NATO and the High Arctic

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Alex Ballinger]

The Foreign Affairs Committee is going to Greenland in a couple of weeks. We hope to meet the Foreign Minister of Denmark, among other leaders of the Greenlanders, and that sounds like the kind of sensible suggestion that we should be talking about.

Certainly, there are lots of opportunities for NATO to base troops in Greenland already; we did not need a change in sovereignty to do that. I am pleased that that has fallen off the radar. It is concerning that Trump’s interest in Greenland is not a one-off. The US security strategy is explicit that the Arctic is becoming more important to America and to American national security, whether it is because of Russia, China, geography or critical minerals. We should not pretend that this was just a single passing storm.

In the Arctic, NATO is responding, but we need to be honest about the scale of the task. With the Arctic sentry, the alliance is trying to pull together a more coherent posture in the High North, with better visibility, better co-ordination and a clearer framework for operating in the sea, air, space and undersea environments.

We should also underline the importance of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. That strategic choke point is vital to NATO. It affects how Russia can move submarines into the wider Arctic, it affects the security of reinforcement routes in a crisis and it sits alongside the undersea infrastructure that we rely on every day.

I will raise the joint expeditionary force, which my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) raised earlier. The UK-led JEF has real value in this part of the world; it is practical, northern-focused and moves faster than the full NATO machine in the early stages of a crisis. That is exactly the sort of framework we should use to build readiness, interoperability and credibility.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The hon. and gallant Member is making a hoofing speech. He mentioned the Greenland-Iceland gap. We have committed to Operation Firecrest later this year, which will see the carrier strike group go to the High North as a deterrent against the Russian northern fleet breaking out of the Kola peninsula and moving across the Barents sea and into the open ocean. With the emergence of the conflict in the middle east, a potential commitment to a post-conflict force in Ukraine, a commitment to troops in Norway and Operation Firecrest, does he share my concern that we may have to make some very difficult decisions about how much capability we are able to deploy to ensure that our interests are looked after across all those fronts?

[Alex Ballinger]

The hon. Member makes a good point. Our naval capability has sadly diminished; we have fewer destroyers and frigates than we used to, and we are rightly deploying some of those to the Mediterranean and the middle east at the moment.

There will have to be hard choices as we approach that timescale. I think those will depend on the situation in the middle east at that point, but maybe the Minister can address that in her remarks. Later in my speech, I will raise what we might want to do about capability. It is important that NATO is backed by increased capability regarding ships, aircraft, sensors, munitions, trained people and deployable logistics; otherwise, our response will fall short.

The First Sea Lord has made the case for UK action in the High North repeatedly. In recent speeches, he has said that the High North is a critical area, that Russia’s submarine force is a huge concern and that we need more warfighting readiness now, not a peacetime posture. He has also said that

“the advantage that we have enjoyed in the Atlantic since the end of the Second World War is at risk”

unless we take action soon.

I want to ask the Minister whether we are resourcing this crucial area sufficiently. We continue to retire Type 23 frigates—anti-submarine ships. Five have retired since 2021, including HMS Lancaster most recently, but are we retiring them before replacements are ready? We have the Type 31 programme coming on soon, but it would be nice to have reassurance on the timelines and the risk that we are taking if there are gaps. If we are relying on future ships for future threats, we need confidence that they will arrive before the threat does.

We cannot talk about the High North without talking about the vital contribution of the Royal Marines—our Arctic-trained troops—who are ready to operate alongside Norwegian, Dutch and other forces. That is a genuine strength, but cold weather expertise must be backed by enablers—lift, sustainment and surveillance assets.

That brings me to the most important point: the defence investment plan. We can announce deployments, launch missions and make speeches about the High North, but if we do not publish a clear investment plan that is costed and credible, our adversaries will conclude that the UK strategy is stronger in rhetoric than in reality. The Chairs of the Defence Committee and the Public Accounts Committee have warned that delay sends damaging signals to our adversaries, and they are right. We are serious about the Arctic. We need serious choices, and we need them now, not in a year’s time.

There is a practical, day-to-day test. We are facing concurrent pressures in other theatres, including recent deployments to the middle east. The question is not whether we can deploy ships to other regions on paper; it is whether we can do it without hollowing out our commitments to other parts of the world.

I want to put three questions to the Minister. First, when will the defence investment plan be published? Secondly, do we have sufficient ships that are suitable and available to operate credibly in the north Atlantic and respond to the serious crisis in the middle east at the same time? Thirdly, what steps are the Government taking bilaterally and through NATO to reassure Denmark and strengthen stability around Greenland while making it clear that sovereignty is not negotiable and that influence operations will be resisted?

The High Arctic is becoming a sharper edge of competition. Climate change is opening access, Russia is militarising, undersea vulnerability is rising and NATO is adapting. The UK has a choice. We can treat this as a niche theatre and muddle through, or we can treat it as what it is: a direct test of our seriousness as a north Atlantic power. Deterrence is built on credibility, credibility is built on capability, and capability requires investment. That is why the defence investment plan and ship availability matter.

Ministry of Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The world has rarely been as delicately balanced as it is now. We have entered the era where hard power is the only currency, and we are well into our overdraft. Moving to defence spending of 3% of GDP still remains only an ambition for the next Parliament, not a guarantee or even a firm commitment, and there was nothing in the spring forecast yesterday about the achievability of that target. This morning, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury was on the media round, and in a bravura performance of sticking to the party line, when Kate McCann asked the Minister on Times Radio whether the Treasury was holding up the defence investment plan, he did not deny it.

In January, it was widely reported that there is a £28 billion funding gap between the scope of the defence investment plan and the available budget over the next four years. That was discussed in a meeting between the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff before Christmas. It is now March. The defence investment plan was due in the autumn, but we still have not seen it, despite repeated assurances that the Ministry of Defence is working “at pace” to deliver it. When the delivery window has been missed by over six months, talking of working “at pace” rings somewhat hollow.

Last week, Bloomberg reported that the Treasury is exploring a multinational defence mechanism, allowing it to borrow off-books for both procurement and stockpiling. In his winding up, will the Minister clarify whether that is something that the Government have explored?

Yesterday, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister said that he hoped that the defence investment plan would be published

“no later than the next couple of months”,

so it may not be published this financial year. There are local elections in May and purdah will start in around a fortnight. The defence investment plan will contain a huge number of geographically sensitive announcements around the awarding of contracts and the construction of factories and new facilities, so it simply cannot be announced after purdah has started. Will the Government confirm whether the DIP will be published before or after the period of purdah?

My contacts in the Ministry of Defence believed that the defence investment plan would be published in March, although it remains unclear whether that will be the DIP in its entirety or just part one of a double DIP that will announce only the headline items, burying the bad news in a later second instalment.

Back in September, the Government’s defence industrial strategy laid out a number of elements, including the pledge to deliver a defence finance and investment strategy by early 2026. How is the Minister doing with that? The defence investors advisory group is supposed to be providing the expertise to formulate the strategy. Will we see it before the defence investment plan or simultaneously? Will it at least be published this financial year?

Recommendation 59 of the strategic defence review states:

“The MOD must deliver an overarching infrastructure Recapitalisation Plan to the Secretary of State by February 2026.”

