Electrical Shore Supplies (Nuclear-powered Submarines)

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for Defence Procurement (Mr Philip Dunne)]

Thank you for chairing these proceedings, Ms Buck. I congratulate the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O’Hara) on securing the debate, and I thank him for giving me an opportunity to address this issue, which I agree is important. It is appropriate that we have an opportunity to discuss it in the House.

I appreciate that the safety of nuclear-powered submarines has been and continues to be a subject of interest not just in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency in the immediate proximity of our submarine base, but to everyone in the United Kingdom. The Vanguard-class strategic ballistic missile submarines, along with the majority of the Royal Navy’s attack submarines, are based at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, and the whole operating Royal Navy submarine fleet will be based there by 2020. Clyde is one of the largest employment sites in Scotland, with about 6,800 military and civilian jobs, which will increase to about 8,200 by 2022. I pay tribute to the hard-working people who man and maintain Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde to support the Royal Navy submarine fleet based there.

The hon. Gentleman expressed the concern that the workforce have about their jobs at the site. What I have just said reinforces the decisions taken under the previous Government. The primary threat to the jobs of those working at HMNB Clyde is from the proposals of the hon. Gentleman’s party and the Scottish Government, rather than from this Government and the work that we intend to place there. However, I listened carefully to his speech and will endeavour to address the points that he raised.

I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that, despite his suspicions to the contrary—I know he knows this privately—there are certain aspects of the operation of submarine nuclear reactors that I cannot discuss owing to security considerations. That is not a fig leaf; it is real. I am sure that no hon. Members would wish the security of the fleet to be compromised. Having said that, I will provide as full a response as I am able to on the issues that he raised. Before I do so, I would like briefly to set in context the Government’s policy for the safe and secure operation of nuclear-powered submarines.

The protection and defence of the whole of the United Kingdom and our dependent territories and citizens is the primary responsibility of Government. In a world that is becoming more uncertain, as we have seen in the actions of a resurgent Russia, the Government are committed to maintaining a strong and capable fleet of attack and strategic ballistic missile submarines and the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence that provides the ultimate guarantee of our national security. In speaking today of our submarine fleet, I would like to take the opportunity—I am sure that all hon. Members would echo this, whatever their personal views on the merits of the nuclear deterrent—to thank the crews of all our submarines, their families and the wider community for their continued dedication and commitment to delivering the mission.

I turn to the points raised by the hon. Gentleman. I want to make it absolutely clear that safety is our priority. Although operating a nuclear reactor in the submarine environment provides unique challenges compared with doing so in the civil sector, the rigorous safety measures that we adopt ensure that submarine reactors remain safe at all times. The safety of reactors is rigorously assessed at every stage of their life, from design and build to operation and disposal. Safety is independently regulated in accordance with the law and by our own Ministry of Defence independent nuclear regulator. Together, those regulators impose robust controls that are at least as stringent as those in the civil sector. We are also held to account by external regulators and, ultimately, here in Parliament.

In Scotland, radioactive substances are regulated by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. A memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Defence and the SEPA includes provisions that enable the agency to carry out its regulatory role effectively while ensuring that sensitive information is properly protected. Similar arrangements are in place with the Office for Nuclear Regulation.

I trust that what I have said will reassure hon. Members that our submarine nuclear reactor operations are subject to independent, impartial and robust regulation. Any suggestion to the contrary is, quite frankly, wrong. As I have said, I am constrained by security considerations in the details that I can discuss, but I can say that the Ministry of Defence regularly and routinely reviews the procedures regulating the operation and maintenance of submarine nuclear reactors. That process naturally includes consultation with industry partners and regulators, but no change can be implemented until it is proved to be safe and, where applicable, has been approved by the relevant regulatory authorities.

Regarding the hon. Gentleman’s specific concern, it may be helpful if I explain that submarine reactors have a diverse range of cooling systems, including a dedicated system that is not dependent on electrical supplies. As I have previously informed the House in answer to a question from the right hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), there have been only four events in the past 20 years involving the loss of electrical power to a submarine reactor cooling system when in port. In all four events, there was no disruption to reactor cooling as a result of the loss of electrical supplies.

That is the measure of the safety of our submarine nuclear reactors. It is simply not the case that a disruption of the electrical shore supply to a submarine will inevitably and rapidly lead to the submarine’s reactor becoming unsafe. It is quite wrong, and indeed alarmist, to suggest otherwise. Any proposals to change reactor operating procedures must be seen in that context. The Ministry of Defence would never propose a change that could lead to a reduction in reactor safety. Were we to do so, any such change would simply not pass regulatory scrutiny.

What I have said may raise in the minds of some hon. Members the question of why submarines require a shore electrical supply and why, if the loss of that supply poses no immediate threat to reactor safety, its restoration is subject to strict regulatory control. That question is simply answered. Once the reactor has shut down, the submarine continues to require a supply of electricity to operate its internal systems, such as lighting to allow sailors to get around the submarine. Although those requirements can be met from other sources, in the longer term a shore supply is required. As I have said, however, reactor cooling can rely on a diverse range of systems, not all of which depend on electrical supplies.

I fully understand that nuclear-powered submarines are a contentious issue for some hon. Members, and that they are likely to remain so. I want to address the question asked by the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute about whether the proposed changes have been inspired by Babcock, and in particular by the savings required in the company. My answer to that is we have made no assessment, in the review of procedures, of the impact on Babcock. This is a Royal Navy-initiated activity with the MOD’s support. Proposed changes to shift patterns have nothing to do with why we are undertaking this exercise. That was one of his concerns, and I hope that I have set it to rest.

[Brendan O'Hara]

I genuinely thank the Minister for his answers, but can he understand my frustration that all my previous questions were grouped together and given one stock answer? Does he agree with me that the Ministry does itself no favours by doing that, because it leads to suspicion and conjecture? Would it not have been an awful lot better if the MOD had answered each of my questions on merit, in which case we would not have needed this debate?

[Mr Dunne]

I can understand why the hon. Gentleman might have been somewhat frustrated by the reply that he got. I have to say that it is not unusual for Departments—across a range of activities, not purely the MOD—to find themselves not always capable of delivering the kinds of answers that the Members who pose them might like to receive. Many of the questions that the hon. Gentleman asked got into topics that were covered by security concerns, which was why he received the answers that he did. I hope that during this debate, I have managed to allay some of his concerns.

In closing, I can only reiterate that the Ministry of Defence operates its submarine nuclear reactors with the highest regard for safety. As in the civil sector, appropriate and targeted assessments of operating processes and procedures are undertaken to ensure that our robust arrangements remain valid. The process involves not only the independent regulator but our industry partners and independent nuclear safety advisers, who play a significant role in ensuring that those processes and procedures are as robust as they need to be to ensure the safe operation of our submarine nuclear reactors. Only when a positive consensus of advice has been reached to the effect that reactor safety will not be compromised, and that there is a clear benefit, are changes to operating processes and procedures undertaken. As I have said, the process includes our independent regulator and, where necessary, external regulators.

The Royal Navy’s attack and strategic ballistic missile submarines are an essential capability for the defence of the whole United Kingdom, and I hope that what I have said goes some way towards reassuring hon. Members that our submarines are operated with the highest regard for the safety of their crews and the public. Through our nuclear-powered submarine programme and the independent nuclear deterrent that it supports, we ultimately guarantee our national security and the freedoms that we continue to enjoy in a democratic society.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered restoration of electrical shore supplies to nuclear-powered submarines.