecedented new national security powers to identify and tackle high-risk vendors. Under the Bill the Government will be able to designate specific vendors that pose risks to our national security and issue directions to telecoms providers to control their use of goods, services or facilities provided by those vendors.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
In principle, I welcome the Bill. Its focus, however, is on kit, hardware and vendors, and that will go some way towards protecting our telecoms systems, but we are also still facing threats from hacking, so making sure we have basic good cyber-hygiene will be just as important as some of these measures we are discussing today.
Oliver Dowden
In short, yes, the right hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct. What this Bill does is bite in three respects. First, it sets out the overarching duties on mobile network operators and other telecoms providers in statute. It then empowers the Government through secondary legislation to provide further requirements on them. On top of that, for the tier 1 providers, which will basically be all the big telecoms providers, it also introduces a code of practice whereby they have to comply with that to ensure that they are secure. Across the board, the Bill tightens the requirements on them.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
To follow up on the comments of my good friend the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), does the Bill also give added protection to private individuals using their mobile phone, to stop them having it tapped by, say, a newspaper reporter?
Oliver Dowden
I cannot imagine what my hon. Friend is alluding to. This is aimed at the telecoms providers, but in tightening the security requirements on them, it in turn, of course, tightens the security for individual telecoms users. The Bill makes it a duty for telecoms providers to comply with those directions and introduces robust penalties for those that fail to do so.
The point is that these powers will protect us against both the high-risk vendors of today and the threats of tomorrow. I know that for right hon. and hon. Members there are significant concerns about one high-risk vendor, Huawei. This has rightly attracted the attention and concern of many hon. Members and I want, first, to reassure them that I have heard them, that I am acting and that I am taking a clear-eyed approach to protecting our national security.
In July, I announced that UK telecoms providers should cease to procure any new 5G equipment from Huawei after 31 December 2020 and remove all Huawei equipment from our 5G networks by the end of 2027. This Bill enables us to implement those decisions in law.
Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)
I welcome both the Secretary of State’s direction and his much earlier than expected announcement of no new installations. Does he agree that this fundamentally changes the incentives on any boardroom for using any kit—in this case, Huawei—that is a risk? The cost is going to be laid with the company—that they will have to remove it anyway—which changes the pricing structure that any other company would have to bid for.
Oliver Dowden
My hon. Friend makes a very important point, and I will be coming on to that in a minute. It is actually happening now because telecoms providers and mobile network operators know three things. They have to remove Huawei equipment in respect of 5G by 2027 entirely. They cannot purchase any equipment from the end of this year, and—I will come on to this shortly—we have double locked that, as it were, by having the installation requirement. Mobile network operators are already working on that assumption.
Mr Kevan Jones
I find that very strange because the Bill is about security. The Secretary of State is now saying that he is introducing proposals which mean that if, for example, Vodafone or any other operator has got some stock in, it cannot put it in from the end of this year. What is the security risk there? The only reason we changed the projections earlier last year—which I supported—was the US sanctions on future kit. There is not a security risk to the kit that is going in now so how can he use this Bill, on security, for doing that? Is this not just a political decision that he is making?
Oliver Dowden
To clarify the position for the right hon. Gentleman, mobile network operators cannot purchase from December this year—so they can purchase it now— and the installation limit will then apply from September 2021. The point of these measures is to address the concerns that Members rightly raised that companies could be incentivised to purchase large amounts of stock, stockpile it and then roll it out right the way through to 2027. I told the House in July that I would set us on a clear and unambiguous path to 2027, and these measures do exactly that.
Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)
Does the Secretary of State agree that, associated with the Bill, there needs to be a plan for the greatest diversity in the supply chains? That is the long-term solution, because part of the challenge is that we have ended up focusing on one supplier, Huawei, which has been dominant in this field. What action is he taking in that area?
Oliver Dowden
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. The interventions are tempting me to jump around points that I intend to make, but he is right about the importance of diversification. We have published the diversification strategy, which is available for Members to examine, and I will come on to it in a moment.
