Transnational Repression in the UK (JCHR Report)

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Thursday 26th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I extend my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Isaac, on an excellent and very informative maiden speech. I also congratulate my noble friend Lord Alton, as well as the members of the JCHR, on producing this excellent report and securing the debate. It will not come as a surprise to noble Lords that I support all the recommendations in this report.

The JCHR has articulated clearly the problems caused by TNR—a growing threat to democratic values, the rule of law and freedom of expression. Foreign policy decisions and international trade partnerships are often made without sufficient consideration of the TNR record of perpetrator states, which risks undermining the UK’s credibility as a leader on global human rights issues and emboldening these authoritarian regimes to escalate their TNR activities.

The JCHR has called for a definition of TNR, and we need it, but I think we recognise it—in state-directed cross-border actions to coerce, intimidate, conduct surveillance on, kidnap, prosecute or even assassinate critics, dissidents and diaspora opponents. All this, of course, is in the wider context of the torture, harassment, intimidation and even execution of diaspora family members who live in the country in question. Noble Lords have spoken of Russia and China. I want to speak briefly about Iran and the impact of its TNR activities in the UK.

The Supreme Leader, as he calls himself, Ayatollah Khamenei, the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security in Iran are very active. They utilise the resources of diplomatic missions and embassies across the world. I give the example of the conviction of Asadollah Assadi, an Iranian diplomat who was convicted in Belgium in 2021 and sentenced to 20 years in prison for attempting to bomb a gathering of the Iranian opposition coalition, the NCRI, in support of a free Iran, which was held in Paris in 2018 and attended by Members of your Lordships’ House and the other place. They use various criminal methods and work assiduously to undermine any protest against the regime; they arrest and prosecute dual nationals on fabricated charges so they can leverage releases of regime operatives and convicted diplomats; and they have developed extensive and co-ordinated transnational repression.

Last July, the ISC issued a report which said that Iran poses a wide-ranging threat to UK national security that should not be underestimated and is persistent and, crucially, unpredictable. Since 2022, the previous major rising in Iran, there has been a sharp rise in physical attacks and kidnapping or assassination attempts. Our security services and police have stopped at least 15 murders or kidnapping attempts against British nationals or UK-based individuals since 2022. The threat to us has increased sharply, and there is now an acute national security and human rights concern.

The designation of Iran and Russia as countries on the advanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme is evidence of the threat posed by TNR originating from these countries. Anyone working for or directed by the Iranian state is at peril if they carry out such activities without compliance. The JCHR has recognised the need to support efforts to elevate TNR as a priority on the UN agenda, to promote co-ordinated international action against its use by authoritarian regimes and to ensure information and data sharing on TNR with like-minded countries in fora such as the Council of Europe, Interpol, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, the OSCE and the UN.

In January, the people of Iran rose up. We know that tens of thousands of them have been killed, including women and children. We should use the powers which are available to us. We should close the Iranian embassy in London, where there is evidence of, for example, co-ordinated attempts to silence Iranian dissidents. We should work with allied states to condemn Iranian state threats. I do not know, as other noble Lords have said, why we are allowing China to build this embassy in our country. This should not happen. We should adopt a more positive approach to sanctions, perhaps particularly against Members of your Lordships’ House. We have heard, and I have read, the Government’s response to the report and I would be very grateful if the Minister could tell us how long it will be before the IRGC is proscribed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We have to work with China. We will challenge it at all times and trade with it when we need to. It is important that we hold standards of democracy to account across the world.

I am conscious of time—

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I do not want to detain the House and I thank the Minister for giving way. He has just said, I think, that he will keep us informed about the proscription issue. This has been said for months and months. Can he please give us some idea of when there might be some actual news?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is not in the interests of the UK’s security or the security of the individuals we are trying to protect to give a running commentary on the issue of proscription. This House will be informed if any proscription decision is ever taken on any individual, country or organisation. That is the process we have followed recently and we will continue to do so, but, unfortunately, I cannot give a running commentary on whether, when and how we will consider these matters. We keep them under review and, in the event of a decision being taken, I will be held to account in this House for that decision, as will Ministers in the House of Commons.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

Can the Minister tell me this, then? Jonathan Hall produced a proposal for dealing with the issue. Is that being accepted by the Government?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We will respond to the Jonathan Hall review very shortly. Again, Members of this House will be able to hold me to account for the response the Government give, but I cannot give a running commentary at the Dispatch Box on issues of national security in the way in which the noble Baroness tempts me.

