Iranian State Threats

Thursday 6th March 2025 Lords Chamber

Statement

The following Statement was made in the House of Commons on Tuesday 4 March.

“With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a Statement on the growing threat to the UK from Iran, and the steps that the Government are taking to combat this threat.

The threat from Iran sits in the wider context of the growing, diversifying and evolving threat that the UK faces from malign activity by a number of states. The threat from states has become increasingly interconnected in nature; the lines are blurring between domestic and international, online and offline, and states and their proxies. In the last year, the number of state-threat investigations run by MI5 jumped by 48%. That statistic is a stark indication of the increased threat.

I turn to Iran. The regime has become increasingly emboldened, and is asserting itself more aggressively to advance its objectives and undermine ours. That is evidenced by the fact that direct action against UK targets has substantially increased over recent years. The director-general of MI5 recently stated that since the start of 2022, the UK has responded to 20 Iran-backed plots presenting potentially lethal threats to British citizens and UK residents. The Iranian regime is targeting dissidents, and media organisations and journalists reporting on the regime’s violent oppression. It is also no secret that there is a long-standing pattern of the Iranian intelligence services targeting Jewish and Israeli people internationally. It is clear that these plots are a conscious strategy of the Iranian regime to stifle criticism through intimidation and fear. These threats are unacceptable. They must and will be defended against at every turn.

It is testament to our world-leading law enforcement and intelligence services that, through their tireless commitment, so many plots have been thwarted. I am sure that the whole House will join me in paying tribute to the brave men and women of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, who work day in, day out, to keep us safe.

To tackle this threat, we must understand it. The Iranian intelligence services, which include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, direct this damaging activity, but often, rather than working directly on UK shores, they use criminal proxies to do their bidding. That helps to obfuscate their involvement, while they are safely ensconced in Tehran. We see that in intelligence, but we also saw it publicly in the 2023 conviction of the Chechen-born Austrian national who was imprisoned for conducting surveillance on Iran International’s UK headquarters.

These threats are not only physical in nature. The National Cyber Security Centre has seen malicious cyber-activity, conducted by actors who are affiliated with the Iranian state, that targets a range of state sectors, including in the UK. The Government are absolutely committed to ensuring that our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have the tools that they need to disrupt and degrade the threats that we face from Iran, so I can announce today that we will place the whole of the Iranian state, including Iran’s intelligence services, the IRGC and MOIS, on the enhanced tier of the new foreign influence registration scheme. The FIRS is a critical disruptive tool for the UK.

This action will mean that those who are directed by Iran to conduct activities in the UK, such as criminal proxies, must register that activity, whatever it is, or face five years in prison. They will face a choice: expose their actions to the Government or face jail. The Home Office will lay regulations before Parliament as soon as possible, with a view to having the scheme up and running by the summer.

On proscription, as honourable Members will know, we do not routinely comment on groups that are being considered for proscription, but I assure the House that we do and will continue to keep the list of groups considered under constant review. However, it has become increasingly clear that there are challenges inherent in applying our existing counterterror legislation to state and state-linked threats to our national security. That challenge was first raised by the Home Secretary in opposition. She warned of a lack of a comprehensive strategic approach for state threats to mirror that adopted on terrorism, and the specific difficulties of using on state bodies a proscription mechanism that was designed for groups such as al-Qaeda.

We are progressing work at pace to address that challenge, so I can announce today that Jonathan Hall KC has been asked to review the parts of our counterterrorism framework that could be applied to modern-day state threats, such as those from Iran. That includes giving specific consideration to the design of a proscription mechanism for state and state-linked bodies, providing more flexibility than is offered under the existing powers. As the independent reviewer of both state threats legislation and terrorism legislation, Mr Hall is perfectly placed to undertake the review and we are grateful to him for agreeing to provide that advice.

Let there be no doubt: we are utterly determined to stay ahead of those who threaten our country, and any step that could aid us in that critical endeavour will be considered. The UK is not alone in facing such threats. States across the western world are threatened by Iran, so we will work with our allies to better understand, expose and condemn Iranian actions and bring Iranian-linked criminals to justice wherever in the world they may be.

