Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

It is a two-pronged attack. I do not believe that the judges should have the power to make lawful what they have already found is unlawful with retrospective effect. That means that prospective-only orders are, in principle, wrong. However, if there were a case for changing regulations or for altering government action so as to bring it within the limits that Parliament wanted, that is for Parliament; that is for legislation, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, argued. It is not for the courts to say, “We find the act unlawful, but it is only going to take effect as unlawful for the future.” It is, in the example of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, an ex tunc approach; but an ex tunc approach, frankly, is right, whereas the removal of flexibility by ruling out the Part A power—the power to delay—would be a removal of flexibility, which would be unnecessary, and we support that. We do not support the presumption, but that is a different point.

The real important point, about retrospective charges and the points in Amendment 6, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is that they accept the unlawfulness—if that was the only amendment that was passed—but would go on to say, “You can rely on the unlawfulness as a defence in criminal proceedings and you can still apply for other financial remedies for judicial review, but the quashing order will only take effect prospectively.” That, in my respectful view, is to fudge the whole point of unlawfulness, and the universality and the universal application of judicial review, which lies at its heart.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the opening remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Marks—I too enter this discussion with some trepidation. I will first set out the Labour Party’s overall view, since the debate on this group has been fairly wide-ranging. We believe that the proposals for judicial review in Clauses 1 and 2, which we will come to in group 4, are regressive and uncalled-for. More especially, when many aspects of the justice system are in crisis, we do not believe that there is a need for this review in the first place. The Ministry of Justice is trying to fix something that is not broken, a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. We believe that overall, the Government’s changes to the judicial review process will have a chilling effect on justice, deterring members of the public from bringing claims against public bodies and leaving many other victims of unlawful actions without redress. These are proposals that will make it harder for individuals to hold this Government to account. As a result, unlawful decisions made by this Government, or by any government or public body, will go unchallenged.

I put my name to Amendments 1, 4 and 5. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as ever, introduced those amendments very fully. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked me about Amendment 3. In my brief, I am embarrassed to say, it says that Amendment 3 is consequential on Amendments 1, 4 and 5; I have had a look at it while the debate has been progressing, and I cannot add any more to that. It may be that what I have been provided with is wrong in that respect.

Amendment 6 would, as set out in the explanatory statement,

“protect collateral challenges by ensuring that if a prospective-only or suspended quashing order is made, the illegality of the delegated legislation can be relied on as a defence in criminal proceedings. This would prevent individuals from being criminalised under defective and illegal ministerial powers.”

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said that he did not think that the problem existed. It would be very useful if the Minister could confirm that he too does not think that the problem exists, because, in a sense, it is an inquiry about whether there is any potential for this problem existing. It would be helpful if the Minister were to confirm what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has said.

My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer entered into a very interesting debate with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about the development of suspended quashing orders through common law and whether that was appropriate. My noble and learned friend was very much against proposed new subsection (1)(b); he thought it was quite wrong to give power to judges to, effectively, change the law unilaterally and retrospectively. He argued very strongly that that was not the case.

That point was dwelled on by a number of noble Lords. It is not the point, really, that comes out in this group. We may return to some of the elements which were discussed on that point, but as I said, I enter this discussion with some trepidation, as I understand the amendments in my name—Amendments 1, 4 and 5—much more clearly. We will be debating further amendments to quashing orders in the next group, where we can further look at other prospective amendments. For now, I lend my support to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the previous two contributors to the debate noted that they spoke on these matters with some trepidation. In responding to the amendments in this group, I declare a non-interest: unlike so many of your Lordships, I confess that I did not sit on, or even appear in, any of the various cases cited to the Committee. Therefore, with that significant handicap, I will instead start by reminding the Committee of the rationale for including Clause 1 in the Bill. However, in these remarks I will not address the list of factors in subsection (8), or the so-called presumption in subsection (9), because we will deal with those in later groups.

