NATO and the High Arctic

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Rupa Huq in the Chair]

10:29

[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Government policy on NATO and the High Arctic.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. There are slightly fewer people here than I was expecting—I think we have a clash with the Ministry of Defence estimates debate—which is a bit of a shame, but I am delighted to see that we have a brace of bootnecks in the debate. I was hoping to see the Minister for the Armed Forces joining us—then we would be nearly a fire team. I note that the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East (David Reed) has just told me he has never been to Norway and therefore is not a proper bootneck. The Minister for the Armed Forces went earlier this year, so maybe he has had his fill of the ice-breaking drills.

This debate is happening at the same time as the war in the middle east, which reinforces not only the importance of naval assets, as we see the impact of the closure of the strait of Hormuz on our economy at home, but the importance of naval air defence. I am pleased that HMS Dragon will be joining the US taskforce in the Mediterranean very soon.

The importance of the Navy cannot be overstated in the middle east, but it is even more important in the High North. That is because the High North is central to the UK’s security, to its economic resilience and to NATO’s ability to deter Russia. If we get our posture wrong, we do not just lose influence in the polar region; we take risks in the north Atlantic, take risks with our critical national infrastructure and risk our ability to reinforce our allies during a crisis.

I will make three points in the debate today: why the High Arctic matters, what has changed in the recent past, and what NATO and the UK should do about it. The High Arctic matters because climate change is changing the geography. Receding ice is extending operating seasons, opening access and drawing in more strategic interest in shipping, minerals and energy. Those create opportunities for states bordering the Arctic, but they also create risks. More access means more traffic. More traffic means more accidents and more opportunities for coercion, especially in a region with vast distances and limited infrastructure.

The Arctic is becoming busier and more contested at the same time. Undersea competition is now a frontline issue. Our economy relies on seabed infrastructure for fibre-optic communications, power cables and gas pipelines. A single major incident with this critical undersea infrastructure can cause disruption beyond the immediate area.

[Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for leading a debate on one of the most important security and defence issues that we face. I was in Estonia at the start of January, in my role as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Estonia. I met members of its military, as well as the British troops in Estonia, to talk about the importance of the High North and Arctic. Does he agree that partnerships such as the joint expeditionary force and other work being done in the area are vital to the protection of the undersea cables that he correctly highlighted? It is important that we look for those effective models to defend the High North and the Arctic.

[Alex Ballinger]

I absolutely agree that the JEF is a vital alliance for our operations in the High North. I met the Estonian ambassador only a couple of weeks ago, and we were pleased to discuss opportunities for co-operation, in addition to the UK forces that are based in Estonia, as part of deterring the Russian threat to that part of the world.

Importantly, the High Arctic is a top priority for Moscow strategically, militarily and economically. Russia has been building up its military presence, and it is not subtle about it. The northern fleet is modernising: it has a more capable navy and increasingly active submarine operations, and it focuses on controlling access to the European High North. We should be clear about what that means for the UK. Russia’s sea-based nuclear forces are concentrated around the Kola peninsula, and the High North is central to its nuclear deterrent strategy. That raises the stakes for NATO.

The Royal Navy has also seen a 30% increase in Russian vessels threatening UK waters over the past two years. Russia’s navy is increasingly capable and willing to test our defences from the High North. Russia wants to exploit the Arctic for more than military leverage; it wants to dominate access to sea routes and mineral resources. For Russia, this is about economics and security, which is why we cannot treat Arctic competition as “just defence”.

Recently, the big change we have seen in this region is what is happening in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion has transformed European security, and the Arctic is a part of that. Two Arctic countries, Finland and Sweden, joined NATO because they concluded that, in the context of Ukraine, neutrality no longer protected them. As a result, every Arctic country except Russia is now a NATO ally. That strengthens NATO’s hand, but it means that NATO’s northern responsibilities have expanded.

The second development is Greenland. We all saw Trump’s threats and rhetoric, which have thankfully receded. I am pleased that European countries were united in saying that Greenland’s sovereignty should not be a bargaining chip.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

I was fortunate to visit Nuuk in Greenland with the APPG for Greenland—of course, we discussed NATO and Trump. It is important for us to remember that the 1951 agreement between the USA and the Kingdom of Denmark gave the US rights of access to military defence. When it comes to what the United Kingdom could be doing for Greenland to develop what will none the less be geo-significant in the future, surely it is time that we should call for a consulate for the United Kingdom in Greenland.

[Alex Ballinger]

The Foreign Affairs Committee is going to Greenland in a couple of weeks. We hope to meet the Foreign Minister of Denmark, among other leaders of the Greenlanders, and that sounds like the kind of sensible suggestion that we should be talking about.

Certainly, there are lots of opportunities for NATO to base troops in Greenland already; we did not need a change in sovereignty to do that. I am pleased that that has fallen off the radar. It is concerning that Trump’s interest in Greenland is not a one-off. The US security strategy is explicit that the Arctic is becoming more important to America and to American national security, whether it is because of Russia, China, geography or critical minerals. We should not pretend that this was just a single passing storm.

In the Arctic, NATO is responding, but we need to be honest about the scale of the task. With the Arctic sentry, the alliance is trying to pull together a more coherent posture in the High North, with better visibility, better co-ordination and a clearer framework for operating in the sea, air, space and undersea environments.

We should also underline the importance of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. That strategic choke point is vital to NATO. It affects how Russia can move submarines into the wider Arctic, it affects the security of reinforcement routes in a crisis and it sits alongside the undersea infrastructure that we rely on every day.