We regularly collaborate with our Five Eyes and European partners to protect our democracies from hostile Iranian attack. Here at home we are going further too. The National Security Act 2023, which was supported on both sides of the House, has given the police new powers to target evolving activity. For example, the Act criminalises assisting a foreign intelligence service, such as the IRGC or MOIS. The maximum penalty for those offences is 14 years in prison, which is the same as the maximum for a proscription offence.

I can also announce that training and guidance on state threats activity is now being offered by counterterrorism policing to all 45 territorial police forces across the UK. That will mean that when any front-line officer encounters a suspected state threats incident, they will know what to do and what to look for to ensure that our communities are kept safe. Furthermore, we have recently issued guidance on the National Security Act and how it applies to the UK security profession, including private investigators. That ensures that they are aware of the law and understand where they might be criminally liable if they were working for any foreign power such as Iran.

We will also continue to go after the criminal networks and enablers that Iran uses to carry out its work. The leader of the Zindashti organised crime group—a group frequently used by the Iranian regime—has already been sanctioned. We will explore further sanctions against other Iranian-linked criminals, and the National Crime Agency will target those who assist the IRGC and others to launder their money.

Alongside the recently launched Border Security Command, which strengthens Britain’s border security and disrupts criminal smuggling gangs, I have asked officials to consider new ways to enforce our robust Immigration Rules to specifically address threats from Iran. That work will focus on further protecting the UK from Iranian infiltration, including those who promote Iranian interference in the UK.

I am clear that our response must be a UK-wide effort, so I welcome the Charity Commission’s statutory inquiries into both the Islamic Centre of England and the Al-Tawheed Charitable Trust. I have also asked officials to review where any Iranian interference is being conducted in the UK, and FIRS will shine more light on any undisclosed relationships between the Iranian state and UK-based institutions and individuals.

Finally, the National Protective Security Authority and counterterrorism policing will continue to provide protective security advice and support to individuals and organisations threatened by the Iranian regime and its criminal proxies, including Persian language media organisations and their employees. We will also continue to maintain funding for protective security measures to synagogues, Jewish community centres and schools, ensuring that we do all we can to keep our Jewish communities safe.

In a dangerous, volatile world, Britain must lead the way. That means proudly promoting our values and straining every sinew to keep our people safe. The measures I have set out today should reassure the House and the public about our unflinching commitment to those objectives. Under this Government, security will be the foundation on which everything else is built. We will resist attacks on our way of life as vigorously as we counter threats to life, whatever their source. We will work relentlessly to root out those intent on causing harm on our streets, and we will do whatever it takes to protect our country and our democracy. I commend this Statement to the House.”

12:04

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing the Statement to the House today and I welcome the Government’s recognition of the growing threat posed by Iran to our national security. The escalation of Iranian state-backed plots against UK residents and the targeting of dissidents, Jewish communities and journalists is deeply concerning. I join Ministers in paying tribute to our intelligence services and law enforcement officers who work tirelessly to thwart these threats.

While we welcome the measures outlined today, I must ask whether they go far enough. The danger posed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, is clear and escalating, as Iran has supported Putin’s barbaric and illegal invasion of Ukraine. Are this Government acting decisively enough on proscription? The Foreign Secretary has ruled it out, despite overwhelming evidence of the IRGC’s involvement in malign activities. Does the Minister now acknowledge that proscribing the IRGC is a necessary and overdue step? If not, can he explain how the measures announced today will be as effective in tackling this threat?

I welcome the decision to place the entire Iranian state on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. However, given Iran’s well-documented use of proxies, how do the Government intend to enforce these requirements effectively? Can the Minister provide assurances that those who fail to register will be swiftly identified and prosecuted?

The role of Iranian-linked organised crime networks is another crucial issue. The Government have pledged further sanctions and action against these networks, but we need clarity. Will the Minister commit to a specific timeline for additional sanctions and further crackdowns on the IRGC’s financial networks in the United Kingdom?

Finally, while it is right that we strengthen our domestic resilience, we must work closely with our allies to counter Iran’s destabilising activities internationally. Can the Minister outline what further steps the Government will take to enhance security co-operation with our Five Eyes partners and European allies in tackling Iranian aggression?

