European Court of Human Rights

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I think the answer to that question is in the affirmative. The UK Government follow carefully any case that concerns UK citizens under the convention.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Does the Minister, as a jurist of some distinction, agree that dialogue between domestic courts and international ones is incredibly important, and that is what is enshrined in the Human Rights Act?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness; I entirely agree with the importance of dialogue.

European Convention on Human Rights

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

The Government have set out their position in the manifesto upon which they were elected. There is no change to that manifesto.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I, for one, am very grateful to the Minister for the clarity of his Answer. However, I am concerned that the more popular of the two candidates in the Conservative race for the premiership who have committed to staying in the ECHR has been subject to an absolutely disgraceful campaign of smearing in the right-wing press. Can the Minister give some fatherly advice to these candidates that when they launch Islamophobic and misogynistic attacks on each other, and when they attack human rights, it is bad for his party and for the country?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am not in a position to give fatherly advice to anybody. The Government do not support misogynistic or Islamophobic attacks on anyone. I have set out as clearly as I can the Government’s policy, and I shall doggedly pursue that policy unless and until instructed to the contrary.

Human Rights Act 1998

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I should declare that I was a lawyer in the Home Office in the late 1990s during the preparation and passage of the Human Rights Act. I also worked on the Good Friday agreement, to which my noble friend Lord Murphy referred. I am a council member of Justice and was the director of Liberty for some years, during which I had the privilege of publishing Jesse Norman and Peter Oborne’s wonderful pamphlet, Churchill’s Legacy: The Conservative Case for the Human Rights Act. I commend that document to all noble Lords, particularly those opposite.

I congratulate my noble friend Lady Whitaker on securing this debate and on all her wonderful human rights works. Of course, it is always an honour to follow my noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen. His record speaks for itself but I wholeheartedly support everything that he said about the importance of the Human Rights Act in our constitutional settlements, including our devolution settlements and the precious Good Friday agreement, in particular.

The Human Rights Act is both a progressive, contemporary Bill of Rights and an exquisite British constitutional compromise. I do not mind the word “compromise”; it is a good word. It preserves parliamentary sovereignty via Sections 3, 4 and 6 while still allowing an independent judiciary to protect both the will of Parliament and the fundamental rights and freedoms of all people, not just citizens, from executive abuse and outmoded, discriminatory laws.

I was slightly surprised by some of the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, because I had not taken him for an originalist, as the Americans refer to people who use very literal interpretations. It is only right to share with noble Lords the facts of the Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza case that he found so outrageously creative. It concerned a same-sex couple who had lived in rented accommodation for many years. The person whose name was on the rent book died. His partner would have been evicted but for the Rent Act having to be reinterpreted under the Human Rights Act Section 3 duty so that the words “living together as man and wife” could be applied to a same-sex couple. That is the outrage of interpretation to which, with respect, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, was referring.

The Human Rights Act is very British in that compromise, but internationalist in incorporating the European convention, which was itself drafted, in no small part, by Conservative lawyers after World War II, as we heard from many noble Lords—particularly from my noble friend Lady Donaghy, in her fantastic history lesson of a speech. Section 2 requires our courts to take accounts of the decisions of the Strasbourg court, but they are not bound by them. That has now been fully accepted by our Supreme Court, as we have heard. This facilitates, therefore, a wonderful judicial conversation—a continuing judicial dialogue—between national and international jurists. This is so important and to the benefit of both. It benefits our law here and means that great jurists, such as the friend of all of us, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, have contributed to the breadth of jurisprudence in Europe as well as here. That is so important: we do not want to break that dialogue and vital link.

Section 19 statements by Ministers have also been important to parliamentary scrutiny of the human rights impact of legislation. Would the noble and learned Lord tell us how many times, even in the last few years under the Johnson Government, Ministers have actively relied on Human Rights Act obligations and interpretations when justifying things such as the CHIS Bill, as was, and the Nationality and Borders Bill, as was—now unfortunately Acts? Ministers have frequently stood there and said, “Do not worry: this power looks broad, but it will have to be exercised in a way that is compliant with the Human Rights Act.” Presumably, all that goes out the window now.

As we have heard, positive obligations, which are now to be trashed, have helped so many victims, but I have one final point on free speech. The Human Rights Act in Article 10 created the first enforceable right to free speech in this country. That will, ironically, be undermined by this rights removal Bill. Finally, I wonder if the noble and learned Lord agrees with me that the greater threat to free speech in this country does not come from the Human Rights Act; it comes from super-injunctions sought by wealthy and powerful people, including in government, relying on Article 8 and on a lot of money. That is hypocrisy: one rule for some and another for everyone else.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

There is, as far as one can tell, an important part of public opinion that is very doubtful about the role of this legislation and the Strasbourg court in our constitutional settlement. Why that is the case is not for me to speculate, but it does seem to be difficult to say that it is not the case that there are sections of the public that have less confidence in this legislation than Members of this House.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for the patience and courtesy with which he is responding to this debate, but I am concerned about one very important element. The Minister said that the Government’s position is that we stay in the ECHR and that we are committed to it; that is the Government’s position, which cannot be overturned by a leadership candidate. But what if that candidate happens to be the current Attorney-General of England and Wales and legal adviser to Parliament and the Cabinet? That is not any old candidate, is it? Ms Braverman surely speaks for the Government, as their Attorney-General. In due course, would the Minister address my question about all these recent powers in the police Act, Nationality and Borders Act and so on, which were justified to us from that Dispatch Box by Ministers who said, “Don’t worry: there is the Human Rights Act as the safeguard, and these powers will have to be exercised in a manner compatible with that”.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

In further testing the patience of the Minister, and no doubt the House, does he really think that the constant repetition over decades of certain politicians and sections of the press that it was only undesirable people who were getting the benefit of human rights law—criminals and whoever—has had no effect whatever? That and the lack of civic education in schools about the benefits of the Human Rights Act has helped us arrive at this situation. Perhaps there is only a slight silver lining to the pandemic, which otherwise, obviously, has been horrible: that while not being able to visit their relatives in care homes, some people might have realised or had perhaps a glimmer of understanding of the relevance of human rights to protect family life, the right to life and all those other issues.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for that further explanation of the point and will happily reflect on it. At the moment, I stand by the point I made a moment ago, which is that it is right in principle for the Government to be able to decide which offences are included under the new procedure. Of course, we discuss with the Lord Chief Justice and other elements of the judiciary how these offences will be managed in practice. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, knows, the operation of the courts is run essentially under a concordat agreement between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary. I will look again at Hansard and go back to the discussion which somebody who was not quite my predecessor was involved in. For present purposes, that is my answer to the noble Lord.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Just on that—and by the way, I did not speak earlier because the case was made so well by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I think it is a kindness to the Committee at this stage not to duplicate concerns and comments—to develop the point from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and to comment on his conversation with the Minister, it is not for the Government to decide, is it? It is not actually the Government’s position that it is for them to decide which offences are covered by the new procedure, because mercifully the Government have said that there will be parliamentary procedure and regulations. It is for Parliament to decide.

Is not the point that when Parliament looks at these regulations that are made in the future, by a future Lord Chancellor who may not take such a measured approach as the Minister is taking now in relation to which offences are to be included, Parliament would benefit from regulations that come with the advice and endorsement not just of the Government of the day but of the senior judiciary?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I should say, first, that when I mentioned the noble Baroness in my speech, I was not making the point that she had not risen. I wanted her to appreciate that I had taken on board that she was opposing the clause. When I say “the Government”, of course I mean “the Government with the authority of Parliament”. We are looking at a Bill and that is taken as read. Ultimately, the question is: is it necessarily right for Parliament to say that we cannot proceed unless we know that the LCJ is on board? I suggest that it is quite proper in this case for Parliament and the Bill to say, “This is a power which can be exercised by the Lord Chancellor and no concurrence is necessary.” As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I am happy to look at this point, but that is the current position which I adopt.

I was going to make one more point on Clause 4 and Amendment 29, which seeks to raise the age of eligibility for the Section 12 procedure—often referred to as “pleading guilty by post”—from 16 to 18. This procedure has been available as an alternative method of summary-only prosecution for defendants aged 16 and over since 1957. I am not aware of any issues of concern being raised in relation to under-18s during the whole of that time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in introducing this group, I thought I would tell the Committee about my experience of sitting as a single justice magistrate dealing with Covid emergency legislation about a year ago. I dealt with fixed penalty notices handed out to people who broke the emergency legislation. The fine was £60, but if it was paid within 14 days it was £30. If that was not responded to the defendants received a letter saying that they should either turn up to court or respond to the letter or the matter would be dealt with by the single justice procedure.

I sat at my dining room table as a magistrate and I dealt with 30 trials in the morning. I convicted 29 of the 30. The prosecution case was the police officer’s note, which I had up on my screen so I could read it. There was no defence case because the defendant had not turned up. I then went on to sentence, which was a £100 fine, £100 in prosecution costs and a £34 victim surcharge, so £234 to pay and a collection order. That is what I did 29 times out of 30 last summer. It was a special time. It was a difficult procedure to go through, but we need to be very conscious of the difficulties and potential pitfalls with these types of procedures. Having said that, and given that example, I believe there are occasions and types of cases where it is appropriate.

Both my amendments make the same point in trying to build in suitable reviews of the procedure to ensure it acts fairly. Amendment 30 states:

“Within two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of the single justice procedure.”


My noble friend will speak to her Amendment 37. Amendment 54 says:

“Before section 43 may be commenced, the Lord Chancellor must—


(a) undertake a consultation with relevant stakeholders regarding the proposed abolition of local justice areas under that section, considering in particular the impact on the principle of local justice,


(b) lay before Parliament the Report and the findings of such consultation, and


(c) provide a response explaining whether and how such issues which have been identified would be mitigated.”


To say a few words on Amendment 54, magistrates arrange themselves in local justice areas. There are nine local justice areas in London. It is a historical way of organising magistrates, if I can put it that way. I understand that there are arguments on both sides. I also understand, from talking to the Minister and his officials last week, that there will be extensive consultation and further legislation on this matter if it is taken forward. Nevertheless, I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, before I speak to Amendment 37, I should like to congratulate my noble friend Lord Ponsonby on everything that his public service outside this Committee and your Lordships’ House brings to our deliberations about criminal justice. The Committee needs no reminders from me of all that the eminent silks, retired Law Lords and former members of the senior judiciary bring to your Lordships’ House. The magistracy is a very important part of the criminal justice system. My noble friend brings an experience, a humility and an anxious scrutiny of the system to our deliberations which is incredibly helpful and always illuminating.

Amendment 37 is purely a probing amendment, and I hope the Minister received that message via his office. I have unashamedly taken this opportunity to put issues concerning women and girls in the criminal justice system on the map. As the Committee and the Minister will know, this is ultimately a shared responsibility with his noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford and her department. These two great departments of state—the Home Department and the Ministry of Justice—are responsible for the whole system, including matters well beyond the scope of this Bill, such as the police and the CPS. They also have responsibilities that are dealt with in this Bill, such as for the court system.

