Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Greg Hands)]

Welcome back to the Chair, Ms Fovargue.

I believe that the intent of the amendment is already captured in the approvals framework for the regulated asset base. That includes the process for designating a project and then modifying its licence, and wider due diligence on the project. The Government simply would not allow a company to enter into a RAB revenue collection contract if there were cause to doubt the ability of the company to complete construction, a point made slightly more pithily by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend in his intervention on the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Southampton, Test. We expect to say more about how the Secretary of State will make this judgment in our statement on the designation criteria, which we will publish in advance of any consultation on designation.

Before considering the matter of licences, let me return to the question asked earlier by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun. Sizewell C does have a licence, as within the terms of clause 1(2). He said that he could not find the link to the licence on the Ofgem website, so I will commit to write to him, copied to the Committee, with that link.

Designation is very much the first step in the process of amending a developer’s licence to include the RAB conditions. At the point of designation, no commitments have been made; a project will be under development, and further negotiation is required between the developer and the Government. The process is open and transparent and includes consultation at several stages, meaning that a project will be designated only at an appropriate point.

Let me deal with the points raised about various RAB projects in the United States. It is not unreasonable to look at foreign experiences, but it is important to separate the experience of another country in developing and delivering a nuclear power plant from what part of that experience was due to a RAB model. There were several unique circumstances linked to the failure of the South Carolina Virgil C. Summer project, which was referred to, and the parent company, including—[Interruption.] I beg your pardon?

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Sorry. I was just wondering to myself whether the Minister had looked all this up during lunchtime. If so, I congratulate him on doing so.

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention—I think it was an intervention—from a sedentary position. As the Energy Minister, I have to be aware of what is going on in the world of nuclear globally, so no, I did not look it up during lunchtime, actually; I have looked into this and other US plants. The failure of the Virgil C. Summer project—I think that is the one he was referring to—and the parent company included arrests and a conviction for fraud. There were also issues linked to design and supply chain immaturity, as well as a lack of experience with the construction of new nuclear projects. Those issues are pretty far removed from its status as a RAB project. I do not think those risks in South Carolina are applicable to the UK.

[Dr Whitehead]

I fully accept that the Minister did not look that up at lunchtime and that he is fully apprised of the circumstances surrounding the South Carolina project. However, does he not accept that the issues that he has mentioned as relevant to the failure of that project—it was entered into without proper consideration of a lot of things that, as he said, were at least in part responsible for its failure—are precisely the sorts of issues that we would expect him to take into account and sort out before deciding on the designation of a project in this country?

[Greg Hands]

Broadly speaking, the answer is yes. I think that all of those factors, if known at the time, would be considered when the Secretary of State makes the designation. That is the point. Of course they would be factors, were they to be known. I cannot put myself in the shoes of the governor of South Carolina—if indeed it was the governor of South Carolina who made the decision—but if he were or had been of the opinion that the project could not have been completed, he would surely not have made the designation at that time. I am slightly hesitant to stray into the politics of South Carolina, but doubtless the governor was of the opinion at that time that the project would have been completed. The hon. Gentleman uses South Carolina as an example, but I do not think that his amendment would have helped the governor make that decision.

This is not just a question of the factors, which are already covered in the Secretary of State’s determination of a RAB designation. The timing is also important. A project has to go through many stages and approvals post designation of a RAB. To include the hon. Gentleman’s additional definition at this stage might be premature, though I doubt it is needed at all, for the reasons pithily put by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend about the chances of the person making the decision being of the view that the project might not be completed. If that were the case, I think it would be a highly material fact in determining whether to designate a RAB. I do not believe that this amendment is necessary in order to meet the laudable objectives that Opposition Members seek to achieve. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I hear what the Minister says about the amendment, but I am not entirely convinced that he has made the case that he thinks he has made as to why this addition is not necessary for the designation process. After all, we are not talking here about a particularly adept and alert Minister in a particular Administration taking a decision on Sizewell C. As the Minister has said, this Bill is supposed to deal with decisions that might be taken under other circumstances, for other projects, at other times, with other Ministers, and possibly other Administrations. It is important that we put in legislation everything that we think could go wrong with a project and its designation process, so that the legislation is robust for the future.