I will raise the joint expeditionary force, which my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) raised earlier. The UK-led JEF has real value in this part of the world; it is practical, northern-focused and moves faster than the full NATO machine in the early stages of a crisis. That is exactly the sort of framework we should use to build readiness, interoperability and credibility.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The hon. and gallant Member is making a hoofing speech. He mentioned the Greenland-Iceland gap. We have committed to Operation Firecrest later this year, which will see the carrier strike group go to the High North as a deterrent against the Russian northern fleet breaking out of the Kola peninsula and moving across the Barents sea and into the open ocean. With the emergence of the conflict in the middle east, a potential commitment to a post-conflict force in Ukraine, a commitment to troops in Norway and Operation Firecrest, does he share my concern that we may have to make some very difficult decisions about how much capability we are able to deploy to ensure that our interests are looked after across all those fronts?

[Alex Ballinger]

The hon. Member makes a good point. Our naval capability has sadly diminished; we have fewer destroyers and frigates than we used to, and we are rightly deploying some of those to the Mediterranean and the middle east at the moment.

There will have to be hard choices as we approach that timescale. I think those will depend on the situation in the middle east at that point, but maybe the Minister can address that in her remarks. Later in my speech, I will raise what we might want to do about capability. It is important that NATO is backed by increased capability regarding ships, aircraft, sensors, munitions, trained people and deployable logistics; otherwise, our response will fall short.

The First Sea Lord has made the case for UK action in the High North repeatedly. In recent speeches, he has said that the High North is a critical area, that Russia’s submarine force is a huge concern and that we need more warfighting readiness now, not a peacetime posture. He has also said that

“the advantage that we have enjoyed in the Atlantic since the end of the Second World War is at risk”

unless we take action soon.

I want to ask the Minister whether we are resourcing this crucial area sufficiently. We continue to retire Type 23 frigates—anti-submarine ships. Five have retired since 2021, including HMS Lancaster most recently, but are we retiring them before replacements are ready? We have the Type 31 programme coming on soon, but it would be nice to have reassurance on the timelines and the risk that we are taking if there are gaps. If we are relying on future ships for future threats, we need confidence that they will arrive before the threat does.

We cannot talk about the High North without talking about the vital contribution of the Royal Marines—our Arctic-trained troops—who are ready to operate alongside Norwegian, Dutch and other forces. That is a genuine strength, but cold weather expertise must be backed by enablers—lift, sustainment and surveillance assets.

That brings me to the most important point: the defence investment plan. We can announce deployments, launch missions and make speeches about the High North, but if we do not publish a clear investment plan that is costed and credible, our adversaries will conclude that the UK strategy is stronger in rhetoric than in reality. The Chairs of the Defence Committee and the Public Accounts Committee have warned that delay sends damaging signals to our adversaries, and they are right. We are serious about the Arctic. We need serious choices, and we need them now, not in a year’s time.

There is a practical, day-to-day test. We are facing concurrent pressures in other theatres, including recent deployments to the middle east. The question is not whether we can deploy ships to other regions on paper; it is whether we can do it without hollowing out our commitments to other parts of the world.

I want to put three questions to the Minister. First, when will the defence investment plan be published? Secondly, do we have sufficient ships that are suitable and available to operate credibly in the north Atlantic and respond to the serious crisis in the middle east at the same time? Thirdly, what steps are the Government taking bilaterally and through NATO to reassure Denmark and strengthen stability around Greenland while making it clear that sovereignty is not negotiable and that influence operations will be resisted?

The High Arctic is becoming a sharper edge of competition. Climate change is opening access, Russia is militarising, undersea vulnerability is rising and NATO is adapting. The UK has a choice. We can treat this as a niche theatre and muddle through, or we can treat it as what it is: a direct test of our seriousness as a north Atlantic power. Deterrence is built on credibility, credibility is built on capability, and capability requires investment. That is why the defence investment plan and ship availability matter.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Dr Rupa Huq (in the Chair)]

Order. I remind Members to bob if they want to speak, and then we will work out who is next.

14:42

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairship, as always, Dr Huq. I thank the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for leading the debate in such a helpful way. He set the scene, the focus and the strategy, and he asked questions that I was going to ask—great minds think alike. He has a greater mind than me, by the way. I thank him for all that he does in this House. In the year and six months or thereabouts that he has been here, he has made a name for himself in canvassing the Chamber and in the way that he presents his case. He has done his constituents proud today, and he should be congratulated on that.

The High Arctic may lie far away from our coastline, but the sea lanes, the airspace and the critical undersea infrastructure are fundamental to the United Kingdom’s security and economic wellbeing. Defence is obviously about protecting our people and our assets, whether they be around the United Kingdom or further afield, but it is also about economic wellbeing. I am very impressed by the Government’s commitment to the defence industry on the mainland and in Northern Ireland. The Minister has always told us about the Government’s commitment.

We have seen the financial commitment to weapons and cyber-activity through Thales and SPIRiT, and the Government have been keen to build on that. After the south-east of England, Northern Ireland is the most credible part of the United Kingdom when it comes to cyber-security, and I welcome that very much. That is down not only to the companies that we have but to the Government’s commitment to that, and we thank them for that.

Complacency must never be an option. I am pleased to be here to discuss this issue and see what more we can do to support the High Arctic. I am a fair weather person who likes sunshine and heat. It is highly unlikely that I would be seen in Norway and I have no interest in skiing because it looks too cold for me. I enjoyed watching the winter Olympics on TV and it was good to see our team doing well. Five times we came within 0.2 seconds of winning another medal. That tells us about the achievements of this wee country and makes us proud to be British.