I am conscious of time. This has been a very fruitful and useful debate for us. I will look at Hansard in detail when it is produced and, if there are issues I wish to respond to further, I will write individually to Members. I thank the noble Lord for securing the debate today. I hope that we can continue our discussions on how we keep people in this country safe from transnational oppression and how we support the security of the United Kingdom.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

That is true as far as that goes. However, in the wider context, the principal objective of that legislation is not to enable people to commit crimes but to prevent people being subject to endless civil and criminal litigation that may arise from their duties as representatives of public bodies, be they the security services, the police et cetera. So I think that the noble Baroness is being slightly unfair to the Ministers at the time who put through that legislation. What she outlined was clearly a corollary of passing that legislation, but it was not the principal reason, as I am sure she will concede.

The reason I wanted to speak is to interrogate the details of this amendment. Looking at paragraph (2B)(b) of the proposed new clause, I wonder what is meant by

“otherwise seeking to discredit, the person, people or group subject to the authorised surveillance operation”.

That seems a very wide-ranging paragraph and a recipe for much litigation in the future. Should it eventually be found on the face of the enacted Crime and Policing Bill, the way that it will be interpreted will give rise to a situation where the police, the security services and others are much more reluctant to enter into long-term surveillance of the kind I discussed earlier in seeking to thwart a terrorist plot, because of that quite wide-ranging and open paragraph.

Generally speaking, the noble Baroness has made a very fine point and I agree with much of what she said, but I genuinely do not understand the point of that paragraph. If it is a way of describing an agent provocateur, I understand that—and, because she is a prominent lawyer, she will no doubt tell me where that is found in other pieces of legislation. However, currently, that paragraph could be misinterpreted, and it will circumscribe the capacity of the security services and the police to do their job and protect individuals. For those reasons, while I am not necessarily against the amendment, I would like further clarification if possible.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I have long had a responsibility for the investigation of matters involving CHISs and I fully accept that many people who agree to become CHISs do so in the public interest, because, without their activities, the intelligence that they are able to collect would be unavailable. I also accept that undercover activity of this kind has long been a feature of criminal investigation.

Nevertheless, while the CHIS Act, which was passed in 2021, provided a very necessary statutory framework for the operation of CHISs, because that was previously absent, it does not contain sufficient safeguards against abuse, particularly where such acts risk falling beyond the scope of the authorisation of the CCA, particularly where they are well concealed by those committing such crimes and not reporting back properly.

Regrettably, like many others, I have seen repeated abuses of authorisations of CHISs. I have also seen CHISs acting way beyond the scope of their authorisations, sometimes with the knowledge of those who manage them, to the extent that they value the CHIS more than dealing with unauthorised and perhaps criminal conduct by the CHIS.

When the CHIS is not an undercover officer—and, of course, not all CHISs are undercover state employees—there is less control and potentially a higher risk. Unlike in the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, we in Northern Ireland have been able to expose unlawful activities of CHISs to bring them to account. So it can be done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I cannot answer for all the cases that have gone wrong; indeed, I cannot answer for any cases that have gone wrong—it is not my place to do that. I can say, however, that it very much depends on good leadership and good supervision, and all of that comes down to good training. It has always been my view that training is at the core of all of this.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

Does the noble Lord accept that statutory blanket immunity from civil or criminal action acts as a barrier for people who are affected by such unlawful activities? It is a significant concern because of the impact that barrier has on those who might need to bring such action, and who might have difficulty getting funding or access to the necessary support. Then, there is an ongoing huge impact on trust in the police.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Trust in the police in this area is essential. I am not sure I quite get the gist of what the noble Baroness is asking, but I am very happy to discuss it outside the Chamber later, if that would help.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

