Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, it is almost absurdly challenging to try to speak on a Bill of 427 pages, 203 clauses and 21 schedules in four minutes. The Bill is extremely wide. It ranges across multiple offences, creating multiple new criminal offences, and we will need to determine inter alia whether they have sufficient clarity, whether they disproportionately limit our fundamental freedoms and whether they may lead to unintended consequences. Clause 185(3) is a case in point. And we will need to consider the very real resource implications of what we propose.

I want to concentrate on Clause 191, though there are many others I would want to talk to. This clause was passed after only 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate in the other place. It was not a manifesto commitment. It constitutes a very significant change to our law on abortion. It carries with it enormous risks to women who might consequently think that aborting a baby up to birth will be safe in these circumstances, doing so without medical help.

Dr Caroline Johnson MP explained in the other place that she works as an NHS consultant paediatrician and has cared for and held babies in her hands from 21 weeks and six days gestation right through to term. She said:

“I am very aware that babies from, say, 30 weeks upwards have a more than 98% chance of survival”.


She went on to explain how an abortion is achieved in the later stages of pregnancy, saying that taking abortion pills intended for early pregnancy is not a suitable or safe medical intervention in later pregnancy. She said:

“If one has a termination later in pregnancy, it is done by foeticide. Essentially, an injection of potassium chloride is administered to kill the baby, and then the baby is born in the usual way, but deceased. That is why it is important to know what the gestation is—because the termination offered under the law is done by a different route, to make sure that it is done safely. We know that the later in pregnancy a termination happens, the more a woman is at risk of medical complications”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/25; col. 309.]


That is the essence of the challenge we face here. We must scrutinise a clause that, under current law, would enable a woman who has secured medication to end a pregnancy under the pills by post scheme—which is supposed to be used only up to 10 weeks—to take this medication right up to birth in a non-clinical setting where she would have no professional medical support, despite the fact that, as Johnson said, she is at greater risk of complications. The clause does not give her any protection other than that against prosecution—but prosecution is the least important issue. What is profoundly important is the woman’s safety.

Even at earlier stages of gestation, there may be need for surgical intervention to remove a dead baby. How might a woman achieve an abortion in the later stages of pregnancy? Essentially, as I understand it, it will be by taking abortifacient medication which is neither suitable nor safe, or by acquiring potassium chloride by some means. But how could the potassium chloride be administered? It has to be injected into the baby’s heart, using ultrasound guidance, to cause cardiac arrest and death to the baby. That is not the end of the process; the baby must be delivered. During childbirth, specific drugs are administered and offered for pain management and the prevention of things such as haemorrhage and other complications. None of these would be available to this mother.

Most women who have experienced miscarriage or childbirth will probably agree that, if proper medical help is not available, it is terrifying. Things can go so terribly wrong: for example, babies can get stuck in the birth canal, which will eventually lead to the need for an intervention, whether by caesarean section, forceps or vacuum extraction. There is a serious risk that a mother whose baby gets stuck may die if the baby is not removed. At the very least, she may suffer terrible pain or multiple serious consequences to her own health and her future childbearing capacity.

We are left, then, with a situation in which your Lordships are being asked to legislate for abortion to birth without medical help, because any medical practitioner who helped would be subject to prosecution. If this provision is passed, women will think that aborting their own babies will be a safe thing to do, simply because it is lawful. This clause is redolent with danger to women. Can the Minister tell us exactly how the Government think women might seek to end a full-term pregnancy, and how they might be protected against the potentially catastrophic consequences of aborting and delivering a baby without medical help? This clause is too dangerous to women to remain in the Bill.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness O'Loan]

422: After Clause 151, insert the following new Clause—
“Police disciplinary proceedings: use of force(1) Schedule 2 of the The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/4) (standards of professional behaviour) is amended as follows.(2) In the heading “Use of Force”, at end insert—“Where a police officer uses force on the basis of an honestly held but mistaken belief, they can rely on that belief as justification for the use of force only if the mistake was an objectively reasonable one to have made.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to (1) codify the decision in W(80) UKSC 24, that in police disciplinary proceedings involving use of force, an officer may rely on a mistaken belief only if that belief was both honestly held and objectively reasonable, and (2) and enable parliamentary consideration of the appropriate test in this context.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 422 relates to the test used to determine whether an officer acted in breach of discipline when he or she used force in self-defence. We come late to this, but it is a very important issue. Currently, the test used in police disciplinary law is the civil law test. Under the current law, an officer must hold an honest belief that they or others are in immediate danger, must use only proportionate and necessary force, and, critically, where their belief is mistaken, their mistake must have been an objectively reasonable one.

The amendment is necessary because, following the police accountability rapid review report, published in October 2025, a recommendation was made to change the legal test to the criminal test. This would allow officers to rely on an honestly held but mistaken belief, even if it was unreasonable. The Government have said they will implement this change through a statutory instrument without public consultation. At this stage, I thank Justince and Inquest for their research on this matter.

The criminal law test, which the Government propose, would allow officers to rely on a mistaken belief, even if it was unreasonable, so long as it was honestly held. I fully understand that officers are under great pressure when faced with possible or actual violence. Split-second decisions must be made on the ground in the immediate context. That is why it is critical that officers are properly trained and managed. However, it is not a good reason to move from the civil to the criminal law test.