It is this Bill and this Bill alone that gives Members the assurances they seek for the security of our networks both now and in the future. Further to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), operators are already taking our approach seriously—they are working now to meet the Government’s requirements. For example, BT has signed a deal with Ericsson for 5G equipment to enable it to phase out Huawei and is already in the process of using Ericsson products to replace Huawei in its core. Where operators can go further and faster without jeopardising the stability of our network, we will of course encourage them to do so, but it would be a big risk to force them to go even further. BT and others have warned that moving faster could put our networks under considerable strain, creating significant risk of blackouts, and it would take longer for 5G to reach the parts of the country where it would make the most difference.
Mr Ellwood
O2, Three and BT had concerns that they would have to cancel their contracts with Huawei but still pay for them, because the equipment was on its way. Could my right hon. Friend clarify what happens to contracts that are in the pipeline, which could see these companies go bust if they have to pay for them?
Oliver Dowden
My Department is in close contact with mobile network operators. I do not think that the sort of risk my right hon. Friend describes of companies going bust is remotely the case. Furthermore, we have given clear advance notice of this. For example, we made the first statements in January this year. We updated the guidance in July, and we also consulted extensively with the mobile network operators on the requirements in relation to installation that I am announcing today.
Oliver Dowden
I will make some progress. I may come back to the right hon. Gentleman later, but I have already given way to him twice.
I know that some Members are concerned that we have not named Huawei on the face of the Bill and that our approach could be reversed in years to come. I want to reassure those Members on a number of fronts. We have not chosen to name Huawei for two compelling practical reasons. First, as we discussed, this Bill is designed to tackle not only the Huaweis of today but the Huaweis of tomorrow, wherever they come from. It needs to be flexible enough to cover future threats and not tie our hands by limiting our response to one company and one company alone. Secondly—this is the most crucial point—making reference to any one company would create a hybrid Bill, dramatically slowing the passage of the Bill and therefore our ability to combat all high-risk vendors, including Huawei.
However, as a concrete sign of our commitment to tackling the national security risks posed by Huawei, I can confirm today that we are going further in two significant ways. First—I hope Members will have had a chance to see this—we have published an illustrative designation notice and an illustrative designated vendor direction to demonstrate how the Bill’s powers in relation to a high-risk vendor could be exercised. Given the level of concern in this House and in the other place about Huawei’s role in 5G infrastructure, these illustrative drafts name Huawei explicitly, clarifying our position beyond doubt, and set out a clear pathway to the reduction and removal of its equipment.
Dr Luke Evans (Bosworth) (Con)
Does the Secretary of State believe that taking out companies such as Huawei may damage the economic impact, and what assessment has he made about making sure that we are at the forefront of growing 5G network in the UK?
Oliver Dowden
My hon. Friend raises an important point. We are clear-eyed about putting national security first. If national security and economic interests are in conflict with each other, national security comes first. But within the context of that, we have properly weighed up the risks as between different dates. I believe that 2027 strikes the appropriate balance in that it can be delivered with impact, in the way that I described in my statement to the House in July—it will have an impact in terms of cost and roll-out for mobile network operators—but it does not run the risk that we go too far and too fast, whereby we risk some sort of blackout and loss of provision.
In addition to the draft directions, we are going a step further by using the illustrative directions to set out a new hard deadline for the installation of Huawei equipment. That direction makes it clear that all operators must not install Huawei equipment in their networks from the end of September 2021.
That clarification has clear practical implications. It will prevent any operator from stockpiling Huawei kit in the hope that the ban might be reversed. The new installation deadline will create cold hard facts on the ground, effectively turning the plan for Huawei’s removal into an irreversible reality.
The powers in the Bill also allow us to keep an eagle eye on the progress of Huawei’s removal. They enable us to require Ofcom to obtain information from companies to see whether a provider has complied, or is complying, and they allow us to require providers to prepare a plan setting out exactly how they intend to get to zero Huawei by 2027.
