NATO and the High Arctic

Alex Ballinger Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Government policy on NATO and the High Arctic.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. There are slightly fewer people here than I was expecting—I think we have a clash with the Ministry of Defence estimates debate—which is a bit of a shame, but I am delighted to see that we have a brace of bootnecks in the debate. I was hoping to see the Minister for the Armed Forces joining us—then we would be nearly a fire team. I note that the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East (David Reed) has just told me he has never been to Norway and therefore is not a proper bootneck. The Minister for the Armed Forces went earlier this year, so maybe he has had his fill of the ice-breaking drills.

This debate is happening at the same time as the war in the middle east, which reinforces not only the importance of naval assets, as we see the impact of the closure of the strait of Hormuz on our economy at home, but the importance of naval air defence. I am pleased that HMS Dragon will be joining the US taskforce in the Mediterranean very soon.

The importance of the Navy cannot be overstated in the middle east, but it is even more important in the High North. That is because the High North is central to the UK’s security, to its economic resilience and to NATO’s ability to deter Russia. If we get our posture wrong, we do not just lose influence in the polar region; we take risks in the north Atlantic, take risks with our critical national infrastructure and risk our ability to reinforce our allies during a crisis.

I will make three points in the debate today: why the High Arctic matters, what has changed in the recent past, and what NATO and the UK should do about it. The High Arctic matters because climate change is changing the geography. Receding ice is extending operating seasons, opening access and drawing in more strategic interest in shipping, minerals and energy. Those create opportunities for states bordering the Arctic, but they also create risks. More access means more traffic. More traffic means more accidents and more opportunities for coercion, especially in a region with vast distances and limited infrastructure.

The Arctic is becoming busier and more contested at the same time. Undersea competition is now a frontline issue. Our economy relies on seabed infrastructure for fibre-optic communications, power cables and gas pipelines. A single major incident with this critical undersea infrastructure can cause disruption beyond the immediate area.

[Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for leading a debate on one of the most important security and defence issues that we face. I was in Estonia at the start of January, in my role as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Estonia. I met members of its military, as well as the British troops in Estonia, to talk about the importance of the High North and Arctic. Does he agree that partnerships such as the joint expeditionary force and other work being done in the area are vital to the protection of the undersea cables that he correctly highlighted? It is important that we look for those effective models to defend the High North and the Arctic.

[Alex Ballinger]

I absolutely agree that the JEF is a vital alliance for our operations in the High North. I met the Estonian ambassador only a couple of weeks ago, and we were pleased to discuss opportunities for co-operation, in addition to the UK forces that are based in Estonia, as part of deterring the Russian threat to that part of the world.

Importantly, the High Arctic is a top priority for Moscow strategically, militarily and economically. Russia has been building up its military presence, and it is not subtle about it. The northern fleet is modernising: it has a more capable navy and increasingly active submarine operations, and it focuses on controlling access to the European High North. We should be clear about what that means for the UK. Russia’s sea-based nuclear forces are concentrated around the Kola peninsula, and the High North is central to its nuclear deterrent strategy. That raises the stakes for NATO.

The Royal Navy has also seen a 30% increase in Russian vessels threatening UK waters over the past two years. Russia’s navy is increasingly capable and willing to test our defences from the High North. Russia wants to exploit the Arctic for more than military leverage; it wants to dominate access to sea routes and mineral resources. For Russia, this is about economics and security, which is why we cannot treat Arctic competition as “just defence”.

Recently, the big change we have seen in this region is what is happening in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion has transformed European security, and the Arctic is a part of that. Two Arctic countries, Finland and Sweden, joined NATO because they concluded that, in the context of Ukraine, neutrality no longer protected them. As a result, every Arctic country except Russia is now a NATO ally. That strengthens NATO’s hand, but it means that NATO’s northern responsibilities have expanded.

The second development is Greenland. We all saw Trump’s threats and rhetoric, which have thankfully receded. I am pleased that European countries were united in saying that Greenland’s sovereignty should not be a bargaining chip.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

I was fortunate to visit Nuuk in Greenland with the APPG for Greenland—of course, we discussed NATO and Trump. It is important for us to remember that the 1951 agreement between the USA and the Kingdom of Denmark gave the US rights of access to military defence. When it comes to what the United Kingdom could be doing for Greenland to develop what will none the less be geo-significant in the future, surely it is time that we should call for a consulate for the United Kingdom in Greenland.

[Alex Ballinger]

The Foreign Affairs Committee is going to Greenland in a couple of weeks. We hope to meet the Foreign Minister of Denmark, among other leaders of the Greenlanders, and that sounds like the kind of sensible suggestion that we should be talking about.

