Shared Rural Network Implementation

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Wednesday 24th January 2024 Westminster Hall

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Maria. I congratulate the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan) on securing this important debate.

There have been a lot of contributions, and I will zoom through most of them. We had contributions from the hon. Member for Milton Keynes North (Ben Everitt) and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), who raised concerns about signals within buildings, which is a different technical issue but one that still causes problems.

[Mr Carmichael]

There’s a problem in this building!

[Carol Monaghan]

There is a problem in this building as well, of course.

The hon. Member for Buckingham (Greg Smith) told stories about his children; I think many of us can relate to those. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Sarah Dyke) is unfortunately still struggling with 3G, never mind 4G. The hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) talked about Jean’s folly. Jean is the name of my dog—a different Jean. I gently point out to the hon. Member that this is a reserved issue, so it is incumbent on the UK Government, not the Scottish Government, to sort it out.

It was only last month that a number of us—the same characters—were here in Westminster Hall debating the difficulties arising from the switch from copper wire to internet fibre signals for phone lines. Today’s debate is important because, with the removal of the copper wire network, if an internet signal drops out, as has happened to many households this week with Storms Isha and Jocelyn, people rely on the 4G network, as the hon. Member for North Shropshire said. If the 4G network is not reliable, people are left without the resilience to deal with emergency situations, as we have heard. The hon. Member also raised concerns about the speed of the 4G roll-out. That is rather ironic: at the same time as the roll-out is happening too slowly, the switch from copper wire to fibre is happening too quickly. There seems to be a real—pardon the pun—disconnect between those two issues.

The shared rural network is a joint venture between the UK Government and the big four mobile providers. It should provide 4G coverage to 95% of the UK, and enable rural communities and businesses to gain greater connectivity. In Scotland, the roll-out must be done with an awareness of the importance of the natural environment. Although the issue is reserved, as I said, the Scottish Government have done some work in this area to bring together different groups and ensure that the roll-out is done in a sympathetic way. The Scottish Government have organised and participated in discussions with national parks and NatureScot to ensure that we get mutually acceptable outcomes.

We have heard about some difficulties regarding planning. The hon. Member for North Norfolk (Duncan Baker), who is no longer in his place, raised concerns about ugly infrastructure. If we do the roll-out in conjunction with local communities, we can look at creativity of placement and the use of existing structures.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister. EE has recently announced that it has met its coverage targets for the first phase of the rural network programme. We need to know whether that statement matches reality. How is EE checking that? Is it actually going round with a mobile phone and ensuring that there is coverage everywhere that there should be coverage, or is it saying that the mast should provide coverage in that area? Those are two very different things. How are the Government checking what the mobile providers are saying? What further incentives are the Government providing to ensure proper coverage?

[Dame Maria Miller (in the Chair)]

Order. I am sure that the hon. Lady is coming to a close.

[Carol Monaghan]

I am just finishing. It would be useful to hear about specific interventions that the Government are taking in tricky rural areas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Julia Lopez]

My hon. Friend highlights a challenge whereby some communities have not only bad broadband connection, but bad telephone connection. Sometimes one can substitute for the other: people can tether off their phone signal. He has a constituency that has poor coverage for both, and I am very sympathetic. As he is aware, I am trying to do what I can as a UK Government Minister to substitute for some of the challenges that we have had with the Scottish roll-out.

We are looking at pilots on satellite connectivity in the very hardest areas to reach; we are also looking at some of the wireless solutions that my hon. Friend alluded to. Is the technology there? Some of these are probably not technologies that will substitute for gigabit roll-out, but we are seeing where they can. I can only assure him, as I do on a regular basis, that I am pushing and looking at every lever I have to get him the connectivity he desires. I should also say that we have had some progress in our discussions with the Scottish Government recently. We are having a regional procurement, and they are finally getting their act together on some of the more local procurement. I hope that my hon. Friend’s constituents will start to see the benefit.

[Carol Monaghan]

Once again, I point out that broadband roll-out, as well as 4G roll-out, remains reserved to Westminster. The Scottish Government are of course helping to support the roll-out, but it is a reserved issue.

[Julia Lopez]

Perhaps at some point the hon. Lady might like to update us on the progress and success of the R100 programme and its impact on constituents.

I thank the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) for highlighting some of the issues in Borgie in particular. I will happily take up the issue of Jean’s folly and see whether we can make any progress on it. I thank the hon. Member for highlighting cases showing the real-life impact that poor connectivity can have.