Using those powers, we will not just publish an annual report of compliance on the removal of Huawei equipment, but keep a close watch on the future progress of all telecoms companies where Huawei is concerned. Under this rigorous monitoring and reporting system, no provider will be able to drag their feet. They will need to provide proof that they are working to meet the 2027 deadline. But, critically, we can do this only if we secure these important powers—the powers that will enable us to take action in relation to Huawei to protect our networks, but also to take action against any other potential high-risk vendors now and in the future.
Mr Kevan Jones
The right hon. Gentleman is wrong. This Bill is actually about security. The reason he is going to get the powers is to take out vendors who are a clear high risk. Huawei has been there for a while. The kit that he is talking about banning after 2021—even if it is stockpiled or part of a contract—has not got a security implication at all because it has already gone through our Huawei centre. So I am not sure that he has the powers in the Bill to do that. I am sorry, but if I were a telecoms provider and I had a contract or a stockpile of kit that I could not use, I would be looking at taking legal action against the Government, because he cannot use the Bill if that equipment is not a threat to national security, which it is not.
Oliver Dowden
I say to the hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] I beg his pardon. It is the right hon. Gentleman. I stand corrected. I say to the right hon. Gentleman that, first, this Bill and the measures in it implement what we announced as a Government in January and July, which, in turn, was based on the advice of the National Cyber Security Centre and GCHQ. In relation to whether I, or any Secretary of State, has sufficient powers in the Bill, I refer him to clause 16(2), which inserts new section 105Z8(4)(a) to (l) into the Communications Act 2003, which sets out a very wide range of bases on which I can designate a provider as high risk and take measures, so I am confident that I have those sufficient powers.
We must never find ourselves in this position again. Over the last few decades, countless countries across the world have become over-reliant on too few vendors, thanks to a lack of competition in the global telecoms supply chain. While this is a global problem, today this Government are officially leading the way in solving it. Alongside the Bill, we have published an ambitious diversification strategy—the first such strategy to be published anywhere in the world. It sets out our vision of what an open, competitive, diverse supply market for telecoms will look like, and the measures we will bring forward to develop an innovative and dynamic market.
We want to make progress as quickly as possible, so today I can also confirm that we are committing £250 million to kick-start this work. That includes funding and building a state-of-the-art national telecoms lab, which will bring together suppliers from across the world to test the performance and security of their equipment. We are also running a 5G open radio access network trial with the Japanese supplier NEC in Wales to help the entire UK benefit from this exciting new industry. That, of course, comes on top of NEC establishing a global open RAN centre of excellence in the UK just last month. We also know that Vodafone has recently announced that it intends to deploy open RAN technology across more than 2,600 of its sites—the largest commitment of its kind across any European network.
Tom Tugendhat
The Secretary of State is rightly focusing on open RAN and the opportunity to partner with others in the democratic and law-abiding world. What has he done to reach out to countries such as South Korea, whose Samsung system could provide for the UK, and to encourage Nokia, Ericsson and Fujitsu in Japan?
Oliver Dowden
I am pleased to say that the Minister for Digital Infrastructure has met every one of the parties my hon. Friend named; indeed, I have met many of them. Essentially, we are working across three strands. First, we are working with the existing vendors—there were three, now to become two—to secure them and make sure we do not lose a further one. We are also working with new potential incumbents such as NEC and Samsung. In addition, we are working across a range of countries, in particular the D10, to ensure that we work together to improve standards in telecoms.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who is being customarily generous in giving way, but can I just make a point to him and hear his answer? This situation has constantly been wrongly described as a market failure. It was not a market failure; the failure was in the reality of one country abusing and breaking World Trade Organisation rules on subsidies. The key problem has been that China has subsidised its providers dramatically, even over 100% on contract, which has killed this market over the last 10 years. Once we release the market by stopping that, the private sector will come back into this industry because competition will be real competition, not broken competition. That is the key point.
Oliver Dowden
My right hon. Friend highlights one of a range of different market distortions that have been going on. To a certain extent, there will be some market correction, but the Government also need to intervene, and our diversification strategy addresses that. If we are to get existing vendors who are not currently in the UK market back in, or to create a new open RAN solution, we need to provide financial incentives, and the diversification strategy touches on many of the steps that we propose to take.
We are taking concrete steps towards a solution, but diversification is not just a problem to be solved. It is also an opportunity to be seized. As part of our strategy, we will invest in homegrown solutions that will put us at the forefront of developing 5G technology and all the transformative benefits it brings. The next phase of this work will be taken forward by the Telecoms Diversification Task Force, chaired by Lord Livingston, formerly of BT, and others. I am grateful for the work that he, industry and academic experts have done in developing the strategy and in taking it forward.
The Bill has not been designed around one company, one country or one threat. Its strength is that it creates an enduring, flexible and far-reaching telecoms regime, one that keeps pace with changing technology and changing threats, that supports billions of phone calls, email exchanges and file transfers in this country every day, and that is essential to the UK’s economy and its future prosperity.
I listened carefully to the concerns of Members on both sides of the House in designing the legislation, and I have sought to address those concerns head on in the Bill as it stands before the House. I genuinely hope that the Bill will command cross-party support and that we will be able to work together in the national interest to ensure the security of our telecoms networks. I commend the Bill to the House.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Matt Warman)
I thank all Members for a well-informed and important debate. We have heard across the House that all Members believe that this Government should be putting national security at the very top of our agenda. That is what we are doing tonight. We are also putting forward a strategy that will allow the UK to derive all the benefits that we possibly can from all the enhanced digital reliance that we have seen across the country over the course of this pandemic and, of course, before it.
We have all heard this evening just how much connectivity matters and just how much our national security matters. We heard upwards of 20 speeches, which clearly demonstrated the critical importance of the security of our telecoms networks, especially as we move into the next phase of digital connectivity. As the Secretary of State has said, this Bill will raise the security bar across the board. It will provide us with the capabilities that we need to protect ourselves from a range of threats, both now and in the future. I am pleased that the Bill has support across the House. It is clear that we are all keen to put the UK’s national security interests first.
I hope that Members are reassured that the Government are taking these issues seriously. A number of Members referred to the Huawei interest group. Much as I have enjoyed being the subject of the Huawei interest group’s interest, I am glad that we have come to a position that has been welcomed across the House. The Government have taken steps today both to lay out our diversification strategy—an important £250 million commitment that is detailed and has real potential to see British companies grow in the way that my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) identified—and to publish illustrative designations and directions demonstrating the transparency that many Members across the House have asked for. Through that, I think we have demonstrated our commitment to dealing with the risks to our networks and the national security threats that come from high-risk vendors.
I turn to some of the points that have been raised in the course of the debate. The first, which was raised across the House, is the important matter of human rights. We want respect for human rights to be at the centre of all business that takes place in this country. These are vital issues that go much wider than telecoms. A number of Members rightly pointed out that the Telecommunications (Security) Bill will be focused on matters related to telecommunications and security, but of course we have serious concerns about the human rights situation in Xinjiang, including the extrajudicial detention of over 1 million Uyghur Muslims and other minorities in political re-education camps, systematic restrictions on Uyghur culture and the practice of Islam, and extensive invasive surveillance targeting minorities.
Where China is not meeting its obligations under international law, the UK Government will continue to speak out publicly. Indeed, the 30 June formal statement that the UK read out on behalf of 28 countries at the UN Human Rights Council highlighted arbitrary detention, widespread surveillance and restrictions targeting ethnic minorities. The Government published their response to the consultation on transparency in supply chains in September, and we are committed to taking forward an ambitious package of changes to strengthen and future-proof the transparency provisions in the Modern Slavery Act 2015. While, as many have said, issues of human rights are not matters directly for this Bill, they are acutely important, and Britain will continue to take that leading role.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I hear what my hon. Friend says, but surely he would concede that, as this Bill deals specifically with vendors and the vendors are themselves located, originally, in countries that may have been guilty of these abuses of whatever nature, should those companies be found to be using slave labour—such as some that are already referenced in this Bill—that would be a reason not to have them. Would he not think that they were high-risk vendors for the very simple reason that they abused those human rights?
Matt Warman
As I said earlier, we would want to apply those standards not just to telecoms companies but to the garment industry and in a host of other areas where we know that there is the potential for similar abuses. I absolutely hear what my right hon. Friend says, but Britain can do better than focus simply on the relatively narrow aspect of telecoms.
Bob Seely
I hear what the Minister is saying, but I wish to follow up the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). If the debate on this Bill is not the place to discuss human rights, I get that, but we are also told that the debates on the National Security and Investment Bill are not the place to discuss human rights. I may get that as well, but the Government need to say where significant national interest concerns that are outside national security can be addressed. We talk the talk on human rights an awful lot in this country and this Parliament, but we have to put some trousers on that, I think.
Matt Warman
I am not going to engage too heavily with my hon. Friend’s trousers, but I will say to him that, as I said a minute ago, we are committed to taking forward an ambitious package of changes to strengthen and future-proof the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and that is one of several significant avenues that are open to him.
On the important matter of diversification, the telecoms supply chain review asked how we can create sustainable diversity in our telecoms supply chain. That question is addressed by the new diversification strategy that we published today, which is crucial to ensuring that we are never again in a situation in which we are dependent on just a handful of vendors who supply the networks on which so many of us have come to depend. I wish to spend a little time on this issue. The Government have been working at pace to develop the 5G supply chain diversification strategy, which sets out a clear vision for a healthy, competitive and diverse supply market for telecoms and the set of principles that we want operators and suppliers to follow.
The strategy is built around three key strands: first, securing incumbents; secondly, attracting new suppliers; and thirdly, accelerating the development and adoption of open and interoperable technologies across the market. That is why, in the diversification strategy that we published today, we commit to exploring commercial incentives for new market entrants as we level the playing field; to setting out a road map to end the provision of older legacy technologies that create obstacles for new suppliers; and to investing in R&D to grow a vibrant and thriving telecoms ecosystem here in the UK.
I say gently to the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah) that we have directly addressed a number of the issues that she raised in Westminster Hall last week. I look forward to engaging with her more on the strategy because it is important that we should work together to try to make sure that we all derive the benefits of a serious £250 million Government commitment that will drive early progress and ensure that our 5G diversification strategy not only bolsters the resilience and security of our digital infrastructure but creates opportunities for competition, innovation and prosperity.
Sir John Hayes
It is wonderful that the strategy has emerged, but will my hon. Friend be just as clear about legislative change associated with that strategy? I understand that a further Bill may come forward; given the urgency of this issue and the concentration that his Department is applying to the strategy, when can we expect that legislation?
Matt Warman
We do not anticipate legislation as a direct result of the diversification strategy, but of course there are other important avenues to explore as part of the broader industrial strategy. A lot of what is in the diversification strategy does not need to be delayed by the legislative programme, and I think my right hon. Friend would welcome that.
A number of Members raised the role of Ofcom. Ofcom will monitor, assess and enforce compliance with the new telecoms security framework that will be established by the Bill. It will report on compliance to the Secretary of State alongside publishing the annual reports that he mentioned on the state of the telecoms security sector. I want to be absolutely clear: we have had productive conversations with Ofcom already. Ofcom will continue to have the resources it needs. We appreciate that those needs will be affected by the changes that we are bringing in today, and we will agree their precise nature with Ofcom. We will make sure that Ofcom has all the security clearance that it needs to do the job, and all the resources, external or otherwise, to do the job, because this is an important new power.
Ofcom may also play a role in gathering and providing information relevant to the Secretary of State’s assessment of a provider’s compliance with a designated vendor direction, and it may also be directed to gather further information to comply with the requirements specified in a direction. The Bill already enables Ofcom to require information from providers and, in some circumstances, to carry out inspection of the provider’s premises or to view relevant documents. Ofcom’s annual budget, as I say, will be adjusted to take account of the increased costs it will incur due to its enhanced security role.
Let me turn to a couple of issues raised by the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central. We will of course be working with local authorities and with networks to minimise any disruption, but we do not anticipate that the decisions that we have made over the past few months will have a direct impact on existing commercial decisions. As the Secretary of State said, we do not expect the two to three-year delay to be extended by what we have said today, but we will keep in close contact with the networks and continue to make sure that we do everything we can to remove the barriers to the roll-out of the networks as far as we possibly can. I do, however, expect companies to do as much as they can to minimise the effects. These are commercial decisions that have been made by companies over a number of years. We have already seen, as a result of the Government’s approach over the past few months, significant changes to decisions. I welcome the neutrORAN project that my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan mentioned, as well as a number of others that have been taken by networks that already see important changes to how they procure their networks.
Mr Kevan Jones
The Minister has introduced the September 2021 date after which no new Huawei or high- risk vendor equipment can go into the networks. What will happen to those companies that perhaps have stock of Huawei equipment or entered into contracts thinking that they could implement them before September 2021 and will now have to be told that they cannot? Would they actually lose a lot of money?
Matt Warman
Those decisions, as I said, were taken in the context of the environment that people were already well aware of, and they are taken at a degree of commercial risk. However, we have worked closely with the networks to ensure that there will be no additional delays as a result of this decision. I think it is the right thing that puts national security at the absolute heart of our programme, but it also does that in the context of not jeopardising the clear economic benefits and the clear practical benefits of improving connectivity across the country that we would all like to see.
On the emergency services network, we anticipate that these announcements concerning Huawei will have a very low impact on the emergency services network. We do not anticipate any impact on the programme schedules. There is some Huawei equipment in the EE part of the emergency services dedicated core network that EE is already working towards removing.
Let me cover one other aspect raised by the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). I look forward—maybe that is not quite the right phrase—to appearing before the ISC in the next few days. We will always co-operate with it, and I am very happy to work with it on the best way to balance the obvious requirement between transparency and national security, although we would always seek to be as transparent as we possibly can be within those important bounds.
Dr Julian Lewis
I did ask a few questions. If the Minister cannot answer them now, by all means he should write to me. However, I am concerned about a situation where, for example, a former leader of the Conservative party and former Prime Minister has a major role in the China belt and road funding operation. How secure will Government be against lobbying of people with that sort of connection and prominence?
Matt Warman
I will simply say that the Government will always put our national security interests first, and of course we are always alive to the commercial interests of the companies that seek to engage with us in this matter or any other. I look forward to further engaging with my right hon. Friend and his Committee.
To conclude, this Bill does not simply produce a framework that will address one particular company or even one particular country. It sets up the futureproof regime that will allow us to deal with the company that we have spoken about so much this evening and also its successors in successor networks. The intention of this legislation is to persist well beyond the current challenges that we face. I am glad that it commands the support we have seen across the House. I am immensely grateful for what has been a genuinely well-informed debate and one that I look forward to carrying on in Committee. The Telecommunications (Security) Bill will create one of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world. It will enable us to protect our national telecoms infrastructure, and it is also a chance for the UK to become the world leader in the development of new 5G technology that we all know we can be.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Telecommunications (Security) Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 19 January 2021.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Question agreed to.
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Money)
Queen’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, it is expedient to authorise any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Question agreed to.
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Ways and Means)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, it is expedient to authorise provision requiring public communications providers to pay certain costs incurred by the Office of Communications.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Question agreed to.
Telecommunications (Security) Bill (Carry-over)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 80A(1)(a)),
That if, at the conclusion of this Session of Parliament, proceedings on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill have not been completed, they shall be resumed in the next Session.—(David T. C. Davies.)
Question agreed to.