Over the past few days we have heard all too well the importance of national security and infrastructure. My goodness—not a day goes by when we know what will happen next. I am a man of faith, so I trust in someone better in control who is in heaven looking down at us. I am quite clear in my mind where my faith and trust lie. In the world, there are 67 wars: think of that. It is almost a world at war, and we have seen that reflected in the middle east in the past few days.

The High Arctic has proven central to Atlantic security and maritime trade routes and the importance of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. Sometimes that is forgotten about. Some hon. Members have travelled to Greenland, but President Trump’s focus on the country has made us think about its importance. Maybe we did not see it in the way we should. I thank those hon. Members who have been instrumental in that. I understand that the hon. Member for Halesowen is going there shortly.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

Of course, we are at risk in our democracy of looking at things in the very short term. With climate change, 30 years from now the access to key rare earth minerals, and possibly shipping lanes, in the far north may have changed considerably.

[Jim Shannon]

That is the focus we need to have. Climate change is affecting the world. We might find ourselves in a slightly different geographical position in a short time. The right hon. Lady has illustrated that to our advantage.

The Greenland-Iceland-UK gap remains vital for monitoring submarine activity. I can never understand how anybody can get into a submarine; it is too claustrophobic for me, but I admire those who do, as they play a vital role in the defence of this great nation. It is no secret that Russia has expanded its Arctic military footprint, which may be what Trump is looking towards. We need to be aware of Russia’s input, especially its submarine operations, air bases and missile systems. The Arctic region is a key domain for undersea infrastructure. Protecting the integrity of UK security is a major priority. NATO allies must remain as a cornerstone of support in doing that.

When we focus on the importance of where we are, we support the policies that strengthen deterrence rather than encourage confrontation. I cannot remember which one, but a US President said:

“Speak softly but carry a big stick.”

That reminds us that we must have a deterrent—the nuclear power and the submarines and the strength of the Army—to persuade others not to go to war. That is the ultimate goal we all try to achieve. We must also maintain readiness to respond to threats and ensure that military deployments to Norway and the north Atlantic are exercised and fully trained. Again, we see commitment from the British Army and NATO, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, as well as Poland. Those troops are the best.

The hon. Member for Halesowen mentioned the Marines, and there are none better. When I was a wee boy, I was always saying, “I am going to be a Royal Marine.” As an eight-year-old, that was my big ambition. It obviously never happened, but I did serve part time in the Ulster Defence Regiment and in the Royal Artillery. It was a slightly different role and not as exciting as the Marines—it never could be—but it was an incredible role.

We often have discussions around defence spending. A proper budget is needed to perfect intelligence and surveillance of the High Arctic. In strategic terms, sea lanes and undersea cables are vital. I asked the Minister a question over recess, and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy came to the main Chamber maybe six or eight weeks ago and referred to undersea cables. In my question to the Select Committee Chair, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), I asked about the undersea cables that come across the North sea, down to England and across to Ireland. The Republic of Ireland is a soft belly. Do we have a role to play in securing the undersea cables that go from there across the Atlantic as well? Of course, the Republic of Ireland does not have the Royal Navy, the Army or the personnel that we have. Are there discussions, or is there a relationship or a defensive agreement, between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to ensure that the undersea cables that go across the Atlantic are protected? The Chair of the Select Committee was unable to confirm that. That is not a criticism; I am just saying that I asked a question and the answer could not be given.

The undersea cables and the Arctic’s stability affect trade, energy and global security. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and the United States have shared interests in terms of the Arctic region. Of course, President Trump has made his opinions clear in relation to Greenland, but close co-operation ensures that NATO can respond rapidly to threats, particularly from Russia. The United States, as the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) and the hon. Member for Halesowen mentioned, has bases in Greenland. It has feet on the ground and it is building up to using that footprint as a protection or a launchpad. It is important that we have that relationship with the United States.

To conclude, I stand firmly for a united NATO, a credible deterrent to aggression and robust investment in our armed forces to ensure they are equipped for operations in the High Arctic. We have an enduring partnership with the United States of America and we must strengthen our ability to defend vital waters and airspace. The hon. Gentleman asked about the number of ships being built for the Royal Navy to enhance its position. I know the Government are giving everything to enhance investment—that is never in doubt—but maybe the Minister could tell us about their commitment to the Royal Navy, which is clearly needed.

I say this with incredible respect. For 10 days our base in Cyprus was potentially under attack. My comment is not an attack on anybody, but why on earth did we not send a ship to protect Cyprus 10 days ago? It niggles me whenever we see the French and the Germans giving us protection.

[Alex Ballinger]

I am sure the Minister will respond, but the hon. Gentleman will know that there are allies of ours in the Mediterranean as well, including a large American flotilla. It is appropriate for us to work closely with other air defence assets. The single ship that we have sent would not have changed the situation entirely; there are other assets out there as well.

[Jim Shannon]

The point I am trying to make is that there is a perception across the world that the United Kingdom, who ruled the waves 300 years ago or whenever it was, has not got a ship that it can send. That sends a message. The hon. Gentleman is right about working with our allies. We cannot fight a war on our own any more; we have to do it collectively, but there is something that niggles me whenever I recognise that. It is not meant to be an attack on anybody; I am just making the point that we need to be seen to be proactive.

14:54

[Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this debate and also for his service. I have not served myself, unlike the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East (David Reed), who is speaking for the Opposition, but I have been to Norway.

