Health Bill (Eighth sitting)

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

The clause updates the National Health Service Act 2006 to abolish the requirement for integrated care boards and their partner NHS trusts to prepare and publish a joint forward plan and a joint capital resource use plan. The 10-year health plan aims to simplify local healthcare planning, and the Bill delivers that objective by removing legal requirements for integrated care partnerships, integrated care strategies, joint forward plans and joint capital resource use plans. Planning will now begin with the joint strategic needs assessment, developed by health and wellbeing boards. The assessment will inform a new neighbourhood health plan, replacing the joint local health and wellbeing strategy. ICBs will produce population health improvement plans, aligning multiple joint strategic needs assessments, neighbourhood health plans and local priorities across their wider populations. As a result, the planning process will be streamlined and less bureaucratic, and will deliver healthcare for local people based on local planning and strategy. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

As the Minister said, the clause removes the need for ICBs and their partner trusts to produce a joint forward plan. The existing legislation requires ICBs and their partner trusts to prepare a plan setting out how they propose to exercise their functions over five years, which is reviewed and/or revised each financial year.

Joint forward plans address objectives in the Government mandate regarding the ambitions in the NHS long-term plan and planning guidance. Section 14Z52 of the 2006 Act sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts have to prepare such a plan before the start of each financial year and specifies what the plan must give regard to, including the ICB’s discharge of its duties—general duties and financial duties—under other sections of the Act. The plan must also cover steps that will be taken to implement the local health and wellbeing strategy, the particular needs of young people, and the particular needs of victims of abuse. ICBs and their partner trusts must publish the plan and give it to a set of specified authorities, and NHS England may give directions for that. Section 14Z54 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts must consult people when developing such plans and that health and wellbeing boards must be involved. Section 14Z55 sets out that the relevant health and wellbeing board may give an opinion, and that when it does so, it must provide it to the ICB and its partner trusts.

Section 14Z56 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts must prepare a joint capital resource use plan before the start of each financial year, and that the period may be determined by direction from the Secretary of State. Section 14Z57 sets out that an ICB and its partner trusts may revise the joint capital resource use plan, but if it is revised significantly, it must be published and given to the list of specified authorities.

Section 14Z58 sets out that an ICB must produce an annual report on how it has discharged its functions. It must explain how it has discharged its duties under other specified sections of the Act, review the extent to which it has exercised its functions in accordance with the forward plan and its capital resource use plan, review the extent to which it has exercised its functions consistently with NHS England’s views, and review steps it has taken to implement any joint local health and wellbeing strategy. The report must include details of expenditure and be given to NHS England by a specified date and then published.

In essence, the clause deletes sections 14Z52 to 14Z57. In some respects, it is legislative plumbing, to remove plans that are no longer necessary. The Government’s impact assessment notes that

“there is some duplication across planning documents. For example, the Joint Forward Plan covered the integration of services, which the Better Care Fund plan also considers, as does the Joint Local Health and Wellbeing Strategy.”

It goes on to note that duplication delivers an administrative burden, as staff

“complete parallel planning returns and fulfil competing data requests,”

so that is a positive aspect of the clause.

Will the Minister please address the following points? Section 14Z52 contains specific requirements to address the particular needs of young people and of victims of abuse. Where do they fall now? The NHS has a large maintenance backlog. What is the new mechanism for transparency of capital prioritisation decisions between the ICBs and the trusts? Can the Minister remind me and the Committee of other areas in which local democracy will be able to input into ICB planning once these planning documents are no longer required?

Under the Government’s strategic commissioning framework, ICBs have to develop population health improvement plans. Essex ICB published a document that is 148 pages long, with a particular focus on inequality. Is the Minister concerned about the length of some of the plans, the time it takes to produce them and the amount of bureaucracy involved, or does she think this is an improvement? What is the key objective in delivering these plans? Do the Government plan to introduce population health improvement plans through legislation? If they do not, Parliament will have scrutiny of the bureaucracy being removed but not of the bureaucracy that the Government replace it with. As the Minister once said:

“Local taxpayers deserve to know how their money is being spent.”—[Official Report, 13 June 2023; Vol. 734, c. 122WH.]

[Karin Smyth]

I thank the shadow Minister for her comments. I largely agree about legislative plumbing—that is a nice phrase. As she rightly highlights, and as is clear in the explanatory notes and so on, the duplication and administrative burden on all these bodies is considerable. On her question about objectives, we certainly want to streamline that so that ultimately, as well as organisations knowing the objectives they are pursuing, the local population—importantly to her concluding point—can readily see and address that, follow it through and hold people to account. I do think that 150-page documents are not always the easiest to see.

Young people will obviously be part of the joint strategic needs assessment, and ICBs will be mindful of the Government’s wider policy objectives, as we have discussed previously. With regard to maintenance and prioritisation of capital schemes, since coming into office we have already done a huge amount of work to streamline the relationship between NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care—and, indeed, our friends over at His Majesty’s Treasury—in respect of the approvals process, making better use of capital and making that more transparent at local level so that individual organisations are involved in the prioritisation that comes forward to the ICBs.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Abolition of integrated care partnerships and strategies

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

The clause abolishes the requirement for ICBs and their partner local authorities to form an integrated care partnership. It also abolishes the related requirement for that partnership to prepare and publish an integrated care strategy.

These abolitions address the policy objectives of the 10-year health plan by streamlining the number of plans that must be created by local health systems and supporting key local stakeholders to work together more flexibly and effectively. The changes recognise that in many areas, integrated care partnerships have not had a positive impact on local health outcomes and have come with significant opportunity costs. Alternative planning approaches proposed elsewhere in the Bill and more broadly will enable local health bodies to plan for their patients in a way that is tailored to their strengths. However, I can reassure the Committee that where existing arrangements are working well, nothing in the Bill will prevent local areas from coming together to consider how best to integrate services and plan their approach to tackling the challenges they face. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

In essence, the clause abolishes integrated care partnerships and strategies, which are where ICBs come together with local authorities to discuss how they can make their services more integrated. We know that many of the challenges facing the NHS are caused by difficulties in social care provision and some of the difficulties in social care provision are caused by issues with health provision, and that if those commissioning services in those two areas work together, we can see an improvement in both.

The Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 made changes to local government structures and enhanced public involvement in health services. Section 116 requires local authorities to produce joint strategic needs assessments for the local authority and its partner ICB. When preparing the assessment, the local authority and its partner ICB must

“co-operate with one another…have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State…involve the Local Healthwatch organisation”,

and involve local people and the relevant district councils. I note that later in the Bill we will also come to the abolition of Healthwatch.

Section 116 of the 2007 Act has been modified by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the Health and Care Act 2022 to ensure that references match the current NHS structure. For instance, in 2008 there were primary care trusts, rather than ICBs. Section 116ZA of the 2007 Act requires ICBs and local authorities whose areas coincide or overlap to create integrated care partnerships, which consist of a member appointed by the ICB, one from each responsible local authority and any other members that they choose to add; to some extent, they can determine their own procedures.

Section 116ZB of the 2007 Act requires ICBs to prepare an integrated care strategy

“setting out how the assessed needs in relation to its area are to be met by the exercise of functions of…the integrated care board…NHS England, or…the responsible local authorities”.

When developing that integrated care strategy, the integrated care partnerships must have regard to NHS England’s mandate and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. Clearly, that would now apply only to guidance issued by the Secretary of the State, because NHS England is also being abolished. An integrated care partnership must publish its integrated care strategy and give it to each local authority and partner ICB. Integrated care partnerships must reconsider and, where necessary, revise the strategy each time they receive a new needs assessment.

Clause 23 deletes section 116(5A) of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. That subsection required the local authorities to give a copy of the needs assessments to the ICBs, which is of course no longer necessary because they are being abolished. Clause 23 also deletes sections 116ZA and 116ZB of the same Act, which established ICBs and defined integrated care strategies respectively.

As Conservatives, we believe that streamlining bureaucracy is sensible, and I am sure that this is a well-intentioned reform. However, a survey conducted by the NHS Alliance in November indicated that a quarter of integrated care system leaders are likely to keep the integrated care partnerships anyway on a non-statutory basis, and 40% plan to fold them into health and wellbeing boards and working partnerships with the authorities. It is not really a ringing endorsement of the policy if a sizeable number of people intend to keep it anyway.

Like many other elements of the Bill, these changes are uncosted—if we read the impact assessment, it says “N/A” for the cost. Clearly, there will be a cost incurred by the abolition of the process, but there will also be an opportunity cost to services if ICBs and commissioners are not working together in the provision of social care as effectively as they were before. That will cost people in social care, and it will cost people in healthcare.

As recognised by the impact assessment that the Government have produced themselves, there is a risk of reduced focus on the wider determinants of health at system level. Committee members on both sides of the House have already stressed the impact that other health determinants can have on the health service and social care, and we have previously considered amendments to that effect.

Overall, it is regrettable that local government does not have the direct feed into ICBs that the design of those integrated care partnerships provided. Whether or not I agree, I can follow the theory or principle behind making the area covered more local, in line with the strategic authority. However, if the Government wanted to do that, I do not understand why they did not decide the mayoral areas first. At the moment, we do not know where the mayors will be, and where they are now is not where the ICBs are. The Government have decided to cut ICB budgets and force mergers before they have decided where the mayoral authorities will be in some cases. Even where there are mayoral authorities already, the Government have not mandated that the ICBs be coherent with them, and, therefore, in many cases, they are not. We have a very confusing pattern emerging, which may require further reorganisation of ICBs to line them up, with a further cost down the line.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend reflect on the fact that, even if the Government get through the combined mayoral authorities they are trying to in this Parliament, there are still great swathes of England where there are no active plans for a mayoral authority at all. Even if the Government get their own way, some areas will not have a mayor for many years—if they get one at all.

[Dr Johnson]

My hon. Friend is, as ever, correct. The mayors are also not all responsible for health and social care—the local authorities are, in most cases. There could therefore be a mayor directing proceedings with the ICB who is a political opponent of those actually democratically elected to look after social care. ICBs are supposed to be apolitical commissioners accountable to the Secretary of State, but now, instead of working with social care directors, they will work with an elected mayor instead.

I can see a positive to that in terms of democratic accountability, but what happens if they all disagree? There is some incoherence about who is in charge. We have the local authority tasked with delivering social care, which may be led by one political party; the mayor directing the ICB, who may be of a different political party; and the Secretary of State who can also direct the ICB, who may again be of a different political persuasion. How does it work if they disagree? Does the mayor actually have authority, given that the Secretary of State can override them anyway? How does the Minister see that working in practice? It feels like some people will be in power without responsibility and others will have responsibility without the power to exercise it.

[Helen Morgan (North Shropshire) (LD)]

I will raise some similar concerns about the abolition of integrated care partnerships and integrated care strategies, which clause 23 brings about. Before I do, I should declare my interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association.

The removal of integrated care partnerships, as well as the extension of ICBs to cover multiple local authorities, raises unanswered questions about the future of social care planning, which is very important to the Liberal Democrats, as the Minister knows. We feel that it removes the voice of charities and others in the voluntary sector who are crucial to meeting the range of needs in health and social care.

Throughout the Bill there is a theme of separating social care and the NHS, at a time when greater integration and closer working are clearly needed. We heard Sir Andrew Dilnot say in evidence that we cannot deal with some of the challenges that arise in the NHS—particularly around flow through hospitals and long waits in corridor care in accident and emergency—without improving the discharge of patients into social care. Separating the organisations that deliver those things is clearly problematic. If we think about it, as the shadow Minister just outlined, we have lost the local authority representative on ICBs. The Bill also changes the way the better care fund is administered. With those changes, we are really concerned about the separation of these two responsibilities.

I want to draw the Minister’s attention to an example in Shropshire. Shropshire council spends almost 80% of its budget on social care. It is an extremely challenged council because of those funding pressures. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin ICB has also been one of the most financially challenged ICBs. That is partly because of its small scale and its merging with Staffordshire—which, for the record, is unlikely to be the combined mayoral authority that Shropshire ends up in, as is my current understanding, although we are a long way off resolving that problem.

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[Karin Smyth]

Clause 24 abolishes the requirement for health and wellbeing boards to prepare and publish a joint local health and wellbeing strategy. Instead ICBs, local authorities and their partners must work together through the health and wellbeing board to develop a neighbourhood health plan, in line with this Government’s commitment in the 10-year health plan. The neighbourhood health plan should be updated regularly to reflect the needs of the local population, unless all partners consider the existing plan is sufficient.

In developing their neighbourhood health plans, responsible local authorities and partner ICBs must involve the people who live or work in the area of the responsible local authority. The neighbourhood health plan will cover most of the topics previously considered by joint local health and wellbeing strategies, but will also encourage a deep focus on tackling the challenges facing individual neighbourhoods. That may mean applying different geographical focuses to different elements of the plan, to ensure that planners are addressing the real and different needs of the diverse communities they serve.

These plans will outline how the NHS, local government and local partners intend to improve the health of people in their locality and reduce health inequalities through a joined-up neighbourhood health approach. The plans will consider how local services can help realise national NHS priorities, further public service reforms, and improve performance against the adult social care outcomes framework and the local outcomes framework metrics. To support this work, the Government also intend to provide local areas with guidance and we will work with systems to ensure this addresses the needs of local planners and local communities.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 24 puts neighbourhood health plans on a statutory basis. Currently, section 116A of the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 requires local authorities and partner ICBs to prepare a joint local health and wellbeing strategy once they have received their integrated care strategy. Essentially, that means that the ICBs and local authorities produce their overall strategy, then it devolves down, and then the joint health and wellbeing strategy looks at how it will be delivered. The local authority and its partners must give regard to the integrated care strategy, the NHS England mandate and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. The strategy must be published and local people and the local Healthwatch must be involved in its development.

Section 116B of the 2007 Act places a duty on local authorities and partner ICBs to have regard to various strategies when exercising their function, specifically, a joint strategic needs assessment, an integrated care strategy and a joint local health and wellbeing strategy. NHS England also has regard to these when providing healthcare for a specific area.

Clause 24 changes the JLHWS to a neighbourhood health plan. In many ways, that aligns with the shift in the Government’s 10-year health plan from hospital to community. As they have described it, more care in the neighbourhood will allow hospitals to focus on the more specialist care that may be needed, so more people can be cared for closer to home, which seems a reasonable aim.

However, if local authorities and partner ICBs have to give regard to what the centre is doing when developing neighbourhood health plans, to what extent does the Minister envisage that being directed? Local authorities and partner ICBs giving regard to the centre could mean there being a very loose requirement from the centre to provide for the local population, and then they get on with it; it could also be very prescriptive—my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) has talked about the pros and cons of having targets—with a whole litany of targets in the plans. Whether that squares with the Government’s claim to be devolving power, or whether it strikes as a centralising power, depends on how that is done and to what extent the Secretary of State plans to direct it. I would appreciate it if the Minister could talk about that.

As has been said, Sir Andrew Dilnot told the Committee that

“we cannot really address many of the fundamental problems facing the NHS if we do not sort out social care.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 84, Q131.]

The Government have asked Baroness Casey to review social care, but they have developed this measure in the meantime. Is that because they have been talking to her and know that it is the sort of thing that she will recommend—or are they putting the cart before the horse, as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon suggested?

Later in the Committee’s considerations, we will come to Healthwatch, its benefits and the concerns that I and, I am sure, many other Committee members have about its abolition. What mechanisms does the Minister envisage there being for local people—local patients—to contribute to the neighbourhood health plans? A local Healthwatch currently contributes to the equivalent, the joint local health and wellbeing strategy, as a way of ensuring that it captures patient and community voices. How will that be done otherwise?

Some 80% of the Government’s new neighbourhood health centres that will deliver these plans are expected to be funded through public-private partnerships. Does the Minister have any comments on that, particularly in the light of the expensive private finance initiative that the last Labour Government entered into and left us stuck with?

In March 2026, the Government produced a neighbourhood health framework policy paper, which identified the goal of reducing non-elective admissions for those with severe frailty. Given that goal, why are the Government not on track to deliver the fracture liaison service improvements that they promised?

The policy paper also commits to what it calls

“a diversion rate of at least 25% by March 2027 for at least 10 high volume specialties”.

What is a “diversion rate”? It essentially requires more GP referrals to be rejected, so let us be clear about what that means. When someone, either hon. Members or constituents, goes to see their GP, they are referred to a consultant for care; I should declare an interest as a consultant in the NHS. The consultant will then review that referral and decide whether they think it is clinically appropriate to see the patient, whether a different specialty may be more appropriate, or whether they can give advice or make suggestions about treatment that could be given in primary care instead.

When a patient is given an appointment in secondary care, it essentially means that the GP has decided that they clinically need it, and the consultant has decided that they clinically need it too. If the Government want a diversion rate of at least 25% by March 2027 for at least 10 high volume specialties, are they suggesting that patients who the GP and consultant agree clinically need an appointment should not get one? If so, why?

[Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I have been itching to speak on this new clause, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire)—I am not sure how to pronounce that, but I am sure it is a very beautiful place; I have never been. It would ensure that a certain range of primary care providers were consulted by integrated care boards in the development of the healthcare plans.

The recent King’s Fund report, as well as many others, showed that over 90% of NHS contact with patients is in primary care in all its forms. New clause 70 relates to new clause 60, also tabled by my hon. Friend, which is about having GP representation on integrated care boards. This is an extension of that, so that dentists, pharmacy contractors and providers of ophthalmic services can all feed into integrated care boards’ healthcare plans. That is how most people come into contact with the NHS, which means that those providers have a close and deep understanding of the healthcare issues facing the demographics in their communities.

[Dr Johnson]

New clause 70 talks about a certain range of primary care providers being consulted by the ICB. Can the hon. Member clarify whether it is his intention for all providers of those services in a defined area to be consulted, or would it be a representative selection? If it is the latter, how would they be chosen?

[Dr Chambers]

The hon. Lady makes a good point. The purpose is to ensure that those who are deeply embedded in community care are consulted by the ICBs, so that they do not miss obvious localised issues in their demographics when developing care plans.

Just to give a brief example from a surgery I held recently, Joanne Cook is an occupational therapist who is campaigning for occupational therapists who have received specific training to be able to prescribe, and crucially de-prescribe, medications, in the same way that trained paramedics can. Often, occupational therapists see patients on a daily basis. They give them intimate and regular care, and are even better placed than GPs to notice small changes and adjust medications to keep people out of hospital.

If integrated care boards are not drawing on the experience, knowledge and data from primary care providers in all their forms, any healthcare plans they come up with will not be relevant to those demographics. We will not be keeping people out of hospital or treating them as effectively in the community, and the whole system will not be as efficient or as targeted as it could be. I would appreciate it if the Minister considered accepting the new clause.

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[Karin Smyth]

Clause 25 makes focused but important changes to the accounting and audit arrangements for NHS trusts by amending schedule 4 to the National Health Service Act 2006. It does not put additional burdens on NHS trusts; instead, the aim of the clause is to align the requirements for trusts with the updated accounting arrangements for foundation trusts made elsewhere in the Bill. The changes are needed as a consequence of the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the requirement for foundation trusts to have councils of governors and members.

The amendments the clause makes replicate trusts’ existing duties to keep proper accounts and records about those accounts, and to prepare annual accounts for each financial year. The clause also replicates the Secretary of State’s current power to direct an NHS trust regarding the form of its annual accounts, but extends that power of direction so the Secretary of State may also direct a trust to prepare accounts for a specified period—for example, when part-period accounts are needed. That will help to ensure a consistent approach to financial reporting while retaining the flexibility to keep requirements up to date.

The clause also sets out and strengthens how the audit arrangements for NHS trusts should operate, mirroring the approach for foundation trusts and integrated care boards. It provides that NHS trust annual accounts are audited under the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, as is the case currently, but it also provides that part-period accounts may be audited in accordance with that Act where the Secretary of State so directs.

The clause also enables the Comptroller and Auditor General to examine the accounts and related auditor reports, as is currently the case. To reflect the fact that the Secretary of State will have oversight of providers once NHS England is abolished, it requires the accounts and audit reports to be sent to the Secretary of State.

Taken together, these measures support transparency, consistency and robust financial assurance. They will help to reduce unnecessary divergence in accounting requirements across different types of NHS provider, while maintaining clear oversight of public funds. That is consistent with the Bill’s broader intent to support effective governance and clear accountability for providers.

Clause 26 makes minor technical amendments to ensure that the statute book remains clear and coherent as the Bill aligns the approach to audit and accounts across NHS trusts and foundation trusts. It sits alongside the provisions in the Bill that update the arrangements for the audit of foundation trusts following the abolition of NHS England and the removal of the requirement for NHS foundation trusts to have councils of governors and members.

The clause does that by amending or removing outdated transitory provisions relating to the audit of NHS trust accounts in two places: the NHS Act 2006 and the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014. Clause 26 therefore supports the effective implementation of the wider measures in this part of the Bill by ensuring that the legislation is up to date, accurate and internally consistent. I commend clauses 25 and 26 to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

As has been said, clause 25 specifies how NHS trusts should handle their accounting. Paragraph 11A of schedule 4 to the NHS Act 2006 sets out the current obligations, which are that the trust must keep proper accounts, that the Secretary of State may give directions about how the accounts are held, and that the accounts must be prepared annually, may be examined by the Comptroller and Auditor General, and must be submitted to NHS England.

Clause 25 replaces paragraph 11A entirely. Under the new provisions, the reporting goes to the Secretary of State, instead of NHS England—which seems sensible, because the Government are abolishing NHS England—and the Secretary of State may give directions about “methods and principles”, as well as the “form and content”. The Secretary of State may also give directions about specified periods in which accounts are to be prepared.

Will the Minister explain why those provisions are felt to be necessary? There will be suspicion among some more cynical people that the power to specify periods could be used to be more flattering for the Government, or that methods and principles could be used to change the perception of the position. Can the Minister give an example of where she thinks such periods would be useful, and also say why she thinks it is necessary to enable the Secretary of State to give directions about methods and principles, and form and content, in a way that is not done at the moment?

The exception for charitable trusts of which the NHS is a trustee is being removed. Will the Minister explain why she thinks that is important, and in what situation she thinks that power would be used? Finally, will she say whether the financial directors of NHS trusts have been consulted about these changes? If so, what was their feedback?

Clause 26 tidies up relevant provisions in two pieces of legislation, as the Minister has described.

[Karin Smyth]

If there are specific examples that are helpful, I will write to the hon. Lady—I am not entirely sure I got the point about charities, but we will pick that up in Hansard.

As I outlined in my opening remarks, these clauses are about standardising the key requirements across the NHS provider landscape in relation to annual and other accounts and records in relation to those, and audit and reporting requirements, including keeping those up to date and having a consistent approach across all NHS provider types. Of course, we worked closely with NHS England colleagues and directors of finance in seeking to bring forward those provisions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Special Health Authorities: establishment and exercise of functions

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[Karin Smyth]

Clauses 27 and 28 make amendments to the legal framework around special health authorities to give the Secretary of State the flexibility to best manage the reliable delivery of healthcare for patients and the public. As the Committee knows, special health authorities are independent bodies established by the Secretary of State, by order, to perform specific functions. They play a key national role in the health system, carrying out specific functions on behalf of the Secretary of State.

Clause 27 does two key things to the special health authority legal framework. First, it amends section 28 of the NHS Act 2006 to increase the scope of functions that a special health authority could be established to deliver. Currently, the Secretary of State can create a special health authority only for the purpose of exercising functions under the 2006 Act. The clause allows a special health authority to be established to exercise functions under any other Act as well.

Secondly, the clause amends section 29 of the 2006 Act, which currently enables regulations to provide for the functions of a special health authority to be carried out flexibly, by another special health authority or jointly with one or more other special health authorities. That applies only to functions that the Secretary of State has directed the special health authority to exercise under section 7 of the 2006 Act. The clause removes that limitation, so that those arrangements can be made for any functions of the special health authority, not just those that it is directed to carry out under section 7.

These changes are needed because the health and care system is underpinned by a range of statutory functions that do not sit exclusively within the 2006 Act. The Secretary of State needs to be able to establish special health authorities to carry out those wider functions, and to give those functions to existing special health authorities. The clause ensures that the Secretary of State has the modern, adaptable tools required to place specialist functions in the right national body, with the appropriate governance and accountability. Equally, special health authorities need to be able to work with other special health authorities across all their functions in a way that best serves the needs of the wider health and care system.

On occasion, it is necessary for Ministers to merge, alter or abolish special health authorities, either because of changing circumstances or to ensure the smooth and effective running of the system. Clause 28 provides the flexibility to transfer and redeploy staff. It allows regulations to be made to enable staff to be transferred to an integrated care board or another special health authority. These changes ensure that staff can be transferred where they may be needed most, allowing for flexibility to direct resources in the health system.

The clause also allows for arrangements to be made for a special health authority’s staff to be made available to another special health authority, a local authority, the Secretary of State or an integrated care board. That may be necessary during an emergency or to provide specialist support to help an organisation achieve a particular outcome. The clause also allows the Secretary of State to give directions to a special health authority to make staff available to another special health authority or integrated care board or the Secretary of State.

Clause 28 also amends the existing power to make regulations about the sharing of information with other bodies, to allow information to be shared with integrated care boards in addition to the Secretary of State and other special health authorities. That allows for information to be shared across the system so that national and local functions can be successfully fulfilled and supports a more joined-up health system.

Clauses 27 and 28 provide for future-facing updates that will support effective administration and ensure the more reliable delivery of healthcare for patients and the public. I commend them to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Special health authorities are, in essence, specialist health authorities set up by the Secretary of State, usually to provide an England-wide service of some form. Examples include NHS Blood and Transplant, and the NHS Business Services Authority, which provides NHS pensions—I should declare that I have an NHS pension—admin for prescription exemptions and other such business-type functions. We also have NHS Resolution, which deals with clinical negligence claims, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority.

In principle, special health authorities are useful in some cases, but they are effectively a form of quango. Can the Minister explain when she thinks the Government might want to set up a special health authority, rather than using a department within the DHSC to deliver the same thing? There are plenty of other nationally delivered services, and although the Government have suggested that some services, such as screening, will become localised as part of the Bill, some things will remain national. Can the Minister give some examples of what the new provision will be used for?

I can see there is provision for flexibility, but the special health authorities would require setting up, and there are set-up costs and costs associated with branding and those sorts of things. How does the Minister envisage those costs being provided for, and when will it be necessary for the Government to use them rather than just using the Department?

Special health authorities have been created, reconfigured and shelved many times. For example, the National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse became part of Public Health England in 2013, and the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement was closed in the same year. The functions of the National Patient Safety Agency went to the NHS Commissioning Board Special Health Authority, later known as NHS England, in 2012 and then to NHS Improvement in 2016. Widening the scope could leave us with more quangos than are necessary.

Which specific functions do the Government plan to move into special health authorities under this widened power? Have the Government just decided that they need this power and are increasing the scope because they are abolishing NHS England without a proper plan? Is this power just to cover themselves in the event that, as they start to make a plan, they find out they need it?

Clause 28 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations for the transfer of staff from one special health authority to another, or to an ICB. Paragraph 3(8) of schedule 6 to the National Health Service Act 2006 states:

“Regulations may provide for the transfer of officers from one Special Health Authority to another”,

or to NHS England,

“and for arrangements under which the services of an officer…are placed at the disposal of another Special Health Authority”,

or NHS England, or a local authority. Paragraph 3(12)(a) states that the Secretary of State may give directions

“to place the services of any of its officers at the disposal of another Special Health Authority”,

or NHS England. Paragraph 13 states:

“Provision may be made by regulations with respect to the recording of information by a Special Health Authority, and the furnishing of information by a Special Health Authority to the Secretary of State, another Special Health Authority”,

or NHS England.

Clause 28 modifies that paragraph such that regulations can now provide for the transfer of an officer to an ICB—that is a new power—as well as a special health authority and a local health authority, but no longer to NHS England because NHS England is being abolished. Regulations can now provide for an officer’s services to be placed at the disposal of the ICB and the Secretary of State, which is a new power, as well as the special health authority or local authority, but no longer NHS England. The clause modifies paragraph 3(12)(a) of schedule 6, so that directions may be given about placing the services of officers at the disposal of the special health authority and, newly, the Secretary of State or an ICB, but not NHS England. As the Minister said, the clause also modifies paragraph 13 of schedule 6, so that a special health authority can be required by regulations to pass information to integrated care boards, which is a new power, but no longer to NHS England.

NHS England is to be abolished, so it is sensible to say that staff can no longer be placed there—that seems an entirely reasonable exercise—but the legislation providing for special health authorities essentially contains open-ended spending power. Remuneration of the special health authority chairman and staff can be determined by the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Treasury. Does the Minister foresee an upper limit to those sorts of salaries?

People will essentially be able to transfer from one special health authority to another, or to an ICB—or be placed at the disposal of another special health authority, an ICB, a local authority or the Secretary of State. Will the Minister talk about the location, pension and salary of those individuals? We heard yesterday that the future Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham), may want to move a whole load of civil servants from London up to Manchester. That will clearly be within his gift if he becomes Prime Minister, but for individuals who work in one location to be asked to move to another is disruptive to their family and social lives, and involves significant relocation costs. If people are moved in the way that clause 28 describes, particularly by transfer, what choice will they have? What will happen to their pension, salary and other terms and conditions, and will they have a choice of location or not?

[Gregory Stafford]

Very briefly, on clauses 27 and 28, I am sure the Committee is aware that special health authorities were initially established under the National Health Service Act 1977. Since then the number of special health authorities has expanded and contracted a number of times over the years to leave us with, currently, NHS Blood and Transplant, and the Business Services Authority, which covers pensions, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham mentioned—I should declare that I have an NHS pension, albeit a very small one—as well as the NHS Litigation Authority, also known as NHS Resolution, and the NHS Counter Fraud Authority.

The mood music and the direction of travel, certainly since 2006, has been to reduce the number of special health authorities. On my reading, clauses 27 and 28 suggest that the Government are potentially looking to expand the number of special health authorities, given the Secretary of State’s direction under clause 27 and the practical steps for staff transfers in clause 28. Is the Minister looking at, for example, a special health authority to deal with artificial intelligence? Clearly that is something the NHS will have to embrace—or deal with, depending on which end of the AI argument one is on—rapidly over the coming years. Is that a potential area for a special health authority? Perhaps the Minister could outline where she sees the special health authorities acting and what their remits might be.

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[Dr Johnson]

This is quite a large group. First, clause 29 introduces schedule 3, which will make changes to the constitution of NHS foundation trusts. Currently, chapter 5 of the National Health Service Act 2006 establishes NHS foundation trusts as public benefit corporations in accordance with schedule 7 to the Act. That schedule, “Constitution of public benefit corporations”, sets out, among other things, the requirements for a constitution, the eligibility for membership, and the council of governors.