Certainly, there are lots of opportunities for NATO to base troops in Greenland already; we did not need a change in sovereignty to do that. I am pleased that that has fallen off the radar. It is concerning that Trump’s interest in Greenland is not a one-off. The US security strategy is explicit that the Arctic is becoming more important to America and to American national security, whether it is because of Russia, China, geography or critical minerals. We should not pretend that this was just a single passing storm.

In the Arctic, NATO is responding, but we need to be honest about the scale of the task. With the Arctic sentry, the alliance is trying to pull together a more coherent posture in the High North, with better visibility, better co-ordination and a clearer framework for operating in the sea, air, space and undersea environments.

We should also underline the importance of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. That strategic choke point is vital to NATO. It affects how Russia can move submarines into the wider Arctic, it affects the security of reinforcement routes in a crisis and it sits alongside the undersea infrastructure that we rely on every day.

I will raise the joint expeditionary force, which my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) raised earlier. The UK-led JEF has real value in this part of the world; it is practical, northern-focused and moves faster than the full NATO machine in the early stages of a crisis. That is exactly the sort of framework we should use to build readiness, interoperability and credibility.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The hon. and gallant Member is making a hoofing speech. He mentioned the Greenland-Iceland gap. We have committed to Operation Firecrest later this year, which will see the carrier strike group go to the High North as a deterrent against the Russian northern fleet breaking out of the Kola peninsula and moving across the Barents sea and into the open ocean. With the emergence of the conflict in the middle east, a potential commitment to a post-conflict force in Ukraine, a commitment to troops in Norway and Operation Firecrest, does he share my concern that we may have to make some very difficult decisions about how much capability we are able to deploy to ensure that our interests are looked after across all those fronts?

[Alex Ballinger]

The hon. Member makes a good point. Our naval capability has sadly diminished; we have fewer destroyers and frigates than we used to, and we are rightly deploying some of those to the Mediterranean and the middle east at the moment.

There will have to be hard choices as we approach that timescale. I think those will depend on the situation in the middle east at that point, but maybe the Minister can address that in her remarks. Later in my speech, I will raise what we might want to do about capability. It is important that NATO is backed by increased capability regarding ships, aircraft, sensors, munitions, trained people and deployable logistics; otherwise, our response will fall short.

The First Sea Lord has made the case for UK action in the High North repeatedly. In recent speeches, he has said that the High North is a critical area, that Russia’s submarine force is a huge concern and that we need more warfighting readiness now, not a peacetime posture. He has also said that

“the advantage that we have enjoyed in the Atlantic since the end of the Second World War is at risk”

unless we take action soon.

I want to ask the Minister whether we are resourcing this crucial area sufficiently. We continue to retire Type 23 frigates—anti-submarine ships. Five have retired since 2021, including HMS Lancaster most recently, but are we retiring them before replacements are ready? We have the Type 31 programme coming on soon, but it would be nice to have reassurance on the timelines and the risk that we are taking if there are gaps. If we are relying on future ships for future threats, we need confidence that they will arrive before the threat does.

We cannot talk about the High North without talking about the vital contribution of the Royal Marines—our Arctic-trained troops—who are ready to operate alongside Norwegian, Dutch and other forces. That is a genuine strength, but cold weather expertise must be backed by enablers—lift, sustainment and surveillance assets.

That brings me to the most important point: the defence investment plan. We can announce deployments, launch missions and make speeches about the High North, but if we do not publish a clear investment plan that is costed and credible, our adversaries will conclude that the UK strategy is stronger in rhetoric than in reality. The Chairs of the Defence Committee and the Public Accounts Committee have warned that delay sends damaging signals to our adversaries, and they are right. We are serious about the Arctic. We need serious choices, and we need them now, not in a year’s time.

There is a practical, day-to-day test. We are facing concurrent pressures in other theatres, including recent deployments to the middle east. The question is not whether we can deploy ships to other regions on paper; it is whether we can do it without hollowing out our commitments to other parts of the world.

I want to put three questions to the Minister. First, when will the defence investment plan be published? Secondly, do we have sufficient ships that are suitable and available to operate credibly in the north Atlantic and respond to the serious crisis in the middle east at the same time? Thirdly, what steps are the Government taking bilaterally and through NATO to reassure Denmark and strengthen stability around Greenland while making it clear that sovereignty is not negotiable and that influence operations will be resisted?

The High Arctic is becoming a sharper edge of competition. Climate change is opening access, Russia is militarising, undersea vulnerability is rising and NATO is adapting. The UK has a choice. We can treat this as a niche theatre and muddle through, or we can treat it as what it is: a direct test of our seriousness as a north Atlantic power. Deterrence is built on credibility, credibility is built on capability, and capability requires investment. That is why the defence investment plan and ship availability matter.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Shannon]

That is the focus we need to have. Climate change is affecting the world. We might find ourselves in a slightly different geographical position in a short time. The right hon. Lady has illustrated that to our advantage.