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in the debate, because last month I spent five days in the High North with the armed forces parliamentary scheme, visiting British Marines, sailors and soldiers training in northern Norway. From my arrival in Tromsø to field exercises in the Mauken training area and aviation operations at Bardufoss, I saw at first hand what Arctic readiness really means. It is impossible to witness that work and not conclude that the High North is central to Britain’s security in some of the harshest conditions imaginable—sub-zero temperatures, deep snow, limited daylight. Our personnel demonstrated extraordinary mobility, reconnaissance capability and survival skills. They operated seamlessly alongside Norwegian and other NATO allies with professionalism, pride and determination. They understand that what they are doing matters not just to the alliance, but to the safety and prosperity of the people back home.

The High North is not a remote periphery. It is strategically vital. Maritime routes are opening; energy infrastructure is concentrated there; and critical undersea data cables that power our digital economy run through those waters. That is without the impact of climate change, which we have heard about. As competition intensifies, allied readiness in the Arctic is not optional—it is essential. The Government have recognised the realities, as has the First Sea Lord.

As vice-chair of the APPG for the armed forces, representing the Navy, and as the Member of Parliament for Portsmouth North, it would be remiss of me not to mention our two aircraft carriers, His Majesty’s ships Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales. HMS Queen Elizabeth deployed to the High North in autumn 2021, as part of the UK carrier strike group 21 deployment. During that period, the ship operated in the north Atlantic and near the Arctic circle, including in exercises with Norway and our NATO allies. She returned to northern waters again in 2023 for further NATO and joint exercises, focusing on cold-weather and Arctic operations. I am proud to say that when she returned in 2023, my son was serving on that ship.

In 2022, His Majesty’s ship Prince of Wales also deployed on a major NATO maritime deployment in the north Atlantic, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The ship operated again in northern waters early in 2024, taking part in NATO’s large-scale exercise in Norway and the surrounding Arctic region. We have committed to her returning there in the near future. All the evidence is that we, as a Government and as the armed forces, as the First Sea Lord has said, are taking our national security very seriously.

Our national security policy positions the United Kingdom at the forefront of efforts to make NATO stronger, fairer and more effective, and commits us to strengthening our armed forces and protecting our national security in the face of growing threats from state actors. Those commitments are not abstract, because they underpin the Government’s defence investment pledge, agreed with NATO allies, to raise defence and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, reinforcing our broader national resilience and collective deterrence.

The UK’s preparations for Exercise Cold Response demonstrate our commitment to NATO and our collective defence. They send a clear signal that we stand shoulder to shoulder with Norway and our allies, and that we are prepared to operate and, if necessary, defend in the most demanding of environments. Since taking office, this Government have doubled down on our strategic posture in the High North, including with plans to double the number of UK troops deployed to Norway over the next three years to strengthen security in the Arctic and the High North.

Readiness, however, is not only about kit and capability; it is about people. I not only observed exercises, but spoke at length with those deployed about welfare, sustainment and the realities of repeated operations far from home. They spoke candidly about separation from their families, the physical and mental demands of Arctic conditions, and the importance of clear political direction and sustained investment—as well as about the kit.

If we are serious about Arctic readiness, we must ensure that our defence policy reflects operational reality and not assumptions, and that our people at home and abroad get what they need. That means listening carefully to those who deliver the missions, ensuring that equipment is fit for purpose, guaranteeing that logistic chains are resilient, and recognising that deterrence begins long before a crisis emerges. It also means that we must champion the alliances that make our security possible. Labour’s manifesto reaffirmed our absolute commitment to NATO, and to ensuring that Britain plays its full part in collective defence.

While I was in the High North, our Norwegian partners spoke about their genuine respect for the capability and reliability of our British forces. Their trust has been built over decades of partnership and a real shared endeavour. In the High North our forces are prepared and professional, and they are proving that Britain remains a serious and dependable ally. Our responsibility is to match that commitment with our own, to provide the strategic clarity, resources and long-term vision that Arctic readiness demands.

I echo the three questions put by my hon. Friend the Member for Halesowen and add one of my own: a request from service personnel. In terms of our troops on the ground, how can we ensure that what are often seen as soft materials—their gloves, jackets, uniforms, boots, body armour and backpacks—are the best they can be? How can we ensure that they are listened to when it comes to the real things used by real people?

15:00

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

As ever, Dr Huq, it is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I thank the hon. and gallant Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this geostrategically important debate and drawing this issue to the attention of the House.

At a moment when the world’s attention is understandably distracted and drawn to other parts of the world—whether to the brutal war in eastern Europe or the escalating tensions in the middle east—it would be all too easy to park an issue such as this and see it, perhaps, as something for the future rather than as something for immediate attention. I contend, however, that that would be an enormous strategic error; history, after all, has a terrible habit of punishing those who overlook the vital importance of geography.

The opening up of the Arctic is undoubtedly one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of the 21st century. As we know, climate change is transforming the region at extraordinary speed. Retreating sea ice is opening new maritime routes and increasing access to energy resources and critical minerals, drawing renewed strategic interest from major powers.

At the same time, the co-operative governance structures that once defined the Arctic are under strain. For much of the post-cold war period, the region was described as “High North, low tension”. That description no longer holds. The era of Arctic exceptionalism seems to be over. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fractured the Arctic Council and accelerated the wider geopolitical tensions that now shape the region. Strategic competition is returning to the High North—not as a distant possibility, but as a clear and present reality.

Although the United Kingdom is not an Arctic coastal state, we are undeniably a near-Arctic nation. We are geographically proximate, strategically exposed and directly affected by developments in the High North. Instability in the Arctic affects our maritime approaches, north Atlantic shipping lanes, subsea cables, offshore energy infrastructure, and ultimately the deterrent posture of the Royal Navy. For the United Kingdom, the Arctic is not a remote frontier; it is part of our immediate strategic environment.