This determination arose from a criminal law test where the Supreme Court made a decision in the W80 case, where an officer shot a man. When misconduct proceedings were brought, he claimed he had done so in self-defence. The IOPC recommended to the MPS that the officer should face misconduct proceedings, the MPS declined to initiate those proceedings, and the IOPC wrote to the MPS directing disciplinary proceedings. That decision was challenged by judicial review. The Divisional Court allowed the appellant’s claim. The IOPC appealed to the Court of Appeal, and the appeal was allowed. On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld. In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court judges commented:

“This is an area of the law of vital importance to the public and to the police. It is essential that the public and the police should be informed in straightforward terms of the law which applies. We hope that it will now be possible to recast legislation and guidance so as to achieve this result”.


This amendment is not about criminal law, and it is not about whether an officer should be prosecuted for the use of force. It seeks only to provide the clarity that the Supreme Court advocated.

The criminal law test is simply not appropriate for disciplinary proceedings. Applying it would undermine public confidence in the police disciplinary process, weaken accountability and make meaningful scrutiny of police use of force far more difficult. The Home Office’s statutory guidance makes it clear that the disciplinary framework is intended to encourage a culture of learning and development for individuals in the organisation. This focus on learning and development is part of what makes disciplinary procedures distinct from criminal procedures. Misconduct processes are an important and excellent opportunity for forces to identify mistakes, learn from them and prevent recurrence.

The Supreme Court in W80 made clear that the criminal law test conflicts with the fundamental principle of the disciplinary process, which is

“to contribute to learning and development for the individual officer concerned or for the organisation as to the reasonableness of mistakes”.

If the objective reasonableness of an officer’s mistaken belief is no longer relevant, unreasonable beliefs, however dangerous and widespread, may never be identified. Allowing unreasonable but honestly held beliefs to serve as a defence would strip away the incentive to examine, understand and remedy the factors that led officers to hold those beliefs in the first place. For public safety it is essential that unreasonable mistakes and the conditions that enabled them are identified and addressed.

Moreover, the introduction of the criminal law test would risk allowing honestly held beliefs based on prejudice or stereotyping, however unreasonable, to provide a defence following police use of force. Police use of force is continually increasing, with over 812,000 recorded uses in 2024-25, an increase of 9% on the previous year. Police complaints about use of force rarely lead to investigation by the IOPC, because most complaints are referred back to the officer’s force for investigation. Fewer still result in disciplinary proceedings, and hence the opportunity to identify training or management deficiencies to enable institutional learning and improvement is not there.

--- Later in debate ---

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, raised the case of W80. I reserve my position on the point that the noble Baroness made about the standards for when you decide to make a prosecution. As the Minister will know, these are very complex legal issues. I am not qualified to talk about that, and certainly not in the space of hearing the noble Baroness’s comments; I am not here to say that she is wrong. But W80—

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I did not talk about criminal prosecutions at all.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I did not say that the noble Baroness did. My point is that after a public inquiry, where it was found that W80 had lawfully killed Jermaine Baker in 2015, and a series of further hearings that led eventually to the Supreme Court, W80 appeared before a gross misconduct hearing by an independent body—nothing to do with the police; it was ordered by the IOPC—and was found to have no case to answer. It was not found that there was an arguable case, or that there was mitigation. There was no case to answer, 10 years later. It had been through the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and nobody had noticed that there was no case to answer.

One of the central problems in these cases is that they are rare. Every time an officer waits years to be cleared, there is an outcry asking why they were charged in the first place or why it took so long to resolve. Every Government affected by this has said, “We will review it, and improve”. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has just mentioned the latest example of that.

My broad point is that all the reviews in the world have produced absolutely nothing. Nothing has changed. I have given two examples but there are many more, where people have been waiting 10 years for something to be shown to be not a criminal offence. I am afraid that the reviews have not produced anything, which has led to me tabling this amendment.

The officers are under a triple jeopardy. First, the IOPC considers whether there is a criminal offence or an offence of misconduct. That can take around 18 months. If there is a claim of a criminal offence, that is considered by the CPS, which probably takes another year. In the event that there is a criminal charge, the officer will go to court. During this period, the inquest into the person’s death will have been suspended. If there has been no charge, the inquest, usually with a jury, will be resumed. Those juries can find, and have found, that there was an unlawful killing, which then must be reconsidered by the CPS, usually leading to a criminal charge to go through a criminal court and then back through the IOPC. It has been hard to establish the facts, but by my calculation there have been around five officers charged with murder following cases over the last 20 years, each leading to a finding of not guilty at a Crown Court. The people who seem to be able to appreciate this issue, and deal with it with some wisdom, are called jurors.

My amendment is designed to give some comfort to firearms officers that their case will have to reach a higher bar before a prosecution can be started. It is modelled, as the noble Lord, Lord Carter, has mentioned—he is the one who pointed this out to me—on the householder defence to murder that already exists in criminal law. If a householder is attacked in their home and, in the process of defending themselves, kills the intruder, there is a higher legal threshold to pass before a prosecution for murder can follow. All I am asking is for the same to apply to a firearms officer.