Before I respond to points raised by other hon. Members, it might be helpful if I explain how the SRN will be implemented across the UK and what has been achieved for some time when it comes to boosting mobile coverage. To deliver the programme, the operators are investing about half a billion pounds to eliminate the majority of partial notspots, which are the areas that receive coverage from at least one but not all four operators. The Government will then go even further and tackle the total number of notspots with our contribution of half a billion pounds. Those are the hardest-to-reach rural areas that currently have no 4G coverage at all.

By upgrading existing networks and working together on shared infrastructure in new sites, we will transform mobile coverage in rural areas and—this is key—maximising the use of existing infrastructure. I was particularly glad to hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Banff and Buchan about how we are seeing that sharing of infrastructure in his constituency. We want to minimise environmental impacts, but also ensure best value for the taxpayer.

One of the ways we are trying to speed up roll-out is by easing the planning process. Several hon. Members raised the need to make more straightforward the erection of new infrastructure, as we did in the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022. It can be a difficult balance, because a number of hon. Members are unhappy about the siting of masts, and we are encouraging operators to put in mast applications in sensible places. To have engagement with local authorities, I wrote to all councils to set out where they have powers in that regard. I also raised the matter with Ofcom, because I know that there are some issues in particular parts of the country. We want to make sure that we can ease people’s concerns about the impact of mast infrastructure on communities, because pausing roll-out on that basis is in nobody’s interest.

Copper Wire Telecoms

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Wednesday 13th December 2023 Westminster Hall

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Mundell, and I congratulate the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). The majority of people probably have no idea about this subject—certainly no idea of the implications for them. For me, this is a debate about resilience, about what we do when things do not work as they should and about back-up plans. When dealing with climate change, unexpected power outages and extreme weather, we need back-up plans. If we did a quick poll in the room of how many people have 10 litres of water, three days’ supply of food and a torch with back-up batteries in their house, we would probably all fall short, but that is what we need. We also need a phone signal and to be able to contact people.

I will briefly digress to address the point made by the right hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal (Dr Coffey) about the Vodafone-Three merger. She talked about the areas in which Three is already involved. When she mentioned it was the same people who are in charge of x, y, and z, she did not say they are the same people who have close links to the Chinese Community party. There is a real naivety to think that all is fine and that we can hand over critical infrastructure in this manner, but that debate takes place tomorrow.

The hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan) set out well the reasons why the switchover is happening and the advantages it will bring to do with better signal, clearer calls and lower energy use. That is fantastic, but we need to ensure that everything works as it should when the switchover takes place.

With new telephone lines working via the internet, all landline users will first need a broadband line, which not everybody has. Traditional telephone lines are run largely by Openreach and Virgin, private sector organisations that have taken the decision to retire these networks. Communication providers such as BT, Sky and TalkTalk are moving their customers over to fibre lines by December 2025. In fact, I believe Virgin hopes to have its customers moved over before then. The Government have said this change is industry led, but in practice it is a bit more complicated. The complexity of the current broadband market means there are more than 600 providers with 600 different processes, each managing the change in their own way. That could leave the consumer vulnerable, and certainly in a position where information is not properly communicated to them.

Analogue lines, of course, have back-up power, so they can work without an independent power supply if a property is affected by a local power cut. The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland talked about the issues with his rural island constituency. I appreciate that power outages are far more common there, but even in urban constituencies and in cities, we do have power outages; more than that, wi-fi goes down regularly. Over the past week, the wi-fi in my house went down six times—that I am aware of—and twice while I was in the middle of a meeting. That was really problematic, and it would certainly be problematic for a vulnerable person who has fallen over. Although I understand the specific reasons why the right hon. Member brought this debate, the issue is not specific to rural constituencies.

Currently, personal alarms and fall detectors operate over the analogue network. It is estimated that around 1.7 million people in the UK use such devices, and they will be at risk if we do not get this switchover right. How will a personal care device work on a digital line if there is a power cut or the wi-fi is down? Those are more common occurrences than the Minister might like to admit. Upgrading those devices to the digital network—changing them so they can operate—is also going to be extremely costly, considering the number of people using them.

The Government have said that the change is industry led, possibly to wash their hands of it. Local authorities, which are often concerned with the care of vulnerable individuals, have been given no financial support for this change. Where will the money to upgrade those devices come from? There is also a lack of information, particularly from service providers. Despite that, I do not believe there are any plans for a national awareness campaign, by either Government or Ofcom—maybe the Minister can tell me otherwise. That is something we need to consider.