The clause aims to expand the remedies available in judicial review proceedings to provide more flexibility to the courts. As I put it at Second Reading, we want to put another couple of remedial tools into the judicial toolbox so that they can be used when appropriate. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that this has nothing to do with dismantling judicial review or an elective dictatorship. The Government and I recognise the importance of judicial review to good government, which is lawful government. But one also has to recognise that, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, reminded us, we have lots of different sorts of cases where we want flexibility of remedy—and that judicial review applies to many decision-makers who cannot sensibly be described as “government” in the way that the noble Baroness was using that word.

The current position is that quashing is typically both immediate and retrospective, depriving the decision of ever having had legal effect. It is as if the decision had never been made; it is a legal nullity. This makes a quashing order something of a blunt instrument, and it can have unintended consequences when applied to nuanced problems.

The clause seeks to give the court a discretion to change quashing orders in two ways, as we have heard. The first is to allow the effects of a quashing order to be suspended for a period, as the court sees fit. The Independent Review of Administrative Law—I listened very carefully to the contribution of its chair, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—recommended this additional remedial flexibility, and the clause therefore seeks to implement its recommendation. I agree with the noble Lord that the word “may” is critical to the way that this clause operates. The suspended quashing order allows courts to suspend the effect of an order for a period of time to allow the decision-maker to prepare for the effect of the quashing. This could give them time lawfully to make a new decision before the unlawful decision is quashed or to implement some other transitional arrangements.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, which aims to remove the whole clause, would remove this new remedy, which I had thought was broadly supported. Although I heard the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, say, “If the judges want this power, they can create it”, we have heard that it is far from clear, to put it at its lowest, that the common law would actually enable the judges to do this. More importantly, there are circumstances where suspending a quashing order will allow the court to provide a remedy that better serves the interests of justice, and we should therefore ensure that it is a tool available to the courts.

The second modification, which would be removed by Amendment 1 and the consequential Amendments 4 and 5 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is the ability to make a quashing order prospective only. I accept that that has been more controversial in the Committee this evening, so I will set out some of the parameters of the debate, as the Government see it.

We have heard examples from those in the other place, and indeed from some noble Lords this evening, where, prima facie, a prospective quashing order could cause significant injustice to the claimant, the applicant or third parties. There will be cases where a prospective quashing order could cause injustice, which is why we are not forcing the courts to use the powers in any case where it would cause injustice or, indeed, be inappropriate. Therefore, I suggest that we leave those discussions aside, because there is remedial flexibility, and concentrate on whether prospective orders make sense in principle, given the wide variety of cases that come before the courts. We could therefore answer the question: are there cases in which their use could be appropriate?

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

Amendment 2, not moved?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

No, I am moving Amendment 2.

Amendment 2

Moved by

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

2: Clause 1, page 1, line 9, at end insert—
“(1A) Provision under subsection (1) may only be made if the court is satisfied that it is in the interest of justice to do so.”

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my various amendments quite briefly, because while the detail of the amendments has not been covered, the overall debate around quashing orders has.

Amendment 2 seeks to limit the use of any new remedies issued under Clause 1 to where, in the court’s view, it is in the interests of justice.

Amendment 7 clarifies that the factors which the court considers before making a modified quashing order are a matter for the court’s discretion.

Amendment 8 removes one of the factors to be given consideration by the courts when deciding whether to award a suspended quashing order or quashing order with limited or no retrospective effect. The removal of this factor is intended to rebalance the factors to be given consideration so as not to disadvantage the claimant unfairly.

Amendment 9 would make an addition to one of the factors to be given consideration by the courts when deciding whether to award a suspended quashing order or quashing order with limited or no retrospective effect. This amendment would make it clear that the provision of a timely remedy to the claimant is a factor to be given consideration.

Amendment 10 would require the defendant to identify what the interests and expectations of persons who have relied on the impugned act are and to explain these to the court.

Amendment 11 would remove the requirement to take account of actions which the public body proposes or intends to take but has not yet taken. Such actions are too uncertain to form a basis for suspending a quashing order or making it prospective only. Any intentions indicated to the court could change in light of subsequent developments, leaving those affected potentially without any recourse.

The intention behind Amendment 12 is to clarify that the principle of good administration includes the need for administration to be lawful. The Executive and all public bodies are not entitled to act unlawfully. Therefore, in a society based on the rule of law, administration may rationally be categorised as fully good only when it is lawful.