It was about statutory blanket immunity—the extent of the immunity.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Again, I would have to have a look at that before I give an answer. I am very happy to discuss it with the noble Baroness.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for her amendment. The discussion today has taken me back to my time in Northern Ireland, when I had to see the product of covert intelligence. As Counter-Terrorism Minister in 2009, I had to see the product of that intelligence, so I understand the value of that. I also understand that the amendment seeks to amend the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by removing the legal protections for covert human intelligence sources who have been tasked by the police and a limited number of other public authority agencies, such as the intelligence services, with engaging in specific, tightly defined, pre-approved criminal conduct. Furthermore, the amendment seeks to remove protections for CHISs engaged in such authorised criminal conduct where it engages the offences of encouraging or assisting an offender under the Serious Crime Act, or seeks to discredit those who are subject to a particular investigation. I understand the motive behind what my noble friend has brought forward.

I begin by addressing the undercover police inquiry, raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. I took office in July 2024, and the undercover policing inquiry had operated for nine years at that stage. It is clear that the historical allegations under consideration by the inquiry are absolutely appalling. Such behaviour should rightly be condemned. The inquiry is ongoing, and we await the findings and any recommendations, but let me assure all those who have spoken that I am now responsible in the Home Office for managing inquiries, and I wish to see recommendations as soon as possible, for the very reasons noble Lords and Baronesses have mentioned today.

The current landscape around undercover operatives is much changed, and since 2013 enhanced safeguards have been put in place, but the Government want to see the lessons of that inquiry and consider them as soon as possible.

Noble Lords may recall the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, which has been referred to today, and the revised CHIS code of practice of 2022, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, which were subject to debate and approval both here and in the House of Commons. This scrutiny includes consideration of similar amendments proposed by my noble friend at the time.

I say to noble Lords generally, including my noble friend Lord Hacking, that CHIS play a crucial part in preventing, detecting and safeguarding the public from many serious crimes, including terrorism, drugs and firearms offences, and child sexual exploitation and abuse. Those who do it do so at such personal risk to themselves. I noted and welcome the support from the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Jackson—I will take the support where I can get it. It needs to be properly authorised and specifically defined criminality by the state, and they do so knowing that they will not be penalised for carrying out that activity, particularly by those engaged in criminal or terrorist activity, who may otherwise pursue legal action against them.

It is important that we place on record that CHIS authorisations and criminal conduct authorisations under Part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 can be validly given only where the proposed conduct is necessary, proportionate and compliant with the Human Rights Act. Valid authorisations make activity carried out in relation to them “lawful for all purposes”, providing protection from criminal and civil liability. However—I know my noble friend knows this—should a court find that the authorisation does not satisfy these necessary requirements, or should the conduct go beyond what is permitted by the authorisation, it will not be rendered lawful.

Given the significance of these powers, it is important to note that there are independent and effective avenues of oversight and redress, and that these exist—I know that colleagues who have spoken know this, but it is worth putting on the record again—via the Investigatory Powers Tribunal for anyone who believes they have been subject to improper activity by a public authority using covert investigatory powers.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I wonder whether the Minister is aware that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has commented on the unsatisfactory nature of the recording of CCAs in a number of cases most recently, which appears to indicate a deterioration in that area.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am always interested in what Sir Brian Leveson, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, says. From my perspective he provides robust oversight, which includes comments that he has made, and he and his inspectors pay particular attention to that criminal conduct authorisation. He produces annual reports—I know that they are time-lagged, for reasons that are self-evident with any annual report. In his annual report in 2024, he identified

“good levels of compliance for the authorisation and management”

of police undercover operatives and noted that the quality and content of police undercover operative criminal conduct authorisations was found to be of a “good standard”. I will always look and listen to what he says because we have a responsibility to ensure that these matters are dealt with for the product of that CHIS to help protect the public at large.

I assure my noble friend and in this context the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, that the CHIS cannot be authorised to entrap people—which is one of the objectives of her amendment. Any such entrapment would be in conflict with Article 6 of the ECHR—as my noble friend knows, we are committed to maintaining our obligations under the ECHR—which protects the right to a fair trial. Furthermore, I point my noble friend to the publicly available Undercover Policing: Authorised Professional Practice, which states in clear terms that an undercover operative

“must not act as an agent provocateur”.