It is now March, and we would like to see that as well,

Only last week, I spoke in the Chamber to explain that we are potentially facing a crisis of overstretch in our armed forces. I said that

“our armed forces are on the cusp of looking overstretched, and doubly so in the event that anything else comes into scope or goes hot.”—[Official Report, 25 February 2026; Vol. 781, c. 414.]

Now we are committing resources to the middle east that there appears to be no coherent plan for.

If the last few days in Iran have taught us anything, it is that we are barely justifying our seat at the top table when it comes to defence. Overtaken by our European rivals, now less experienced than our Ukrainian allies, and smaller and more reticent than our American allies, there are questions about our place in this new era. The Government run the risk of somehow making us a militarily irrelevant nuclear power.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy MacNae (Rossendale and Darwen) (Lab)]

Current events are once again showing the vital importance of an agile and independent fast jet defence capability, and the UK is one of the few countries with a sovereign ability to manufacture these world-leading fast jets. The UK’s Typhoons are made in Lancashire, where over 20,000 jobs are reliant on maintaining that production. However, right now, assembly facilities lie empty. Last year, the Government secured a very important £8 billion deal with Turkey, which gives temporary protection for those jobs and will restart assembly, but the job is absolutely not done.

We now need to look at how we take the next step and secure our production base and competitive position for the next decade and more. This is all about the UK committing to its own order of Typhoon jets, which is what we need to ensure our world-leading position and keep the skills and experience that were so crucial in securing the Turkey deal and will be crucial for other, future deals. A UK order means that the maximum value is retained here, with sections made at Samlesbury and full assembly at Warton. The UK ordering the latest Typhoon also indicates full confidence in the jet and allows us to stockpile, making further sales to other countries more likely.

In any case, we need more fast jets. We had 137 Typhoons, but the 30 original tranche 1s are already being withdrawn from service and will be retired by 2027. This will leave 107 tranche 2 and 3 fighters, which are also ageing and are due for retirement in 2040, and lack the range of capabilities that can be delivered in the latest tranche 5 version. We can all get excited about the long-term potential of the global combat air programme, but it will be the late 2030s before those jets ever enter into service, leaving a capability gap. Part of that gap is being addressed by the purchase of the F-35s. These are exceptional aircraft, but they are a very different beast from the Typhoon. The F-35 is primarily a stealthy, ground-attack, precision-strike aircraft able to penetrate heavily defended airspace; the Typhoon is an air dominance fighter, with higher top speed, faster acceleration, better climb rate and superior sustained turn performance. It is also compatible with the full range of British-made missiles, such as the Meteor and the Spear 3, whereas the F-35 currently is not.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Does the hon. Member agree that the very best advert for the Typhoon is its ability to engage in air-to-air combat, and that this week’s confirmed kills by the Qatari air force of two Iranian Sukhoi Su-24s is a fantastic advert for just how lethal the Typhoon remains in this day and age, despite only being a gen 4 fighter?

[Andy MacNae]

Precisely, and of course the upgrade in the radar systems gives it the very latest capability to suppress at a distance. The Typhoon is a powerful beast and works so well within a blended capability, alongside F-35s and other craft. Other European countries have voted for their domestic production bases by ordering their own Typhoons. Spain, Italy and Germany have all done so; only the UK is left out.

Of course, there is a wider perspective. Lancashire is home to world-class defence industries, which every growth plan in Lancashire has at its heart. The fact that I can go into schools in places such as Bacup, Whitworth and Darwen and talk about some of the best engineering and technical jobs in the world being just down the road is so vital for aspiration. The apprenticeships and career opportunities at not just BAE, but the many innovative companies in the supply chain, show that the north-west is the best place for anyone who wants to be at the cutting edge of the manufacturing industries of the future. We should not be happy with merely sustaining this jewel in the crown; rather, we should be seeking to strengthen and continually build skills, scale and competitive advantage. Turkey chose to order Typhoons from us because the experience and skills of workers at Samlesbury and Warton cannot be matched. We now have the opportunity to build on this and give the ultimate vote of confidence by ordering UK fighters that will maintain our balanced and multi-functional fast jet capability for this decade and beyond. Frankly, it feels like a no-brainer, and I hope the defence investment plan will reflect this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Luke Pollard]

Well, I had to sit through the hon. Member’s drivel, so he can sit through mine until he finds out the answer to that one. I want to respond to the main points raised in today’s debate by a number of speakers; it is important that I use the time I have to respond to them.

I welcome the clarion call from the Defence Committee to go faster and further on defence spending. It is right that we have increased defence spending, with an extra £5 billion in our Budget this year and more coming next year, but the argument made by my hon. Friend the Member for Slough is a strong one, and it is one I know he will continue to make. We were, as I believe he said, the third largest percentage spender in NATO in 2021, and we remain the third largest spender in cash terms in NATO, but I recognise the argument he makes. Let me say to him clearly on Ajax that it remains one of my priorities as Minister to make sure that we can fully field equipment that is safe for our people and to make decisions based on safety. I want our industry and our forces to innovate and be bold, but they must not compromise on the safety of our people. I cannot be clearer about that.

My hon. Friend also asked about the supplementary estimates, and I am happy to provide some clarity. A large part of the increase relates to the technical accounting updates to ensure the Department’s asset values are accurately recorded. These adjustments do not provide additional spending power and have no impact on the Department’s cash budgets, so they are technical, non-cash accounting adjustments. As programmes mature and asset information improves, it is standard practice to update these valuations. This ensures that the Department’s accounts reflect the most accurate value of its equipment and estate. The adjustments do not indicate a loss of capability and have no in-year cash impact. I was asked about that by a Conservative Member, but I hope that is helpful to him, too.

The Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, the hon. Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) was right to raise a number of important issues. He is certainly right when he says that defence programmes are usually late and usually over-budget. When we inherited the defence programmes from the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge), 47 of 49 major defence programmes were delayed and over-budget; that is a record for which he should have stood at the Dispatch Box and apologised, but the Opposition do not want to claim any responsibility for what they handed over—they only want to throw stones and blame for the future. To be a constructive Opposition, it is necessary for the shadow Secretary of State to be helpful and constructive with advice, not just to seek to forget about his responsibility for the mess he caused.

The hon. Member for North Cotswolds is also right about accommodation. It was unacceptable that our service personnel and their families were living in accommodation with black mould, leaky roofs and broken boilers. It is for that reason that this Government announced £9 billion to refit, refurbish or rebuild nine in 10 defence homes over the next decade. That will directly support our defence personnel and their families, on top of the largest pay rise in 20 years. I believe the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) described that as a cash bung. The largest pay rise in 20 years for our people, accompanied by a second above-inflation pay rise, has seen morale not fall under this Government, unlike when his party was in power, when it fell in every single service in every single year. The hon. Member for North Cotswolds is also right to make the case for reforming the MOD. That is exactly what we are doing with the process of defence reform.