I have talked to the Attorney-General about this. He reminded me that lawyers generally have concerns about this because it creates a unique group, a group of people who are treated differently by the criminal law, but I have two points in response to that general principle. First, householders are already a unique group. The criminal law has decided that they are a unique group and that is okay, but that it would not be all right for police firearms officers, who—I argue—are also a unique group. Why can we not add one more group? This was decided by Parliament on the advice of lawyers. What is different about this group? More importantly, for the reasons that I have given, they are a unique group. They the only people in society who use a firearm to prevent a crime, save a life or make an arrest. We say that no one can carry a firearm for that purpose, even if they are a legal firearm owner.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have heard during this short but important debate, these amendments all relate to the same matter of principle—namely, the legal standard by which an authorised firearms officer should be judged on the thankfully rare occasions when they discharge a firearm.

The Government pay tribute to our armed officers. Theirs is a difficult, dangerous and stressful job. They do it to keep us all safe, and we have a great deal for which to thank them. Of course we recognise that they often find themselves in exceptionally difficult circumstances, having to make life and death decisions in an instant. That said, there is the matter of public confidence in the police. I do not think that any of your Lordships would disagree that confidence in the police is of equal importance. I would not be doing justice to this debate if I did not recognise and mark the fact that some of our citizens feel great anxiety about the accountability of firearms officers. In the past, when there have been high-profile fatal shootings by the police, this anxiety has boiled over into anger and social unrest.

The Government’s job is to balance these factors. We must ensure that the law offers protection to our brave police officers while at the same time providing reassurance to our fellow citizens that, if officers do fire their weapons, their conduct will be rigorously scrutinised. It is only right that the public should have confidence that any officer whose actions fall below the high standards we rightly expect will be held to account in the public interest.

Our conclusion is that we should not create a two-tier justice system where police officers who kill or injure in the course of their duties are judged by a more lenient standard than applies to the rest of the population. Our reason is this: we are confident that the criminal law which covers self-defence, defence of others and the use of force in the prevention of crime already provides sufficient protection for police officers. Because of the lateness of the hour, I am not going to go through the details of this, which I had intended to do, but will move straight to the amendments.

Amendment 423, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, would change the law so that an authorised firearms officer who acts with disproportionate—in other words, unreasonable—force would still be guilty of an offence, but it would be manslaughter, not murder.

I want to say a few words about what the law says about how a jury must consider whether the amount of force used by the officer was reasonable, sometimes described as proportionate. While this is an objective test, if the jury is told that what the officer did in the heat of the moment, when fine judgments are difficult, was no more than they genuinely believed was necessary, even if they were mistaken in that belief, that would be strong evidence that what they did was reasonable. If the jury also considers that the officer may have done no more than was reasonable in the light of what they believed to be happening, they are not guilty of anything. In other words, the law provides a full defence.

It is unclear whether Amendment 423 is intended to replace this full defence with a partial one, or whether, as I think is the case, it is intended to work alongside it in some way. If the noble Lord’s intention is to create a partial defence, then what he is saying is that officers who use unreasonable or excessive force should be held to a different standard from the rest of the population. We cannot accept this because the Government believe that to do so would fundamentally damage confidence in the police and in the justice system.

I turn to Amendment 423A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which seeks to amend Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. As your Lordships have heard, Section 76 deals with householder cases. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to make authorised firearms officers subject to the same standard as the householder confronted by an intruder. The amendment attempts to raise the threshold for when force becomes unreasonable from disproportionate to grossly disproportionate for firearms officers. In effect, this means that firearms officers could rely on the defences of self-defence, preventing crime or making a lawful arrest if they used force that was disproportionate in the circumstances, provided it was not grossly disproportionate.

For the reasons I have already given, the Government are of the strong belief that it would be wrong in principle to authorise the police to use excessive force and that this would be extremely damaging to public confidence. In any event, we do not think there is a proper comparison to be made between householders facing an unexpected intruder and trained firearms officers. The threshold was raised in householder cases to recognise the exceptional nature of being unexpectedly confronted by an intruder in one’s home. The unique stress and shock of a home invasion justifies greater legal protection, allowing a higher level of force than in other self-defence contexts. The same logic does not apply to firearms officers, who are trained and equipped to use lethal force and are deployed only in the most high-risk situations. They are subject to strict command, control and training protocols to ensure that lethal force is used only when necessary and in accordance with the current legal framework.

I turn finally to Amendment 422, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. As the noble Baroness has explained during the debate, her amendment deals not with criminal trials but with police conduct hearings. The previous Home Secretary commissioned Timothy Godwin and Sir Adrian Fulford to carry out an independent police accountability rapid review because it was recognised that there was ongoing complexity and confusion, and that there were concerns that this was having an impact on recruitment and retention of these essential and much valued officers. Sir Adrian and Mr Godwin examined the matter thoroughly and heard evidence from a wide range of stakeholders. Their conclusions and recommendations, published in October 2025, were clear that the Government should change the legal test for use of force in police misconduct cases from the civil to the criminal law test.