Just last year, both Secretaries of State felt the unprecedented need to issue a public apology to women and girls for their experience of the handling of sex offences in our criminal justice system. To some extent, that has led to the resignation of the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. Perhaps more importantly still, it has led not just to terrible attrition rates for sex offences in particular, but to a real crisis of trust and confidence in the system on the part of women and girls that none of us on either side of your Lordships’ House wants to see.

I do not want to say that there should be an inquiry on the narrow grounds that happen to fit into the scope of this Bill. Rather, I want to give the Minister the opportunity to update the Committee and therefore the country on where the Government are and where they propose to be, and how quickly they can rebuild trust and confidence in relation to sex offences in particular and criminal justice in general for slightly more than half of the population.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make two separate points. First, Amendment 54, tabled by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, relates to Clause 43, which abolishes local justice areas. It says that the Lord Chancellor must,

“by regulations, make consequential or supplementary provision in relation to the abolition of local justice areas.”

I assume that the thinking behind this is that it would be convenient if all justices were appointed, say, for England and Wales and not to a local justice area, and training, deployment and other issues should be dealt with on a national basis.

I do not know what is planned, but I do know from my experience as Lord Chancellor that being a Justice of the Peace in a particular area is of very considerable importance. I also know that people are appointed as magistrates because they are committed to their local community, and that people being trained and deployed together over a period of time in a particular area is also incredibly important to local justice.

This looks to be a very wide-ranging provision which may well have been thought out in full, but I should be grateful if the Minister explained the thinking, and what is being done about recruitment, deployment and training.

--- Later in debate ---

Particularly when it comes to people with mental health problems or vulnerabilities and the like, I have certainly been in court when, if I may use the expression, “the light goes on” and they understand the seriousness of the position that they are in, and it is because of the allocation procedure. So we ought to be very careful about doing a lot of these procedures administratively or online, without the defendants present or without them being fully involved in the process. If you do that, you lose an opportunity to fully engage the defendant in the process that is happening in court. My experience, in both adult and youth courts, is that one of the greatest problems is making sure that defendants fully engage in the process. In my experience, allocation decisions are an example of where people sometimes fully engage and, as I said, the light goes on and they understand the seriousness of their position. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 36 in my name. I also support Amendment 36A in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. I declare an interest as a member of the council of JUSTICE, the all-party law reform organisation, and a British agent of the International Council of Jurists, along with many other Members of the Committee and your Lordships’ House.

Notwithstanding the praise that we all rightly heaped on my noble friend and his fellow magistrates in the earlier group, I am a passionate believer in the right to jury trial. I suspect I am not alone in that in this Committee. Juries are not perfect; however, I have defended jury trial, sometimes against Governments of both stripes, for at least 20 years. I hope I do not need to rehearse for too long why it is such an important right. It is not just because people believe in it. People want to be tried for serious matters that will send them to prison for a long time and destroy their reputations, and lives in many cases, not just because they want to be convicted by their peers; it is also important for trust and confidence in the justice system that it is not always seen as primarily about more-deprived and working people in the dock being adjudicated over by middle-class professionals like this Committee. As a third point, my experience of people who have served on juries is that it is a really important part of public service and engagement that people from a broad range of communities can ideally participate in. It is a very important glue for our country and the rule of law. I hope that did not need rehearsing, and I will stop on it there.

I note that in more controversial debates, for example around the Human Rights Act and its survival or not, some of the Minister’s colleagues—and indeed the current Justice Secretary—have said that one of the ways in which the Human Rights Act might be improved on would be with greater entrenchment of the right to jury trial. That is said on the one hand yet, on the other hand, provisions are taken to extend the sentencing powers of magistrates, which is ultimately a significantly broad back door to undermining jury trial.

I understand that the Government are concerned about the backlog. I certainly understand that the backlog in the system has been exacerbated by the pandemic. But if the Government did not share some of my concerns, they would not have added the so-called off switch in the other place that is now to be found in Clause 13. I am concerned not just in principle because of my belief in jury trial, but in practice as to whether the measures in the Bill will actually do what the Government are hoping. First, will these measures really save 1,700 sitting days in Crown Courts by enabling 500 jury trials to be switched to magistrates? Is that really a credible figure? Even if it is, we think that it would represent a saving of only 1.6% according to recent courts service estimates. Secondly, there is a presumption that defendants will not exercise their right to opt for a jury trial, which they are more likely to do if the benefit of a lesser sentence is not a temptation to take the magistrates’ court option. Thirdly, I am really concerned about whether there will be sufficient and appropriate training for magistrates if we are to double their sentencing powers. That is the rationale behind Amendment 36 and, quite possibly—I will not speak for my noble friend Lord Ponsonby—part of the rationale for Amendment 36A as well.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I express my support for Amendment 36A. When I was a member of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee we looked into the impact of the pandemic on the criminal courts. What was striking about our activity was the difficulty we had in extracting from the Ministry of Justice any valuable, reliable statistics on what was happening in the criminal justice system. To have a specific statutory obligation to produce data on this important subject is essential if Parliament is to know what the impact of these new provisions will be.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

40: Clause 38, page 53, line 12, at end insert—
“(4) After subsection (2), insert—“(2A) The coroner is not to decide that the investigation should be discontinued unless—(a) the coroner is satisfied that no outstanding evidence that is relevant to the death is available,(b) the coroner has considered whether Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged and is satisfied that it is not,(c) there are no ongoing investigations by public bodies into the death,(d) the coroner has invited and considered representations from any interested person known to the coroner named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act (“interested person”), and(e) all interested persons known to the coroner named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act consent to discontinuation of the investigation. (2B) If a coroner is satisfied that subsection (1) applies, and has complied with the provisions at subsection (2A)(a) to (d), prior to discontinuing the investigation, the coroner must—(a) inform each interested person known to the coroner named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act of the coroner’s intended decision and provide a written explanation as to the reasons for this intended decision,(b) explain to each interested person known to the coroner named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act that the investigation may only be discontinued if all such interested persons consent, and(c) invite each interested person known to the coroner named at section 47(2)(a) or (b) of this Act to consent to the discontinuation of the investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that certain safeguards are met before a coroner can discontinue an investigation into a death and that family members and personal representatives of the deceased are provided with the coroner’s provisional reasons for why the coroner considers that the investigation should be discontinued, helping ensure that family members make an informed decision as to whether to consent to the discontinuation.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am conscious that the Committee is valiant and well into the third hour of today’s proceedings; nevertheless, the next is a very important group. We are now in Chapter 4 and we are not talking even about £25 million; we are talking about life and death, bereaved families and the vital work of our coroners’ courts. We are talking about provisions that will broaden the circumstances in which coroners may discontinue their investigations. We are talking, once more, about the power to hold inquests on the papers, in writing only, and we are talking about the wider use of remote hearings. Amendments 40, 42 and 43 are in my name and I am honoured to share those with my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and maybe even my noble friend Lady Chapman of Darlington as well—I am doubly honoured. I also have the support, I am delighted to say, of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for the Liberal Democrats.

Further amendments in this group are about providing an appeals process for families who disagree with discontinuance, about ensuring that there are no audio-only inquests, even within the class of remote inquests—no telephone or audio-only inquests—and to ensure that remote hearings are still accessible to the public. Amendment 53 ensures pre-implementation consultation before the remote inquests come into effect. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, supported by his noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has a very important amendment to ensure a right of address for bereaved families. I do not see the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans in his place, but he may appear in the way that only the Lords spiritual can, and his Amendments 50A and 50B contain important provisions in relation to cases of death by suicide. The indefatigable Minister will speak to his provisions on the register of deaths, which will be important; there are things to tidy up there where an inquest has been discontinued.

I turn to Amendments 40, 42 and 43 in my name. Amendment 40 is about ensuring vital safeguards before a coroner can discontinue an investigation into a death. I hope I do not need to go into too much detail about why safeguards are important in such a scenario, but these include ensuring that family members and personal representatives of the deceased get at least a provisional indication of why this is to be the case, so that they can evaluate whether they support the discontinuance of an inquest. Amendment 42 ensures that inquests will not be held without a hearing—in other words, not on the papers only—if this is against the wishes of the bereaved family. Amendment 43 ensures safeguards before there can be a remote hearing, including by giving interested persons the reasons for that judgment.

I say to the Committee that we need to remember the position that bereaved families, in particular, and other interested parties are in when there is an unexplained or unnatural death. I commend the briefing that will have been provided to, I hope, all members of the Committee by the NGO Inquest. It has done vital work in this area for many years. I remind the Committee that legal aid is not available to these families, and it has often been inquests, over the years, that have been the sole source of support and advice to them. Sometimes these will be deaths in custody, deaths in hospital or deaths in other circumstances where people were very vulnerable and looked after, especially by the state to begin with, before that unnatural and unexplained death happened.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to coroners’ inquests, and include government and non-government amendments. I will begin with those tabled by noble Lords who have spoken and then come to the government amendment at the end.

Before I do that, I should inform the Committee that the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of St Albans has kindly sent me a note, because his Amendments 50A and 50B are in this group. As he is serving elsewhere, in Committee on the Building Safety Bill, he is unable to join this Committee this afternoon. I do not know whether this is normally done, but unless the Committee objects, I propose to write to him setting out substantially what I would have said had he been here and I will circulate the letter, because even though the amendments are not formally moved, the right reverend Prelate raises points which he has raised in the House on previous occasions.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Subject to the views of the Committee, that sounds eminently sensible. In case it is necessary, perhaps I might say that I support those amendments and would not want to deprive the right reverend Prelate of the opportunity to bring them back to the House at a later stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I understand that, certainly from my postbag. I should say that coroners work extremely hard, but the pandemic has caused a real problem. I do not want to go back to the online discussion, but we hope that enabling people to do that sort of thing online will help. I certainly take the noble Lord’s point.

To solve this, the amendments in my name will enable a coroner to provide the registrar with the information required for the registration to take place on the basis of that information. I should make it clear that we are not introducing new duties on coroners or removing the duty on qualified informants to provide information. It is intended to be used in those exceptional circumstances where qualified informants are unable or unwilling—often for good reason, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said—to discharge their duties. The effect will therefore be that the death will not go unregistered. We think that about 200 of these cases happen a year. They affect the accuracy of records, but there is also the potential for fraudulent use of the identity of an unregistered deceased person, since the identity has not been closed by the death being registered. It is not quite Day of the Jackal territory, but there is potential for fraud there. We want to close that.

For those reasons, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments and I will move mine when the time comes.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to every Member of the Committee who participated, in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for crystallising the fundamental inequality of arms that exists in so many inquests. Regardless of jurisprudence or terminology, that is how it is and how it feels for these families.