On top of that, there is also the potential for this switchover to create opportunities for criminals to target vulnerable constituents. There may be a potential increase in criminality through the selling of devices at inflated prices, selling vulnerable individuals new broadband packages that they may not use when all they use is a phone line, or perhaps charging for unnecessary work in their properties. We all need to be aware of those possibilities.

In summary, what is it we need? We need clear information—a campaign from Government to let people know what is happening. The timescale for this switchover has to be stretched. December 2025 will come up on us very quickly. From what we have heard this morning, many things clearly have not been considered. We need a back-up plan for when the internet goes down, and not just for when there are power cuts, because the internet often goes down even without power cuts. We need to know what specific interventions will take place in rural areas. Finally, returning to my initial point on resilience, we need to think more carefully about how we all consider our own resilience. Do we have the means to cope with extreme weather? We will be getting more of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Chris Bryant]

The right hon. Gentleman made some very good points and I will come on to them in a moment.

It is good to have the right hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal (Dr Coffey) here with us, who made some very important points. She referred to the debate tomorrow on the potential merger between Vodafone and Three. I will also not be there, because I shall be at Glenys Kinnock’s funeral. The Minister will have a different shadow tomorrow; my place will be taken admirably by another Chris from the shadow Front Bench, also from south Wales, my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn (Chris Evans). I somewhat disagree with the points that the right hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal made, but anyway, those will be elucidated tomorrow.

It was good to hear from the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan), who referred to notspots, which I think she said covered 13% of her constituency, and the fact that 3% of people in the UK have no 4G signal. We are also 51st in the world for 5G signal. We are all aware that there are quite a lot of issues in terms of mobile and internet connectivity that apply to large sections of the United Kingdom. Somehow, we have not really managed to seize this with the energy that some other countries have managed.

[Carol Monaghan]

I apologise to the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan), because I meant to mention her point about mobile signals indoors. I think any of us who have tried to have a mobile phone call on the parliamentary estate will know that mobile signals indoors are temperamental at least. Older buildings can be difficult, because of the thickness of the walls. Modern buildings can make it difficult for mobile signals too, because of the amount of steel on the outside of them. Having a mobile signal outside does not necessarily mean there is a mobile signal inside.

[Sir Chris Bryant]

I will come on to that point about the difference between inside and outside, which certainly applies to homes in the Rhondda. The point was also made by the right hon. Member for Suffolk Coastal. I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Glasgow North West (Carol Monaghan) was saying that the signal on the parliamentary estate was temperamental or that the MPs were—maybe it is a bit of both. The hon. Lady made other good points about the potential for criminality. This is not a point that I have heard elsewhere. The Minister may want to refer to it later.

One of the biggest problems with this debate is that the vast majority of people in this country would have absolutely no idea what we are talking about. In fact, I would guess that of the 650 MPs, barely 10% would know what we are talking about. That is a potential problem, because if the public does not know what we are talking about, there is a danger for other people to exploit that lack of understanding and knowledge. Several Members have referred to the fact that this is primarily an industry-led, rather than Government-led, project. They are quite right, but the Government have a significant responsibility in this area. Towards the end of my speech, I will come on to a few things that I think the Government may want to look at.

There are real, legitimate concerns. PSTN—if 650 MPs were asked to say what that acronym stood for, my guess is that we would be lucky if 10 of them knew the answer—stands for public switched telephone network, and I only know that because I am reading it out.

The complete lack of public understanding of the issue is significant. The industry is extremely diverse, with roughly 650 providers in England alone, let alone the rest of the UK. As has already been referred to, BT has decided to delay its digital voice roll-out, and instead of a national roll-out by the end of December 2025 there will be a region-by-region roll-out, which adds a degree of complexity to any kind of national understanding of this issue. Indeed, I would argue that there is even less clarity about what is happening now than there was back in 2022.

As has already been said, some devices rely on PSTN. Security alarms are one. I would guess that quite a few MPs have security alarms. I wonder how many of those alarms are reliant on PSTN; I have no idea.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 29th November 2023 Commons Chamber

[Sir John Whittingdale]

As the hon. Gentleman knows, I strongly share his view about the need to act against abuse of legal procedures by the Russian state. As he will appreciate, this aspect of the Bill emanated from the Home Office. However, I have no doubt that my colleagues in the Home Office will have heard the perfectly valid point he makes. I hope that they will be able to provide him with further information about it, and I will draw the matter to their attention.