The reviewers found that police officers need confidence and greater consistency in the disciplinary system and that this would improve fairness and public confidence. The Government have taken on board that recommendation and we are in the process of making the necessary changes to The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. Our intention is that these changes will come into force in the spring. We accept that the amendment is well intended, but I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government cannot support it and, for the reasons I have given, I invite her to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and everyone who has spoken. There is a major issue of public trust in policing which has yet to be fully explored, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 422 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I have the greatest respect for the noble Lord. I wonder whether he will give way; I thank him. The situations which he describes are all provided for in the Abortion Act.

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness very much for her point, because I appreciate that she is giving me a brief rest during a very emotional speech in my case. I apologise for it being an emotional speech, but when you have dealt with such patients frequently for many years, you forget exactly how serious this can be.

I have seen many women requesting terminations at all stages of their pregnancies, even very early and sometimes after in vitro fertilisation to get them pregnant. That is an extraordinary issue and you would not expect it to happen, but actually it happens throughout pregnancy. The women have such serious problems which may not show up as the kind of psychological problem that has been described.

I do not believe that any woman goes through a termination of pregnancy lightly. She certainly does not want to damage herself and do her own abortion. That is an extremely rare situation. The risk here is that we are trying to make law which is just impractical, in the real sense of the word, when we have such a range of syndromes and a population in which we cannot in fact diagnose pregnancy all the time, and never will be able to in people, for example, who are very poor or otherwise live in very serious circumstances and are damaged.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, but, of course, the wrong question was asked. Let us be very clear, I personally do not want to see anybody criminalised, and I doubt that people want to see women who have gone through a very distressing situation be criminalised. But they would probably want to see a law, as identified by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, across the way, that dealt with the balance much better. Currently, that was the wrong question to answer.

I tabled the amendment because I am very worried about the real-world consequences for young women in vulnerable situations where, when they are being coerced, their abusers would know that no investigation is even possible. No matter where you stand on the question of abortion, surely noble Lords can see that the most vulnerable young women should be protected by us in law.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, talked about women who had suffered from rape gangs. They are exactly the kind of women I think would have benefited from some kind of investigation. As it stands, Clause 191 will prevent that happening.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 461 and in support of the Clause 191 stand part notice from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton. I have put my name to that stand part notice, too.

As other noble Lords have observed, Clause 191 was passed in the other place following a very brief and truncated debate, entirely incommensurate with the gravity of its impact. In moving the amendment, the Member for Gower noted that it was about ensuring only that

“vulnerable women … have the right help and support”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/25; col. 306.]

I am sure that we all support the provision of appropriate and timely support for a woman considering an abortion. However, it drastically understates the effect of Clause 191, regardless of the intent of its mover.

We must confront the radical legal reality that this clause removes all deterrence against a woman performing her own abortion up to the very moment of birth. How does that ensure that women have the right help and support? The clause will decriminalise actions by a woman at any stage of her pregnancy, including actions which are criminal at present under the Offences against the Person Act and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act.

In 1929, they knew that a child who has been in the womb for 28 weeks was capable of being born alive. Now, we know of children who are born alive at 22 weeks and live. In 2020 and 2021, 261 babies were born alive at 22 and 23 weeks, before the abortion limit, who survived to be discharged from hospital. Why is abortion so distressing? As the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, said, it is because, by 23 weeks, the unborn baby has all its organs, muscles, limbs, bones and sex organs, it may hear, and it makes facial expressions, responds to loud noises, is getting into a pattern of sleeping and waking, practices breathing and it definitely feels pain. After that, they just keep growing.

Proponents of Clause 191 have been at pain to say that the Abortion Act is not changed and that the time limits remain the same, but that is not the reality of the clause. Clause 191 may not repeal the Abortion Act but it renders its protections largely symbolic in practice. At present, the Act operates as a tightly drawn exception to criminal offences that otherwise prohibit ending a pregnancy. Its force comes from the fact that abortion outside its conditions is unlawful. Once associated consequences are removed, the framework ceases to be a deterrent or a boundary for conduct and becomes, in effect, merely a regulatory code for providers, albeit with criminal consequences for clinicians who are left untouched for now. It is a profound shift. Time limits, certification requirements and clinical safeguards would no longer operate as meaningful legal limits on a woman’s actions.

Clause 191 is not an outworking of modernised enforcement; it is a hollowing out of the underlying settlement, which nullifies the protective structure built into the 1967 Act, particularly its recognition that abortion law is not a matter of personal autonomy but one of safety, safeguarding and the status of the viable unborn child. Both lives matter. The issue is not whether the Abortion Act still exists on the statute book; it is whether it still performs the function that Parliament intended. Clause 191 leaves the text intact while removing the mechanism that makes its limits real. I strongly urge noble Lords to support the removal of Clause 191 from the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hazarika (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I wish to finish my sentence.

The woman may be unable to deliver it. It may get stuck in the birth canal. If it survives the attempt to terminate its life, it may be born alive, as babies still are. What then? What of the mother? When one gives birth, one is monitored by doctors to ensure no crises occur, if possible. Those crises can include haemorrhage, damage to the womb and bladder, and, in the worst cases, death.

If the Bill is passed and a mother chooses to terminate her baby other than as provided for in the Abortion Act, she will not be prosecuted. She may have been coerced into it, as we have heard at length, for a variety of reasons, but, despite being decriminalised, she may die or face life-changing injuries.