I am grateful, too, to my noble friend Lady Chapman of Darlington for making it crystal clear that evidence that cannot be challenged is going to be a huge problem, not least for compliance with Article 2, and for reminding us of the tragic case of Laura Booth, which is in the Inquest briefing in case noble Lords want to read it at leisure. There are other tragic cases of that kind, where, but for close scrutiny and the testing of evidence that initially seemed very straightforward, some real public interest problems, whether in our hospitals or elsewhere, would not have been revealed.

I am only slightly disappointed that the very busy right reverend Prelate disappointed my hope that it would be possible for a Lord spiritual to be in two places at the same time. None the less, I am very happy to take care of his amendments and ensure that he has the opportunity to bring them back next time. I think that is the right thing to do.

The Minister will forgive me, I hope, for being disappointed in the 100% defensive rebuttal of every single concern raised in this Committee. He reminds us that coroners are judicial officers and not mere administrators; of course, he is right about that. But he says that in total rebuttal of every safeguard and gentle constraint suggested—for example, the discretion to discontinue these vital investigations.

I cannot help but point out the contrast in the Government’s approach to this part and, for example, to Clauses 1 and 2. In Clause 1 we are told that it is perfectly acceptable for the legislature to constrain judicial thinking and discretion in quite convoluted ways, but here, when we want to put the needs and concerns of families into the equation, we are told that it is somehow an inappropriate constraint on the wonderful, inquisitorial, coronial province. We are reminded that coroners are inquisitorial and not adversarial, as if these terms of art are set not in aspic but in stone. I do not really care whether these are technically inquisitorial or adversarial—you can call them “Doris” as far as I am concerned. There are vital rights and interests being explored in this jurisdiction.

I am sorry to say that I do not know whether the government position is science fiction or space fantasy. In many cases these proceedings are tantamount to very difficult quasi-adversarial proceedings, but one side is silent. One side is silent because it does not have the language and resources to put its side of the picture. This is exacerbated in cases where very defensive public authorities, understandably, are heavily represented by Silks and so on. We cannot say that the full answer to that problem will be a technical, jurisprudential definition of inquisitorial versus adversarial proceedings. That is not reality at this moment in the 21st century.

I gently ask the Minister to consider meeting some representatives of the unrivalled NGO Inquest before Report. That organisation and those working within it have done so much work over the years with a number of bereaved families. I am sure they would at least help illuminate the Minister’s understanding of what some of these most difficult inquests are like for ordinary people. That would be my request to him. None the less, for the moment—but only for the moment, because having heard from my noble friend Lady Chapman and from the Liberal Democrats, I suspect that the Committee will want to return to this group on Report, and I obviously preserve the position for the spiritual Benches opposite—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 40 withdrawn.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

I apologise for getting things into a state of confusion—or nearly—by thinking that Amendment 3 was to be moved.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I will take the opportunity to jump in briefly at this stage, even though the first three groups to some extent cover similar territory. I know that in the next group we will get into the presumption in particular.

I speak now having had the considerable benefit of listening to the debate on the first group, which the Minister described as being about just giving an extra tool to the judicial toolbox, to be used where appropriate. I think that was the thrust of his remarks. That begs the question of whether it is just a tool in the box and what is and is not appropriate.

It seems that we are dealing with a judicial review of administrative action—of executive action. I know that the Minister said, “Calm down, dears, it’s not all about government as we would understand it; it is about all sorts of administrative action”. I am sure that is right. However, the principle is the same. This is executive action. Some of it is very significant for citizens’ lives and some of it less so. However, it is the job of the judiciary and Parliament, together in different ways, to hold executive action to account.

The traditional method has worked rather well. There are discretionary remedies for the judiciary and the power to legislate for Parliament, including, in extremis, to legislate retroactively. We do not like that, but if anybody is going to do it, it should be Parliament, because it is sovereign and has the democratic legitimacy to do so. That is the debate between my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thornton and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on one side, and the Minister and his supporters on the other.

To that, I think the response comes from the Minister, “Actually, the new Section 29A(1)(b) is not doing what you think it’s going to do. This is just remedies; it is not about rewriting history and saying that the unlawful decision or subordinate legislation was always lawful. It is just about the effect of the quashing, not about changing history”. If that is the genuine intention of the Government with this provision, I respectfully suggest to the Minister that some clarification and comfort other than reassurances from the Dispatch Box may be required. That is to deal with the fact that we are not actually giving a retroactive legislative power —let alone duty, to which we will come—to the court.

Maybe, if I can be helpful, there is some room for explicit clarification to that effect. Having listened to the previous group, I too do not see the point of new Section 29A(1)(b) if this is just about giving extra tools to the judicial toolbox to use where appropriate. In all this I am mostly worried about the people not in the courtroom—the people who are not the litigants in the particular case but who rely on that particular judicial review, brought by one individual or a small group of individuals who had the means, either because they had personal means or the benefit of legal aid, which is not widely available these days. I am worried about anything that would shut out the possibility of good administration being provided for all the people—there could be hundreds or thousands or millions—who were not in the room and could then be shut out from justice because of something that it was not appropriate for the court to do. Why? The courts, unlike Parliament, are not best suited to polycentric decision-making. If there is to be emergency legislation because of a particular decision around illegality of regulations and so on, it is better dealt with in Parliament because Parliament will be able to look at all the potential cases in the round and will have the legitimacy to so act. The Government cannot have it both ways.

By the way, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks: Governments of all stripes get irritated with judicial review from time to time. However, whoever is in power, it is not for politicians to have it both ways and criticise judicial overreach on the one hand but then ask the judges to do their dirty work for them when they have been found to act unlawfully on the other.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I feel tempted to respond to the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Beith. It is absolutely true that this particular form of words does not find its way into our report in any way. That, of course, does not necessarily mean that it is a mistake to include it in the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, gives a choice that is not very inviting: either this is a mere surplusage, in which case it should go, or it is potentially something that an inexperienced judge might get wrong or feel compelled by to make an order that he or she would not otherwise want to make. I wonder if that does not slightly overstate the case. I should say that I am not wholly convinced of its necessity, but I do not think it anything like as damaging as has been described.

After all, before you even get to the question of whether the court is to make a quashing order, a considerable number of hurdles have to be surmounted, as do a number of considerations which we have canvassed during the course of the debate. So, if the “interests of justice”, or whatever term that the judge directs himself or herself to, have allowed them to reach the conclusion that it is not appropriate to make a quashing order, this question of a presumption, whether it is a weak or a strong one, simply does not arise. Of course, the judge can also simply say, “Well, I take into account subsection (9), but I don’t see a good reason for making the order”, having regard to whatever it might be. I do not see it as quite the same hurdle race that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, described it as.

I will listen carefully to the Minister on why it is in there. I do not think it particularly harmful, but there is, as it were, enough here to allow the judges to do what is fair without necessarily including this particular presumption.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, on his Amendment 13. He rightly suspected that my Amendment 14 is a little more in the way of a probing amendment. I tabled it because of the concern I expressed earlier about the people not in the room when, by definition, a judicial review is brought by one party against a government department.

My Amendment 14 would be far less preferable to his Amendment 13 if we could clear up the problem with proposed subsection 29A(1)(b). As I said earlier, there is the question of whether that starts engaging the court with a more legislative function in deciding exactly who is and is not to benefit from the wider class of citizens not in the room.

So, we are back to the Minister’s saying that this is just about putting some extra discretionary tools in the judicial toolbox, to be used where appropriate. If that is the case and we could clear up the issue with paragraph (b), I would have no problem with allowing this extra tool, so that, in some cases, the quashing could not take effect until a future date, and the department could sort itself out and effect new regulations or, if necessary, even come to Parliament with emergency legislation. As a former government lawyer, I would have no problem with that possibility—but why all the rest of it?

On the one hand, the Minister talks about trusting the courts; on the other hand, we are all to be tied in knots with our various interpretations of all the various differently tilted tests that follow. That is probably the difference between me and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I say that because I have genuinely changed my mind about various aspects of this during Committee. If it is just a tool in the toolbox, make it an open-textured discretion that allows the suspended quashing order, and leave the rest to the court.

I shall make two further points. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made an essential point that is worth repeating: central government is a party to most judicial reviews and certainly the ones that are going to cause concern to the Government. So the Government can relax a little at this stage, knowing that any crucial arguments about the effect of particular discretionary remedies on wider public administration will be put by government lawyers to the court. Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, talked about the risk of litigation with an overly complex provision. That has to be taken seriously. I hope it will not be said in response that that amounts to a threat. That has been said to me in the past when I have suggested that a convoluted provision will lead to litigation. It is not a threat; it is based on experience of what happens when discretion is tied in knots in that way. Inevitably, that leads to more litigation, not less.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely support the amendments put forward, for the reasons that have been given. I do not want to add to them. It seems odd to give judges discretion and say that we trust them, then immediately circumscribe what they can do.

That leads to my concern about new Section 29A(10). When listening to the Minister earlier, I asked myself why new Section 29A(8) was there because all the points are perfectly obvious. I wonder whether we are looking at a new technique here being laid down for future use. Do you list perfectly obvious things in new subsection (8) to bring in the killer in new subsection (10)? I hope the Minister can assure us that we are not going to see in any future legislation dealing with judicial review—who knows whether there will be any—the codification of perfectly obvious principles as a means of bringing in by the back door what one sees here in new subsection (10).

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I think I replied to that point in the previous group. The interests of justice test is subsumed here because you can use these remedies only where there is no good reason not to do so; in other words, if there is a good reason not to do so, you cannot use the remedies. Therefore, necessarily, every time you are considering whether to use the remedies, it is in the interests of justice to do so.

If I may repackage the noble and learned Lord’s question, it really is: why not just say, “in the interests of justice”, or have a freestanding discretion? That point was put by a number of members of the Committee and gets me back to my point that we want jurisprudence to develop, and we want the court positively to consider these remedies. This is not least because there could be cases—the music copyright case is one—where these remedies would be very helpful to third parties, while the instant parties to the case may not be too bothered whether they are used or not.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Does the Minister understand that his comments about third parties are now making me feel more nervous again about proposed new section 29A(1)(b)? We are effectively opening the door to judicial legislation in relation to immunising the Secretary of State from further challenges by a whole class of people who are not currently in the court; we are therefore doing the legislative thing in removing or limiting any retrospective effect of the quashing, as opposed to just delaying the quashing for the future.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

With respect, no. The noble Baroness is looking at this in a very negative way. The whole point about the music copyright case was that the prospective-only remedy was there to protect people who have relied on the regulations. One must not look at these cases with the view that you have all these people out there with claims against the Government and the prospective-only remedy insulates the Government from all these other claims. There are lots of cases where a local authority, or the Government, or some other public body has made a decision and people have relied on it. Businesses have been set up, people have taken out bank loans and made investments. In those cases, I ask rhetorically, should all those third-party interests be disregarded merely because in the case of the claimant bringing the judicial review, his bank loan has not been drawn down yet, so he does not mind whether they are upheld, so to speak, prospectively or retrospectively?