My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) is proud to represent the home of the Royal Navy. As MP for Devonport, I am also proud to represent the heart of the Royal Navy; she and I have much in common. She is right to ask about HMS Dragon. I am pleased to give her an update about the ship and the ship’s company. The Royal Navy is working at pace to prepare HMS Dragon for deployment to the eastern Mediterranean. HMS Dragon has begun re-supplying her air defence missiles at the ammunition facility at the naval base in Portsmouth. She will then return for a logistics re-supply before sailing. For security reasons—as she will know, as a Portsmouth MP—we do not comment on precise departure dates of our Royal Navy assets. She will also know that we have two Royal Navy Wildcat helicopters armed with drone-busting missiles already deploying to the region. They will reinforce the additional RAF Typhoons, F-35B jets, ground-based counter-drone teams, radar systems and Voyager refuelling aircraft which we have already deployed to the region. Our jets are now flying continuous sorties to take out Iranian drones and missiles threatening UK people, interests and bases, and threatening our allies.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Obviously, the whole House appreciates the deployment of HMS Dragon, but it has had to be withdrawn from its NATO Maritime Group 1 commitment in order to fulfil the trip to Cyprus. Do we have another Type 45 that can replace it, given that HMS Duncan could not be sent because it is already committed to preparing for Operation Firecrest?

[Luke Pollard]

I will not be announcing deployments from the Dispatch Box, but I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s point. It is one of the reasons that we are seeking to invest more in our Royal Navy: to provide not only crewed but uncrewed capabilities.

The hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) spoke about his desire for a larger Royal Navy. In 2017, when I had brown hair and sat broadly where the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) is sitting now, I made the case in my maiden speech for more surface combatants for the Royal Navy. That is what our hybrid Navy will deliver—and not only crewed platforms, which are being built in Scotland at this very moment. Last week, I saw the steel cut on HMS Bulldog and the roll-out of HMS Active—two of our new Type 31 frigates—which will be sailing alongside uncrewed and autonomous systems as part of that hybrid Navy concept. This is something that the Prime Minister announced in his speech at the Munich security conference and which we are keen to extend to many of our European partners, increasing the mass and lethality of our Royal Navy and, importantly, improving the survivability for our crewed platforms.

I will quickly rattle through some of the questions that have been asked. Are we looking at novel financing methods? Yes, we are. My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Dr Gardner) spoke about advanced ceramics; she is right to do so. I was happy meeting her before and I am happy continuing that discussion. I know the progress she is making. The hon. Member for Spelthorne will know that we have increased pay for our armed forces and are increasing the supply of ammunition and missiles through the munitions and energetics factories that we have already announced; I hope to provide further updates about the rapid procurement process that is under way in due course.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rossendale and Darwen (Andy MacNae) spoke passionately about the importance of Typhoon for his area. I was very pleased that the Government were able to secure the Typhoon deal with Türkiye, and I can assure him that we continue to have conversations with a number of our other allies, further promoting the Typhoon as an essential platform for air defence. He is right to praise the work they are doing. I really liked the phrase he used about the best jobs being just down the road—that is echoed by colleagues right across the House. Indeed, my fellow south-west MP, the hon. Member for North Devon (Ian Roome), gave a good shout-out to regional jobs, which I enjoyed. It is right that we increase defence spending so that it can be felt in every single nation and region, and that is exactly what we are doing.

My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Michelle Scrogham) made a passionate case for submarines. Her constituents build them, and mine refit them in Devonport—teams working together, with Team Plymouth and Team Barrow, as well as the work that takes place in Derby. It is an important part of bringing together our nuclear enterprise.

I welcome the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr Dillon) speaking about the compelling vision in the SDR; he is right to do so. I am happy having a conversation with him about the tax credits issue, especially if he could bring small business examples.

My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Alex Baker) was right to talk about the DSRB. I know she is passionate about this, as are a number of other Members. I am happy to meet her to talk further about it.

Finally, perhaps the most important part of this is our people. I was pleased that the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade) raised recruitment in an intervention. Let me say clearly that since September 2024, we have seen an 8% decrease in outflow from our armed forces and a 13% increase in inflow into our armed forces. As the hon. Member for North Cotswolds mentioned, we do need to do recruitment differently, which is why we have a new direct entry scheme for cyber, and we will go further on that.

Let the message go out clearly to our troops in combat operations around the world: they have our support and they have a Government who are increasing defence spending, putting their welfare at the centre of our future defence plans, ensuring that we move towards warfighting readiness with new equipment and new capabilities, and putting our people at the very heart of our defence plans.

Ministry of Defence: Palantir Contracts

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s passion on this matter but, as I have set out to the House, we will continue to maintain a close defence and security relationship with the United States—it is in our national security interests to do so. In signing any agreement with a US company, just as would be the case with a French, German or Australian company, we ensure that the agreement is in the UK’s national interest, and that controls are in place on the sovereignty of data, particularly with AI contracts. We will continue to ensure that those standards are upheld in all contracts, but we will also continue to work with international partners where no UK provider could deliver that work, or where the services they offer are in excess or deliver a defence capability faster, better or cheaper than one provided elsewhere.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I want to return to a question that was initially asked by the Opposition spokesperson, my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge). When the Prime Minister met Palantir and Peter Mandelson in February 2025 in Washington DC, was he aware that Palantir was a client of Peter Mandelson’s firm Global Counsel?

[Luke Pollard]

As I said in reply to the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), that is a matter for Downing Street to publish in due course. I am afraid that I have spent the last three days in Saudia Arabia, so I am just catching up on these events. I have been clear about where that information will come from, and I point my hon. Friend in that direction.

Oral Answers to Questions

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

It is well known in the House that the Prime Minister was a human rights lawyer, so obviously he wrote in connection with that. What really stands as a testament to the Prime Minister’s support for veterans is the fact that this Government are delivering record spending for veterans and rolling out £50 million for valour hubs. I think that speaks for itself.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

8. What steps he is taking to ensure the delivery of initial operating capability for the Ajax programme.

[The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry (Luke Pollard)]

I have paused the declaration of IOC for Ajax until the investigations of safety incidents have concluded. Let me be clear: I want the Ministry of Defence and our forces to be bold, to innovate and to challenge, but they must never compromise on safety. We are preparing a recommendation on the next steps on Ajax, and I will keep the House informed, as I have since Exercise Titan Storm on 22 November last year.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

The Minister knows that I have a keen interest in this topic. There were 33 injuries sustained during Exercise Titan Storm. General Dynamics achieved initial operating capability for Ajax on 23 July, and between then and Exercise Titan Storm on 22 November, there were three other exercises: Exercise Scorpion Cyclone, Exercise Cyclone Storm and Exercise Tradewind. I asked the Minister a written question last year about how many injuries were sustained, but I am yet to receive a response. How many noise and vibration injuries were sustained on those three exercises? Will he confirm whether there were any injuries prior to his signing off IOC on 5 November?

[Luke Pollard]

It is good to know that the hon. Gentleman, the Member of Parliament who tables the most parliamentary questions to the MOD, keeps track of all his questions. I am certain that I have replied to that one, but will check when I get back to the Department, and make sure that he has the reply. We are looking at all the incidents from Titan Storm, at previous suggestions of incidents, and at potential injuries. The injuries under the last Government were well documented, but we have instigated a number of investigations to get to the bottom of what happened, and why that information did not flow to Ministers ahead of the IOC declaration. I will continue to keep the House updated on progress.