A few weeks ago, I had the enormous privilege of visiting Greenland and Denmark, alongside my Liberal Democrat colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller). I can report that in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, life often appears outwardly calm. The harbour is busy and the cafés are full. The rhythms of daily life continue, despite the long Arctic winter and the limited daylight available in February, when I was there. However, anyone spending any time talking to Greenlanders will hear something quite different: a persistent and gnawing anxiety about what might be coming down the tracks from not Moscow or Beijing—nobody realistically thinks that either Russia or China pose an immediate threat to Greenland—but, extraordinarily, from Washington.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

My hon. Friend knows a great deal about this subject; I am also grateful to the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this debate.

Yesterday, President Trump suggested that our current Prime Minister is no Churchill. Should we not add that the current President of the United States is no Franklin D. Roosevelt? FDR was a big supporter of the development of the United Nations and knew about the importance of sovereignty. Does my hon. Friend share my view—I think he will—that who governs their countries is a matter for the Danes and Greenlanders alone?

[Dr Pinkerton]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his intervention; the President of the United States is perhaps more Teddy Roosevelt than Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He seems to be living every day under the impression that his mission should be to expand US territory and to plant the US flag, no matter how loyal and allied the country in question has been in the past.

I clearly recall the deeply offensive remarks that the President of the United States made about both Britain and Denmark’s past military contributions to US international adventurism. I remember watching a film called “Armadillo” about the extraordinary work that Danish troops did on the frontline in Afghanistan. I agree with my hon. Friend’s comments wholeheartedly.

For Greenlanders, this is not a recent experience; they have been living with the threats of Donald Trump for the best part of 12 months. Over the past year, he has repeatedly suggested that the United States should “acquire” Greenland, presenting the idea as a matter of American national security. Sitting here in Westminster, it may be tempting to dismiss such remarks as rhetorical theatre, but in Nuuk they are experienced profoundly differently. Greenland is a self-governing Arctic society of 56,000 people. When the world’s most powerful country repeatedly discusses one’s homeland as though it were a strategic asset to be acquired, the effect is not abstract.

During my visit, we heard accounts of families stockpiling supplies. Some described moving savings abroad in case of financial disruption to their homeland and their lives. Others spoke of delaying vital, essential medical treatment in Denmark—treatment that many Greenlanders rely on—because they feared that further escalation would mean that they would not be able to return to their homeland afterwards.

Greenlandic commentators have described the psychological effect of the campaign from the United States as a form of “mental terror”. It is a striking phrase, but it captures an important truth: security in the Arctic is not solely about missiles, submarines and military installations; it is also about trust, stability and the ability of societies to live without fear.

There is also a profound strategic irony here. The United States already enjoys extensive rights in Greenland under the 1951 US-Denmark defence agreement, including the operation of the Pituffik space base—formerly, the Thule air base—and any other base that it may wish to re-establish in the present moment. Greenland sits inside NATO’s security architecture through Denmark and benefits from the protections of article 5. The idea that Greenland must somehow be owned to be defended simply does not withstand any scrutiny. What it challenges, however, is something far more fundamental: the principle that people are not property and that sovereignty cannot be negotiated away for strategic convenience.

Across Greenlandic politics, the response has therefore been consistent and unequivocal: Greenland is not for sale. For liberal democracies, that principle should not be negotiable. If western democracies cannot defend the idea that territories cannot be simply acquired by powerful states, then the rules-based order that we claim to uphold begins to look increasingly selective and fragile. Nowhere are those principles more important than in the wider strategic geography of the North Atlantic.

At the heart of that geography lies the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap: the naval corridor between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. During the cold war, NATO prioritised that corridor to detect and constrain the submarines of the Soviet northern fleet departing the Kola peninsula into the Atlantic. Today, it has again become central to NATO’s strategy. Russia’s northern fleet must transit through or around the GIUK gap to reach the north Atlantic.

Monitoring the corridor remains essential to tracking submarine activity and protecting the integrity of the north Atlantic. The corridor also safeguards the sealines of communication between North America and Europe. In any NATO contingency, the transatlantic reinforcement route would pass directly through those waters. If the GIUK gap were compromised, the United Kingdom’s western maritime flank would be exposed. Control and surveillance of the space are therefore fundamental to preventing adversaries from projecting power into the north Atlantic or threatening western Europe and North America.

Within the strategic geography, Greenland’s importance cannot be overstated. Its location makes it pivotal for missile early-warning systems, Arctic sea routes, access to the north Atlantic, and space-based infrastructure. Destabilising Greenland or undermining Danish sovereignty would fracture NATO cohesion, complicate security in the GIUK gap and weaken Arctic governance structures at precisely the moment when unity is most needed.

The Liberal Democrats are therefore clear: sovereignty and international law are not negotiable principles. I am deeply concerned that the Prime Minister has yet to state unequivocally that British soil, British bases and British facilities would never be used to propel American troops on to Greenlandic territory by force. The Government must put that matter beyond doubt.

Any suggestion that one NATO ally could coerce another would erode alliance cohesion, weaken deterrence and play directly into the hands of President Putin. Fragmentation in the Arctic theatre would directly benefit Russia’s northern fleet posture and its wider Arctic military strategy. Again, this is not about abstract diplomacy; it is about the credibility of collective defence. The UK must therefore deepen its commitment to Arctic security and north Atlantic resilience. That means strengthening anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness, investing further in north Atlantic patrol and surveillance capabilities, and reinforcing defence co-operation with our Nordic and Baltic partners.