I wish to say just a few more words about the biometric material received from our international partners, as a tool in protecting the public from harm. Sometimes, counter-terrorism police receive biometrics from international partners with identifiable information. Under current laws, they are not allowed to retain these biometrics unless they were taken in the past three years. That can make it harder for our counter-terrorism police to carry out their job effectively. That is why we are making changes to allow the police to take proactive steps to pseudonymise biometric data received from international partners—obviously, that means holding the material without including information that identifies the person—and hold indefinitely under existing provisions in the Counter-Terrorism Act information that identifies the person it relates to. Again, those changes have been requested by counter-terrorism police and will support them to better protect the British public.

The national underground asset register, or NUAR, is a digital map that will improve both the efficiency and safety of underground works, by providing secure access to privately and publicly owned location data about the pipes and cables beneath our feet. This will underpin the Government’s priority to get the economy growing by expediting projects such as new roads, new houses and broadband roll-out—the hon. Gentleman and I also share a considerable interest in that.

The NUAR will bring together valuable data from more than 700 public and private sector organisations about the location of underground utilities assets. This will deliver £490 million per year of economic growth, through increased efficiency, reduced asset strikes and reduced disruptions for citizens and businesses. Once operational, the running of the register will be funded by those who benefit most. The Government’s amendments include powers to, through regulations, levy charges on apparatus owners and request relevant information. The introduction of reasonable charges payable by those who benefit from the service, rather than the taxpayer, will ensure that the NUAR is a sustainable service for the future. Other amendments will ensure that there is the ability to realise the full potential of this data for other high-value uses, while respecting the rights of asset owners.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

Is any consideration given to the fact that that information could be used by bad actors? If people are able to find out where particular cables or pipes are, they also have the ability to find weakness in the system, which could have implications for us all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Patrick Grady]

It is difficult to know where to start. The Minister described this as a Brexit opportunities Bill. Of course, Brexit was supposed to be about this place taking back control. It was to be the triumph of parliamentary sovereignty over faceless Brussels bureaucrats, the end of red tape and regulations, and the beginning of a glorious new era of freedom unencumbered by all those complicated European Union rules and requirements that did silly things like keeping people safe and protecting their human rights.

Yet here we are with 200 pages of new rules and regulations and a further 160 pages of amendments. This time last week, the amendment paper was 10 pages long; today it is 15 times that and there is barely any time for any kind of proper scrutiny. Is this what Brexit was for: to hand the Government yet more sweeping powers to regulate and legislate without any meaningful oversight in this place? To create additional burdens on businesses and public services, just for the sake of being different from the European Union? The answer to those questions is probably yes.

I will speak briefly to the SNP amendments, but I will also consider some of the most concerning Government propositions being shoehorned in at the last minute in the hope that no one will notice. How else are we supposed to treat Government new schedule 1? The Minister is trying to present it as benign, or even helpful, as if it had been the Government’s intention all along to grant the DWP powers to go snooping around in people’s bank accounts, but if it has been so long in coming, as he said, why is it being added to the Bill only now? Why was it not in the original draft, or even brought to Committee, where there could at least have been detailed scrutiny or the opportunity to table further amendments?

Of course there should be action to tackle benefit fraud—we all agree on that—but the DWP already has powers, under section 109B of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, to issue a notice to banks to share bank account information provided that they have reasonable grounds to believe that an identified, particular person has committed, or intends to commit, a benefit offence. In other words, where there is suspicion of fraud, the DWP can undertake checks on a claimant’s account. Incidentally, there should also be action to tackle tax evasion and tax fraud. The Government evidently do not require from the Bill any new powers in that area, so we can only assume that they are satisfied that they have all the powers they need and that everything possible is being done to ensure that everybody pays the tax that they owe.

The powers in new schedule 1 go much further than the powers that the DWP already has. By their own admission, the Government will allow the DWP to carry out—proactively, regularly, at scale and on a speculative basis—checks on the bank accounts and finances of claimants. The new schedule provides little in the way of safeguards or reassurances for people who may be subject to such checks. The Secretary of State said that

“only a minimum amount of data will be accessed and only in instances which show a potential risk of fraud and error”.

In that case, why is the power needed at all, given that the Government already have the power to investigate where there is suspicion of fraud? And how can only “a minimum amount” of data be accessed when the Government say in the same breath that they want to be able to carry out those checks proactively and at scale.