The Greenland-Iceland-UK gap remains vital for monitoring submarine activity. I can never understand how anybody can get into a submarine; it is too claustrophobic for me, but I admire those who do, as they play a vital role in the defence of this great nation. It is no secret that Russia has expanded its Arctic military footprint, which may be what Trump is looking towards. We need to be aware of Russia’s input, especially its submarine operations, air bases and missile systems. The Arctic region is a key domain for undersea infrastructure. Protecting the integrity of UK security is a major priority. NATO allies must remain as a cornerstone of support in doing that.

When we focus on the importance of where we are, we support the policies that strengthen deterrence rather than encourage confrontation. I cannot remember which one, but a US President said:

“Speak softly but carry a big stick.”

That reminds us that we must have a deterrent—the nuclear power and the submarines and the strength of the Army—to persuade others not to go to war. That is the ultimate goal we all try to achieve. We must also maintain readiness to respond to threats and ensure that military deployments to Norway and the north Atlantic are exercised and fully trained. Again, we see commitment from the British Army and NATO, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, as well as Poland. Those troops are the best.

The hon. Member for Halesowen mentioned the Marines, and there are none better. When I was a wee boy, I was always saying, “I am going to be a Royal Marine.” As an eight-year-old, that was my big ambition. It obviously never happened, but I did serve part time in the Ulster Defence Regiment and in the Royal Artillery. It was a slightly different role and not as exciting as the Marines—it never could be—but it was an incredible role.

We often have discussions around defence spending. A proper budget is needed to perfect intelligence and surveillance of the High Arctic. In strategic terms, sea lanes and undersea cables are vital. I asked the Minister a question over recess, and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy came to the main Chamber maybe six or eight weeks ago and referred to undersea cables. In my question to the Select Committee Chair, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western), I asked about the undersea cables that come across the North sea, down to England and across to Ireland. The Republic of Ireland is a soft belly. Do we have a role to play in securing the undersea cables that go from there across the Atlantic as well? Of course, the Republic of Ireland does not have the Royal Navy, the Army or the personnel that we have. Are there discussions, or is there a relationship or a defensive agreement, between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to ensure that the undersea cables that go across the Atlantic are protected? The Chair of the Select Committee was unable to confirm that. That is not a criticism; I am just saying that I asked a question and the answer could not be given.

The undersea cables and the Arctic’s stability affect trade, energy and global security. Furthermore, the United Kingdom and the United States have shared interests in terms of the Arctic region. Of course, President Trump has made his opinions clear in relation to Greenland, but close co-operation ensures that NATO can respond rapidly to threats, particularly from Russia. The United States, as the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) and the hon. Member for Halesowen mentioned, has bases in Greenland. It has feet on the ground and it is building up to using that footprint as a protection or a launchpad. It is important that we have that relationship with the United States.

To conclude, I stand firmly for a united NATO, a credible deterrent to aggression and robust investment in our armed forces to ensure they are equipped for operations in the High Arctic. We have an enduring partnership with the United States of America and we must strengthen our ability to defend vital waters and airspace. The hon. Gentleman asked about the number of ships being built for the Royal Navy to enhance its position. I know the Government are giving everything to enhance investment—that is never in doubt—but maybe the Minister could tell us about their commitment to the Royal Navy, which is clearly needed.

I say this with incredible respect. For 10 days our base in Cyprus was potentially under attack. My comment is not an attack on anybody, but why on earth did we not send a ship to protect Cyprus 10 days ago? It niggles me whenever we see the French and the Germans giving us protection.

[Alex Ballinger]

I am sure the Minister will respond, but the hon. Gentleman will know that there are allies of ours in the Mediterranean as well, including a large American flotilla. It is appropriate for us to work closely with other air defence assets. The single ship that we have sent would not have changed the situation entirely; there are other assets out there as well.

[Jim Shannon]

The point I am trying to make is that there is a perception across the world that the United Kingdom, who ruled the waves 300 years ago or whenever it was, has not got a ship that it can send. That sends a message. The hon. Gentleman is right about working with our allies. We cannot fight a war on our own any more; we have to do it collectively, but there is something that niggles me whenever I recognise that. It is not meant to be an attack on anybody; I am just making the point that we need to be seen to be proactive.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Ballinger]

I am grateful for the excellent contributions from my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin), the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts), my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie), the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Dr Pinkerton), the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East (David Reed) and, of course, the Minister.

I think this is the first debate I have been in where there has been almost unanimous agreement across the piece about the importance of Arctic security, outrage at the position the Americans took on Greenland, and agreement on the necessary steps we need to take to reinforce the capability of our troops. I am also grateful to have heard the Royal Marines being spoken about so much in this Chamber—we need that to continue.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered Government policy on NATO and the High Arctic.