Amendment 15 removes the extra weight which would otherwise be given to subsection (8)(e) by the courts when applying the test created in subsection (9)(b) to establish whether the statutory presumption is applicable.

This range of amendments looks at other aspects of Clause 1. I think we had a wide-ranging debate about Clause 1 in the first group, and I beg to move Amendment 2.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

I apologise for getting things into a state of confusion—or nearly—by thinking that Amendment 3 was to be moved.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I was going to come to interests of justice slightly later, but let me take the point now. I do not want to drift into the presumption, but these issues are related to an extent. If it is not in the interests of justice to make the order, there would be good reason not to do so in new subsection (9). Therefore, the noble Lord’s question answers itself.

Amendments 2 and 9 add further factors to the list, including a condition that the court may use the new remedies only where it is satisfied that their use will be in the interests of justice. In addition to the point I have just made to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—perhaps I am putting his question in reverse—I struggle to foresee a situation where the court, having considered new subsection (8) and the presumption, would think it appropriate to apply one of the new powers where the court none the less considered it against the interests of justice to do so. Indeed, I am making the same point: you do not get there, because if it is against the interests of justice, there must be “good reason” not to use one of the orders.

Furthermore, coming back to the amendments, if timeliness is relevant to the case, the court can consider that under the current drafting, in particular the factors set out in new paragraphs (c) and (f).

Those amendments sought to add some factors. Amendments 8 and 11 seek to remove a factor from the list and remove an important provision—the need for the court to consider

“any detriment to good administration that would result from exercising or failing to exercise the power”

and the need for the court to consider actions that a public body proposes or intends to take but has not yet taken. The point of clearly specifying that the court should have regard, not only to actions taken but to actions proposed to be taken, is that actions a public body proposes to take could sometimes be a relevant factor. For example, let us say that a government department recognises that regulations may be quashed but has already stated its intention to make new regulations and has announced the date by which they will be in force. This could help a court to reach a decision on whether a suspended quashing order is appropriate in principle and to determine how long the suspension period should be.

Amendment 10 seeks to modify the fourth criterion, paragraph (d), making it so that the defendant is responsible for identifying the interests of those who rely on legislation being quashed. I suggest this amendment is unnecessary. If a suspended quashing order, or a quashing order with limited retrospective effect or none, might be appropriate, it will always be in the interests of the defendant to set out why that is the case. The defendant would want to encourage the court to use that remedy rather than the ab initio quashing order. So, in effect, the onus is already on the defendant or respondent to demonstrate who will be affected if the impugned act is quashed immediately, ab initio; and that would obviously include identifying who has relied or is relying on the impugned act.

Amendment 12 seeks to modify the same factor in paragraph (d) by providing that the principle of good administration includes the need for administration to be lawful. I think I said in the previous group that that really is, if I may say so, motherhood and apple pie. Good administration is lawful administration. We all expect our Government and all decision-makers to abide by a set of lawful principles and duties that are conducive to effective administration. I am therefore not persuaded that legislating to say that good administration is lawful administration adds anything that is not already obvious or, indeed, inherent in the drafting.

Amendment 15 seeks to remove the requirement in subsection (10) for the court to take “particular” account of any action taken or proposed to be taken, or any undertaking given by a person with responsibility, in connection with the impugned act. This is intended to draw the court’s attention to any response the defendant may have already provided, or be in the process of providing, to the relevant defect. We see this subsection as a positive measure which could encourage a defendant to consider how to resolve matters proactively by offering suitable redress where it is appropriate, before the court need order it. It is also aimed at ensuring that the court takes particular care in considering any redress already provided so that defendants do not feel that they have to provide redress twice.

Finally, I come back to the point I was making about tax. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked me whether I was satisfied with the phrase “offer adequate redress”. I certainly am satisfied with that phrase, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has an amendment in the next group that focuses on it. He certainly raised it at Second Reading, and I will be coming back to that. When I was referring to tax in the previous group, I was saying it would be very unlikely that a court would want to use a prospective remedy in that situation. I did not say “never” for two reasons. First, it is always up to the judge in any particular case. Secondly, one has to consider other effects even in tax cases. There could be cases where, for example, under tax legislation, somebody has not paid, but they have been given a refund, or they have a rebate or a tax credit. In those situations, it may be right, if it is positive to the taxpayer, so to speak, to use a prospective remedy even in tax cases. That is why I do not say “never” but in the case the noble and learned Lord was putting in the previous group, of when people have paid, in no circumstances does it seem likely that a prospective remedy would be appropriate.