Armed Forces Bill

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 26th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

The hon. Lady has made a detailed point very clearly—perhaps it is another bid to be a member of the Bill Committee. It is exactly the sort of issue that should be examined in detail at that point in the passage of the Bill.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I am sure that you would be the first to endorse the fact that the first duty of any Government is to keep their citizens safe. In our age, drones are rapidly changing the nature of war and homeland defence. It is essential that we have the power and authority to protect defence sites from any current or future threats. In October, I promised to introduce new legal powers to bring down unidentified drones over UK military bases. The Bill will create a regime that will allow defence personnel to better detect, deter and defeat drones that pose a threat to defence property and activities.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

On that point, will the Secretary of State give way?

[John Healey]

I will not. I am conscious of the number of hon. Members who want to speak, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will want to make a contribution.

The reforms are designed to be both flexible and future-proof, allowing defence to adapt to the ever changing and increasing threats. If the strategic defence review were boiled down to one core objective, it would be to raise the level of warfighting readiness in order to strengthen our deterrence.

Crucial to achieving a sustainable, efficient and rapid potential transition to war will be our reserve forces. In 2024, more than one in five troops training Ukrainian forces on Operation Interflex—the British-led multinational military operation supporting the Ukraine armed forces—were reservists. They are an integral part of the operation and, very often, of the deployment and exercising of our forces. The Bill will make it easier to mobilise personnel earlier, ahead of the outbreak of war. It will align the time for which recall applies across all three services to 18 years, and it will increase the maximum age at which reservists can be recalled, from 55 to 65.

At the moment, we have cyber-operators, trainers, medics and translators who are being shown the door to the military only because of an arbitrary age limit. They are men and women who will continue their profession in civilian life for many years after they are forced out of the military. That makes no sense for the reservists or for our nation’s security, so through the Bill we must act to build a major boost to our readiness to fight during this era of increasing threat.

I will end by recalling our manifesto at the election, which said:

“At the heart of our security are the men and women who serve and risk their lives for this country.”

The Bill gives legislative force to that Labour principle, with better housing, better services and better protections to those who serve. We pledged to renew the nation’s contract with those who serve. Through this Bill, we are delivering exactly that, backing those who sacrifice so much, making Britain safer, delivering for defence and delivering for Britain. I commend the Bill to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[James MacCleary]

Those are important details, which I hope the Minister will take up in his closing remarks. Justice must be seen to be served wherever our service personnel are in the world.

The measures in the Bill to support victims and strengthen protective orders are steps in the right direction, but they must be accompanied by a genuine commitment to accountability and cultural reform in our services.

We must also be honest about what the Government are not doing. This is a technical renewal Bill, whereas what our armed forces need is a comprehensive fair deal; that matters profoundly for Britain’s security and our place in the world. The Bill is silent on the recruitment and retention crisis facing our armed forces. It says nothing about reversing the devastating troop cuts that have hollowed out the Army. It offers no plan to rebuild regular troop numbers back to above 100,000—a goal that the Liberal Democrats are committed to achieving.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Following that pledge, will the hon. Gentleman outline what the additional 30,000 troops would be roled as?

[James MacCleary]

I think the question here is more about mass in the armed forces, and deployability.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Mass for what?

[James MacCleary]

For deployment overseas, so that we can achieve the objectives that we want to achieve. The Conservatives cut troop numbers during the last Government. It is understandable that you are embarrassed —that they are embarrassed—about that, but—

Ajax Programme

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the future of the Ajax Programme.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. This debate has been a long time coming. Such is the Kafkaesque procedure for selecting debates that this application was granted only at the eighth time of asking; I had first requested a debate on this subject on 1 September 2025—over four months ago. Since then, the Ajax programme has gone from on track to throwing a track, and the outlook for the programme and our armoured capability, the future of armoured infantry as a concept and the current deployability of 3rd (UK) Division are now all very much under the microscope.

In this debate, I am not seeking to apportion blame, point fingers at individuals or orchestrate a witch hunt. It is clear that the Ajax programme has been failing for a number of years, although I will go on to question some of the recent specific decision making regarding the programme. Accountability sits with successive Ministers. The slow progress on delivery appears to be an issue between the Army, the Department and General Dynamics.

We can skip over the potted history of the Ajax programme—others will cover that—but, to paraphrase Rodgers and Hammerstein, “How do you solve a problem like Ajax?” Although it was based on an existing General Dynamics platform, the Army made so many additions and revisions to the existing capability that it is now considered to be bespoke technology. We are talking about a staggering 1,200 capability requirements for each of the six vehicle types under the Ajax umbrella.

The March 2022 National Audit Office report on the Ajax programme details the fact that neither the Department nor General Dynamics fully understood some component specifications or how they would be integrated on to the Ajax vehicle, leading to consequential changes to the overall design, disputes between the Ministry of Defence and General Dynamics and, inevitably, programme delays. Both the MOD and General Dynamics have been criticised for underestimating the scale of the work, the technical challenge and the sequencing of the work. General Dynamics blamed the MOD for not having fully defined acceptance criteria; the MOD blamed the General Dynamics safety documentation. The contingency within the programme was quickly used up and the programme was suddenly four years behind schedule.

Noise and vibration issues were recognised in mid-2020, with a stop notice issued in June 2021. All dynamic movement and transition activity was halted while the programme underwent a significant reset. The Army resumed training on Ajax in 2023, but paused again in November 2025. The programme’s issues from 2020 to 2021 are well documented. Those issues are a failure to establish effective governance, complex assurance arrangements, high turnover of senior staff, an ineffective programme board, weak project controls—the list goes on. The most stark, however, was

“an over-emphasis on achieving its IOC”—

initial operating capability—

“target date, which meant that it prioritised time and cost over capability. As a result, it pressed ahead with the programme without resolving performance issues.”

Given what we know now and the issues encountered less than three weeks after IOC was declared, I would like to hear an assessment from the Minister as to whether he believes that that is still an issue today.

Initial operating capability for the Ajax programme was declared on 5 November 2025 by the Government; I stress “by the Government”, because several stages to that process were not made public until last month. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me:

“All criteria for Ajax Initial Operating Capability…were met on 23 July 2025 and following a period of review, IOC was declared by the Army on 15 September 2025.”

We know that only because it was written on a cake in a General Dynamics promotional video of the Minister’s visit to Merthyr Tydfil. Additionally, he confirmed:

“Before declaring Initial Operating Capability, I received written assurances from the Chief of the General Staff and the acting NAD”—

national armaments director—

“that the vehicle was safe to operate. Within the letter note AJAX the vehicle was described as ‘demonstrably safe to operate’.”

The Minister added that

“prior to Ajax Initial Operating Capability being announced, I sought assurances in writing from the Chief of the Defence Staff and the National Armaments Director that the system was safe to operate, which I received.”

[Stuart Anderson (South Shropshire) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for initiating this important debate. Does he agree with me that it is important for the Minister to set out that in 2022 I and colleagues on the Defence Committee went to Merthyr Tydfil, did a review and clearly stated that IOC was nowhere near deliverable in the timeframes proposed? Does my hon. Friend think it is worth the Minister setting out what checks against the Defence Committee report were done when looking at IOC?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank my hon. Friend for that excellent point. I was not going to cover it in my speech, so it is definitely worth adding to the record for the Minister to address in his response.