I hope that satisfies my noble friend on that point.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

With due respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that the 550 Iranian citizens who have been sanctioned by this Government would say that we have acted slowly. They are facing travel bans and financial freezing of their assets, and those 550 individuals known to this Government have a marker against them. I do not think we are taking it in the way in which the noble Lord described. We have summoned the ambassador, we have made representations at a UK level to the foreign office in Iran this week, and we will continue to take action. It is important that we do, because the Iranian regime is a malign force that is taking appalling actions in Iran and is a threat to nationals elsewhere in Europe and the United Kingdom. We have to take action on that, and we will, but proscription is an issue still under review.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that the IRGC in Iran is accountable only to Ayatollah Khamenei and nobody else, and that in the past two weeks it has killed more than 3,000 people, according to the estimations of the Iranian resistance? Is he also aware that Erfan Soltani, who is 26 years old and was taken from his house six days ago, is due to be executed tomorrow? When the Iranian ambassador comes, could he express the strongest condemnation of this proposed action and call for it not to happen and for there not to be a mass execution of those who are protesting for freedom and democracy in Iran at the present time?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness will be aware of the Government’s long-standing position that we are opposed to capital punishment. I will make sure that her remarks in relation to the individual, whom I am aware of because of press reports in the last few hours, are drawn to the attention of the Foreign Secretary. My noble friend the Minister for the Foreign Office is next to me, and she will be able to assess what and how representations are made to the Iranians in that respect.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, it is almost absurdly challenging to try to speak on a Bill of 427 pages, 203 clauses and 21 schedules in four minutes. The Bill is extremely wide. It ranges across multiple offences, creating multiple new criminal offences, and we will need to determine inter alia whether they have sufficient clarity, whether they disproportionately limit our fundamental freedoms and whether they may lead to unintended consequences. Clause 185(3) is a case in point. And we will need to consider the very real resource implications of what we propose.

I want to concentrate on Clause 191, though there are many others I would want to talk to. This clause was passed after only 46 minutes of Back-Bench debate in the other place. It was not a manifesto commitment. It constitutes a very significant change to our law on abortion. It carries with it enormous risks to women who might consequently think that aborting a baby up to birth will be safe in these circumstances, doing so without medical help.

Dr Caroline Johnson MP explained in the other place that she works as an NHS consultant paediatrician and has cared for and held babies in her hands from 21 weeks and six days gestation right through to term. She said:

“I am very aware that babies from, say, 30 weeks upwards have a more than 98% chance of survival”.


She went on to explain how an abortion is achieved in the later stages of pregnancy, saying that taking abortion pills intended for early pregnancy is not a suitable or safe medical intervention in later pregnancy. She said:

“If one has a termination later in pregnancy, it is done by foeticide. Essentially, an injection of potassium chloride is administered to kill the baby, and then the baby is born in the usual way, but deceased. That is why it is important to know what the gestation is—because the termination offered under the law is done by a different route, to make sure that it is done safely. We know that the later in pregnancy a termination happens, the more a woman is at risk of medical complications”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/25; col. 309.]


That is the essence of the challenge we face here. We must scrutinise a clause that, under current law, would enable a woman who has secured medication to end a pregnancy under the pills by post scheme—which is supposed to be used only up to 10 weeks—to take this medication right up to birth in a non-clinical setting where she would have no professional medical support, despite the fact that, as Johnson said, she is at greater risk of complications. The clause does not give her any protection other than that against prosecution—but prosecution is the least important issue. What is profoundly important is the woman’s safety.

Even at earlier stages of gestation, there may be need for surgical intervention to remove a dead baby. How might a woman achieve an abortion in the later stages of pregnancy? Essentially, as I understand it, it will be by taking abortifacient medication which is neither suitable nor safe, or by acquiring potassium chloride by some means. But how could the potassium chloride be administered? It has to be injected into the baby’s heart, using ultrasound guidance, to cause cardiac arrest and death to the baby. That is not the end of the process; the baby must be delivered. During childbirth, specific drugs are administered and offered for pain management and the prevention of things such as haemorrhage and other complications. None of these would be available to this mother.