[Carol Monaghan]

My hon. Friend probably shares my concern that we are moving into a new era in which the bank account details of people claiming with the DWP must be shared as a matter of course. That is the only reason I can see for such sweeping amendments, which will impact on so many people.

[Patrick Grady]

There is a huge risk. It is clear that the Government’s starting point is very often to avoid giving people the social security and welfare support that they might need to live a dignified life. We know that the approach in Scotland is incredibly different.

That is the thing: as with so much of this Bill, there is a good chance that minority groups or people with protected characteristics will find themselves most at risk of those checks and of coming under the proactive suspicion of the DWP. As we said when moving the committal motion, we have not had time to seek properly to interrogate that point. In his attempts to answer interventions, the Minister kind of demonstrated why scrutiny has been so inadequate. At the same time, the Government’s own Back Benchers, including the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr Fysh) and others, are tabling quite thoughtful amendments—that is never a great sign for a Government. The Government should not be afraid of the kinds of safeguards and protections that they are proposing.

The SNP amendments look to remove the most dangerous and damaging aspects of the Bill—or, at the very least, to amend them slightly. Our new clause 44 and amendment 229 would have the effect of transferring the powers of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That should not be all that controversial. Professor William Webster, a director of the Centre for Research into Information, Surveillance and Privacy, has warned that the Bill, as it stands, does not provide adequate mechanisms for the governance and oversight of surveillance cameras. The amendment would ensure that oversight is retained, the use of CCTV continues to be regulated, and public confidence in such technologies is strengthened, not eroded. CCTV is becoming more pervasive in the modern world—not least with the rise of video doorbells and similar devices that people can use in their own personal circumstances—so it is concerning that the Government are seeking to weaken rather than strengthen protections in that area.

The SNP’s amendment 222 would leave out clause 8, and our amendment 223 would leave out clause 10, removing the Government’s attempts to crack down on subject access requests. The effect of those clauses might, in the Government’s mind, remove red tape from businesses and other data-controlling organisations, but it would do so at the cost of individuals’ access to their own personal data. That is typified by the creation of a new and worryingly vague criterion of “vexatious or excessive” as grounds to refuse a subject access request. Although that might make life easier for data controllers, it will ultimately place restrictions on data subjects’ ability to access what is, we must remember, their data. There have been attempts—not just throughout Committee stage, but even today from the Opposition—to clarify exactly the thresholds for “vexatious and excessive” requests. The Government have been unable to answer, so those clauses should not be allowed to stand.

Amendment 224 also seeks to leave out clause 12, expressing the concerns of many stakeholders about the expansion in scope of automated decision making, alongside an erosion of existing protections against automated decision making. The Ada Lovelace Institute states that:

“Against an already-poor landscape of redress and accountability in cases of AI harms, the Bill’s changes will further erode the safeguards provided by underlying regulation.”

There is already significant and public concern about AI and its increasingly pervasive impact.

Clause 12 fails to offer adequate protections against automated decision making. An individual may grant consent for the processing of their data—indeed, they might have no choice but to do so—but that does not mean that they will fully understand or appreciates how that data will be processed or, importantly, how decisions will be made. At the very least, the Government should accept our amendment 225, which would require the controller to inform the data subject when an automated decision has been taken in relation to the data subject. I suspect, however, that that is unlikely—just as it is unlikely that the Government will accept Labour amendments 2 and 5, which we are happy to support—so I hope the House will have a chance to express its view on clause 12 as a whole later on.

The SNP’s amendments 226, 227 and 228 would have the effect of removing clauses 26, 27 and 28 respectively. Those clauses give the Home Secretary significant new powers to authorise the police to access personal data, and a power to issue a “national security” certificate telling the police that they do not need to comply with many important data protection laws and rules that they would otherwise have to obey, which would essentially give police immunity should they use personal data in a way that would otherwise be illegal—and they would no longer need to respond to requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. We have heard no explanation from the Government for why they think that the police should be allowed to break the law and operate under a cover of darkness.

The Bill will also expand what counts as an “intelligence service” for the purposes of data protection law. Again, that would be at the Home Secretary’s discretion, with a power to issue a designation notice allowing law enforcement bodies to take advantage of the more relaxed rules in the Data Protection Act 2018—otherwise designed for the intelligence agencies—whenever they are collaborating with the security services. The Government might argue that that creates a simplified legal framework, but in reality it will hand massive amounts of people’s personal information to the police, including the private communications of people in the UK and information about their health histories, political beliefs, religious beliefs and private lives.