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said in the very first debate, there is a wide gamut of cases that come before the courts, and we have to give remedial flexibility; that is what all of this is seeking to do.

--- Later in debate ---

and linking “adequate redress” to the relevant defect—the noble Baroness will have picked up that it is not “adequate redress” in relation to the claimant or the parties before the court but in relation to the relevant defect—further emphasises that the imperative is for remedies to be practical and suited to the circumstances, including those of third parties, and not arbitrarily constrained—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am hugely and genuinely grateful to the Minister for that, because it cuts to the heart of my residual concern about proposed subsection 29A(1)(b). It is that the Government are thinking of circumstances—copyright and others have been cited—where granting the immediate quashing order, which may be what the applicant in the particular case is seeking, would cause all sorts of problems for other people not in the courtroom, certainly in the Government’s view. Of course, it is the job of the elected Government to think about all of those other classes. Therefore, in that case, the Government would seek to invite the court to make all sorts of detailed delineations to remove or limit any retrospective effect of the quashing, but that would be the Government inviting the judiciary into a quasi-legislative role that it is not best placed to discharge, given that it would be just the Government’s view of those wider interests, not challenged in Parliament, as the Government are.

So, although I am so grateful to the Minister for making that genuine point about the need for polycentric decision-making, there is a limit to what you can ask the court to do. Remember, this would not even be the substantive judicial review hearing; this would just be the argument about remedies.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I would not say that it is “just” about remedies; as this debate shows, remedies are very important. But I do not think that Mr Justice Green, in the music copyright case, felt that he was legislating in any way. As we heard in the first debate, this issue goes back to Lord Reid and indeed further.

There are two separate issues here. First, should we have prospective-only quashing orders as a matter of principle? We dealt with that in the first group, and I set out the reasons why. Secondly, in this group, should there be any sort of presumption? That is the point that I am seeking to address. But I hope that what I have said on third parties assuages the noble Baroness on both the presumption and prospective quashing orders generally.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, asked me whether this will become a standard approach for future legislation. There, I really would be going well beyond my remit. However, going back to what I said earlier, there is nothing conceptually unusual here in either a presumption or a list of factors. There is certainly nothing sinister—a word that was used by someone in that context.

I hope that what I have said goes at least some way to clarifying the concerns that have been raised on the presumption. Of course, I have listened very carefully to what has been said, and I shall reflect on it further. For the moment, I invite the proposers of the amendments not to press them.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 29 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, any anxiety that I may have felt earlier this afternoon about the Whip’s injunction to be brief largely evaporated in the distinguished debate that I just heard, because, the more I heard the eloquent succinctness, particularly of noble Lords opposite—the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and others—the less anxious I felt about initially crossing sections of my notes out and eventually remaining silent. So I feel equally confident about the solidarity and inspiration to come.

With the Committee’s indulgence, I propose to open up this section on interpretation, which goes on for about three groups, but not to pop up on each group; rather, I shall make my points about this whole concept of reinterpreting the convention here. I do so knowing full well that noble Lords from around the Committee will ventilate granular and very important concerns about reinterpreting “social group”, for example, from the disjunctive to the conjunctive approach to trip up some claimants—or about doctoring the burden and standard of proof and turning persecution, in the context of non-state persecution, into something that does not grant refugee protection where the reasonable steps in which the other state is engaged are totally failing, and so on. Initially, then, I will leave others to extrapolate those concerns and, instead, my own part in the collective approach in this Committee will be on the fundamental problem with reinterpreting the refugee convention in this legislation, which begins with Clause 29 and goes on. I hope the Committee is happy for me to make my contribution on that basis.

I have a fundamental objection to the entire approach with this reinterpreting of a shared post-World War II refugee convention, not because I do not trust this country to take control of its borders and laws and so on, but because in order for the convention to work, it has to be an international enterprise, and also because I trust our courts. Although Ministers have said at various points on previous days of this Committee that it is for Parliament, not the UNHCR, to interpret the convention, what they really mean is that it is for the Home Office and not the courts—neither the courts over there, nor the courts here.

What is really going on is that the Government are not taking the approach that they took with the internal market Bill of just being open and honest about an intention to violate international law; they are doing it by this sleight of hand. You could almost call it “violation laundering”, because they will palm it off on Parliament and, once they have done that—once this rewriting of the jurisprudence of the convention has been passed through Parliament—we will be the laundromat: it will be on us that decades and continents-worth of international human rights jurisprudence around this convention will not bite any more to protect those seeking asylum in the UK. I certainly do not want that on my conscience, and I suspect the Committee does not either.

This is wrong because it is a violation of the principle that this treaty has been entered into in good faith, which is obviously a principle of common sense and the Vienna convention, and so on. It is outrageous because it is telling the courts, including our own, that all this jurisprudence that has been built up over years of dealing with cases, with some of the greatest jurists in our history, including Lord Bingham, can go out of the window because the Home Office has a better idea—one which is, of course, designed to trip people up. Let us be clear: it is not designed to extend convention protection to more people; it goes back to the stump speeches we heard from various noble Lords last week about numbers and so on and is not at all about refugee protection and honouring the convention.

I get to the point where I actually think that maybe it would be more honest for the Government to do what some noble Lords have occasionally tempted them to do, which is to put their hands up and say, “We don’t believe in this refugee convention anymore. It is inconvenient and old-fashioned; we don’t like the numbers, and we’re not having any of it.” There is something Orwellian, distasteful and misleading of the electorate to go through these contortions and perversions of language and law.

Maybe other noble Lords in Committee will have a different view of that, but it is coming to the point where these contortions of language and jurisprudence are so obscene and genuinely Orwellian—I know that word is overused, but for me it was never about having six cameras in the street instead of three; for me, it is about Politics and the English Language, Orwell’s greatest work, and the abuse of language that leads to the abuse of people. That is what is wrong with this whole section—it is not in good faith; it is not a reflection of the jurisprudence; it is an attempt by sleight of hand to undermine it.

This is not just terrible in the context of refugee protection, which, given what is at stake, is bad enough; it is really bad for Britain and the rule of law, which is arguably one of our greatest exports—not David Beckham’s left or right foot, not even Shakespeare or Elgar, but the rule of law. It is the reason why, unfortunately, so many oligarchs want to come here, in addition to hiding their money. They want to sue each other in our courts and hire some of our noble and learned Lords to go and judge their arbitrations in secret, because there is something magical and special about our law.

When we share our jurisprudence in good faith with supreme courts and constitutional courts around the world, we are not just affecting refugee protection here but influencing that jurisprudence all over the world; and that is an export too. You cannot measure it in pounds and pence, but you can measure it in a truly global Britain and a better world. There needs to be this international conversation between judges here and over there, in good faith and influenced by each other’s jurisprudence. By reinterpreting the convention, we throw it all out. It is year nought in the Home Office, and all that jurisprudence goes out the window because we have rewritten the convention via this totally offensive clause. Of course, Ministers have an oath, and they are supposed to respect international law—enough said about that.

I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, is having a break now, not just because it is good to have a break but because it gives me the opportunity to put a question to the Minister the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, that I tried to put last night in the context of a different Bill, about whether the Government have already instructed parliamentary counsel on the Bill to scrap the Human Rights Act. In the last group, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, invoked convention rights, the ECHR and our participation in that in defence, so it is an important question in practical terms, because it can always be said that we will not be sending anybody for Article 3 treatment and so on and so forth. It is also really important because Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires that all other legislation be read compatibly with convention rights as far as it is possible to do so. In this pandemic period, I have heard noble Lords opposite, and Ministers in particular, invoking that in defence of the CHIS Bill, the overseas operations Bill, the police Bill: “Don’t worry, because remember, there is always the Human Rights Act as a catch-all protection—particularly the interpretation provision but also the duty on public authorities to comply.” If parliamentary counsel have already been instructed to draft the Bill that will scrap the Human Rights Act, we need to read all of this in a slightly different light, do we not? Frankly, even in the light that we currently have, it is bad enough.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

On the first point, of course the EU sought to interpret the refugee convention for all its members. But that actually makes my point, because it is only for the members of the EU. All the other states will interpret it in their own way. If you want to hand over your interpreting power to the EU, that is fine if you are a member—but I suggest that that does not cut across my basic point.

As to the effect of leaving the EU, if we have hitherto signed up to various interpretations through EU regulations, we now have an opportunity to look at the matter afresh, as I said when I began. To go further into that point would go way beyond the scope of this group.

Finally, I come back to the question put to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, about “scrapping” —I think that was the word she used last night as well—the Human Rights Act. I said last night, and I will give the same answer now, that the Human Rights Act brings into English domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights. We have reaffirmed— I did it yesterday; I will do it again now—that this Government will stay in as a signatory to the convention.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for that, but will he answer my question a bit more specifically? Has he instructed parliamentary counsel to begin the drafting process for the Bill that will replace, repeal or reinterpret the Human Rights Act and/or the convention on human rights?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

As a matter of policy, I am afraid I am not going to get into the discussions I have with government law officers and parliamentary counsel. The Government’s legislative programme has been set out. The Lord Chancellor, the Deputy Prime Minister and I have given evidence on this. We have made it clear that we will be staying in the European Convention on Human Rights. In so far as the burden of the noble Baroness’s challenge was that we have to be careful, because the Government are watering down rights, we are staying in the European Convention on Human Rights. Therefore—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who contributed to this group. I believe there was a great deal of consensus in the Committee, but I am sure the Minister was grateful for the support of his doughty and always agreeable noble friend the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts.

I say to the Minister that asserting does not make it so. Asserting, reasserting, “We’re in the convention” and “We will honour the convention” are not enough in the face of the very detailed analysis of these provisions by the UNHCR, the Bingham Centre, Raza Husain QC and, if I may say so, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, again in his always agreeable way, was trying to help the Minister out. The Minister might take his hand and shake it. It is not a hand, it is a lifeboat, but I will be told off again for using metaphors. Last week I was told of by the Minister for using the word “tawdry” too many times; I thought I was on “Just a Minute”. Today, it is metaphors.