The interim National Armaments Director, the new National Armaments Director, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Defence Staff represent our most senior leaders within defence. It is hard to believe that they all would have signed off a vehicle platform that was inherently unsafe or where it was a sketchy 50:50 decision. How did we reach a point where four-star senior officers and equivalents had the confidence to sign off the vehicle’s initial operating capability, which then received ministerial approval, only for it to blow up in everybody’s face weeks later like a Wile E. Coyote Road Runner trap?

The March 2022 National Audit Office report states:

“The Department believes that the contract also incentivised GDLS-UK to prioritise production milestones over the quality and performance of the capability.”

It goes on:

“The contract incentivised GDLS-UK to achieve production milestones resulting in it continuing to manufacture vehicles while technical issues remained unresolved.”

Can the Minister give any clarity on whether that is still the case today, given that General Dynamics signed off achieving all the criteria required to meet initial operating capability, only for the entire programme to collapse less than four months later? Initial operating capability was also signed off by the Army on 15 September, before ministerial sign-off was granted on 5 November.

Last year, the then Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry stated that

“The Armoured Cavalry Programme (Ajax) is projecting the delivery of over 180 operationally deployable platforms by the end of 2025.”

Despite the various travails of the Ajax programme, production has continued throughout the training pause. As a result, we know that the Army has received just under a third of all Ajax platforms across all variants. It should be noted that the 2022 National Audit Office report highlighted that the compressed programme schedule flagged that there would no longer be time to validate the design of capability drops 3 and 4 before manufacture. Given that we are now in capability drop 3, can the Minister confirm whether the designs were validated before these vehicles were assembled and delivered last year?

The Minister also confirmed that

“It is anticipated that a further 110 platforms will be delivered in 2026, with the remaining 297 platforms delivered by 2028.”

With 180 Ajax platforms delivered, a similar number still to be accepted by the Army and all 589 hulls having now been completed in Spain, on current timelines the complete production run will have been completed by mid-2027. I believe that includes bringing all vehicles up to capability drop 4 standard.

Assuming that any resolution to the current training pause does not involve the mother of all factory recalls, there could potentially be an idle factory in Wales. What plans are there for the Merthyr Tydfil factory beyond the middle of next year? With only 18 months’ work left to complete, can the Minister assure General Dynamics employees in Wales that they will have a job once Ajax production is complete? Can he assure those employees that there will be no redundancies, given that we have no plans to purchase any more vehicles and that export plans are yet to materialise? While I appreciate that UK Defence and Security Exports sit within the Department for Business and Trade, can the Minister confirm what progress UKDSE has made regarding any potential export sales?

One of the main reasons why we are debating this topic today, and the reason for such media interest, is the social media content that has emerged from the factory and from Army personnel regarding the workmanship on the vehicles. To that end, I would like to recognise the efforts of Alfie Usher, aka Fill Your Boots, who has been instrumental in putting heat and light on this issue on behalf of service personnel. For obvious reasons, I am no trade unionist, but he has been the unofficial secretary-general of the unofficial armed forces union for some time.

I know that the Armed Forces Minister has previously liaised with Alfie on issues, and—I say this only partially in jest—perhaps the Government should reconsider his application to be the Armed Forces Commissioner. The Government are struggling to fill the role. Alfie’s application got binned back in August, but he has been doing the job unpaid since then anyway.

For those who do not follow Alfie’s account—any politician with an interest in defence really should—I should say that between the exposés and topical memes, Alfie has been the bête noire of General Dynamics and the Army, operating as chief whistleblower and ensuring that the voice of those on the ground can be heard. There have been multiple examples of concerns shared by him via social media on behalf of service personnel tasked with prepping newly delivered vehicles. A variety of issues have been highlighted and I ask the Minister, if he has not done so already, to include Alfie within the scope of the ministerial-led review to ensure full transparency and the inclusion of service personnel. They are the end users of this vehicle, and too often we ask our personnel to put up and shut up. An organisation that dines out on moral courage and pretends that it values 360° feedback should make sure that it listens to our soldiers, irrespective of how refreshingly blunt their views might be.

The evidence shown by Fill Your Boots has put heat and light on the production and assembly issues upon which blame has been placed. During the first pause in 2021, the MOD and General Dynamics did not agree on whether the levels of noise and vibration of Ajax vehicles breached contractual requirements. Given that the same noise and vibration issues potentially remain unresolved six years later, can the Minister clarify what does constitute a contractual breach?

Through 2020-21, General Dynamics undertook a supposedly in-depth review of the Ajax programme to confirm the root cause of noise and vibration issues, identify solutions and then validate them through extensive testing. They identified that noise and vibration issues were caused by the track, suspension and running gear; the engine and its mounting in the vehicle; quality issues including bolting, cable routing and welding; and performance and integration of crew headsets. The vehicles were thoroughly assessed using a noise and vibration calculator, whatever that is, to determine

“the safe operating envelopes for the platform across different speeds and terrains.”

The noise and vibration calculator provided by General Dynamics did not measure noise and vibration, which the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory raised concerns about. It estimated the maximum safe exposure time on Ajax vehicles for given conditions based on measurements from early trials. In August 2020, the first noise-induced hearing loss symptoms were reported by soldiers. In September 2020, DSTL discovered an error in General Dynamics’ measurements, which meant that vehicle crews might have been overexposed to noise and vibration. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry has told me:

“Whole Body and Hand Arm Vibration Levels were well understood, and effective mitigations were in place.”

But they cannot have been effective, or why would personnel still be suffering from noise and vibration-related sickness? Will the Minister confirm that any analysis of the root cause of the current noise and vibration sickness does not use the General Dynamics noise and vibration calculator, and instead seeks to use a metric that does not raise concerns with DSTL?

The measures implemented by General Dynamics included the implementation of an effective hearing protection and combined communication system, an improvement to the overall Ajax build quality, a review and amendment of build tolerances for key crew interfaces, changes to seat structures to provide greater vibration attenuation—that sounds very much like new seat cushions—and improvements to track tensioning procedures to ensure correct track tension, which reduces vibration.

On the track tension, I am aware that composite rubber tracks are now mature enough to be viable for a vehicle the weight of Ajax. Although there are still issues regarding track replacement, given that the whole track has to be replaced rather than a single track link, I note that the General Dynamics Ajax Blackjax demonstrator vehicle at DSEI had this fitted. I ask the Minister what assessment his Department has made of the feasibility of switching to composite rubber tracks as a potential solution going forward?

The 2022 National Audit Office report outlined that there were 27 limitations of use on Ajax vehicles in September 2021; 22 were safety-related and 11 were critical to achieving IOC. Can the Minister give the House assurances that those 11 limitations were resolved prior to initial operating capability being declared in 2025? Could the Minister also confirm what contractual payments were made to General Dynamics on the achievement of the criteria for initial operating capability in July 2025 or the formal declaration of initial operating capability on 5 November 2025? What is the total amount paid to General Dynamics as of today, and how much still remains to be paid? What delivery milestone will trigger the remaining payments?

With those resolutions to the previous issues identified in mind, we know that three exercises took place between IOC criteria being achieved on 23 July and ministerial IOC declaration on 5 November. We have not heard of any instances of noise and vibration sickness occurring among vehicle crews during those three exercises. Will the Minister confirm that there were no noise and vibration sickness issues among crews during those three exercises?