On South Carolina, the Minister is right. The project failed as a result of a series of interlocking issues. Those issues were not necessarily associated with the RAB process, which is what we are considering in this Bill, but there were wider concerns that should have been apparent to legislators in South Carolina when the project was commissioned and went ahead. Many of the things that the Minister alluded to that occurred in South Carolina were not unforeseeable events. They were events that could have been analysed out at the time of the designation of the plant. Essentially the amendment seeks to address that issue.

We will not press this amendment to a vote—indeed, we will withdraw it—but we have put on the record our belief that the Secretary of State should have a very substantial hand in ensuring, as far as possible, that the project really can come to completion. I am sure that the Minister is with me on that and agrees that that should be the process by which we conduct designation.

Even if it is not explicitly in the Bill, the fact that the Minister has indicated that he thinks that a number of these issues can be covered within the designation elements is perhaps a step along the path to ensuring that these processes can be carried out properly. I do not wish to proceed with the amendment on that basis, but we need to do a proper job at the point of designation, for the protection of investors, for the project and for the customers who pay for it.

[Greg Hands]

Just to probe the hon. Gentleman on this, if I may, one of the criteria is whether the project is sufficiently developed to warrant a RAB. At what point does he think that the fact that the person making the decision might not necessarily think it would be completed would mean that they do not think it is sufficiently developed to start the process? Surely, if they did not think it was going to finish, they would not think it was ready to start either?

[Dr Whitehead]

The Minister puts that as a binary choice, but it is not because there are circumstances. That is essentially what happened in South Carolina. A number of people thought that it was a fine project that would go ahead; they put forward impossible timelines for the project to work on, there were very difficult financing arrangements and the RAB was placed on top of that. Yes, they may have thought that the project could come to completion, but it was not a very well-founded thought, and nor was it arrived at on the basis of the sort of diligence we should expect from the approach to a project the size of, say, Sizewell C.

The amendment’s intention is not to make the Secretary of State make a choice based on a potential view, when designating a project, that it might not be completed. He should do all that work, and indeed be publicly accountable for it, when ensuring that his view is as well founded as possible and that it will stand the test of time as the project progresses. There are points of landing between knowing whether a project is not going to be completed, and being sure that it is going to be completed. When making a designation, the Secretary of State should be held accountable for arriving at an informed position, which can be scrutinised in future, on whether it is reasonable and realistic to say that a project is likely to be completed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

This clause, through subsection (1), gives power to the Secretary of State to designate by notice a nuclear company to benefit from a RAB. The later provisions of this part mean that the designation power can only be exercised with appropriate protections and transparency of decision making. Subsection (3) sets out the criteria a company must meet to be eligible for designation: that the Secretary of State must be of the opinion that, as previously debated, the nuclear project is sufficiently advanced to justify the designation, and that designating the company in relation to the project is likely to result in value for money. In considering value for money, it is expected that the Secretary of State will take into account considerations such as the cost to consumers and the impact on our net zero obligations. As set out in clause 3, the Secretary of State will be obliged to publish details on the process that he will follow when assessing whether the criteria are met.

The eligibility criteria offer important protections for consumers and taxpayers. A company can have access to a RAB only when the Secretary of State is convinced that it is a good project and sufficiently advanced, and where the likelihood of cost overruns is remote. The Secretary of State will also need to consider whether using the RAB to fund the project is likely to represent value for money.

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Designation: procedure

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 3, page 2, line 37, at end insert—

“(5) Prior to consulting persons under subsection (3)(g), the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out why it is relevant to consult those persons.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to indicate the relevance of the people he is consulting on the designation of a nuclear company.

The amendment, and another couple that relate to clauses further down the order paper, need not detain us for long. They essentially seek to improve the effect of the text of the Bill and are not controversial.

Amendment 4 applies to clause 3, on page 2 and requires the Secretary of State to

“publish a statement setting out why it is relevant to consult those persons.”