The threats we face from hostile states require more than just words—they require action. The Government must match their rhetoric with decisive steps to protect Britain from Iranian intimidation and ensure that those responsible for such threats face the full force of the law.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, just last week in the Chamber we debated the unacceptable practice of the Iranian regime holding joint nationals in detention. My noble friend Lady Brinton spoke powerfully in that debate. Therefore, these Benches support what the Government are doing and how they are doing it. We join others in giving thanks for the work of our intelligence services and our law and order community, the men and women who work every single day to keep us safe.

However, we need constant vigilance. We have seen the unacceptable practice of the intimidation of BBC journalists, and individuals within this country who have been targeted by the Iranian regime, as it continues to do. Placing Iran on the enhanced tier scheme is welcome.

We are all aware that, given the economic crisis and tense political situation in Iran, it is likely that the regime will seek to export further attempts to destabilise and disrupt neighbouring countries, and countries such as the United Kingdom. The persecution of individuals in Iran is heightening, especially that of women and girls. As the Minister taking the Statement is from the Home Office, I ask him not to have a closed mind with regard to potential safe and legal routes for those who are persecuted within Iran, for whom we can provide refuge in the United Kingdom. There is currently no safe and legal route, but it would be a very strong signal of support for the human rights of people within Iran.

Of course, however, the first duty of government is to protect those within the United Kingdom. We have seen the use of proxies: we have seen the use of agencies and we have seen the use of other countries’ nationals. So I also wish to ask: when it comes to the implementation of the enhanced scheme, as well as the policing, how vigilant are we about those from other countries who are paid by the Iranian regime to carry out actions on its behalf? It is, of course, not the case that it will always be Iranian nationals who will be carrying out this work.

We have a country-wide Iranian sanctions regime, which is welcome, but the question I asked when we scrutinised that regime was about other bodies whom the Iranians are paying and who are nationals of other countries. That is a grey area when it comes to our legislation, so I would be grateful if the Minister could reassure us that nationals of other countries acting on behalf of the Iranian regime will also be covered by the enhanced tier element.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the questions from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Purvis of Tweed. I will try to answer them as best I can. First, it really sends a strong signal that His Majesty’s Government, the Official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats all broadly support the actions taken today. That support means that, actually, Iran is the first country we placed into the FIRS scheme which, as I said in earlier answers to an earlier Statement, will be operational from the summer of this year. The signals that we have sent by placing Iran on the enhanced tier and announcing that yesterday, via my right honourable friend Dan Jarvis, and today is extremely important.

I can give comfort to the noble Lord that those who subsequently are proved not to have registered when the scheme goes live in the summer will face the potential penalty of a five-year jail sentence for the failure to register. That is a stiff sentence which, again, is outside my gift—it will be for the criminal justice system to pursue—but it is a very stiff sentence which, I hope, will send a very strong message to those who wish to do this country harm and who are sponsored by the Iranian regime.

I should also say to both noble Lords that there will be significant new training for all front-line police officers. We are going to explore further sanctions against criminal groups linked to Iran, and this goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, mentioned. The Zindashti criminal gang has already been sanctioned, and that has therefore sent a strong signal, but we will look at further sanctions against criminal groups linked to Iran. That could include a number of other potential measures such as travel bans, which are key. We want to make sure that not just Iranian interference in the United Kingdom, in whatever form it takes—be it by the state or by proxies—is examined and clamped down on. We will certainly be taking those measures. The points that the noble Lord has mentioned are certainly ones of which we are cognisant.

The noble Lord also mentioned safe and legal routes. There are safe and legal routes which, again, are potentially operational, but, again, this country is a haven for asylum, and if individuals wish to claim asylum, that will be considered along with the position that government asylum policy has in place as a whole.

We are also looking at the issues with Jonathan Hall, the terrorism reviewer. We have asked him to look at both counterterrorism laws and the question of proscription, which, again, is an option we never rule out but on which I cannot comment in detail today. It is always an option for government in these areas.

I welcome the broad support and hope that we will monitor this. Obviously, as this scheme goes live in the summer, we will be able to monitor its impact on both those who register and, in the event of anybody who does not register, those who do not. We can monitor the effectiveness of this, but it is put in place for the simple reason that we cannot accept the level of activity by the Iranian regime in the United Kingdom against both Iranian citizens here and British interests. That is why we introduced this measure yesterday and I am pleased it has the support of the two main Opposition parties in this House.