Neither the amended approach to national security certificates nor the new designation notice regime would be reviewable by the courts, and given that there is no duty to report to Parliament, Parliament might never find out how and when the powers have been used. If the Home Secretary said that the police needed to use those increased powers in relation to national security, his word would be final. That includes the power to handle sensitive data in ways that would otherwise, under current legislation, be criminal.

The Home Secretary is responsible for both approving and reviewing designation notices. Only a person who is directly affected by such a notice will be able to challenge it, yet the Home Secretary would have the power to keep the notice secret, meaning that those affected would not even know about it and could not possibly challenge it. Those are expansive broadenings not just of the powers of the secretary of state, but of the police and security services. The Government have not offered any meaningful reassurance about how those powers will be applied or what oversight will exist, which is why our amendments propose scrapping those clauses entirely.

There remain other concerns about many aspects of the Bill. The British Medical Association and the National AIDS Trust have both raised questions about patients’ and workers’ right to privacy. The BMA calls the Bill

“a departure from the existing high standards of data protection for health data”.

We welcome the amendments to that area, particularly amendment 11, tabled by the hon. Member for Jarrow (Kate Osborne), which we will be happy to support should it be selected for a vote.

I am afraid that I have to echo the concerns expressed by the Labour Front-Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant), about new clause 45, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Aberconwy (Robin Millar). That clause perhaps has laudable aims, but it is the view of the Scottish National party that it is not for this place to legislate in that way, certainly not without consultation and ideally not without consent from the devolved authorities. We look forward to hearing the hon. Member for Aberconwy make his case, but I do not think we are in a position to support his new clause at this time.

Proposed Merger of Three UK and Vodafone

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Tuesday 19th September 2023 Westminster Hall

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Sir George. I thank the hon. Member for Stockport (Navendu Mishra) for securing this important debate. As the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and a couple of other Members did, I would like to thank Unite the union for the incredibly helpful briefings that it produced for this debate. I also welcome the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant), to his post.

We have been here before. It is only three years since we engaged in a whole pile of debates about Huawei and the threats posed to national security by the involvement of the Chinese state actor with our 5G network. Despite repeated warnings from allies and security experts, the Tories went ahead and awarded Huawei a huge contract to deliver the UK’s 5G network. Only after months of debates, questions and condemnation did they do a final U-turn to revoke the contract, but not before Huawei had begun its work. That meant that not only was a security risk introduced, but the removal of Huawei from the 5G system cost somewhere between £2 and £3.5 billion. The UK Government’s intransigence in the face of those warnings cost taxpayers a huge amount of money.

We should have learned the lesson. However, it now appears that we are getting ready to hand over control of key infrastructure to the CK Group—the parent company of Three. Following the merger, as the hon. Member for Stockport pointed out, the CK Group will become a person of significant control over a business that will serve 40% of the UK’s population. Unite the union has uncovered extensive collaboration between the CK Group, the Li family that controls it and the Chinese state. A number of CK Group executives sit on Chinese Government committees, with access to the inner circle of the Chinese political elite. That has to raise serious questions about privacy and security for UK consumers, which the CK Group has done nothing to address.

Under the Chinese Government’s state security laws, it would be possible for the personal data of all users of the new merged company to end up in the hands of the Chinese Government. That is bad enough, but Vodafone holds UK Government contracts for the NHS 111 helpline, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence.

[Navendu Mishra]

And police forces.

[Carol Monaghan]

And police forces; I thank the hon. Member. Added to that, strategic national assets in the form of Vodafone subsea telecommunications cables between the UK and US would pass to the CK Group. It is quite simply madness.

Security is one thing, but there are other concerns, as a number of Members have pointed out. What would the merger, and any further monopoly of the telecoms market, mean for consumer costs, consumer choice and job security in the UK? The merger would result in nearly half of all UK consumers falling into the company’s market share. As the EU has previously warned when blocking similar mergers, that could harm consumers and give free range for price hikes.

[Navendu Mishra]

The hon. Member is making an excellent speech. Does she agree that the root cause of the problem—the core of the issue—is that the Government do not have an industrial strategy? The merger seems to be bad news for customers, bad news for national security and bad news for people who work for telecoms businesses. The bottom line is that if we had a good, forward-thinking industrial strategy that looked at growing good, well-paid jobs in this country and treating customers well, perhaps we would not be in this place.