That refers to the list of those people who are to be consulted upon the designation of a nuclear company. At the bottom of that list is the phrase

“such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

I appreciate that is often seen in Bills and I am sure hon. Members have seen it in their time in other Committees, but I suggest that it is rather loose arrangement if we want to have a Bill that will stand the test of time. While it is a catch-all arrangement, one could almost ask why the other categories are listed. One might as well just put, “Those persons who the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

Surely, where the Secretary of State is considering consulting other people, in addition to those listed, those people ought to be relevant to the designation of the nuclear company. As the Bill stands, it is just people

“the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

I am slightly confused about why the hon. Member seems to be suggesting that it is a bad thing for the Secretary of State to undertake more consultation. Surely more consultation is a good thing. Generally, the Opposition call for more transparency. If the Secretary of State feels that it is necessary to consult more people, I am not hugely convinced that there is a point to making him justify that.

[Dr Whitehead]

I hope that the hon. Member will forgive me if I have not made myself clear. I am certainly not saying that consultation is a bad thing or that there should be less of it; I am saying that the Bill appears to provide for consultation with all the people named in it and anybody else the Secretary of State feels like including. One may think that that is a good thing, but I would have thought that anyone else the Secretary of State feels like including ought to be relevant to the designation of the nuclear company. All the amendment asks is that, when and if the Secretary of State decides that people other than those who were already on the list be consulted, he publish a statement to say why the people he has selected for additional consultation are relevant to the issue in hand. Otherwise in principle it would be possible for the Secretary of State simply to choose a random number of people off the street and consult them. That would not serve the cause of further consultation and transparency.

[Kirsty Blackman]

May I check that an alternative amendment could have been to change the last word in subsection (3)(g) to “relevant” rather than “appropriate”, which would mean that the Secretary of State would be able to consult all the other people he considered to be relevant, rather than appropriate? Is that the direction in which the hon. Member is trying to go with his amendment?

[Dr Whitehead]

Indeed. The hon. Member has drafted her own, perhaps more succinct, amendment on the fly. I would welcome hon. Members tabling amendments if they feel that they can do it better, or more succinctly, than we can. She is right that it is a test of the relevance of the consultation process. Her suggestion does not quite cover the point because I would like the Secretary of State to say why those people are being consulted. Essentially, the amendment requires the Secretary of State to not just think that people are relevant but tell us why. It is not a big point, but I think that would improve the Bill a little were it to be accepted.

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Members for Southampton, Test and for Greenwich and Woolwich for amendment 4, which amends the clause governing the process by which the Secretary of State can designate a company. As part of the process, the Secretary of State must consult a named list of persons, including the authority, Ofgem, the Office for Nuclear Regulation and the relevant environment agency. The Secretary of State will also be able to consult, of course, such other persons as they deem appropriate at that time. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish the reasons for consulting those persons not named in the legislation.

Of course it is important for us to be transparent, and I welcome the intention of the amendment to increase transparency and accountability throughout the process, but it might help if I set out the intention of the consultation requirement in clause 3. The Government have agreed a set of persons that they feel must be consulted: the Office for Nuclear Regulation, Ofgem, the relevant environmental agencies and the devolved Administrations in the event that all or part of one of the plants be located in one of the devolved nations of the United Kingdom. The ones who must be consulted include the key regulatory bodies for nuclear generators in Great Britain.

Alongside that, for each designation, there may be other relevant parties that the Secretary of State thinks it is reasonable to consult to inform the draft reasons for designation. That sort of provision is standard practice. The clause is modelled closely on existing consultation obligations in the Energy Act 2013, which allows the Secretary of State to consult other persons without the requirement to publish a justification.

I do not seek to reject the amendment because of concerns about transparency. The designation process takes several important steps to ensure transparency, including the publication of a statement on how the designation criteria will be assessed and the publication of the designation notice.

The hon. Member for Southampton, Test says that those consulted ought to be relevant, but I think that the Secretary of State will consult only with those who ought to be relevant rather than, in the terms of the hon. Member for Southampton, Test, a random set of people off the street. The way that governmental processes work is that consultations are supposed to be with people who are relevant. I do not think that including a relatively unprecedented amendment to publish a statement about why it is relevant to consult those persons will help the transparency or the understanding of the decision made by the Secretary of State.