I hope I have dealt with all the points raised. For the reasons I have set out, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said, this suite of amendments was really an attempt to get clarity. Some of them were probing amendments, and some we may return to at a later stage. As my noble and learned friend said, there are potential conflicts, and he gave the example of that between subsection (8)(c) and (d). Those two elements would need to be considered within the broader context of the whole of subsection (8).

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I entirely support the removal of the presumption. I will never try to achieve the brevity of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, but he is absolutely right: this is a presumption in favour of the wrongdoer.

The only reason my name is not on Amendment 13 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is that I failed to secure a place among the first four supporters who were rushing to support the amendment. There is no getting away from the fact that, by new Section 29A(9), the Bill proposes making the exercise of the Clause 1 powers, prima facie at least, mandatory. If the “adequate redress” condition is met, and unless the court sees good reason not to do so, it must exercise both powers—not just one of the powers, according to the statute—both to suspend to suspend or delay the quashing order and to make it prospective only.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that this presumption colours the approach that is required to be taken by judges. I believe that understates the position. He was also right to say that it was dangerous and wrong in principle.

The Minister’s position on behalf of the Government is that the court is not bound to exercise these powers if it sees good reason not to do so. It follows from that that these are therefore wide discretionary powers and that any judges worth their salt—if I may paraphrase what he was saying at Second Reading—would find ways of not applying the presumption. If that is right then the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is right that subsection (9) is entirely unnecessary. If the judge were to be entitled to exercise a wide discretion, there would be no reason to mandate the exercise of the powers in any particular way and we would be back to the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the Government should trust the judges. I fear that the only reason the Government want to have the powers exercised on a mandatory basis is to ensure that there is a default position. That is why it has been correctly labelled a presumption. My noble friend Lord Beith’s analogy is absolutely right: if you have a toolbox, you should not be bound to use any particular tool, whether it is right or wrong for the job in hand.

My noble friend Lord Beith was also right on the question of “adequate redress” as an unsatisfactory and difficult-to-interpret test. Not only would it encourage unnecessary appeals, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, but it is also entirely unclear for whom the redress has to be adequate. The natural meaning of the words would be adequate for the applicant, but that is wrong in a public law case; it has to be adequate for every person materially affected. That is the point made in the amendment put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, although she modified her position on it slightly in addressing it today. Other parties affected need to be protected, not just because that is at the essence of public law but because those other parties are, by definition, not before the court and not personally represented when the judicial review application is made.

The Minister’s approach that judges will not regard themselves as bound by the presumption because they have this wide discretion, I suspect, underestimates the loyalty to the law felt by judges. Where there is a paradigm case that calls for the exercise of the power, under the compulsory wording of the Bill judges will strive to give effect to the will of Parliament and the principle that the law is there to be obeyed. That is embedded in their DNA. Therefore, the Government’s view that judges will bend over backwards to find ways around the presumption so as to avoid legalising unlawful acts of government is deeply cynical. It may shed significant light on the Government’s view of the rule of law, but it is completely inaccurate about the approach of the judges, who will apply the presumption if it becomes law lawfully and in so doing will considerably weaken the effect of judicial review.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I open by noting that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said that Amendment 14, to which I have my name, is a probing amendment and I think that she rightly said it is less preferable to Amendment 13 if we can clear up the element of new Section 29A(1)(b) about removing retrospective quashing. I agree with her point on that.