[Carol Monaghan]

Of course, we have to look at who the merger is good for. It is good for the shareholders, good for the corporation and good for those who seek to profit off the back of it, but it is not good for the ordinary consumer or, as the hon. Member says, national security.

Given the potential for price hikes, the merger should be thrown out straight away, especially given the cost of living crisis, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson) pointed out. We should not even be here having this debate. The hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mick Whitley) gave an indication of the potential magnitude of such a price hike; I think he mentioned a figure of up to £300 per year. That is astronomical for people who are struggling to make ends meet from week to week. This merger has been portrayed as something that will increase investment, and lead to a better consumer experience and lower prices, but we know what normally happens during a merger: investment falls, profits increase and the customer suffers. I cannot see this being any different.

The difficulty is in who is profiting. We have to look at the Government Benches. Two Tory MPs are on CK’s payroll; that is in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, so it has been declared. The UK Government must do full diligence, and protect customers from Chinese state surveillance, not override these security concerns.

We need assurances from the Minister that this merger does not compromise national security in any way, shape or form. The two profitable companies concerned, which hold the data of 27 million UK consumers, have critical Government contracts. Will the Government take a “consumer first” and “national security first” approach to any regulatory checks? What steps will the Minister take to ensure that large job losses do not result from any merger? This cannot be allowed to become a repeat of the Huawei scandal, in which ignorance and intransigence not only put consumers at risk but cost billions and led to an eventual U-turn. Security of the telecoms network and of users’ data must come first.

[Sir George Howarth (in the Chair)]

I call Sir Chris Bryant.

Gambling Act Review White Paper

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Thursday 27th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[Lucy Frazer]

It is important to ensure that we protect people from legitimate gambling where we have problem gamblers, but also from the black market. I emphasise one important point, because some of the measures we are bringing in today are already in place for some companies. Some responsible companies have already taken the measures we have announced today, and they have punters and successful operations. The issue is that not all companies are doing the right thing, so our measures seek to ensure consistency across the board to ensure that the system is not prejudiced against companies doing the right thing and that we protect those who might become problem gamblers.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

The Secretary of State said in her statement that she will ensure that children can “engage in no forms of gambling”, including online gambling. Can she confirm whether that will be through an age verification process, and how exactly will that operate?

[Lucy Frazer]

It is already the case that it is illegal for children to gamble online, and there are some protections in place. We will continue to ensure that those protections are strengthened.

Professional and Amateur Sport: Government Support

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Wednesday 30th September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Huddleston]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. Tonbridge Angels and many other sports clubs across the country have shown their pivotal role in their communities during coronavirus and much before. We will continue to work with all relevant stakeholders. We are continuing to have ongoing dialogue, we have working groups and we have day-to-day dialogue through Department officials—all the things he raises about making sure that all stakeholders work together so that we can come to a conclusion and get out of these difficulties as soon as possible. I completely agree, and I assure him that we are doing just that.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP) [V]]

Gymnastics clubs such as Drumchapel gymnastics club in my constituency play a huge role in developing good habits for young people, particularly girls. They set up life habits and do a huge amount to tackle things such as obesity. However, they are struggling at the moment due to limited numbers and the fact that they still have to pay rent in indoor facilities. What support will the Minister provide for clubs such as Drumchapel gymnastics club and others, which play a key role in improving the life chances of our youngsters?

[Nigel Huddleston]

The hon. Lady makes an important point about the value of clubs, which help with education, confidence, and physical and mental wellbeing. We are encouraging all sports clubs to take advantage of the full suite of opportunities in the Government’s support package. We are constantly talking to all the relevant governing bodies about their plight. I will hopefully be able to make announcements at some point, but we cannot give further details at this stage.

UK Telecommunications

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2020 Commons Chamber

[Oliver Dowden]

As my hon. Friend will be aware, the US and Australia have already taken such decisions, the Canadians have a similar analysis to us but have yet to take a decision on it, and New Zealand has a slightly different process. Each country around the world is looking at how best to protect its telecoms networks, but also—crucially—how to develop its own domestic alternatives. The way to address that is by working co-operatively such as through open RAN.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP) [V]]

In January, the Government announced that Huawei would be limited to 35% of the network but crucially not be in its core. While I welcome the U-turn, I must point out that Huawei is already in the core of EE’s 4G network—5G, of course, is layered on top—and BT has said that it will take years to remove it. How will the Secretary of State mitigate the risk posed by Huawei’s continued presence in the core of EE’s network?