I hope that I have shown hon. Members that the legislation already takes the necessary steps to ensure transparency and that the amendment would go against the established precedent for this kind of provision, which has generally worked well for big Government infrastructure decisions. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Southampton, Test to withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I am certainly happy to withdraw the amendment, but in passing I mention that the Minister has drawn attention to the word “must” in clause 3(2), which precedes the people who the Secretary of State is listed as consulting. I am glad that he drew attention to that, because it may reflect on an amendment that I will move later concerning the words “may” and “must”. The Minister will know that a regular concern of mine is that legislation needs to be written in the right way concerning the imperatives on the Secretary of State rather than the allowances. We have made progress from that point of view.

Although this clause contains a fairly standard way of putting things, that may just mean that legislation has been slightly lax in the past, which may be considered less than satisfactory in future. I take the Minister’s point, however, that it is not an exceptional way of putting things, and I take his assurance that a question of relevance would be in the Secretary of State’s mind when he consulted anybody under such circumstances. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

Let me lay out the purpose of clause 3, which is to set out the procedure that the Secretary of State must follow to designate a nuclear company for the purposes of the nuclear RAB model. The clause requires the Secretary of State to undertake various transparency and consultation obligations before a company is designated.

The clause sets out the process. By putting the process in the Bill, the Government are showing their commitment to transparency and openness when designating a company. Prior to the designation of any company, subsection (1) requires the Secretary of State to publish a statement setting out the procedure they expect to follow in determining whether to designate a nuclear company and how they expect to determine that the designation criteria are met.

The Government anticipate that a nuclear company with a generation licence, and which thinks that its project should be funded through a RAB, would approach the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State will then assess the project against the factors set out in the statement, before consulting expert bodies on the designation. That provides opportunities for those directly affected by the potential designation, or with special expertise relevant to the decision, to provide their views on the matter. That includes the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, the governing body of Ofgem—I will refer to it generally as Ofgem in the course of this debate, for the sake of time—whose primary statutory duty is to protect the interests of consumers.

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[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Members for Kilmarnock and Loudoun and for Aberdeen North for their contributions on clause 3. I will try to deal with their points.

It is important to understand the different parts of the process and the transparency involved in the process. The rules are published first; then comes the rationale for the designation, which is consulted on. It is standard practice in a consultation, of course, to take into account the results or the responses made to the consultation. Perhaps the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun was trying to characterise it as superfluous or part of a process that would not add any additional information, but a Government consultation is there specifically to seek out and find more information. We then publish the final rationale for the designation. I hope that is helpful in setting out a little of the process involved.

The question about stating the length of the consultation is one that would be appropriate to the project itself. Let us not forget that we are trying to design a process here that would take into account a number of different possible future nuclear power stations. It would be difficult for us today to be prescriptive about the length of time that a consultation should take. We have set out those who we think must be consulted, and we have also left it open for the Secretary of State to consult other interested parties, which is quite reasonable considering that this legislation is supposed to encompass various forms of future nuclear power plants. We would be in danger of becoming too prescriptive about things such as the length of the consultation and the earlier amendment about stating reasons for particular people to be consulted.

[Dr Whitehead]

I do not want to be accused of trying to be too helpful to the Minister but, as I understand it, this part is about the designation of an existing nuclear company for the possibility of receiving RAB payments for a project it has not yet undertaken. That is it. It seems to me that what we are concentrating on in this part of the Bill—although not later on in the Bill—is just the designation process. I hope the Minister will agree that that is not the project or the RAB process itself, on which we would expect considerable transparency as it goes through, but not necessarily at this particular stage.

[Greg Hands]

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point, and he is right that that is the purpose of this clause. None the less, the purpose of the clause is also to allow designation for a potential variety of timeframes within those projects, so it is still important not to be over-prescriptive, for example with the suggestion that we lay out today what the length of time for a consultation should be.