[Baroness Hazarika (Lab)]

The noble Baroness paints a very vivid picture of how traumatic it is for a woman to go through this once late-term. I am sure all of us would agree that nobody would do this lightly. Does that not reinforce why it is so important that the woman should not be in a position where she thought she could be investigated by the police at this point and why she should go and seek medical advice, safe in the knowledge that she was not potentially going to end up in prison?

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

There are situations in which the woman in that case, under the Abortion Act, can seek help. I would expect that she would, but there are situations in which she may not. I simply ask the Government how they expect it to happen. Doctors administer these drugs. Doctors look after us in childbirth. We do not do it ourselves.

I move to Amendment 461. A considerable danger associated with Clause 191 is the activities of abusers and exploiters. The shield, which would be reimposed if telemedicine were stopped, is a requirement for all women considering abortion. It is not possible on the telephone to ensure a woman’s privacy and that she is not being coerced, or to verify that the person seeking the medication is the person who will actually take it, particularly in cases involving domestic abuse, child abuse and trafficking. It is important that the medication is not taken by a woman whose pregnancy exceeds 10 weeks. The NHS reported in July 2025 that, since 2020, 54,000 women have been admitted to hospital in England for complications from birth pills. Last year alone, there were 12,000.

In removing the criminal status of abortion, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, says, we perversely incentivise abusers to pressure vulnerable women into dangerous, isolated and self-administered late-term abortions. My Amendment 461 is a safeguard against that, which I hope noble Lords will be minded to support. It would create a provision analogous to that found in Section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961—a special offence of encouraging or assisting an abortion which is unlawful under the terms of the Abortion Act.

The amendment would not chill medical advice or online information. It requires intent, which is a distinct threshold. Ordinary clinical counselling or neutral provision of information would not meet the test. The amendment does not engage with or change what is lawful under the Abortion Act. It concerns only unlawful terminations and intentional encouragement or assistance. If an abortion is lawful, the offence does not arise. Perhaps most importantly, its desired effect is safeguarding vulnerable women.

Under the current wording of Clause 191, there is a risk, if self-administering an abortion is no longer a crime, that the woman can be pressurised. By legislating expressly where safeguarding is paramount and creating a clear specific offence, we would send a strong protective signal for women. My amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult and to talk to clinicians, et cetera. It is a measured, reasonable and necessary response. I urge noble Lords to support it.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise with a certain level of trepidation and fear to convey a contribution during this debate, as I am not a mother. I have never enjoyed motherhood; therefore, I do not have the experiences of many women right across this Chamber. But I rise to support Amendment 460, to which I am pleased to be a signatory and to which the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has already spoken, and the clause stand part notice on Clause 191 from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton.

I support Amendment 460 because the health risks of obtaining abortion pills without adequate prior in-person checks are now well documented. I feel that if they are to be available—if that is the way you support—you need an ultrasound and a full investigation.

I simply add one further example to those which have already been cited. The Irish Medical Journal published an article in March 2024 explaining how a woman in Ireland nearly died from an ectopic pregnancy after taking abortion pills. The article reported that the case

“could have been prevented by an ultrasound”.

If women once again had mandatory in-person scans, it would protect them, allowing ectopic pregnancies and other possible health risks to be picked up more reliably.

However, as has been noted, the woman is not our only consideration. I agree that there is a need to protect the woman but also the unborn child. By allowing Clause 191 to stand, we would remove the legal safeguards that exist to protect an unborn baby after the point of viability, when a baby could survive outside the womb. I contend that this is a radical and unpopular proposal. Indeed, this is an issue that should unite those of us who are pro-life and those of us who are pro-choice. In an article for the Times entitled “I’ve always been pro-choice but this is too far”, the well-known pro-choice commentator Janice Turner wrote

“I find it discomforting that a woman could abort a full-term baby and face no sanctions”.

She is not alone. Polling in 2024 found that only 1% of women support abortion up to birth, while just 16% of the public support removing a legal deterrent after the 24-week limit. In fact, 70% of women would like to see a reduction in our abortion time limits, not permitting women to induce their own abortions up to birth, as would de facto become the case under Clause 191.

As a Northern Irish Peer, I echo the earlier comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, regarding Northern Ireland. I was concerned to hear suggestions in the other place, during the truncated Report debate on this clause, that there are considerations about whether to introduce pills by post in Northern Ireland. I am deeply worried about this possibility. If supporters of Clause 191 really wish to bring England and Wales into line with Northern Ireland, as they claim, I make a simple suggestion that they ought to support Amendment 460 and reintroduce the in-person appointments that we rightly continue to have in Northern Ireland.

I finish by quoting the Times leading article, published two days after Clause 191 passed in the other place:

“Even the most ardent advocate of a woman’s right to choose must see that this change risks a host of unintended consequences. While women considering ultra-late termination must”—


I support them in this—“be regarded” and supported

“with the greatest understanding and sympathy”,

as well as with compassion and humanity,

“the possibility of a viable child being killed shortly before its birth is not a prospect to be treated lightly”.