I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry what discussions his Department had had with General Dynamics, the senior responsible officer and the British Army regarding the Ajax programme between 23 July and Exercise Titan Storm in late November. Instead of a response, the Minister told me:

“I have directed a Ministerial review that covers elements of his question. I will update the House in due course.”

The Minister was happy to tell me that he met with key stakeholders, including meeting General Dynamics after the programme was paused, but, much as I have tried, the Government have scrupulously avoided disclosing any information about what ministerial discussions have taken place with stakeholders between 23 July and 5 November.

On 1 January, I asked a named day question for answer on 7 January 2026. I asked:

“how many noise and vibration injuries were sustained…between 23 July 2025 and Exercise Titan Storm”.

Strangely, I have not received a response yet, a week after one was due—it is almost as if this is an issue that the Government do not want to disclose. Will the Minister clarify the answer to written question 101920 and put on the record how many noise and vibration injuries were sustained between the achievement of initial operating capability criteria by General Dynamics and the start of Exercise Titan Storm?

The March 2022 National Audit Office Report states that the Department

“knew of noise and vibration issues before soldiers reported injuries but was not aware of the severity of potential problems. Reporting of issues identified in trials was limited and slow, meaning that safety concerns were not shared or escalated by the Army or…DE&S”.

Has that culture been addressed? Concerns were first raised about noise and vibration by the Army trials team in late 2019, but did not appear in quarterly programme reports until March 2021. To what extent have we seen the same issue repeat itself last summer?

In December 2025, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me that

“Of the 61 vehicles of all AJAX types involved in the exercise, 23 AJAX Vehicles were linked to soldiers suffering from noise or vibration injury.”

I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed where those 61 affected vehicles were manufactured. Were they part of the first 100 Ajax vehicles manufactured and assembled in Spain, or were they later vehicles whose hulls were manufactured in Spain but were assembled at the Merthyr Tydfil facility? Can he also confirm whether the early production vehicles from capability drop 0 to 2, which were identified as not being fully compliant with requirements, have now been retrofitted and what capability drop are they currently equipped to?

The Minister also confirmed that

“On 22 November…during a routine training exercise, around 30 soldiers operating in Ajax reported being affected by noise and vibration exposure.”

For 30 soldiers to be affected by the same noise and vibration sickness, with identical symptoms, as a result of a known issue supposedly resolved by 2023 is simply unacceptable. It is incredibly important that we are able to understand whether there were any instances during the three exercises prior to Titan Storm and indeed to identify whether there have been any instances of General Dynamics employees affected by noise and vibration exposure during the same period, prior to or after the 23 July IOC criteria achievement milestone.

In November, I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry how many compensation claims related to noise and vibration symptoms incurred during the use of Ajax variants had been made since the start of the armoured cavalry programme. The Minister informed me that it would take time to collate and review the information needed to answer the question, and that he would write to me. It is now mid-January and I would appreciate it if the Minister could provide that information in his response. It should not take two months to work out how many compensation claims have been made relating to Ajax. If I were Minister, I would have a close eye on the running tally, particularly in preparation for this debate.

On 8 December the Minister confirmed:

“We are currently undertaking reviews into the medical injuries sustained by Ajax crews, and more details on the findings will be published in due course.”

Will the ministerial-led review he has commissioned or the report from the Defence Accident Investigation Branch contain the details of those findings? In that review, will he confirm how many service personnel are undergoing treatment or have been diagnosed with hearing loss following audiometry protocols after operating within an Ajax variant?

Regarding when the vehicles will be able to recommence training, any decisions on the pause are to be made by Ministers after the investigations by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch have concluded. That suggests that the pause will be lifted after the investigation but before the conclusion of the ministerial-led review. Will the Minister clarify the timeline for the investigation, which he previously stated would take at least two weeks and so should be approaching conclusion, and the ministerial-led review, for which we are yet to see the terms of reference, which were due before Christmas? I appreciate it will still be autumn until the defence investment plan is published in March. Will the pause on the use of Ajax be lifted before the conclusion of the Minister’s review, given that the noise and vibration issues may not have been identified, let alone resolved?

This debate is about the future of the Ajax programme. Although the near future revolves around the resolution of the immediate issues that followed Exercise Titan Storm, beyond that the programme will need to achieve full operating capability, but crucially, it will be the tip of the spear in our armoured doctrine. So, a good start would be to have an armoured doctrine that is coherent.

In 2014, we ordered 589 vehicles out of an optional 1,328—below the Army’s required fleet size at the time of 686. Although that was not necessarily a defining error at the time, subsequent decisions, even as recently as last summer, have compounded the issue, bringing us to a situation where our armoured fleet is now completely unbalanced—increasingly so given the evolution of modern conflict since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the ubiquity of drones at all levels, and the current global arms race.

When Ajax was commissioned, we were still undertaking combat operations in Afghanistan. Since then, we have had multiple defence reviews, and changed our focus to the Indo-Pacific and now to the High North, and now we are talking about putting troops in eastern Europe as a deterrent to a belligerent Russia. The irony is that we still have much of the same armour designed to do that job the first time round.

The original plan was for Ajax, alongside Boxer and Challenger 3, to provide the backbone of the Army’s armoured capability within Integrated Force 2030. March 2021’s “Defence in a Competitive Age” outlines how the Army would use Ajax in its two close-combat armoured brigade combat teams, and as part of its deep reconnaissance strike brigade combat team—formations that are now putatively in place.

We cannot discuss the future of the Ajax programme without discussing how the Army plans to use Ajax within those brigade combat teams. As somebody with a background in armoured infantry, who formerly held an admittedly niche specialisation in anti-tanks, I have more than a keen interest in the future of our armoured capability. Being something of a tank-spotter, I note some glaring capability gaps based on the information provided by Ministers over the past year or so.

Let us start with the basics. In December 2024, the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle), the then Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry, stated in a written answer to my question:

“On current plans, Boxer will be delivered to four Heavy Mechanised Infantry Battalions and Divisional Enablers.”

Seven months later, however, on 15 July, she stated:

“The Army intends to reorganise its Heavy Forces units in 3 Division, such that all four would become Armoured Infantry Units based on the Ajax and Boxer family of vehicles.”

She subsequently went on to state:

“The Army intends to equip the Regular Infantry Units within 3 (UK) Division with Ares in the infantry troop carrying role: 1 Mercian, 1 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, 1 Royal Welsh and 5 Rifles.”

What happened between December 2024 and July 2025 that saw such a fundamental change to the future of the infantry, and indeed our entire armoured capability? The number of Ares platforms to be provided has not changed since 2014: just 93. For reference, the current land equipment table shows that we currently have 604 Warrior. Ares’s role was originally “protected mobility reconnaissance support” and latterly to “deliver and support specialist troops”. It has never once been earmarked as an infantry-fighting vehicle.

The present Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), then gave this written response to my question:

“The Ares variant of Ajax is designed for mounted close combat and is being delivered to the Field Army. The decision to field Ares with Infantry Battalions was taken after a considerable assessment programme.”

I would be interested to know whether the aim of the Ares assessment programme was simply to justify the existing total of 589 vehicles, or actually to highlight the capability required, because whichever question the Army asks, the answer always appears to be 589 Ajax vehicles. I asked to see the outcome of that assessment programme but was told that its disclosure would

“be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces”.