Crucially, the Government should invest further in the Joint Expeditionary Force, and convene a summit of JEF leaders here in the United Kingdom to address the rapidly evolving security environment in the High North. The reality is simple: the Arctic is no longer a peripheral concern; it is at the frontline of strategic competition, alliance solidarity and international law.

I leave the Minister with three questions. First, what concrete steps have the Government taken to ensure that the UK is prepared for the reality that I have just outlined? How is the UK strengthening defence co-operation with our Arctic allies, including considering enhanced diplomatic presence in Greenland and perhaps the establishment of a permanent consulate in Nuuk?

Finally, the strategic defence review mentions the High North as a space of geopolitical and geostrategic interest, but does not offer a defence strategy per se. Do the Government intend to bring one forward? How does the Government’s future procurement reflect that strategic concern?

15:12

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I echo the initial comments of the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), in thanking the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger), a fellow former Royal Marine, for bringing this debate to the House today. This is a massively important subject, and I am glad that we have the opportunity to discuss it. I hope that we will continue to discuss it because the area will only increase in importance.

We all know that the High North is no longer a distant theatre of academic interest or a place for explorers’ delight. It is fast becoming the new frontier of great power competition. As the ice retreats through climate change—we have heard about that from many Members today—strategic rivalry advances. Sea routes are opening, undersea infrastructure is exposed and military activity is increasing.

The Arctic is no longer insulated by geography or climate, and it is becoming a central arena in the contest between major powers. The decisions that we take now will shape the security of the north Atlantic for decades. The hon. Member for Halesowen outlined that very clearly in his opening remarks. Russia views the Arctic as a core strategic bastion. Its northern fleet operates from heavily defended bases in the region, protecting its nuclear deterrent and projecting power into the north Atlantic. Moscow treats Arctic territory and resources as central to its long-term security and economic resilience.

On the other hand, the United States sees the Arctic as integral to homeland defence and the security of the transatlantic alliance. Greenland, which we have heard about today, and the wider north Atlantic have returned to prominence in American strategic thinking, as reinforcement routes and early warning systems regain importance.

Lastly, China, although not an Arctic state—it claims to be a near-Arctic state, whatever that means—has steadily expanded its presence through research, commercial investments and polar shipping, signalling long-term interests in Arctic trade routes and resources. That will only increase as climate change reduces the ice.

The Arctic is a theatre where Russian militarisation, American strategic recalibration and Chinese expansion intersect, as many Members have set out clearly. That is why NATO now treats the defence of the High North as a strategic imperative. The accession of Finland and Sweden has transformed the strategic geometry of the region, as the hon. Member for Halesowen rightly said. We have seen over recent years that NATO’s northern flank is stronger and more coherent.

The GIUK gap and the north-Atlantic sea lanes—the arteries through which reinforcements would flow in a crisis—have regained their cold war significance. NATO’s launch of Arctic Sentry earlier this year reflects that reality, and I am glad that has happened. It signals a recognition that deterrence in the High North must be persistent, co-ordinated and credible.

The United Kingdom says that it understands the shift. Under the last Government, the 2023 “Looking North” policy framework set out a whole-of-Government approach across security, science and the environment. Fast-forwarding to this Government, the strategic defence review acknowledged that developments in the High North have direct consequences for the Euro-Atlantic and the United Kingdom’s place within it. Ministers have also highlighted the Royal Navy’s approach to Atlantic Bastion, which is intended to secure the north Atlantic through a networked mix of warships, aircraft and autonomous systems.

Important steps have been taken. The United Kingdom is strengthening co-operation with Norway through the Lunna House agreement and the JEF, to counter undersea threats and protect NATO’s northern flank. The Royal Marines—my old outfit, and the hon. Member for Halesowen’s—continue to train in Norway, including through exercises such as Cold Response and our training presence at Camp Viking, which is set to expand. I put on the record my thanks to the Royal Marines delegation that recently came to Parliament, under Brigadier Jaimie Norman, to educate us on the High North. It was a fantastic day that left a lasting impression on us all.

The UK will contribute to NATO’s Arctic Sentry mission, with the carrier strike group deploying to the north Atlantic later this year under Operation Firecrest. I hope the Minister will expand on the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty).

The actions I have mentioned demonstrate intent, but the House must distinguish between intent and delivery. The Government have chosen not to publish a refreshed stand-alone High North defence strategy; instead, Arctic policy has been folded into broader defence frameworks. I am sure there is a good reason for that and look forward to hearing the Minister’s rationale for it, but the Opposition, if we are playing a good friend to the policy, think it risks diluting focus.

If the High North is truly the new frontier of great power competition, the United Kingdom’s objectives there should be clearly defined. Are we primarily focused on securing reinforcement routes across the north Atlantic, or on protecting critical undersea infrastructure, which the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) referred to? We need a much better strategy across all our partners. I think that is being developed, but the question is whether it is being developed fast enough.

It has been made quite clear in the debate that the United Kingdom does not currently maintain capabilities dedicated specifically to Arctic operations. Without additional capacity, Arctic ambition risks becoming a competition for scarce assets rather than a sustained strategic commitment, as I think would be acknowledged by anyone who sees themselves as our adversaries.

The Royal Marines are a good microcosm through which to see the challenge clearly. They are being asked to pivot towards High North operations—they are specialists in that environment—while continuing special operation roles and global deployments.