Schedule 3 to the Bill, introduced by clause 29, has a number of functions. First, it modifies the 2006 Act so that a foundation trust will no longer be a public benefit corporation, but will now be a body corporate—I would be interested in the Minister’s explanation of that change. It also modifies section 33(4) of the 2006 Act to remove reference to councils of governors, so that trusts no longer need to set those up, and modifies section 37 so that an NHS foundation trust can amend its constitution with the approval of the Secretary of State, where previously, that would have required a vote of more than half the members of the board of directors and more than half the members of the council of governors.

The schedule also deletes section 39A of the 2006 Act, “Panel for advising governors”, because one presumes if there are no governors, they do not need advice. It modifies section 43, “Provision of goods and services”, so that if a foundation trust wishes to raise its non-NHS income by 5% or more, the Secretary of State must approve it—previously that would have required local decision making from more than half of the members of the council of governors. It also deletes section 51A, “Significant transactions”, which states that an NHS foundation trust may enter into significant transactions, as defined in its constitution, only if more than half the members of the council of governors voted to approve it.

The schedule also deletes sections 56(1A), 56A(2), 56B(2) and 57A(2) of the 2006 Act. That means that governors will no longer have to approve a trust merging, being acquired, splitting or being dissolved. The Bill’s explanatory notes say that the Secretary of State will take on those approvals via schedule 11. Schedule 3 also deletes section 59, “Conduct of elections”, section 60, “Voting and standing for election” and section 61, “Representative membership” of the 2006 Act, which set out the democratic machinery for foundation trusts.

Schedule 3 also substitutes schedule 7 to the 2006 Act with an entirely new version. Elements of that new schedule 7 are as follows: the Secretary of State will now be able to appoint, suspend or remove the chair and non-executive directors—previously that was a governor’s role—and they can set the pay, allowances and terms of non-executive directors, and may regulate their tenure. The chief executive will be appointed by the non-executive directors, and the other executives will be appointed by a committee of the chair, the chief executive and non-executive directors, but the Secretary of State may set when those powers may be used. As the council of governors and its membership will be abolished, there are no members, elections or constituencies anywhere in the new schedule. Constitutional amendments will need the Secretary of State’s approval, not the approval of members and governors. The Secretary of State may make regulations on director eligibility, beyond the standard disqualifications. Directors owe a duty to promote the trust’s success, to maximise benefits for the public, with respective interests, duties and registers of interest. Board meetings must be open to the public. Accounts and audits are aligned with NHS trusts and ICBs. The Secretary of State may direct the form, content and timing as we have talked about before. Annual reports and forward financial plans go to the Secretary of State in the form that the Secretary of State decides, and trusts must publish their constitution, register, accounts and annual reports and hold a public meeting on them.

The council of governors was intended to feed in democratic input. Does the Minister have any comment on where democratic input will be held? Will it be solely through the Secretary of State, or is there any intent for local patient voice, now Healthwatch is being abolished too? How will local decision making be informed, and how will they understand their local area, particularly if it is to be directed largely by the Secretary of State?

Removing the council of governors will save money on administration, as noted in the impact assessment. The impact assessment also notes the Secretary of State does not have the ability to intervene in serious instances of foundation trust failure. Could the Minister comment on that?

Foundation trusts were intended to be independent. If the council of governors is removed and many things, as I have listed, are put under the control of the Secretary of State, they become increasingly more like an ordinary NHS trust, pre-foundation. Will they be independent in name only?

Non-executive directors are meant to be there to hold the leaders of the trust to account, but the Secretary of State can now appoint, pay and fire every non-executive director so a foundation trust’s internal watchdog can now be controlled by an elected politician who is potentially quite remote from that area. Does the Minister have any comment on how she sees that working?

Foundation trusts may have failed to increase democratic involvement in so far as there has not been huge interest in some of these elections for chairs of governors. But the answer to that would be a better version of local involvement rather than removing local input entirely.

The theme right across the schedule and the changes I listed is that foundation trusts are looking up to the Minister rather than out to local communities. Many NHS inquiries have reported back that frontline concerns did not reach the highest tiers of leadership. The Government are now closing an independent channel for sounding the alarm. Will the Minister comment on that?

I welcome Government amendment 19 because the idea that you need medical expertise on the board of a trust that delivers medical care seems to me fairly obvious, because otherwise you will get decisions that are not grounded in medical knowledge. I do recognise what the Minister says about it was not having been her intention to demote the voice of clinicians, but that was the effect. This amendment will go some way to correcting that, by having an executive director who is registered medical practitioner or a dentist, and another who is a registered nurse or midwife. Could the Minister be clear if a foundation trust wanted a nurse and a midwife, perhaps because they had a specific issue with the midwifery area, or a medical practitioner and a registered dentist, could they have both?

The Minister suggested that an exemption would be ambulance care, but there are medical practitioners, consultants, with expertise in out of hospital care. Does the Minister feel their expertise is not useful in some way?

I will speak to amendment 36 once it is moved. On clause 30 stand part, that clause removes the requirement for NHS England to consult prospective members or governors of a prospective foundation trust before its authorisation. Getting a new foundation trust without NHS England because it has been abolished is a consequence of earlier clauses that we have already voted on. Therefore, I will not go further on that issue.

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[Dr Johnson]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Helen Morgan]

I had finished speaking, but I will give way and think of something else to say.

[Dr Johnson]

The civil servants will be under the direction of the Minister, so how does the hon. Lady envisage it working? Presumably, civil servants are there to deliver for their Ministers or Secretary of State? Is she suggesting that makes the decision more impartial? Can she give us some detail on how that will work?

[Helen Morgan]

As I mentioned in my previous remarks, one imagines that a Secretary of State would set out criteria to ensure that the best people for the job are appointed. We are in a situation where a current Parliament cannot bind a future one, but we do need to set a precedent that political capture of these important leadership roles is not an unintentional consequence of this legislation. I accept that it is unintentional; I think the Secretary of State and the Minister have drafted this legislation with the best of intentions, but this is something we should guard against.

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[Gregory Stafford]

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention neatly brings me to my next point. I have some sympathy for his viewpoint—and apparently the viewpoint expressed to him by governors—that in many cases, if not most, governors do not have the teeth, the influence or the ability to change things in the way they would like. My argument is very similar to the one we will expand on later regarding the abolition of the Healthcare Services Safety Investigations Branch and Healthwatch: the Government’s response to something not working as effectively as it could is to abolish it, but why not give those organisations the teeth—the powers—to achieve the things they were set up to do, unless the hon. Gentleman and the Government feel that there is no need, in Healthwatch’s case, for that level of independent scrutiny or, in governors’ case, that level of independent influence on boards?

There is a fundamental difference here: the Conservatives would take something imperfect and make it better; the Government’s response is to take something imperfect and abolish it. That is the wrong way round.

[Dr Johnson]

Does my hon. Friend think that this leaves a bit of a gap? The Secretary of State will not have the level of local oversight that the governors had, so how will that local oversight feed into the Secretary of State so that he or she can make the decisions instead?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is right that there will be a gap in local decision making on these issues. It goes back to that tension I described some moments ago: the Government’s stated intention is to devolve powers locally, but they seem to be pulling so much power up to the Secretary of State that we will lose the ability to make local decisions for the benefit of local populations where appropriate. We have a stated ambition for neighbourhood health, but those neighbourhoods are rapidly expanding in this legislation to become areas of millions of people. Local people who are interested in their local health delivery or local hospital trust would not see that as local decision making, and there is the gap that my hon. Friend describes.

I do not think that amendments 74 and 75 have been moved, so I will not talk about them. Government amendment 19 will require

“NHS foundation trusts to have at least one executive director who is a registered medical practitioner or a registered dentist and another who is a registered nurse or a registered midwife.”

As also stated in the explanatory note, and as the Minister mentioned, regulations may create exception—for example, for ambulance trusts. That is the right decision, and it is important that we have medical experience on foundation trust boards. I am interested in understanding from the Minister, first, why she has chosen a medical practitioner or registered dentist. Does she see some equivalence in their expertise that could be substituted? I have great respect for doctors and for dentists, but they have potentially different clinical expertise. If a foundation trust does no oral healthcare or maxillofacial reconstruction, and does no dentistry or allied specialties, would it really satisfy requirements to have a dentist on the board? Likewise, given that the amendment also refers to a registered nurse or midwife, if a trust has no maternity services, would having a midwife on the board really satisfy the requirement of that trust to have nursing care input? I ask those questions, and I would be interested in the answers.

Likewise, there is the exemption for ambulance trusts. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, I would be interested to understand from the Minister why she thinks ambulance trusts do not need a medical practitioner on their boards, given that they are doing medicine. Plenty of consultants work alongside paramedics and in ambulances, so again I am not quite sure why she is making that exemption. I would be interested to hear from her on that.

I understand the intention behind Liberal Democrat amendment 36. Once again, it is trying to soften the Secretary of State’s power grab over decision making—like the hon. Member for North Shropshire, I am not saying anything against the current Secretary of State, but a future Secretary of State could be different. The aim is to try to temper that in some way. Unfortunately for the hon. Member—I have sympathy for the amendment—the stated intention of the Bill is to pull more power to the Secretary of State. The Minister may surprise me, but I fear that the amendment will not find favour with the Government, because the whole Bill is about pulling more power to the centre, certainly when it comes to appointments, and to the Secretary of State.

However, the Minister should think about how future Secretaries of State may have to go through some process whereby their decisions are checked and justified, especially at local level. If we want local people to have influence and say over their local health systems and trusts, there needs to be some sort of bridging legislation or bridging process to ensure that whatever a Secretary of State decides, it has the confidence and support of local people and local service providers.

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On the question of the right level of clinical representation, our amendment 19 is clear that clinical and medical representation is fundamental to the work of those boards. It is important that boards reflect that clinical and medical work, although it will be for them to determine the right balance.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way?

[Karin Smyth]

I will move on, if I may. I think my response will the cover the issues raised in the debate.

On amendment 36 and new clause 59, I note the concern that the Secretary of State could act inappropriately when making appointments to the boards of ICBs and NHS trusts and foundation trusts. We discussed democratic accountability in a previous sitting, and at the end of the day it is up to the British public whom they elect to Parliament and as the governing party.

Transparency and democratic accountability are at the heart of our reforms. It would not be right for the civil service to be given sole legislative responsibility for appointments to NHS trusts, foundation trusts or integrated care boards. Ministers are democratically accountable to Parliament, and civil servants act on their behalf under the Carltona principle. Civil servants serve and advise the Government, and act on behalf of Ministers, but it is for Ministers to take decisions and to be held accountable to Parliament for the performance of the NHS. The civil service will run fair, open and equitable campaigns to fulfil these roles and will recommend appropriate candidates to Ministers.

Ministers are under a duty to comply with public law principles and to act reasonably, and will adhere to the Nolan principles, including objectivity, transparency and integrity, in discharging this function. The practical arrangements for appointments are being developed as part of the transition planning for the integration of NHS England’s functions into the Department, and will be based on these principles. It would therefore be inappropriate to exclude Ministers entirely from the appointments process. I urge hon. Members not to push the amendments to a vote.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way?

[The Chair]

I think the Minister has finished.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendment made: 19, in schedule 3, page 81, line 10, at end insert—

“(1A) Unless or except to the extent that regulations provide otherwise, the executive directors must include—

(a) at least one person who is a registered medical practitioner or a registered dentist (within the meaning of the Dentists Act 1984), and

(b) at least one other person who is a registered nurse or a registered midwife.”—(Karin Smyth.)

This requires NHS foundation trusts to have at least one executive director who is a registered medical practitioner or a registered dentist and another who is a registered nurse or a registered midwife. Regulations may create exceptions (for example, an exception could be created for ambulance foundation trusts).

Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31

NHS foundation trusts etc: audit of accounts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Health Bill (Ninth sitting)

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

I will start where I left off. Clause 34 addresses the gap by making it clear where responsibility sits, so that there is no doubt about who must produce the final accounts and ensure that they are completed properly, and about how those accounts should be audited. We think this is a proportionate provision to ensure continuity and clarity on how NHS money has been managed during organisational transition. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

Clause 31 introduces schedule 4, which essentially makes series of amendments to other Acts. It amends the Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000 to remove a cross-reference to other categories, and it amends the Audit and Accountability (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 and the Public Audit (Wales) Act 2004 for similar purposes. It also amends the National Health Service Act 2006 by deleting section 62 and schedule 10, relating to the audit of accounts of NHS foundation trusts, to end the old audit scheme.

Schedule 4 amends section 3 of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 so that foundation trusts are now included in the list of bodies that must keep accounts in the standard way, it amends section 4 to specify which documents count as accounts of foundation trusts for the purpose of auditing, and it amends sections 8 and 10 so that the auditor appointment procedure and the auditor panel’s role now cover foundation trusts.

In addition, schedule 4 rewrites section 13 of the 2014 Act so that if a trust fails to appoint a local auditor, it is the Secretary of State’s job to step in. Previously, that was NHS England’s job; clearly, that needs to change, because NHS England is being abolished. The schedule also amends section 21 so that the auditors’ general duties now apply to foundation trusts too, and it amends section 30, relating to unlawful expenditure and activity, and section 32B, relating to the independence requirement, to remove a now-redundant item from the list.

Schedule 4 also amends schedule 2 to the 2014 Act to formally add foundation trusts to the official list of audited bodies; schedule 5 so that the rules on who can be a local auditor now cover foundation trusts too; schedule 6 to remove an outdated segment from the audit practice code rules; schedule 7 to tidy the reporting rules and extend them to foundation trusts; schedule 9 to realign data matching rules that apply to foundation trusts in the new system; and schedule 11, relating to the disclosure of information, to remove a reference to NHS England, which is no longer necessary because NHS England is being abolished. In general, clause 31 aligns the audit process for accounts of foundation trusts with those of standard trusts and integrated care boards.

Clause 32 removes the need for NHS England to maintain a register of foundation trusts and the fees associated with maintaining it. Section 39 of the NHS Act 2006 requires NHS England to maintain a current register of NHS foundation trusts and specifies what must be in that register. Section 50 states that an NHS foundation trust must pay NHS England a fee that NHS England may determine in respect of exercising its functions under section 39, which relates to keeping the register, and section 39A, relating to a panel for advising governors. Clause 32 deletes sections 39 and 50. The explanatory notes say that the requirement to maintain a register does not need to be transferred to the Secretary of State when NHS England is abolished because, the Government argue, the information will already be available centrally, and there is no need for a fee to keep that in place. That seems sensible to me.

Clause 33 enables the Secretary of State to impose limits on a foundation trust’s annual capital or revenue expenditure. Section 42B of the 2006 Act allows NHS England to make an order imposing a limit on the capital expenditure of a foundation trust in a single year. Section 42C sets out that NHS England must publish guidance about the exercise of its power under section 42B, including about the circumstances in which it is likely to make an order and the method it will use to determine the capital expenditure limit. Clause 33 entirely replaces sections 42B and 42C with rewritten sections, with some notable changes. The wording is changed from “capital expenditure” to “expenditure”. The power is therefore widened from capital expenditure limits to limits on any expenditure—capital and revenue. The Secretary of State replaces NHS England as the entity with the power to impose limits, which makes sense, and the subsection requiring an order to specify the trust, the financial year and so on has been removed in full.

The change gives the Government financial control to stop overspending by NHS foundation trusts. I note that in financial year 2023-24, NHS trusts overspent by £1.2 billion, so presumably this is the Secretary of State getting a tighter grip on spending. In some respects that is sensible, but overspending is often due to staffing costs and day-to-day pressures, not capital expenditure, so there is an argument that the capital limits themselves are not sufficient to deal with the problem. Under the new governance model, the Secretary of State has oversight and responsibility for the health service, and financial control aligns with those changes. The new power could prevent one organisation’s failures from undermining the health service’s wider financial position or impacting other providers.

However, the purpose of foundation trusts is supposed to be that they have greater independence over spending, and the Government have stated that their aim is to create a more devolved and autonomous health system. How does broadening the Secretary of State’s ability to interfere in expenditure devolve power or make foundation trusts more independent? Imposing expenditure limits may control overspending on paper, but it does not address the reasons why it is happening, so limits could lead to a deterioration in the health services delivered by some trusts. What plans does the Minister have to deal with that?

Because the power moves from an arm’s length body to the Secretary of State, interventions could be politically motivated, rather than in the best interests of the NHS. How does the Minister consider that that will be managed?

The power for the Secretary of State to impose expenditure limits at any time during or before the financial year could create uncertainty among trust leadership and undermine long-term planning. If a trust is given a budget for the year, it knows what it has to work with, but if somebody says halfway through the year, “Actually, you are going to have to work with less money than that,” it is very difficult for the board to plan its expenditure, because it is always looking the other way. Why does the Secretary of State need that power? Can the Minister clarify that, if there is a change in the expenditure limit during the year, it will always be revised upwards, and never downwards?

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a prescient point. Has she thought about the word “limits”? To me, it is not clear from the clause as drafted—perhaps it is clearer to her—whether that is an overall limit on capital and revenue expenditure, or whether the clause is saying that the Secretary of State could impose limits on individual line items or departments. The word “limits”—plural—suggests that he or she may be able to do that.

[Dr Johnson]

I do not think the Bill is very clear on that. It says that the Secretary of State

“may by order impose limits on the expenditure that may be incurred by an NHS foundation trust in respect of a single financial year.”

However, it does not say whether that is an overall limit, whether it is for capital or revenue or whether it is a limit on a specific item, so the degree to which the Secretary of State has control is not clear. I presume it is an overall limit and that it is for dealing with budgets, but perhaps the Minister can provide some clarity for my hon. Friend.

Clause 34 requires foundation trusts that have been newly authorised, or that have recently acquired another trust or another foundation trust, to prepare the final accounts for their predecessor trust or foundation trust. It does that by modifying section 36 of the NHS Act 2006 to add new provisions that require foundation trusts to prepare accounts for the final period for which they were an NHS trust, establish that part of schedule 7 and part of the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014 apply in relation to those accounts, and define the final accounting period. It does the same for section 56AA of the 2006 Act.

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[Karin Smyth]

During the process of producing our 10-year plan, we were clear that, as much as we will reward the best performing providers with new freedoms to innovate, we will not hesitate to act on poor performance, and this group of measures deal with just that: action in the event of a failing provider.

Clause 35 and schedule 5 insert new provisions into the NHS Act 2006 to enable the Secretary of State to, by order, convert a failing foundation trust to an NHS trust. This is intended to take place only in the most critical circumstances, and where it is in the public’s best interest for the Secretary of State to be able to direct the trust about how it should exercise its functions, to address safety or other issues at the trust. Foundation trust status should be a mark of good performance, and there must be a mechanism to remove it when performance is seriously deficient. This deauthorisation power will help to maintain the integrity of the reinvigorated foundation trust status and provide an additional incentive for challenged foundation trusts to improve.

The power to make a conversion order can be used where the foundation trust has failed to comply with a condition of its provider licence or with another legislative requirement. In deciding whether to make a conversion order, the Secretary of State must consider various factors, including the seriousness of the failure, the health and safety of patients, the quality of the provision by the trust of goods and services, the financial position of the trust, and the way the trust is being run.

The conversion power is also subject to two additional requirements. First, the Secretary of State must publish guidance about the matters they will consider in deciding whether to exercise the conversion power, including the factors I just outlined. They must consult on any such guidance before its publication. Secondly, where the Secretary of State proposes to use the power, they must first consult the foundation trust in question, any integrated care boards in the areas in which the trust operates, and any other person to whom the trust provides goods and services, and whom the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult.

Clause 35, together with schedule 5, also inserts new schedule 9A into the NHS Act 2006, which sets out the immediate consequences of a conversion order. Deauthorising a foundation trust has no impact on the property it holds, the contracts it has with commissioners and other groups, or the terms of employment of employees. These powers set clear organisational consequences for significant underperformance and allow the Secretary of State the freedom to take action to protect patients in extreme circumstances.

Clause 36 contains another critical power to allow action in the case of a failing foundation trust. It allows the Secretary of State to add conditions to an NHS foundation trust’s provider licence where they consider that the trust will breach its licence conditions due to issues with its governance. The clause is a consequence of abolishing NHS England and makes changes to the powers currently held by NHS England under section 111 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, to confer them on the Secretary of State, with additional consequential changes reflecting the abolition of councils of governors.

The clause sets clear expectations for a foundation trust through the licence conditions and provides the Secretary of State with a transparent mechanism to take more urgent, targeted enforcement action to address failures of governance. Should the foundation trust breach any conditions imposed via section 111, the Secretary of State may require it to make changes to the executive directors of its board as necessary, including removing or suspending executive directors, replacing executive directors with interims, and preventing the trust from appointing specific individuals. If the foundation trust fails to take those actions, the Secretary of State may implement the changes.

To reassure the Committee, there are clear safeguards underpinning the clause, which can be used only where there is evidence that failures of governance in the foundation trust will cause it to breach the conditions of its licence. Further, acting under section 111 does not preclude the Secretary of State from using their other regulatory powers, including to require the foundation trust to take steps to address a breach of any condition of the licence, or to accept undertakings from the trust to address the breach.

Finally, the section 111 power was originally granted to Monitor in 2012 under transitional arrangements, as it was anticipated that the power could be withdrawn once governors had transitioned into their roles and could hold boards to account without outside intervention. Over 13 years on, that has proven not to be the case. With the abolition of the foundation trust councils of governors, it makes sense to repeal the provisions under sections 112 to 114 of the same Act that made it transitional.

Clause 37 makes changes to the special administration framework to ensure that it continues to function coherently after the abolition of NHS England. The clause makes focused, technical amendments to the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to amend the framework for establishing a mechanism for financial assistance in cases where a provider is subject to a health special administration order under chapter 5 of that Act. It also amends the Act to remove the duty to establish a mechanism for financial assistance to foundation trusts to which a trust special administrator has been appointed. The duty no longer needs to apply to foundation trusts, because the Secretary of State already has the power under provisions in the NHS Act 2006 to provide financial assistance to NHS foundation trusts if needed.

With the abolition of NHS England, the duty to establish a mechanism for financial assistance for independent providers will be retained and conferred on the Secretary of State. It is worth noting that the provisions related to financial assistance in special administration cases, and chapter 5 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which sets out the powers and processes for the making of health special administration orders, have not yet been commenced. However, the amendments made by the clause ensure that the special administration regime can operate smoothly if it is ever needed.

The clause does not create new financial support mechanisms, but ensures that existing ones can be used appropriately in the reformed system. In short, clause 37 ensures that the legal framework reflects the new institutional landscape while retaining the ability to act swiftly to safeguard continuity of services during special administration.

Clause 38 makes changes to the trust special administration framework to ensure that it continues to function coherently after the abolition of NHS England. This clause, together with schedule 6, make targeted changes to the trust special administration process set out in the NHS Act 2006 for NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts as a consequence of the abolition of NHS England. It also aligns more closely the processes between NHS trusts and foundation trusts.

Trust special administration is, and will remain, a last resort mechanism used only in cases of serious failure. It is used to protect patients, stabilise services and put the organisation back on a sustainable footing. Where deemed necessary, a trust special administrator would be appointed to manage the trust and work with relevant key stakeholders to develop recommendations regarding the organisation and its services.

The amendments made by schedule 6 remove functions that currently sit with NHS England and confer the key decision-making functions on the Secretary of State, who will provide clearer lines of accountability and faster decision making when rapid intervention is required. The amendments also simplify the steps involved in the TSA process, with the aim of improving the speed of intervention and providing transparency. They align more closely the processes for trusts and foundation trusts, and set out a simpler process in relation to the administrator’s draft report, consultation and final report. They also require, as is the case now, that key documents and decisions are published and laid before Parliament. That will help ensure proper and meaningful scrutiny of the TSA process and outcomes. It also helps ensure that affected patients, staff and local partners have the opportunity to engage during the process, while maintaining the balance with the need to deliver timely intervention and secure continuity of safe services.

In addition, the amendments in schedule 6 make changes to the role of the Care Quality Commission in trust special administration. The CQC will be able to recommend that a trust special administrator should be appointed. The Secretary of State is also required to consult the CQC before making an order, ensuring that independent expertise on quality and safety informs decisions and that intelligence on service performance is co-ordinated.

The provisions in the Bill ensure that the process remains fit for purpose, proportionate, and aligned across NHS trusts and foundation trusts. They support faster, more coherent decision making in the most serious cases, with the aim of protecting patients and securing sustainable, high-quality services for the future. Taken together, the clauses provide the necessary tools for the Secretary of State to take proportionate, swift and decisive action in the event of provider failure. I therefore commend these clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 35 essentially establishes the right of the Secretary of State to convert a foundation trust into an NHS trust in certain circumstances. Currently, section 25 of the NHS Act 2006 establishes trusts and introduces schedule 4 of the same Act, which makes provision about NHS trusts. Section 56AA sets out how additional requirements concerning acquisitions of a trust or foundation trust are to work. Clause 35 deletes section 25(2), which specifies that an order in this context is referred to as “an NHS trust order”, and amends subsection (3), so that no order under section 25—previously no “NHS trust order”—can be made until any consultation that has been prescribed is complete.

Clause 35 introduces proposed new section 57B into the 2006 Act, “Conversion of failing NHS foundation trust into NHS trust”, which provides the Secretary of State with the power to convert if the foundation trust breaches its licence or other legal duties. The trigger is broad and includes non-compliance with any statutory requirement. The proposed new section requires an order to specify when it takes effect and also requires the Secretary of State, when deciding to issue an order, to consider among other things

“the seriousness of the failure…the health and safety of patients…the quality of the provision by the trust of goods and services…the financial position of the trust, and…the way that the trust is being run.”

Before making an order, the Secretary of State will be required to consult the trust, any ICB where the trust has facilities and

“any other person to whom the trust provides goods or services…whom the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to consult.”

The proposed new section also provides the Secretary of State with the power, when the conversion order is made, to

“terminate the appointment of the chair or any executive or non-executive director”,

and to

“appoint a person to be the chair or an executive or non-executive director”.

It also time-limits the powers to intervene with management to one year after the order is made.

Clause 35 also introduces proposed new section 57C into the 2006 Act, “Guidance about conversion”, which requires the Secretary of State to publish guidance about matters to be considered when deciding to make an order and requires them to consult persons considered appropriate before publishing or revising guidance. The clause removes “NHS trust order” from section 276 of the 2006 Act, “Index of defined expressions”, and updates schedule 4, so that an NHS trust may be established by an ordinary order under section 25 or a conversion order under proposed new section 57B.

Schedule 5 to the Bill inserts proposed new schedule 9A to the 2006 Act, “Conversion of failing NHS foundation trusts”, which provides that, on conversion, the foundation trust’s chair and directors become the initial chair and directors of the new NHS trust, unless they are removed by the Secretary of State under the procedures we have just talked about. The proposed new schedule initially keeps the board the same size, until new arrangements are made. It provides that the foundation trust’s public dividend capital carries over to the NHS trust and that the conversion does not affect continuity of the body —it will remain the same organisation, just with NHS trust status.

The proposed new schedule provides that the trust’s property and liabilities, including criminal liabilities, continue unaffected. It also provides that existing contracts continue and that the trust remains party to them. It clarifies that those contracts do not automatically become NHS contracts under section 9(1) of the 2006 Act, provides that the trust keeps any corporate memberships that it held before the conversion, and clarifies that the continuity provisions do not affect the Secretary of State’s wider powers to make directions.

The Secretary of State will have a direct power to act where the foundation trust has failed—for instance, where there have been patient safety lapses—and there are clear benefits to that. There are also transparency requirements built in: the Secretary of State must publish guidance and consult before issuing guidance or undertaking conversion, and the power to change the management is limited to a year.

However, the last Labour Government said that independence was central to the success of foundation trusts. In 2005, the then Secretary of State, Patricia Hewitt, said:

“We know that independence from central Government control and greater freedoms are giving NHS foundation trusts the opportunity to innovate new approaches to healthcare and healthcare services, for the benefit of NHS patients.”—[Official Report, 7 November 2005; Vol. 439, c. 5WS.]

The challenge with innovations is that, even with the very best intentions and the very best advice, some will work and some will not. If any failure at all is a reason for trusts to be taken over, will that cause them to be shy about innovating, for fear of their independence being undermined as a result? There is a balance to strike, so I wonder whether the Minister will comment on that.

The change also makes it easy for the Secretary of State to convert a foundation trust for political reasons—for instance, because of pressure from local Members of Parliament. That is a positive in some ways and a negative in others. Again, it could have a chilling effect on the very autonomy and innovation that Ministers want to see, so the question is how they think they will balance that.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I do not think that the Minister addressed new clause 26, so does she wish to do so now? [Interruption.] She need not worry about it, I am told.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 39 broadens the Secretary of State’s ability to delegate or jointly exercise health service functions with NHS bodies and local government. Currently, section 7A of the National Health Service Act 2006 enables the Secretary of State to arrange for any of their public health functions to be exercised by relevant bodies, such as NHS England, ICBs and local authorities. Section 65Z5 sets out how relevant bodies may jointly exercise delegated functions, and section 65Z6 sets out how funds may be pooled for such purposes. Section 65Z7 sets out that NHS England may issue guidance for exercising functions under those two sections and that relevant bodies must have regard to any guidance. Section 75 then sets out that the Secretary of State can make regulations to enable NHS bodies and local authorities to enter into arrangements related to the delivery of health functions.

Clause 39 deletes section 7A, removing the separate power for the Secretary of State to delegate public health functions. It amends section 65Z5 to create a wider power that allows the Secretary of State to arrange for any health service-related function in England to be exercised by or jointly with relevant bodies, local authorities, combined authorities, combined county authorities or other prescribed persons. It removes outdated references in section 65Z5 linked to NHS England and updates the wording so that arrangements can be made with a wider range of persons and not just bodies.

Clause 39 also replaces section 65Z6 so that where functions are exercised jointly, the parties can use joint committees and pooled funds. It provides that pooled funds can include payments from relevant bodies and the Secretary of State, and can be used for expenditure connected to jointly exercised functions. It amends section 65Z7 so that guidance on joint working and delegation is issued by the Secretary of State rather than NHS England. It makes consequential amendments to provisions on directors of public health and local authority public health functions, reflecting the removal of section 7A. It also makes consequential amendments to section 75 partnership arrangements and the Local Government Act 1974, again removing references to section 7A.

Once again, it is necessary to move functions to the Secretary of State when NHS England is abolished—somebody else needs to do the work. The changes introduce more flexibility for joined-up working between the Secretary of State and other entities in the health system, which could support integration and the shift to place-based care, with localised approaches to prevention, integration and service planning in line with the Government’s 10-year plan.

However, the power is very broad, relating to any function in the health service. The Secretary of State could arrange for functions to be exercised by or jointly with any person prescribed, which could mean anyone. How will it be possible to determine who is responsible for things that have gone wrong when joint committees are established and funds are pooled? The Minister has spoken a number of times during our sittings about the importance of clear accountability. In the event that the work, funds and activities are pooled, how will it be made clear who is responsible and therefore accountable for the activity that occurs?