I suggest that, given the enemy knows that Ares does not have any armour-defeating weapons capability, the issue around prejudicing capability lies elsewhere.

Let’s walk that back a step. In my opinion, the Ares variant is not designed for mounted close combat. It is equipped with a remote weapon station that can mount a 50-calibre machine gun at the heaviest. As someone whose specialisation in the Army was armoured infantry, I know my way around a 30 mm canon. A 50-cal cannot defeat armour; it is no substitute for 40 mm APFSDS, which is the round that its Ajax brother uses.

In September, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport stated in a written answer that Ares would be,

 “used to deliver and support specialist troops across the battlefield. The term ‘specialist troops’ is used informally, and in this context refers to Anti-Tank Javelin Teams, Snipers and Support Troops.”

But by November that had changed again, with the same Minister contradictorily stating:

“Anti-tank platoons within Armoured Infantry units will be equipped with Boxer variants”.

So which is it: Ares or Boxer for Javelin platoons? Will armoured infantry battalions be tracked or a mix of wheeled and tracked, with the logistical implications of that? Will Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers light aid detachments have both Ajax and Boxer repair and recovery variants? Where are we going to keep the additional vehicles? What is the training burden of mixed armoured fleets, thereby doubling driving cadres, maintenance training, and vehicle commanders’ courses? Have we even bought a recovery variant of Boxer yet? The Army’s own website suggests it is not one of the variants within the 623. This approach is incoherent and suggests that the Army does not really know what to do with the capability it will shortly have.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. On Boxer specifically, just before Christmas I received an answer to a parliamentary question from the Department, saying that it now will not give the initial operational capability date for Boxer, and that it is subject to the long-awaited defence investment plan. Does my hon. Friend agree that Boxer has already slipped by years, and that we cannot let it slip any further?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I absolutely concur with my right hon. Friend that Boxer is a vital capability—even more so, given the training pause that we are now encountering with Ajax—and we need to get Boxer into service as quickly as possible. I welcome the speeding up of that process overall.

Meanwhile in October, the then Minister for the Armed Forces had stated:

“Currently ARES will be fielded to Training Regiments, Armoured Cavalry units and Armoured Infantry units.”

As I said, we have ordered only 93. For reference, in order to reflect the establishment of an armoured infantry battalion, we would need 45 Ares to replace the capacity of the Warrior FV510, notwithstanding how many Athena variants we would need to cover the 511 command variant. Where is the capacity to have vehicles at training regiments and armoured cavalry units? There is no redundancy built into the current vehicle fleet.

The 93 Ares platforms equate to just 23 per battalion with no spare capacity, which is not even enough to replace three rifle companies’ worth of the Warrior FV510 variant. Can the Minister explain what the future establishment of these armoured infantry battalions will be? I appreciate that he will not have that information to hand—I do not think the Army knows yet—but will he write to me and explain how an armoured infantry battalion will be structured using Ares and Boxer?

The demise of Warrior leaves a yawning capability gap that will be difficult to adequately replace without a new IFV. The then Minister for the Armed Forces stated that,

“there is no direct replacement for Warrior”,

and:

“There are no plans to extend the out-of-service date for Warrior beyond 2027, and as such an extension is not under consideration.”

The then Minister also stated:

“As the ARES platform is delivered into service, tactical doctrines will be reviewed accordingly.”

I do not expect the Minister to answer the question or to know the ins and outs of armoured infantry doctrine, but he should raise the question with the Land Warfare Centre, and with the infantry battalions that will receive Ares, to ask them how the platform will be used and what capability will then be lost.

By removing a main armament from the armoured infantry’s firepower we fundamentally change the way that the vehicle is fought. It changes the way the vehicle can move cross-country, effectively removes the option to move in bounding overwatch, and means it can never engage enemy armour. Doctrinally, it turns the armoured infantry into mechanised infantry.

Doctrinally, Ares is more akin to the Mk3 Bulldog. Despite that, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry this week informed me that Ares

“is more suitable to be employed in the direct battle, rather than in the close support role”.

Given the glaring absence of a main armament on Ares, I would dispute that assessment, which seems convenient rather than well thought through. Bulldog itself is due to be replaced in 2030, so what progress has been made in procurement of the Patria 6x6?

Crucially, in December, the same Minister stated:

“There are no other platforms within the Army’s armoured fleet which can fulfil the armoured reconnaissance role; Ajax has been specifically designed for this purpose.”

With that in mind, and given that the entire Ajax fleet is grounded for an unspecified length of time pending an investigation by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch, with support from the Army Safety Investigation Team and General Dynamics, can the Minister state how the armoured reconnaissance capability of the British Army is currently being provided given that statement, and therefore what is the deployability of 3rd (UK) Division without any formation or armoured reconnaissance capability, or even the deployability of an armoured battle group from within 3 Div?

The parlous state of the British Army’s armoured capability is on the cusp of being thrust into stark relief by the Prime Minister’s announcement last week that we had committed troops to the multinational force for Ukraine. While any detail on that force structure is currently pure speculation, it was reported by The Times that those troop numbers would not exceed 7,500. On a three-form cycle, that is circa 22,000 troops—the majority of the field army. If they are to be more than a speed bump for the vanguard of the Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, they will need capability that they simply do not have today.

Challenger 3 has no timeline, with manufacturing due to commence only once the tank’s performance has been proven in the demonstration phase. It is not going to appear anytime soon. The Government have no plan for the remaining 140 Challenger 2s that are not due to be upgraded, and not even a promise that the plan will be outlined in the mythical defence investment plan. That is against the backdrop that the defence investment plan is unfunded, with a black hole of somewhere around £20 billion, give or take an Ajax programme budget. There will be cuts, and there will be delays. Out-of-service dates are going to be stretched to their limits. Bulldog is already 63 years old, and I am sure that it is no coincidence that it will be 67 when it reaches its out-of-service retirement date.

The Chief of the General Staff wants to implement the 20-40-40 land warfare concept, of which Ajax is a key part, working in tandem with Project Asgard. That is the capability that could and should provide a continuous on-land deterrent along the eastern flank defensive line, reduce our sensor-to-effector time, and achieve the nebulous tenfold increase in lethality by reducing the kill chain to well inside the sub-seven-minute timeframe that defines the current frontline in Ukraine.

Ajax cannot be scrapped. The Army needs it. There is no plan B, and given that it is a fixed-price contract, scrapping it will save no money anyway, despite Ministers confirming that the Government have sought legal advice from the Government Legal Department. The Government have not even considered a viable alternative option in CV90, and starting that process from scratch will take the best part of a decade before we even see a vehicle, based on current queues.

Put simply, Ajax needs to be delivered, primarily because the Army needs to restore its armoured reconnaissance capability. Additionally, there is a second order effect: confidence. The British Army badly needs to restore faith in Ajax as a platform. For all the negative stories and press, the Army and the Government must work out how to rebuild confidence in their ailing platform. I know what it is to be given kit that I do not have confidence in, and to have to use it on operations and wonder whether it will let me down, or worse. I know that the Minister can sympathise with that view. We must restore faith in the platform, not only for the soldiers expected to operate with it, but for its appeal from an investor and export position.