12:14

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome this Statement. I know that it will be particularly welcomed by my noble friend who, like me, was on the Intelligence and Security Committee when we produced our Russia report in 2020. The FIRS scheme was one of our major recommendations from that. My noble friend said he would work with local police forces to roll out information around the FIRS scheme, but what work is being done with the diaspora in the UK, which is based not only in London but throughout the UK, to make sure that they are aware of, and can be protected from, the Iranian influence that is out there?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. He is right that the genesis of the FIRS scheme came out of the investigations undertaken by the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I was a proud member from 2015 to 2019. We are now developing at pace the implementation of the FIRS scheme, which requires significant infrastructure investment. It was delayed under the previous Government, but has now been given added energy by my right honourable friend Dan Jarvis, the Minister, and myself to make sure it is on stream for the summer of this year. It is, therefore, important that we send out two strong messages: first, that we are standing up to intimidation and criminal activity by the Iranian regime, and, secondly, that people in the diaspora need to know that the scheme is in place. We need to put some efforts behind ensuring that those who qualify for registration under the scheme are aware of it. That will be a major part of the communications strategy in the post-Easter period of this year.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest: the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and I are the two people proscribed by the Iranian regime, and have been for the past couple of years. I pay tribute to the authorities who have helped and advised us.

I welcome this important Statement. I do not speak on behalf of the Jewish community, but I want to thank the Government for their continued support for the protective security that the community needs.

The Statement says that the National Crime Agency will target those who assist the IRGC and others to launder their money. I fail to understand what more the IRGC needs to do to be proscribed. We have raised this many times: my noble friend on the Front Bench raised it today. I even voted with the Labour Party on the Trade Bill when the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, had an amendment to proscribe the IRGC, which he did in Opposition. I supported him, as did others. What does it have to do to be proscribed?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I understand where the noble Lord is coming from. We keep proscription under review at all times. It is an option for the Government at any time, in relation not only to Iran but to other agencies and countries as well. It is not a silver bullet: the organisation does not disappear just because proscription has taken place. What we have done—I hope that the noble Lord will bear with us on this—is ask the independent reviewer of terrorism, Jonathan Hall, to look at the legislation generally and at issues to do with proscription in the wider context.

I welcome the noble Lord’s comments on the Jewish community. One of the drivers for this is to ensure that members of the Jewish community have security from any state threats that are made to them. He would wish to know that around £18 million is being provided up to 2027-28 for security measures where members of the Jewish community feel they need them for places of worship. That is, again, a secondary, but very important, measure that the Government are putting in place to ensure that people feel safe in their communities.

[Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston (CB)]

My Lords, it has been reported that President Putin has been making overtures to the Iranian regime to act as a broker in the relationship with President Trump. May I therefore urge him to talk to his colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to ensure that our Five Eyes partners and all those who work together to defend democracy do not ignore this new threat?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend, with whom I shared time on the Intelligence and Security Committee. The situation with President Putin is one that the Government continue to keep under review. I will draw her comments to the attention of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. It is extremely important not only that we understand the Iranian threat, but that we assess and understand the threat from Russia. Therefore, I take on board her comments and will feed them into the system.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, in asking a question of the Minister, I do so respectfully, and I commend the Government for the steps they are taking just now; it is a move forward. If we were to proscribe the revolutionary guard, would we not be able to maintain an embassy in Iran? Sweden, Canada, the United States and Bahrain—a whole set of countries—have proscribed the revolutionary guard. Is the reason linked to the presence of an embassy or to intelligence—the things Governments always have to think about? Secondly, if it is not possible for us, for all manner of very sensitive reasons, to proscribe—we may be the conduit for difficult conversations—can the leadership of the revolutionary guard not be placed on our targeted sanctions lists?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. I assure her that the decision to undertake any proscription, at any time, is a matter for the Government at that time, based on intelligence, security threats and a range of other matters that they will take into account. I am not in a position today to confirm or deny that proscription could happen; it is a matter for us to make a judgment on. We have already brought charges against those conducting activity for, and on behalf of, foreign states acting within the UK. We are continually keeping this matter under review; it is not something we advertise ahead of proscription. I hope my noble friend can accept that point.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

May I make another point? Am I not allowed to? Do the rules proscribe me from—

[Noble Lords]

Order!