I want to address a different point. It was actually raised in the House of Commons by the government Minister at the time when he talked about unintended consequences. I will read out the briefing I have on this. In Committee, the Minister suggested that limiting the retrospective effect of remedies could mitigate the potential negative and unintended consequences that some public interest judicial reviews could have. For example, if a statutory instrument concerning social security is quashed, immediately it could remove all the social security protections provided for in that statutory instrument because they would no longer have any legal effect. But the argument is not convincing. The mere fact that some judicial reviews could potentially produce unintended consequences does nothing to argue in favour of a presumption. I was amused by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, picking up that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, referred to a so-called quashing order. In the vast majority of cases, a court will not issue a quashing order in any event. In most cases, a court merely declares a statutory instrument to be unlawful and leaves it to the Government to amend the instrument in a way thought necessary by the Government. Indeed, even where human rights were violated between 2014 and 2020, the courts have quashed only four statutory instruments out of 14 successful challenges.

So we are not talking about very many cases and the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and in support of his amendment, I think, are absolutely right. I shall listen with interest to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by responding to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to whom I am grateful for his characteristically kind words and his tender concern that I am replying to these matters not so much on my own and without a Leader as on my own and without any juniors. That is, I am without much support from those Peers who also take the Government Whip. I would not want to make this point publicly, but in the undoubted privacy of these discussions I can perhaps venture the suggestion that the undoubted attraction of a debate with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others, about the finer points of judicial review might possibly have failed to outshine the annual dinner—which has now been awaited for a couple of years—of the Association of Conservative Peers. But that is mere speculation.

More substantively, let me turn to Amendments 13 and 14. These amendments seek to remove subsections (9) and (10), which have come to be known as the presumption, but I stand by calling it a so-called, or low-level, presumption, for reasons that I will set out. As I explained in answer to the question put to me in the previous group by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, if the court regards there as being good reason not to apply either of the new remedies, then it does not have to; the presumption essentially falls away. The question then put to me, which I will come to, is: why have it in the first place? That is the either/or which a number of contributors have put to me this evening.

The aim, as I have said in previous groups, of Clause 1 is to aid good administration and provide greater flexibility to the court in giving remedies. The new remedies are a very useful addition to the courts’ toolbox —to use that metaphor again—and the presumption, we believe, allows the courts to consider their use and will make sure that a body of case law develops quickly around the appropriate use of new remedies.

The policy intention, therefore, behind the inclusion of the presumption is to encourage judges to use the new remedies where appropriate, and for that I really do make no apology. I do not see that as any fetter on judicial discretion or as the Government intruding into places where they should not be. The independent review, as we have heard, recommended that courts should be given a statutory power to make suspended quashing orders, as it thought that they would be beneficial if used appropriately. We believe that the suspended quashing order and the prospective order are useful additions, but they can only be beneficial to the jurisprudence if the court considers their use.

The presumption is therefore phrased in a way which encourages the court to consider their use, but we are not trying to fetter judicial discretion or to steer—I think that was the word used by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich—the courts to a particular decision. As now, it will remain very much up to the court to decide what remedy is appropriate in the individual circumstances of the particular case.

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Moved by

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

16: Clause 2, page 3, line 19, at end insert—
“(1A) Notwithstanding subsection (1), subsections (2) and (3) do not apply where the party refused permission (or leave) to appeal by the Upper Tribunal was the appellant before the First-tier Tribunal and—(a) that party was without legal representation and the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was not within legal aid scope;(b) that party was not of full age or capacity;(c) the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was not an in-country appeal;(d) the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal was subject to any accelerated procedure;(e) the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was subject to any statutory restriction or direction concerning how that tribunal was to evaluate the credibility of the appellant or the evidence before it; or(f) the application to the Upper Tribunal raises a point of law concerning the construction of any statutory provision for interpretation of an international agreement.”

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, a Cart judicial review is where the High Court can, in exceptional circumstances, review a decision of the Upper Tribunal to refuse permission to appeal a decision by the First-tier Tribunal. The purpose of Clause 2 is to oust, or abolish, this type of judicial review. Cart judicial reviews are mostly used in immigration and social security cases to identify serious errors in law; they have prevented the removal of people to hostile regimes, where they risk torture and murder, and have brought justice to benefits claimants who have been treated unlawfully. Cases where Cart judicial reviews have been used concern matters of life and death and are a safeguard, costing a relatively modest amount of money.