I want to put on the record, as the hon. Member for Halesowen did, that I never spent any time in the Arctic, even though I am a former Royal Marine, and it is said that until someone has spent time in Norway, they are not a proper bootneck. Given that the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) has spent five more days in the High North than me, I defer to her more recent knowledge. Before the debate started, the Minister offered to join me back up again; I am still unsure whether that was a threat or some sort of treat; given that the hon. Member for Strangford also wants to join the Royal Marines, maybe we can do it together.

Cold weather warfare cannot simply be improvised, as the hon. Member for Halesowen will know, having been deployed up in that area, nor can credible specialist capability exist without, as he said, the lift, logistics and sustainment that enable it. In the undersea domain, the stakes are even higher. The North Atlantic seabed carries the cables and energy links that underpin our economy and communications; the hon. Member for Strangford talked about the economic security that we all rely on.

Deterrence in the High North will increasingly be measured below the surface, in the submarines tracked, cables monitored and infrastructure protected. The Lunna House agreement with Norway, which includes co-operation on anti-submarine warfare and the protection of undersea infrastructure, is strategically sound, but the interoperability on paper must translate into persistent operational presence at sea. That means modern anti-submarine capabilities, sufficient hulls available for deployment, and the crews required to sustain them.

The strategic defence review acknowledged that the Arctic is a region of increasing competition in the United Kingdom’s wider neighbourhood, yet it did not outline specific capability adjustments tailored to the theatre. If the High North is becoming central to NATO deterrence, treating it simply as an adjunct to other priorities will not suffice. To go back again to the overriding point that we keep hearing, I really hope there is clear detail in the defence investment plan, whenever it is released, and that the Minister can give a clearer view on when that will be. The House of Lords has also raised concerns that the United Kingdom risks aspiring to a meaningful security presence in the High North without the resources to sustain it. Those concerns have not yet been fully answered.

Recent events elsewhere underline the importance of readiness. When crises escalate, forces held at high readiness must deploy rapidly. Air and missile defence must be integrated, munition stockpiles must sustain operations over time, and the growing cost imbalance between high-end interceptors and low-cost threats cannot be ignored. These challenges go to the heart of credibility. NATO deterrence in the High North depends on the confidence that allies can reinforce Europe across the Atlantic, defend sea lanes and protect the northern flank under pressure. If we speak of Atlantic Bastion, we must demonstrate the ships, aircraft and trained crews required to make it real.

Let me be clear: the Opposition support a strong NATO presence in the High North, and we want to work with the Government to strengthen it wherever we can, but we cannot support some of the plans without being a critical friend. We will therefore ask the Government to define clearly the objectives of the United Kingdom’s contribution to Arctic Sentry. We will ask how Atlantic Bastion is being resourced and crewed, how the expansion at Camp Viking will be sustained alongside global commitments, and how the protection of undersea infrastructure is being operationalised in practice.

The High North is becoming the northern gateway to the United Kingdom’s security. It is the corridor through which allied reinforcements would flow, and it is where deterrence will increasingly be tested below the surface. If this is the new frontier of great power competition, we must treat it with the seriousness that such a frontier demands. The strategy must be clear, the capability must be credible, and the resources must match the ambition.

15:22

[The Minister for Veterans and People (Louise Sandher-Jones)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for initiating this debate on the high Arctic and its increasing importance to our security—an incredibly important topic.

As my hon. and gallant Friend knows well from his time as a Royal Marine, the UK has a long and storied history in the High North, and for some 50 years the Royal Marines have practised Arctic warfare alongside our Norwegian allies. Indeed, he may have taken part in the rite of passage of plunging into the ice, as I believe the First Sea Lord did again when he visited troops there only last week.

As the threat from Russia has cast an increasingly long shadow over Europe, our High North capabilities have grown only more important, and today High North deployments of Royal Marines are up 40%, with year-round cold-weather operations. The reality is that we have a frontline with Russia in the North Atlantic, and the Russian threat is higher than it has been for decades. We have seen from the activities of the spy ship Yantar that Russia is an increasing threat to our critical underwater infrastructure. We see Putin rapidly re-establishing military presence in the region, including reopening old cold war bases. Last year, Russia and China conducted their first joint air patrol into the Arctic circle. China has declared itself a near-Arctic state and expanded its icebreaker and research vessel presence.

The changing military picture is fuelled by the changing climate and rising temperatures, and a number of Members rightly raised how pivotal it is to understand climate change and recognise the huge threat it poses to our security. It is vital to consider it in that way. The Arctic is warming up four times faster than the global average, and the strategic defence review projects the region to be ice-free each summer by 2040, opening new routes, trade dynamics and flash points. Our responses to those challenges were set out in the SDR: we need increased investment, new technologies and stronger alliances. We are prepared to meet those challenges.

Spearheading our capabilities is our littoral response group north, which is our specialised Royal Navy task group that deploys across the north Atlantic, the Baltic and the High North, with dedicated personnel, ships and helicopters to project power and respond to crises. We have also launched Atlantic Bastion, which is our groundbreaking programme to protect the UK from Russian undersea threats using an AI-powered network of sensors.

We are working ever more closely with our nine partner nations that make up the joint expeditionary force. We established Operation Nordic Warden with JEF allies, working together to track threats to undersea infrastructure from Russia’s shadow fleet—a responsibility now assumed by NATO. Last autumn, we conducted Exercise Tarassis, which was JEF’s largest ever military exercise, involving more than 1,700 British personnel, alongside air, land and naval forces from Scandinavian and Baltic nations.