Most women who have experienced miscarriage or childbirth will probably agree that, if proper medical help is not available, it is terrifying. Things can go so terribly wrong: for example, babies can get stuck in the birth canal, which will eventually lead to the need for an intervention, whether by caesarean section, forceps or vacuum extraction. There is a serious risk that a mother whose baby gets stuck may die if the baby is not removed. At the very least, she may suffer terrible pain or multiple serious consequences to her own health and her future childbearing capacity.

We are left, then, with a situation in which your Lordships are being asked to legislate for abortion to birth without medical help, because any medical practitioner who helped would be subject to prosecution. If this provision is passed, women will think that aborting their own babies will be a safe thing to do, simply because it is lawful. This clause is redolent with danger to women. Can the Minister tell us exactly how the Government think women might seek to end a full-term pregnancy, and how they might be protected against the potentially catastrophic consequences of aborting and delivering a baby without medical help? This clause is too dangerous to women to remain in the Bill.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 12th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a trustee of St John’s Hospice.

This is one of the most important Bills we will ever see. For centuries, we have protected and preserved life, which is to me, and to so many, sacred. We are now asked to change utterly and create a way to help people die. The opposition is massive, particularly among medical practitioners and their professional associations. This is a profoundly dangerous and flawed Bill. The Constitution Committee rightly affirms our right to scrutinise, amend or reject it.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, was to speak today. He was seriously injured last week and he cannot travel. He is not permitted to speak remotely. Had he been here, he would have warned against coercion, inadequate safeguards, inevitable incrementalism and the risk posed to human rights—very important issues.

Is this Bill clear? The consequences are not known. There was no pre-legislative consultation and no proper impact assessment. The committee was selected by the Bill’s promoter. The witnesses selected largely supported the Bill. The evidence secured did not reflect a wide evidence base. Most amendments tabled on Report were not debated or voted on. Many MPs who wanted to speak were not called. The Constitution Committee said yesterday:

“The degree of deliberation, assessment and scrutiny is therefore significantly less than we would expect to see for an equivalent government bill. This is especially concerning given the subject matter of the bill”.


The Bill is a framework for assisted death, nothing more. There are 42 delegated legislative powers, including Henry VIII powers—powers which the DPRRC described as “sweeping, unspecified and unjustified”. Eligibility is very uncertain. What is a reasonably expected death? The definition of terminal illness is unclear: 36% of such diagnoses are recorded after death to be inaccurate; only 48% of prognoses are accurate at six months; and one in two prognoses will be wrong.

Is it safe? Capacity is to be assumed under the Mental Health Act. The assessment process involves two doctors, only one of whom must meet the patient. How will they determine capacity, especially in those suffering from shock, grief and depressive illness after diagnosis? How will it be assessed and monitored? Deaths may take place in hospices. Hospices have said that the Bill is not safe. In care homes, how could it be safe? In people’s homes, are doctors going to be able to manage their practices if they have to stay until the patient is dead—for up to 137 hours? What if someone does not die? It does happen.

Nobody has to check why someone wants to die. Coercion? Someone who feels they are a burden on others, or is lonely or isolated. And how will we keep our doctors and other clinicians safe? Clinicians are being asked to forget, “First do no harm”, and to provide medication to terminate a patient’s life. Many will not do it. What will be the effect of this on our doctors? Suicide rates are already higher among doctors than generally. According to the BMJ, a doctor dies by suicide every 10 days. How will we care for our doctors and keep them in practice? There is a shortage of obstetricians and gynaecologists because of the processes around abortion. The president of the Royal College of Radiologists recently said that there is

“a chronic lack of radiologists and oncologists … the outlook is bleak”.

What will be the effects of the introduction of assisted death in this situation?

Finally, is it accountable? If only 1% of people seek assisted death, that will be nearly 6,000 a year. How will the VAD commissioner find the psychiatrists, lawyers and social workers to constitute panels for 6,000 applications a year at a time when all three professions are understaffed? At only one hour a case, it would take 18,000 panel member hours a year—and, internationally, the rate is much higher than 1%.

The Bill provides little protection and no security around how death comes about. There will be no inquests. Nobody will ask about coercion, abandonment or anything else. Around 50% of those who die cannot get specialist palliative care. Why do we fund 100% of services at the beginning of life but only 30% at the end? Dame Cicely Saunders said:

“You don’t have to kill the patient in order to kill the pain”.