On Report in the House of Commons, the Lord Chancellor moved a new amendment to Clause 2 which would narrow the small number of exceptions to the abolition of Cart judicial reviews even further. In particular, the consequences of the amendment are that a legal error made by a tribunal would be regarded as a fundamental breach of natural justice only if that breach related to a procedural defect. The amendment is problematic, because it would exclude courts from considering issues such as actual or perceived bias in a tribunal, or a tribunal’s failure to assess obviously relevant considerations in its decision-making.

There are a range of arguments why Cart judicial reviews should remain, including arguments about the volume and cost of cases and whether it is a proportionate use of judicial resource. Indeed, there are arguments about the criminal courts’ backlog, and how it would be affected—I think the Government make this argument—if judicial resource was used in this way.

Another argument, which I am calling the “bites of the cherry” argument, and which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, at Second Reading, is where a claimant has already had two separate hearings but wishes—the argument says illegitimately—to have a third hearing. This is not an accurate or fair representation of how the process works. A claimant can only pursue such a judicial review when the First-tier Tribunal has made a serious error of law and when the Upper Tribunal has wrongly refused permission to appeal against that error of law; in other words, the Upper Tribunal has taken no steps to correct a serious error in law by the First-tier Tribunal. This is exactly why the Administrative Court must step in. A Cart judicial review represents a situation where a claimant has not had a proper first bite of the cherry—one might say that the first bite was sour—rather than that they are seeking a third bite. Therefore, the reasons given for abolishing Cart cases proceed on a false characterisation and should be reconsidered. It is for this reason that we are against Clause 2 and believe that it should be removed from the Bill.

Returning to my amendments, Amendments 16 and 21 seek to provide a further list of exceptions to the ousting of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Clause 2. These are examples of circumstances in which there must be particular concern about the capacity of the First-tier Tribunal to deliver an effective appeal for the appellant for reasons beyond the control of the tribunal. Amendment 17 seeks to clarify that to find a breach of the principles of natural justice, the High Court need not focus only on procedural defects. Amendment 18 would change the test to judicially review a decision of the Upper Tribunal to refuse permission to appeal from a “fundamental” breach of the principles of natural justice to a “material” breach of those principles. Amendment 22 in my name would require the Lord Chancellor to carry out and publish a review of the operation and the consequences of the ouster of Cart judicial reviews.

There are a number of other amendments in this group which I support, but the process of this group is to look at the overall intensions of the Government and then to further look at the individual ameliorating effects, if I can put it like that, within the amendments which I have tabled in this debate. I beg to move Amendment 16.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I do not want to repeat what I said at Second Reading. Suffice it to say that I referred to what Lord Carnwath said in a lecture, essentially that the decision in Cart was incorrect and needed to be reversed. That line of argument was supported by the recently departed—in the physical sense, I hasten to add—noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.

The question is whether the decision was correctly reached. If one follows the story of Cart, which we did with some care, looking at the decision of the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Laws was the first judge to break what had been a consensus that the decisions of the Upper Tribunal should not in any way be subject to challenges by way of judicial review.

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I echo what I said on previous occasions. These are modest suggestions and the Labour Party should not take the view that any change to judicial review is per se bad. It is a change that is welcomed by the judges as a whole—of course, I cannot speak for all of them—and to say simply that this whole section of the Bill should go is not a responsible act of opposition.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, just to put the record straight, it is right that David Lammy said that when he was in a previous position. However, what he says now is that he has changed his mind and that he thinks that the whole of Clause 2 should go.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

He is in opposition.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to comment on Amendment 23 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. The amendment retains the Cart supervisory jurisdiction but bars

“any appeal from the court exercising the supervisory jurisdiction or any other challenge to decisions of that court whether by way of renewal or otherwise”,

and the decision of the High Court will be final. As the noble and learned Lord put it, this is a middle way. In a way, it is a shame that it was not degrouped from this group of amendments because, essentially, we have been having two debates in parallel. Also, it might have been more appropriate as a Report stage amendment.

