Health Bill (Eighth sitting)

Helen Morgan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Johnson]

My hon. Friend is, as ever, correct. The mayors are also not all responsible for health and social care—the local authorities are, in most cases. There could therefore be a mayor directing proceedings with the ICB who is a political opponent of those actually democratically elected to look after social care. ICBs are supposed to be apolitical commissioners accountable to the Secretary of State, but now, instead of working with social care directors, they will work with an elected mayor instead.

I can see a positive to that in terms of democratic accountability, but what happens if they all disagree? There is some incoherence about who is in charge. We have the local authority tasked with delivering social care, which may be led by one political party; the mayor directing the ICB, who may be of a different political party; and the Secretary of State who can also direct the ICB, who may again be of a different political persuasion. How does it work if they disagree? Does the mayor actually have authority, given that the Secretary of State can override them anyway? How does the Minister see that working in practice? It feels like some people will be in power without responsibility and others will have responsibility without the power to exercise it.

[Helen Morgan (North Shropshire) (LD)]

I will raise some similar concerns about the abolition of integrated care partnerships and integrated care strategies, which clause 23 brings about. Before I do, I should declare my interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association.

The removal of integrated care partnerships, as well as the extension of ICBs to cover multiple local authorities, raises unanswered questions about the future of social care planning, which is very important to the Liberal Democrats, as the Minister knows. We feel that it removes the voice of charities and others in the voluntary sector who are crucial to meeting the range of needs in health and social care.

Throughout the Bill there is a theme of separating social care and the NHS, at a time when greater integration and closer working are clearly needed. We heard Sir Andrew Dilnot say in evidence that we cannot deal with some of the challenges that arise in the NHS—particularly around flow through hospitals and long waits in corridor care in accident and emergency—without improving the discharge of patients into social care. Separating the organisations that deliver those things is clearly problematic. If we think about it, as the shadow Minister just outlined, we have lost the local authority representative on ICBs. The Bill also changes the way the better care fund is administered. With those changes, we are really concerned about the separation of these two responsibilities.

I want to draw the Minister’s attention to an example in Shropshire. Shropshire council spends almost 80% of its budget on social care. It is an extremely challenged council because of those funding pressures. Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin ICB has also been one of the most financially challenged ICBs. That is partly because of its small scale and its merging with Staffordshire—which, for the record, is unlikely to be the combined mayoral authority that Shropshire ends up in, as is my current understanding, although we are a long way off resolving that problem.

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[Helen Morgan]

We cannot see the resources allocated, so we cannot confirm that, but it is clearly a concern. We are not yet discussing the part of the Bill that deals with Healthwatch, so I should keep my powder dry, but we know that local authorities will get some additional funding to deal with their elements of Healthwatch, while ICBs will not. There is a concern that that streamlining is, in fact, slimming down.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I want to pick up where the shadow Minister left off. Essentially, she said that the cart is being put before the horse in terms of mayoral authorities.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East outlined, many areas have no plans for a mayoral authority; our area of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight is some way down the track. As I expressed last week in Committee, we have a strange anomaly in the new Surrey and Sussex ICB, because Sussex will get a mayor and Surrey will not, so Sussex residents will have representation on the ICB whereas Surrey residents will not. I hope that the Minister has had a chance to reflect on that strange paradox over the weekend and that she will now be able to answer specifically, as she did not last week, how that lack of representation for Surrey residents will work locally.

The abolition of the integrated care partnerships and their allied strategies continues a theme whereby the Government, under the veneer of slimming down, are actually decoupling—or weakening or whatever terminology Members wish to use—health and social care. For many years, all parties have regarded the bringing together of health and social care as essential, but the Bill not only looks like it is not trying to encourage that bringing together, but in fact is doing the opposite of that—it seems to be looking to pull them apart and decouple them. That is strange, because it does not appear to be the expressed policy of the Government, but it is the only logical explanation for many parts of the Bill, including the abolition in clause 23.

The shadow Minister pointed out that a number of areas will keep the ICPs in some form or other. I ask the Minister, does the Government support that feature? Was it the Government’s intention to remove the statutory footing of the ICPs and strategies in the hope and expectation that they would continue on a non-statutory footing? If so, we come to the paradox: if the Government support local authorities and health services continuing to work together in informal ICPs, why is the Minister trying to get rid of them? If they do not support that, is it now stated Government policy to separate social care and health services?