Melanie Williams, the then president of the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, told the Health and Social Care Committee that we spend

“a lot of time debating about who pays, rather than having a conversation about how, in the longer term, we can invest in people’s outcomes to enable better health and wellbeing.”

Is it the Government’s intention to decide the allocation of money for social care and health providers, or that whoever they decide will work together?

The Government have said that this is all about the devolution of power. This morning, we discussed the abolition of integrated care partnerships, on which ICBs and local authorities work together on projects that they choose locally. The Government are now introducing another power that will enable the Secretary of State to direct them to work together on things that he or she chooses. That does not sound terribly like the devolution of power. Could the Minister explain that to me?

I shall leave new clause 26 to the Liberal Democrats. Government new clause 20 ensures that there is a complete list of authorities that may be included. I think some were missing from the first iteration. I just make the point that the more actors there are in the mix, the harder it may be to see who is responsible overall. We also need to discuss how to maintain the balance between clinical need and political priorities in the choice of what healthcare is provided.

[Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)]

New clause 26, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran) and the hon. Member for Worthing West (Dr Cooper), who both sit on the Health and Social Care Committee, would require the Secretary of State to review the arrangements under section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006 and consider whether to require NHS bodies and local authorities to enter into new arrangements with one another if that is likely to lead to an improvement in how their functions are exercised.

A recurring theme of Health and Social Care Committee inquiries is the impact of financial flows and how they frustrate attempts to deliver truly integrated care—an issue we discussed in earlier sittings. We all recognise that closer arrangements are needed to properly address discharge delays, which directly lead to corridor care or even unnecessary admissions to hospital. It seems that a consensus has been reached, yet the action to back that up is not there. We feel that, through this Bill, the Government are moving away from closer integration.

Melanie Williams, the then president of the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, told the Health and Social Care Committee that the NHS and local authorities

“spend a lot of time debating about who pays, rather than having a conversation about how, in the longer term, we can invest in people’s outcomes to enable better health and wellbeing.”

She highlighted concerns about the funding of intermediate care and community health services through aftercare under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and NHS continuing healthcare.

Section 75 of the 2006 Act provides a legal mechanism for NHS bodies and local authorities to pool budgets and jointly commission health and social care services. The Select Committee has heard evidence of positive examples of such arrangements being used to commission integrated services. It also heard that the use of section 75 arrangements is inconsistent.

In October 2023, the Government launched a call for evidence to explore how section 75 could be better utilised to support integration. A summary of responses published in December 2024 identified several areas for improvement, including the need for stronger inter-organisation relationships, clearer governance and financial structures, and better data sharing. The Health and Social Care Committee recommended that the Government expand the use of section 75, including the range of services that it will be used to support.

This Bill is a missed opportunity for the Government to reform or promote the use of section 75 arrangements, or to provide an alternative mechanism that they believe would be more effective in addressing the challenges that funding flows present to the integration of health and care services. That is why the Select Committee suggested this new clause to prompt a review of section 72 and the introduction of guidance to support pooled budgets and jointly commissioned health and social care services.

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

We know that robust finances are an essential part of the health service. The financial accounts related to the NHS are of keen interest to His Majesty’s Treasury and indeed to Parliament. The Government are especially mindful of the keen interest of the Public Accounts Committee in this area. Under current arrangements, NHS England prepares a set of financial accounts for all NHS trusts and foundation trusts, and that is audited by the National Audit Office. That is the point at which the National Audit Office conducts its oversight of NHS providers, with that feeding into the National Audit Office’s assurance over the Department of Health and Social Care group.

The financial accounts for integrated care boards are currently included in the NHS England group accounts, which are presented separately and audited by the National Audit Office. With the abolition of NHS England, the Government intend to reduce central administration costs, so financial reporting needs to be proportionate while balancing stakeholders’ keen interest in financial information related specifically to the NHS. Clause 40 therefore replaces the current consolidated accounts of NHS providers with a single set of consolidated accounts for the NHS covering its trusts, foundation trusts and integrated care boards. That consolidated account will continue to be audited by the National Audit Office.

We believe that bringing the accounts together in this way will assist the public, Parliament and the National Audit Office in scrutinising NHS expenditure. Although it is not covered by the clause, it is important for the Committee to be aware that there will be no change to the current requirement for the Department to publish a Department of Health and Social Care group annual report and accounts that will consolidate the NHS accounts with the core Department and other group bodies—for example, its arm’s length bodies.

However, the Government recognise that only reporting figures for the NHS in the overall Department group would reduce transparency compared with the current structure of NHS financial accounts. The clause therefore seeks to prioritise high quality audited financial accounts information being made available while balancing against administrative costs, both of which are important to the Government.

Clause 41 amends the Secretary of State’s existing power to create a scheme allowing NHS bodies to pool funds to cover property losses and legal claims arising from their healthcare activities. They ensure that when liabilities arise, whether from damage to property, negligence or other claims, there is a clear and consistent mechanism through which those liabilities can be managed and resolved. In doing so, they protect the financial stability of the NHS. The clause updates the legislation for the new landscape by removing NHS England from the arrangements and ensuring that responsibility for administrating the schemes rests appropriately with the Secretary of State.

Although the clause is targeted and technical, its effect is essential in that it ensures continuity and legal clarity and continued effective operation of arrangements that underpin confidence and functionality across the health service. Clause 42 is a necessary technical and structural change that supports the new statutory framework following the abolition of NHS England. It removes provisions in the NHS Act 2006 and the Health and Care Act 2022 that relate specifically to NHS England’s funding and financial responsibilities, which will no longer be required once NHS England ceases to exist. The clause avoids duplication and confusion and ensures that financial accountability is clearly defined in the post NHS England system. Under the reformed framework, the Department is responsible for the overall funding of the NHS and for national financial assurance, while integrated care boards and providers continue to operate within defined statutory financial duties and controls.

Clause 42 plays an important housekeeping role, providing legal clarity and underpinning a more transparent and coherent financial framework that is fit for the NHS future operating model. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 40 prepares for the preparation of the annual accounts of NHS trusts and integrated care boards. Existing legislation in section 65Z4 of the NHS Act 2006, “Consolidated accounts for NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts”, requires NHS England to prepare a set of accounts every financial year and consolidate the accounts of all the trusts and NHS foundation trusts. The Secretary of State can give directions about the content for methods and principles, and the accounts must be accompanied by reports or other information as directed by the Secretary of State. A copy may be sent by NHS England to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor General. The latter must then examine and certify those accounts before sending a copy to the Secretary of State and NHS England, and NHS England must then lay a copy of the consolidated accounts and the Comptroller and Auditor General’s report before Parliament. That is how it works at the moment.

Clause 40 rewrites section 65Z4 and the duty to prepare the consolidated accounts every financial year moves to the Secretary of State, and the list of what gets consolidated now includes the ICB accounts. The power to give directions to NHS England about accounts is removed, which is fair enough because there would be no need for it, as the Secretary of State is now preparing them and NHS England will cease to exist. The requirement for the accounts to be accompanied by such reports or other information as the Secretary of State may direct has been removed. The accounts go straight to the Comptroller and Auditor General, who reports back only to the Secretary of State. At the end, the Secretary of State lays the accounts before Parliament. The changes are necessary owing to the abolition of NHS England.

I want to ask about the consolidation, including the ICB accounts, which was not there before, and what impact that will have. Will the accounts be sufficiently detailed so that it is possible to disaggregate that information if people are interested in doing so?

Clause 41 changes which NHS companies can be covered by the scheme that meets certain losses, legal claims and liabilities. Currently, section 71, “Schemes for meeting losses and liabilities etc of certain health service bodies”, of the NHS Act 2006 enables the Secretary of State to establish schemes to meet the losses of NHS England, ICBs, trusts, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, the CQC and several other bodies. The list of bodies includes

“(ha) a company formed under section 223 and wholly or partly owned by the Secretary of State or NHS England”.

In the new legislation, clause 41 rewrites paragraph (ha) so that it is

“a company formed under section 223 other than by an integrated care board by virtue of section 223A”.

That narrows the scope of the liability scheme by preventing ICB-created companies from automatically gaining protection, presumably to encourage ICBs to manage risk responsibly.

NHS Breast Screening

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Monday 29th June 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I congratulate Gemma Reeves on bringing forward the petition and the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Irene Campbell) on introducing this important debate. It has been very moving to hear so many stories from hon. Members on both sides of the House reminding us of the human cost of this disease.

Breast cancer is very common, as other Members have said, affecting one in seven women during their lifetime. The Minister and I have had a number of debates in this Chamber about various diseases and forms of cancer. One of the core principles we often discuss is that early diagnosis saves lives. Cancer Research UK says that 85% of women who live more than 10 years after a diagnosis of breast cancer were diagnosed at stage 1 or 2 —the earlier stages to be diagnosed at. It was for that reason, and on that principle, that the UK introduced the world’s first national screening programme for breast cancer in 1988. Since then, much has changed. In particular, survival rates have improved dramatically. Now, 76.6% live more than 10 years; the figure was very much lower in the 1980s.

There are still some issues with screening, however, as hon. Members have said. One is that women with denser breasts find it more difficult to locate lumps, and when doing mammograms, it can be more difficult to locate cancerous tumours. Will the Minister update the House on what work has been done on using ultrasounds and MRIs to identify tumours in women with denser breasts? I understand that the National Screening Council is looking at this subject in detail. When is it due to report its findings to the Minister, and when does she intends to bring them to the House?

The effectiveness of treatment has improved, but the risk of overtreatment is higher in younger women. The incidence of the disease is increasing in younger and older women: the Cancer Research UK website says that the rate has increased by 12% in women aged between 25 and 49, and by 72% in women aged between 65 and 69. Should younger women therefore now receive screening, and should older women receive more frequent screening?

The cancer plan, which the Government published earlier this year, said that they will engage with manufacturers to look at mammograms that are more accessible to those with a physical disability, who at the moment struggle to receive their screening. Will the Minister update the House on the engagement she has had with manufacturers and on the progress that has been made?

The age trial in Oxford is looking at women aged between 47 and 49, and between 71 and 73—the ages just outside the current range of screening. I understand that early results are due in December 2026. Has the Minister had any indication of the results yet, and is she preparing for any results that come forward? Has she engaged with the people running that important trial?

Community diagnostic centres, which were initiated by the previous Government and rolled out across the country, provide screening close to people’s homes, which makes it much easier for them to attend. Will the Minister update us on how she is improving the number of CDCs available across the country?

The Government have talked about the shifts that they want to produce in healthcare, one of which is about prevention. According to the Cancer Research UK website, 23% of breast cancer cases are preventable. Will the Minister update us on what she is doing to reduce the number of preventable cases of breast cancer?

Many hon. Members have talked about attendance at screening tests. The hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) spoke about some of the reasons why women do not attend screening. It is important that we understand why about a third of women do not attend. It is only by understanding what puts women off and makes them not attend that we can improve the services so that more women do attend. It was sobering to hear how many lives could be saved if more women attended screening. How are we making screening more accessible for women? Are we ensuring that women know that it is happening and that they need it? Do they understand the benefits of it? I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts.

Another shift relates to the digital NHS. AI provides us with a number of ways to improve breast cancer screening and treatment. It could help us to understand who should be invited to screening and how often, and it can help when looking at mammogram scans. A few years ago, the Health and Social Care Committee visited Stanford in California and looked at the AI there. We saw a study comparing two radiology consultants looking at a scan, two AI computers using two different programmes, and a person and an AI computer. It discovered that the person and the AI computer were the most accurate. That can help to reduce the number of people we need in the workforce and, importantly, can improve the accuracy of screening results.

That brings me on to the workforce. We know that the Government have a workforce plan, although its publication has been much delayed. We have been told repeatedly over the past few weeks that it has moved to “imminent” status—imminent being quicker than soon—but we do not know when imminent is. Does that mean it will be published before the summer, or do we need to wait for the new Prime Minister to make a decision? It would be helpful to know that from the Minister. As we heard about radiology and radiotherapy, the workforce is incredibly important. We need a thorough plan, otherwise we will have recommendations from the NSC for screening and no people to provide that care.

I also wanted to raise with the Minister the Lobular Moon Shot Project. We have discussed before the importance of research into lobular breast cancer, which is more difficult to diagnose and treat. The last time we spoke about this, the Minister was looking at research projects that the Government could fund to identify new treatments and ways of screening for this disease, hopefully saving lives. Will she update us on how she is getting along with that?

Much of my time at the moment is spent with another Health Minister—the Minister for Secondary Care, the hon. Member for Bristol South (Karin Smyth)—in Committee Room 9, debating the Health Bill. That is where I will be tomorrow. The Bill relates to one of the important organisational factors in screening. At the moment, screening programmes are generally organised by NHS England, which is being abolished. NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care wrote a letter in March saying that commissioning responsibility will be directly delegated to ICBs, in the same way that they are currently delegated to NHSE, by the Secretary of State. Does the Minister expect that to cause any disruption to the breast screening programme?

Integrated care boards have had their budgets cut by 50% just as they are asked to take on this work. We know that they are merging and reorganising in cells. The Government’s plans are that they should follow the mayoral authority boundaries, but the mergers that have taken place so far do not follow those boundaries. There is therefore a risk that we will need reorganisation all over again. Does the Minister think that that will have an effect on the screening programme? If so, what is she doing to mitigate that effect to ensure that as many people as possible get the very best screening and we can reduce the number of people suffering from the disease?

The screening programme offers a real opportunity to diagnose, treat early and save lives, but it needs to be delivered well. We need to ensure that the right people get the right type of screening at the right age, and at the right frequency. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response.

Health Bill (Seventh sitting)

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 25th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Edward Argar]

My hon. Friend comes to this with significant knowledge from his work on the Health and Social Care Committee. He is absolutely right, but that is a tension and a balance that I fear runs as a thread throughout this legislation, between local decision making and tailoring and the genuine need for a Secretary of State to have effective powers. We lobby Secretaries of State; on occasion I have lobbied the Minister, and she has always been very responsive—she does not always agree with me, but she has always been very responsive to me. As Members of Parliament, we do that on behalf of our communities.

My argument is that ICBs need to be more responsive, even when they do consult, to make it clear that the decision is not predetermined by the board and that they are going through the process. In the context of this clause, that also needs to be true of the Secretary of State: it needs to be not simply a formulaic approach but a genuine engagement and consultation. My question for the Minister, in that context, is about how we make sure of what she is seeking to do in the clause. The Secretary of State or those undertaking commissioning on their behalf must pay heed to something, but how do we make sure that that consultation, engagement and feedback genuinely have some teeth in what emerges in the final decision?

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston and my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon have covered my points so effectively that I will be very brief indeed. How do we ensure that the consultation is not just well meaning and ticking the legal boxes, but actually listened to, so that people’s voices are incorporated into the plans? Also, I appreciate that amendment 28 is a well-meaning intervention, but how do we ensure that all voices are heard in a co-production, not just those who are the most articulate or the most able to engage with a process that they see online?

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

Patients and the public have a critical role in shaping our health services. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon for tabling the amendment, as moved by the hon. Member for North Shropshire. I will discuss the amendment with the wider question of whether the clause should stand part of the Bill.

To be clear, the Government are committed to engaging with patients and the public about the services they use. Services shaped together with the people who rely on them are better services. We want to see deep and collaborative ways of working between patients, public and the NHS. Across the country, there are good examples of that from which we want to learn. That is why the clause requires the Secretary of State to involve patients and the public in the planning of commissioning arrangements, the development and consideration of proposals for service change, and decisions that may affect how services are delivered or the range of services available.

The clause is intended to encourage early engagement and meaningful involvement in service change, thereby helping to build legitimacy, trust and better-informed commissioning decisions. As a duty, it covers the entire end-to-end commissioning cycle. I have been a commissioner myself, so although I will not detain the Committee too much on that, it is indeed part of the job of a commissioner to do that at a very early stage.

I also draw attention to the fact that the clause places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure the involvement of individuals who use or may use health services, together with carers and representatives, where appropriate, in commissioning activity. That duty is purposely broad, covering both existing service users and those who may reasonably rely on services in future, and will support preventive approaches and enable the consideration of wider population health impacts.

We made the deliberate choice to include specific references to carers and representatives, recognising that some individuals may require support to participate effectively in engagement and decision-making processes. That is particularly important where barriers such as disability, communications needs, sometimes age, vulnerability or unequal access may otherwise limit participation. We are ensuring that involvement is inclusive and meaningful, which I think is what all hon. Members want to see.

Specifically on amendment 28, I gently caution against creating an implication of different approaches to patient involvement for different parts of the system, leading to a two-track approach and unnecessary confusion. Instead, we propose a Government commitment to ensure meaningful consultation. We support co-production and will continue to champion it, but we do not think it necessary to put it on the face of the Bill.

The Government support involving patients and the public at every stage, and we recognise that working closely with the people and communities affected by commissioning decisions brings valuable insight into service quality, accessibility, equity and effectiveness. We will use the duties and powers available to Ministers to ensure that that principle is embedded across the work of the NHS. I hope, therefore, that the hon. Member for North Shropshire has some reassurance and will withdraw her amendment. I commend the clause to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 16, page 12, line 10, at end insert—

“(3) The regulations must ensure that integrated care boards may not impose operational policies requiring patients to wait a minimum number of weeks before they may access treatment.”

This amendment would prevent minimum waiting times for NHS treatment.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 35, in clause 16, page 12, line 10, at end insert—

“(3) Regulations under this section must make provision requiring integrated care boards to make arrangements which ensure that community equipment and wheelchair services are provided within 18 weeks of the date on which a person is assessed as requiring such equipment or services.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)—

‘community equipment and wheelchair services’ means equipment, aids, home adaptations or appliances provided to support a person’s independence, safety, care or daily living at home or in the community, including hoists, hospital beds, pressure-relieving mattresses, commodes, shower chairs, walking frames, grab rails, ramps, specialist seating, postural support equipment, associated mobility equipment, and wheelchairs.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make regulations which would require integrated care boards to ensure that community equipment and wheelchair services are provided within 18 weeks of the date on which a person is assessed as requiring such equipment or services.

Amendment 63, in clause 16, page 12, line 10, at end insert—

“(2A) Regulations under subsection (2) must make provision requiring integrated care boards to—

(a) assess whether sufficient capacity exists to meet current and projected patient demand for cancer treatment, including radiotherapy treatment,

(b) maintain plans to ensure that workforce, equipment and estates capacity are sufficient to reduce waiting times for cancer treatment and improve access to treatment, and

(c) monitor and address geographical variations in access to cancer treatment, including radiotherapy treatment, with a view to reducing inequalities in patient outcomes the provision of satellite units.”

Amendment 52, clause 16, page 12, line 10, at end insert—

“(3) The regulations must include a requirement for the Secretary of State to publish the number of patients validated off of treatment waiting lists each month, and the reason for which they have been removed.”

This amendment would require publication of the number of patients validated off waiting lists each month and the reason for their removal.

Amendment 32, clause 16, page 12, line 22, at end insert—

“14Z45BA Patient choice: community services substituting for consultant-led elective care

(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision to enable patients to make choices in respect of non-consultant-led community services where those services are commissioned as a direct substitute for, or to prevent a referral to, consultant-led elective services.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a service is to be regarded as a direct substitute for, or intended to prevent a referral to, consultant-led elective services if it—

(a) provides assessment, treatment or management for a condition that would otherwise be referred to a secondary care specialist; or

(b) is commissioned by an integrated care board for the purpose of reducing or managing demand on secondary or elective care.

(3) Services to which this section applies include, but are not limited to—

(a) community audiology services;

(b) community glaucoma management and monitoring services; and

(c) Minor eye conditions services.

(4) Regulations made by virtue of this section must ensure that—

(a) patients are offered a choice of any clinically appropriate provider commissioned under a qualifying NHS contract for the relevant service;

(b) no limitation on the number of providers from which a patient may choose is imposed solely on grounds of cost or demand management; and

(c) patients are provided with information enabling them to make an informed choice, including information about waiting times and quality.

(5) An integrated care board must not commission a community service of a kind falling within subsection (2) in a manner which has the effect of restricting patient choice below the standard that would apply to an equivalent consultant-led elective service.”

Clause stand part.

Schedule 2.

New clause 35—Community equipment and wheelchair services: standards, performance and outcomes—

“(1) Each integrated care board must publish standards which apply in its area in relation to the assessment for and supply of community equipment and wheelchair services.

(2) Each integrated care board must monitor its performance against the standards under subsection (1).

(3) Each integrated care board must publish an annual report including—

(a) its performance against the standards under subsection (1),

(b) waiting times for the assessment for and supply of community equipment and wheelchair services,

(c) the number and proportion of people waiting longer than 18 weeks for such equipment or services,

(d) outcomes achieved for people by the provision of community equipment and wheelchair services, and

(e) steps taken by the integrated care board to improve the assessment for, and supply of, community equipment and wheelchair services.

(4) For the purposes of this section—

‘community equipment and wheelchair services’ means equipment, aids, home adaptations or appliances provided to support a person’s independence, safety, care or daily living at home or in the community, including hoists, hospital beds, pressure-relieving mattresses, commodes, shower chairs, walking frames, grab rails, ramps, specialist seating, postural support equipment, associated mobility equipment, and wheelchairs.”

This new clause would require each integrated care board must publish standards which apply in its area in relation to the assessment for and supply of community equipment and wheelchair services and publish an annual report on their adherence to these standards.

[Dr Johnson]

The Government say they are firmly committed to cutting waiting times and meeting the NHS’ 18-week target. It seems odd that, despite that, it is necessary for me to table an amendment to prevent systems from forcing patients to wait artificially longer for their care through the imposition of minimum waiting times.

Last year, The Times reported that at least eight local ICBs had introduced policies to pay healthcare providers for treatments only once patients have waited 12 weeks or more. I cannot think of any clinical reason why someone should wait for 12 weeks before having any treatment. At the time, the Minister said that while there was

“no formal national policy supporting minimum waits”,

local areas may

“choose to include minimum waiting times in Activity Planning Assumptions to ensure delivery of targets within agreed financial allocations…to support commissioners in managing activity to ensure they can sustainably manage within their budgets”.

I do not understand why we would want to make people wait longer than necessary.

The Royal College of Surgeons has expressed concerns and made clear that minimum waits prolong “pain and anxiety” for those made to wait longer, saying that it is

“counterintuitive…to give commissioners the green light to impose 18-week waits, while simultaneously working to ensure patients begin treatment within 18 weeks.”

Age UK deemed it a “rationing approach” that is

“potentially harmful to the health and wellbeing of older people.”

NHS England has made it clear that ICBs cannot introduce minimum waits of more than 18 weeks—that is longer than the target, so that makes sense—but waits between 12 and 18 weeks are permissible. Will the Minister explain why that is a good idea?

Amendment 51 seeks to ban ICBs from introducing any operational policies requiring patients to wait a minimum number of weeks before they may access treatment. There are safety risks involved in introducing minimum waiting times. They distort clinical priorities and may make patients wait in unnecessary pain and anxiety. Treatment should be delivered when possible, based on clinical needs. If a patient has a high level of clinical need, they might need to be treated earlier than the minimum waiting time because of the suffering they are experiencing.

Minimum waits are not only detrimental to patient experience by forcing people to live in greater pain and discomfort; in some cases, the delay may make the patient’s condition worse, and the treatment they need may be more extensive and even more expensive. Their condition may even become life-limiting or life-threatening as a result of the delay. The introduction of arbitrary minimum waiting times that do not have any relevance to patient clinical need raises worrying issues, clinically, professionally and ethically.

Minimum waits will also hinder the NHS’ ability to cut waiting lists and get waits to within 18 weeks. Some providers will have a list of people who can be available at short notice for a procedure, who they can call on if there is a cancellation on the day. If that person has not waited the minimum, that may be left as a gap, and that operation or appointment may not happen. That is wasted NHS resource.

Each month that goes by, many people are added to the waiting list, and some are removed from it. We are aware that there seem to be a lot of unexplained removals from the waiting list, and that has spiked recently. Among the people treated by NHS providers in April, around 600,000 were treated within eight weeks of referral, versus 74,000 who were treated between 14 and 18 weeks. The introduction of a minimum waiting time will therefore push back many people’s treatment by as much as 10 weeks.

Minimum waits also worsen and entrench postcode lotteries, because patients who have differential waits, based on whether their ICB has decided to implement minimum waiting times, may experience differential levels of care because of where they live. They are also another way of undermining patient choice, because patients may want to be treated in one area or one hospital because of the waiting time. If they all have different minimum waiting times, that distorts patients’ ability to choose.

Minimum waits are also completely contrary to the 10-year plan for health, in which choice and productivity were considered central features, along with the Government’s wider commitment to keep people healthy. I hope the Minister will agree with amendment 51, which would ensure that minimum waiting times cannot be instituted.

Amendment 52 also concerns waiting times. You will no doubt have seen, Dr Huq, the many newspapers articles about the Government fiddling the figures on waiting times, and there has been a spike in removals from waiting lists. People have found themselves removed from lists or going back on lists, or have suddenly found out that their waiting time started more recently than they thought. Amendment 52 would require the Secretary of State to publish the number of patients who are taken off treatment waiting lists each month and why they were removed. It is important that we are able to explain to our constituents why the Government have decided to remove them.

[Helen Morgan]

I want to speak to amendment 63, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron). As hon. Members know, he has campaigned passionately and for a long time on the provision of radiotherapy. His amendment seeks to ensure that there is sufficient and equitable access to radiotherapy. Radiotherapy is required by half of all cancer patients, and it is incredibly cost-effective, but England has fewer radiotherapy machines than comparable European countries, and thousands of people have to travel long distances and over 45 minutes for their treatment, particularly in my hon. Friend’s Cumbria constituency, as he has noted on many occasions.

The Darzi review noted that radiotherapy services are on their knees. They have some of the longest waiting times for treatment and vast parts of the country are classed as radiotherapy deserts, because of lack of accessibility. Radiotherapy currently has the worst 62-day performance of all main cancer treatments, and if we are serious about ensuring that all cancer targets are met by 2029, then we need the infrastructure, people and equipment to deliver them.

Cancer cases are expected to rise 30% by 2040, meaning that radiotherapy centres must be able to keep pace. Importantly, radiotherapy can also be used at an earlier stage in treatment, potentially saving lives, saving money and meeting important waiting time targets. We really ought to be leading the way on this and keeping pace with our European counterparts so that no one is left without the treatment they so desperately need. I add my support to amendment 52, because we do need to build confidence in the reduction of waiting lists, and more transparency around reductions would be helpful.

[Gregory Stafford]

Amendment 35 has not been moved, but it is very similar to new clause 35, which may be moved and concerns equipment. I will address both together. I think all in this Committee would agree that ensuring timely access to community equipment and wheelchair services is vital for patient independence, dignity and recovery. I have a number of constituents who believe that they are not getting access to that equipment in the time they would expect.

We also need to ensure that we give proper consideration to the efficiency and management of resources. In particular, we should look more closely at what happens after that equipment has been distributed. Too often, items such as crutches, wheelchairs or Zimmer frames are not reviewed after issue or returned when they are no longer needed. We are already seeing a massive financial consequence of that. It was reported last year that the Royal Berkshire NHS foundation trust is losing around £70,000 a year due to patients retaining unused mobility equipment. That might seem like a drop in the ocean for the NHS, but £70,000 could fund another nurse, if we include the on-costs. These things do have consequences.

Despite distributing thousands of items, only 38% of crutches and just 15% of Zimmer frames were returned in 2024. That represents a significant loss of reusable equipment and considerable pressure on NHS resources. It also gets into the mindset of how patients use and value those pieces of equipment and how NHS users think about resources. While I think that we all agree in this Committee that the NHS should be free at the point of use, one of the downsides of that is that patients rarely think about what the cost of their care contributes. I personally think that if people understood how much crutches or medicines cost, they would use them much more usefully. Plenty of times I have spoken to pharmacists in my constituency who tell me that once a patient has unfortunately died, their family then comes to the pharmacy with a sackload of drugs that have never been used. I think that if people understood the cost of those things, they would use them more effectively and with more caution.

This is not an isolated issue but indicative of a wider problem across the system. If we were to introduce firm timelines for provision, we would need to ensure that there is a robust process for recovery, reuse and proper management of that equipment. Therefore, while I am not supportive of amendment 35 or new clause 35, I ask the Government to consider how those proposals could be strengthened by embedding clear expectations about the return and reuse of that equipment so that public funds are used as effectively as possible.

I will now turn to the two amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. Amendment 51 is important because, while I understand the Government’s intention in clause 16, as my hon. Friend has mentioned, her amendment will prevent any artificial delays in treatment by ensuring patients are seen as soon as clinically appropriate, rather than being required to wait a minimum period. It simply protects the principle that care should be based on medical need—which I think we would all agree on—rather than some administrative target. It helps avoid situations where waiting times are managed on paper rather than reduced in reality. That ultimately safeguards patient outcomes and timely access to care.

Moving on to amendment 52, I add my strong support to this amendment, because it goes to the heart of trust, transparency and patient safety in the health system. I have been speaking to constituents and individuals from across the country who have contacted me after a video I posted on my social media that contributed to the exposure of the removal of 351,000 patients from waiting lists in March of this year. The stories I have heard are deeply troubling. Those include patients who have waited years for potentially life-changing treatment only to receive notification late—or in some cases not at all—that they have been removed from the list. For many it came as a shock, while for some it came after months or years of uncertainty. This is not some trivial administrative matter. I would sum up the Minister, when responding to questions on this point, as: “Nothing to see here, this is what always happens.”

There has been such a significant jump over a period of two months that there has to be something going on here. The experiences of patients who have spoken to me about this suggest that that is happening. For those patients it is the difference between treatment and deterioration, between hope and abandonment. It is also undoubtedly affecting more vulnerable and less technologically savvy pockets of society, such as the elderly.

[Dr Johnson]

I should say that I am on a waiting list for treatment myself. The validation process seems to involve phoning people to check if they still need treatment, which after a long period is perhaps not an unreasonable thing to do. However, if they then say yes, they are phoned again a few weeks later; and if they say yes again, they are again phoned a few weeks after that. That puts pressure on people to say, “Okay”. If they are then asked, for example: “Would you be happy to see the consultant so that he can check that you are still listed for the right procedure, given that your condition may have changed and you may want to do something else?” it feels entirely unreasonable to say anything other than “Yes” to that. Would my hon. Friend be surprised to hear that when some people do that they find that they do indeed need the same procedure, but that their waiting time has now gone back down to zero?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend makes two important points. First, of course there has to be a validation process. There has been for a long time, and I do not think that anyone is objecting to that. However, it is a question of how it is being articulated and the people it is focused on. It is being focused on vulnerable people. I have anecdotal evidence from conversations with a significant number of people since I posted that social media video that they feel pressured into coming off the lists. It does not help that trusts have financial incentives to take people off lists. Earlier this month, the Health Service Journal said that three trusts are earning more than £1 million in having people taken off lists. There is no problem with giving trusts a financial reward to do due diligence and validate the lists, but there is potentially a perverse incentive for trusts to try to knock people off them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

The hon. Gentleman is entirely correct, and I think I said some moments ago that I am not against a validation of the list—I think I even said that I am not against some sort of financial incentive to clear the list. My concern is the extraordinary jump in the baseline in the last month or so: 351,000 people have been removed from the list for no apparent reason.