[Oliver Dowden]

The first point is that all that equipment will have been approved by the Huawei cell in GCHQ. In addition, that is why we introduced the ban on Huawei from the core, and we have now set out the path down to zero.

Huawei and 5G

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2020 Westminster Hall

[Matt Warman]

I will come to the international picture later, if I get the chance.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

The Minister keeps talking about the security of the nation, but we know that many UK companies working in the areas of photonics and quantum are concerned about national security. They want to scale up but cannot get funding from his Government, and they therefore look to countries such as China in order to expand—another area where this Government are failing.

[Matt Warman]

The hon. Member raises a point that I would be happy to cover in another debate, but the Government and I share some of her concerns.

It is because of our security and intelligence agencies that we have a comprehensive understanding of the threats and risks of 5G, and I would like to remind right hon. and hon. Members—not that I need to—that our agencies are the envy of the world. They work every day to safeguard our national security and put the UK’s interests at the heart of everything we do. The National Cyber Security Centre has provided expert technical and security advice on 5G. They are experts in the technical changes that will take place in the network and in the risks we currently face from the presence of high-risk vendors’ equipment in our networks and those of many of our allies. They are experts in security, including the national security threats that we face today. Our unique shared understanding of security threats and risks, together with that of the technical characteristics of the network, means that the NCSC is in the best possible position to advise on the cyber-security of the UK’s telecoms national infrastructure.

Elgin Marbles

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Margaret Ferrier]

I think the only answer to that is, how arrogant! How arrogant to feel that we are the only ones who can house the Parthenon sculptures. I am sure many Greeks will be listening to that this evening.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Margaret Ferrier]

I am sorry, but I need to make some progress.

As I said, this would enable the marbles to be appreciated in the original context in which they were sculpted. That is perhaps best summed up in the poetry of Constantine Cavafy:

“It is not dignified in a great nation to reap profit from half-truths and half-rights;

Honesty is the best policy, and honesty in the case of the Elgin Marbles means restitution.”

Campaigns to return the Elgin marbles to Greece have been a feature of the cultural landscape for many years, with many celebrities backing the campaign. Most memorably, the original host of “Fifteen to One”, the late William G. Stewart, delivered a speech in favour of their return in a 2001 episode, after all the contestants were eliminated in the first round of the competition. Although a popular teatime quiz show might not have been the best place to air his views, William G. Stewart’s actions highlighted people’s strength of feeling towards the acquisition of these incredible sculptures.

When public opinion on the return of the marbles has been tested, there has been consistent support for returning them to Greece. The most recent opinion poll by YouGov showed that more people in Britain favoured the return of the marbles than opposed it—by a margin of 37% to 23%. Proponents of the reunification of the marbles have rightly pointed out that there is a moral case for their return. In an Intelligence Squared television debate, which is available on YouTube for any hon. Members interested in the subject, both sides of the debate acknowledged that the circumstances in which the Elgin marbles were returned to Greece would be emblematic of Britain’s status in the world.

Oral Answers to Questions

Carol Monaghan Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Helen Whately]

I can see that my diary will get very busy, but I am keen in my role to get out and about as far as I possibly can and spend time in regional museums, not just those in London. I point the hon. Gentleman particularly to the £125 million investment as part of the cultural investment fund, which will go in particular to regional museums and libraries to support their repair and maintenance. I am very keen to ensure that our regional museums thrive.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

5. What steps the Government are taking to protect UNESCO world heritage sites throughout the world.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

16. What steps the Government are taking to protect UNESCO world heritage sites throughout the world.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Helen Whately)]

There are over 1,000 UNESCO world heritage sites globally. The UK is the proud home to 32, six of which are in Scotland. The Government take their responsibilities under the world heritage convention very seriously. In recent years, we have sadly seen some of the world’s great cultural treasures destroyed by conflict or natural disasters. We are working around the world to help to protect world heritage sites.

[Carol Monaghan]

Of course we are concerned about the destruction of cultural sites due to conflict. Any attack on one of these sites is an attack on our shared global history, but when we have President Trump tweeting one thing and his advisers saying the opposite, can we really trust the assurances that these sites will not be targeted in conflict?

[Helen Whately]

The targeting of cultural sites contravenes several international conventions to which the United States is a party, including the world heritage convention and the 1954 Hague convention. The Foreign Secretary was very clear that we expect those conventions to be adhered to.