By way of introduction to my comments on the amendment itself, one of the experiences of being a magistrate is that a lot of legal advisors leave magistrates’ courts to go and work in the administrative courts; it is a career progression for a number of them. Some, who I would count as friends, have said to me how utterly hopeless are many of the cases they have to deal with and prepare for the judges; so, interestingly, a number come back to the magistrates’ courts because they prefer the work there. Anyway, that is an aside.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, questioned the figures presented by the Minister. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that. A number of noble and learned Lords proposed further amendments. The noble Lords, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey and Lord Pannick, also proposed further amendments, which may come back on Report; we wait to hear. I noted that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, also supports the approach taken by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I think that an encouraging statement has been made by all these noble Lords.

As I said earlier, we oppose Clause 2 standing part. I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Evans, on that, but I intend to withdraw my amendment after the Minister has spoken.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I will begin by addressing the clause as a whole before dealing with specific amendments, as a number of Members of the Committee have indicated that they believe the clause should be wholly removed from the Bill.

As the Committee is aware, Clause 2 overturns the Cart and Eba judgments, removing the route of challenge known in short hand as a Cart judicial review. Let us be clear exactly what that is: it is a challenge of a decision of the Upper Tribunal to refuse permission to appeal a First-tier Tribunal decision. The claimant has already had a case before the First-tier Tribunal, which the claimant has lost, and the claimant has then been refused permission to appeal by both the First-tier and Upper Tribunal. A Cart judicial review allows an applicant to challenge in the High Court the Upper Tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal—and that is not the end of the matter. If permission to apply for judicial review of the Upper Tribunal’s decision is refused by the High Court, that itself opens a route to the Court of Appeal, as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

It should not surprise anyone that the Upper Tribunal, which is a senior and specialist tribunal, in some cases presided over by a High Court judge, appears to get over 96% of its determinations on permission to appeal right. In this context, “right” means that, sometimes, another High Court judge sitting on an application for a judicial review did not give permission. That should not come as a surprise because the Upper Tribunal is a senior court with a specialist jurisdiction, with senior judges sitting on it, so it is well suited to determining those questions of law.

I have heard it argued that we are removing a lifeline for claimants, but that argument can be extended to any system that has a limit—and there must be a limit. The question for Government and Parliament is where to draw the line. It is commonplace in our judicial system, so far as applications for permission to appeal are concerned, for that application to be considered by the original judge and the putative appellate judge, but no more. That is what the tribunal system does already.

Some members of the Committee may remember the decision in Board of Inland Revenue v Haddock, a decision of the Court of Appeal, comprising the Master of the Rolls, sitting with Lord Justice Ratchet and Mr Justice Apple, but reported only by one AP Herbert in his collection Uncommon Law. Subtitled

“Why is the House of Lords?”—

referring, I hasten to add, to this House in its former judicial capacity—the report posed the question why there should be three tiers of appeal: judge, Court of Appeal and then what he referred to, somewhat impertinently, as the

“wild wager on the final race”,

as he described the former Judicial Committee of this House. This metaphor meant that the Court of Appeal was relegated to

“a minor handicap taking place at 3.30”.

However, we have moved on since then. There is often now one tier of substantive appeal. If you want to appeal from a master to a judge, and then from the judge to the Court of Appeal, there are very special rules for second substantive appeals, and even showing that the judge was probably wrong is not enough to get you a second appeal. This is not even a substantive appeal; it is a question of permission to appeal where both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal have refused permission.

As I have said, the Upper Tribunal does not err often, with only 3.4% of claimants who were refused permission to appeal being granted an appeal and then having that appeal found in their favour. That can usefully be compared to a general 30% to 50% success rate for judicial review cases. Due to this, and the sheer number of Cart JRs per year—around 750—the IRAL recommendation was for Parliament to legislate to remove the Cart judicial review process.

I obviously listened very carefully to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said about the time and motion study and the assumptions set out therein. I know that he and my officials have had a number of useful exchanges on this. We have striven to count as accurately as possible the days taken at each point in the process, and we set that out in our impact assessment. I think that the noble and learned Lord omitted the time taken by the Upper Tribunal for reconsideration, which is not insignificant. Whatever the number of cases that reach the Court of Appeal, it must be more than zero. Therefore, I argue that there is a risk that we are actually underestimating the judicial time spent on Cart reviews. But, for present purposes, I can say that I am very happy to continue discussion on these matters ahead of Report. I will also write to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the data, if there is any—I do not know whether there is—on the settlements and the other points that he mentioned.