On a visit to Norway last month, the Secretary of State went further still, announcing that Arctic and High North security will be strengthened against rising Russian threats as Britain steps up its presence in the region. He also announced a major joint expeditionary force, Exercise Lion Protector, which will see air, land and naval forces from JEF nations deployed across Iceland, the Danish straits and Norway, and trained to protect critical national infrastructure against attacks and sabotage, and enhance their joint command and control capabilities. The Secretary of State confirmed that the number of British troops deployed to Norway will double over three years, from 1,000 to 2,000 personnel.

Finland and Sweden’s accession has transformed NATO’s northern posture, meaning that seven of the eight Arctic states are now NATO allies. The whole alliance is consequently more focused on the threats and challenges to our north.

As can be expected from a Government who have put NATO first, NATO is at the heart of our response to growing threats and tensions in the region. The UK is playing a full part in NATO’s Arctic sentry mission, which is enhancing NATO’s posture in the Arctic and High North, and we currently have 1,500 commandos deployed across Norway, Finland and Sweden as part of Exercise Cold Response. Planning is at an advanced stage for Operation Firecrest, and the upcoming deployment will see our carrier strike group across the Atlantic and High North. Of course, we continually review threat levels and will change our policies accordingly. The thousands of personnel from the three services are spearheaded by HMS Prince of Wales, and parts of the deployment are under NATO command.

Our military co-operation in the Arctic is underpinned by key bilateral partnerships that have all been strengthened under this Government. Russia’s growing activity across the Arctic, High North and north Atlantic has changed the security picture for the region. The UK, with its 50-plus years of history operating in the Arctic, and through our deep partnerships with allies, including Norway, Sweden and Finland, will be at the centre of NATO’s northern response from day one.

In December, the Defence Secretary signed the historic Lunna House agreement with Norway, which will see the UK and Norway jointly operate a fleet of submarine-hunting Type 26 warships, expand joint Arctic training and pre-position British military equipment in Norway to be better prepared for future crises. We have stood resolutely with Denmark over Greenland, the future of which is for Greenlanders and Danes alone. I welcome the uplift in Danish Arctic defence spending, worth more than £10 billion.

We have also worked closely with the Finnish military, including through NATO’s Exercise Dynamic Front, with the British Army conducting its first live firing of our Archer mobile howitzer on Finnish soil—the Army is getting in on the High North joy. We currently have three P-8 Poseidon aircraft carrying out RAF NATO air policing from Keflavik in Iceland—the largest-ever P-8 overseas deployment.

Let me turn to a couple of questions that Members asked. We are working flat out to deliver the DIP. I am sure I do not need to stress to every Member here that it is important to get this hugely important piece of work right before we commit to it. We have ordered five Type 31 frigates, and HMS Venturer should be the first of those to deliver by the end of the decade.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) asked about Ireland. the Prime Minister is due to meet with the Taoiseach at the bilateral in just a few days’ time, and I know that the Secretary of State will call his counterpart and have discussions around some of the points the hon. Gentleman raised.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) for her contribution. She has been to Norway; I have never made it there—I have only been as far as Denmark—but I am sure there is time to rectify that. She is a doughty campaigner for families, and as we say in the military, although personnel join the military, their families serve too. It is within my purview to do everything I can to support families through the very difficult challenges they face when their loved ones deploy. My hon. Friend rightly noted the importance of not only the larger pieces of shiny equipment that we must procure, but simple items such as gloves. Having worn military-issue gloves, I concur. We must make sure that we have a good standard of personal protective kit and equipment.

Real tribute has been paid to the mighty Royal Marines, who have been excellent guardians of our Arctic warfare capability. It is a very difficult operating environment, and I pay tribute to those who operate there on our behalf to keep us safe. The Royal Marines are a fantastic career choice for those considering starting their careers or who might be interested in joining the reserves. Other armed services are available, including the British Army, should anyone be interested.

Politically and environmentally, the Arctic is in flux. While the eyes of the world are currently focused on the middle east, we are clear that there can be no national or global security without security across the Arctic and northern Europe.

[Richard Foord]

In its negotiations with the United States, Denmark pledged to raise defence spending from 2.4% of GDP last year to 3% of GDP this year and next. Does the Minister think that the example Denmark is setting is a good one for the United Kingdom?

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I am very proud of the steps that the Government have taken to raise defence spending, which are very welcome off the back of many years of underspend. In fact, this is my very next line: defence spending will rise to 2.6% in 2027, 3% in the next Parliament and 5% by 2035. Just as important as raising defence and security spending is making sure that we continue to pursue a NATO-first defence policy. We are a Government who are delivering the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war, to keep Britain secure at home and strong abroad.

[Liz Saville Roberts]

I appreciate that the Minister is talking about defence spend, but in my earlier intervention I raised a point about having a consulate. Many of our European neighbours are ensuring that they have a presence in the area, alongside China and the United States. Surely that would be an effective way of spending Government money at a time when we are looking to spend effectively for the future of the UK’s best interests.

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I am sure the right hon. Member will understand that consulates are a matter for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. I will make sure that the FCDO is aware of her comments.

15:30

[Alex Ballinger]

I am grateful for the excellent contributions from my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin), the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts), my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie), the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East (David Reed) and, of course, the Minister.

I think this is the first debate I have been in where there has been almost unanimous agreement across the piece about the importance of Arctic security, outrage at the position the Americans took on Greenland, and agreement on the necessary steps we need to take to reinforce the capability of our troops. I am also grateful to have heard the Royal Marines being spoken about so much in this Chamber—we need that to continue.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered Government policy on NATO and the High Arctic.

15:30

Sitting suspended.