I will try one more metaphor with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, who asked a very pertinent question of the Minister. Is this not a simplification, rather than a dilution or repudiation? I believe the noble Lord comes from a business background and has often referred to the Wharton school of business. We all draw on our experience and I think a basic contract is not a bad analogy to draw here. It is the equivalent of the chief executive of a company that has been in a contractual relationship with another company for many years getting a bit fed up with various provisions of this contract that has nevertheless been working. We are talking 50 or 70 years of this contract between the parties, when the chief executive thinks, “Maybe we need to reinterpret the various articles of this contract”. He decides not just to repudiate it, because that would be embarrassing, illegal and unlawful, but he says to his board, “What we are going to do in the boardroom is reinterpret all the provisions in a way that is different from the way that we ourselves have honoured them in the past”. “We ourselves” include learned judges such as Lord Bingham and others from all over the world. We are now going to year nought and are rewriting it. We are not just simplifying; we are making material differences, in some places to the convention and in others to decades of jurisprudence, by changing “or” to “and” and changing standards of proof. This is not insignificant.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

The noble Baroness’s description of how business works, with an agreement that has lasted for a number of years, is far from the reality of any business in which I have ever worked. It is not a good analogy to use with my noble friend on the Front Bench. There may be all sorts of reasons, as we have heard, about international law, European law, UK law, UK primary legislation and UK secondary legislation, all of which cut across. They are completely different from a single arrangement in business, in which there is a contract, of one sort or another, between two firms. This is not a good analogy at all. I much prefer the complications, which my noble friend referred to, seeking to sort this out.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Forgive me; I stand corrected by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts—as always, certainly in matters of business. I was merely trying to suggest that we cannot repudiate a contract by pretending that we are reinterpreting it, when we are making material differences to the relationship between the contracting parties.

Finally on the UNHCR, it is set out in Article 35(1) of the refugee convention:

“The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.”

Clause 29 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. In a previous group, the noble Baroness the Minister—I was very grateful to her—sought to make distinctions between immigration and asylum protection; I think that was quite important. To be now almost resiling from that and suggesting, in answer to a previous intervention, that we are going to reinterpret the refugee convention—to respond to the millions of people who voted for Mr Johnson’s Government on the basis of controlling immigration—is a little troubling. I do not think I am alone in the Committee in being so troubled.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am surprised that anyone in a democracy is troubled by a Government listening to the people and putting forward legislation which, first, delivers on a manifesto commitment, and, secondly—as I have said and I repeat —is entirely consistent with our international law obligations. There is nothing wrong and everything right with each signatory to the refugee convention interpreting its obligations under it; we have now been around that point on several occasions.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

I will try to edit my speech as I go. I support Amendment 118, to which I was pleased to add my name. We all agree that we do not want unsafe journeys, and there is no silver bullet: the situation is complex. If a deterrent was really the answer, securitising the Eurotunnel and the ferry ports has not worked; it has just created even more dangerous routes. So we must have more safe and legal routes.

The major reason I support the idea of a humanitarian visa is that it is a further safe and legal route. It also addresses the issue of people coming from the countries where there are smaller numbers who face persecution and so on, for whom bespoke schemes are never going to be created. Last year, only 93 people arrived from Iraq, five from Yemen, none from Iran and 36 from Sudan. That is all those who were resettled last year. The focus became so heavy last year on Afghanistan and Hong Kong, through the BNO scheme, that all other refugees appeared to be forgotten, so we need this kind of visa. I hope the Minister will not pick holes in the way the amendment is worded because the point is that this kind of visa needs to be looked at.

I also speak in favour of Amendment 116—it is very nice to speak with the noble Lord, Lord Horam, on one occasion. During the Syrian crisis of 2015, a target was set of 20,000 and it helped galvanise everybody with a vision of what could be done. It helped local authorities to understand what kind of numbers they might expect and so on. We also saw through that process the creation of the community sponsorship scheme, so we came up with a new thing through a targeted number. Ten thousand is a number widely supported, as the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, noted, by huge numbers of refugee organisations because the UNHCR has identified that it is, roughly speaking, our fair share across the world. It is not a number plucked out of thin air but from looking at our fair share across the globe. I hope that we will hear positively the idea that it can happily include the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme. I shall stop there because we need to keep moving.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, this is the safe-route group and I associate myself with so much of what I have heard already, although I signed the amendments in the names of my noble friend Lord Dubs and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who is absent. We have heard already about the many ways in which the Government try to have it both ways in the Bill. On a previous group, we heard from the Minister how, for example, European precedent is to be hugged if it is deleterious to the refugee but shunned if it means co-operation and burden-sharing. We have understood that the Government, essentially, want to make it harder with the Bill to get here but if you manage to get here, it will be harder to qualify for protection because we are rewriting the convention.

The Government tell us that they do not want people coming via unsafe routes, in little boats and so on, yet they do not provide adequate safe routes—or maybe they do, but if so they do not want it to be in statute because while it is important to fetter judicial discretion in statute, Home Office largesse should not be similarly constrained, structured or put in law. This group deals with the final two contradictions in particular: providing the safe routes and putting them in statute. For those two reasons I really hope that the Minister, who I know to be a compassionate and logical person, will see the need for something in statute to go with sentiment about safe routes.

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 116 in the name of my noble friend Lord Kirkhope, to which it was a pleasure to add my name. Listening to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, I was persuaded by his arguments as well on Amendment 119B. I too shall edit along the way, given the speeches already made.

As we debated last week, I have grave concerns about the creation of a two-tiered refugee system but was encouraged to hear my noble friend the Minister agree that creating a two-tiered system can make sense only if there are adequate and consistent safe and legal routes. As my noble friend set out in the debate last Tuesday and circulated in her note, the Government have taken steps in recent years to create some safe and legal routes, as we have heard, through the refugee family reunion scheme, the Afghan resettlement scheme and the vulnerable persons resettlement scheme.

I am encouraged that the New Plan for Immigration charts a road map for resettlement, albeit without setting an annual target. It states:

“The UK’s commitment to resettling refugees will continue to be a multi-year commitment with numbers subject to ongoing review guided by circumstances and capacity at any given time.”


It also confirms the Government’s objectives that

“programmes are responsive to emerging international crises”.

This amendment is not intended to say that there are currently no safe and legal routes; we have heard that there are some. Instead, it pushes for greater consistency in our approach to ensure that there are pathways for the most volatile situations in the world. If we want to be responsive to emerging international crises, we need the infrastructure in place to do so, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out.

One of our greatest challenges for Afghan arrivals has been that we do not have the capacity or infrastructure to take such a big influx so quickly. This is largely because we do not have that infrastructure for welcome and integration in place. The success of the Canadian approach to refugee resettlement lies in its consistency. There is strong integration infrastructure, well-resourced civil society groups and genuine expertise in local authorities. This is why the Government setting a baseline target of the number of refugees who will be resettled by safe and legal routes could help to build and maintain the infrastructure that is required.

If the response to Afghanistan proves one thing, it is that we need to guarantee consistency to both the local authorities and civil society groups which do so much to ensure smooth transitions for asylum seekers. A predictable but flexible global resettlement model in which the Government retain control over how many places are allocated enables the Home Office to react swiftly to international refugee crises in a co-ordinated fashion with local authorities to scale provision in line with demand if required.

My noble friend the Minister will observe that the four named supporters of this amendment sit on the Conservative Benches. This is not because other Members of this House were not supportive, but because the strength of support on the Conservative Benches meant that we got there first. A basic target of 10,000 would ensure that every year we are joining the international community in what needs to be a global response and ensures the Government can say with integrity that it is not only firm, but fair.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

What I encouraged noble Lords to come up with at Second Reading were solutions, not new routes. I have consistently said, and written to noble Lords on this, that we have a number of very good safe and legal routes.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down—to use the convention, although I am glad she is resting for a moment—she talked about this group being about uncapped routes and visas, but many, if not most, of these amendments are probing, as she will appreciate. She will also appreciate, because of her experience in the department, that visas do not have to be uncapped. For example, my noble friend Lady Kennedy’s amendment about emergency visas for human rights defenders is probing that the Secretary of State must do something in the rules about human rights defenders; it is not saying that every human rights defender in trouble around the world must be allowed in as if it is a new human rights defenders convention—my noble friend is just probing and asking the Government whether we can do something in the rules or in some kind of statutory form. The Minister has this massive brief, and I sympathise with her. On the police Bill, she has taken special measures for front-line emergency workers to get extra protection—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Evans of Bowes Park) (Con)]

Will the noble Baroness ask a question? It is getting very late at night; can we please try to focus points? We absolutely accept that we need everyone—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is always me.

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

It is genuinely not the noble Baroness, but we also need to work together —please—to get this Bill through. It is an important Bill. All noble Lords absolutely have the right to say what they want, but we also need to get this through. I am sorry, but can we please focus on that? We will let everyone speak, but please be aware of the time and what everyone else needs to be doing tonight.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Why do we need to get the Bill through? Why can we not leave it until after the recess? I do not understand. This is the Government’s problem—they have created this problem for us.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The intervention was on me—

[Baroness Evans of Bowes Park (Con)]

I am sorry; I did not mean it to be about the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry, but this is not the first time this has happened. I have been here all through Committee with the Minister. This is the second time the Leader of the House has done this when she has not been here—she has come in and it is beginning to feel a bit personal. I want that on the record. The Minister knows what I am getting at and I do not think she thinks I have been taking up too much time in this Committee this evening.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is an absolute privilege to follow my learned friend, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with his unrivalled experience in this area. I have had the pleasure to work with him for not 40 but 25 years, including in defence of the noble Lord, Lord Howard, and against the interests and decisions of previous Labour Governments. I also declare my interest as a council member of Justice, and I join others in welcoming and congratulating my noble friend, who, like a maiden, is introduced for the very first time.

Each new week brings another briefed or otherwise-exposed attack upon the rule of law from a Government neither conservative nor liberal in their instincts towards a once-treasured value. This populist pattern is as wearing on the soul as it is corrosive to vital institutions of good governance, without which trust in democracy cannot be sustained. Yet however soul-destroying the exercise, we in your Lordships’ House cannot afford to let up in our scrutiny, even of measures that appear—perhaps at first glance, to the lay or naked eye—to be slightly less offensive than entrenching discrimination against Travellers, putting down peaceful dissent, repelling refugees or engaging in voter suppression. Attacks upon judicial review, obtaining criminal convictions online with insufficient safeguards and having fewer jury trials and inquests need to be seen in that broader context, with an eye to millions of hidden victims of the arrogant, indolent and ignorant Government whom the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, has recently left.

Judicial review of administrative action is a vital protection in a system founded upon the rule of law. It cannot be conflated with civil disputes between individuals or commercial litigation between corporations. It exists to level the playing field between citizens and the state to prevent oppression of the former and corruption of the latter.

Individual cases must be seen not as nuisances to be swatted away by an omniscient Executive. The independent “judge over your shoulder” is as much a check and balance upon government as is your Lordships’ unelected House. Indeed, legislature and judiciary work in tandem to ensure that Ministers and officials respect the letter and spirit of both the rules and the discretion accorded to government by a sovereign Parliament—not a sovereign Executive. A single successful judicial review finding of illegality against the Administration need not result in an avalanche of claims, as long as the Secretary of State or another public authority halts unlawful practice and the court possesses adequate discretionary remedies in relation to both the claimant and all others in the affected class.