This Bill is ill-conceived, uncertain and unsafe. It should be rejected.

Public Order Legislation

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

If the noble Viscount is referring to recent actions relating to Palestine Action, which I believe he is, he will remember that the House of Commons voted 385 to 26 only on 23 June and this House voted 144 to 16 only on 3 July to put in place measures to proscribe Palestine Action. One of the reasons for proscription was to ensure that people cannot support that organisation because of advice we were given about the levels of terrorist activity. The police are currently enforcing that legislation for those holding a placard in Parliament Square saying, “I support Palestine Action”. It is important that, in a couple of months, we look at how the legislation has progressed. By that I mean that there will be published statistics on the number of arrests, the number of charges and the number of convictions. I suggest this House awaits that information and remembers the reasons why, at this Dispatch Box and in the House of Commons, Ministers stood up and asked for that proscription order, overwhelmingly supported by both Houses.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I have listened to the Minister talk about the reviews he intends to have on the legislation, but there is serious concern in the country about the erosion of the right to free speech. That is demonstrated by the hundreds of people who have turned out simply to express their opinion about the situation in Palestine. They do not want to commit acts of violence. They believe that our country has always cherished its right to free speech. So although His Majesty’s Government intend to have reviews, this issue is bringing the law into disrepute because so much police time is being used in processing the hundreds of people who are arrested in situations which are, as the noble Viscount said, questionable. What can the Government do short of two years to ensure that our democratic right to free speech is protected?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I assure the noble Baroness that the rights to free speech, to protest, and to make a view known about Palestine or Israel, or any other issue before the House, are central to the democratic rights that we all have as citizens. This House, with the other House, made a decision to proscribe Palestine Action. That does not mean that people cannot protest about the issue of Palestine or support or condemn Israel—it does not mean any of that. It means that Palestine Action has been deemed, on advice to Ministers, an organisation that goes beyond issues of protest and of criminal damage to organise activities which are potentially in the sphere of terrorist activity. I say to the noble Baroness: protest about Palestine, protest about Israel, protest any way you like—wave a flag, hold a placard—but supporting Palestine Action under the terms of the proscription order in this House and in the House of Commons, overwhelmingly passed, deserves to have action taken. That is why the police are upholding that legislation currently.

Police: Facial Recognition Technology

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns, and I understand that people want to ensure that there is a legal framework for interpreting not just facial recognition but other such things. As I have mentioned, a plethora of organisations are looking at different aspects of regulation. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary is trying to look at that and to give clearer guidance on the use of what I still maintain is an effective tool. If this helps stop crime and identifies potential individuals through intelligence-led policing, then it is a good thing.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer to the Question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but he did not actually answer the part about procurement of facial recognition technology and so on. For the most part, the many accountability organisations that he listed do not actually examine procurement, and if they do it is only in the context of compliance with procurement requirements and not necessarily with, for example, considerations of national security.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I tried to answer my noble friend’s initial Question as best as I could. Procurement is another issue we are looking at. In the Government’s forward look to policing, we are considering what areas of work we can bring in centrally in terms of the guidance and support for the 43 police forces currently operating. Again, without pre-empting my right honourable friend the Home Secretary’s review, one possibility is giving greater guidance on procurement and issues such as facial recognition technology and other forms of preventive activity by police forces.

Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls: Funding

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Monday 28th April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will certainly look at that for the noble and learned Baroness. Again, I am accountable for this area, but the direct responsibility is with my colleague Jess Phillips. I will raise that with her to see what discussions are going on, but the noble and learned Baroness can rest assured that the strategy we are bringing forward on violence against women and girls is a cross-government strategy, to which all departments are contributing. I will examine the specific responsibilities of the DfE and get back to the noble and learned Baroness.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, the Government’s strategy is welcome, particularly in so far as it affects women in the country who have linguistic and cultural difficulties in trying to articulate what is happening to them and trying to seek help. Given that one-third of complaints about domestic violence are made by men and boys, and that number is increasing, what plans do the Government have to enhance provision for those men and young boys who are subject to domestic violence?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness makes an extremely important point. Domestic violence is seen through the window of being violence against women, but it is also male on male, female on male, and a range of other forms. I will take that away and respond to her in due course.