I know there are different views on that issue right across the Chamber, but I hold my view, and I respect the views of others who take a different viewpoint. There has been no great public clamour, I believe, for this change. I very much hope that Clause 191 will not remain part of the Bill, and I also support Amendment 460 to which I am a signatory.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

The noble Baroness talks about the number of complications being reduced in telemedical abortions, but the NHS statistics have shown a rise in the number of complications following the use of telemedical abortions, such that 12,000 people presented to hospital last year. Is the noble Baroness also aware that there is no collection of any statistics in Northern Ireland other than statistics delivered in accordance with the law? There are statistics on medical abortions and on surgical abortions, and that is it. There are no other statistics. I do not see where she is getting the evidence to support what she is saying in reference to abortion being decriminalised in Northern Ireland.

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

On the noble Baroness’s first point, as I said, I acknowledge that the number of complications has gone up, but we have actually seen that the rate has gone down, because the number of abortions has increased. Even though that number has gone up, the actual rate has dropped by 25%. I am very happy to share the figures.

On the Northern Ireland statistics, that comes from the Northern Ireland medical association that provides the abortions. I completely agree that the more statistics and information we can have on this the better, so we are able to make fully informed decisions. Again, I am very happy to share that with the noble Baroness.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

The statistics in Northern Ireland are collected from the health trusts that deliver the abortions; they are not collected from anyone else.

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

Yes, from the people who provide the abortions. As I say, I am very happy to share that information with the noble Baroness.

Telemedicine is a choice—

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

That is true as far as that goes. However, in the wider context, the principal objective of that legislation is not to enable people to commit crimes but to prevent people being subject to endless civil and criminal litigation that may arise from their duties as representatives of public bodies, be they the security services, the police et cetera. So I think that the noble Baroness is being slightly unfair to the Ministers at the time who put through that legislation. What she outlined was clearly a corollary of passing that legislation, but it was not the principal reason, as I am sure she will concede.

The reason I wanted to speak is to interrogate the details of this amendment. Looking at paragraph (2B)(b) of the proposed new clause, I wonder what is meant by

“otherwise seeking to discredit, the person, people or group subject to the authorised surveillance operation”.

That seems a very wide-ranging paragraph and a recipe for much litigation in the future. Should it eventually be found on the face of the enacted Crime and Policing Bill, the way that it will be interpreted will give rise to a situation where the police, the security services and others are much more reluctant to enter into long-term surveillance of the kind I discussed earlier in seeking to thwart a terrorist plot, because of that quite wide-ranging and open paragraph.

Generally speaking, the noble Baroness has made a very fine point and I agree with much of what she said, but I genuinely do not understand the point of that paragraph. If it is a way of describing an agent provocateur, I understand that—and, because she is a prominent lawyer, she will no doubt tell me where that is found in other pieces of legislation. However, currently, that paragraph could be misinterpreted, and it will circumscribe the capacity of the security services and the police to do their job and protect individuals. For those reasons, while I am not necessarily against the amendment, I would like further clarification if possible.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I have long had a responsibility for the investigation of matters involving CHISs and I fully accept that many people who agree to become CHISs do so in the public interest, because, without their activities, the intelligence that they are able to collect would be unavailable. I also accept that undercover activity of this kind has long been a feature of criminal investigation.

Nevertheless, while the CHIS Act, which was passed in 2021, provided a very necessary statutory framework for the operation of CHISs, because that was previously absent, it does not contain sufficient safeguards against abuse, particularly where such acts risk falling beyond the scope of the authorisation of the CCA, particularly where they are well concealed by those committing such crimes and not reporting back properly.

Regrettably, like many others, I have seen repeated abuses of authorisations of CHISs. I have also seen CHISs acting way beyond the scope of their authorisations, sometimes with the knowledge of those who manage them, to the extent that they value the CHIS more than dealing with unauthorised and perhaps criminal conduct by the CHIS.

When the CHIS is not an undercover officer—and, of course, not all CHISs are undercover state employees—there is less control and potentially a higher risk. Unlike in the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, we in Northern Ireland have been able to expose unlawful activities of CHISs to bring them to account. So it can be done.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I cannot answer for all the cases that have gone wrong; indeed, I cannot answer for any cases that have gone wrong—it is not my place to do that. I can say, however, that it very much depends on good leadership and good supervision, and all of that comes down to good training. It has always been my view that training is at the core of all of this.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Does the noble Lord accept that statutory blanket immunity from civil or criminal action acts as a barrier for people who are affected by such unlawful activities? It is a significant concern because of the impact that barrier has on those who might need to bring such action, and who might have difficulty getting funding or access to the necessary support. Then, there is an ongoing huge impact on trust in the police.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Trust in the police in this area is essential. I am not sure I quite get the gist of what the noble Baroness is asking, but I am very happy to discuss it outside the Chamber later, if that would help.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

It was about statutory blanket immunity—the extent of the immunity.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Again, I would have to have a look at that before I give an answer. I am very happy to discuss it with the noble Baroness.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for her amendment. The discussion today has taken me back to my time in Northern Ireland, when I had to see the product of covert intelligence. As Counter-Terrorism Minister in 2009, I had to see the product of that intelligence, so I understand the value of that. I also understand that the amendment seeks to amend the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by removing the legal protections for covert human intelligence sources who have been tasked by the police and a limited number of other public authority agencies, such as the intelligence services, with engaging in specific, tightly defined, pre-approved criminal conduct. Furthermore, the amendment seeks to remove protections for CHISs engaged in such authorised criminal conduct where it engages the offences of encouraging or assisting an offender under the Serious Crime Act, or seeks to discredit those who are subject to a particular investigation. I understand the motive behind what my noble friend has brought forward.