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend raised the issue of safe and legal routes. One particularly pernicious act of the Iranian authorities is that they continue to go after the families of people they have executed. They are fleeing abroad as a result and now find themselves under extraterritorial reach. Can the Minister say whether people arriving after the execution of one of their family members will be given immediate support by the police and security services? It is clear that they are still being targeted.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We will keep that support under review. We will certainly ensure that any evidence of threats against individuals resident in the United Kingdom will be examined by police forces. Any attempt by any foreign power to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities in the United Kingdom will not be tolerated and will be thoroughly investigated. As the noble Baroness would expect, Home Office officials will work closely with other government departments to ensure that UK residents are safe and secure. Separately, we also have the Defending Democracy Taskforce, which is currently reviewing the UK’s response to the issues of transnational repression to develop our understanding and ensure that we have strong system-wide responses. It is vital that people are allowed to live their lives in peace. Safe and legal routes, as with other issues, are determined on a case-by-case basis. The Government will look positively at the circumstances the noble Baroness mentioned.

[Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)]

My Lords, in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, the Minister said that he cannot confirm or deny that proscription of the IRGC could take place. If he cannot confirm that it could be proscribed, what does “keeping it under review” mean?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

What I was trying to say to my noble friend—which I repeat now to the noble Lord—is that proscription is continually under review. It is possible to proscribe any organisation, and Governments have done that. If we do seek to proscribe, we bring orders before both Houses of Parliament to confirm that. The matter is under continual review. What I do not want to do is to give an indication to this House on whether or not the Government would take that step. However, with this Statement the Government have, for the very first time, sent a very strong signal to the Iranian regime that we will not tolerate its behaviour, by including it in the new FIRS scheme—the very first country to be included. When this scheme goes operational towards the end of the summer, there will be severe penalties for individuals who should register but do not. That is the general thrust, which, as with everything else, is still kept under review, and which I hope sends a very strong signal about the behaviour of the Iranian regime in the United Kingdom and internationally.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome what the Minister said about the possible proscription of the IRGC, but can he give us any idea how long it will be before Jonathan Hall’s report reaches the Home Office—is there a timeline for that? On transnational repression, the Minister knows that the Joint Committee on Human Rights is working with the Home Office on examining examples of Iranian transnational repression, and we have received evidence from BBC journalists and others who have been personally affected, including pro-democracy advocates. Last week, the Iranian regime’s court rejected the appeal of Behrouz Ehsani and Mehdi Hassani, who were both at risk of imminent execution. Hassani is a father of three; he was arrested in 2022 and taken to Evin Prison ward 209, where he was subjected to severe torture. Following his death sentence, he sent a message to the people of Iran:

“This execution-driven regime knows nothing else. I will not bargain over my life. I am prepared to give my humble life for the freedom of the Iranian people”.


In combating this terrorist state, will the Minister liaise with his FCDO colleagues to ensure that we co-ordinate our efforts to raise those cases with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Human Rights Council and the UN special rapporteur, in order to challenge the grossly wrong, unfair verdicts that have been delivered?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I will draw his comments to the attention of my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. I am not aware of whether representations have been made in the specific cases he mentioned, but it is a matter I will look into after today. I will write to him with a response from the Foreign Office on those matters; I understand that they are of an urgent nature, so I will do that for him today.

On transnational repression, let me be clear, as I have said already, that it will not be tolerated and it will not be supported. We will take action on these issues. If anyone is concerned for their safety in the United Kingdom, in the first instance they should contact the police, who have had training to ensure that they are aware of the potential threats and dangers. As I have already said, the police are raising both the awareness and capability of front-line officers and staff across the United Kingdom to include an understanding of how threats from foreign powers are presented and how to respond to reports made by members of the public to police forces about potential areas of local concern. The National Security Act, which had cross-party support, strengthened UK legal powers to counter foreign interference, including actions on what would amount to transnational repression. I assure the noble Lord that it is a matter of concern for the Government that we keep citizens safe in this United Kingdom, whatever their nationality.