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a list of four things, which, to be honest, are entirely woolly—things like “opportunities”.

[Helen Morgan]

The hon. Member will be aware that the new clause is a probing amendment. It is designed to push the Minister to describe how we will ensure that this range of expertise is taken into account when the plans are put together. We will not press the new clause to a vote, but we want to use it as a discussion point to probe how the range of expertise in the health service will be fully utilised, so that the plans are the best they can be.

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank the hon. Lady for that clarification. It is helpful to understand that the Liberal Democrats will not press the new clause to a vote, but if we are to use probing amendments effectively, they need to be drawn much more tightly, so that a Minister does not have the opportunity—I am sure that today’s Minister would not do this—to wriggle out of it because it is so poorly drafted.

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[Helen Morgan]

I wish to speak to amendment 36 and new clause 59, which are different ways of seeking to do the same thing. They are aimed at ensuring that “civil servants are responsible for the decision making and appointment processes for trust and ICB leaders, rather than Ministers or Special Advisers.”

In earlier sessions, we spoke about the risk of political capture; the amendment and new clause intend to deal with that. The Government’s intention is to give providers more freedom to design services around local needs, but we are worried that giving the Secretary of State the powers to appoint trust chairs and non-executive directors will undermine that local flexibility and agency. It risks creating a bottleneck in the Department for Health and Social Care, leaving foundation trusts waiting for approval to make their arrangements. In theory, the Secretary of State will be responsible for the appointment of 143 foundation trust chairs and roughly 1,000 foundation trust non-executives, who themselves will appoint the executive directors. Clearly, there is the potential for a bottleneck there.

We also think that in the hands of the wrong Secretary of State—I cast no aspersions about the current one—there is potential for mass manipulation of the make-up of future NHS leadership. I think everybody here would agree that NHS leaders should be the best possible people for the job, not those who best fit the political agenda of the Secretary of State of the day. We are worried that future Secretary of States could abuse their power, intervening unnecessarily and for non-clinical reasons in hiring and firing decisions. Their political views could heavily influence the make-up of trust and ICB non-executives across the country—who are themselves responsible for appointing the chief executive— and lead to the firing and hiring of those who suit their personal vision of what a leader should look like.

From speaking to chief executives and other senior NHS leaders, I know that many already feel that chief executives are subject to the political whims of the day and are too easily scapegoated for wider failures. Holding poorly performing leaders to account is extremely important when there are failures, but sometimes those concerns and the blame culture that can exist in those organisations stops capable, impressive NHS leaders from taking the next step up the ladder to becoming a chief executive. We think a safeguard is necessary there.

We recognise that someone has to hold that power and appoint those people now that NHS England has gone. That is why amendment 36 proposes that in order to ensure there is not political capture of those decisions, they are taken by impartial civil servants who are given a set criteria of what a good leader looks like, rather than by Ministers or their special advisers.

As I mentioned, new clause 59 broadly seeks to do the same thing, but uses a different mechanism for getting that into the Bill.

[Dr Johnson]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Helen Morgan]

I had finished speaking, but I will give way and think of something else to say.

[Dr Johnson]

The civil servants will be under the direction of the Minister, so how does the hon. Lady envisage it working? Presumably, civil servants are there to deliver for their Ministers or Secretary of State? Is she suggesting that makes the decision more impartial? Can she give us some detail on how that will work?

[Helen Morgan]

As I mentioned in my previous remarks, one imagines that a Secretary of State would set out criteria to ensure that the best people for the job are appointed. We are in a situation where a current Parliament cannot bind a future one, but we do need to set a precedent that political capture of these important leadership roles is not an unintentional consequence of this legislation. I accept that it is unintentional; I think the Secretary of State and the Minister have drafted this legislation with the best of intentions, but this is something we should guard against.

[Gregory Stafford]

On clause 29 and the relevant amendments, the membership model and the council of governors were originally introduced to give patients, staff and local communities a formal voice in the governance of NHS organisations. I worry that by removing them the clause concentrates power in the hands of the trust board at a local level and, potentially, the Secretary of State at a national level, while reducing opportunities for local scrutiny and public participation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said, there is a real danger that organisations will be independent in name only.

That brings us back to the never-ending tension in the Bill between the centralisation of power in the Secretary of State, through the abolition of NHS England and all the other bodies we have talked about, and the Government’s stated desire to have more accountability for decision making at a local level.