I begin by addressing the undercover police inquiry, raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. I took office in July 2024, and the undercover policing inquiry had operated for nine years at that stage. It is clear that the historical allegations under consideration by the inquiry are absolutely appalling. Such behaviour should rightly be condemned. The inquiry is ongoing, and we await the findings and any recommendations, but let me assure all those who have spoken that I am now responsible in the Home Office for managing inquiries, and I wish to see recommendations as soon as possible, for the very reasons noble Lords and Baronesses have mentioned today.

The current landscape around undercover operatives is much changed, and since 2013 enhanced safeguards have been put in place, but the Government want to see the lessons of that inquiry and consider them as soon as possible.

Noble Lords may recall the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, which has been referred to today, and the revised CHIS code of practice of 2022, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, which were subject to debate and approval both here and in the House of Commons. This scrutiny includes consideration of similar amendments proposed by my noble friend at the time.

I say to noble Lords generally, including my noble friend Lord Hacking, that CHIS play a crucial part in preventing, detecting and safeguarding the public from many serious crimes, including terrorism, drugs and firearms offences, and child sexual exploitation and abuse. Those who do it do so at such personal risk to themselves. I noted and welcome the support from the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson—I will take the support where I can get it. It needs to be properly authorised and specifically defined criminality by the state, and they do so knowing that they will not be penalised for carrying out that activity, particularly by those engaged in criminal or terrorist activity, who may otherwise pursue legal action against them.

It is important that we place on record that CHIS authorisations and criminal conduct authorisations under Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 can be validly given only where the proposed conduct is necessary, proportionate and compliant with the Human Rights Act. Valid authorisations make activity carried out in relation to them “lawful for all purposes”, providing protection from criminal and civil liability. However—I know my noble friend knows this—should a court find that the authorisation does not satisfy these necessary requirements, or should the conduct go beyond what is permitted by the authorisation, it will not be rendered lawful.

Given the significance of these powers, it is important to note that there are independent and effective avenues of oversight and redress, and that these exist—I know that colleagues who have spoken know this, but it is worth putting on the record again—via the Investigatory Powers Tribunal for anyone who believes they have been subject to improper activity by a public authority using covert investigatory powers.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I wonder whether the Minister is aware that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has commented on the unsatisfactory nature of the recording of CCAs in a number of cases most recently, which appears to indicate a deterioration in that area.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am always interested in what Sir Brian Leveson, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, says. From my perspective he provides robust oversight, which includes comments that he has made, and he and his inspectors pay particular attention to that criminal conduct authorisation. He produces annual reports—I know that they are time-lagged, for reasons that are self-evident with any annual report. In his annual report in 2024, he identified

“good levels of compliance for the authorisation and management”

of police undercover operatives and noted that the quality and content of police undercover operative criminal conduct authorisations was found to be of a “good standard”. I will always look and listen to what he says because we have a responsibility to ensure that these matters are dealt with for the product of that CHIS to help protect the public at large.

I assure my noble friend and in this context the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, that the CHIS cannot be authorised to entrap people—which is one of the objectives of her amendment. Any such entrapment would be in conflict with Article 6 of the ECHR—as my noble friend knows, we are committed to maintaining our obligations under the ECHR—which protects the right to a fair trial. Furthermore, I point my noble friend to the publicly available Undercover Policing: Authorised Professional Practice, which states in clear terms that an undercover operative

“must not act as an agent provocateur”.

I hope that satisfies my noble friend on that point.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 392 in my name is about fairness, discipline and humanity.

First, misconduct investigations that drift on for months and years are damaging to everyone involved—the officer, the family, the complainant and public confidence in the system. Secondly, where these cases run on endlessly, the consequences can be severe. Long investigations place huge strain on mental health and, in the worst cases, such prolonged uncertainty has been linked to suicide. That alone should make this House pause and ask whether the current system is working as it should. Thirdly, I want to stress that this amendment does not block proper investigation and does not touch criminal matters. It simply says that, after 12 months, there should be independent scrutiny by a legally qualified person so that cases can move on properly and an officer can either be brought back into service or removed from the service without delay. Finally, swift justice is a matter for all involved. It matters for the innocent officer who should not be left in limbo. It matters for the complainants who deserve prompt and credible outcomes. Justice delayed helps no one; this amendment would bring greater urgency, greater accountability and a greater sense of fairness to the police disciplinary system.

Morale in the police force, particularly in the Met, is very low and one of the things that officers continually point to is the length of investigations when an officer is accused of something. This is not to say whether the officer is innocent or not—that is a whole other affair—it is the length of the investigation. If you speak to any of your local bobbies, particularly if they are an officer, they are likely to tell you they are considering leaving. When you probe a bit deeper, this question of investigations always comes up. One of the major roles of this Government now has to be to improve police morale by doing the right thing and making the whole system fairer.

I come from the Black community, the community arguably most over and under policed simultaneously in this country. If we are to have a police force that can actually care for the people who have the most interaction with the police, we need to raise their morale. I commend this amendment to the House. It could be a very good step in the right direction to make these investigations fair and to raise police morale.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 393A in my name seeks to codify the Supreme Court decision in W(80) which relates to police disciplinary proceedings involving the use of force. The amendment relates to the test used to determine whether an officer misconducted themselves when he or she used force in self-defence. The amendment would place in statute the current legal position that an officer must hold an honest belief that they or others faced an immediate danger and, crucially, that where that belief is mistaken, the mistake must also be an objectively reasonable one.

I have retabled this amendment to encourage further consideration by the Government of their decision to depart from this test following Sir Adrian Fulford’s rapid review. Under their proposal, an officer would be able to rely on an honestly held but mistaken belief, even if the mistake was unreasonable. This is a significant shift, and one intended to be made by statutory instrument and without public consultation.

Since this is Report, I will not repeat the arguments made in Committee; however, I continue to believe firmly that the current civil law test is the right one in the context of misconduct proceedings. Of course, as many have rightly emphasised, it is essential that officers required to make split-second decisions in life-threatening situations are treated fairly, but fairness to officers must be balanced with the equally important obligations of learning, improvement and accountability of officers. The current test already achieves that balance. On the previous references to delays in the misconduct proceedings arena, I would say that these matters should be addressed by review, rather than removing the possibility of misconduct proceedings.

It is important to be clear that this amendment does not concern the criminal law. It does not touch on criminal prosecutions, as was suggested during Committee. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with respect, the reason that disciplinary proceedings await the outcome of criminal proceedings is that this is what the police ask. I chair the safeguarding service in the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster and in many cases the police will say to us, “Please stop: do nothing”, and the policy is that we stop and do nothing until the police say we can do something. That is an important reservation.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

May I address that simple point? To be clear, in these cases, the IOPC is the investigating body. It is in full possession of the information it has gained—interviews, evidence from the scene, et cetera—so it is in a good position to query criminal charge or, at that stage, query misconduct charge, but it waits until the end of the whole process to instigate the misconduct charge that it could have instigated at the beginning, indicating the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it may be an employment issue. I find it confusing that it waits until the outcome of a criminal case, where it will have had no reasoned explanation for the jury’s decision—it would in a civil case, but not in a jury case, because no reason is offered. That is my point. It can be different in other professions, I understand, because they did not have the benefit of the investigators deciding what to put forward to the CPS.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

As police ombudsman, I was faced with exactly this problem, and I knew that our criminal proceedings had to be dealt with first.

To continue, what we are talking about here is the standard to be applied in misconduct proceedings. These proceedings exist in large part not just to ensure accountability but to enable forces to reflect and learn. They also enable the police to demonstrate that they take seriously situations involving the use of force, even when that force has been held not to be criminal. Despite that, the use of force must be necessary and proportionate.

This has broader implications. A disciplinary system that cannot scrutinise unreasonable mistakes risks undermining public confidence in policing. Retaining the civil law test supports public confidence by ensuring that unreasonable errors of judgment are open to scrutiny. Removing that scrutiny would weaken the learning function of misconduct proceedings, pose risks to public safety and give the impression that unreasonable policing errors lie beyond the review of accountability. That would have an impact, inevitably, by diminishing trust in policing.

For these reasons, I would be very grateful if the Minister could indicate what steps the Government are willing to take to address the serious concerns raised about moving to the criminal standard for self-defence in misconduct proceedings, particularly in the absence of wider public consultation or engagement with the communities most affected by police use of force. I am grateful to Justice, Inquest, the National Black Police Association and StopWatch for their help and support in this amendment.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments all address the same question: how we protect the public from unlawful force while treating officers fairly when they carry out dangerous duties on our behalf. From these Benches, we start from two simple principles: there must be clear, consistent standards of accountability; and we must not drift into a two-tier justice system that treats police officers differently from everyone else.

On Amendment 391, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, we have particular concerns. It would, in effect, close off the possibility of independent scrutiny by the IOPC once a criminal court had acquitted an officer. That might sound attractive in the interests of family, but it risks confusing two distinct questions: whether conduct meets the high criminal threshold for conviction and whether it meets the professional standards we rightly expect from those who wield state power.

We are more sympathetic to Amendment 392 from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey. Misconduct cases that drift for years are bad for families seeking answers, for complainants whose evidence fades, for taxpayers funding prolonged suspensions and, not least, for officers left in limbo. The broad thrust of the amendment—that investigations need clear expectations and real grip—is one we support, while recognising that complex cases sometimes need longer and that rigid timelines can carry risks.

Amendment 393A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, seeks to put beyond doubt the test that should apply in police disciplinary proceedings involving the use of force. We support the aim of aligning those proceedings with the approach of the Supreme Court in W80 as a modest but important safeguard for bereaved families and communities who need to see that internal standards reflect the law as articulated by the highest court. If the Government are now moving in that direction through secondary legislation, so much the better, but Parliament is entitled to a clear, on-the-record explanation of the test, not simply an assurance that it will be sorted out behind the scenes.