In terms of the costs, the whole purpose of the Bill is to reduce costs. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun is probing on the costs and what they actually mean, but the point is that this is a reduction in the costs that would otherwise be the case under a contract for difference model. That is ultimately getting to the heart of the Bill. I appreciate that he is against nuclear power, but he would surely have to recognise that the Bill is about reducing the costs of nuclear power. That is the purpose of the Bill. He says it is going to be very expensive—we acknowledge that it can be very expensive, and the purpose of the Bill is to make it less expensive.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

I am not going to give way again, because I have set out clearly that the Secretary of State is ultimately accountable to Parliament, and Parliament would find a way of examining the reasons that he or she laid out under this clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Expiry of designation

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 4, page 3, line 24, leave out “5” and insert “4”.

This amendment shortens the maximum time allowed by the Secretary of State for the designation period of a nuclear company.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 6, in clause 4, page 3, line 33, leave out “5” and insert “4”.

This amendment shortens the maximum time allowed by the Secretary of State for the designation period of a nuclear company.

[Dr Whitehead]

The amendments are grouped because one follows directly from the other—amendment 6 is consequential on amendment 5. The previous debate about the designation process was helpful for discussion of this clause, because clause 4 looks at how long a designation may last once the process has started. That is important because the process can cease to have effect either on the expiry of the designation—that is, a company has been designated for moving along the path to eligibility for a RAB and various negotiations will take place as the company develops its plant—[Interruption.]

[Greg Hands]

The House has adjourned.

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[Dr Whitehead]

Hon. Members have such Pavlovian responses these days, automatically running out of the door whatever the circumstances.

The expiry date of a designation could well arrive because the company has received a designation, but has done nothing about it, or because the Government have got a designation through, but are a bit lax in pursuing the subsequent process. Alternatively, as the clause suggests, it could be because a project is under way, the revenue collection contract starts biting, investment is secured and the project goes ahead.

However, I am a little concerned that the expiry date is set at a period of five years, beginning on the date of the designation notice in question. As such, both the nuclear company and the Government have five years to get their act together on the RAB process, although that could lead to a going slow or delays. We already know that nuclear projects have a habit of running over time, sometimes due to construction issues and so on, but we do not want projects to be further delayed because people have not got themselves organised for a proper RAB process or because the Government cannot be bothered to get things going at a certain time and believe that they have five years to sort that out.

We have made the modest suggestion that that period should be four years; that might concentrate minds a little on moving from the process of hopefully being designated to the process of having a revenue collection contract and getting under way properly. There would not be that time to mess about between the two ends of the process, as might be the case under the five-year designation period.

I agree that we could pick any one of a number of different dates; the four-year period is just to suggest that we should concentrate minds a little. The amendment does not lay down the law: if the Government think it could be reconstructed in a different but more concentrated way, we would be happy with that. The amendment just suggests an indicative new date so that the point is borne in mind. I hope the Government will be able to accept it on that basis.

[Greg Hands]

Amendments 5 and 6 would seek to reduce the length of time a designation remains valid from five to four years and they would reduce the period for which the Secretary of State may extend the designation notice for a designated nuclear company to four years.

First, I thank the Opposition for their consideration of this matter. The hon. Member for Southampton, Test spoke to his amendment in a probing way—trying to get to the bottom of why the period should be five years rather than some other period. I am glad that the Opposition recognise the importance of the designation notice period and the fact that it should strike the right balance between providing enough time for the Government and the company to undertake all the processes necessary to inform a decision on licence modifications without leaving a designation in place for an unreasonable length of time. That is, as it were, the exam question here.

I believe that we have achieved that balance in the Bill. Currently, if negotiations on a project are successful and a relevant licensee nuclear company becomes party to a revenue collection contract, the power of the Secretary of State to modify its licence ceases, of course, outside some limited circumstances. That is vital to give investors confidence that the Secretary of State does not have an open-ended power to further amend the generation licence.

On the other hand, if negotiations are not successful after a project has been designated—the point here is to give enough time for those negotiations to be successful—it is necessary for the Secretary of State’s modification powers to lapse rather than continue indefinitely, so a sunset clause to the designation is also needed. That sits alongside the provisions in the Bill that revoke designation if the designation’s criteria or conditions are no longer met.