The long-term future of Ajax depends on the ability of General Dynamics to sell it overseas. The most advanced armoured fighting vehicle in its class should be an easy sell to the nations currently in the process of rearming and upgrading. We have a history of exquisite sovereign capability that nobody else really wants: Challenger 2, Warrior, even the SA80. Each of those has suffered from a lack of development over its life cycle, too often a day late and a dollar short.

[Mr Francois]

I thank my hon. Friend for his generosity in giving way. As well as the delays to Boxer, there are now strong rumours about further delays to the upgrade of Challenger 2 to Challenger 3. As Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land is responsible for both programmes, does my hon. Friend agree that it really needs to sort itself out and get on with it?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank my hon. Friend again, and I absolutely concur. With the delays to Ajax, we can no longer afford to fail to upgrade Challenger 2 to Challenger 3. The fact that the timeline of that has slipped to indefinite is a serious concern for our armoured capability.

A successful export programme would fuel development of the platform and allow it to improve over multiple iterations. It would enhance our own capability, and allow us to benefit from the first-mover advantage of adopting a common vehicle platform that can be expanded with the addition of an IFV and a mortar variant, putting us in the vanguard of armoured development in the drone age. But that cannot happen without the vehicle proving its capability—first with the soldiers, then with our allies. In a crowded field, that should be a top priority.

In “The Iliad”, Ajax loses a competition to Odysseus and, distraught by the result and conquered by his own grief, plunges his sword into his own chest, killing himself out of shame at his own failure. The irony should not be lost on any of us. Fix Ajax, and fix it quickly. There is a war coming.

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to be called. We are looking at around three and a half minutes each.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank everybody who participated in this very detailed debate. The Welsh Members who spoke represented the workers at the factory in Merthyr Tydfil extremely well; it is important that their voices are also heard in this debate. From my perspective, it is very important that we focus on how to deliver Ajax as a capability. I appreciate everything that the Minister said about the changing character of conflict and the changing nature of warfare. Ukraine has certainly moved the dial, particularly on armoured warfare and the survivability and lethality of armour going forward, and I know that the Chief of the General Staff has a very detailed view on how he wants to progress our lethality across the Army, particularly with regard to what that looks like going forward.

Ajax is in danger of being superseded by events; indeed, there is a potential that it is almost out of date. It is important that we consider how to make it relevant for the future, given that it has had a significant investment. Yes, it is late, but we can still utilise it, if we can harness its capability. I spoke to soldiers who have used the platform successfully—there are some—and they were positive about the capability of the vehicle. The wider issue is that we do not have an armoured capability that backs that up. It is the tip of the spear, but the handle of the spear is not up to standard. There are some serious concerns around how we maintain the capability of Challenger and what the armoured infantry looks like in the future. I would like to thank everybody for participating in the debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the future of the Ajax Programme.

New Medium Helicopter Contract

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

The hon. Gentleman is certainly right that it is really important to have an industrial base that can build autonomous helicopters and autonomous lift, and a number of players are already developing in that space. I want to be able to provide certainty to the workers at Leonardo on the future of the NMH, and that decision will be made in the DIP.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Rotary is obviously a vital element of military logistics. I know from my own experience in Afghanistan how much operations can be hampered by the inability to field a full suite of rotary assets in order to move troops around. With that in mind, and following the retirement of Puma for obvious reasons, can the Minister outline the rotary requirements for the armed forces at present and confirm whether the new medium helicopter is still a military requirement?

[Luke Pollard]

The hon. Gentleman comes from a background of knowledge in this respect. As part of the defence investment plan, the military have set out their needs, and they are being matched against the funding of the platforms that we have and the platforms that we want to purchase. As part of that, he will be aware of the SDR objective to move to greater autonomy in our platforms; indeed, a number of projects—including ones by Leonardo—are working to build that up. The new picture of crewed and autonomous platforms will be published as part of the defence investment plan.

Ukraine and Wider Operational Update

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 7th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I warmly welcome my hon. Friend’s support for the statement and the wise words that she has set out for the House. She speaks with great authority and great strength for her home city, and I think the House will have welcomed her words.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I start by recognising the US service personnel from my constituency, who played a part in the co-ordination of the interdiction operation to seize the MV Bella 1 via the joint intelligence analytics centre, Europe at RAF Molesworth, which is part of the US-European command.

I am slightly worried that this might be a moot point, but turning to the coalition of the willing, the presence of boots on the ground in Ukraine was a red line for Putin, and potentially it might be a stick that he beats us with in order to push back on any peace deal. If we workshop that idea, with a force of 7,500, as is being reported in the press, we clearly cannot realistically maintain a deterrence force posture, which underlines the paucity of our anti-access and area-denial options. That would also explain the commitment to military hubs, and I would appreciate clarification as to what exactly they are. With Ajax off games for the foreseeable—maybe for years—and no viable recce-strike capability, what assessment has the Secretary of State made of the urgency to bring forward the next iteration of Project Asgard from quarter 2 to quarter 1, given its urgent requirement as a force multiplier on the eastern flank defensive line?

[John Healey]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right to point to the importance of Project Asgard. It is breaking new ground. It is demonstrating new technologies and new military techniques. It is Britain at the forefront of creative military innovation and technology, and we are determined to accelerate it. On the wider question of the peace negotiations and red lines, the nature of any negotiations is always that declared initial positions are tested. If a successful process of peace negotiations is secured, we want to be ready, and we are ensuring that we are ready, to play a role in securing that peace for the long term through the multinational force for Ukraine.

Northern Ireland Troubles Bill: Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 5th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Given the concerns that have been expressed about this Bill and protections for our veterans, what assessment has the Minister made of the forthcoming Haddon-Cave inquiry and the impact that could have on the retention of personnel, given the cohort of people affected are likely either still serving or are of the same era as veterans in this Chamber?

[Al Carns]

The Haddon-Cave inquiry is an independent inquiry established by the last Government, and we must allow that to continue. We are focused today on ensuring that the correct protections are in place and written into law to ensure that no veteran who served so valiantly in Northern Ireland has any concerns about the Northern Ireland legacy Bill as it progresses in terms of their involvement in that operational context.

Defence

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Thursday 18th December 2025 Written Corrections

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Last week, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry told me:

“There are no other platforms within the Army’s armoured fleet which can fulfil the armoured reconnaissance role; Ajax has been specifically designed for this purpose.”

Our commitment to NATO includes two divisions. The first includes three manoeuvre brigades, with armoured and mechanised capabilities. With Ajax undeployable, we have no formation reconnaissance capability and therefore no deployable armoured brigade, thus we are not currently meeting our NATO obligation. Will the Minister clarify whether we still meet his NATO test without Ajax, whether we meet our NATO obligation more broadly, and, if he thinks we do, how?

[Al Carns]

As the hon. Member will recognise, a review of Ajax is under way. However, Ajax has been overspent and the key user requirements have changed and oscillated from left to right for the past 10 years. We have now taken this on and we recognise that we have to secure the capability to provide our armed forces with the very best. The reality is that Ukraine is teaching us that war is being fought very differently. It is not just about armour; as the hon. Member knows, it is about a mix of uncrewed systems and armoured systems, not one over the other.

[Official Report, 15 December 2025; Vol. 777, c. 612.]

Written correction submitted by the Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns):