(9 years ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House believes that Trident should not be renewed.
It is a pleasure to move the motion that stands in my name and the names of my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Scottish National party, Plaid Cymru and the Green party.
The SNP was elected to this place in such numbers in May on a promise to do three things: first, to argue that the maximum possible powers be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, via the full delivery of the vow; secondly, to fight tooth and nail against the failed and divisive policies of austerity, and to protect the poorest and most vulnerable in our society from the worst excesses of this Government; and thirdly, to oppose Trident. By bringing this matter to the Floor of the House today, the SNP can say that within the first six months of being here, we have done exactly what we promised to do. Of course, there is much more that we need to do on all those issues, but no one will ever be able to accuse us of not doing what we said we would do.
In recent months, Trident and the UK’s nuclear—
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will make some progress.
No one could deny that Trident and the nuclear deterrent have been at the forefront of public debate for many years, not only because this is the 70th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but because the United Kingdom will soon decide whether to commit to spending £167,000,000,000 over the lifetime of the Trident programme.
We had high hopes that we would not be a lone voice. When the rank and file of the British Labour party elected the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), an avowed unilateralist, as its leader, SNP Members hoped that there would be serious opposition to Trident. Of course, the mere thought of that caused palpitations among both the red and blue shades of the British establishment. I genuinely wish the right hon. Gentleman well in continuing his robust opposition to Trident.
While the hon. Gentleman is outlining the reasons behind the motion, will he explain the SNP’s apparent incoherence during the Scottish referendum campaign, when it pledged to scrap Trident on the one hand and to seek to join NATO, a nuclear alliance, on the other?
I hope the hon. Lady will forgive me if I do not accept for a moment her definition of incoherence. If that was incoherent, the actions of Germany, Spain and many other members of NATO are equally incoherent. I would point—
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Please, let me finish the answer. I point out to the hon. Lady that the last two Secretaries-General of NATO have been Danish and Norwegian—countries that have exactly the same position that we advocate.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
No, I will make some progress. I realise that you are very keen to get in on this debate—so keen that you left a little message on my door this morning.
I am not keen to get into this debate and I did not leave a message on anybody’s door.
My apologies, Mr Speaker. The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) left a little note on my door this morning. I will come to him.
That is a matter of debate. The hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O’Hara) has the floor. When it is clear that he is not taking an intervention, he must not be hollered at from a sedentary position by Members on either side of the House. He is free to develop his case.
Thank you, Mr Speaker.
I wish the right hon. Member for Islington North well. I say to Members of his party that being anti-Trident can be a vote winner. The fact that the SNP was returned in such great numbers on an explicitly anti-Trident platform is testimony to that.
In recent weeks, the Scottish Parliament, yet again, reaffirmed its outright and overwhelming opposition to Trident. The Scottish Government, the Scottish TUC, the Scottish Churches and great swathes of Scottish civic society have set their face against Trident.
Will my hon. Friend take this opportunity to remind us how the different political parties in the Scottish Parliament voted on Trident? What decision was reached at the annual conference of the Scottish Labour party? Does he not think it strange that the single Member of Parliament from the Scottish Labour party, who opposes Trident and whose party opposes Trident, is not even in the Chamber for this debate?
As my right hon. Friend points out, there is an established consensus among the Scottish political parties against Trident. The Scottish National party, the Scottish Greens, the Scottish Socialists and, as he says, the Scottish Labour party are all opposed to Trident. We have a Government in Westminster with just one elected Member of Parliament from Scotland, representing a party that failed to achieve even 15% of the vote in Scotland, yet they insist that they have the right to foist on Scotland weapons of mass destruction that Scotland has said it does not want.
Does my hon. Friend find it strange to see the contrast between the unified voice from Scotland and the confusion from the Welsh Labour party, which is for Trident and then against Trident, and that is quite apart from the First Minister, who wants to move it down to west Wales?
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. I have been asked a number of times by the media and the press, “Are you doing this simply to embarrass the Labour party?”, but the Labour party needs no assistance from me in embarrassing itself on this matter.
I will take the hon. Gentleman’s intervention in a moment.
I have always argued that there is no moral, economic or military case for Trident, and—let us be absolutely clear—there is no moral case for any state to possess weapons of mass destruction. Possessing the wherewithal to destroy the world and everything in it several times over is not something to be proud of; indeed, it is something to be deeply ashamed of. I know of no creed, belief system or article of faith that has ever said it is okay to hold the threat of annihilation over one’s neighbour, and to disguise it as peacekeeping.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the possession of nuclear weapons serves as a deterrent that has worked well for many years? In 1994 Ukraine unilaterally disarmed, relying on a treaty with Russia that meant it would not invade. That undertaking was broken and Ukraine is now suffering because of the absence of those weapons.
I will pick up the hon. Gentleman’s point later in my speech. The idea of a deterrent is important and I will address that issue.
Not only is Trident morally questionable, but I believe it is economic madness. In 2006 when the Successor programme was first discussed, the likely cost of building new submarines was put at between £15 billion and £20 billion. Yesterday’s strategic defence and security review put that cost at £31 billion, with £10 billion of contingency on top of that. That is £41 billion set aside to build submarines—the cost has doubled in the last decade, and I shudder to think what it will be in the next decade. Based on the Government’s own figures, the lifetime cost of Trident will be in the region of £167,000,000,000. That is real, taxpayers’ money, and there is no escaping that fact. It may—indeed, it should—embarrass the Labour party that that money has been made on the backs of the poor and the most vulnerable in our society.
The Chancellor appeared at Faslane, appearing out of nowhere like Mr Benn—I mean the cartoon character, not the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn)—to announce £500 million of extensions to jetties. On the same day, the United Nations announced that it would be investigating whether the Government’s policy of cutting welfare support to the disabled was a violation of their human rights.
I know that the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) is anxious to get involved in the debate, but as the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute I represent Faslane and Coulport, and I live roughly six miles from the base. For decades, my constituents have been told that their jobs and prosperity depend totally on that base.
My hon. Friend’s constituency is next to mine. Does he have the same grave concerns that I have about the alarming number of nuclear safety incidents that have been reported at Faslane naval base? There was a 54% increase in the number of incidents reported in 2013-14 compared with 2012-13. Such incidents threaten the safety not only of the workers at Faslane nuclear base—a large proportion of whom live in my constituency —but the communities that surround it.
Order. I remind the House that interventions should be extremely brief. It is not proper for a Member to read out what amounts to a mini-speech that purports to be an intervention.
I agree with my hon. Friend that safety is paramount, and I raised that issue last week in a debate in Westminster Hall. There are huge safety concerns among workers at Faslane about the cuts being made within the nuclear operations department.
I hope my hon. Friends realise that my election in Argyll and Bute suggests that we do not have to put all our eggs in one basket. Let me make it clear that by saying no to Trident, we are not saying no to Faslane—far from it. [Interruption.] The SNP has never, and will never, consider closing the Faslane base. Whether as part of the United Kingdom or—hopefully sooner rather than later—as part of an independent Scotland, Faslane will have a bright, non-nuclear future as a conventional naval base. Faslane is a fantastic facility, and its proximity to the north Atlantic means that its prospects are not dependent on having nuclear submarines based there. [Interruption.]
Given the outrageous chortling from both sides of the House, does my hon. Friend agree that the only way that the UK establishment parties will support Faslane is if it has nuclear weapons? What a shocking proposal that is.
I agree with my hon. Friend. Today we have seen through any pretence that the Labour party is somehow taking a radical position on nuclear weapons—it is bewildering.
I assure the hon. Gentleman that some Labour Members support his view. I am one of those, and I intend to vote for the motion this evening.
The hon. Gentleman is generous in giving way. As I understood it, he said that without nuclear submarines at Faslane, and with the separation of Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom, he would seek to have a naval base with ships at Faslane. He also said that he considered it a waste of money to build new hardware for the Navy because that money could be better spent on welfare. Those points do not seem to marry up.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but at no point have we said that we will double-spend that money. Scotland’s share of the money that we would save by not renewing Trident would be in the region of £15 billion over the lifetime of Trident, and that money could be invested in conventional defence and in turning Faslane from a nuclear submarine port to a state-of-the-art conventional naval base.
I will make progress. I have taken a lot of interventions and been very generous.
I have always argued that there is no military case for Trident because it is not a military weapon. Trident is a political weapon that can never, and will never, be used. Nevertheless, it is set to consume between 30% and 50% of the UK defence procurement budget.
Does the hon. Gentleman understand that Trident is being used every day? Every moment that we have continuous at-sea deterrence, Trident is being used. The fact that it is never fired in anger is a symbol of its success.
It will come as no surprise to the right hon. Gentleman that I do not agree with him at all, and I will come on to the point about deterrence.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
I will make progress. I have been very generous up to now.
The money spent on Trident is put into keeping Britain at the top table of the United Nations Security Council. Money that should be doing good—whether through peacekeeping, reacting to emergencies such as the Ebola outbreak, or relieving the humanitarian crises that are currently unfolding in the middle east and north Africa—is being sacrificed on a collective military and political ego trip that has more to do with status than with defence.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will make some progress.
Indeed, Members should not just take my word for it. In a Defence Committee evidence session last week, General Sir Richard Shirreff, referring to finding money for Trident, said:
“you either go down the line of nuclear capability at the expense of conventional capability or conventional capability at the expense of nuclear. It seems to be that sort of zero-sum game”.
The problem with Trident is that it puts pressure on the rest of the defence budget to the detriment of our overall security. Even Tony Blair, not someone I seek to quote often in this place, wrote in his memoir about Trident renewal that
“The expense is huge and the utility…non-existent in terms of military use.”
He decided to go down the road of Trident renewal, however, because it would be
“too big a downgrading of our status as a nation.”
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that nuclear weapons are actually making us less, not more, safe? They give out a signal to the rest of the world that the only way to guarantee security is by acquiring nuclear weapons, therefore driving proliferation rather than countering it.
I absolutely and wholeheartedly agree.
Tony Blair summed it up: the UK’s obsession with having an independent nuclear deterrent is little more than a former imperial power indulging in a desperate search for a better yesterday. Possessing Trident is not about defence; it is about the illusion of continuing past glories regardless of cost. The fact is that we cannot afford it. Pride, it seems, will not let us back down. We would rather cut benefits from the disabled. We would rather take tax credits away from the working poor, as long as the bottomless pit of Trident is fed.
On affordability, will the hon. Gentleman give way?
I am exceptionally grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I have written to the former First Minister about these issues on a number of occasions and have not yet received any answers. In the event of decommissioning the nuclear fleet and the warheads at Faslane, where in Scotland would the nuclear materials be stored and disposed of, and how much would it cost the Scottish taxpayer?
Scotland is absolutely set to take its responsibility. Scotland accepts that we have responsibility and Scotland will take care of it, but to use that as an argument to re-arm is, frankly, ridiculous.
I will make some progress.
The possession of top-end military capabilities without the ability to exercise them effectively is known in strategic parlance as a hollow force. To put that in a more colloquial way, we are acting as though we have a fur coat and nae knickers. Trident is a military and political ego trip paid for on the backs of the poor.
The UK independent nuclear deterrent is not all that independent. I refer hon. Members to the Defence Committee report of 30 June 2006, which states that the fact that
“in theory, the British Prime Minister could give the order to fire Trident missiles without getting prior approval from the White House has allowed the UK to maintain the façade of being a global military power. In practice, though, it is difficult to conceive of any situation in which a Prime Minister would fire Trident without prior US approval.”
In reality, it will be a US commander-in-chief who will ultimately decide. In 18 months’ time, that commander-in-chief could be President Donald Trump. Does anyone seriously think that Trident makes the world a safer place?
I have already given way once to the hon. Gentleman. Let me press on.
Everyone accepts that the world has never been a more uncertain place. The world is changing and the threats are changing. They are most certainly not as they were 30 or 40 years ago. Many military strategists recognise that the changes have to be prepared for accordingly. They have identified important threats. There is mass migration into mega cities; by 2040, it is thought that 70% of the world will be urbanised. The great movement of people because of climate change and the search for natural resources, such as water and energy, will cause huge global problems too.
We are increasingly engaged in an ideological war with terrorism. Hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks will be among our enemies’ main weapons. Indeed, the Prime Minister himself said that Daesh was an existential threat to the United Kingdom. We have to assume, sadly, that after the evil of Daesh is destroyed other ideologically driven groups will emerge. Looking ahead, in many ways the traditional nation state will not be the main enemy. Why then, given the radical changes happening in the world, is the UK’s response exactly as it was 30 or 40 years ago—nuclear-armed submarines at sea 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year, with nuclear missiles pointed at and designed to obliterate European cities?
The hon. Gentleman makes the case for Britain’s unilateral nuclear disarmament, a case we have heard many times in this Chamber over the years. How does he address the inescapable fact that the only nation that has ever had nuclear weapons used against it, namely Japan, did not have any?
I am not entirely sure what the hon. Gentleman is driving at. To be perfectly honest, it was not exactly worth waiting for. It makes no military sense at all. I return to the view that Trident is not a military weapon; it is purely a political weapon.
The hon. Gentleman is clearly satisfied that the Russian state is no longer a threat to western security and the security of the UK. Perhaps he could give us his reasons for thinking that. Why is he so confident that Russia is no longer a threat to the security of the UK?
The hon. Lady is advocating that every country in the world—Germany, Poland, Norway and Sweden—should arm itself to the teeth. Is she honestly arguing for that? Does she believe that Russia is going to come sweeping across the plains and invade the United Kingdom? Is that what she is honestly advocating? If she wants to argue that every country in the world should possess its own nuclear weapons, I advise her to take that to the Labour party. From the sound of it, she may well get some support.
As I mentioned at the start of my speech, there was a genuine, though forlorn, hope that, with the election of the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) as leader of the Labour party, there would at least be a debate on Trident in this place. I fear that the right hon. Gentleman has not managed to take his party with him. The paltry attendance of Labour Members today suggests exactly that.
The Labour party’s refusal to debate Trident will disappoint many in their own rank and file. I have no doubt that when the Prime Minister promises a vote on the maingate decision, as he did yesterday, I will see the right hon. Member for Islington North voting with the Scottish National party against Trident renewal. I fear he will have to swim through a tide of his own MPs going through the Lobby with the Conservative party again to support Trident renewal at a cost of £167,000 million. Labour loves to talk about being a multilateral party, but it cannot hide behind the fig leaf of multilateralism while committing the United Kingdom to this massive increase in nuclear weaponry. If the Labour party decides to support the Government in renewing the Trident missile programme, it will be as morally bankrupt as the Conservative party.
If Trident was ever an answer, it was an answer to a 20th-century problem, not to the problems we face in the 21st century. Trident is a purely political not a military weapon. It does not make us any more safe than nations that do not possess weapons of mass destruction. Trident is all about the UK projecting power. It is a desperate attempt to cling to the remnants of a fading imperial past, and is being paid for on the backs of the poor. Trident is diminishing the rest of the UK’s capability, and therefore there is no moral, economic or military case for renewing it.
The review is being led by the shadow Secretary of State for Defence. I shall not go into the arcane details of Labour party processes, but a member of the national executive committee is involved in supporting that process. That is the role that Ken Livingstone will play.
As I said a moment ago, this is not the first time that SNP Members have brought this question to the House, but they will know that their own approach to defence has failed to stand up to close scrutiny. Their White Paper that preceded their failed referendum campaign was clearly uncosted and provided no breakdown of costs for equipment, personnel or budgets.
I will not give way again; I am going to complete my speech—[Interruption.] We listened to the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute for quite some time, and I still do not know what he really thinks. The SNP’s White Paper failed to confront the contradictions between the party’s desire to join NATO and its desire to remove all nuclear weapons from Scottish soil. It was clear from the hon. Gentleman’s contribution that the SNP had no understanding of what would be involved when it said that it wanted to sign up to NATO. It thought that it could be a part of the alliance while being somehow removed from NATO policies. It cannot have its cake and eat it.
Does the hon. Gentleman believe that there is no such thing as a non-nuclear member of NATO? Does he not understand that the past two Secretaries-General of NATO have come from non-nuclear countries—namely, Denmark and Norway?
This is not a question of what my opinion is; it is a matter of simple fact that NATO is a nuclear alliance. Membership of NATO, which the SNP supports, requires allies to be members of the NATO nuclear alliance and to sit on the appropriate committees. So the fact is: an independent Scotland that was part of NATO would be covered by the nuclear umbrella. To be frank, I suspect that it is precisely because it would be covered in that way, with all the strength and security that that would offer, that it wants to be a member of NATO. That would give assurance to its own members. This is not a question of my opinion; it is a simple statement of fact.
No, I will not give way.
That is what we are talking about. It is misleading at best to the people of Dunbartonshire to say that that number of jobs, jobs of that quality, and those skills will be there without a nuclear deterrent.
Does the hon. Gentleman believe that the people of Argyll and Bute, and the people of Dumbarton are so unaware of the circumstances in which they live that at the general election they could not work that out for themselves? Had they not believed what we were saying, I would not have been elected and my hon. Friends who represent Dumbarton would not have been elected.
Absolutely. Elections are always referendums on the future. I spent the day with the hon. Gentleman on Thursday looking at the aircraft carriers. If we took HM Clyde out of the equation, along with Coulport, Faslane and the skills that those high-paid jobs bring, his constituency would be a far poorer place.
I am about to respond to some of the comments that have been made today. Before I answer the hon. Gentleman’s question, I want to deal with the fantasy figures presented by the SNP’s defence spokesman, the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O’Hara), who had conjured up from nowhere the idea that if the nuclear deterrent ceased to exist, Scotland would benefit by some £15 billion as a result of not spending money on it. The cost of replacing the Vanguard class with the Successor class is, as identified clearly in yesterday’s document, £31 billion spread over decades—over some 30 years—so the idea of a much larger figure is not correct.
No, I am afraid I will not give way.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s apparent admission that in the event that the deterrent was to be decommissioned, Scotland would take its share of the nuclear decommissioning risk and location of nuclear material. That is very welcome indeed and is in stark contrast to the responses we have had from the Scottish Government to the disposal project currently in consultation.
The hon. Gentleman also indicated no willingness to acknowledge there is any potential threat from nuclear-empowered nations. He was challenged and signally failed to provide an answer as to what the potential threat might be from Russia, despite the fact that every time there is an incursion into either air or sea space approximate to our national territorial waters SNP Members are the first to jump up and ask what we are doing about it. It seems that they have, as so often, double standards. Finally, I point out to the hon. Gentleman that there has been no increase in nuclear weaponry in this country—far from it; nuclear weapons numbers have declined.
The hon. Member for Chesterfield gave a thoughtful speech from a somewhat confused party position. On the governance of implementing a delivery organisation to make sure we deliver the Successor programme on time and to budget over the years to come, I can confirm that this will remain subject to oversight by the MOD. We are in the process of working out how we best learn the lessons of delivering major procurement projects like Aircraft Carrier Alliance to get the industry properly aligned, and the Ministry and the delivery organisations currently within DE&S properly aligned, to work in partnership to deliver this vital programme.
(9 years ago)
Commons ChamberAs my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman) says, the High North is becoming one of the world’s strategic hotspots. Does the Minister agree that, for a nation with a maritime history such as ours, seeking the assistance of France and Canada in locating a possibly hostile submarine is deeply embarrassing? Will he confirm that this is the third time the UK has had to call on such assistance?
The hon. Gentleman will have to wait until 3.30 pm for the detail, but I just remind him that the Defence Committee shared the Government’s view that the Nimrod programme was dying. I am very glad that it should be possible to give some better news a little later today.
The lack of naval capability in the High North is indeed a worry. Given that just 14 months ago the workers at Scotstoun and Govan were guaranteed a bright future should they vote no to independence, will the Minister like to take this opportunity to make sure the promise made to them of 13 Type 26 frigates, is kept? Does he agree that if, at 3.30 pm, that promise is not kept, it will be a shameful betrayal of that workforce?
As the hon. Gentleman knows, I cannot give him a detailed answer. I can, however, say that the future for Scotland will look even brighter after 3.30 pm. We have just completed, in the past few months, the largest far north exercise in NATO history.
(9 years ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move,
That this House has considered restoration of electrical shore supplies to nuclear-powered submarines.
It is a pleasure to have this debate under your chairmanship, Ms Buck—and to have secured it, but I say that rather guardedly, because it was never my intention to bring this issue forward for debate in this place. My intention from the outset was simply to ask a series of questions of the Ministry of Defence on behalf of my constituents, who approached me with serious concerns about the changes to nuclear safety procedures at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde at Faslane. It was not until the MOD replied, or perhaps I should say did not reply, to my questions that I felt the need to bring the matter to this Chamber.
Last month, as the constituency Member of Parliament for Argyll and Bute, which takes in Faslane and Coulport, I was approached by workers at Faslane who had learned of proposed changes to the long-standing work practices relating to the restoration of shore power to nuclear-powered submarines. They had already raised their concerns with their employer, Babcock, but with no success, and unable to glean what they considered to be an adequate response, they turned to me as their local MP, in the hope that I would be able to secure answers from the Ministry of Defence on their behalf.
I then tabled a series of very specific questions relating to the extension of the limit of restoration of electrical shore supplies to nuclear submarines at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde from the existing 20 minutes up to a maximum of three hours. Rather than answering my questions, the Ministry simply grouped all my detailed and specific questions together and responded to them using a single standard response—a response that I believe hid behind national security, although my questions were specifically about health and safety. I believe that the Ministry of Defence, by dismissing those questions in that manner, has shown me and my constituents a great discourtesy. I am firmly of the opinion that safety at nuclear establishments, and the safety of nuclear materials, is not just a matter for the MOD or Babcock; it is of the most serious concern to my constituents who live beside Faslane, whose concerns cannot be dismissed in such a high-handed fashion.
For far too long, the Ministry of Defence has relied on the stock answer of “Move along; there is nothing to see here,” in the hope of avoiding scrutiny, accountability and transparency—and in many ways it has got away with it. That is unacceptable, and frankly it will not wash any more with me or my constituents, who refuse to be fobbed off with such an answer.
I will give a little background on what has been happening at Faslane, and on the situation that led my constituents to approach me with their concerns. As I understand it, in October 2014 Babcock entered into a contractual agreement with the Ministry of Defence to provide a range of support services at Faslane and Coulport for a period of five years. Part of that arrangement called for a reduction in costs totalling £77.5 million over the lifetime of that contract. No department, including the nuclear operations department, was to be exempt from the cuts.
Prior to that agreement and the swingeing cuts of £77.5 million being announced, a working group comprising management and the trade unions was established to study shift patterns in the nuclear operations department. That working group, I am led to believe, identified a number of different shift options that were to be taken to Babcock management, and then presented to the workforce affected by the proposed changes for their consideration. It appears that the plans to negotiate shift patterns have been shelved, and that Babcock is instead pressing ahead with a radical and unilateral plan of changes to the working patterns in the nuclear operations department. The trade unions understand that the proposed changes will allow Babcock to reduce shift patterns by more than two thirds—a measure that will save around £4.5 million in staff wages, thereby contributing significantly to the £77.5 million of savings demanded in the new contract.
However, the new changes to shift patterns are not, in and of themselves, the problem. The major concern is that in order to facilitate the new shift patterns, Babcock will need to relax the long-standing safety principle of 20-minute restoration of electrical supplies to nuclear vessels alongside the jetties, extending that 20-minute period to a maximum of three hours. I should point out that the 20-minute restoration limit and the current manning levels for out-of-hours cover have been in place for decades; minimal changes have taken place in that time. Every time the 20-minute restoration period has been challenged in the past, it has been vigorously defended and change has been rejected. As I understand it, regular 20-minute training sessions and programmes are still carried out to prove that the 20-minute restoration can be accomplished by the nuclear operations department with existing staff levels.
There can be no doubt that the workers at Faslane are loyal and hard-working. They do a vital job and are not prone to alarmist talk, or flagging up problems when there are not genuine concerns. Their paramount concern and the overriding priority for them is safety: safety of the vessels, the base and, by extension, the entire community in the Helensburgh and Lomond area. When they, with their decades of experience in these matters, feel so marginalised that they are forced to approach their MP for help, we know that they have genuine concerns and serious worries. That is why, when they approached me a few weeks ago, I was only too happy to listen to their concerns and to seek answers from the Ministry of Defence.
I tabled a series of detailed questions that I believe focused on health and safety and on how the decision to extend the 20-minute limit to a maximum of three hours was reached. Unfortunately, my questions were grouped and summarily dismissed by the Ministry of Defence in a single, stock, off-the-shelf answer, which basically said, “We look after security and safety. There is nothing else you need to know; telling you anything further would prejudice the capability, effectiveness and security of our armed forces.” Does the Minister really think that that is an acceptable answer to hard-working, loyal employees, who have sought an answer from their employers to serious questions?
Questions were asked about: health and safety; why important changes to long-established safety routines are being proposed; who is driving the changes; the money that will be saved by implementing the changes; what studies have been made of the safety implications of the changes; and whether an independent nuclear safety assessment has been carried out. Can they really be dismissed with a reference to national security and the fear of undermining our armed forces? If that is the case, the Ministry of Defence is saying that absolutely nothing that goes on behind the gates of Faslane is open to scrutiny, or is in any way transparent—that it is, in fact, accountable to no one.
I remind the Minister that the MOD and Health and Safety Executive agreement states, on page 2, that the Ministry of Defence is
“a Crown body accountable to Parliament for Defence, including the activities of the Armed Forces.”
There has to be accountability and transparency. We recognise the importance of national security, but I believe that this issue has gone far beyond that. Had I been daft enough to ask for the position of the nuclear submarine fleet when it was out on patrol or for details of military training exercises, I could and should have been told by the Ministry of Defence that it would not answer such a question on the grounds that the information was likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces. However, the questions I asked were about health and safety, not national security. For the Ministry to hide behind national security, and to claim that responding to my questions and the concerns of employees at Faslane would undermine the armed forces, is absurd and a public relations blunder of epic proportions.
The prevalent attitude that we have seen so often is, “There is nothing to see, so move on.” That cannot continue, because it simply breeds mistrust and suspicion. If nothing that goes on at Faslane is open to scrutiny, and if nothing is transparent, every denial from the Ministry of Defence will be accepted less and less by those on the civilian side of the fence.
On day one of my parliamentary career a few months ago, I raised the case of Able Seaman William McNeilly and his catalogue of alleged safety breaches aboard nuclear submarines and at Faslane. Within 48 hours, every one of those allegations had been dismissed as having absolutely no substance, and again we were advised, “There is nothing to see here, so move on.” This is history repeating itself.
There are plenty of other examples; a quick trawl through the parliamentary records reveals that on 28 October, my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Steven Paterson) asked
“what arrangements are in place to monitor Babcock’s performance and safety record”.
The response referred to “appropriate measures”. On 8 September, my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) asked
“what notice is given to emergency services in advance of visits by nuclear convoys”.
The response was:
“Police forces may advise fire and rescue services…I am withholding specific information on the period of notice given to the emergency services as its disclosure would”—
this is classic—
“prejudice the capability, effectiveness and security of the Armed Forces.”
A question was asked in the House of Lords in June about what assessment the Ministry of Defence had made of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and its vulnerability to espionage, as we have no maritime patrol aircraft. The reply was that the Government continually conduct assessments but are not prepared to comment further.
The Ministry of Defence is acting like the boy who cried wolf in reverse. The situation is ridiculous, so I hope that the Minister will today end the policy of saying nothing, and recognise that the workforce at Faslane have genuine concerns. They are concerned about their future jobs, and about the safety of the vessels they are charged to look after. Will he reply, either today or in a full written answer, to the questions I submitted two weeks ago asking what discussions his Department has had with Babcock on the proposal to extend the limit of electrical shore supplies to nuclear submarines at Faslane? Will he also tell me whether his Department instructed Babcock to extend that time, or was that a customer-driven request—that is, did the Ministry of Defence ask for that, or did the idea emanate from Babcock?
Will the Minister tell me why, after decades of military, industrial and political consensus on the 20-minute limit, it is now felt necessary to make this change? Has his Department made an assessment of the financial saving accruing to Babcock? What analysis has he undertaken to ensure that the change is science-driven, not cost-driven? Can he enlighten me on what the Astute-class vessels’ procedures are, in terms of the 20-minute shutdown? Finally, will he tell me whether an independent nuclear safety assessment has been carried out? If so, what did the report say?
Let me be clear that this is not an old courtroom trick of asking questions to which one already knows the answers. These are genuine questions, and I am seeking helpful answers. As I said, I believe that nothing that I have said or asked is a threat to national security or could undermine our armed forces.
If the people of Helensburgh and Lomond and the workers at the base are to have faith in this facility, we have to be able to believe that those in charge will always make safety and security their top priority, and any suspicion that corners are being cut to save money has to be thoroughly investigated, but how can we have confidence when every single concern raised and brought to the attention of the authorities is met with the same standard response of “Move along; there is nothing to see here”? Confidence is further undermined when the concerns of a loyal and dedicated workforce are similarly dismissed.
I ask the Minister to seize this opportunity to show that transparency, accountability and appropriate public scrutiny are not alien concepts, and to restore the confidence of both employees at the base and my constituents that decisions are being taken in the correct manner and for the right reasons.
Thank you for chairing these proceedings, Ms Buck. I congratulate the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O’Hara) on securing the debate, and I thank him for giving me an opportunity to address this issue, which I agree is important. It is appropriate that we have an opportunity to discuss it in the House.
I appreciate that the safety of nuclear-powered submarines has been and continues to be a subject of interest not just in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency in the immediate proximity of our submarine base, but to everyone in the United Kingdom. The Vanguard-class strategic ballistic missile submarines, along with the majority of the Royal Navy’s attack submarines, are based at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, and the whole operating Royal Navy submarine fleet will be based there by 2020. Clyde is one of the largest employment sites in Scotland, with about 6,800 military and civilian jobs, which will increase to about 8,200 by 2022. I pay tribute to the hard-working people who man and maintain Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde to support the Royal Navy submarine fleet based there.
The hon. Gentleman expressed the concern that the workforce have about their jobs at the site. What I have just said reinforces the decisions taken under the previous Government. The primary threat to the jobs of those working at HMNB Clyde is from the proposals of the hon. Gentleman’s party and the Scottish Government, rather than from this Government and the work that we intend to place there. However, I listened carefully to his speech and will endeavour to address the points that he raised.
I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that, despite his suspicions to the contrary—I know he knows this privately—there are certain aspects of the operation of submarine nuclear reactors that I cannot discuss owing to security considerations. That is not a fig leaf; it is real. I am sure that no hon. Members would wish the security of the fleet to be compromised. Having said that, I will provide as full a response as I am able to on the issues that he raised. Before I do so, I would like briefly to set in context the Government’s policy for the safe and secure operation of nuclear-powered submarines.
The protection and defence of the whole of the United Kingdom and our dependent territories and citizens is the primary responsibility of Government. In a world that is becoming more uncertain, as we have seen in the actions of a resurgent Russia, the Government are committed to maintaining a strong and capable fleet of attack and strategic ballistic missile submarines and the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence that provides the ultimate guarantee of our national security. In speaking today of our submarine fleet, I would like to take the opportunity—I am sure that all hon. Members would echo this, whatever their personal views on the merits of the nuclear deterrent—to thank the crews of all our submarines, their families and the wider community for their continued dedication and commitment to delivering the mission.
I turn to the points raised by the hon. Gentleman. I want to make it absolutely clear that safety is our priority. Although operating a nuclear reactor in the submarine environment provides unique challenges compared with doing so in the civil sector, the rigorous safety measures that we adopt ensure that submarine reactors remain safe at all times. The safety of reactors is rigorously assessed at every stage of their life, from design and build to operation and disposal. Safety is independently regulated in accordance with the law and by our own Ministry of Defence independent nuclear regulator. Together, those regulators impose robust controls that are at least as stringent as those in the civil sector. We are also held to account by external regulators and, ultimately, here in Parliament.
In Scotland, radioactive substances are regulated by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. A memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Defence and the SEPA includes provisions that enable the agency to carry out its regulatory role effectively while ensuring that sensitive information is properly protected. Similar arrangements are in place with the Office for Nuclear Regulation.
I trust that what I have said will reassure hon. Members that our submarine nuclear reactor operations are subject to independent, impartial and robust regulation. Any suggestion to the contrary is, quite frankly, wrong. As I have said, I am constrained by security considerations in the details that I can discuss, but I can say that the Ministry of Defence regularly and routinely reviews the procedures regulating the operation and maintenance of submarine nuclear reactors. That process naturally includes consultation with industry partners and regulators, but no change can be implemented until it is proved to be safe and, where applicable, has been approved by the relevant regulatory authorities.
Regarding the hon. Gentleman’s specific concern, it may be helpful if I explain that submarine reactors have a diverse range of cooling systems, including a dedicated system that is not dependent on electrical supplies. As I have previously informed the House in answer to a question from the right hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), there have been only four events in the past 20 years involving the loss of electrical power to a submarine reactor cooling system when in port. In all four events, there was no disruption to reactor cooling as a result of the loss of electrical supplies.
That is the measure of the safety of our submarine nuclear reactors. It is simply not the case that a disruption of the electrical shore supply to a submarine will inevitably and rapidly lead to the submarine’s reactor becoming unsafe. It is quite wrong, and indeed alarmist, to suggest otherwise. Any proposals to change reactor operating procedures must be seen in that context. The Ministry of Defence would never propose a change that could lead to a reduction in reactor safety. Were we to do so, any such change would simply not pass regulatory scrutiny.
What I have said may raise in the minds of some hon. Members the question of why submarines require a shore electrical supply and why, if the loss of that supply poses no immediate threat to reactor safety, its restoration is subject to strict regulatory control. That question is simply answered. Once the reactor has shut down, the submarine continues to require a supply of electricity to operate its internal systems, such as lighting to allow sailors to get around the submarine. Although those requirements can be met from other sources, in the longer term a shore supply is required. As I have said, however, reactor cooling can rely on a diverse range of systems, not all of which depend on electrical supplies.
I fully understand that nuclear-powered submarines are a contentious issue for some hon. Members, and that they are likely to remain so. I want to address the question asked by the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute about whether the proposed changes have been inspired by Babcock, and in particular by the savings required in the company. My answer to that is we have made no assessment, in the review of procedures, of the impact on Babcock. This is a Royal Navy-initiated activity with the MOD’s support. Proposed changes to shift patterns have nothing to do with why we are undertaking this exercise. That was one of his concerns, and I hope that I have set it to rest.
I genuinely thank the Minister for his answers, but can he understand my frustration that all my previous questions were grouped together and given one stock answer? Does he agree with me that the Ministry does itself no favours by doing that, because it leads to suspicion and conjecture? Would it not have been an awful lot better if the MOD had answered each of my questions on merit, in which case we would not have needed this debate?
I can understand why the hon. Gentleman might have been somewhat frustrated by the reply that he got. I have to say that it is not unusual for Departments—across a range of activities, not purely the MOD—to find themselves not always capable of delivering the kinds of answers that the Members who pose them might like to receive. Many of the questions that the hon. Gentleman asked got into topics that were covered by security concerns, which was why he received the answers that he did. I hope that during this debate, I have managed to allay some of his concerns.
In closing, I can only reiterate that the Ministry of Defence operates its submarine nuclear reactors with the highest regard for safety. As in the civil sector, appropriate and targeted assessments of operating processes and procedures are undertaken to ensure that our robust arrangements remain valid. The process involves not only the independent regulator but our industry partners and independent nuclear safety advisers, who play a significant role in ensuring that those processes and procedures are as robust as they need to be to ensure the safe operation of our submarine nuclear reactors. Only when a positive consensus of advice has been reached to the effect that reactor safety will not be compromised, and that there is a clear benefit, are changes to operating processes and procedures undertaken. As I have said, the process includes our independent regulator and, where necessary, external regulators.
The Royal Navy’s attack and strategic ballistic missile submarines are an essential capability for the defence of the whole United Kingdom, and I hope that what I have said goes some way towards reassuring hon. Members that our submarines are operated with the highest regard for the safety of their crews and the public. Through our nuclear-powered submarine programme and the independent nuclear deterrent that it supports, we ultimately guarantee our national security and the freedoms that we continue to enjoy in a democratic society.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered restoration of electrical shore supplies to nuclear-powered submarines.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberWe agree that the legitimate Government of Yemen is that led by President Hadi, and to that extent we support the efforts of Saudi Arabia and its partners to ensure that President Hadi can again be recognised as president of the country. We also want the fighting there to stop so that we can get much-needed food aid and fuel into Yemen, where millions of people are now at risk of starvation. In the end, however, this is a war that must be brought to a conclusion through some kind of political settlement.
Will the Secretary of State tell me whether the year-long bombing campaign in Syria has improved the stability and security of the region? Does he think that it has brought peace closer?
As I said in my original answer, it has reduced the ability of ISIL to operate, particularly in Iraq. To that extent, the coalition strikes in Syria are useful to that campaign. Given that ISIL is a danger to the people of this country as well as to the security of that region, and bearing in mind that 30 of our holidaymakers, including four Scots, were slaughtered on a beach in an ISIL attack in Tunisia, it would not be right for the task of defeating ISIL in Syria in order to keep our streets safe to be left to French, Australian and American aircraft.
The Secretary of State says that military personnel from America, Australia, Russia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Libya, Egypt, France, Jordan, Iran, Belarus and North Korea are already in Syria, along with the peshmerga, the Free Syrian Army and Daesh. What does he think the UK dropping even more bombs is likely to achieve? Should not the United Kingdom be using its influence in the United Nations to pursue peace through diplomacy rather than gearing up for airstrikes?
ISIL has been butchering our own civilians, killing people of other faiths and throwing gay people off buildings. With respect, I have to say to the hon. Gentleman that I find the idea that it would suddenly cave in to diplomacy in the form of a United Nations resolution a little naive. ISIL has to be defeated in Iraq and in Syria, and the coalition would welcome the precision capability that our Tornado aircraft could bring in Syria, as they have done in Iraq.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI, too, welcome the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) to her new role; I look forward to working constructively with her and her colleagues in the coming weeks and months. On behalf of the Scottish National party, may I also express our deep sadness at the loss of Flight Lieutenant Alan Scott and Flight Lieutenant Geraint Roberts? We, too, extend our most sincere condolences to their families and friends on the tragic loss of such highly regarded servicemen.
It goes without saying that we support the renewal of the Armed Forces Acts that enable our dedicated and professional service personnel to defend and protect the people and the interests of all four constituent parts of this United Kingdom. We will fully engage with the Bill as it progresses through Committee.
Let me put on the record at the first opportunity to do so since coming to this place that we wish to highlight some serious concerns about the current state of the armed forces, particularly pertaining to Scotland. It is an inescapable fact that since the last Armed Forces Bill came before this place, a record number of servicemen and women have been betrayed by a Government who have overseen historic levels of cuts to the number of service personnel and the military footprint in Scotland. Year on year, we have had to endure cuts to the number of people serving in our armed forces. The Scottish Government’s employment figures show a 9.5% drop in the number of people employed in the armed forces in Scotland. That is a staggering 2,800 jobs lost in just five years. It is a matter not just of military personnel but of Scotland’s military footprint.
Since the strategic defence and security review of 2010, we have lost two of our three air bases—Leuchars and Kinloss—and we have had to witness an act of gross military vandalism when the Nimrods, the nation’s strategically vital maritime patrol aircraft, were chopped into pieces and sent for scrap. Given the United Kingdom’s geographic position in the north Atlantic, not having maritime patrol aircraft is quite remarkable, but for the United Kingdom to have had MPAs and then to have had them chopped into pieces and scrapped simply beggars belief.
Many of us in the House would agree with what the hon. Gentleman says, and we opposed many of these sad cuts, which were necessary for the nation to break even. Will he enlighten the House? If the outcome of last year’s referendum had been different and we now had an independent Scotland, would he guarantee that the pre-cuts strength that he decries that we have lost would be replaced by the Scottish National party and the Scottish Government? Also, how many jobs would be lost if Trident were to be removed from Scotland?
Order. I can understand the temptation, but I do not want to open this pretty technical debate into a general point-scoring debate on policy. As I say, I can understand the temptation, but I am sure the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara) will want to stick to what we are debating.
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. To respond very briefly, I refer the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) to the White Paper published before the referendum. Everything would be contained therein. The Scottish National party is quite clear about its paramount commitment to conventional defences. We would thus obviously invest in such defences.
I shall take your advice, Mr Deputy Speaker, and perhaps not engage further, other than to say that we shall support the Bill as it makes its way through Committee. Most notably, at the 2015 general election, the SNP was the only party to make a commitment to providing a statutory footing for a British Armed Forces Federation. We would like to introduce such provisions into the Bill in Committee. There is, of course, already an established British Armed Forces Federation, which provides a professional, independent and apolitical voice for service personnel. The BAFF is, in its own words,
“a specifically British solution for the British Armed Forces”,
which campaigns on range of issues such as armed forces housing, compensation and improved medical care for veterans.
Veterans’ mental health is particularly important. I recommend anyone attending last night’s Adjournment debate—and those who did not attend it—to get hold of the Hansard and read the fantastic contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Dr Cameron), ably supported by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer). This was a learned and informed debate—a shining example, I believe, of this House at its best.
If the BAFF were given statutory status, it would be a far more robust organisation in providing legal advice, aid for the writing of wills, anti-bullying advice, grievance reporting and, of course, aid to those with mental health problems. The idea of having an armed forces federation is not new and it is not radical. Indeed, there are several such federations operating extremely well within the armed forces of many of our NATO allies. Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Germany and Hungary all have armed forces federations, while there are also recognised and functioning armed forces federations in Australia and, closer to home, in Ireland. I firmly believe that a mature and responsible military such as that of the United Kingdom has nothing to fear from an armed forces federation.
As I said elsewhere, it should be seen as complementary rather than in opposition to the chain of command. A federation would not impinge in any way on the chain of command, but would rather give support to service personnel and their families—and, of course, to our veterans, to whom we all have a duty of care. If a federation works well for the police force, surely it is wholly appropriate that we extend the same right to our military personnel, who put their lives on the line every time they go on duty.
In conclusion, we support the Bill and will continue to support it, but we will go through it, as the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood said, line by line to make sure that the Bill will be the best that it can be. Our service personnel deserve no less.
I agree, which is why the White Paper was complete nonsense. Not only did the sums not add up, but there were no practical proposals to generate those forces from an independent Scotland. Scotland would have information, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities and other assets but would have no capacity, because of the numbers involved, to analyse what was collected or what its purpose was. For example, it would need fast jets and other things. It was just bizarre, to be honest.
Does the hon. Gentleman think it fair and equitable that Scotland has only 6.3% of the armed forces personnel, down from 7.1% in 2012?
I know that the Scottish nationalist party wants to play up its victim mentality, which it has turned into an art form that I admire, but the idea to which the hon. Gentleman’s White Paper refers, which is that Scotland could provide the manpower needed for its proposals from the Scottish population, which is getting older, was absolute nonsense—[Interruption.] May I give him some evidence? He needs only to look at the recruitment to Scottish regiments when they were reorganised. Why was one regiment in Scotland—
I would refer, for example, to the recruitment of overseas nationals from the Commonwealth. The regiments that had to backfill with Fijians were the Scottish regiments because they could not get the numbers within Scotland. If the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute has some magic pool of people in Scotland who will suddenly join the armed forces or if there is some huge boom that will happen in the next few years that means that 18-year-olds and fit individuals will join the armed forces, I would like to see them.
The hon. Gentleman is not exactly doing the idea of the United Kingdom a great service. Indeed, he is pointing out everything that is wrong with the current system.
Order. I think we are now going to get back to the Bill. We have had enough playing around. Kevan Jones, have you finished?
(9 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI wholeheartedly agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. ISIL draws no legal distinction regarding which side of the Sykes-Picot line it is operating on. Actions by American, Canadian and other forces in Syria are legal because they contribute to the collective self-defence of the legitimate Government of Iraq where the Government of Syria are unwilling and unable to deal with ISIL at its source in northern Syria. Like him, I think the time will come when this new Parliament will have to reconsider whether we are doing enough to tackle ISIL at its source.
I thank the Secretary of State for the early sight of his statement.
Let me make it absolutely clear that no one on the SNP Benches disagrees about just how evil Daesh is. I take the opportunity to pay tribute to the bravery of our service personnel.
I agree with many of the strategic goals that were outlined early in the statement, but I have to point out that we remain firmly opposed to extending airstrikes into Syria without a great deal more justification than has been outlined by the Secretary of State. I cannot help but feel that we are in danger of doing something just to be seen to be doing anything.
I agree that here in the UK we need to develop a comprehensive counter-radicalisation programme, but can the Secretary of State tell me why it has taken five years to develop such an integrated programme? Does he agree that, alongside that, we need a military strategy that will minimise the number of civilian casualties and that is not at odds with the building of a counter-radicalisation programme?
On the FOI request, the Secretary of State suggested that there was transparency, but the fact of the matter is that the information was dragged out of the Ministry of Defence. Why did he choose not to inform the House about the embedded service personnel two weeks ago, in his statement following the tragedy in Tunisia? He spoke about the widening of the UK mission, including airstrikes in Syria, when he knew that there were personnel embedded with the Americans and the Canadians, albeit wearing a different uniform. Why did he choose not to tell the House of the embedded personnel then?
I repeat that the freedom of information request did not drag information out of us; we put the answer on the Ministry of Defence website, and we will do the same with any further requests. We have answered questions in the House from hon. Members, including the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson). If questions are tabled, we will answer them. But it has been standard practice for some time not to publicise the placing of embeds in other countries’ forces because, as I have said, those are their forces and their operations. It is for them to publicise them, not us. However, if we are asked to give details, we of course do so.
The hon. Gentleman rightly drew attention to the loss of life in Tunisia, which included Billy and Lisa Graham and James and Ann McGuire from Scotland, so I hope that he will also see, from the Scottish nationalists’ point of view, the need for us to combat ISIL at its source. He asked about the Prevent programme. The Prime Minister has today given more details of the programme, which we are intensifying. The hon. Gentleman asked where the military strategy fits in. As I have described to the House, the military campaign is only one component of the overall effort against ISIL.
(9 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI pay tribute to the service of my hon. Friend’s daughter in the Navy. Although three times the size of HMS Invincible, the new carriers will operate with approximately the same number of crew. The Royal Navy is already planning to ensure that it has the suitably trained and qualified people it needs, which includes training at HMS Raleigh in my hon. Friend’s constituency and at Devonport nearby.
As the Secretary of State points out, the Queen Elizabeth class was partly built on the Clyde where the Type 26 frigates are to be built. Can he explain a quote from the Cabinet Office, reported in yesterday’s edition of The Sunday Times, which stated that the Type 26 frigates will now be ordered in small batches
“to bring realism to the programme”?
What does that mean, and what was so unrealistic about the initial order?
We confirmed earlier this year that we are spending £859 million on the design of the Type 26 frigates and on some of the long-lead items for the first three.
I have no doubt that the Type 26s are on the order book, but could the Secretary of State explain the quote from The Sunday Times yesterday about the need
“to bring realism to the programme”?
What was so unrealistic about the initial programme?
Only the Scottish National party could regard £859 million as somehow half-hearted. We will finalise the design of the ships shortly, but we have to make sure that we get good value for taxpayer pounds.
(9 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am in the hands of the House, Madam Deputy Speaker. I know that other Members want to speak, but I will give way to my hon. Friend.
I absolutely agree. That is what the Prime Minister calls a “full spectrum” effect. We have to deal with these things right across the board—with diplomacy and tackling radicalisation, as well as the harder power that we are charged with. I wish my hon. Friend well in her experiences with the armed forces parliamentary scheme.
In describing the personnel who serve this country across the globe, it would be wrong not to mention those who work in our nuclear submarines. In those submarines, unseen and undetected, we have an ultimate deterrent that has now been maintained for more than 46 years. It is right to pay tribute to the men and women of that service, whose work is unseen but never out of our minds.
Apart from the United States, no other country has our global reach or defence footprint, which I have described. In a world where global problems demand global solutions, we are leveraging that influence to strengthen our international partnerships. At the multilateral level, we have encouraged NATO, the cornerstone of our defence, to upgrade its capabilities and increase allies’ defence spending. Bilaterally, we have worked with the French to form the combined joint expeditionary force, with some 1,000 British and French personnel taking part in an exercise this year to bring us up to full operating capacity next year. Our relationship with the United States remains as strong as ever. We are working together not just in Europe and the Baltic, but in the Gulf, the Red sea and the Indian ocean. The United States Defence Secretary, Ash Carter, emphasised the importance of that relationship when I met him at NATO ministerial meetings last week.
We have been able to maintain this vast range of activity only because of the reforms we have implemented. We cannot have strong defence without a strong economy, so we had to take some tough decisions. We are now on course to deliver more than £5 billion of savings since 2010. We are making efficiency part of the culture of the Ministry of Defence and of our armed forces by making the drive to seek savings a habit. That approach has allowed us to protect the front line better, to maintain the existing size of our regular and reserve forces and to ensure that our personnel have the high-end capability they need, as well as to spend £160 billion over the next 10 years on the new hunter-killer submarines, helicopters, armoured vehicles and joint strike fighters that are needed.
Does the Secretary of State accept that there is a large defence capability gap, and does he now regret the ill-advised and short-sighted decision to abandon the maritime patrol aircraft that were chopped up and left to rot after the 2010 SDSR?
Tough decisions were taken back in 2010, but let me tell the hon. Gentleman that the maritime patrol aircraft, which were supposed to have been delivered some 10 years previously, did not exist. Not a single aircraft had been handed over to the RAF. The programme was years behind schedule. The Conservative Government ordered them, but in their 13 years the Labour Government did not deliver them. There was not an aircraft on the tarmac, so we had to take a tough decision to organise our maritime patrol capability differently. That will of course be one of the areas that will be considered in the 2015 review, which is now under way.
Let me turn to that review. We have to deal not just with the challenges of today, but with those of tomorrow, which I think was the point made by the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes). I know that the strategic defence and security review has generated high levels of interest in this House, and I am grateful to the Defence Select Committee of the last Parliament for its reports, which are certainly informing our work.
The 2015 review will build on the 2010 review. Much of its analysis still holds good. We were right to identify counter-terrorism and cyber as key areas for investment, to start reshaping the Army for a post-Afghanistan future and to reform our defence structures. The 2010 review was the first forward-looking review of national security policy, plans and capabilities to cover all national security departments, not just defence. It established the National Security Council, ensuring strategic decision making at the top of Government, and it underlined the need for more agile forces in an era that is placing a greater number of more diverse demands on defence, which we are meeting through our Future Force. We are therefore far better placed for a review today than we were five years ago.
The review that is under way must reflect a world that now looks darker and more dangerous than at any time since the end of the cold war. It will consider the full range of threats that we face now and in the future, examine the capabilities that we need to handle those threats, and help us to judge how to resource those capabilities. Underpinned by a strong evidence base, the review will unite diplomacy, defence, development and homeland security. It will recognise that our security and prosperity at home and abroad are interlinked. It will also focus on opportunity and innovation—on getting the most out of our whole national security workforce, not just the uniformed services; on strengthening the defence and security industries to harness their technological know-how; on promoting the prosperity agenda; and on cementing key international partnerships.
We expect the review to be completed before the end of the year, but today is a good chance for me to listen to colleagues’ views as well as to speak. The House has huge expertise in defence, development and national security, and I invite Members, whether they are going to speak today or not, to make submissions on the defence aspects of the review directly to me at the Ministry of Defence. We would welcome those submissions.
I say to those who are worried about the events of last Friday that we have highly capable armed forces, respected the world over, and we are putting in one of the biggest defence efforts of any nation in the world, with the fifth biggest defence budget. We are doing that right around the world, and for all the right reasons—to defend the values of freedom, tolerance and the rule of law that we hold dear. To the terrorists in Tunisia and extremists wherever they are, that is the best possible answer.
I am glad that I have captured the attention of the Labour Front Bench, and I hope what I have said will receive wide support in the House.
Another reason for my scepticism is my experience—an experience that I have shared with a number of Members over the last 12 years—of successive military interventions in a range of Islamic countries. At each stage it was argued, and we were assured, that the next intervention would be the absolute key, or at least would deliver progress towards the objectives of this country. I think it must be said that, on each and every occasion, exactly the reverse has come about.
According to the House of Commons Library, 2,047 days have passed since Sir John Chilcot made his opening statement in the Iraq inquiry. By contrast, the first world war lasted 1,561 days, and the second world war lasted only slightly longer than the Chilcot inquiry, at 2,075 days. I am told that a trip to Mars and back would take 520 days. We are also reminded that the Franks inquiry into the Falklands war took a little over six months.
I think it very important—and I would apply this, with great respect, to those who voted for intervention in Iraq, including the present Prime Minister, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer and the present Secretary of State for Defence—for us to reflect on the lessons of that intervention, and also the wider interventions which have, in my view, removed despotic tyrants only to create political vacuums from which unspeakable horrors have now emerged. I think that we should reflect on the wisdom of what we are doing before embarking on another extension of military intervention without at least establishing a specific line of causality between the latest atrocity carried out against United Kingdom citizens and the way in which military intervention would affect it. My view of this matter is tempered by experience, and that experience has not been helpful to those who advocate military intervention.
The third reason for my scepticism is one of practicality. I hope that I shall be able to type in my eight-numeral password so that I can find something that I read a few minutes ago on this iPad. I had looked up the derivation of the dictum “My enemy’s enemy is my friend” . I was once told that it had originated from Sandhurst—that it was the Sandhurst view of diplomacy—but further examination reveals that it is much, much more ancient than that. In fact, the original dictum came not from Sandhurst but from Sanskrit. It is as old as recorded history itself. Having consulted my iPad, I now understand that there is a Bedouin Arabic version of the proverb which reads “Me and my brother against my cousin, but me and my cousin against the stranger”.
The dictum about “my enemy’s enemy” no doubt applies to many situations in many countries in the world, but I think that one country where it certainly does not apply—or where it is not easy to fathom—is Syria. In Syria, your enemy’s enemy is just as likely, perhaps more likely, to be your enemy than to be your friend. It is a country of extraordinary complexity. We read of the anguished debates about Syria that are taking place in the United States at the moment about the wisdom of specific air strikes on specific targets, and whether the allied air force will end up bombing the wrong people in Syria and undercutting the aims that the campaign is meant to engender. For that third reason, practicality, we remain to be convinced that this is a wise course of action.
I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend that the situation is extremely complex. Every Member who has spoken in the debate seems to have accepted the complex and ever-changing nature of the threat that we now face. The response to that threat must be flexible and innovative. Does my right hon. Friend agree that nuclear weapons cannot be used to combat terrorism, and are, in fact, useless at protecting citizens against sentence atrocities? Does he agree that the Government’s plan to spend £100,000 million on renewing Trident, while at the same time making swingeing cuts in the conventional forces on which we shall rely more and more, is an extremely worrying development?
I do agree with my hon. Friend. I could, if I wished, spend a great deal of time talking about Trident to Conservative Members, but I shall try to confine myself specifically to the issue that the Secretary of State has cast as the issue under discussion. Nevertheless, I think that there is a connection between these issues. The Secretary of State talked about a number of threats that the United Kingdom faced. To remarkably few of those threats would anyone present the Trident nuclear system or its renewal as an effective answer, and it could certainly not be presented as an answer to the threat that we face from terrorism.
In summary, I say to the House that we could achieve something together by accepting the wisdom of so many of our Arabic friends and so many of our allies that “Daesh” is the right term to describe terrorists. Is a terrorist by any other name still a terrorist? Most certainly. Does it matter that they are called “terrorist” and not accorded the respectability of being referred to as a state or representing a religion? I think it matters a very great deal, and I think we are on the point of a consensus on the matter—and I hope the Secretary of State for Defence will, perhaps, be able to go further in summing up this debate.
We are sceptical and opposed in the current circumstances to extending the air campaign into Syria. We would have to see the legal basis, and the practicality would have to be much better understood. In particular, a great deal of my experience in this House, and our experience collectively as a country over past years, tells us that interventions can have unforeseen consequences. Many of our interventions and extensions of military action could at best be described as counter-productive and at worst have helped to replenish the dark well from which terrorism is now springing.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberLet me begin by joining all the other Members who have congratulated you on your appointment, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) for allowing me to take some of his allotted time. In doing so, he recognised that this issue is important not just for his constituency but for Scotland more widely. It goes to the heart of the question of the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and local communities, particularly Scotland’s rural communities.
As my hon. Friend said, there is no doubt that work on the extension of the BUTEC range has already started, although, as recently as last month, the West Highland Free Press said that the official MOD position was that no such work had begun. The evidence is plain: anyone passing Sands Beach and looking down will see that major and extensive trench digging is already taking place—and why, if no major construction is taking place, are the Applecross guest houses full of construction workers? Some are booked up four months in advance. That is the crux of the matter: it is about engagement and respect between the Ministry of Defence and local communities.
Will the Minister please tell us what level of consultation has been entered into by the MOD with the local population about the range extension, and about the serious effects that it will have on fishermen and associated businesses? Like my hon. Friend, I understand that a public consultation was due to start in April, but it did not. Then it was due to start in June, but that has not happened either. Now there is a vague promise that it will take place some time before the end of the summer. What is the truth? When will that public consultation take place? Indeed, will it ever take place? It now appears that the first part of the extension will be completed before there has been any consultation with the local community. Will the Minister confirm this evening that there will be a consultation process, and will he tell the House when it will take place?
In accepting that the construction work is well under way despite a lack of any public consultation, will the Minister tell us what procedures the MOD believes it has to follow in order to proceed with the major part of the construction work? I ask that question because I am unaware of any planning application having been made, or of an environmental impact assessment having been carried out. As I understand it, when the Ministry sought to extend the buildings at Faslane, it used the conventional planning process. Is it the Ministry’s intention to use that process to extend the work at BUTEC?
Will the Minister tell us whether an application has been made under the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997? Does the work even require such planning permission? If not, what mechanisms are being put in place to facilitate scrutiny and consideration by the public, by the local authority and by the Scottish Government? My fear is that the development will be buried deep within the confines of a general permitted development of an unspecified nature, or that the Secretary of State will use the powers granted to him under the antiquated and anachronistic Military Lands Act 1892 and its associated byelaws to avoid any public scrutiny or consultation. Unfortunately, the MOD stands accused once again of a lack of public engagement, of secrecy and of obfuscation. I urge the Minister not to hide behind the Military Lands Act, and to ensure instead that public consultation and transparency are the hallmark of his actions.
We are forced to conclude that the Ministry of Defence is once again spending hundreds of millions of pounds of the public’s money yet is unwilling to be held up to public scrutiny. We strongly suspect that the reason this whole project is shrouded in such secrecy is that the MOD is spending this money by stealth to extend the BUTEC range in preparation for the arrival of Trident. How can the Minister explain that, when this place has yet to debate, let alone agree, Trident’s renewal?
When will the Ministry consult the people whose lives are going to be affected by the extension of the range? What safeguards are being put in place to prevent any disturbance to the local environment, to the public and to marine life as a result of the extension? And when will the MOD come clean with the people of Applecross and wider Scotland about what is actually happening at BUTEC and admit that this is further below-the-line spending based on Trident’s renewal before this House has debated or agreed to such an undertaking?
May I get clarification on something? The Minister said that this would lead to £1 million of savings for the MOD, but the knock-on effect to the local economy will be that the fishing boats will be cleared out of the new extended range. There will therefore be a devastating effect on the local economy while the MOD is saving £1 million per annum.
I shall come on to deal with the hon. Gentleman’s comments about the impact on the fishing industry, because that is the thrust of the argument being made by Scottish National party Members. In short, that vision is not shared by the MOD, and I will come on to explain why. We believe that this investment will sustain the activity in Applecross and the Kyle of Lochalsh, and in the Inner Sound, which will have an enduring future in terms of maintaining economic prosperity in the area.
Relocating the in-water acoustic measurement equipment away from Rona will mean extending the current Ministry of Defence byelaws for the BUTEC protected water space by some 28 sq km. The current byelaw covers 82 sq km, which is currently divided into two areas. The first is an outer area of approximately 56 sq km, which prohibits the fishing by any method involving the use of a net or dredge. There is also an inner area of around 26 sq km within which all fishing, whether by line, net, trawl or creel, as well as the anchoring of vessels, dredging and dumping of rubbish are prohibited.
Under the proposed changes for the BUTEC water space, there would be a single water space provided for all range activities covering an area of approximately 110 sq km. This relatively modest increase in water area would be offset by removing the fishing restrictions currently in place in the area of water around the Island of Rona.
Let me assure the hon. Gentlemen that the Ministry of Defence takes very seriously its obligations to ensure the continued and sustainable use of waters that are used for defence purposes by other users. We already work closely with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and with Marine Scotland to establish a sound informal consultation process in respect of the national marine plan development.
As part of the work to implement QinetiQ’s proposal for BUTEC, it will be necessary to revise the current byelaws. Part of that revision process involves the need for public consultation. It is intended that this formal public consultation will commence later this summer as part of a separate strand of work to review all current byelaws at some 200 defence sites. The consultation is in relation to byelaws, the timing of which is not determined solely by this site. It is affected by proposals across a range of defence sites, not exclusively in Scotland—most of them are in fact outside Scotland.
All I will say to the hon. Gentleman is that I think it behoves him to act responsibly as a Member of Parliament and not to foment his constituents into getting overexcited about something until he is well informed about the situation. We all have to deal with contentious issues in our constituencies, and having been a Member of Parliament for 10 years, I think that it is always better to adopt an informed position before reaching for the panic button. Therefore, I hope that this debate has helped reassure the hon. Gentleman on how we propose to conduct ourselves and the extent of the consultation we are looking to undertake, because we will take into account the legitimate views of his constituents who might be inadvertently affected.
I would like to answer some of the hon. Gentleman’s questions. He asked who will be responsible for the consultation. The byelaw consultation will be undertaken by the Defence Infrastructure Organisation’s byelaw review team. The consultation with the fishermen will be undertaken primarily by QinetiQ, as it has the direct relationship with them. He asked whether the depth of the water would have an impact on what we are proposing, and the answer is no; the extension of the range would be in water of a similar depth, rather than shallower water. He asked whether we have any expectations of an adverse impact on the fishing community, which I think I have already addressed. The answer is that we do not think so, but we are keen to explore any concerns there might be.
On the question asked by the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara), I do not think that there is a question of undue secrecy by the MOD. As I have said, we have been very clear with his colleagues in the Scottish Parliament about what we are seeking to undertake, and we will do a consultation. However, we will maintain secrecy over the precise nature of some of the equipment and the capability it delivers, because that has a clear defence purpose. I do not think that he would expect us to be as transparent about that.
The hon. Member for Argyll and Bute also raised in a traditional way his concerns about whether this might be some underhand way of encouraging Trident renewal. I do not think that is a relevant concern here. This is about providing capability that is used for a wide variety of submarine testing, including the strategic deterrent, but it is by no means exclusively in relation to it.
Can I be absolutely clear that the extension of the range has absolutely nothing to do with the proposed renewal of Trident? I find it difficult to comprehend that such an investment would be made in an underwater submarine test facility when the Government are clearly on record as supporting Trident renewal. Is this not just under-the-line spending, by which we have seen billions spent preparing for Trident renewal before this House has had a chance to debate it?
As I tried to make clear at the outset, this is about improving the efficiency of the facilities that exist at the moment in the Inner Sound. We are, in essence, taking two separate locations under the water and combining them into one. The functionality of what happens under the water is being improved because of technological advances. This has to do with seeking to upgrade the existing facilities to make them fit for purpose for the future; it has no specific relationship to the strategic deterrent.
I think I have sought to address all the points that hon. Members have raised. I hope that the House will understand why the changes I have outlined for the BUTEC water space are required. Put simply, they are key to sustaining the continuing operation of this vital facility, which happens to be one of the largest employers in that part of the constituency of the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber. I hope that he will come to recognise that this is something that he should support.
Question put and agreed to.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI can reassure my hon. Friend on that. We are building on the foundations of the 2010 review, much of whose analysis holds good, but, as he has told the House, it did not predict the sudden rise of ISIL in the middle east or the return of Russian aggression, with the attempt to change international borders by force in Europe. Let me assure him that both those threats will be a key part of this review.
In the forthcoming SDSR, what cognisance will the Secretary of State give to the fact that in last month’s general election a clear majority of the Scottish electorate voted for parties that put opposition to Trident at the forefront of their manifesto and that 57 of 59 Members returned from Scotland do not want Trident renewal to go ahead? What cognisance will he give to the fact that the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Churches and the Scottish trade unions are also opposed to Trident—
Given that there was precious little strategy involved in the 2010 SDSR and that it was in fact little more than a cost-cutting exercise, will the Minister ensure that the process of renewing and purchasing United Kingdom maritime patrol aircraft will be undertaken immediately and that those aircraft will then be based where they should be historically and logically—in Scotland?
The 2010 review necessarily involved some tough decisions because we had to balance the budget as a result of the mess that we inherited from Labour. Let me assure the hon. Gentleman that we will be looking again at all these different capabilities and at the importance of Scotland. I hope that he noted that I was able to be on the Clyde this morning cutting the first steel on our very latest warship, HMS Medway, which is being built on the Clyde to defend the whole of the United Kingdom.