[Lord Cryer (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to press my noble friend the Minister further on the question that has been raised repeatedly on the IRGC. It is clearly a bunch of clerical fascists and homicidal maniacs who specialise particularly in the rape, torture and murder of women, among others. They will not stop perpetuating their poison and using proxies to do the same, whatever we do. Further to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, I realise that the Minister cannot make a commitment today, but what does the IRGC have to do to lead to it being completely proscribed—not just the proscription of individuals but complete proscription?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am afraid that I may sound like a broken record, but the Government keep under review, at all times, the option of proscription. We will not publicly speculate in the House about the line that needs to be crossed to have proscription. However, I hope that my noble friend can be reassured that it remains an option that the Government can consider and can bring before both Houses.

Irrespective of proscription, the National Security Act, which this House passed in 2023, specifically bans assisting foreign intelligence services, such as the IRGC. The Act also criminalises receiving material benefit—such as payment—from these types of organisations. The maximum penalty for transgressing that Act is 14 years in prison, the same maximum as a proscription offence. Although proscription remains an issue for the Government to consider, there are now specific powers to ensure that individuals who find themselves on the wrong side of the National Security Act face severe penalties and jail.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests in working for freedom and democracy in Iran. I welcome the Statement made in the Commons on Tuesday on increasing Government action against the Iranian regime. In that Statement, we received information about 20 identified potentially lethal Iran-backed threats to British citizens and UK residents, and its targeting of dissidents, of which we are all aware.

I listened carefully to the Minister respond repeatedly to the questions about the proscription of the IRGC. I had a Written Question about this issue in January. I am delighted to hear that Jonathan Hall is reviewing the situation. We ask him to make it an absolute priority, given the appalling situation in Iran, with 800 executions since last July. Action is definitely necessary.

Finally, I ask the Government to engage directly with Iranian pro-democracy groups and dissidents, so as not to legitimise the regime by refusing to engage with them, and to support Iranian civil society and opposition movements advocating for a democratic, secular republic. In particular, I ask the Government to permit Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, to visit the United Kingdom? She currently lives in France.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

On the first part, I will not repeat what I have already said on proscription, but it is helpful to say—as the Statement does—that Jonathan Hall KC was asked to review the parts of our counterterrorism framework which could be applied to modern-day state threats, such as those from Iran. This includes giving specific consideration to the design of a proscription mechanism for state and, importantly—going back to what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, said earlier—state-linked bodies, providing more flexibility than is offered under the existing powers. I cannot give a timescale for that review but we are encouraging it to happen speedily. We have Bills before the Commons and Lords that it could be added to downstream if required. I noted what she said about civic society and leaders. I will take that away and reflect on it.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, not only do we not proscribe the IRGC as a terrorist group, we allow Iran Air flights into London daily, which is astonishing. By all accounts, the Home Office has issued around 200 visas to Islamic clerics during the last 18 months, despite the regime’s involvement in the 7 October attacks on Israel. Can the Minister confirm to the House whether this is accurate information?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Statement said that we will strengthen the enforcement of our immigration laws and examine, on a case-by-case basis, the issues that the noble Baroness mentioned. For that very same reason, we need to examine who requires transport to the United Kingdom. We also need to look at people who we do not wish to enter the United Kingdom. That is why strengthening our immigration laws, irrespective of the other measures, is an important consideration.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

The leadership being shown by the Government on this is highly welcome, but I noted the approving reference in the Statement to the investigations by the Charity Commission. Does the Minister share my concern that the Charity Commission, despite having a staff of 500 people and a budget of £32 million, has so far been unacceptably reactive and slow in looking at these issues? I think there are 130-odd live investigations—some of which are into Iranian-linked charities—that are not moving quickly, firmly or proactively enough.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I share the noble Lord’s concerns around Iranian-aligned centres in the United Kingdom and the malign influence Iran might be projecting through them. I hope I can assure the House that that is on the Government’s radar. We are examining them and will continue to assess the potential threats to the United Kingdom.

The Charity Commission is undertaking inquiries into both the Islamic Centre of England and the Al-Tawheed Charitable Trust. Ministers are closely tracking progress. My officials and others in the Home Office are now reviewing whether any Iranian interference is being conducted in the United Kingdom. Crucially, I hope that the specification in the Statement that Iran is in the enhanced tier of FIRS will, when it comes into place in summer, shine a considerable light on the Iranian state and the UK institutions and individuals involved in it. In my final comment, I remind the House that breach of the FIRS legislation for Iran, when it is introduced in summer, will result in a potential five-year prison sentence.