The second contention put against me is that the means by which we propose to implement the recommendation is a dangerous one. There are two points here. First, are ouster clauses appropriate in principle? I know that I will not persuade the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on this but, to put it briefly, parliamentary sovereignty means that an ouster clause can be appropriate in principle, I suggest. Legislation can change any aspect of the law and can also include an ouster clause. Although I respect and understand the argument that they are wrong as a matter of principle, I and the Government do not agree with this argument, and we consider that they are appropriate in particular circumstances.

The question now is: in this case, is the ouster clause the proper measure? We say it is: this is the best way to make Parliament’s intention clear vis-à-vis the relative and respective competences of the Upper Tribunal and the High Court. I absolutely accept that the clause’s drafting has been influenced by the arms race, one might say, between Parliament and the courts on ouster clauses in a series of cases. Parliament says X; the court says, “Did you really mean X? Maybe you meant Y.” Parliament says, “No. We are now saying Y.” “Well, what about Z?” You can see that development of the cases from Anisminic through Privacy International and thereafter. That is why the clause must in the form it is: otherwise, the point from Privacy International will be put: “Why does it say ‘purported’?” I think that was the Privacy International point. That is why the clause is drafted in the way it is.

Amendment 23 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, creates a procedural bar, providing that the decision of the High Court or any other supervisory court in reviewing an Upper Tribunal permission to appeal decision is final, preventing any escalation of that point to the Court of Appeal. Although I accept that that approach would create some efficiencies compared with the status quo, they would be significantly fewer than the approach we are taking. It also does not address the conceptual issue, with the High Court overseeing permission to appeal decisions of the Upper Tribunal, which is a senior court of record with specialist subject knowledge.

I am also concerned that some of the nuance in the original ouster clause, which still allows review in certain circumstances, has been lost in that revised version. The procedural bar proposed by the noble and learned Lord would seem to be absolute, not only on the refusal of permission point but, as was identified in the debate, in the substantive disposal were permission granted. As the debate went on, it seemed to me that the lid would not be as tight-fitting as he intended. Indeed, it sounded to me that as more additions and exceptions were built into the amendment, we would be back at either square one or, perhaps at best, at square two. Therefore, although I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord seeks a compromise solution, his amendment, especially with the additions accreted thereto, would not meet the Government’s policy intent.

Amendments 16 and 20 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and Amendment 21 from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, add a variety of exemptions to the ouster clause in particular cases but, in short, the Upper Tribunal is well placed to know the circumstances. It deals with matters of immigration law on a regular basis, and I therefore see no justification for treating those circumstances as exceptions to the ouster clause.

Amendments 17 and 18 apply to the natural justice exemption. This provision was amended by the Government on Report in the other place to read in the words now in the Bill. That was not, as my colleague James Cartlidge explained, a change of policy. Our intention is for substantial procedural impropriety to remain reviewable but for errors of fact or law within the Upper Tribunal’s remit to be ousted. The new wording is intended to be clearer. The amendments would undo the clarification on that point. As to whether fundamental breach is particularly different from material breach, that is perhaps something of a moot point. The intention is to set a high bar which will not be susceptible to erosion over time or cause an unnecessary number of applications, which would undermine the entire purpose of the ouster.

In that context, Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which would allow the High Court or the other supervisory jurisdictions to carry out a JR of an Upper Tribunal permission to appeal decision where there is a “fundamental error of law”, risks taking us back, I am afraid, almost to where we started. That amendment attempts the same thing the Supreme Court attempted in Cart itself—to create a route for judicial review on errors of law but with a sufficiently high bar not to create a flood of cases. That attempt obviously failed, and I fear the noble Lord’s amendment will take us back and, essentially, repeat the same mistake.

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I therefore consider that Clause 2 is both appropriate and proportionate. It supports the efficiency of our justice system and forms an important part of the Bill. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, will be withdrawing his amendment, and I invite other noble Lords not to press theirs.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, it is clear we will return to a number of issues on Report. But for this evening, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 16.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.