However, a decision to take a financial close on a nuclear power station may not happen overnight; robust processes must be followed, extensive due diligence must be carried out and there must be rigorous negotiations to ensure value for money for both the consumer and taxpayer. That is the case with many large infrastructure projects.

Take the negotiations at Hinkley Point C as an example: discussions and eventual negotiations on the project took a number of years to complete. I believe therefore that a five-year window is a reasonable period to expect negotiations to have run their course, recognising that a project for RAB must be suitably advanced to be designated in the first place—that goes back to the earlier debates. That window provides time for negotiations to achieve a successful outcome without providing the Secretary of State with licence modification powers for an inappropriate period. The ability to extend the designation presents a backstop provision that allows the designation to be continued when the designation criteria continue to be met and negotiations are ongoing—in other words, it builds a certain amount of flexibility with a positive decision to extend negotiations. It is therefore appropriate that the extension period should mirror the initial designation period.

I do not consider that the amendments would provide any enhancement to that rationale. I did not hear any specific argument for four years rather than five years, so I am minded to continue with five years. I consider the provisions within this clause, which will permit the Secretary of State to revoke a designation notice at any point if he considers that the criteria are no longer met, mitigates the risk that negotiations—or, indeed, the modification power—will continue for longer than they should. I therefore invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

As the Minister has said, the amendment was essentially a probing amendment to seek a little more clarification on why five years is considered to be the appropriate time. I am not sure that the Secretary of State has fully answered the question about the extent to which that might allow people not to get on with things as quickly as they might otherwise do, but I appreciate that in a complicated project such as those we are considering, there are processes that take quite a lot of time; it may well be that getting on for five years is the time necessary for such projects to be completed.

The overall point is that we want to make sure that, once designation has been undertaken, we move to the next stage as quickly as possible. I am sure that the Secretary of State would concur with that particular aim. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

Clause 4 sets out the circumstances in which the designation of a nuclear company would expire. As set out in subsections (1) and (2) of the clause, the designation of a nuclear company will be limited to a period of five years from the date of the project designation. If a designation expires, the Secretary of State must publish the details of that fact under the provisions in subsection (5). However, the Secretary of State will have the power under subsection (3) to extend the designation period before the five-year period lapses.

Subsection (4) of the clause requires that prior to granting an extension for a maximum of five years, the Secretary of State would need to consult the company, the authority, the ONR, the relevant environment agency, and the devolved Governments if relevant. Before exercising that power, the Secretary of State would also need to continue to be satisfied that the criteria for designation are met. This would allow for any circumstances in which the negotiations with the designated company and engagement with the financial markets last beyond the five-year designation period, but the Secretary of State believes that the project both represents value for money and is sufficiently advanced to warrant a RAB.

The designation will also expire if the company enters into a contract with a revenue collection counterparty. That is to provide confidence to investors that once the RAB licence conditions have been inserted into the company’s electricity generation licence, the Secretary of State will no longer be able to modify that licence except in the limited circumstances set out in clauses 7 and 35 of the Bill. This is a proportionate approach that balances the need for investor certainty with the ability to flexibly apply the RAB model to individual projects. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Revocation or lapse of designation

[Dr Whitehead]

I rise to speak to amendment 7, in clause 5, page 4, line 16, leave out “either” and insert “any”.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 2 and 3.

This amendment was tabled to deal with the possible eventuality that we would have three designation criteria in clause 2(3), rather than two, as is the case at the moment. We moved an amendment to try to place three criteria into that clause, which the Committee did not accept. The statement, therefore, that either of those two criteria are relevant stands as far as the Bill is concerned, and the word “either” should therefore not be replaced by “any”. On that basis, amendment 7 logically falls, so I have no wish to move the amendment.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

Clause 5 provides the Secretary of State with the power to revoke the designation of a nuclear company and sets out the applicable circumstances and procedure for doing so, as well as the circumstances and procedure whereby a project designation could lapse. The revocation power is tightly constrained by subsection (1). It applies only where a nuclear company ceases to hold a generation licence in respect of the nuclear project for which it was designated or it no longer meets the designation criteria. It is important that only the right projects are able to benefit from a RAB where they are sufficiently advanced and likely to provide value for money.

