Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

Amendment 2, not moved?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

No, I am moving Amendment 2.

Amendment 2

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my various amendments quite briefly, because while the detail of the amendments has not been covered, the overall debate around quashing orders has.

Amendment 2 seeks to limit the use of any new remedies issued under Clause 1 to where, in the court’s view, it is in the interests of justice.

Amendment 7 clarifies that the factors which the court considers before making a modified quashing order are a matter for the court’s discretion.

Amendment 8 removes one of the factors to be given consideration by the courts when deciding whether to award a suspended quashing order or quashing order with limited or no retrospective effect. The removal of this factor is intended to rebalance the factors to be given consideration so as not to disadvantage the claimant unfairly.

Amendment 9 would make an addition to one of the factors to be given consideration by the courts when deciding whether to award a suspended quashing order or quashing order with limited or no retrospective effect. This amendment would make it clear that the provision of a timely remedy to the claimant is a factor to be given consideration.

Amendment 10 would require the defendant to identify what the interests and expectations of persons who have relied on the impugned act are and to explain these to the court.

Amendment 11 would remove the requirement to take account of actions which the public body proposes or intends to take but has not yet taken. Such actions are too uncertain to form a basis for suspending a quashing order or making it prospective only. Any intentions indicated to the court could change in light of subsequent developments, leaving those affected potentially without any recourse.

The intention behind Amendment 12 is to clarify that the principle of good administration includes the need for administration to be lawful. The Executive and all public bodies are not entitled to act unlawfully. Therefore, in a society based on the rule of law, administration may rationally be categorised as fully good only when it is lawful.

Amendment 15 removes the extra weight which would otherwise be given to subsection (8)(e) by the courts when applying the test created in subsection (9)(b) to establish whether the statutory presumption is applicable.

This range of amendments looks at other aspects of Clause 1. I think we had a wide-ranging debate about Clause 1 in the first group, and I beg to move Amendment 2.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

I apologise for getting things into a state of confusion—or nearly—by thinking that Amendment 3 was to be moved.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I will take the opportunity to jump in briefly at this stage, even though the first three groups to some extent cover similar territory. I know that in the next group we will get into the presumption in particular.

I speak now having had the considerable benefit of listening to the debate on the first group, which the Minister described as being about just giving an extra tool to the judicial toolbox, to be used where appropriate. I think that was the thrust of his remarks. That begs the question of whether it is just a tool in the box and what is and is not appropriate.

It seems that we are dealing with a judicial review of administrative action—of executive action. I know that the Minister said, “Calm down, dears, it’s not all about government as we would understand it; it is about all sorts of administrative action”. I am sure that is right. However, the principle is the same. This is executive action. Some of it is very significant for citizens’ lives and some of it less so. However, it is the job of the judiciary and Parliament, together in different ways, to hold executive action to account.

The traditional method has worked rather well. There are discretionary remedies for the judiciary and the power to legislate for Parliament, including, in extremis, to legislate retroactively. We do not like that, but if anybody is going to do it, it should be Parliament, because it is sovereign and has the democratic legitimacy to do so. That is the debate between my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thornton and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on one side, and the Minister and his supporters on the other.

To that, I think the response comes from the Minister, “Actually, the new Section 29A(1)(b) is not doing what you think it’s going to do. This is just remedies; it is not about rewriting history and saying that the unlawful decision or subordinate legislation was always lawful. It is just about the effect of the quashing, not about changing history”. If that is the genuine intention of the Government with this provision, I respectfully suggest to the Minister that some clarification and comfort other than reassurances from the Dispatch Box may be required. That is to deal with the fact that we are not actually giving a retroactive legislative power —let alone duty, to which we will come—to the court.

Maybe, if I can be helpful, there is some room for explicit clarification to that effect. Having listened to the previous group, I too do not see the point of new Section 29A(1)(b) if this is just about giving extra tools to the judicial toolbox to use where appropriate. In all this I am mostly worried about the people not in the courtroom—the people who are not the litigants in the particular case but who rely on that particular judicial review, brought by one individual or a small group of individuals who had the means, either because they had personal means or the benefit of legal aid, which is not widely available these days. I am worried about anything that would shut out the possibility of good administration being provided for all the people—there could be hundreds or thousands or millions—who were not in the room and could then be shut out from justice because of something that it was not appropriate for the court to do. Why? The courts, unlike Parliament, are not best suited to polycentric decision-making. If there is to be emergency legislation because of a particular decision around illegality of regulations and so on, it is better dealt with in Parliament because Parliament will be able to look at all the potential cases in the round and will have the legitimacy to so act. The Government cannot have it both ways.

By the way, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks: Governments of all stripes get irritated with judicial review from time to time. However, whoever is in power, it is not for politicians to have it both ways and criticise judicial overreach on the one hand but then ask the judges to do their dirty work for them when they have been found to act unlawfully on the other.