Clauses 1 and 2 need to be seen in this light. Binding or attempting to bind the hands of courts with a presumption towards prospective-only quashing orders could have the following consequences, as we have heard. Criminal convictions under unlawful emergency regulations could go unquashed. Unlawful taxation or deprivation of benefits could go unrectified, to the detriment of hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens who might be driven into debt or destitution. Unlawful and even corrupt government grant schemes could be struck down by the courts but with millions or billions in unjust enrichment unrecoverable by the state. People unlawfully removed from the country, including British nationals, would be dependent on the largesse of the Government who unlawfully removed them for a route home. Ousting or excluding the court’s jurisdiction over Upper Tribunal permission decisions could deny review to those denied asylum on the basis of fundamental errors of law. It could deny scrutiny of flawed tax or benefit regimes or decisions affecting millions of pounds and people.

Perhaps the Minister will reassure us that such things just do not happen here or with the overarching protection of the Human Rights Act. After all, it is his name on the statement. Would he like to respond to rumours that the Government have already begun drafting a Bill to scrap the Human Rights Act?

The papers report that it will take a “Panzer division” to remove the Prime Minister from No. 10. That phrase is surely worthy of the Jimmy Carr joke book and the Donald Trump playbook combined. This Bill, however, is no joke, because no one is above the law.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord is right about EU arrangements. I remember as an MEP fighting hard on the inadmissibility provisions in EU directives. On the Dublin arrangements, my understanding is that the UNHCR is satisfied that those arrangements were compliant with the refugee convention. I contend that Clause 15 is not, hence I have put my name to some of the amendments in this group. My noble friend will propose that Clause 15 be removed altogether, as it fails to recognise the need to share asylum responsibilities with other countries in order for the international system to work effectively, but at least some changes to the clause are necessary, and so I have co-signed the amendments suggested by the JCHR, tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs.

Amendments 69, 70, 71 and 75 all seek to restrict and improve the operation of the scheme proposed in Clause 15. I also support Amendment 68, and convey the apologies of my noble friend Lord Oates, who has a conflict with other business. Clause 15 is about proposals whereby the UK would attempt to persuade some other country to take responsibility for the asylum applicant if it considered that there was a connection to that state, broadly defined, or even if there was no connection at all.

Amendment 69 seeks to ensure that the definition of “safe third State” means it affords the protection and rights to which the person is entitled, so there is no real risk of them experiencing persecution, a violation of their human rights or refoulement, and that there is access to fair and efficient asylum procedures and refugee convention rights. Amendment 70 seeks to ensure that any removal should be only to a state with which the person has a connection. Amendment 71 requires that, unless formal and legal binding return arrangements are in place with the state in question—such as was the case with Dublin, which is why the UNHCR gave it its blessing—and removal takes place within a reasonable period. Absent those conditions, there must be no declaration of inadmissibility and the claim must be considered in the UK. Amendment 75 removes and rejects the suggestion that the UK can remove a claimant to a country in which the UK Government think it would have been reasonable for them to have made a claim, even if they had never visited that country.

As I said, even if these four amendments were adopted, Clause 15 would still be flawed. It would create yet greater delays, backlogs and costs in the asylum system. As we keep saying, the Home Office says the system is broken yet it wants to shoot itself in the foot by having ever-more complicated and long-winded procedures. It would also create greater anxieties for claimants and disruption to the international system. Therefore, Clause 15 must be at least amended, if not removed.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, unsurprisingly, I agree with everyone who has spoken so far except, I am afraid, for the noble Lord, Lord Horam. This is why: we are out of the EU now and have taken back control of our borders and laws. This is the Government’s policy. We are no longer in this family of nations, this bloc called the EU. Therefore, on what logical basis should we be saying that, by definition, we will never consider a claim made by an asylum seeker from that group?

It is one thing when you are in the EU to say that we do not need to be taking refugees from the EU because there is free movement in the EU and we are part of that bloc. You might well say that it will be inadmissible and that we do not consider refugee claims from within that family of nations of which we are a part, but we are not in it anymore. We have taken back control. Therefore, we are no longer able to assert pressure on others in that group to buck up their ideas about human rights or to threaten the Hungarians with being ejected from the EU if they do not sort out their human rights record. We do not have that leverage anymore. Therefore, it is our obligation as global Britain, as great believers in human rights and a signatory to the refugee convention, that if Hungarians are being persecuted we will consider their claims for asylum because we are better than them and we have taken back control in a lovely global Britain sort of way. It is totally illogical for Clause 14 to be part of the Bill.

More generally, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, made an important point about complexity and efficiency. In an earlier group, everyone in the Committee agreed that decision-making needs to be faster and better. That is in everybody’s interest, whichever side of the argument we are on. Creating lots of convoluted provisions about what is inadmissible, before you even consider whether someone is being persecuted, will only make life harder for caseworkers in the home department. I have seen Governments of both persuasions do this over the years. They think they are making it easier, but they actually make it harder by creating more convoluted hoops for people to jump through before their claim is even considered. It is better to have a clean slate and to consider somebody’s circumstances: do they qualify for asylum or not? It would be much easier without all these hoops, so Clauses 14 and 15 should go.

Just consider the claims: if countries are safe, they are safe. If people are not telling the truth, test their credibility and make that decision. Of course, I agree with everything my noble friend Lord Dubs said about safe countries, who has or does not have an association with one and the Government making the decision for them on a spurious basis.

Finally, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, it is a well-established principle of refugee convention jurisprudence the world over that you do not have to be persecuted just by agents of the state. States have a duty to protect all the people in their state. If they do not do it, there can be behaviour and persecution by non-state agents within that territory. If the state is not offering protection, if there is no effective rule of law, it is not enforcing the criminal law and is allowing Roma or gay people or whoever to be persecuted by fascist skinheads in Hungary or whatever it is, that is persecution for the purposes of the refugee convention.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I will be brief. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for moving Amendment 68 and associate my name with this amendment. It deals with a glaring omission. I hope the Government will accept the amendment because, as has been rightly said, the Bill states:

“The Secretary of State must declare an asylum claim made by a person who is a national of a member State inadmissible … For the purposes of subsection (4) exceptional circumstances”.


This is where Amendment 68 beautifully sits and deals with that omission because intolerance is on the rise on the grounds of many protected characteristics listed within the Equality Act not only in Hungary, but in Poland and other parts of the EU. Indeed, the EU is somewhat restricted in what it can do with independent member states on some of these issues. I hope that the Minister will indicate that the Government will move on this, and the other positive amendments within this group, because in the end we are dealing with issues of human rights.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but my feeling about these amendments is that that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, is right and that the best answer is to strike out the clause.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am so sorry but would the noble Lord remove his mask for a moment so we could better hear his wisdom?

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Was everything I said even more incomprehensible than usual? Basically, I am saying that we can amend and improve this a bit, but it would be much better to get rid of it.

I also have one point of detail. I am struck by the double reference to the definition of a safe third country, which I believe is irrelevant because the refugee convention says what it says. The definition is that a safe third country

“is one from which a person will not be sent to another State … otherwise than in accordance with the Refugee Convention”

and that is repeated later. Of course, there is absolutely nothing in the refugee convention about sending somebody to a safe third country, or sending somebody to any country, except there is the firm ban on refoulement, that is, sending somebody back to the country where he had the justified fear of persecution. I understand why the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has that phrase in his amendment. He is thinking about refoulement, but the Government, when they put it in the Bill, are not thinking just about refoulement. They are thinking about their doctrine of having to seek asylum in the first safe country. They are thinking about their strange reading of Article 31 of the refugee convention. They are not letting Article 1 speak for itself, and their reading of the convention is a quite different one, as was explained by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Etherton, Lord Brown and Lord Clarke, with a different definition from the one that has become the jurisprudence of this country.

--- Later in debate ---

I understand the spirit of Amendments 69, 69A and 73A in seeking to define a safe third state to ensure that an individual removed to that country is provided with adequate protection, and that their individual rights as a refugee are recognised under the refugee convention.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Briefly, on the Minister’s previous point in response to the right reverend Prelate about refugees being able to fly here instead of making perilous crossings, will she make a commitment that the Government will not slap transit visa restrictions on jurisdictions that produce a lot of genuine refugees because of what is happening over there, and that they will not use carriers’ liability as a deterrent for people trying to escape through that safer method?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Can I write to the noble Baroness on that? I suspect that I will misspeak if I try to answer because there are several things in that question that I am thinking about. I hope that she is okay for me to write to her.

The definition of a safe third state is already set out in the clause. It ensures that, even if a country is not a signatory to the refugee convention, the principles of the convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country. It defines safe third countries as states where an individual will not be sent to another state where they would be at risk of persecution or a breach of their Article 3 ECHR rights. This is consistent with our obligation under the refugee convention to ensure that individuals are not subject to refoulement; I keep pronouncing it as “refowlment”, which is completely wrong. This definition has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries and is a widely recognised definition of a safe third state; it is used in EU law under the procedures directive.

I want to come to point made by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that the UNHCR says that we are breaking the refugee convention. There are three groups of amendments on this in Committee—not today, but shortly, so I will not go too much into the convention. We have already touched on it. We think that everything we are doing complies with our international obligations, including the convention. The first safe country principle is the fastest route to safety and widely recognised internationally. It is a fundamental feature of the Common European Asylum System. It is self-evident that those in need of protection should claim in the first safe country and that is the fastest route to safety.

There are different ways in which an individual may be protected and not all of them require entitlements that fall under the refugee convention. To define a safe third state in the way that is suggested by these amendments ignores the fact that other forms of protection are available to individuals which ensure that these countries are safe for them to be removed to. We will only ever remove inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe. Using this definition is not a new approach. It has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries. I do not think these amendments are necessary.

On Amendment 70, the ability to remove an individual declared inadmissible to any safe country has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to the Immigration Rules in December 2020. This amendment would remove a provision that Parliament has already had the opportunity to scrutinise. The aim of these provisions is to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means facilitated by criminals. They send a clear message that those arriving via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to another safe country, not of their choosing, to be processed.

I do not agree with the premise of Amendments 71 to 73A and 195. Agreements by a safe third country to accept an asylum seeker may not always be via a reciprocal or formal arrangement. It is right to seek removals on a case-by-case basis where appropriate. Doing so has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to the Immigration Rules in December 2020. I do not think that these provisions are unworkable without formal agreements in place. That said, I do not disagree with the need to get formal agreements in place. Without providing that running commentary, that is what we are working on doing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to the five amendments in this group—Amendments 83, 88, 90B, 95A and 137, and the question of whether Clause 25 should stand part—all of which I have co-signed or are in my name. The four I have co-signed are inspired by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. He has had to leave and has asked me to give his apologies.