While I have been having anecdotal discussions with patients, my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham has been doing something a little more robust. It would be interesting to see the outcome of her endeavours and researches and to find out exactly what is happening in those areas. Anyone with a modicum of inquiry and common sense would say that the significant jump that we have seen in a single month deserves at least a level of interrogation, which the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket is not allowing in his comments.

[Dr Johnson]

Does my hon. Friend agree that when somebody—particularly a vulnerable person—receives a call asking them whether they would be prepared to see a consultant to see whether they still need treatment, they are aware of all the noise in the media? They are aware that other people are waiting. People do not want to waste NHS resources. The first time, they may think it is a routine process but, when they receive the second or third call, they may start to think to themselves, “They are trying to tell me that they want to do something else. Maybe I don’t need it as much as other people.” They feel obliged and pressurised into saying they do not need the procedure when they do.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The danger in this process—especially the multiple instances of chasing within a period of weeks, which sometimes happens—is that pressure is put on patients. Again, I know anecdotally from patients who have been speaking to me that those who are most compliant—if I can put it like that—and do not want to make a fuss are generally older and vulnerable people, who feel that they are perhaps causing an inconvenience to the system. They see people with, in their view, more serious conditions or a greater need. We need to be very careful about creating perverse incentives, financial or otherwise, to try to take some of those people off the list. As I say, the significant jump that we have seen deserves more scrutiny and inquiry, and that is why I am very supportive of my hon. Friend’s amendment.

We need to understand whether patients are being removed because they no longer require treatment, as the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket said—which is, of course, entirely appropriate—or just to improve targets, present an improved picture of waiting lists, and unlock the financial benefits tied to performance metrics. There is a troubling echo here. We saw similar practices in the 2000s when patients were removed or reclassified in ways that reduced waiting list numbers without genuinely improving access to care; it damaged confidence in the system then and it risks doing so now. What concerns me most is that we may be repeating that pattern. If the Government find they cannot meet their waiting list targets, there is a real danger that the pressure to do so will translate into decisions that, intentionally or not, compromise patient safety and fairness.

[Gregory Stafford]

There have been a number of reports of situations where people have not received care and have died because of that, so I do not see the hon. Member’s point. I think that, with amendment 52, my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham is trying to ensure that when the statistics are published, we can scrutinise the reasons behind them. The hon. Member for Ashford may be entirely right; let us imagine that is the case, and there is no gamifying or pressure going on. Why not allow the public to see that? Why not put to bed the HSJ stories that say there is something fishy going on? He should welcome that level of transparency and scrutiny to back up his argument if he is correct.

[Dr Johnson]

The hon. Member for Ashford talks about social media and social media comments. I wonder if, where the DHSC or the Government have put that waiting lists are falling, my hon. Friend has read any of the comments that come in from the general public below such proclamations.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend tempts me to be political; I will rise to that briefly. Yes, I have seen them and she is right. There is a clear concern that when the Government make all these proclamations about how brilliant the NHS has suddenly become, the reality on the ground does not meet that for many patients. However—I am being gentle now—that is probably not exclusively a problem with this Government. My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston might kill me, but I am sure other Governments have done something similar.

I will go back to amendment 52 because I think it is really important. Let me be clear: it would not prevent people being removed where appropriate; it would simply require the Government to be honest about why. It requires the Secretary of State to publish the number of patients removed from waiting lists each month and, crucially, the reasons why. If everything is being done properly there should be nothing to fear from such transparency, but if there are problems, sunlight is the best disinfectant and the amendment is exactly what we need. We owe it to our constituents and to every patient in the country to ensure that waiting lists are not improved just on paper, or in a press release, or in a social media tweet, or at the expense of the care of real people but actually improved.

If we are to strengthen patient choice, particularly in relation to community services that substitute for or prevent hospital admission and treatment, there are some good measures in clause 16. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said, there are concerns, so I hope the Minister will be able to pick those up in her comments when she winds up.

[Karin Smyth]

There are a number of amendments in the group. Amendment 35 was not moved but as the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon spoke to it, I will comment on that amendment, which is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford (Daniel Francis). Community equipment and wheelchair services are really important to us and—to allay the concerns of the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon—that is why the medium-term planning framework requires that, from this year, all ICBs and community health services must actively manage and reduce waits over 18 weeks and develop a plan to eliminate all 52-week waits. I assure the Committee that we will hold the ICBs for their performance. The community health services situation report has a specific monitoring line, covering children and young people and covering adults, for the wheelchair, orthotics, prosthetics and equipment category. We intend to continue that work following NHS England’s abolition. Consistent national standards will help us to identify the best and the weakest-performing areas, to identify what improvements need to be made and to tackle the longest waits.

Amendment 52 was tabled by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. We are committed to ensuring that all patients receive the NHS care they need in a timely manner, and I recognise the importance that Committee members have placed on that matter. The NHS constitution sets out that patients should start consultant-led treatment within 18 weeks of referral, and it is imperative that the system continues to work towards returning to and then upholding that standard.

I listened with great care to the comments from Members on the Opposition Benches, but I was here—as were you, Dr Huq—during the last couple of Parliaments; I was here as waiting lists rose and rose after 2012, under the previous Government’s stewardship, until they reached 4 million people, all waiting an inordinate amount of time. That Government had no kind of approach to reducing the numbers; they were quite content to have 4 million people on waiting lists, and to never bring forward measures to change that. They were quite content not to challenge NHS England or trust boards about why people across the country in all our constituencies were languishing on those lists. We are determined to resolve that situation.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way?

[Karin Smyth]

I will move on. It is absolutely right that integrated care boards, as local commissioners, retain the ability to manage their services and waiting lists effectively, given the shocking numbers that they have inherited. This is complicated, difficult work: commissioners have to balance demand, capacity and clinical need, and a prohibition such as the one set out in the amendment would threaten to remove legitimate flexibilities that are required at the local level to ensure that services are delivered safely and efficiently.

We are clear that systems should not be setting minimum wait times that exceed the 18-week constitutional standard, but hon. Members will appreciate that not all elements of waiting are inappropriate. In many cases, they reflect clinical pathways, sequencing of care or the need to prioritise the most urgent patients. It is imperative that clinical judgment and urgency remain the key drivers of prioritisation, which is something the amendment threatens to remove.

Turning to amendment 52, I recognise that Members across the House are committed to ensuring that all patients receive the NHS care they need in a timely manner. Validation is a routine and long-standing part of waiting list management by providers. It ensures that patient records are accurate, that patients are on the best pathway to meet their needs and that they still need their appointments. Routinely validated waiting lists will support a return to the 18-week NHS constitutional standard.

Reasons for removal as a result of validation include a patient no longer needing their appointment or there being a duplicate appointment. The previous Government left behind some systems and trusts in such a poor condition that they give out duplicate appointments, and we need to resolve that as part of our work. Other reasons for removal include a patient’s record not being properly updated following treatment or a clinical decision—another sign of the inefficiency that the previous Government left behind.

[Karin Smyth]

Once again, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. He is expert on this issue and has outlined to us some excellent clinical examples. I look forward to debating the single patient record further in Committee.

Importantly, any patient removed from a waiting list should be notified alongside their GP. Data on the total number of removals from waiting lists is published by NHS England. That data includes, but cannot separately identify, patient pathways removed as a result of validation. The Department remains committed to the transparent publication of official waiting list statistics following the abolition of NHS England, although there are no plans to publish more detailed breakdowns. NHS staff are delivering record levels of elective activity, which has enabled us to meet our interim target of 65% of patients being seen within 18 weeks.

[Dr Johnson]

If a person has been waiting more than 18 weeks, the trust calls them and asks them to see a consultant to check whether they still need the appointment or whether they need a different treatment. If, after having that appointment, they are told that they still need the treatment, that same day they go back on the waiting list as if it were day one. Therefore, they have not waited less than 18 weeks, even though the Minister’s statistics might suggest they have. Does she accept that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Edward Argar]

The hon. Member for North Shropshire makes the point very well. Back when I was a Minister, and subsequently shadow Secretary of State, she raised that point with me. The clause is sensible. The Minister articulated concisely and reasonably why it is necessary. It is the nature of any devolution arrangements that a little bit of cross-border co-operation is required along the border to make sure that services work effectively for people. This may have changed, but in my experience the majority of those crossing the border were people from Wales coming for secondary care services in a hospital on the English side of the border, so I think the clause is entirely reasonable.

I echo the hon. Lady’s request: I would be grateful if the Minister updated the Committee on what conversations she has had, particularly with the Welsh Government, but also with the Scottish Government, to ensure that there is reciprocity and that they will put an equivalent provision into their laws to ensure that patients in England are taken into consideration in their healthcare planning.

[Dr Johnson]

The clause imposes a duty on ICBs to have regard to the likely impact of their commissioning decisions on areas of Wales and Scotland close to the border. In some respects, this is like other parts of the Bill—a statement of the obvious regarding a person’s job. Are we suggesting that the Secretary of State, and in particular ICBs, would not consider the effect of their decisions? I hope that they would, but, given that the clause is there, what teeth does it have? What if they do not? Is there any consequence in the Bill if they do not? As others have said, will the Minister confirm whether there is a reciprocal agreement with Wales and Scotland? If there is not, what negotiations has she entered into and what progress are they making?

[Karin Smyth]

As an MP in Bristol, which is not quite on the border, but is pretty close, I absolutely understand. We have relationships with our Welsh colleagues and I have been involved in debates on this matter. The clause ensures that, with the abolition of NHS England, regard is had to to arrangements with our colleagues across the border. We all understand that devolution means that different arrangements will be made in the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. It is not for the UK Government to determine what those are, because they are devolved. However, I assure members of the Committee that across the piece in the Department, and indeed across the Government, regular meetings and conversations on these and other matters with regard to the devolved functions are a regular part of the work that we do.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Transfer schemes in connection with integrated care boards

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

The clause gives the Secretary of State the powers to make transfer schemes where an ICB is being abolished or established, or where the area covered by an ICB is being amended. A transfer scheme ensures that all the staff, property rights, responsibilities and liabilities, other than criminal liabilities, of the ICB being abolished are transferred to another ICB. That ensures that the ICB taking over has the appropriate information and resources to continue to arrange healthcare services for their population. In the past, that has been used to support the restructuring of ICBs to achieve geographical boundary alignment with strategic authorities, as set out in the 10-year health plan. The power also allows transfers to the Secretary of State and, when a new ICB is established, allows the transfer of staff from an NHS trust or foundation trust or from a special health authority.

Following the abolition of NHS England, we expect that Ministers will continue to need to be able to make transfers between ICBs. The clause allows that as needed. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

I have one question for the Minister. Which ICBs does she envisage being abolished, or is this just a precaution for the future?

[Karin Smyth]

It is precautionary to give the power in the event—future-proofing the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Integrated care boards: power to provide assistance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

The clause relates to the power for integrated care boards to provide assistance and support in relation to the health service. It replaces section 14Z48 and, in part, section 12ZA of the National Health Service Act 2006 with a clearer and more flexible power. At present, the various ICB assistance powers are narrower and more confusing. Section 12ZA provides for certain forms of practical assistance in connection with ICBs’ commissioning functions, while section 14Z48 provides a more limited power to make grants or loans. Other specific assistance powers sit elsewhere in the legislation, including in sections 96, 112, 124 and 147, which allow assistance and support for primary medical services, dental, ophthalmic and pharmaceutical services.

Clause 19 replaces all those separate powers with a general power for ICBs to provide assistance or support. The clause will make it clearer when an ICB may support providers, prospective providers or other activity connected with the health service. It will allow an ICB to provide assistance or support to a person who is providing or proposing to provide services as part of the health service. It will also enable an ICB to support a person who is carrying out or proposing to carry out activities that the ICB considers to be conducive to the health service. The assistance may include financial assistance, making available the services of ICB staff, or making available any other ICB resources. The clause also allows assistance to be provided on agreed terms, including terms about payments by or to the integrated care board.

The clause supports ICBs in their role as strategic commissioners. ICBs need to be able to support the development, improvement and resilience of services for their populations. They need to be able to cultivate their provider sector to meet the needs of the people they are responsible for, and they need to be able to do so in innovative and flexible ways. The clause gives them a clearer statutory basis for doing so. This is only an enabling power; it does not require an integrated care board to provide assistance and it does not create any entitlement for a person to receive assistance, nor does it disapply the ordinary legal and financial controls that apply to integrated care boards, or any other element of the usual way in which NHS bodies are overseen and regulated.

The clause should be read alongside clause 9, which creates a broadly analogous assistance power for the Secretary of State. In combination, the clauses support the move to a simpler, more flexible statutory framework that enables everybody, from the centre to ICBs, to discharge their responsibilities in ways that can be adapted to the complexity and multiplicity of circumstances they will inevitably encounter. I commend clause 19 to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

The Government’s explanatory notes state that the clause is intended to give ICBs the ability to provide a broad range of support to those involved in providing or administering the health service. The flexibility there aligns with the Government’s stated vision for more autonomy across the system. I have a couple of questions. If the ICB were to provide support in a way that was out of line with good practice or what is expected by the Department, what would be the recourse? Where will it be possible for right hon. and hon. Members to see the financial expenditure that ICBs make in any such circumstance?

[Karin Smyth]

I thank the shadow Minister for her questions. ICBs are part of the accountability outcomes framework, so they will be monitored in the usual way, and any expenditure by the ICB—and, indeed, by the Department—is recorded in the departmental accounts.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Performance assessments of integrated care boards

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

I recognise the right hon. Gentleman’s expertise as a former Minister in this role. I do not want to mislead him, so I will come back to him in writing on both those points, if that is acceptable. He tempts me to be more prescriptive than I think we intend to be at this point, but I will ensure that he gets a proper answer to both questions. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

As has been said, the clause replaces the part of the NHS Act that requires NHS England to carry out performance assessments of the ICBs and rewrites it so that the Secretary of State has to carry out those assessments. That makes some sense, but, as the Minister said, it takes out the criteria against which the ICBs will be assessed.

I accept what the Minister says—she wants those criteria to be set out more flexibly than can be done in primary legislation—but it is not reasonable or fair to assess people against criteria that they do not know in advance. It will be important, will it not, that ICBs know in advance what those criteria will be? Given what she said to my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston about writing to him, will she commit to writing to us to say not only what the criteria will be at the moment, but how far in advance ICBs can expect to receive them before they are expected to work to them and then be assessed against them?

Will variation be a factor in whether an ICB is deemed to have been performing well or not? We know that there is a tension in the Bill between the Secretary of State’s need to equalise provision and the ICBs’ desire and intention to vary it and innovate. Given that the Secretary of State is a political individual, how will the assessment process be conducted in a way that gives ICBs and their leaders confidence that there will not be political interference in it?

[Karin Smyth]

Of course ICBs will know how they are going to be assessed; that will be in guidance in the usual way. In the last two years, in planning terms, we have brought forward all that work for the system—including on the finances—in order that the system works more efficiently, and we will continue to seek to do that.

The hon. Member, as she has several times in the Committee, returned to the question of variation. When there is devolution and local systems are different, there will be a degree of variation, as I have said. In performance management terms, where there is unwarranted variation, we will seek justification and understanding of that. Sometimes, there is variation for geographical reasons. There may also be historical structural reasons in a local system, or temporary reasons why performance is variable. We would look at that as part of that general work.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Membership of integrated care boards

[Dr Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 21, page 15, leave out from line 33 to line 6 on page 16 and insert—

“(2) The constitution must provide for the ordinary members appointed as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b) to include—

(a) at least one person nominated by one or more NHS trusts or NHS foundation trusts which provide services under arrangements made by the integrated care board, in accordance with regulations made under sub-paragraph (2A);

(b) at least one person nominated by a body representative of providers of primary medical services whose area falls wholly or mainly within the area of the integrated care board, in accordance with regulations made under sub-paragraph (2A);

(c) at least one person appointed by a local authority whose area falls wholly or partly within the area of the integrated care board; and

(d) at least one member nominated by the mayor of each mayoral strategic authority whose area coincides with, or includes the whole or any part of, the integrated care board's area (if any).

(2A) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the nomination of ordinary members under sub-paragraph (2)(a) and (b), including provision about which NHS trusts, NHS foundation trusts or representative bodies are entitled to make nominations.

(3) The constitution must set out the process for making nominations under sub-paragraph (2).

(4) A person making a nomination under sub-paragraph (2) must have regard to any guidance published by the Secretary of State as to the selection of candidates.”

This amendment modifies Clause 21 so that, rather than replacing the existing mandatory membership requirements in Schedule 1B to the National Health Service Act 2006 with a requirement for mayoral representation alone, the new sub-paragraph (2) reinstates and consolidates the full range of required ordinary members.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 25 in clause 21, page 15, line 38, at end insert—

“(2A) The constitution must also provide for the ordinary members appointed as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b) to include at least one member nominated jointly by the local authorities whose areas coincide with, or include the whole or any part of, the integrated care board's area.”

This amendment would require integrated care boards to have a member jointly nominated by local authorities from within the board's area, as is currently the case but would otherwise be removed by clause 21.

Amendment 45, in clause 21, page 15, line 38, at end insert—

“(2A) The constitution must provide for the ordinary members as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b) to include at least one member nominated by local primary care providers.”

This amendment would ensure that ICBs have to have representation from primary care providers.

Amendment 26, in clause 21, page 16, line 3, leave out from “mayor” to “sub-paragraph (2)” on line 4 and insert

“or local authority nominating an ordinary member as mentioned in sub-paragraphs (2) and (2A).”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 25 and would require a local authority involved in nominating a member of an integrated care board to have regard to guidance published by the Secretary of State.

Amendment 27, in clause 21, page 16, line 9, at end insert—

“‘local authority’ has the meaning given by section 2B(5);”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 25 and 26 and defines the term “local authority”.

Clause stand part.

[Dr Johnson]

At present, integrated care boards will have a chair, a chief executive and at least three further ordinary members. Those three ordinary members will include a representative of the NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts in the area, someone from the primary medical services in the area and someone nominated by the local authority areas within the ICB area. Under the clause, the requirement for those individuals is replaced with a requirement to have someone from each of the mayoral authorities.

Because of the order in which the Government have done this—removing half the budget from the ICBs, which has caused them to merge in a way that is not coherent with the Government’s not-yet-complete local government reorganisation—we have a situation where representation is not even. For example, in my ICB area the Mayor of Greater Lincolnshire and the Mayor of the East Midlands will each be able to choose someone to represent them on the board, but the proportions of the population are not even. Lincolnshire will be over-represented, which is not an issue for my constituents, but it may be for those from Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. Likewise, the northern part of Greater Lincolnshire, which is in a different region, has a small population relative to its ICB. Some mayors will therefore have representation that is not proportionate to their population size.

There is surely a risk that the next step will be for the Government to say they want to make things more even, with ICBs working in relation to mayoral authority areas. Yesterday, the Minister for Care suggested at his appearance before the Health and Social Care Committee that the ICBs should be aligned with strategic authorities, but the only way in which that can happen once the Government have decided where the strategic authorities will be is if things are changed once again.

That brings ongoing costs—financial costs, opportunity cost for service development, and cost to the people delivering these services. The people working hard to try to deliver the Government’s plan find themselves and their jobs threatened and chopped and changed all the time. We heard evidence that the concentration on reorganisation rather than service delivery, provision and development is causing distress to those people.

We also heard about the effect on social care, which, certainly in Lincolnshire and in other places, is delivered by the upper-tier local authority, but not all mayors have any responsibility for health—our mayor does not. We will therefore have someone who is not responsible for health on the ICB while someone responsible for delivering social care will have their seat on the ICB removed. I am afraid that I simply do not understand that. I watched through several times the Minister for Care’s Select Committee appearance, and I still do not understand the rationale. I will be grateful if the Minister for Secondary Care could explain that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

The clause will replace the constitutional requirements contained in paragraph 8(2) to (4) of schedule 1B to the 2006 Act so that “ordinary members” must now include at least one member nominated by the mayor of each mayoral strategic authority whose area coincides with or includes the whole or any part of the ICB’s area. The ICB’s constitution must set out a process for making such a nomination, and a mayor nominating an ordinary member must have regard to any guidance published by the Secretary of State, following the abolition of NHS England, as to the selection of candidates.

The definition of a local authority in paragraph 8(7) of schedule 1B to the 2006 Act will be replaced with the definition of a mayoral strategic authority. Sub-paragraph (1), outlining the process to determine the appointment of an ordinary member, and sub-paragraph (6), specifying that one ordinary member must have knowledge and experience in mental health services, are both retained. The clause therefore represents a clear shift in the structure of integrated care boards and, in my view, an unwelcome one, by removing the requirement for representation of GPs, local authorities and NHS trusts, while introducing a requirement for representation from mayoral authorities.

Those are not minor features of the system. The inclusion of local authorities in particular was designed to ensure that decision making reflected local needs and supported genuine integration between health and social care.

For as long as I can remember, Governments of all colours have talked about bringing health and social care together. Some have been more successful at that than others, but there should be agreement across the House that much more needs to be done. With this clause, the Government seem to be taking at least one step back—I would say numerous steps—from trying to bring health and social care together. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, I watched the Health and Social Care Committee’s discussions with the Minister for Care yesterday, and I too cannot fathom why the Government are doing it. I hope that it is an oversight and that, once the Minister goes away and reflects on it, she will look to table some amendments further down the line—I am sure that she will vote against ours today—so that we can bring these matters back.

I am especially concerned about the removal of local authority representation. We are effectively asking local authorities to continue to deliver vital services while removing their voice in the room where strategic decisions about health and social care are made. That raises a fundamental question about how the integration is intended to work in practice. There is also a broader concern about the direction of travel. We are moving away from place-based representation towards a model that places greater emphasis on these mayoral structures, yet the legislation is not prescriptive about who the mayors appoint, and colleagues within and without this Committee have already raised concerns that there is a gap in the understanding at the centre about how local authorities operate in practice.

That brings me to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham and the hon. Member for Winchester. I apologise; the Minister said that she did not want a geographic tour of our constituencies, but I am afraid that she will get one now. Part of my constituency sits in Hampshire in the Hampshire and Isle of Wight ICB, and as the hon. Member for Winchester said, we may or may not have mayoral elections in a year’s time. Hampshire county council has launched a judicial review against the proposed local government reorganisation; if that is successful, or even if it delays the process, this Bill will come into effect without our having a mayor, and there will be no representation for anybody on this board. We need clarity from the Minister on who will represent the people on the board if there is no mayoral authority. I would say that local authorities—Hampshire county council in this case—should remain on that board, at least until there is a mayoral authority.

[Dr Johnson]

Where a mayor is from one political party and local authorities are run by different political parties, the mayor, as part of the ICB, will be able to make decisions about spending done by authorities that are run by different parties. That will surely create a political conflict, or at least the potential for one.

Health Bill (Sixth sitting)

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 25th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we begin, I remind Members to switch all electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. As Members will have noticed, I have taken my jacket off, so please feel free to take yours off—it is hot in here.

Clause 12

Commissioning functions: responsibility

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 12, page 10, line 10, at end insert—

“(4A) Before making regulations under subsection (1)(b) that would alter the range of services or facilities which the Secretary of State is required to commission nationally, the Secretary of State must—

(a) prepare and publish a commissioning transition plan in accordance with subsection (4B),

(b) consult in accordance with subsection (4C), and

(c) lay the commissioning transition plan before Parliament.

(4B) The commissioning transition plan must set out—

(a) a description of each service or facility that the Secretary of State proposes to add to, or remove from, national commissioning responsibility under section 3B(1)(b), and the reasons for each proposed change;

(b) a description of the body or bodies to which commissioning responsibility for each such service or facility would transfer and the basis on which that body is considered capable of commissioning that service or facility effectively;

(c) an assessment of the impact of each proposed change on patients who rely on the affected services or facilities, including—

(i) patients with rare diseases or conditions,

(ii) patients whose needs cannot be met by a single integrated care board area, and

(iii) patients who may face differential impacts on account of a protected characteristic within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010;

(d) the transitional arrangements to be put in place to ensure continuity of service for patients during any transfer of commissioning responsibility;

(e) the workforce and capacity implications for the bodies to which commissioning responsibility would transfer;

(f) the financial arrangements for the transfer of commissioning responsibility, including the funding to be allocated to receiving bodies; and

(g) the proposed timetable for implementation of each change.

(4C) Consultation under this subsection must include—

(a) integrated care boards that would assume commissioning responsibility under the proposed changes;

(b) NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts providing the services or facilities affected by the proposed changes;

(c) patient groups and representative organisations for patients likely to be affected by the proposed changes;

(d) clinicians with expertise in the services or facilities affected; and

(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4D) Consultation under subsection (4C) must—

(a) run for a period of not less than twelve weeks, and

(b) begin no earlier than the date on which the specialised commissioning transition plan is published under subsection (4A)(a).

(4E) Following the consultation period, the Secretary of State must publish a response to the consultation that—

(a) summarises the representations received,

(b) sets out the Secretary of State's response to the key issues raised, and

(c) describes any amendments made to the specialised commissioning transition plan in light of consultation responses.

(4F) No regulations under section 3B(1)(b) that alter the range of nationally commissioned services or facilities may be made until at least 60 days have elapsed after the consultation response required by subsection (4E) has been published.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to publish and consult on a commissioning transition plan before making any regulations under the new section 3B of the National Health Service Act 2006 (inserted by Clause 12) that would alter which services are commissioned nationally.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 13 stand part.

[Dr Johnson]

In essence, the clause confers the commissioning duties of NHS England on to the Secretary of State, because NHS England is being abolished. In that respect, it is quite straightforward. In the existing National Health Service Act 2006, which is to be amended, section 3 sets out the duties of integrated care boards as to commissioning health services, and section 3A similarly. Section 4 is about NHS England’s responsibility for the provision of high-security psychiatric services. In essence, clause 12 replaces the references to “NHS England” in sections 3 and 3A with “the Secretary of State”. The ICBs now must act consistently with the discharge by the Secretary of State of the section 1 duty to promote a comprehensive health service. That is consistent with the aims of the Bill. I have concerns, which I have expressed previously, about how the Government ensure that the Secretary of State can make those decisions fairly, on the basis of clinical need, rather than because of pressure from a lobby group, a celebrity campaign or such like, but again, that seems consistent.

The clause also replaces entirely section 3B of the 2006 Act. Under the previous section 3B, the Secretary of State could direct NHS England to commission the service nationally; the proposed new section 3B confers a regulation-making power to require the Secretary of State to arrange nationally services for members of the armed forces and their families specifically, as well as such services or facilities as may be prescribed. Perhaps the Minister will comment on what sort of services or facilities might be prescribed under that proposed new section.

In doing that, the Secretary of State must have regard to the number of people needing the service, the cost and the number of possible providers. That reflects a balance. Some services, such as hip replacements, are very common. They occur in all areas of the country, perhaps at different rates, but they are broadly a common service. Accident and emergency is another common service. Some people, however, have the misfortune to have a condition that is rare and requires specialist care, in small numbers. That needs to be commissioned on a more national basis, because of the need for specific expertise among commissioners and health professionals.

In subsection (4), proposed new section 3B(5) modifies section 4 of the 2006 Act so that the duty to arrange high-security psychiatric services transfers from NHS England to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State gains a new power to direct the providers of those bodies—but only non-public bodies—if he is satisfied that the provider is already licensed under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and would be required by its licence to obey the direction.

In one respect, as I said, it is necessary to transfer powers to Secretary of State, now that NHS England is to be abolished, but I have a couple of questions. NHS England published a direct commissioning update on 2 March, which describes a new commissioning structure. At the moment, NHS England commissions regional NHS England bodies and the ICBs at a more local level. The update suggests that we will have the ICBs commissioning services, and the Secretary of State instead of NHS England, but that each of the seven regions will have an office for pan-ICB commissioning, known as an OPIC, to support ICB commissioning services—both standard commissioning and at-scale commissioning in some instances.

How is that more efficient than the old structure? Are we just going to see the people working in the regions of NHS England get made redundant, at a huge cost to the state, only to be re-employed by the OPIC? What is the estimated cost of that? Is that the intention? We are going to either lose the expertise of the regional advisers in NHS England or end up re-employing them having paid them redundancy. Can the Minister explain which she thinks it is?

There is a hugely long list of specialist nationally commissioned services. Can the Minister guarantee that those services will not be moved locally? The ICBs only have so much capacity. It will be a challenge for an ICB to deal with conditions that may affect only one or two people in its area in a given year, particularly given the 50% budget cut; obviously, it will prioritise things that affect more of its population. People who have the rare conditions that are currently commissioned nationally may be worried that they will not get the same level of service that they are getting at the moment.

The direct commissioning update talks about prisoners and the justice system. At the moment, NHS England works directly with the Ministry of Justice to commission healthcare for those in the justice system. That includes adults in the custodial system, children in secure children’s homes, non-custodial care, sexual assault and abuse centres, and abuse referral centres.

There are eight high-security category A prisons in England. Instead of being specially commissioned as one batch, they are going to be commissioned specially by their local ICBs. Where are the ICBs going to get the advice and expertise to do that? Dealing with category A prisoners is about not only managing the prisoner and providing them with healthcare, but keeping the people providing that healthcare safe while they are working. This is a specialist area. I am interested to understand why the Minister thinks it will be managed best locally. If, under her new system, it is to be managed locally and the prisoner’s home address ICB is different from the prison address ICB, where will the funding move from and to? Will the prison’s ICB be reimbursed by the prisoner’s home ICB or will it bear the brunt locally?

What will happen to the sexual abuse referral centres? It is perfectly possible, particularly in some areas of the country, that an individual is sexually assaulted in one ICB area, lives in another and reports a crime in a third. Will local commissioning have an impact on where the individual needs to go for their pretty intimate examination and assessment? Has the Minister considered that? What is her view?

What happens to healthcare for migrants? That is another area that is dealt with partly by the justice system at the moment. Can the Minister update us on that? There are over 100,000 people in asylum accommodation, including 30,000 in hotels, and many members of her party are keen to welcome even more. Who will be responsible for commissioning their care?

The Government are also delegating the child health information services, which are the record of whether children have been vaccinated and such like. Given that they are planning to have a single patient record and the electronic red book, why do they want the services to be commissioned locally rather than nationally? Do they expect commissioning for a uniform service, such as a screening service, to lead to differential outcomes—and if it does not, what is the rationale for it?