Iranian State Threats

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am afraid that I may sound like a broken record, but the Government keep under review, at all times, the option of proscription. We will not publicly speculate in the House about the line that needs to be crossed to have proscription. However, I hope that my noble friend can be reassured that it remains an option that the Government can consider and can bring before both Houses.

Irrespective of proscription, the National Security Act, which this House passed in 2023, specifically bans assisting foreign intelligence services, such as the IRGC. The Act also criminalises receiving material benefit—such as payment—from these types of organisations. The maximum penalty for transgressing that Act is 14 years in prison, the same maximum as a proscription offence. Although proscription remains an issue for the Government to consider, there are now specific powers to ensure that individuals who find themselves on the wrong side of the National Security Act face severe penalties and jail.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests in working for freedom and democracy in Iran. I welcome the Statement made in the Commons on Tuesday on increasing Government action against the Iranian regime. In that Statement, we received information about 20 identified potentially lethal Iran-backed threats to British citizens and UK residents, and its targeting of dissidents, of which we are all aware.

I listened carefully to the Minister respond repeatedly to the questions about the proscription of the IRGC. I had a Written Question about this issue in January. I am delighted to hear that Jonathan Hall is reviewing the situation. We ask him to make it an absolute priority, given the appalling situation in Iran, with 800 executions since last July. Action is definitely necessary.

Finally, I ask the Government to engage directly with Iranian pro-democracy groups and dissidents, so as not to legitimise the regime by refusing to engage with them, and to support Iranian civil society and opposition movements advocating for a democratic, secular republic. In particular, I ask the Government to permit Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, to visit the United Kingdom? She currently lives in France.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

On the first part, I will not repeat what I have already said on proscription, but it is helpful to say—as the Statement does—that Jonathan Hall KC was asked to review the parts of our counterterrorism framework which could be applied to modern-day state threats, such as those from Iran. This includes giving specific consideration to the design of a proscription mechanism for state and, importantly—going back to what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, said earlier—state-linked bodies, providing more flexibility than is offered under the existing powers. I cannot give a timescale for that review but we are encouraging it to happen speedily. We have Bills before the Commons and Lords that it could be added to downstream if required. I noted what she said about civic society and leaders. I will take that away and reflect on it.

Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Wednesday 8th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government are cognisant of the fact that there have been failures by individuals who should have had a responsibility for safeguarding children. We will look at that and put in place the lessons learned. But I do not think—speaking personally, as well as on behalf of the Government—that a four or five-year inquiry will add to the sum of knowledge that we have, for the very reasons that the noble Viscount outlined. What we need to do is to implement action to ensure that we prevent further child abuse. That is what this Government’s main focus will be.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I chaired the Catholic Council for the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. My role there was to ensure that the Catholic Church co-operated fully with the inquiry. The CCIICSA still exists, because the recommendations have not been implemented. In that role, I sat through much of the inquiry, and I heard an enormous amount of evidence from victims. Many of those victims were visibly retraumatised by the very experience of giving evidence to IICSA; their pain was very often palpable. It also seemed to me, as I watched, that they were traumatised by listening to others who were giving their evidence as witnesses—but they had to be heard; there is no question about that. The Minister has said that there was a module in IICSA that effectively dealt with organised crime. The people who participated in those hearings, and all the other hearings of IICSA, do not need a further inquiry; they need action. We spent £186 million on IICSA, and it was money well spent. I welcome the Minister’s commitment to finding ways to implement the recommendations now to protect all our children for the future.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, for that support, and for her support for the Government not reinvigorating or starting again a national inquiry. She makes an extremely important point about victims. Victims are victims and, whatever has happened, they are being traumatised and have been traumatised, and will carry that with them for many years, if not for life. Therefore, the Government recognise that we need to support victims and survivors. We will look at the issue of compensation in slower time now, but we are doing that. We also recognise the significant impact that funding for support services can play in helping victims. The Home Office, my department, is continuing to provide funding to voluntary organisations for survivors of child sexual abuse. We will continue to work across government to ensure that we put a proper victims package in place to help support them.