The provisions whereby the presentation of evidence, after a date specified by the Home Office or in a priority removal notice, is required to be treated as damaging to credibility or to be given minimal weight are unfair, unjustifiable and should be removed. I agree with everything the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said.

I have also tabled Amendments 90B and 95A in the alternative, as it were. Under Clauses 21 and 25, the decision maker on priority removal notices or in an asylum or human rights claim would at least be obliged to consider whether the presumption of damage to credibility was fair, rather than looking solely at whether there were good reasons for the delay. Taking lateness into account should be rejected if it would be unfair.

The motivation for all these amendments is fair access to justice—both to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights and, as set out in Amendment 137 about removal notices, to uphold a common-law right to access justice. Yesterday, I had the pleasure of being at the Joint Committee on Human Rights session at which the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, gave evidence. We discussed having the common law as an inspiration, as well as the ECHR, in the application of human rights. I am sure the noble Lord will be able to tell me that the Government at least accept Amendment 137.

I do not need to say more because the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, put it very well. To say that evidence is not convincing is one thing; to say that, because it has not been submitted by date X it is incredible or has no weight, is putting process over substance.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak against Clause 25 standing part. I agree with so much of what has already been said. This is a particularly tawdry little clause in an outrageous Bill, which, as we have heard, has been slammed by UNHCR, the custodian of the refugee convention, by the JHCR, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and everybody, it seems, except noble Lords opposite.

My noble friend Lord Coaker need not apologise for not being a lawyer. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to see how tawdry Clause 25 is and how it absolutely puts process over substance.

This area of the law is not about parking regulations, or the tax owed to the Revenue or even major civil or commercial litigation between powerful opposing forces. This is the David and Goliath situation referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. When an asylum seeker presents themselves to whoever—the Border Force or the Home Office—they are putting themselves in the trust of Her Majesty’s Government in the hope that this is the right place to be.

Noble Lords have been making arguments in Committee, and those opposite have been making arguments about forum shopping, wanting better lives and all those things as if they are terrible but, in essence, the refugee convention is about desperate people escaping and having a fair crack at being believed. They may not all be telling the truth. Whether they are or not, they may not all qualify for convention protection, but there should at least be a kind and fair reception and a fair crack of the whip. That means not taking tawdry little process points such as this.

I have been a refugee lawyer, in and outside the Home Office. When I worked as a lawyer in the Home Office—I am going back now to before the new Labour Government, when my first boss was the noble Lord, Lord Howard—we did not take tawdry process points like this. That was in 1996.

In a moment, the ever-avuncular and brilliant advocate, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, will get up and tell us not to worry, because this will come into play only when there are no good reasons. So, fear not, Women for Refugee Women, UNHCR, Amnesty International, ILPA and every other bleeding heart. The Home Secretary would call them activist human rights lawyers and they are perhaps almost as contemptible as refugees in her eyes. The noble Lord will say not to worry because, where there are good reasons, this does not come into play and there will not be an issue about evidence.

But why put this in the statute book? Immigration officers, the Secretary of State, the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal and SIAC—these bodies are well capable of looking at evidence and credibility. It is an insult to their intelligence for them to look at whether there were or were not good reasons for late evidence. Sometimes late evidence is incredible and sometimes it is perfectly valid, because there are very good reasons—a host of good reasons, more good reasons than not—in relation to trauma.

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

Would the noble Baroness like to say whether evidence is ever deliberately produced late in order that it is impossible to remove people for whom such a decision has been made?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I have no doubt that that is sometimes the case, but my point is that you do not need Clause 25 to deal with that case, because the decision-makers listed here are well capable of looking at evidence whenever it is served. If the idea is that this is late, incredible or mischievous evidence, or the other concerns of the noble Lord, these decision-makers are capable of getting there by themselves. They do not need this insult to their intelligence that they must give it minimal weight. I never knew about this principle of minimal weight. It has been invented. Sometimes late evidence is good and sometimes it is bad, but this is asylum; refugees are at stake.

The noble Lord opposite always wants to talk about the numbers. He is very concerned about the numbers and I appreciate that, but this is not about numbers. It is about getting decisions right and protecting even the one claimant in a thousand who is the torture victim, who has been persecuted, who may be a child and who may have been trafficked. To turn this into a matter of a parking fine or commercial litigation, in which your case is prejudiced because you were only just advised that being gay is relevant and that you do not have to be afraid to say so, because this is Britain and Hungary, is tawdry. To make that process point, when we are talking about life or death—not big bucks or small bucks but life and death—is totally tawdry.

Clause 25 does not help. If anything, it will make life more difficult for the Home Office because, I promise you, there will be endless litigation about what good reasons are. That is why the amendments are helpful, because they are beginning to tease out what will eventually be the subjects of litigation. We do not need it. We all know that late evidence is sometimes an abuse and is sometimes incredible, but sometimes it emerges because people have only just got decent translators or lawyers, or country or other vital information, which is sometimes hard to get.

I am sorry to hear that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is unwell. I am sure that the Committee will join me in wishing her a swift and full recovery.

On the point about identifying documents, let us go back to the history of the refugee convention. Some of the most genuine refugees have to escape without identifying documents, and some of the least oppressed people are the ones who have fantastic documents. That is why Amendment 85 has to go. This is not the biggest problem in a terrible Bill, but Clause 25 is a tawdry little clause, unworthy of Her Majesty’s Government; let us strike it from the Bill.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I have deep concerns about Clauses 17, 19 and 25. Others have already expressed why, so I will not overly repeat myself. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Coaker on brilliantly moving the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser. Equally, I associate myself with the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, my noble friend Lord Dubs and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

The reality of what is sometimes the last line of defence, not only in LGBTQ issues but in other vulnerable situations, is that it is the last thing you want to have to deal with yourself. Sometimes the very notion of coming out to yourself is deeply painful, because the recognition in certain cultures, countries and religions means to shut yourself off, not only from a body of support, your religion or community, but from your family. Initially, to come out to yourself is a huge step. Then you have to make the decision, day in and day out, whether to come out in other, very ordinary situations. You are here and you have put in your claim, and someone might say, “How was your weekend? Did you spend it with your girlfriend?” You have to decide whether to lie or tell the truth. If you tell the truth, you may become isolated in the asylum community, and perhaps from your country or religion. This is the community that you associated yourself with, to give yourself support and belonging, in a country where you seek to belong. Then you come out in late evidence, with that last line of defence. If your claim is rejected, you are possibly putting yourself in danger at home, in that you could be returned to one of the seven countries where you are criminalised simply for the reason of being LGBTQI+, or to one of the 11 countries where you could face the death penalty.

I remember in the 1990s working on the case of an 18 year-old Iranian who came out in this country. His asylum application was going to be rejected. A group of us were privileged to intervene on his behalf. What that teenager had said publicly would have been recorded and noted back home. We were successful—I do not say this boastfully, but it is one of the few things I am proud of in my life—in preventing that young man being returned to Iran, where, like three other young men in the weeks before, he could have been hung by his neck on the gallows until he was dead. How will the Government deal with exceptional cases where people bring in late evidence in order to substantiate their claim?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Let me come to that point in a second. First, let me say that I almost took it as implicit in the request from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that the Committee would like to have the guidance, but I have heard the point made, and I will certainly pass it on. I do not want to go over points I have already made, and I think when the noble Lord looks in Hansard, he will see that I have set out quite clearly why, first, we need to have a system whereby, in particular cases, the date can be extended or adjusted, but also, secondly, why that does not undercut the principle of actually having a date and having this structure. However, I am very happy to look again at what the noble Lord has just said. If, having read it, it seems to me that I can add to what I have already said, I will; otherwise, I respectfully direct him to what I said earlier.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It may be that, because it has been a long day, I have missed something, or it may be that I have jumped the gun and the Minister was about to come to this point, but I have not yet heard the justification for having Clause 25 at all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

In that case, I will certainly read it over the weekend. I know that those in the Home Office responsible for this area are obviously looking at the debate and will have picked up what the noble Baroness has said.

I was just dealing with Amendment 95, after which I will come to Clause 25 itself. I lost count of how many times the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “tawdry”. It really is not, if I may say so. We obviously disagree, and I will make no comparisons either to parking fines or international commercial litigation. At one point it seemed to me that the noble Baroness was saying that, on the one hand, this clause was terrible and, on the other, that this is what tribunals do in any event and we can trust them to do the right thing.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am saying that, if we trust—as I am sure the Government do—immigration officers, the Secretary of State, the First-tier Tribunal, et cetera, to be intelligent, effective operators in the system, they are by definition capable of looking at late evidence on a case-by-case, open-textured, well-reasoned basis and determining those occasions where there is a good reason and those where there is not. That goes without saying, so why do we have to have this diktat in the Bill, with “must” give it “minimal weight”? I suspect it is because, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested, the Government are trying to dictate to the tribunals in particular what is and is not a good reason. That is the sinister aspect of this. It is also impractical, because you then have to have arguments about what is and is not a good reason. I promise the Minister that this will be litigated ad nauseam. It would be better, as he said to other noble Lords, to leave this to open-textured judgment and decision-makers who are capable of applying it.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

As regards the in terrorem threat that things will be litigated ad nauseam, I am tempted to say that that is not really a change from the current position. More substantively, and with respect, to say that the clause sets out that the tribunal “must give … minimal weight” to the evidence, as the noble Baroness just put it, is not what it does at all.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It says that they have to have good reason.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

It does not do that either.

It does not say that the tribunal “must give the evidence minimal weight”; it says that the tribunal

“must, in considering it, have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence”.

The tribunal is perfectly entitled to say, “Well, we’ve looked at that principle. Actually, we’re not going to apply it here”—for reasons A, B and C. There is no requirement and no fettering of the tribunal; there is no compulsion that the evidence be given minimal weight. What the decision-maker has to do is have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to any late evidence unless there are good reasons why it is provided late.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I promise that this is my final intervention on the Minister, but I do not understand why we have to have the provision at all. He is saying that it is perfectly open-textured enough, that good reasons do not have to be specified in the Bill because the Government are not going to put glosses on it or be overly prescriptive, that they can be objective good reasons or subjective good reasons, that it is only about having regard to the new principle that they are inventing et cetera. Why have this at all?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

It is because there is absolutely nothing wrong with Parliament saying to a tribunal, “We want you to have regard to this principle, but of course the final decision is yours”. We do that in other areas of the law as well. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, kindly said, I gave evidence yesterday to her committee in what I hope was an interesting session. One thing we talked about was Section 12 of the Human Rights Act. The layout there was not a million miles away from this. It too gives a very clear direction to the court, but ultimately it is the court’s decision. I find it slightly surprising that, on the one hand, the noble Baroness is saying that this is tawdry and dreadful but, on the other, is saying, “Actually, you don’t need it all because the same result is going to eventuate”. Both points cannot be right at the same time.

