NATO and the High Arctic

Graeme Downie Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Government policy on NATO and the High Arctic.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. There are slightly fewer people here than I was expecting—I think we have a clash with the Ministry of Defence estimates debate—which is a bit of a shame, but I am delighted to see that we have a brace of bootnecks in the debate. I was hoping to see the Minister for the Armed Forces joining us—then we would be nearly a fire team. I note that the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East (David Reed) has just told me he has never been to Norway and therefore is not a proper bootneck. The Minister for the Armed Forces went earlier this year, so maybe he has had his fill of the ice-breaking drills.

This debate is happening at the same time as the war in the middle east, which reinforces not only the importance of naval assets, as we see the impact of the closure of the strait of Hormuz on our economy at home, but the importance of naval air defence. I am pleased that HMS Dragon will be joining the US taskforce in the Mediterranean very soon.

The importance of the Navy cannot be overstated in the middle east, but it is even more important in the High North. That is because the High North is central to the UK’s security, to its economic resilience and to NATO’s ability to deter Russia. If we get our posture wrong, we do not just lose influence in the polar region; we take risks in the north Atlantic, take risks with our critical national infrastructure and risk our ability to reinforce our allies during a crisis.

I will make three points in the debate today: why the High Arctic matters, what has changed in the recent past, and what NATO and the UK should do about it. The High Arctic matters because climate change is changing the geography. Receding ice is extending operating seasons, opening access and drawing in more strategic interest in shipping, minerals and energy. Those create opportunities for states bordering the Arctic, but they also create risks. More access means more traffic. More traffic means more accidents and more opportunities for coercion, especially in a region with vast distances and limited infrastructure.

The Arctic is becoming busier and more contested at the same time. Undersea competition is now a frontline issue. Our economy relies on seabed infrastructure for fibre-optic communications, power cables and gas pipelines. A single major incident with this critical undersea infrastructure can cause disruption beyond the immediate area.

[Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for leading a debate on one of the most important security and defence issues that we face. I was in Estonia at the start of January, in my role as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Estonia. I met members of its military, as well as the British troops in Estonia, to talk about the importance of the High North and Arctic. Does he agree that partnerships such as the joint expeditionary force and other work being done in the area are vital to the protection of the undersea cables that he correctly highlighted? It is important that we look for those effective models to defend the High North and the Arctic.

[Alex Ballinger]

I absolutely agree that the JEF is a vital alliance for our operations in the High North. I met the Estonian ambassador only a couple of weeks ago, and we were pleased to discuss opportunities for co-operation, in addition to the UK forces that are based in Estonia, as part of deterring the Russian threat to that part of the world.

Importantly, the High Arctic is a top priority for Moscow strategically, militarily and economically. Russia has been building up its military presence, and it is not subtle about it. The northern fleet is modernising: it has a more capable navy and increasingly active submarine operations, and it focuses on controlling access to the European High North. We should be clear about what that means for the UK. Russia’s sea-based nuclear forces are concentrated around the Kola peninsula, and the High North is central to its nuclear deterrent strategy. That raises the stakes for NATO.

The Royal Navy has also seen a 30% increase in Russian vessels threatening UK waters over the past two years. Russia’s navy is increasingly capable and willing to test our defences from the High North. Russia wants to exploit the Arctic for more than military leverage; it wants to dominate access to sea routes and mineral resources. For Russia, this is about economics and security, which is why we cannot treat Arctic competition as “just defence”.

Recently, the big change we have seen in this region is what is happening in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion has transformed European security, and the Arctic is a part of that. Two Arctic countries, Finland and Sweden, joined NATO because they concluded that, in the context of Ukraine, neutrality no longer protected them. As a result, every Arctic country except Russia is now a NATO ally. That strengthens NATO’s hand, but it means that NATO’s northern responsibilities have expanded.

The second development is Greenland. We all saw Trump’s threats and rhetoric, which have thankfully receded. I am pleased that European countries were united in saying that Greenland’s sovereignty should not be a bargaining chip.