A particular example is blood spot screening. The Minister will be aware that there was a Westminster Hall debate earlier in the week on spinal muscular atrophy, in which blood spot screening was mentioned. Metachromatic leukodystrophy is another condition for which people want blood spot screening. If blood spot screening is to be commissioned on a local ICB level, will ICBs be required to do it in line with Government guidelines, or will they be able to vary the service they provide to those patients?

By delegating more to ICBs, Ministers are creating variation. On one hand, they want local differentiation and variation; on the other hand, they have put in a clause that requires the Secretary of State to limit local variation. Again, there is a tension there. Will the Minister talk about that?

Moving to some technical points, I noticed that “hospital premises” is defined in section 4 of the 2006 Act, but I cannot find it defined in the Bill. Under the original section 3B of that Act, the Secretary of State had to obtain appropriate advice before making regulations about commissioning services; when services were commissioned locally or nationally, the Secretary of State had to take expert advice. That seems like a sensible thing that we want the Secretary of State to do. One would hope that if the Secretary of State were doing his job properly, he would do that, but it seems a little odd that that requirement has been taken out, as though there is an intention for the Secretary of State not to do that. I would appreciate the Minister’s comments on that.

Proposed new section 3B provides that a direction can be given to a person other than a public authority regarding high-security psychiatric services. The Minister knows that high-security psychiatric services are currently provided at Broadmoor, Ashworth and Rampton, which are still stand-alone units run by NHS providers. Does she plan to ask a private provider—someone other than a public authority—to run those facilities? If not, what is the purpose of the clause? There is a secure children’s unit in Sleaford in my constituency. What will happen to those children if it is commissioned locally, and where will the money flow from?

We asked in a previous sitting whether the Minister thought that the new Prime Minister will want to continue with this Bill. When it comes to the OPICs, in essence the Government will be firing staff from one job, paying them redundancy, and rehiring them, potentially on different terms and conditions, to do a similar job in the OPICs. Is the Minister aware that the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) used to speak out against firing and rehiring staff, and abolishing and recreating organisations? That is essentially what is happening, so will she have to abandon these changes?

[Dave Robertson (Lichfield) (Lab)]

We have heard a few times about Conservative fears about redundancy payments and so on. Why did they not add NHS England to the list of organisations covered by the modification order when they had the opportunity to do so? Is the hon. Lady aware of a reason why that did not happen when the Conservatives were in government?

[Dr Johnson]

I am afraid I do not know the answer to that question. The key point is that it is not logical to abolish a three-tier structure and recreate it with taxpayers’ money to do exactly the same thing. If NHS England is replaced by the Secretary of State, the regional NHS England is replaced by the OPICs and the ICBs are at the bottom—the more local tier—what has changed? The middle tier will be doing the same thing.

[Dave Robertson]

The modification order is a piece of legislation that is often used in the public sector. It means that when people from a lot of public sector organisations are made redundant and find alternative employment at another state-funded organisation, they are not entitled to a redundancy payment. During their 14 years in power, it would have been entirely possible for the Conservatives to add NHS England to the list of organisations covered by the modification order. That would have prevented the costs that the hon. Lady has mentioned several times. It just seems like they did not take the opportunity to do that, and now they are saying that they should have done that when they were in government.

[Dr Johnson]

But we were not planning to abolish NHS England, so we had no reason to worry about redundancy. We were not planning a large-scale abolition—the largest that has ever happened in this country.

Amendment 57 would require the Secretary of State to publish and consult on commissioning transition plans before making regulations under proposed new section 3B that alter which services are commissioned nationally. It is a very reasonable amendment that would just mean that people get answers. It would mean that vulnerable people with unusually rare or highly complex conditions requiring regional or even national treatment could understand any changes the Government planned to make. We know that some services are delivered in only three or four centres in the UK. If a patient lives far from a centre, and suddenly that centre is closed, that can have huge travel and service implications, which can create huge distress and worry and make care worse.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Morgan (North Shropshire) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Lewell. In general, the Liberal Democrats support clauses 12 and 13. We think that local decision making and community empowerment in the NHS, including on commissioning decisions, is the right thing to be doing.

However, I echo some of the concerns of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, particularly on specialist commissioning. I declare an interest as vice-chair of the spinal cord injury all-party parliamentary group. We are concerned that expertise in low-volume, very specialist concerns will be lost if the commissioning is pushed out to multiple ICBs. My understanding is that specialist commissioning sat with NHS England in the first place because of concern that multiple commissioning groups would struggle to deal with low-volume, complex issues.

The president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists warned earlier this month that the new commissioning structure lacks mental health experts, with only one senior mental health lead across the seven new regional commissioning hubs taking specialised services from NHS England. Equally, the chief executive of the Derby and Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, and Nottingham and Nottinghamshire ICB cluster has said that it does not look like there will be a requirement for senior mental health expertise in reorganising ICBs. Will the Minister reassure us that when the Department designs which specialist services will be pushed back down to ICBs and which will be retained centrally, it will be minded to listen to representations from experts in the sector?

There are excellent services located geographically by accident—for example, the orthopaedic hospital in my constituency and the veterans service that goes with it. Both are highly valued, but they need specialist commissioning at national level to be utilised properly and to provide the best outcomes for patients. I would be grateful for the Minister’s reassurance on those points.

[Dr Johnson]

I agree with much of what the hon. Lady has said. Does she therefore support amendment 57, which would ensure that such a consultation takes place?

[Helen Morgan]

Yes, we would support the amendment, which is a reasonable way to get there, but an assurance from the Minister that the Department will consider specialist commissioning and really think that through properly before the powers are delegated to ICBs would be sufficient.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

Clause 12 inserts new section 3B into the National Health Service Act 2006, re-establishing the responsibility of the Secretary of State to commission services. Although we intend ICBs to commission the vast majority of services, as we discussed this morning, we will use this regulation-making power to set out the small number of specialised services that the Secretary of State will be responsible for. That may include, for example, proton beam therapy, alongside a small number of other specialist services not currently suitable for ICB commissioning, such as gender dysphoria services and clinical genomics. By their nature, those are services to which national commissioning is appropriate because, for example, they have fewer patients or providers, greater or changeable costs, or they require specialist clinical expertise and input. Having a regulation-making power allows us to future-proof the system and update the regulations when new services or treatments emerge, or when services become cheaper or mainstream and therefore sit better with ICBs.

I now turn to amendment 57, which was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. I recognise that any change to the way these services are commissioned matters enormously to the patients who depend on them. The hon. Lady used the word “worried”, and I understand that. Any change must be made with the greatest of care. However, the amendment would require the Secretary of State, before any regulations are made that alter the range of nationally commissioned services and regardless of the scale of the change, to publish a transition plan covering seven prescribed matters, to consult five prescribed categories of persons for a minimum of 12 weeks, to publish a response to that consultation and then to wait a minimum of 60 days before the regulations can be made.

As I have said, I understand and share the concern about continuity of care and the careful allocation of responsibility that lies behind it, but the proposals in amendment 57 are not the right way to address that concern. It proposes a fixed sequence of steps with minimum time periods that would apply to every change without exception. Taken together, the prescribed steps would add the better part of half a year to any change, including changes that are minor or technical, or that, for reasons of clinical safety, need to be expedited. That would create delays for patients and uncertainty for the wider system over where commissioning responsibility sits.

I would like to offer assurance on some of the concerns raised today. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon and Consett, who has spoken to me regularly about her concerns, for the work that she does in this area. I also commend the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for North Shropshire, for her work on spinal cord injuries. I have met the chair of the APPG on spinal cord injury to discuss this topic. I would like to thank Bristol Councillor Kelvin Blake, who has a spinal cord injury and who for many years has impressed on me the difficulties faced by people with spinal cord injuries who are wheelchair dependent. I commend the work of people with these conditions who, as the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said, struggle through a system that they should not have to struggle through. We want to make sure that these changes are assured, and I commit to working with hon. Members to do that as the Bill goes through.

I can assure the Committee that any significant change to nationally commissioned services will be accompanied by proportionate and appropriate engagement with patients, clinicians and the bodies affected. Change will always proceed according to appropriate transition arrangements. Each service, as hon. Members know, has very different patient needs and commissioning requirements, and demands different skills to commission effectively. The framework the Government are proposing will enable the Department to manage these processes flexibly and proportionately.

The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham asked about arrangements for new organisations. In a changing organisation where people are coming forward for redundancy and in a new organisation that is taking shape, it is important that the executive looks at all redundancy requests and changing needs with regard for critical business infrastructure and the retention of skills. That is what we are currently doing.

The hon. Lady also asked about funding. The Bill allows the Secretary of State to set out which ICB pays for whom, and there are clear rules for people in prisons and those not registered with a GP currently under the guidance of court, which is called “Who Pays?” There are also long-standing processes for ICBs to pay each other as needed. The hon. Lady also asked about high security mental health services; I can assure her that we have no plans to ask the private sector to provide services. The power to direct has been updated to ensure that directions would bite on non-NHS providers if that changes in future.

Clause 13, which is part of this group, is a technical clause that permits the Secretary of State or an integrated care board to confer on a person discretion in relation to anything that is to be provided under the commissioning arrangement. In practice, this means that they could undertake some activities traditionally carried out by a commissioner, such as reviewing how services are provided for a population and designing the way that those services will be delivered within the parameters set by the commissioner. These activities would be clearly set out and measured under the contract, and the commissioner would retain overall responsibility for the delivery of their functions. Currently, integrated care boards are already permitted to do this, and with the transfer of NHS England’s commissioning powers to the Secretary of State, we propose a similar approach for services that are commissioned nationally.

I hope that I have been able to reassure the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, and that she will withdraw her amendment. I commend clauses 12 and 13 to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Unfortunately, the Minister’s reassurances have not convinced me. In relation to change, “significant” means various things to different people. As for “proportionate”, what is “proportionate” to one person is not necessarily “proportionate” to another.

Amendment 57 makes reasonable provision for a situation in which there is a change from national to local commissioning, or from local to—mostly, it is from national to local commissioning. Therefore, I would like to push it to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

The clause will ensure that stability for contractors and patients is maintained with important safeguards, while further empowering ICBs to create a stronger and more integrated primary care system. I commend the clause and schedule, as amended, to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 14 is very straightforward: it states that schedule 1

“confers functions on integrated care boards in relation to commissioning primary care services…transfers related functions from NHS England to the Secretary of State, and”—

perhaps most interestingly—

“contains other amendments relating to primary care services.”

Schedule 1 essentially makes the following changes to the NHS Act 2006: it makes ICBs responsible for commissioning pharmacy services instead of NHS England; it amends section 99 to make ICBs responsible for commissioning dental services instead of NHS England; it amends section 83 to make ICBs responsible for commissioning primary medical services such as general practice instead of NHS England; and it amends section 115 to make ICBs responsible for commissioning ophthalmic services.

Largely, this change is formalising existing delegation and the risk of disruption is therefore relatively low. Local commissioners can tailor decisions to local need, and it is better if decisions are taken closer to users. However, there are a few other things in there as well. Paragraph 12(2) amends section 97 of the 2006 Act containing local medical committees, which are statutory committees. The way it is phrased,

“the whole or part of the ICB’s area”,

does not allow for overlap. Is that the Government’s intention? The Government, in a broader sense, talk about the strategic authorities and having the mayoral authority level involved in the ICB. But in Lincolnshire, for example, an area that I represent part of, the local medical committee could not work in conjunction with the mayoral authority under this legislation, as far as I read it, because it essentially covers two ICB areas and two regions.

The mayoral authority is the Greater Lincolnshire mayoral authority. That includes Lincolnshire’s upper-tier area, the Lincolnshire county council area. It also includes the areas around Scunthorpe, Grimsby and Immingham, which fall into the Yorkshire region as opposed to the midlands region, and therefore not a whole or part of any given ICB area. I wonder whether the Minister has any comment on whether that was the intention, because it is also the case with paragraph 24(2) of schedule 1, which amends section 113 of the 2006 Act on local dental committees. Again, although the ambition stated and discussed in the Health and Social Care Committee yesterday by the Minister for Care, who is responsible for primary care, was that ICBs were to be covered at strategic level, that would not be possible for local medical committees or local dental committees under my reading of paragraph 12(2).

[Gregory Stafford]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this Bill would have been the perfect time to align health commissioning services with local government structures and that the fact that these structures are being created totally without the new local government structures is not just an oversight, but a potential problem with the whole Bill? Does she also agree—I think that she was outlining this already, but I want to ensure that the Minister is clear on it—that the Government still have a chance to amend the Bill to ensure that the commissioning structures and commissioning areas outlined in the Bill neatly map out to the new local government areas? In relation to, for example, the current Hampshire and Isle of Wight ICB, Hampshire is potentially being split up into a number of local government areas. I am against the way it is being split up, but if the Government are pressing ahead with it, this would have been the perfect opportunity to align commissioning with those areas. The problem is that we will now have a situation in which they do not match up, and the problems that my hon. Friend has outlined in her speech thus far will come to the fore.

[Dr Johnson]

Of course, my hon. Friend is right. One challenge with the Bill is that although not all the measures are a problem individually, the way they are being brought in is a problem. The planning and organisation that has gone into it has not been coherent. A 50% cut has been made to the budgets of ICBs, which has required many of them to merge, but that has been done before the local government reorganisation has been finished, which means that ICBs have been melded together in a way that is not the same as the local government reorganisation.

Let me again give the example of Lincolnshire. Lincolnshire had an excellent ICB, run by chief executive John Turner. That has now merged with Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire form the East Midlands mayoralty, but Lincolnshire ICB, as was, forms part but not all of the Lincolnshire mayoralty—which, as I said, also includes part of what was the Yorkshire region. Because the cuts were done before the local authority reorganisation, and the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing, we have ended up with an incoherent pattern, which does not help, particularly for social care services that are delivered by local authorities. We will come back to that when we talk about who is on the ICB. The risk is that we end up spending money doing this twice—being forced to do it at short notice, because of the 50% cuts brought in overnight by Government, and then doing it again to try to sort out the mess and bring things back into line with the new local authorities as and when it is decided what they will be.

Going on to the pharmaceutical arrangements—I should probably declare at this point that my brother is a rural dispensing GP—I share the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket in relation to rural dispensing GPs. Let me give the Minister an example from my constituency. The Cliff Villages medical practice was an excellent medical practice. However, there was a doctor retirement and the illness of a doctor, and as a result the service reduced in quality quite substantially.

The ICB was working alongside the surgery and the one remaining practice doctor—not swiftly enough, it must be said. What happened in the end was that the Care Quality Commission came in, found that the service was really not good enough and closed the surgery down overnight, in the middle of the week. It was closed with immediate effect and there were no appointments for any patients in my constituency. Then, because the surgery had been closed, the ICB worked very hard to get a new practice in straightaway, and it got that opened on the Monday, which was pretty quick in the circumstances; but people lost their dispensing GP.

Living in a rural area—I have a dispensing GP myself, living in a rural area—people can go to the doctor’s, see the doctor and, if the doctor perhaps says, “You need some antibiotics,” they can go back to the waiting room and sit there for 10 minutes, be given the antibiotics and then leave. That is significantly more helpful to a rural constituent than having to drive eight or nine miles into the centre of town, park the car, find somewhere to get the prescription and then go all the way home again, which would take much longer. People really value that service—I saw how much when I held a public meeting with the ICB and the new provider to talk about what had happened at the surgery, and 250 people turned up to an evening event in the village hall at short notice. It is hugely important to people.

Will the changes allow the Secretary of State to step in in such circumstances, where the medical contract has been lost due to that cut-off by the CQC? Will that sudden loss of service be able to be replaced with a new dispensing service? Could Ministers have therefore given dispensing rights to the new provider? At the moment, those rights are not transferable, and it means that the only way that my constituents who live in that area and attend that practice can maintain dispensing rights is either to move house—perhaps to next door and back again, but they have to move house—or to change practice immediately, that same day, to another dispensing practice. To be honest, that seems ridiculous. Could the Minister make any comment on how the provisions in the Bill will help that situation and what her views are?

I am confused by new clause 23 and new schedule 1; the Minister has introduced them later than the rest of the Bill, but they seem quite significant. They would move pharmacy appeals from the first-tier tribunal to an NHS body specified by regulations made by the Secretary of State. I presume the regulations are not yet written, so we do not know what form that would take, but the first-tier tribunal is part of an independent judicial system and the appeals will now be under political control, within the Department.

Could the Minister explain why they think that is fair? Why do the Government want to do that? Is it just about saving money? How will the judgments made by that new authority be properly enforceable and give people confidence, given the change from the first-tier tribunal in the judicial system to something more politically controlled?

I move on to new clause 2, which would require the Secretary of State to establish within six months a scheme to give patients the right to a GP appointment within seven days of seeking one, or 24 hours if urgent. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on that and how she thinks it could be achieved.

Modelling by the Health Foundation suggests that 6,500 full-time equivalent GPs—37,800 in total—will be needed by 2030-31 to meet greater clinical need. We have already talked about the doubling of medical school places; I presume the Minister has sought correction since we last spoke on whether the Government have a plan to double those places or not, but the Government are not on track to have that number of GPs. Is it simply that they do not have the resources to deliver it? I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments.

[Helen Morgan]

With permission, I will explain to the shadow Minister our votes on amendment 57, which she pressed to a vote. I was reassured by the commitment the Minister made to consult widely on those commissioning changes, so the Liberal Democrats switched our vote from support to abstain.

I move on to new clause 2, our amendment in this group, which the shadow Minister was just discussing. It would require the Secretary of State to introduce a scheme to ensure patients have the right to see a GP or another appropriate clinician within their GP practice within seven days.

The NHS constitution currently confers rights on patients when they are considered really important. There are, for example, rights within the NHS constitution around receiving cancer diagnoses and treatment. We felt that there was a gap on access to GPs. Given the Government’s stated aim of transferring more care into the community, which we fully support, and given the observation in the Darzi report that more and more money is being spent on secondary rather than primary care, we think it is really important to confer the right on patients to be able to access primary care when they need to.

As the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham pointed out, this measure would require a large number of additional GPs and would therefore not be achievable overnight, but over the course of a Parliament. The Liberal Democrat plan includes recruiting and retaining an extra 8,000 GPs, relieving pressure on the rest of the health service and enabling that shift into the community. When patients—

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Johnson]

We Conservatives share the hon. Lady’s desire to ensure that patients get their appointments as soon as they need them to be had, but she is talking about a difference between urgent appointments, within 24 hours, and non-urgent appointments, within a week. Who is going to make the decision about whether the appointment is urgent? Will it be the clinician? Will it be the patient themselves? Has she thought about where that responsibility lies?

[Helen Morgan]

Yes, I have thought about where that responsibility lies. It clearly lies with the triaging process within the GP surgery. I do not think any of us envisage somebody phoning up about a child with a cold and saying, “I consider this to be urgent,” and getting an appointment within 24 hours, but I would imagine somebody from the surgery saying, “Please describe the symptoms to me,” and then, if they detected something more serious, saying, “That is urgent and you do need to come in within 24 hours.” The point of new clause 2 is to clarify in the NHS constitution that some services require parity with others. We have already established legal rights under the NHS constitution for certain types of treatment, and this puts GP access on the same level. We think that that is important.

I am conscious of time, so I will move on to new clause 52, which is about dental deserts. Everyone is horrified by dental deserts and by “DIY dentistry”, a phrase that means—let us face it—people using pliers to extract their teeth and super glue to reattach crowns, and cavities filled with household adhesives. More than 5 million children did not see a dentist at all in 2025. That is a stark failure. Dental care is as important as care for other parts of the body, in particular when most of what goes wrong in dentistry is preventable. We should absolutely focus on prevention, and that is in line with the Government’s aims to move from sickness to prevention.

New clause 52 is about our £750 million dental rescue plan to guarantee access to an NHS dentist for anyone needing an urgent or emergency appointment, which I hope would end that awful DIY dentistry. The plan needs to be achieved through bringing dentists back from the private sector, fixing the contract, using flexible commissioning wherever necessary and introducing an emergency scheme. For example, the emergency dental scheme in Shropshire, operated by the community dental practice, enables people who have urgent need and cannot register with an NHS dentist to get the care that they need when they need it. I urge the Minister to take our new clauses on board and to ensure that people get the care they need when they need it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Johnson]

One thing that my hon. Friend mentions is the Government’s stated intention to bring things closer to home, as opposed to the reality of the Bill as drafted. Does he agree with me that the document that explains what will happen to the commissioning of specialist services, and that talks about seven regions and how ICBs could collaborate within those regions, might imply that the Government are looking forward to having seven areas in which most commissioning takes place? These are even larger areas than have been described in the mergers so far.

[Gregory Stafford]

It is for the Minister to clarify that point, but I share my hon. Friend’s concern. It is ironic that we seem to be heading back towards the strategic health authorities of an earlier age. Things in the NHS are neither created nor destroyed; they just go round and round and round. I think we may end up being back where we were 15 or 20 years ago, in an ever decreasing cycle of spending money on changes that are perhaps not wanted or needed.

I have touched on dental services, so I will not go any further on that. On pharmaceutical services, I agree entirely with what my hon. Friend said about dispensing GPs. That is a big issue. And I have touched on the Liberal Democrat new clauses. In conclusion, although Conservative Members support a number of the ambitions in relation to the group that we are debating, the questions that my colleagues and I have raised require more clarification from the Minister.

Health Bill (Fifth sitting)

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 50, in clause 7, page 4, line 32, at end insert—

“(4) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) The Secretary of State must publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s workforce needs every five years.’”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s staffing needs every five years.

Amendment 54, in clause 7, page 4, line 32, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must exercise functions under this section with a view to ensuring that managers in the NHS, who have appropriate clinical training, must also undertake clinical care.

(5) The Secretary of State must record the proportion of direct clinical care provided by those with professional qualifications both in terms of the proportion of their areas and full time equivalent by pay grade, and the Secretary of State must increase the proportion.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that NHS managers who are clinically trained must continue to undertake clinical care.

Clause stand part.

New clause 44—Medical training places—

“The Secretary of State must double the number of medical school training places to 15,000 by 2031-32.”

This new clause would put a duty on the Secretary of State to double the number of medical school training places.

New clause 45—Data collection: clinically trained staff—

“(1) The Secretary of State must collect and publish data on the numbers and proportion of NHS staff are qualified to deliver nursing and clinical care who delivering nursing care, or clinical care of any kind, and those who are not.

(2) Information under subsection (1) must be collected according to HCAS pay scales.

(3) Information under subsection (1) must include numbers of nursing and midwifery staff.

(4) Information under subsection (1) must be published quarterly.

(5) The NHS and ICBs are under a duty to comply with any requests from the Secretary of State for data for this purpose.

(6) Information under subsection (1) must include the proportion of time spent delivering clinical care as a proportion of the individual’s total working hours.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to collect and publish data on the numbers and proportion of clinically qualified staff who are delivering clinical care, broken down by HCAS pay band.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

Before the lunch break I was saying that, in essence, clause 7 states what the Secretary of State’s job is. It moves the function of planning the workforce from NHS England to the Secretary of State, which is a reasonable thing to do. I talked about the previous Government’s record on opening new medical schools and how that has helped with the number of clinical staff.

We also talked about workforce planning. The Government are due to produce a workforce plan, but it is not clear when it is due to come out. It was due to come out at the end of last year, but it did not; it was then due to come out in the spring, but now it is the summer. Given the Prime Minister’s resignation, it is not at all clear when it will come out. Will the Minister let us know whether it will come out before the summer recess, this week or whenever?

I quoted some of the concerns of the Royal College of Nursing, the British Medical Association, of which I am a member, and others. Those concerns include the workforce plan. Those organisations have seen what we have not seen, so they have been asked to comment on something that we have yet to see. That brings me to new clause 44, which is in my name.

Before the general election, Labour promised that it would double the number of medical school places. The now Chancellor of the Exchequer promised to double the number of medical school training places, as did the now Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology. Once the general election had passed and Labour was in government, the promise was reiterated. At oral questions in October 2024, the now former Health Secretary said:

“This Government are committed, as we were in opposition, to doubling the number of medical school places”.—[Official Report, 15 October 2024; Vol. 754, c. 683.]—

but there has not really been any progress.

During a debate this year on the junior doctors’ foundation programme, I asked the Minister for Care whether the Government’s intention was still to honour that pledge. He said:

“Yes, that is the Government’s intention.”—[Official Report, 22 April 2026; Vol. 784, c. 133WH.]—

only to later submit a written correction stating that the Government had never committed to doing so. Are they going to, or not? It is not clear.

Labour promised to double the number of medical school places, but now that pledge appears to have been airbrushed out of history. Can the Minister please explain why she and her colleagues deemed the workforce pledge essential before the election but not after it? Can she tell us whether it is Government policy? In essence, my new clause 44 asks Members on the Government Benches to vote for what they promised before the election and have promised since.

New clause 44 is very simple: it stipulates that the Secretary of State must double the number of medical school training places by 2031-32. That is what Labour promised, so it should be fairly easy for Labour Members to vote for it. I hope that the Committee will support the new clause, which only requires Ministers to do what their party promised before it came into government.

If the Government are not keen on committing to clear targets, they can at least commit to full scrutiny of their workforce plans. Of course, there is a risk that the House has been misled. Either the promise was made or it was not. The Minister for Care said that it was promised and then submitted a written correction to say that that was inaccurate and that it was never Government policy, but if it has been stated by the Secretary of State at the Dispatch Box, representing the Government, then it is Government policy. Can the Minister help to clarify that point? If the House has been misled by either her former boss or the Minister for Care, perhaps she can clear that up for us. Perhaps the vote will help.

[Peter Prinsley (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)]

Does the shadow Minister agree that if we doubled the number of medical students, we would simply not be able to accommodate those people as young doctors unless we also doubled the number of training places? After five or six years, those medical students become young doctors. If we are to correct any problem with the medical workforce, it is insufficient to simply state that we will double the number of medical students.

[Dr Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman is right. When all the new doctors that the Government have promised have been trained, they will need jobs and postgraduate medical training, and there are issues with that. Nevertheless, the Government asked the public to vote for them on the basis that they would double the number of medical school places. Many of the hon. Gentleman’s colleagues produced little videos to that effect, which can be viewed on Twitter. They toured the newsrooms saying, “Please vote for us, we’re going to double the number of medical school places.” They suggested that there would be a revolution in Government to make sure that there were enough doctors. This is important—more doctors would help.

All new clause 44 does is ask the Government to commit to doing what they have said that they will do—or to say that they will not. Either way, we have had the Secretary of State saying one thing and a Minister saying the opposite and then correcting it, so we need clarity. The public deserve that. The Minister herself said that they would double the number of medical school places so that we have the doctors that our NHS needs. If they do not double the number of medical school places, it follows that they will not have the number of doctors that the NHS needs. Presumably that is in their workforce plan, but it needs to be cleared up.

Amendment 50 would put a duty on the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS workforce every five years. The logic is straightforward: if the Government believe that their plans are sufficient, they can be compared to an impartial assessment of the workforce. The previous Government published a workforce plan in 2023, setting out how to tackle existing and future workforce challenges over several years. That included doubling the number of medical school places. Yet three years later, this Government are on course for a new plan that is reportedly far less ambitious—we will find out in a minute.

The workforce affects whether patients can be seen on time, maternity wards are safely staffed and elderly patients get the dignity they deserve. It is the difference between the NHS meeting the challenge of an ageing population or slipping into decline. If Labour Members are confident that the Minister’s workforce planning is robust, I expect that they will support my amendment, which requires an independently audited forecast. If they are not willing to support it, that suggests that they know this Government cannot be trusted to deliver the workforce that patients need.

Amendment 54 and new clause 45 were also tabled in my name. Amendment 54 would require the Secretary of State to look at the amount of clinical work that NHS managers undertake. As a clinician, I have increasingly noticed that highly qualified clinical practitioners come in, become the person on the ward who can be relied on, and then go off because they get promoted to a nine-to-five job that is easier and pays more, but does not deliver clinical care.

The chief medical officer, for example, still delivers clinical care, and the amendment probes the Government to consider how many nurses and clinicians in hospitals are delivering clinical care. I asked that in written questions, and the Government did not know the answer. It is materially important information, particularly when looking at the Dash report, which talks about an explosion in the number of people who are clinically trained but not providing clinical work—instead, they are creating guidelines and monitoring whether other clinicians are doing the work. If more of those people were engaged in clinical activity, that might improve the quality of both the guidelines and care, because more junior staff would have senior staff around to help them.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

I strongly support the argument that clinical staff, even if they progress into a senior role, should carry out some sort of clinical practice. Does the hon. Lady agree that that is what went wrong over the past few years, especially when NHS England was created? Many senior clinicians who were moved into management posts had no contact with clinical areas. That is what this Government are trying to fix by abolishing NHS England.

[Dr Johnson]

I am talking predominantly about clinicians working in trusts who are trained and very experienced, but then move to work in the same trust but in a more managerial role that does not involve clinical care. I am not saying that every single person needs to be delivering clinical care—there may be exceptions, of course; people do have career changes—but I encourage the Government to reflect on the number of posts being created that take people away from the clinical arena, and on the effect that that has. When the Minister is presented with the number of nursing or midwifery-qualified staff working in a particular department, that may not reflect the number who are delivering clinical care and, by their own admission, the Government do not know which is which.

Amendment 33 would place a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the workforce is trained on the wider determinants of health, such as housing standards, air pollution and the use of harmful substances. In my many years as a paediatrician, I have yet to meet a nurse, doctor, surgeon, porter or care co-ordinator who does not know that damp and mould are bad for people’s health, and I have yet to meet a fellow employee who does not know that air pollution causes asthma, or that tobacco use increases the risk of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cancer and a whole host of other ailments.

Considering the many pressures on NHS workers, I do not believe that mandating a new programme on health determinants is a good use of time. I fear that it is rooted in the agenda of creating more and more mandatory training, and I would actually encourage the Minister to look at rationalising mandatory training to that which is absolutely necessary. Control of the curriculum for such staff is dealt with separately, so I object to amendment 33.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. Clause 7 says—I abbreviate:

“The Secretary of State must exercise functions…with a view to ensuring that…there are sufficient people with appropriate education and training to meet the workforce needs of the health service, and…there is an effective system in place for the planning and delivery of education and training of people to meet those needs.”

That is all very nice—who couldn’t agree with that?—but amendment 50, tabled by the shadow Minister, would add a means by which the public, in the interests of transparency, could make an assessment of that by requiring the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s workforce needs every five years. That seems entirely sensible, it is something that I am sure any Government would want to do anyway, and it would add meaning, assessment and transparency to what is already in the Bill.

New clauses 44 and 45 would do something similar in relation to the number of medical school places. As the shadow Minister said in response to an intervention, new clause 44 seeks to do only what the Government have already said they want to do. Hopefully, the Minister can give us some clarity on whether that is still the Government’s intention and, if it is, what aversion she has to including it in the Bill.

Separately, new clause 45 seeks to establish a benchmark of data collection. Of course, duties and requirements placed on a Secretary of State, such as those in clause 7, can be delivered only if we start with the proper collection of data and, in the interests of transparency, publish it. For that reason, I also support new clause 45.

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 8 will give the Secretary of State the power to direct integrated care boards to exercise his or her functions. This power, similar to that currently employed by NHS England, will promote subsidiarity by enabling such functions to be delivered at the lowest appropriate level. The clause builds on the existing section 7B of the National Health Service Act 2006, which allows the Secretary of State to direct ICBs but only in respect of public health functions.

With our plans to abolish NHS England, the Secretary of State will again have broad powers and responsibility relating to the health service, and so this power encompasses a wider range of functions. Unlike the delegated frameworks set out under sections 65Z5 and 75 of the 2006 Act, which are entered into voluntarily, any integrated care board directed under this power would be obliged to carry out the stated functions.

I reassure the Committee that, while the ICB will be legally responsible for how it discharges a function, overall accountability will remain with the Secretary of State. Furthermore, the Secretary of State might also use directions to place restrictions on the onward delegation of any functions, preventing delegation where it may be inappropriate. Finally, any directions must be published, ensuring transparency and allowing proper accountability.

This measure will empower the Secretary of State to assign functions to ICBs where most appropriate. It aligns with and facilitates our broader direction of travel towards flexibly planned and delivered local services. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 8 is essentially about the control that the Secretary of State has over ICBs. When we discussed the clause abolishing NHS England, we talked a lot about the balance between democratic accountability on the one hand and independence from political interference on the other.

The Government suggest that the Bill is a decentralising Bill. What this clause does is essentially to recentralise by default. As the Minister has just said, the Secretary of State can change what the ICB is doing if they think that it is inappropriate. What does “inappropriate” mean exactly, and how will that power be used? It may be used very infrequently—perhaps the current and previous Secretaries of State think that the power would be used infrequently—but equally it could be used in response to considerable pressure from MPs, lobbyists and campaign groups. Instead of issuing directions sparingly, we may end up in a position where the Secretary of State is issuing day-to-day instructions.

The Government want ICBs to take greater responsibility for commissioning decisions, but then they want to be able to undermine them by direction from the Health Secretary. The Health Secretary will never have as good a grasp of the situation in the local geographic area as local leaders, but he has the power to tell them what to do and issue blanket instructions with different characteristics. That will be inherently inefficient. ICB leaders will be under pressure, knowing that if they make a particular decision they can be removed or be told to do something different. They have the job and they have the power, but they haven’t really—all at the same time.

There is also the plan, as the Minister outlined, to make directions something that the Government publish. The clause says that directions must be published by the Secretary of State, but only

“as soon as reasonably practicable”.

The intention behind requiring the prompt publication of directions is to reduce the surface area for back-room pressures, but the lack of a clear timeframe makes it rather a weak measure.

We currently have a Government who seem open to greater use of the private sector, whether in financing projects or in delivering out-patient care. Well, our Prime Minister resigned yesterday, and there is no guarantee that the Government of the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) will take the same approach. Will the Minister confirm whether the powers in clause 8 could be used by a Health Secretary to instruct ICBs to stop using a specific type of provider?

I would not dispute the idea that the Secretary of State needs to be able to exercise some control over the health service now that NHS England is being abolished, but the clause seems contrary to the Government’s stated vision for health management. I am not sure whether it is in the best interests of patients.

--- Later in debate ---

[Karin Smyth]

I recognise that this is a subject of some debate; we may discuss it further when we come to the part of the Bill on ICBs. The abolition of NHS England and transferring all its functions to one body has a consequence, which is that the Secretary of State retains that accountability and power. We are keen to have that power clear but flexible in order to empower local systems. That remains the intent.

The power is necessary for the Secretary of State to update national commissioning standards, for example. The ICBs will have wider roles as strategic commissioners. We expect them to take on formal responsibility for a number of services delegated by NHS England. That allows us to issue a common set of commissioning standards, on the point made by the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon about variability in different places. There need to be common standards across the piece: eligibility criteria, the treatments the provider should use, and national reporting requirements. ICBs having those standards means that there will be a reduction in unwarranted variation in some of these events.

The shadow Minister raised the timetable. The Opposition will recognise that there needs to be flexibility for the Secretary of State and Ministers to respond to unforeseen or changing events. That is why it is purposely broad, because the range of events that can impact the NHS is clearly very broad. We cannot predict the future.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said that the Bill needs to deal with all these problems. The Bill needs to give enough flexibility to the system and devolve as much power to the system. The Bill needs to make sure that the powers are in the right place, but it is for the local systems to respond to their local needs within that framework. They will be held accountable, for example through the NHS oversight framework and through ICBs’ normal accountability frameworks.

[Dr Johnson]

The Minister is talking about flexibility. I understand that if a Minister is responding to an unforeseen circumstance, he or she may be very busy, but where a direction has been made, it should not take very long for a member of staff to publish it, because it will already have been written and sent. I understand that a Minister might take a day or so to sign it off because they are so busy, but it should not take months. The addition of a deadline is therefore not an unreasonable request.

[Karin Smyth]

With due respect to the hon. Lady, it is not a matter of the Minister being busy, whether that is me or anybody else. It is about the operational running of a £200 billion organisation with 1.5 million staff treating millions of people every day. I am sure we all remember from our own experience incidents and unforeseen events that have happened in the local system, and sometimes very tragic events that have required the Secretary of State to take action. We are trying not to increase the number of reports and documentation and to rid the system of bureaucracy by putting something out in that timeline.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Karin Smyth]

No, I have finished.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Secretary of State’s power to provide assistance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Karin Smyth]

Clause 9, which will insert new section 12DA into the National Health Service Act 2006, will give the Secretary of State a clear statutory duty to provide financial, staffing or other practical assistance in connection with the health service. The power may be used to support persons providing, or proposing to provide, services as part of the health service or which are beneficial to the interests of the health service. It may also be used to support public authorities where the assistance relates to education or training for people employed, or considering becoming employed, in activities connected with the provision of health services. The assistance may include financial assistance, the services of civil servants or other resources of the Secretary of State, and it may be provided on agreed terms, including terms about payments by or to the Secretary of State.

The clause will support the wider purpose of the Bill by enabling a small centre to act in a supportive and enabling way towards the wider system. Where appropriate, the Secretary of State will be able to provide assistance directly to those delivering or supporting health service activity. The clause is needed because the existing statutory framework does not include a clear power that enables the Secretary of State to provide practical support across the full range of health service activity. Relevant support may be financial, practical, staffing-related or connected with education and training.

Without this clear power, there is a genuine risk of confusion about the basis on which such support may be offered, particularly where the Secretary of State is acting to facilitate the delivery of services by others. The power is permissive and facilitative: it does not require the Secretary of State to provide assistance, and it does not require any person or body to accept it. The power is also limited by its connection to the health service and matters relevant to education, training or activities considered beneficial to the health service. Its exercise remains subject to ordinary public law principles and public financial controls. For those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Dr Johnson]

In a system as large as the NHS, covering an area as diverse as England, it is necessary that the Government be able to deal with unexpected situations. The pandemic may be half a decade behind us already, but the Committee will remember that the previous Government had to act quickly and part with a lot of money in a short time. In such instances, it is essential that Ministers have the power to provide financial assistance. It is not only about crises, however; ordinarily, there are occasions when a Government will want to roll out a new prevention programme or address deficiencies in care in particular areas. I know that health policy is always evolving, and the case for flexibility is clear. The Health Secretary may need to be able to provide financial assistance in pursuit of supporting the health service.

I am sure that hon. Members are familiar with the existing legislation. Section 12D of the National Health Service Act 2006 gives the Secretary of State, NHS England, an ICB or the local authority the ability to make direct financial payments as an assistance to persons or bodies. Clause 9 would new section 12DA of the Act, under which the Secretary of State would be empowered to provide assistance to any person or body carrying out, or proposing to carry out, activities that they deem beneficial to the service.

This is where semantics are important. The existing legislation allows the Secretary of State to make payments, but clause 9 is different: it would allow the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance and to make available persons employed by the civil service or any other resources that the Secretary of State has. This is a remarkably open-ended power that would allow the Secretary of State to spend taxpayers’ money while bypassing standard scrutiny. When NHS England spends money, there is transparency: the public can see how much has been spent on different types of care, ranging from hospitals to public health programmes. The public can see how much money has gone into trusts, into the independent sector and into procurement.

Transparency builds trust in the system and disincentivises wasteful spending. Where will parliamentarians or the public be able to see the financial expense of civil servants, or literally any other resource that the Secretary of State may offer in support? For the first time, the Health Secretary will have the power to insert politically directed civil servants into elements of the health service that are not under public ownership.

As clause 9 is drafted, the Secretary of State could provide civil service labour to private or mutual health providers that work within the NHS. Will the Minister elaborate on how that would be used, and how it would be beneficial to the taxpayer and the health service? The number of civil servants taking home more than six figures has increased under this Government. Their time should be focused on delivering public services, not propping up providers, especially ones that are private businesses.

It is also unclear where the legal liability lies under such arrangements. If something goes wrong and the human resources provided by the Secretary of State are responsible, is the Secretary of State responsible or the entity into which those staff have been inserted? Can the Minister clarify that?

It may be politically beneficial in the short term to provide state support, but it can be costly to the public purse and damaging to markets in the long term. By allowing the Health Secretary to issue assistance in the form of free civil servant labour, clause 9 effectively creates a new type of off-the-books subsidy. How can Members of the House or NHS providers tell whether assistance is operational support or a de facto subsidy? It could undermine the idea of a level playing field for firms contracted to deliver NHS services.

There is also the question of when assistance crosses from operational support into running a provider or firm. We do not necessarily want to be in a position where the Bill is used to bail out failing private firms with NHS contracts. I return to the phrase

“any other resources of the Secretary of State”.

It is difficult to understand why the legislation was written in this way, allowing financial assistance, the provision of labour, and then the use of absolutely any other resource at the Health Secretary’s disposal. As with several other provisions in the Bill, it seems another sign that the legislation was rushed. Instead of circumscribing power tightly where it is needed, the Bill gives huge sweeping powers while claiming that it decentralises.

The Minister has described clause 9 as a discretionary power intended to support the effective functioning of the health service and its workforce. Although that may be what she sought to achieve, that is not the reality. The clause paves the way for arbitrary and unaccountable deployments of state resources, and that should concern all hon. Members.

[Gregory Stafford]

I endorse the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham.

I am particularly concerned about subsection (2)(a) of proposed new section 12DA. On examination, this provision raises significant concerns about the control of public expenditure and the efficient use of resources within the health service, and I find it rather vague. There is no definition of the terms used, no indication of scope and no express limitation on how the power is to be exercised.

When read together with subsection (1) of proposed new section 12DA, the effect, as I read it, is to allow the Secretary of State to provide funding to an extremely wide category of recipients. That includes not only public bodies and established NHS providers but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham has said, private entities, charities, individuals and any person engaged in activities that the Secretary of State considers to be beneficial to the health service.

That breadth is not accompanied by a corresponding statutory safeguard. The clause does not set out criteria for eligibility, priorities for funding or principles to guide decision making. It does not impose limits on the sums that may be disbursed, nor does it require any structured process for allocating funds. There is no express provision for transparency, such as publication of decisions or reporting obligations to another body such as Parliament. That absence is significant.

Control over public expenditure ultimately lies with Parliament, yet the clause delegates a wide and flexible spending power to the Executive with little direction as to how that power is to be exercised. While it may be said that Treasury rules, audit requirements and general public law principles continue to apply, those are external controls and they do not substitute for clear statutory discipline within the provision itself.

The practical consequences of such a broad power need to be considered. The NHS is already under considerable financial strain; as we all know, demand is rising and resources are constrained, and there is a continuing need to ensure that funding is allocated in a way that delivers measurable improvements in outcomes. In that context, certainty, prioritisation and efficiency are essential. By framing this power in such open terms, the clause risks undermining those objectives. It will create the possibility of fragmented funding decisions, with resources distributed across a wide range of initiatives without clear and consistent frameworks, and it may lead to duplication of effort or to supporting projects with benefits that are uncertain or difficult to evaluate. Without clear criteria or structured oversight, it will become more difficult to ensure that funding is directed to the areas of greatest need.

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[Karin Smyth]

In concluding the debate on this part of the Bill, the Opposition have helpfully made most of my arguments for me. The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham opened with reference to the pandemic and the unusual circumstances in which we have found ourselves. It is obviously important that this Government learn the lessons from that pandemic in the round, that we are prepared and that, as NHS England is abolished, those powers come back to the Secretary of State so that we can respond to any eventuality that comes before us.

As the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, there are existing standards and rules of procurement. Any spending that happens through the Department and the NHS will be publicly recorded and published in the Department of Health’s consolidated accounts. Those come before Parliament, so there is direct transparency through the parliamentary process in the usual way and, as we all know and as the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, Treasury rules apply.

The point about the use of civil servants has been made. Again, it is really important that we recognise that we are bringing together NHS England, NHS staff and civil servants in the Department. It is right that the Secretary of State, in whatever eventuality comes before him or her, is able to deploy the right person for the right job, be they a civil servant or someone currently under NHS staff terms and conditions, to support that work going forward. The clause is necessarily flexible and broad to provide for those eventualities, and to enable the necessary assistance to be deployed. I commend clause 9 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Secretary of State’s duty as respects variation in provision of health services

[Dr Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 10, page 6, line 21, leave out from “interests” to end of line and insert “of patients”.

This amendment would only allow the Secretary of State to vary the balance between the public and private sectors in the NHS where it is in the interests of patients to do so.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

[Dr Johnson]

This is perhaps the oddest provision in the Bill. Since time immemorial, the Labour party has accused its political rivals of wanting to privatise the health service. In the early 2010s, the then shadow Ministers indulged the idea that the Health and Social Care Act 2012 was a Trojan horse for privatisation. Several years later, after the Minister had herself joined the House, claims continued. The then leader of the Labour party urged the previous Government to

“undo the very damaging privatisation of so much of our NHS”. —[Official Report, 23 October 2019; Vol. 666, c. 960.]

In the 2019 election, the public were even presented with a dodgy dossier—not Labour’s first—that purported to show that the NHS was on the table in negotiations for a trade deal. We now have a trade deal and the NHS is still intact.

Even though Members know full well that no sensible opposition party is advocating for abandoning our NHS system, they keep saying that Governments have been selling off the health service through the back door. Today, private providers deliver only about 10% of NHS care and the system continues to be free at the point of use.

That brings us to the deep irony of today’s debate. After years of peddling the NHS privatisation myth, the Labour party has introduced legislation to make privatisation possible. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 inserted a safeguard against privatisation, section 12E, into the NHS Act 2006. That section prohibits the Secretary of State from exercising his functions for the purpose of “causing a variation” in the proportion of services provided by the public or the private sector.

Clause 10 substitutes the text in that section and makes two small but significant changes. The first change is to expand the type of providers beyond public and private to

“different kinds of legal entity”.

That is probably a good change, because it encompasses the mutual and voluntary sectors, which do have an important role to play in health provision going forward.

The second change is what has caused alarm. The Secretary of State cannot alter the provider mix unless they deem it to be

“in the interests of the health service.”

Could the Minister set out some scenarios when it would be deliberately beneficial to privatise provision or, indeed, when it would be beneficial to deliberately nationalise provision? I cannot recall an instance where Ministers needed to privatise an entire service to ensure patients did not lose access to care.

In February, the Minister of State for Secondary Care told the House that lessons had been learned from private finance initiatives. Yet the Government announced that 80% of neighbourhood health centres will be privatised through public private partnerships. The Government are able to use these partnerships to loan money outside their limits, but it tends to be more costly than public sector borrowing. Essentially, it is borrowing, but not borrowing on the balance sheet.

What is the effect of these private initiatives? I remember receiving my own office on being promoted as a doctor to consultant. It is quite an exciting moment; before that, resident doctors share an office. I had my own space, my own desk, my own computer and a big whiteboard for notes. When I asked whether I could place the whiteboard on the wall, I was told I could not—it was £800 to stick it on the wall under the private finance initiative contract.

So my great big whiteboard sat there, propped against the wall. Periodically, I would move a piece of paper, knock the bottom of the whiteboard and it would tip and fall on me when I was sat at my desk. I did suggest putting it up myself, but that would also incur a charge through the PFI contract—for modifying things without getting them to do the modifications—so I just had to sit there with it propped up against the wall, ad infinitum.

The Government are on the hook for more than £100 billion of payouts, simply for the use and maintenance of PFI facilities. The Labour scheme was a shambolic waste of taxpayers’ money that could have been spent on improving care. When my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans) asked the Minister about public private partnerships, she told him she was

“very proud of the capital investment under the last Labour Government”.—[Official Report, 4 March 2026; Vol. 781, c. 386WH.]

But is clause 10 simply a mechanism for Ministers to develop further private finance initiatives? If Government spending is under pressure, may Ministers seek to shift provision even if it proves more costly in the long run?

There is another side to the conundrum of clause 10. Instead of a Health Secretary intent on privatisation, what if we get one intent on squeezing out private sector provision? Who our new Prime Minister will be, we do not know, but one of the candidates has called for the country to abandon 40 years of neoliberalism. Perhaps the Minister could elaborate on what that means, since the tax take as a percentage of GDP is the highest it has been in 40 years. To me, it signals a potential hostility towards choice and competition. We do not want to be in a situation in which the decision is made to alter the provider mix in service of ideology, rather than in the best interests of patients.

I am aware of several private firms that provide services to the NHS and are concerned that clause 10 could be wielded against them. If a future Health Secretary decided to reduce private provision on the basis of ideology, what would happen to the 10% of planned activity that is currently delivered by for-profit entities? NHS providers could not feasibly handle such a surge in demand, waiting lists would increase further, and patient choice would suffer. It would also be expensive. If private providers fear that the NHS is no longer a reliable customer, and that they may suddenly lose their contract if this clause is invoked, they will charge a risk premium on their services—that is what firms do when they face shifting regulatory goalposts. That would only damage the public purse.

Under clause 10, it would be legally possible for the Health Secretary to alter the provider mix. As a result, it would be worth it for several types of providers and ideologically motivated groups to spend vast sums of money hiring lobbyists to convince Ministers that their sector deserves favourable treatment and that they serve the interests of the NHS. Organisations would invest less in resources and more in influencing the rules, which is not a good outcome either.

All those issues are compounded by the fact that clause 10 is imprecise. What does the Minister define as

“the interests of the health service”?

I am not trying to catch the Minister out; I just want to illustrate the problem with legislation drafted in such terms. It is difficult to prove that the Health Secretary has not acted in what they thought were the best interests of the health service. What could that refer to? It could refer to the interests of patients, to the interests of NHS staff or to the financial stability of the health service—it is entirely subjective. What is the health service there for? It is there for patients, which is why I tabled amendment 53.

Amendment 53 would revise clause 10 to specify that the Secretary of State must not alter the provider mix unless doing so is in the interests of patients. I would like to place patients at the centre of the Bill’s changes, in recognition that we do not have the numbers on the Committee to change the clause altogether. My revision would make it harder for the Health Secretary to justify altering the provider mix if it harms patient access or reduces their choice. It would make NHS providers less fearful to know that the Health Secretary would be subjected to a better defined legal threshold.

[Gregory Stafford]

The shadow Minister has outlined a couple of hypotheticals for the future, when we have a different Prime Minister and a different Secretary of State. One might go down a route of more privatisation, another down a route of removing the private sector from health service provision. My concern is more practical and for the here and now: if the clause stands part of the Bill, it must be because the Government have some desire to do one of those two things now. Would it not be a good idea to hear from the Minister which of those two options it is?

[Dr Johnson]

It does raise questions about the point of new section 12E. That provision was not there before; there must be a reason for adding it. Either the Government want ideologically to reduce the amount of private provision in the NHS, or they want to increase it. The clause gives them the power to do both.

Labour politicians very often tell the public that the NHS is being privatised. Data has shown that that is not happening, but that did not matter; they found the myth politically advantageous and repeated it ad nauseam. Now, the Minister and her colleagues are in office—they have the levers of power—and are proposing to change the law to make it easier to change the provider mix. That is not only ironic but deeply misguided.

I tabled amendment 53 to require any changes to the provider mix to be in the interests of patients. If the Minister is unwilling to support that, will she offer a compelling explanation why? Clause 10 has alarmed stakeholders across the health sector and the political spectrum. That really ought to tell us something. I look forward to her response.

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[Karin Smyth]

I will respond to that question before picking up the other comments. If I do not address all the Committee’s comments, I will come back to Members.

Everyone would expect this, but let me be clear: this Government are absolutely committed to a free-at-the-point-of-use, taxpayer-funded service. We also think that unless it is reformed and changed, it is an existential problem for the British public, who will not continue to support the service. As Members know, one Parliament can never bind another one, so I cannot predict what a future Government will do. There is talk from some of our Reform colleagues about an insurance-based system. There are people who were in the Conservative party but have moved over who think that, so obviously I cannot—

[Dr Johnson]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Karin Smyth]

I will make some points, and then I will be happy take the hon. Lady’s intervention if I do not address what she was going to say.

The hon. Member for North Shropshire outlined some of the history. This clause seeks to strike a balance. The governing principle behind it is that the decisions of the Secretary of State must not vary the proportion of providers by the type of legal entity that they are. Decisions must be taken according to what serves the health service and the people who depend on it. The clause permits, by way of exception, the balance between sectors to be varied purposefully, but only where doing so would be in the interests of the health service. That would, for example, prevent the Secretary of State from deliberately choosing to grow the proportion of NHS services delivered by private providers for solely ideological reasons.

I understand the concern that drives the amendment. It is that the exception might be relied on to support the convenience of those already providing the service, without taking into account what is best for patients, as the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said. That is not the Government’s position, and the clause does not lead to that outcome. The test that it creates is whether the interests of the health services are served.

As the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham also said, the definition of the health service—as defined under section 1 of the National Health Service Act 2006—is not separate from the people it exists to serve. It is defined as “a comprehensive health service” for “the people of England”, directed at improving their health and at the “prevention, diagnosis and treatment” of illness. A decision to rely on the exception must be justified by reference to that duty; one taken merely because it was easier or more convenient for existing providers or any other group, with no such justification, would be unlawful. The protection that she seeks is, in substance, already secured by the clause.

The amendment would also create another difficulty. Section 1 of the 2006 Act reaches the entire population and includes the prevention of illness before anyone becomes a patient at all. The “interests of patients” reaches only those already receiving care, which is a narrower test than I think the hon. Lady intended, and would allow a Secretary of State who was so minded to provide a landscape that ignores vital preventive health and wellbeing concerns. I hope that she will take from my remarks an assurance that the clause already meets her concerns.

The hon. Lady also highlighted the example of PFI—a subject of much discussion over many years—and of being unable to change her whiteboard. That is absolutely one of the lessons that needs to be learned from the way in which some past PFIs were procured and dealt with. For example, as a new Government, we outlined proposals for a new model of public-private partnerships for neighbourhood health centres, among other things. The previous Government could also have learned the lessons and done something about that, but they chose instead to completely halt the building of any kind of facilities. That is one reason why we are in such a shocking state at the moment. The new proposal outlines, as I think the Opposition know, an 80:20 funding route, exactly to make the point about which is the most efficient way forward. That will absolutely drive measures for growth and create more jobs in the sector.

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[Karin Smyth]

I refer the hon. Gentleman back to my comments. The health service is defined under section 1 of the NHS Act 2006 as not being separate from the people it exists to serve. It is defined as “a comprehensive health service” for “the people of England”, directed at improving their health and at the “prevention, diagnosis and treatment” of illness—so, yes.

At this juncture, I will explain a number of other features of the clause. In particular, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that it builds on section 12E of the 2006 Act to cover the Secretary of State’s health functions, powers and duties. It recognises that, with the abolition of NHS England, the Secretary of State has a far more substantial role to play—as a commissioner of services, for example—than previously. I also put on the record that whenever the Secretary of State takes a decision in this space, the general NHS procurement requirements and other statutory duties will continue to apply.

Finally, the NHS relies on privately owned providers, as well as charities and community organisations, to provide a range of important NHS-funded services across the country. As such, it is important to ensure that, where there is a mixed-market provision between public and private for providers of a particular service, the Government’s powers are not used to distort the provision and potentially discourage important investment from outside the NHS. Conversely, they should not be used purposefully to favour independent providers over NHS providers for reasons unrelated to the quality or efficiency of NHS-funded healthcare.

[Dr Johnson]

If I heard the Minister right, she said that the clause did not provide for changes on the basis of ideology. However, it says that changes are not to be made

“unless the Secretary of State considers that to do so is in the interests of the health service.”

A Secretary of State whose ideology is that the private sector is bad, good or whatever else could well believe that it is in the interests of the health service to be private or not private. How does the clause prevent an ideologically driven Secretary of State from changing the health service on the basis simply of his ideology, rather than of patient or clinical need?

[Karin Smyth]

The hon. Lady tempts me to delve into the politics of future Secretaries of State. They will respond according to the manifesto on which they are elected by the British public. That is the point of a democratically accountable public service. I think that the clause strikes that balance, as I have said. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Lady will withdraw her amendment. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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General power to direct integrated care boards

[Dr Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 11, page 8, leave out lines 15 to 30.

This amendment prevents the Secretary of State from removing the Chief Executive of an integrated care board.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Dr Johnson]

Clause 11 is particularly interesting. In August 2025, Alan Milburn was asked about the abolition of NHS England on the Health Foundation podcast. He said that the Government wanted to see a model that was “more delegated…more devolved” and “more diverse”, which necessitated the centre being smaller. Considering that he is a former Labour Health Secretary and a non-executive director at the Department of Health and Social Care, I do not doubt his understanding of what the Government wanted to achieve.

When the former Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), announced the 10-year plan to the House, he also talked about dissolving power. He spoke of a

“brave new world of devolution of power, resources and control”.—[Official Report, 3 July 2025; Vol. 770, c. 469.]

That was repeated in the Government publications that accompanied the Bill:

“Empowering ICBs as strategic commissioners will support putting patients at the centre of care by devolving decisions to a local level where different services can better integrate… Reforms to the NHS FT model will give providers more flexibility to design and deliver healthcare around local needs.”

Between the announcement of the abolition of NHS England and the publication of the Bill, Ministers articulated a vision for a more decentralised system. There is expert consensus that decentralisation boosts performance, reduces health disparities and fosters innovation. After listening to remarks this morning, I have no doubt that Members are clued up on the importance of innovation to the health service, but a problem—a philosophical contradiction—at the heart of the Government’s reform programme and the Bill is that Ministers talk about decentralisation while these provisions constitute a recentralisation of power.

Health Bill (Fourth sitting)

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Public Bill Committees

Using one dataset to decide funding from one pot of money, and another for another pot of money seems quite arbitrary—or at least not joined up. If that happens within one Department, there is greater scope for it happening across different Departments—indeed, it is certain that it will. By my reading, that is what amendment 30 is designed to address. Whether this is the right place for that, and whether it will actually achieve anything, I am not sure, but it is certainly a debate that needs to be had. It may well be that here is better than anywhere else in terms of including it somewhere in law.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak to clause 4 and this group of amendments. Health inequalities are commonly defined as the systemic differences in health status and distribution of health resources between different population groups. There are limits to how far the state can equalise health in a free society, but I am sure all Members would agree that the service should not preside over differences in access to health resources. Unequal access runs contrary to the vision of the NHS as a comprehensive service, available to all and based on clinical need, not ability to pay. Those principles are violated when people without fixed addresses struggle to access general practice, or patients in rural areas, such as my constituency, miss out on treatments—for example, specialist cancer treatments—that are available in more urban areas.

The Health and Social Care Act 2012 inserted section 1C in the National Health Service Act 2006, placing a duty on the Secretary of State to consider the need to reduce inequalities in the benefits that people obtain from the health service. As the explanatory notes to the 2012 Act made clear, the intention of that was to

“include consideration of the need to reduce inequalities in access...and the outcomes”.

Clause 4 of this Bill takes that which was understood and makes it more explicit.

The Minister will be pleased to hear that I support updating that duty—she is smiling. The word “benefits” in the original section is a nebulous and subjective term. The wording introduced by the clause is less imprecise and requires the Secretary of State to consider the whole health pipeline. None the less, I have some questions about the lens that clause 4 and its predecessor, section 1C of the 2006 Act, invite the Secretary of State to look through, particularly in relation to other statements made by the Government.

In the Government’s policy paper “ICBs as strategic commissioners”, they say that increasing the commissioning responsibilities of integrated care boards will result in them being

“better placed to support innovation”

and

“design new models of care”.

Innovation can produce disparities; that is true in healthcare as well. If one ICB decides to innovate and produces a better service, that area will have a better service than another, and the Secretary of State will have the job of undoing that. That could be done by spreading the innovation across the whole of the country, but if the innovation is expensive or difficult to roll out, it could in effect be quashed. Does the Minister recognise that empowering health leaders to innovate and do things differently could widen inequalities, at least in the short term? Is she willing to accept that?

A problem with using inequalities as a stand-alone metric is that it does not really tell you whether things are getting better or worse; it must be taken into consideration alongside a wide range of other metrics. An often forgotten fact is that disparities can be reduced by levelling down as well as by levelling up. Fixating on determining the size and cause of disparities can, in some cases, come at the expense of eliminating them. I recently tabled a written question to ask the Government if and when they plan to

“set an explicit target to close the Black and Asian maternal mortality gap.”

I note that the Minister stood on a manifesto pledge to close that gap. The Government response to my question indicated that they are waiting for Baroness Amos to finish looking at the drivers of inequalities before they do anything. It is possible to produce tomes on the nature of disparities; I suggest that energy would be better spent on addressing them.

Amendment 13 would require the Secretary of State to consider health inequalities arising from differences in general health determinants. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment, as statistically, those with lower earning capacity, limited access to green space or unhealthy lifestyles have comparatively worse health outcomes, but would placing a duty to take stock of that on the Secretary of State make the health service any better for such groups, or for the population as a whole?

What would be the practical purpose of the amendment? As somebody said to me yesterday evening, do we have a section in education legislation stating that the Education Secretary has to consider that their job is to ensure that people are educated? Do we have clauses in defence Bills saying that the Defence Secretary must consider the defence of the realm? I cannot be sure, but the amendment seems to be a statement of the blindingly obvious, so what effect would it have? Does the Member who tabled the amendment think that the Secretary of State will not consider those factors—essentially, that he will not do his job properly? Do they not have confidence in him or in future Secretaries of State?

Under the amendment, the Secretary of State would need to consider inequalities arising from people’s employment, environmental conditions and lifestyle choices, which his Department has little to no control over. If poverty is the problem, the solution is employment and welfare policy, which is not in his gift. If poor environment is the problem, the solution is environmental policy. If a well-informed adult chooses, despite knowing the detriment it may cause them, to consume unhealthy food or an excessive volume of alcohol, or not to exercise, what can and should the Minister do about it in a free society?

Amendment 13 would risk distracting from the focus of clause 4, which is, as I see it, to ensure equal access to health resources regardless of a person’s standing in society. What is the practical effect of making it a duty on the Minister to do these things? Will it cause a whole load of bureaucracy? Will the Minister have to produce impact statements for every new hospital? If, for example, one opened on the Isle of Wight—my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was talking about that—would we need to consider what effect it would have on smokers, people who do not exercise or people who have a lower earning capacity, and produce an endless list of assessments? It would take a lot of money and effort and not really add anything. The amendment would also risk the Government getting bogged down in litigation, as people who disagreed with the Government’s or the ICB’s decision would spend their time litigating the question whether something that may or may not even be relevant was considered properly.

Members will not be surprised to hear that my thoughts on amendment 29 are similar to those on amendment 13. I do not doubt for a minute that its supporters have the best intentions, but this type of public sector equality duty language does not do anything to improve public services. Too many arms of the state have been so concerned with disparities that they have become incompetent at getting on with the job that they are actually meant to be doing; they are distracted by trying to measure all these different equalities.

Amendment 30 would require the Secretary of State to involve all Departments in reducing health inequalities and take all reasonable steps to ensure that all other Departments

“consider the impact of their policy proposals on health inequalities.”

Is this spreading the bureaucracy and the impact assessments more widely? If the Government decide to buy a new submarine, do they have to consider what effect it would have on people who smoke on the Isle of Wight? It does not make sense to me. It is a statement of the obvious that members of the Cabinet and Government have to work together to deliver better health for the country. Of course that is true, but what would be the practical effect? The Minister may be able to tell us.

New clause 19 would require the Secretary of State to publish a health improvement and health inequalities strategy within six months, and an annual report thereafter. Again, that would invite more glossy brochures from the Government, using the precious time of civil servants. The new clause seeks a cross-Government approach by mandating that all Ministers of the Crown must have regard to the strategy when carrying out their functions. Again, it is basically stating what their job is.

[Joe Robertson]

My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. Although all these amendments come from a very good place, they are so obvious that they should already be happening, and are too obvious to be enshrined in some overriding duty in a Bill.

[Dr Johnson]

I agree. The amendments include, in many cases, a statement of what someone’s job is. Does the Member who tabled them think that the Secretary of State is not doing his job and therefore needs to be told what his job is? That could create a whole load of bureaucracy detracting from the actual job in hand.

Amendment 34 concerns transport access. I understand that that is a problem for many people in rural areas, such as my constituency. They often have a harder time, as the distance they need to travel is longer and public transport services are infrequent. Healthwatch, which will be cancelled by this Bill if the Government get their way, has heard from patients who struggle to book transport online, and whose transport turned up several hours early or was cancelled with little or notice at all. Those problems are well documented.

I visited Lincoln county hospital, which has a unit for renal dialysis, where I heard that although transport is provided for individuals having dialysis, which is good, it often does not turn up when it should or does not pick people up at the time that it is supposed to. More concerning is the fact that if they need a transplant and transplant assessments, most have to go to Leicester to have that done, which is several hours’ drive from some parts of Lincolnshire. Most disturbingly, I heard concerns that some people would choose not to go through the transplant programme, and a factor in that decision would be the ability to get to the transplant centre to have the significant amount of testing and follow-up that needs to be done. Clearly, that is not equal access, so I urge the Minister to look at that.

Imposing a duty on the Secretary of State to consider reducing inequalities is a good thing, but it does not magic up the resources necessary to fix them. In exercising his functions, it is a problem the Secretary of State is already capable of addressing. I am sure the Secretary of State, like the Minister, is a good person and wants people to be able to access the services. If Members believe the Government are failing in that regard, I would advise that adding another legislative duty is not likely to bring about the change desired. If we are being honest with the public, we must challenge the premise that every disparity is evidence of a policy failure. The duty placed on the Secretary of State should be to ensure that care is of an equally high standard across the board.

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[Peter Prinsley]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Patient involvement and choice

[Dr Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 59, in clause 5, page 4, leave out lines 2 to 4 and insert—

“(1) In exercising functions in relation to the health service, the Secretary of State must act with a view to enabling patients to make choices with respect to aspects of health services provided to them, including to make choices as to the provider of those services.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Secretary of State must ensure that patients who are referred for a service to be provided outside a hospital setting (‘out-of-hospital services’) are offered a choice of provider of that service from among the providers available in their integrated care board area and, where relevant, in neighbouring areas, in accordance with regulations made under section 14Z45B.

(3) Regulations under section 14Z45B must provide that, where an out-of-hospital service is to be provided to a patient, the integrated care board must—

(a) offer the patient a meaningful choice of at least two providers capable of providing the service, which may include NHS bodies and independent sector providers approved to provide that service under arrangements with the integrated care board;

(b) provide the patient with information to support an informed choice, including for each available provider—

(i) indicative waiting times;

(ii) the location at which the service would be provided;

(iii) the quality ratings or outcomes data applicable to that provider for that service where such data is available; and

(iv) whether any costs would be incurred by the patient in travelling to or receiving the service at that provider;

(c) not exclude from the list of available providers any provider approved solely on grounds of commercial interest or organisational type; and

(d) take all reasonable steps to give effect to the patient's choice within a clinically appropriate timeframe.

(4) For the purposes of this section, ‘out-of-hospital services’ means services—

(a) provided in community, primary care or ambulatory settings rather than in a hospital inpatient or outpatient department; and

(b) which the Secretary of State specifies by regulations as being within the scope of the choice obligation under subsection (2),

and may include diagnostic services, audiology and hearing aid care, podiatry, dietetics and nutrition, physiotherapy, ambulatory cardiac monitoring and such other services as the Secretary of State may specify.

(5) In specifying services under subsection (4)(b), the Secretary of State must have regard to—

(a) the potential for the expansion of choice to reduce waiting times for the relevant service;

(b) the availability of sufficient independent and NHS providers to make genuine choice meaningful; and

(c) the desirability of ensuring access to choice for patients in all parts of England, including in rural and deprived areas.

(6) The Secretary of State must publish, and lay before Parliament, within 12 months of the date on which this Act is passed, a statement setting out—

(a) the out-of-hospital services for which choice obligations under subsection (2) will initially apply;

(b) the timetable for extending the choice obligation to further services; and

(c) the support that will be made available to patients, in particular those with limited digital access or literacy, to exercise the choices to which they are entitled under this section.

(7) The Secretary of State must review and update the statement required by subsection (6) at intervals of not more than two years.”

This amendment strengthens the new patient choice duty inserted by Clause 5 from a general aspiration into a specific, enforceable right to choose between providers for out-of-hospital services.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Dr Johnson]

This group is about how patients can exercise choice. When the national health service was founded in 1948, patients could select their own GP, but it was difficult to change things and exercise choice elsewhere in the system. The health service has come a long way since then. Successive Governments believed that they could make state institutions more responsive by treating the public, to some extent, like customers. Today, patients can choose their GP, hospital, consultant and different types of end-of-life care and mental health service, but choice is about more than just selecting among providers.

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[Gregory Stafford]

I do not recognise the characterisation that the hon. Gentleman puts forward. He is essentially saying that, by allowing the private sector to carry out operations and procedures, we are somehow making the NHS unsustainable. The follow-on from that logic is that we remove all private sector providers and practice so that every single doctor, nurse and therapist is working in the NHS. I do not think that he is arguing for that situation, but it is the logical progression of his argument.

[Dr Johnson]

When I met surgeons, they said that one reason they like working in elective independent sector hospitals is that they can do more operations on a given day. The shadow Secretary of State visited a provider of cataract treatment yesterday. It is able to perform more treatments on a given day, partly for organisational reasons. The NHS, which is quite frustrating for surgeons, could learn from that. Does my hon. Friend agree?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. I do not want to go down the cataracts route, but she and the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket have both mentioned them. Clearly, cataracts are a relatively low-complexity, high-volume type of operation. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that some providers can do five or six operations per list, while other places are doing two or three. That is often about the private sector being able to move more quickly, which is obviously better for patients, as well as for clinicians, who want to do the surgery that they have trained for.

Unlike the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, I think that competition can play an important role in driving improvement. When providers must attract and retain patients, they have a stronger incentive to deliver timely, high-quality services, and to innovate in how they provide care. In that sense, competition is not an end in itself but a means of improving outcomes and responsiveness for patients. If both sides of the Committee support clause 5, because we are interested in choice and competition, amendment 59 is the logical extension of that.

The amendment is also clear about where the new obligation choices would apply. It covers a range of out-of-hospital services, including diagnostics, audiology, hearing-aid care, dietetics, physiotherapy, ambulatory cardiac monitoring and so on. By clearly defining the services in scope, it provides a realistic and workable road map for implementation.

As I said, the amendment is not about ideology—I think we all agree about choice and competition—but about ensuring that patients receive timely care and have a meaningful choice about where that care is delivered. By fostering healthy competition, making full use of the capacity in the system and putting patients at the centre of the decision-making process, it offers a practical route to improving access and raising standards of care. For those reasons, I support it and commend it to the Committee.

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Promoting innovation

[Dr Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 58, clause 6, page 4, line 10, leave out from “promote” to end of line 11 and insert—

“(a) innovation in the provision of health services and in the arrangements made for their provision;

(b) take steps to ensure the timely adoption and spread of clinically effective innovations across the health service in England;

(c) identify and seek to remove barriers to the uptake of innovation by NHS bodies, including procurement barriers, regulatory barriers and cultural barriers to change;

(d) promote access to innovation so that patients in all parts of England, and patients from all socioeconomic backgrounds, have equivalent access to effective new technologies, medicines and care models; and

(e) have regard to the economic and industrial benefits to the United Kingdom of developing and deploying healthcare innovation in the NHS.”

This amendment would further define the meaning of promoting innovation in health services in England.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Dr Johnson]

In healthcare, as in many parts of life, innovation is the way in which new ideas, products and services are developed to solve problems and improve patient outcomes. Here, the entire country has a record to be proud of that goes back a long time. Dr John Preece, a GP and research fellow at the University of Exeter, was the first general practitioner to use a computer in a patient consultation. He co-designed a model with IBM in 1969, and his work led to the creation of the electronic patient record, the forerunner of the electronic patient record that we will discuss later. Innovators working with NHS England have also been seeking to reduce single-use plastic in gastrointestinal procedures, improving outcomes for haemodialysis patients, as well as improving the environment.

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[Peter Prinsley]

Does the shadow Minister accept that, in order to encourage innovation within the health service, we need to do whatever we can to support clinical academics? It is within the academic departments of universities, where people are working in hospitals and teaching in medical schools, that we see the most fruitful innovations.

[Dr Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman is right, but there are pressures and challenges for clinical academics, which he will be aware of. I am sure the Minister, in summing up, will tell us what she is doing about those.

We need to support innovation in all parts of the health service, not just in university hospitals. One of my concerns is that there has been a drive towards a hub and spoke model. There are good reasons for that, and there have been some good outcomes for patient care, but in some cases it restricts innovation in the peripheral parts of the model; it can disincentivise innovation and make it more difficult. We need to consider how we support innovation in all areas of the NHS.

[Helen Morgan]

One of the challenges of recruiting staff in Shropshire relates to exactly that point: some areas of the health service are perhaps less exciting to work in than others. Ensuring that innovation is driven across every NHS site and every region will help us understand the recruitment and retention problems that have plagued some of the country’s more rural areas.

[Dr Johnson]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. When I was a very junior doctor, whether one wanted to work in a small hospital in the countryside or a large teaching hospital in a big city mostly related to whether one wanted to study a specialist, narrow field of medicine or a wider, broader field of medicine with a variety of different conditions. During my career, I have seen consultants make choices that meant they had to move from their district general hospital to a teaching hospital in order to make progress—in one case, a consultant was told he would not get a professorship unless he moved. The hon. Lady is right: we need to carefully consider how we support innovation.

I have concerns with the clause as it is drafted. Section 13K of the NHS Act 2006 gave NHS England the power to award prizes in support of innovation. Clause 6 ensures the Secretary of State has that power, but there is a big difference between an arm’s length body of technocrats awarding prizes and a political office holder awarding prizes, because then the prizes come out of taxpayers’ money and Governments are particularly short of that—not because they are not taking higher rates of tax, but because they are squeezing the economy.

There is a risk that those awards, and funding for innovation more broadly, become exposed to political cycles. When Governments face a fiscal straitjacket, Ministers are often quick to slash discretionary spending, even though it provides a long-term return on investment. There is also a risk that prizes will be awarded on the basis of who shouts loudest. Certain charities will want the Government to focus on awarding innovations in cancer care, for example; some unions will want the Government to focus on awarding innovators who achieve greater equity in service delivery. There is little doubt that Ministers will have a tough time batting away lobbyists calling for more funding to incentivise this or that type of innovation.

Clause 6 also gives the Secretary of State the power to set up a committee to provide advice on awarding prizes. It is right that the Health Secretary should solicit expert advice when determining which trusts, teams or individuals deserve incentive payments, but does that require the power to set up what is effectively a whole new quango? The Government created more than 25 arm’s length bodies and advisory councils in their first six months. Does the Secretary of State require the power to pay members of the advisory committee when there are many experts in their field who can give their time charitably? I notice there is no requirement for any prize committee to include the chief scientific officer or representatives from ICBs. It is ultimately an unchecked spending power.

[Gregory Stafford]

What my hon. Friend describes is the real nub of the Bill. If we are to abolish NHS England and move most of its functions to the ICB level or to the Department of Health under a Secretary of State, it would be utter madness for us to, at best, move one set of bureaucrats from NHS England to the Department of Health and therefore gain no extra efficiency, or at worst, as seems to be the case in this clause, not only transfer the NHS England bureaucrats, but create a whole new set of bureaucrats and committees to continue the functions already performed under NHS England.

We need to understand whether the Bill is really about making our NHS more efficient by removing levels of bureaucracy, as was the stated intent of the Minister and the previous Secretary of State, or whether it is simply a political power grab where we keep all the bureaucrats and the inefficiency of the current system.

[Dr Johnson]

My hon. Friend, as ever, puts things very succinctly. Much of what is said about the Bill is different from what it seems to mean in practice. We have heard the Government talk about the decentralisation of power so decisions are made locally, but in the oral evidence session, even the union rep said that the Bill is more of a centralisation of power. I agree that creating new bureaucracy to replace old bureaucracy—particularly if that involves redundancies—does not help to save money or to make the system more efficient.

I tabled amendment 58 to make the duty on innovation more robust. It would make clause 6 specifically require the Secretary of State to promote innovation in the provision of services, ensure that innovations are spread and adopted across the NHS, tackle barriers to innovation and consider the wider economic benefits of innovation. That is important, because when we talk to people in the life sciences industry, they tell us that one of the biggest challenges is the roll-out of innovation. They can develop innovations in the UK, but it can take a long time to get them on to the shop floor, which is a disincentive to innovating in the United Kingdom. That process needs to move more quickly.

As currently drafted, the clause does not make it clear what innovation is for or whom it is meant to benefit. Amendment 58 would make it clear that innovation should be to benefit patients, no matter their location or socioeconomic status. I welcome the principle of keeping innovation on the statute book, but innovation is an organic process, and it does not begin in the Department of Health and Social Care or in NHS England—that is a fundamental principle that I think the Government fail to understand across many areas. Innovation begins with the frontline workers: the scientists, the technologists and the people who have ideas about better ways to care for patients. I am encouraged that the Minister understands that.

The Government’s vision for ICBs is that they will have more responsibility and more freedom to innovate—although we will discuss whether the legislation actually delivers that later in the Committee’s consideration—and I hope that vision extends to other areas of health policy. The clause is not disagreeable, but it must be made more robust. If Committee members agree, I hope they will support amendment 58.

[The Chair]

I gently suggest to all Committee members that it would help me tremendously if they could stand at the beginning of the debate on a group if they wish to be called.

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[Dr Johnson]

My hon. Friend is describing something a little like “Dragons’ Den”, which is a very good TV programme—perhaps it will be televised or livestreamed. How will the Government ensure that there is no conflict of interest?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend’s point is correct. There is so little detail in the clause about how these prizes will be awarded and how the committee that will award them will be set up that we have no idea how conflicts of interest will be dealt with. That is another reason that the Minister needs to explain to the Committee how this is going to work. My hon. Friend mentions “Dragons’ Den”. I see her as the Deborah Meaden of our Committee, so I look forward to seeing that play out—I will not say what that makes me.

What I see from amendment 58, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham— I hope I am not misrepresenting her—is once again an attempt to codify, clarify and strengthen what is fairly woolly wording within the Bill. In particular, her amendment rightly emphasises the importance of

“timely adoption and spread of clinically effective innovations”.

Timeliness is so important to patients. We need innovation quickly. Again, it worries me that the prizes could be given for innovations that could have happened weeks, months, years or decades ago, according to the wording. We also need to ensure that innovation is not in isolated pockets, either in terms of geography or type of service. We need something that is consistently delivered across the healthcare system.

By highlighting the need to address things such as procurement, the regulatory sector and cultural barriers, my hon. Friend’s amendment would support a more proactive and enabling environment for innovation to flourish, not one that shuts it down, as some Labour Members have suggested. Crucially, paragraph (d) of the amendment represents a significant and commendable commitment to fairness and inclusion by prioritising equal access to new technologies, medicines and models of care regardless of geography or socioeconomic background. It would help to tackle long-standing inequalities and move decisively towards ending the postcode lottery that we often see in care quality.

The focus of the amendment would ensure that innovation benefits all patients, not just those in the most advantaged areas. It would ensure that rural and coastal communities are aligned with the urban. As someone who represents a semi-rural seat, I see those inequalities in service delivery, quality of care and innovation. The large towns in my constituency receive far more money and get far better services than the surrounding villages.

I have many concerns about the clause as it currently stands, and I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify some of the Opposition’s questions. I entirely endorse amendment 58.

[Karin Smyth]

I am grateful to hon. Members for bringing this discussion to the Committee. We heard about the excitement in our constituencies around innovation—my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon and Consett mentioned Newcastle University at the start and the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham mentioned her visit to Imperial College. Those visits are inspiring. Other universities and centres of excellence are available, but they made the case for why this is so important to the Government’s approach to innovation. I will talk about that and then turn to the amendment.

The Government are fully committed to innovation. It is absolutely central to our ambitious priorities to digitise health and care, support prevention and early diagnosis, and enable a shift to neighbourhood care, to growth in our economy, and to regaining our place in the world as a centre for innovation, which was lost under the Conservatives over those 14 years. That is why clause 6 places a clear duty on the Secretary of State to promote innovation in the provision of health services, including in how services are arranged and delivered.

The clause also incorporates the Secretary of State’s existing power to incentivise innovation and research through the payment of prizes, as we have discussed. That is a flexible tool that will allow him to stimulate breakthrough ideas and reward innovation across the life cycle, including an early-stage report.

On some issues that have been raised, the Conservative party knows that Ministers have to act reasonably as this transfers from NHS England, and we would obviously want to tailor a committee to the matter in question, including membership. The clause will allow that flexibility. The equivalent duty was on NHS England; I understand that it has not actually been used over the past five years, but it was previously suggested as a way of promoting innovation.

In practical terms, the Secretary of State already supports innovation in a number of ways, for example through the work of the Health Innovation Network, supporting workforce developments in schemes such as the clinical entrepreneur programme and providing funding support for developing and evaluating promising innovations.

[Dr Johnson]

The Minister talked about the flexibility of the committee, and my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon explained why it is helpful to have some direction. Could the Minister explain why there is no stipulation for the chief medical officer or the chief scientific officer to be part of the committee?

[Karin Smyth]

I am happy to come back to the hon. Lady if I am not correct in this, or if there is another reason, but in the existing duty and under NHS England, the committee’s membership needs to reflect the matter in the question. If there is anything to add to that, I will certainly come back to her. We are also committed to spending more on innovation, raising the NICE threshold to ensure that patients have access to more innovative medicines on the NHS. That is action, not just words.

The Government commend the intent behind the amendment tabled by the hon. Lady, and she spoke well about that. As a clinician, I recognise her support for innovation, but we recognise that barriers remain to the systematic spread of innovation. That is a long-term problem that existed under previous Governments as well, and we seek to rectify it. The ministerial foreword to the “Life Science Sector Plan” published last year says:

“We are clear-eyed about the challenges. For too long, the journey from discovery to delivery has been too slow, too fragmented, and too often held back by outdated systems.”

That is why we need to remove barriers at every stage of the journey; however, the amendment is the wrong way to do that.

The experience of supporting innovation in the NHS suggests that we need flexibility in our approach to tackle emerging barriers as they arise. Specifying several areas of focus in the Bill would limit that flexibility; those are better set out in published strategies and guidance, which is what we are doing. The amendment could also cause unintended consequences. It would create a one-size-fits-all approach, requiring all of England to have equivalent access to innovations. While tackling unwarranted variation is of course vital, we should continue our focus on providing access to innovation that best meets local needs.

Instead of over-defining what we mean by innovation in legislation, we are taking practical measures to drive it on the ground. We are already building the 10-year health plan and the life sciences sector plan to deliver an ambitious set of actions, which address the areas raised by the amendment including procurement, aligned regulation and the alignment of our NHS innovation policy with sector growth policy. That echoes our approach elsewhere in the Bill of devolving power to local levels and giving more opportunity to systems and organisations to innovate, and more agency to use their resources to do so.

The NHS has a strong record of developing and adopting new treatments, technologies and models of care. The clause will build on that record, signalling the Secretary of State’s clear commitment to promoting innovation, and it will do so in a flexible way that will allow us to respond to challenges as they emerge. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham to withdraw her amendment, and I commend the clause the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

I rise to support clause 7 and amendment 33, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West. Having worked in the NHS for many years, I have seen that education and training, especially mandatory training, is absolutely necessary. Some may argue that health staff have too much training, particularly mandatory training, but this amendment specifically concerns training

“in the wider determinants of health such as housing standards, exposure to air pollution, occupational risk, and use of harmful substances like tobacco.”

We may have staff, especially those working in mental health, who have training in some of those areas, but staff in A&E, where patients first present, may not have that training, and may be missing that curiosity. We have heard many incidents involving families living in mouldy houses or people exposed to air pollution. It is important that staff have the curiosity to consider where a patient has come from when they turn up at A&E, or, when planning a discharge, where they are being discharged to.

In the last few years, we have seen many internationally trained healthcare workers join our health sector who may not be familiar with the social and housing situation in this country. Whether this is to be a part of their initial training as nurses or doctors, or through mandatory training at work, the amendment is important because it could help to prevent illnesses and identify them earlier through professional curiosity. I support amendment 33.

[Dr Johnson]

I declare an interest as a member of the NHS workforce and an NHS consultant paediatrician. In England, around one in every 17 working people is employed by the national health service. That is quite a shocking statistic. It is the largest employer in the country and, indeed, in Europe. It has grown significantly over time, in part because the needs of the population have changed. Life expectancy is longer, which is something to be cherished—that is a good thing—but it brings challenges to the health service, as people are more likely to be living with multiple chronic conditions rather than easily treatable ailments. They require more tests, medicines and clinical care. Demographic change requires a larger NHS workforce, particularly in secondary care.

The previous Conservative Government not only recognised the scale of that challenge but took swift action to increase staffing levels across the board, adding more than 42,000 doctors and 55,000 nurses, health visitors and midwives. Conservative Ministers also supported the pipeline responsible for producing the next generation of medical practitioners. They funded 1,500 additional medical school places and opened five new medical schools, including in Sunderland, Lancashire, Chelmsford and Canterbury, and one just outside my constituency in Lincoln. Emergency care became the fastest-growing specialty, with the number of emergency care doctors doubling. That is what support for the NHS workforce looks like.

Conservative investments in the workforce helped to improve survival rates for cancer, increase the number of GP appointments and deliver the fastest vaccine roll-out in Europe. Under existing legislation, the Secretary of State has a responsibility to ensure that there is an effective system for planning and delivering education and training to current and potential staff. Health Education England has been rolled into NHS England, so it is ultimately NHS England that has the duty to ensure sufficient and appropriately trained staff to meet NHS workforce needs. Now that NHS England is to be abolished, it is right that this duty is to be given to the Secretary of State through clause 7, although to some extent it is a statement of the obvious that that is part of his job.

The job of members of this Committee is to improve the Bill, not just wave it through, and that means recognising that the existing legislation had some inadequacies. Clause 7 states:

“The Secretary of State must exercise functions…with a view to ensuring”

several things about the workforce. It is not a cast-iron requirement; the Secretary of State must just think about it, but actually he should not just think about his job; he should get on with it. I have a bit of a bee in my bonnet about legislation that creates obligations that are easy to proclaim and that are virtuous but are difficult to measure. Such legislation makes legislators feel good about themselves because they are writing nice things into legislation, but they are not really robust. What does

“sufficient people with appropriate education”

mean? What is “sufficient”?

One reason concerns are particularly acute is the Government’s shambolic record on workforce planning. They came to power saying that they had a plan, but their workforce plan has still not been published, almost two years since they came into office. I heard the Minister say “imminently”, but I had a written answer last week, I think, saying “imminently”. I appreciate that “imminently” is probably better than “soon”, but what does it really mean, and how soon can we expect the plan to be published? Does she mean that it is coming this week or next? Can she guarantee that it will be published before the summer recess? Has the Prime Minister’s resignation yesterday put all this up in the air once again?

The Royal College of Radiologists has said that the shortfall in clinical radiologists has grown from 29% to 32% since 2024, and the Royal College of Nursing has released data showing that the growth in the nursing workforce slowed last year to its lowest level in eight years. Newly qualified midwives are finding themselves with no jobs to go to in the health service, despite the fact that there is a maternity staffing crisis in some areas. Will the Minister explain the reason for the delay? She said earlier in this sitting that it was not NHS England, but what is causing the delay?

We were told that stakeholders wanted more time to have conversations, test ideas and work together. One would think that after the many months of deliberation, Ministers would have put together an exceptional workforce plan, but the Royal College of Nursing, the British Medical Association, of which I am a member, Unite the union and several other organisations wrote to the Health Secretary earlier this month to urge for the plan, which they have but which has not been published, to be “paused”, because they are

“concerned that the current direction falls significantly short of the scale of workforce growth required to meet patient need and relies too heavily on assumptions about the current state of NHS services, productivity and technology that are not borne out of frontline experience.”

I recently tabled a question asking who had been given advanced sight of the workforce plan, and I received confirmation that the royal colleges and unions have been involved. As I mentioned, I am a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. We now have a situation where a workforce plan is being delayed, and it has been brought before other organisations for discussion rather than elected Members of this House. It is taking far too long. In the meantime, things are going backwards. It is simply not good enough. Ministers are now about to roll out a plan that has mortified seemingly everyone who has seen it, while expecting members of the Committee to rubber-stamp a rather flimsy legal duty.

In May, the Financial Times reported that plans drawn up under this Government would see recruitment cut back. The article reads:

“A workforce plan being finalised by health officials says the NHS in England will have to use technology to get by with hundreds of thousands fewer staff than envisaged under the previous Conservative government.”

Is that clinical staff? Are we going to have fewer doctors? It is not clear because we have not seen the plan and it has not been published. A draft of the plan seen by the newspaper said that the NHS

“does not need anything like the…numbers…set out in its 2023 workforce plan.’

Will the Minister confirm whether those press reports are accurate? She previously said that her plan

“will ensure that the NHS has the right people in the right places with the right skills for patients when they need them”.—[Official Report, 13 January 2026; Vol. 778, c. 737-738.]

Does that mean fewer people and more AI?

Puberty Blockers

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House calls on the Government to take steps to prevent the PATHWAYS clinical trial into the effect of puberty suppressing hormones on children with gender incongruence.

Before I start, I declare an interest as an NHS consultant paediatrician, a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, and a member of the British Medical Association. It is also important for us to recognise at the beginning of this debate that we are talking about the protection of children—vulnerable children who are troubled, and who need our care and compassion and the very best quality of healthcare.

The healthcare of children distressed about their gender is an area in which attempts have been made to shut down debate with threats and accusations of transphobia; we saw the way that the hon. Member for Canterbury (Rosie Duffield) was treated when she raised concerns. As adults and as elected Members of this House, we have a duty to safeguard children in our country. That means protecting them from adults who—with whatever motivation, good or bad—could do them harm.

As a children’s doctor, I have recruited patients for trials, and I have cared for children and babies participating in clinical trials. I recognise the value of a well-designed clinical trial in improving clinical care, but today the House is not being asked to consider the principle of performing clinical trials in general, or on children in particular—I hope we can all agree that a well-designed trial can improve care. Rather, we are being asked to consider the Pathways trial: whether it meets ethical tests, what it does, the cohort, the protocol and the consent. I will go through each of those points in turn.

The Pathways trial is part of a group of studies run by King’s College London and funded by the Government. So what does it do and why are we so concerned? The trial will take 226 children who are physically healthy—who are developing normally—and inject them with powerful drugs to delay that normal development in a way that may weaken their bones, affect their ability to think, damage their sexual function, and leave them unable to have children of their own.

We are told that the purpose of this is to treat a diagnosis of gender incongruence. So what is gender incongruence? The International Classification of Diseases states that it is

“characterised by a marked and persistent incongruence between an individual’s experienced gender and the assigned sex, which often leads to a desire to ‘transition’”.

We know that gender incongruence is a condition that is subjective. It is based on how someone tells us they feel. There are no blood tests and no lab markers that can be used to diagnose it. As a paediatrician myself, I understand that how patients feel, particularly in relation to their mental health, is very important. We know from the Cass review that the vast majority of children with gender incongruence will get better on their own. Again, as a paediatrician, I am used to providing supportive treatment for conditions such as respiratory viruses and gastroenteritis, which generally get better on their own, but I am not used to giving powerful drugs to children that can cause permanent long-term damage for subjective, self-resolving difficulties during adolescence.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

As a consultant paediatrician, my hon. Friend will be able to give a definitive view on this matter. Some who campaign for this treatment and therapy argue that the effects of gene therapy are reversible. To what extent are they reversible? Should we be treating this as a reversible treatment? My hon. Friend has referred to permanent damage. Can we try to agree across the House at least on this matter: that gene therapy applied to children is not reversible?

[Dr Johnson]

This is not a form of gene therapy. It is a medication that is a GnRH analogue, and what it essentially does is delay puberty. It was designed as a drug to treat children who go into puberty much earlier than they would be expected to, and to delay it until, as it were, the right time. The effects of the use of puberty blockers in older children and for a much longer period, at an age when they ought to have started puberty, are not fully understood.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

My hon. Friend says that we do not know the effects, but a number of children have been put through this process via the now discredited Tavistock process. Why does she think that the NHS will not refer to the data linkage study and use the data that would have been gained from the children who were put through that process, in order to find out what the effects are before deciding to put a whole new cohort of children through what is clearly a damaging procedure?

[Dr Johnson]

My hon. Friend raises a very good point, and I will come to the data linkage study shortly. What we do know from the Cass review is that the vast majority of children who went on to puberty blockers in adolescence went on to receive cross-sex hormones, which are known to have permanent effects.

One fact that is crucially important is that it is not possible for clinicians to confidently determine which children with gender incongruence will persist with the trans identity into adulthood, and which will not. How can the clinicians possibly know that they are not injecting potentially dangerous drugs into children whose incongruence will resolve itself? The answer is that they cannot. Will the Secretary of State tell us whether he is aware of new evidence allowing clinicians to work out confidently which children will persist with the trans identity at 11 and which will not? We need to think about the risk involved in the treatment, and whether it is worth the benefits that they will purportedly receive.

The trial researchers suggest that they will take a wide approach to looking at potential benefits, that they will look at quality of life and body satisfaction, and that there must be a reasonable prospect of benefit; but how can they know whether there is a reasonable prospect of benefit when they do not know whether or not the condition will persist? Some have suggested that giving puberty blockers will help the few adults who retain their trans identity into adulthood to pass as the opposite sex. Does the Secretary of State think that the long-term damage to many is worth it for the cosmetic benefit of a few? The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 specify that “anticipated benefits” must justify the risk. This is an ethical rather than a medical question. Does the Secretary of State think that the benefits justify the risk?

I regret that we have ended up discussing the details of a clinical trial in the Chamber—the reality is that things should be done impartially by scientists in most cases—but with this topic we have seen the quashing of open debate, which is why we have ended up where we are.

I will move on to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon (Gregory Stafford). Even if the Secretary of State thinks the principle of the trial is right, he must surely agree that it is unnecessary and unethically broad. For example, if someone was designing a trial to treat children with a specific form of cancer, the children who would be entered into the trial would have that specific form of cancer. We would not include children with any disease, because that would make the results unreliable in terms of benefit to the target group and children would be unnecessarily put at risk of receiving experimental drugs that they did not need.

The same applies to this trial. The Cass report tells us that many of the children in the proposed trial will get better on their own. The Secretary of State said yesterday that

“we are talking about a very small subset of a very small group.”—[Official Report, 22 June 2026; Vol. 788, c. 56.]

[Dr Scott Arthur (Edinburgh South West) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady knows that she is one of my favourite Tories—I think I have said that before. She has quoted Baroness Cass many times. Of course, Baroness Cass thinks this trial should go ahead, because the benefits outweigh the costs. Why is Baroness Cass wrong and the hon. Lady right?

[Dr Johnson]

Well, one of the things with doctors is that if you ask two doctors, you might get two different opinions. I completely respect Baroness Cass. She has been president of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, of which I am a member, and she has done great work on the report that we commissioned in the last Parliament. I know she is concerned that people may obtain these drugs illegally if they are not provided, but I do not share that concern. Personally, I think the important thing is whether the people obtaining such drugs legally are using them in a way that is safe, and I am not convinced that that is the case.

[Dr Arthur]

By giving way a second time, the hon. Lady shows why she is my favourite Tory. Does Baroness Cass not say that she has met young people who have been self-medicating with testosterone, which is irreversible? That is one of the problems that we are trying to address through this trial. It is about protecting young people so that they are not going down their own medical pathway, but are listening to medical advice and are well supported in a coherent framework.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Johnson]

I am sorry, but I just do not support that. We would not give children cocaine on the basis that they wanted it and would get it illegally otherwise. These are not sweeties; they are powerful drugs and need to be treated with respect.

Even if we accept the premise that a very small number of people might benefit from treatment, how could clinicians decide which children to treat? On what ethical or moral code would we want to inject powerful drugs into children who are likely to have a self-limiting illness and therefore do not need it? That is what the Government have chosen to do, and it is not necessary.

Following on from the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon, they have this data already. The Tavistock was a travesty, but it means that the Government could analyse the data from the outcomes of those children. They could establish the outcomes as children went into adulthood, and Baroness Cass tried to do this using the data linkage study. Shockingly, six out of seven adult gender clinics refused to provide the Government with the data. Even when a specific piece of legislation was passed by the previous Government to clarify that it was legal to provide the information to this trial, the gender clinics still did not provide it.

I understand that NHS England is working on the data linkage study, but I ask the Secretary of State why it is taking so long. Is the abolition of NHS England causing delay? Why is he letting this trial, which he has expressed reservations about, go ahead in the knowledge that it is unnecessarily broad and in advance of the data linkage study?

[Iqbal Mohamed (Dewsbury and Batley) (Ind)]

Does the hon. Lady agree that unblocking the reasons why the data is not being made available should be the top priority, and that analysis of that data should be done before any further experiments on children are done?

[Dr Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman is exactly right, and he expresses my point succinctly. Why is the Secretary of State going ahead with a trial—experimenting on more children unnecessarily—when he has the data to analyse already? Why has he chosen to fund this trial? Is he worried about the children who will be put on a medical pathway that may lead to cross-sex hormones and a lifetime of medicalisation when they would have got better by themselves anyway?

I want to talk about the age of these young people. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency warned in February that the youngest patients are at the greatest risk, and may end up on puberty blockers for a much longer period. They have a higher risk to fertility because sperm and eggs have not yet fully developed at Tanner stage 2, but this Government have chosen to include children of 11 or 12. Some will wonder why it is 11 for girls and 12 for boys—indeed, I was asked that question yesterday—but as a paediatrician I am aware that puberty starts earlier in girls than in boys. It is somewhat ironic that a trial based on the premise that girls could be boys recognises this biology, but I am glad that in this respect it does. However, that means some of the participants will be primary school-aged children with the merest form of puberty. How can they possibly meet the eligibility criteria, which includes

“sufficient understanding of the treatment advantages and disadvantages, including discussion of fertility preservation”?

How can a child of 11 understand what it means to lose sexual function, to be unable to have children when they are older, to have difficulties in thinking and to have weak bones? Remember that this Government think that 14-year-olds are not old enough to watch social media, but they think 11-year-olds are capable of understanding this.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I just say this to the hon. Lady and, perhaps more importantly, to the Secretary of State, who is very genuine, personable and easy to speak to. In Northern Ireland, the Assembly and the Minister there have taken a decision not to pursue this. Would the hon. Lady agree that, when the Government pursue something here that may set a precedent for somewhere that has not agreed to it at the time, there could be an influence, with an adverse impact on the regional Administrations—the Northern Ireland Assembly where we are, and elsewhere—and it is important that the Government here do not take a decision that could influence areas they do not control?

[Dr Johnson]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention on devolution, and I am sure the Secretary of State was listening and considering what he has said.

To go back to the age of the young people, I am reminded of the judgment in Bell v. Tavistock, which says:

“We do not think that the answer to this case is simply to give the child more, and more detailed, information. The issue in our view is that in many cases, however much information the child is given as to long-term consequences, s/he will not be able to weigh up the implications of the treatment to a sufficient degree.”

I draw right hon. and hon. Members’ attention to the next part of the quote:

“There is no age appropriate way to explain to many of these children what losing their fertility or full sexual function may mean to them in later years.”

Yet, as Secretary of State confirmed yesterday, the children must consent or assent to being in this trial. Another question that he did not answer yesterday is why the Government did not heed the MHRA recommendation for a minimum of 14 years. Having established that the Government are going to put a group of physically healthy children with a self-resolving condition at a risk they may not fully understand, the remaining question is why they would they want to do this.

The trial itself has an interesting design. We are told that it is a randomised controlled trial—as a doctor, I am familiar with that term—but in this case it is a bit of a fudge. Yes, this Government-sponsored trial will randomise which children get the drugs now and which get them in a year’s time, but the comparison group that does not receive puberty blockers—300 children from the Horizon Intensive trial, with whom the trial will seek to compare—may not be considered a reliable comparison, because the group is a different group with different eligibility criteria. When the results of this trial are published, this fact is bound to be used by people who dispute or disagree with the findings. The Secretary of State said this trial will resolve the dispute over the issue, but that is one of the reasons why I think it will not.

I want to discuss sexual function, because yesterday the Secretary of State said that the trial would involve the completion of a number of questionnaires, and one of my hon. Friends raised the question about what happens to children’s sexual function in the long term. What is sexual function? It is desire, arousal and orgasm. The trial organisers are clearly concerned about this, because they put into the trial the ALSPAC—Avon longitudinal study of parents and children—romantic relationships questionnaire. I read the questionnaire on the Health Research Authority website, and children from the age of 12 and over will be asked these questions, one of which is:

“In the last year have you had oral sex with another person? (This is when they put their mouth or tongue on your penis/vagina or you put your mouth or tongue on their penis/vagina)”.

Let us be clear: if that is happening to a 12-year-old, that is sexual abuse and the police should be called. Is the Secretary of State content for the Government to be asking these questions of such young children? Can he believe that they will be paid £20 for completing their questionnaires, alongside £30 for completing the assessment of cognitive ability and £15 for completing physical and height assessments, in addition to travel expenses?

There will be lots of talk this week about the Prime Minister’s legacy. Putting children as young as 11 on puberty blockers, with irreversible life-changing consequences, would be the most disturbing final chapter in what has been a troubled book of leadership. Today, right hon. and hon. Members will be asked to vote to consider their approval or disapproval of the trial. I urge them to look at their conscience, read the trial protocol—it is online—and remember that these are vulnerable children who deserve the best care. One day, the children caught in the middle of this debate will be adults. It is our responsibility to ensure that when they look back on their one childhood, their one adolescence and their one chance to enjoy growing up, they must know that every decision was made with the utmost care, caution and respect for their future. The power to make that happen is in our hands today. I urge hon. Members to protect children’s futures.

Pathways Study: Puberty Suppression

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Monday 22nd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I declare an interest as an NHS consultant paediatrician and a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. What does this trial do? Put simply, it takes physically healthy children with normal pubertal development and subjects them to powerful drugs that may weaken their bones, affect their ability to think, damage sexual function and make them unable to have children of their own. Serious stuff—and for what? To treat a diagnosis of gender incongruence that will probably resolve without treatment.

Let us look at this carefully. Gender incongruence is a subjective condition; it is how someone says they feel. There are no lab markers and no scans. That, of course, is not necessarily unusual. In fact, it is common in mental health conditions. Gender incongruence is often self-resolving; it gets better on its own. Again, this is not unusual in paediatrics. It is really common for children to be admitted to hospital for supported care for things like gastroenteritis and respiratory viruses. Puberty blockers are powerful drugs. This is a powerful treatment with significant long-term consequences. Again, this is not new to paediatrics. Some chemotherapy, for example, has substantial short and long-term consequences. But what is unusual and, I think, toxic is the combination of all three. Medicine is about balancing risk. Where else would we give powerful drugs with potentially serious long-term consequences for a subjective condition that is likely to get better on its own?

I understand that this trial has been approved, but time and again we have seen and heard how fear and hostility can distort priorities. We have seen tragedy occur when fears of accusations of racism limited mental health treatment. We have seen profound suffering when fear of accusations of Islamophobia limited inquiries into the grooming gangs. The healthcare of children distressed about their gender is another topic where there have been attempts to shut down debate with threats and accusations of transphobia.

Such attempts were reported in relation to the Tavistock.

When considering treatments for life, with lifelong implications, we have a duty to be careful and sensible, so I ask the Secretary of State: why are this Government funding a trial that will cause harm to physically healthy children? These children may be 11 years old, at Tanner stage 2. Some of them are primary school children with only minimal signs of puberty. This is far too young. The MHRA warned in February that the youngest patients are at greatest risk; they may end up on puberty blockers for a much longer period, and face a higher risk to fertility, because sperm and eggs have not yet fully developed at Tanner stage 2.

I am reminded of this point in the judgment in Bell v. Tavistock:

“There is no age appropriate way to explain to many of these children what losing their fertility or full sexual function may mean to them in later years.”

Yet as the Secretary of State confirmed, the children must consent or assent to being in the trial. Why did the Government not heed the MHRA’s recommendation of a minimum age of 14 years? This Labour Government think that 14 is too young to watch social media. Why do they think 11 is old enough for this trial?

What is the goal of the treatment? In the trial, the outcome is a short to medium-term effect on quality of life and body satisfaction. Does the Secretary of State believe this is proportionate to the risks of these medications? Is there any evidence suggesting that puberty blockers are safer than they were thought to be in 2024, when the Government banned them, following the expert advice from the Commission on Human Medicines? Some have suggested that the drugs help adults to pass as the opposite sex. Is the long-term damage really worth it for the cosmetic benefit of a few? And it is just a few, because we know that the vast majority will be better without any treatment.

The Secretary of State said that “when it comes to eligibility, we are talking about a very small subset of a very small group.” Even if we were to accept the premise that a very small number might benefit from treatment, how could the clinicians identify which those children might be? A study of clinical outcomes from kids treated at the Tavistock is due to be completed next year. That could help, so why is the Secretary of State not waiting until that report is completed before conducting an experiment on an unnecessarily broad group of children? Has evidence come to light since the Cass review that helps clinicians confidently work out which 11-year-olds will become adults with gender dysphoria and which will not?

The Secretary of State has said that the criteria will stop short-term harm, and that should mean that long-term harm will not occur or go unnoticed, but history is littered with examples of things that do not cause short-term harm but do cause long-term damage. He also suggested that the trial will resolve the dispute, but sadly, I do not think that will be the case, because, first, a single trial rarely resolves a dispute; and, secondly, the comparison group, who are not getting the puberty blockers, are not randomised and are an intrinsically different population. This is bound to be highlighted once the result is published. In medicine, we have a founding principle: primum non nocere—first, do no harm. I ask the Health Secretary to please cancel this trial before vulnerable children suffer unnecessary, irreversible harm on his watch.

[James Murray]

I agree with the shadow Minister that most children and young people who are questioning their identity and gender are likely to resolve those questions on their own, and I think Dr Cass would agree with that. As I said in my opening remarks, for the majority of children who question their gender, we should let them be; they will resolve the matter through their friends and family and their own development. We are talking here about a small subset within a small group of children who need further support. I also agree with the shadow Minister that the situation before Dr Cass did her review—the situation that had developed in the last few years before the turn of the decade—was totally unacceptable, and we should be clear that that was wrong.

The shadow Minister asked about protecting the young people involved in the trial from harm. As I set out, there is intense scrutiny, and there are robust mechanisms to prevent the children involved from being harmed. She mentioned the MHRA recommendation for the lower age limit. Initially, there was no lower age limit, but a scientific dialogue between the MHRA and the trial sponsor led to publication last week of the updated protocol, which recommended the minimum ages of 11 and 12.

The gateways to younger people and children becoming involved in the trial are significant. There must be not just consent or assent from the children, and consent from their parents or guardians, but approval from the NHS care team, the national multidisciplinary team and others before anyone can be involved. As I set out, I feel uncomfortable and uneasy when considering this matter, but I think that the right way for us to move forward is to have the clinical evidence on which to base decisions. I have received reassurances about there being the highest possible level of scrutiny and protection from harm for young people involved in the trial, and that is the basis on which, on balance, I think it is right for it to proceed.

Health Bill (Third sitting)

Caroline Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Secondary Care (Karin Smyth)]

Clause 1 formally abolishes NHS England as a statutory body, which is one of the key aims of the Bill. The current structure, with its two centres, has led to layers of unnecessary bureaucracy, duplication and unclear lines of accountability, and has come with significant cost, with the centre growing significantly in size since 2013. Through the Bill, we are simplifying the organisational landscape of the NHS and removing unnecessary complexity and overlapping roles among NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care. The reform will enable leaders and staff to focus on delivering care, rather than on navigating bureaucratic hurdles. Importantly, it will also restore Ministers’ central role in national oversight and setting strategy, which the public rightly expect as part of a democratic system. The creation of an arm’s length body of this size was a mistake, and we seek to rectify it.

Clause 2 is integral to the orderly abolition of NHS England. It empowers the Secretary of State to establish transfer schemes, which will provide a structured and transparent means of moving property, rights and liabilities from NHS England to the Department of Health and Social Care, the integrated care boards and other relevant bodies. This robust legal mechanism is required to ensure a responsible transfer of NHS England’s assets and staff. It ensures that all necessary legal powers and permissions for the transfer are in place, preventing uncertainty or loose ends for staff, patients, service users and partner organisations as NHS England is abolished. The clause allows provisions to be made similar to those under TUPE to ensure the protection of employment rights for staff who are transferred from NHS England. In addition, the clause allows for the shared ownership or use of property, ensuring that assets can be distributed and used in a way that supports service continuity for patients and the broader health system.

Clause 3, at its core, provides a power for His Majesty’s Treasury to ensure through regulations that transfers from NHSE to the DHSC, ICBs and other bodies are delivered smoothly and on a tax-neutral basis. In particular, it allows HM Treasury to make adjustments to how existing tax legislation applies to transfers of NHS England’s property, staff and liabilities in a scheme made under clause 2. That will ensure that no tax charges arise, and that neither NHS England nor the transferee organisations end up with a different tax position due to the organisational changes. Importantly, the scope of the power is tightly constrained: it applies only to specified existing taxes and only for the purpose of ensuring tax neutrality in relation to transfers made under clause 2. Without the power, there would be a risk that transfers could trigger unintended tax liabilities that would divert public money away from frontline services and undermine the policy intent of the legislation. Clause 3 therefore protects value for money and ensures that organisational change does not come with avoidable fiscal costs.

Without the changes made by clauses 1 to 3 we will not be able to meet the ambitions set out in the 10-year health plan. The abolition of NHS England, delivered in an orderly, proportionate and considered way that safeguards the interests of staff and taxpayers, is a necessary precondition for an NHS that is more effective for patients, delivers better outcomes across the country and achieves the ambitions that the public expect of us. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. First, I declare a number of interests. I am a consultant paediatrician working in the NHS, a member of the British Medical Association and a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. Like the Minister for Secondary Care, I got into politics after working in the health service. I am sure she agrees that what you see when working in the health service stays with you when working in the House, and that it benefits the House to have people who have done all different jobs working here.

The NHS constitution says that health services should

“improve, prevent, diagnose and treat both physical and mental health problems with equal regard”,

yet in my work as a doctor—and I worked across several hospitals during my training—the gap between the vision of what should be delivered and the reality of what is being delivered has become apparent to me. The answer frequently given seems to be top-down reorganisation. As I will talk about in a minute, such top-down reorganisation has been done so many times but does not seem necessarily to have delivered in practice what it promised. Indeed, to an extent, we seem to be changing things from how they were to how they are to how they were, backwards and forwards. This Government have decided, in pursuit of better outcomes and cost savings, once again to reorganise the health service, and they seek to do so with this Bill and particularly clause 1.

Clause 1 formally abolishes NHS England. The clause may have very few words, but they represent one of the biggest changes to our health service in decades. Abolishing NHS England is not just a decision about organisational structure or trimming bureaucracy, but a break with the direction of travel the health service has been on since its inception.

Prior to the creation of the NHS in 1948, health services were fragmented: some people used contributory workplace schemes, people who could afford it paid out of pocket, and everyone else relied on very limited state and voluntary provision or went without. In the aftermath of the second world war, the national health service created a state monopoly provider. The Minister of Health had a duty to provide a comprehensive health service free for all at the point of use and a bureaucracy was created to manage it.

There was a tripartite split between hospital services, local authority services and independent practitioner services. The hospitals provided secondary care for those with serious disease and those requiring emergency response. The NHS also took over many cottage hospitals in rural areas that had previously been run by GPs, and larger hospitals that used to be run by local authorities and the voluntary sector. At that time, hospital staff were managed by hospital management committees appointed by regional hospital boards. Those boards implemented Government policies and oversaw the budget. Meanwhile, teaching hospitals kept more independence, directed by their own boards of governors.

Councils, operating as local health authorities, had a duty to provide several personal health services including health centres, maternity care, home nursing, immunisation and ambulance services—some of those are now provided by NHS England. They also had substantial powers to prevent illness and to care for the disabled. Independent practitioners—GPs, dentists, pharmacists and opticians— delivered services to local communities under contract from the health service. Now they deliver under contract from NHS England and the ICBs.

The health service underwent significant reorganisation in 1974, not long before I was born. The main objective at that time was to create a unified, integrated system. Community health services previously operated by councils moved into NHS control. These functions were put under the control of new area health authorities, which took control of most NHS hospitals. Some larger area health authorities had their own distinct management teams, which managed services on the ground—we can look at the current process and ask how it is similar and how it is different. The majority of teaching hospitals lost independent governance, in the way that we, too, are seeing that go back and forth. Above the new area health authorities sat regional health authorities, which were responsible for planning and allocating financial resources. Their members were appointed by the Secretary of State.

In the 1980s, Ministers recognised that the system had become very bureaucratic—perhaps similarly to today—and in 1982, area health authorities and district management committees were scrapped in favour of new district health authorities, with the aim of reducing what was in effect a three-layer structure to two layers. The thinking was that the new district health authorities would be closer to local populations, but primary care was left mostly unchanged. Once again, there are parallels with what is happening now.

From its inception to the end of the 1980s, the NHS had gone through several waves of rationalisation, but the model remained that of a centrally planned public service. However, during that time, there was an intellectual change—the concept of choice. Previously, people had been happy just to get a health service, which they had not had access to before, but that changed and people wanted choice. We now see the benefits of giving patients choice, and we will hear about how the Government’s changes through the Bill will apparently improve patient choice.

Of course, individuals have different values and preferences and live their lives in different ways, which makes it impossible for there to be a single public interest for the Government to pursue. Against that backdrop, the new public management approach to Government administration emerged, advocating for the introduction of market mechanisms and performance metrics—we have heard about the targets that NHS England follows—in public institutions. In theory, if elements of the state could operate more like the private sector, perhaps Ministers could achieve both cost savings and better outcomes.

In 1991 the Government introduced market logic into the health service. They created an internal market by splitting the purchasers—mainly, at that time, the district health authorities—from the providers, which were the hospitals. The Secretary of State gained the power to create NHS trusts—hospitals with the freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of assets; make bids for capital directly to the NHS management executive, in the way they might for NHS England; borrow money within limits; develop their own management structure; and employ their own staff with their own terms of employment. Within three years, almost all providers had become trusts. GP fundholding was established, enabling larger practices to receive budgets to buy secondary care on behalf of their patients, but that was short lived and was shelved in 1999.

When new Labour came to power in the late ’90s, one might have thought that things might swing back the other way, but in some respects the trajectory was similar. Initially, the Labour Government talked critically about the internal market. In 1998 the then Health Secretary told Members that the Government were

“sweeping away the internal market”—[Official Report, 1 July 1998; Vol. 315, c. 314.]

and the NHS plan published in 2000 claimed that

“the internal market introduced competition but failed to bring improvements.”

However, the policy choices of that Government furthered, rather than dismantled, the marketised aspects of the health service. They were saying one thing but, to some extent, doing another. There are similarities with this Bill: we have talked about decentralising power but, as we heard in evidence on Tuesday, many people feel it is more of a centralising Bill than a decentralising Bill.

It was clear that the new public management approach had been adopted across the political divide. The NHS plan promised patients more choice about how to access the NHS—a good thing. It promised a system of inspection, accountability and far greater local autonomy. It said:

“For the first time the NHS and the private sector will work more closely together not just to build new hospitals but to provide NHS patients with the operations they need.”

When GP fundholding went, the Government introduced primary care groups, which meant that GPs, nurses and other staff came together to commission for local populations. Those groups then evolved into primary care trusts, which by 2002 were responsible for spending 80% of the annual NHS budget—a budget that is now distributed by NHS England.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Very well. I call Caroline Johnson.

[Dr Johnson]

Thank you, Sir Jeremy. I will be grateful if the Minister clarifies at the end, because she seems to be suggesting that Lord Darzi’s report was wrong in some way. He was assessing the NHS at the same time that she was, with the experience of having been a Minister, and made the counter-suggestion.

It is not just about what one does; it is about how one goes about it. As we heard on Tuesday, there is in general a plan of what is going to happen, but so many decisions have not been made yet in relation to this. In particular, one of the witnesses from the union talked about how unsettling that was for staff and how difficult it is for staff to be asked to go from the current location to a destination unknown. It is very difficult to make transformation in a direction when it is not clear where one wants to be.

In March 2025, the Government announced that NHSE would be abolished. The largest healthcare union described the handling of the announcement as “shambolic”, coming only days after the announcement of a 50% cut to staffing levels at the centre. In the days and months since, Ministers have provided only some clarity about what they are trying to achieve. According to the Government, the restructure will cut red tape, save money, devolve power and improve accountability, all with a view to improving patient outcomes. Those are not new objectives; they are the same objectives that underpinned the creation of NHS England. How is it that the same objectives require dismantling the institution created to deliver them? Again, I just do not understand what has changed the Government’s mind.

Let us look at cutting red tape. As a Conservative, I welcome the ambition to make the health service more efficient. My constituents do not want to pay for staff in the Minister’s Department duplicating the work of those in NHS England, particularly when thousands every day are subjected to care that could certainly be improved. On Tuesday, we heard from the former Health Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), that

“the bureaucracy has got completely out of hand.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 33, Q58.]

However, that bureaucracy is not confined to NHS England and any medical practitioner will explain that bureaucracy exists across the entire health system. Can the Minister explain how the changes will improve that?

Lord Darzi’s independent investigation said that, taken together, there are nearly 80 people employed in regulatory and headquarters functions for each NHS provider trust. Can the Minister say how many people will be in such roles once the abolition of NHS England is complete? Can she talk about how abolishing NHS England will review the volume of paperwork on patient safety, some of which is helpful for patient safety and some of which is not. That was identified by Dr Dash in her report.

I remind Members that abolishing NHS England is not a prerequisite of undertaking a robust cost-benefit analysis before introducing changes. We have had difficulty in getting answers on numbers. We have been told that this will save money—£1 billion a year, I believe—but no sums have been produced for us to scrutinise to explain where that will come from. Indeed, when asking questions about where it might come from, it has been quite difficult to establish that. We have heard that the redundancy package will be worth £1.1 billion to £1.3 billion. It does not seem clear exactly where that will come from or how it will benefit patients. It is also not clear how many of those staff will end up re-employed by the new organisation, having received redundancy from the first, and what effect that will have on the country’s finances.

More than a year on from the Government’s announcement that they will abolish NHS England, how much progress have Ministers made? In March 2025, Lord Scriven tabled a question about the legislation required to abolish NHS England. In her response, the Health Minister in the other place, Baroness Merron, wrote:

“Ministers and senior Department officials will work with the new transformation team at the top of NHS England, led by Sir Jim Mackey, to determine the structure and requirements needed to support the creation of a new centre for health and care.”

One year later, in March 2026, the Liberal Democrat health spokeswoman, the hon. Member for North Shropshire, tabled a question asking what functions had been transferred over since the announcement was made. In response, the Minister for Secondary Care wrote:

“Work is progressing at pace to develop the design and operating model for the new integrated organisation, and to plan for the smooth transfer of people, functions, and responsibilities.”

One does not need to enlist the services of Hercule Poirot to see that, one year later, that work has not been done. The Government have no comprehensive plan for how they will abolish NHS England. They can write a line in the Bill to abolish it, but how that will happen, to which clauses 2 and 3 relate, is, as yet, really uncertain.

--- Later in debate ---

While I welcome the aims and what the Minister has said, I caution against excessive optimism in this place that simply doing away with NHS England will naturally give rise to savings and reduce doubling up of jobs and slightly unfathomable decision making. I will also take this opportunity to say that some of the institutions and frameworks that will continue, such as ICBs, are being subjected to cuts while being asked to take on more responsibility. I do not agree with some of those responsibilities being shifted, such as merging Healthwatch and the patient voice, but that will come up later in the debate on this Bill, so I will not say more on it at this time.

[Dr Johnson]

My hon. Friend talked about how the ICBs have merged. There are lots of different types of reorganisation going on at once: the abolition of NHS England, the changes to local authorities, the introduction of mayors in some areas, and the changes and cuts to ICBs. What effect is that having in his part of the country?

[Joe Robertson]

The shadow Minister points to a much wider issue entirely relevant to the Government’s plans here: the more reorganisation we do, the more we shrink the bandwidth to deal with smaller and more operational problems because so much of the resource has been pulled in. In my area, although it is probably true everywhere, reorganisation of Department or Government responsibilities causes endless frustration that while Governments and politicians—I take some responsibility for my own side’s actions at times in the past in very limited ways—talk about reorganisation when so much can be done on what might be termed low-hanging fruit.

I worry that the Government are missing out on opportunities here to make a much more meaningful difference day to day and much more quickly than this huge reorganisation will achieve. Everything is about priorities. Plainly, no Government can do everything they want to do all at one time. It slightly surprises me that reorganisation of the NHS and doing away with NHS England has become such a major priority, considering it did not feature in the Labour party manifesto just two years ago. I do not seek to put words in the Minister’s mouth, but the gist of her evidence to this Committee was that within eight months of this Labour Government coming into power, they realised that NHS England had to go. Eight months is eight months, but it seems a short timeframe in which to decide to do away with a fundamental way that health is organised and delivered in this country.

Going back to priorities, I recall that before the election, the former Secretary of State for Health and Social Care—then the shadow Secretary of State—the right hon. Member for Ilford North, talked about introducing a national care service. That was the Labour party’s big priority. Although Conservative Members and, frankly, the majority of the public were slightly sceptical of his intentions, we all agree that social care needs reform and that ultimately, the success of the NHS will be delivered only if we deal with the long-standing crisis in social care, which extends back three decades or more, as it is entirely dependent on that.

Before the election, the priority was the national care service, but since the not-so-random date of 5 July 2024, when the right hon. Gentleman became the Secretary of State, he ceased to refer to reform of social care, and it seems once again to have been put on the back burner. I wonder whether the Government’s plan to abolish NHS England has gotten in the way of equally large, and perhaps even more substantial, reforms, which might ultimately have made a much more meaningful difference to the delivery of not only healthcare but health and social care, as well as to the overall wellbeing, including financial wellbeing, of so many people in this country. Social care refers to people living with frailty or dementia, and the family carers, and families more widely, on whom that has an impact. Every decision made is a decision not made, given the resource and bandwidth of those whom any Government ask to implement change, such as the civil service, advisers and the hundreds or thousands of people who are relied on to deliver in their day-to-day job.

I and, it seems, all the other Committee members do not disagree with the fundamentals of what Government are trying to do; their reasons for doing this are broadly sensible, so who could disagree? However, because of the manner in which it is being done, I urge caution and a check on being too optimistic—just doing it and expecting all the good things to flow. It will take an awful lot more than simply passing the Bill to make the NHS the success that, to take the Minister at her word, she intends, wants and will do her best to achieve.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Emma Foody.)