As we all know, the asylum and the legal systems in this regard are overwhelmed. We see repeated unmeritorious claims at the very last minute designed to delay removal. This clause is a proper part of an overall system to make sure that we give protection to those who need it—I always put that first; that is the most important thing—and at the same time to identify unmeritorious claims.

Finally, Amendment 137 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seeks to implement a recommendation made by the JCHR in its ninth report. Of course, we welcome the JCHR’s positive comments on Clause 45. Migrants who are subject to removal must be given sufficient opportunity to access justice. The clause improves and enhances the status quo. It gives a statutory guarantee that migrants will receive a minimum notice period of five working days. As a result, some migrants will get more time compared to the current policy. It introduces a separate statutory requirement for a notice of departure details to be provided to the migrant before removal.

On a practical level, Clause 45 will be supplemented by policy guidance that accords further respect to the common-law right to access to justice. I say respectfully that it is not clear to me what deficiency in Clause 45 Amendment 137 tries to address. I would genuinely welcome engagement from the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, to identify what offending aspects of Clause 45 there may be and how Amendment 137 would solve them.

Therefore, having taken probably too much of the Committee’s time already, I invite the various noble Lords to consider not pressing their amendments.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

We exist to be an effective scrutinising House. After this, we will come to an IPP amendment. We went so badly wrong on that after full scrutiny. This is such an important measure. It is about a mandatory life sentence. Therefore, although I have thought earnestly about the advice I have been given, I have not thought it appropriate to withdraw my amendment. In those circumstances, I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise in support of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who is, as your Lordships will appreciate, a former Lord Chancellor and law officer.

I reiterate that the Government came here on 8 December to commend Harper’s law to your Lordships’ House. However, in the course of that debate, to which I listened with great care, concerns were raised by every single group in your Lordships’ House about the potential unintended consequences that went beyond the Harper’s law case—a case of severe criminality that included dangerous driving that led to manslaughter. In particular, one-punch manslaughter was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and many other noble Lords; as my noble and learned friend said, there was huge concern.

The reason why my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer is right to ventilate this today goes beyond what we believe about Harper’s law, mandatory sentences, or even judicial discretion. All of these should be of particular concern to this second, revising Chamber. The reason he is right to ventilate this issue is that where significant, potentially controversial and rights-impacting measures are to be introduced, it seems to me—and I believe to other Members of your Lordships’ House—that there should at least be two bites at the cherry. The measures should at least be looked at twice.

Without the aid of my noble and learned friend, what will happen is this: it is presented and debated once in the second Chamber—not even in the first Chamber and then the second Chamber. The vote is on the same day and that is it—because, let us be honest, this is not going to have detailed consideration when your Lordships’ amendments go back to the other place. Whatever my noble and learned friend decides—and with the greatest of respect, I totally agree with the clerk about the irregularity of his amendment in terms of procedure at Third Reading—we are forced into a gentlemen’s agreement that is not reciprocated in the other direction. There must be adequate time, and it seems to me that, going forward, any significant and controversial measure must at least be looked at twice, so that there can be an opportunity to ventilate, study it, and correct any potential glaring, unintended consequences.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I came cold to this debate, as it were, to hear what was to be said. I am certainly not an expert on the law, but I have had quite a bit to do with the Companion over the years, and I remember vividly a time when it was quite routine, on Third Reading, to present amendments that clearly should have been debated earlier. The authorities of the House at the time—and I may have been part of that—decided that we needed to tighten up the circumstances in which amendments could be laid at Third Reading. But—and this is a huge “but”, which my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer has already dealt with—it was always assumed that there would be flexibility in the decision about the admissibility of amendments at Third Reading.

There were occasions—I would have come armed with them if I had anticipated this debate—when the usual channels would get together, during or after Report, and say, “Look we really can’t resolve this now, we need to put down an amendment at Third Reading”. Had it been challenged by either Front Bench or by anyone among the usual channels, that would have been resolved at that point. But nearly always, there was such a common-sense argument about, “Well, we’ll let this one go at Third Reading, the air needs to be cleared with this at Third Reading”, that it was agreed among the usual channels; it was never seen as completely Stalinist rule. Indeed, as my noble and learned friend has said, there is flexibility actually written into it. But I can say with confidence that this issue has been addressed in the past. It seems to me overwhelmingly the case, in the way my noble and learned friend described it, that quite clearly it should come within the auspices of the Companion, with the agreement of the usual channels, to be able to debate this hugely important issue at Third Reading.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Lords Hansard - part two & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

Obviously, that is linked with Amendment 89. Of course, Scotland has regularised its new age of criminal responsibility to 12. For many years, the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland was eight but in practice it was only ever administered at 12. I understand that the rules have changed in Scotland so now it is 12. That raises an interesting question about what would happen if an 11 year-old was living in Scotland but committed a crime in England. How would that youth potentially be brought to justice in England when what they had been alleged to have done would not have been an offence in Scotland? I am sure there will be an appropriate way of dealing with that situation. Nevertheless, the Labour Party’s view, and my view, is that the age of criminal responsibility should remain at 10. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords,

“No child should suffer such appalling abuse, especially from those who should love and care for them most.”


Who said that? It is not a Christmas quiz. It was the Minister repeating a sentence what feels like a long time ago, but it was earlier this evening in proceedings on this Bill in your Lordships’ House. What if the same child victim of cruelty or neglect survives and grows to act out as a damaged little person as a result of that neglect or abuse?

I am very disappointed to hear about my own party’s position on the age of criminal responsibility, not least because I was reading David Lammy’s comments in the Guardian just a couple of years ago in relation to concern that our age of criminal responsibility, at 10, is too young. I think that we as a society are failing some of our most vulnerable children, including victims of neglect and abuse, and we should not be criminalising them. Given what we know about child development, 10 is way too young. It makes us as a jurisdiction an outlier in the civilised world and that is not something to be proud of.

Perhaps understandably, much of the debate in Committee focused on some of the most notorious cases, including that of Thompson and Venables, but such horrific and notorious cases are few and far between. More often, we are talking about offences such as criminal damage, and it is often looked-after children who are criminalised for offences of that nature. They have already been let down in their lives by their natural parents and/or their adopted parents and are looked after by the state. They then get involved in something that is treated as criminal damage in a care environment and for which neither noble Lords’ children and grandchildren nor mine would ever be criminalised.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I have dealt with that exact point in my time as a youth court magistrate. It is not just children aged 10 or 11. In the past few years—let us say the past five years—I have never seen any child brought to court for criminal damage in their care home. They used to be brought to court because it was an insurance-related issue and a conviction was needed to get the insurance money, but that has been resolved as an issue. In my experience, care homes do not charge their children for criminal damage.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend; obviously I do not have his personal experience as a magistrate but just today I looked at published statistics from 2018, which showed that a small number of children were criminalised for criminal damage.

Whether children end up in court or not, if they have criminal responsibility, they can be criminalised. They may never get to court—they may accept an out-of-court disposal—but they will be criminalised and will potentially have a conviction that follows them around for a very long time. This is amoral; it is not the way to treat a vulnerable little person who has probably been neglected and/or abused. They are not ready for criminal responsibility—they are not responsible. All the scientific evidence suggests that their brains are not developed enough at the age of 10.

We weep hot tears for these children when we see them as victims of abuse and neglect, but we do not do so when some of them manage to survive but act out in ways that children will. Some children will never be criminalised for minor theft or criminal damage because they have the protection of their privilege. Other children will sometimes be criminalised, which is wrong in principle and says something very embarrassing about this jurisdiction—even compared with the neighbouring jurisdiction north of the border, as my noble friend pointed out. I do not want to repeat what I said about this in Committee, but I thank and pay tribute to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, who have campaigned on this issue for many years to stop us being an outlier in the world.

I note that next year my noble friend Lord Adonis will bring forward a Private Member’s Bill to lower the voting age from 18 to 16—something I will support but I suspect the Government will resist. The Government will insist on 18 for voting purposes and the age of majority, and perhaps take the view that children and young people are not mature enough to vote until they are 18, but heap criminal responsibility on them at the age of 10. That is a mismatch of eight years. Of course. children and young people—indeed, all people—develop slightly differently. Personally, in an ideal world, I would support 16 as a decent compromise. However, that is not the point.

The amendment in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, to which I have added my name, settles on just 12. I am afraid that the fact that neither the Government nor my own party can support that, despite report after report from the UN on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, is an embarrassment. We are choosing some children over others. These difficult issues about children and criminality are always about other people’s children. However, the difference between believing in and promoting human rights and not doing so is whether you care about other people’s children, and not just at Christmas—and not determining, as a noble and learned Lord said earlier, who is naughty or nice but caring for everyone’s children and all children.

With that, I will spare your Lordships any more of my thoughts on this issue—I feel very strongly about it. I wish your Lordships and your children and grandchildren a very good Christmas when it comes.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I agree with every word she just said. She noted that the UK is an outlier in the world in having an age of criminal responsibility of 10. However, I notice that my native Australia is now in the middle of the process of looking to raise its age from 10, which I think was inherited from UK law. With that development in Australia, we will be even more of an outlier.

I shall speak to Amendment 90, which appears in my name, but I stress that this is not in any way meant to compete with Amendment 89. I would support Amendment 89 but, like the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I think it does not go far enough. My idea of a review is that if you were to hold a review, as the Justice Committee in the other place recommended last year, you would arrive at a figure higher than 12. Fourteen is the obvious one.

I apologise that I was not available to present the corresponding amendment in Committee because I was at the COP 26 climate talks. However, I thank my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb for doing a great job of presenting it then, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for supporting me at that stage. I also apologise for an administrative oversight on my part. There was extensive debate on the wording of proposed new subsection (2)(b). It was my intention to change the wording but I am afraid I did not. However, I hope noble Lords will look at the overall intention of this amendment rather than getting into the depths of discussion on the detail of the wording, since I have no intention of pressing this amendment to a vote tonight.

In particular, I want briefly to draw attention to proposed new subsection (4) in this amendment:

“The panel must consult with an advisory panel made up of young people currently and formerly in the youth justice system.”


There is a principle there that we should be following much more: people who have the lived experience of knowing what it is like to be the subject of the system have to be listened to, and we have to understand what the lived experience is like.

There is a risk in the situation I find myself in of thinking that everything has been said but not by me. I will try very hard not to do that. Rather than repeat all the arguments made in Committee, I will pick up one sentence said then by the Minister in response to the noble and learned Lady, Baroness Butler-Sloss:

“I have sought to set out why we believe that 10 is the correct age, given the way that our criminal justice system deals with children.”—[Official Report, 17/11/21; col. 263.]


In that context, I point to comments made by the former Children’s Commissioner, Anne Longfield, in late 2019. She called for a wholesale review of the youth justice system, saying that the youth court was

“not a child-friendly environment where you could really help a young person and is not meeting standards that we had hoped.”