As set out in subsection (2), revocation of a designation would follow a similar process to project designation. The Secretary of State must prepare draft reasons, consult the named persons and publish a revocation notice, where relevant; they can attach additional conditions to a designation notice, as set out in subsection (3). If a company fails to comply with the conditions set out in the designation notice, the Secretary of State will notify the company that it has failed to comply, which will result in the designation lapsing. Such a notice must be published by the Secretary of State under subsection (5).

Such a model is a common feature of similar RAB models. The procedures envisaged allow time for consideration and consultation before any decision to revoke is taken. Given that the ability to continue to meet any of the conditions attached to designation is within the control of the company, there is no consultation requirement for the Secretary of State before a designation lapses.

Taken together, these routes to ending a designation provide an important layer of protection for consumers before a designated company enters into a RAB. In essence, they allow for a designation to end in any circumstance where it is no longer appropriate for a company to benefit from a RAB before project funding begins.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Licence modifications: designated nuclear companies

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 6, page 5, line 3, at end insert—

“(2A) Prior to exercising the power under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out how the exercising of the power will facilitate investment in the design, construction and commissioning of nuclear energy generation projects.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to justify the exercise of a power to modify the electricity generation licence of a nuclear company.

The clause concerns modifications to the licences of companies that have entered into a designation with regard to the RAB process. It sets out a number of powers enabling the Secretary of State to make modifications to licences in order to square the designation process with the licence process. It occupies a lot of other areas, but would be particularly relevant to the licence as it applies to, say, the Sizewell C project.

Subsection (2) states that the Secretary of State is able to exercise the power under subsection (1)—to modify licences—

“only for the purpose of facilitating investment in the design, construction, commissioning and operation of nuclear energy generation projects”,

which restricts the powers of the Secretary of State to modify the licences, concentrating it in the field of the design, construction and operation of the nuclear project.

Hon. Members will notice that that restriction stops there—that is, the Secretary of State may exercise that power for that purpose, but no one else needs to know about it. The Secretary of State may consider doing that, or restricting himself or herself to that particular designation, and may consider that he or she has done that, but it is a completely opaque process.

This amendment seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State publishes a statement setting out how his decision does indeed facilitate investment in the design, construction, commissioning and operation of nuclear energy generation projects, so that when he is considering exercising that power, it is a publicly exercised power, and information on what he has done is in the public domain.

The publication of the statement does not restrict what the Secretary of State can do; it sheds a light on what they can do, and ensures that they are carrying out that particular power correctly, as laid out in the legislation. We think that would be a good, safe addition to the Bill. It does not fundamentally alter its direction, but sheds a little more light on the process as the directions of the Bill are undertaken.

[Greg Hands]

As the hon. Gentleman says, this amendment addresses the process for modifying a designated nuclear company’s licence, particularly which documents should be published before the power is exercised. We recognise that designating a nuclear company and subsequently modifying its licence is a significant decision. That is why the legislation lays out a clear process, which provides transparency and builds confidence in the decisions that the Secretary of State will make when exercising these powers. The process in the Bill is strongly based on existing licence modification powers; it is well precedented.

The amendment obliges the Secretary of State to publish a document setting out how the licence modification would facilitate investment in nuclear projects before modifications are made. I do not believe that is necessary. The Government have already set out a clear process and strong transparency provisions in the legislation. Currently, the Secretary of State is required to consult named persons prior to making any licence modifications, and must then publish the details of any modifications as soon as reasonably practicable after they are made, with material excluded only when necessary—for example, for purposes of commercial confidentiality or national security.

[Greg Hands]

The process is as described. It is based on a very good precedent on these sorts of licence modifications. This would not be the first Bill to come along to look at how to modify a licence, and we have based that entirely on existing precedents. There is nothing unusual in this process or this structure.

The approach of consultation followed by publication is well precedented, as I said, in other licence modification powers. We think that the amendment proposes an unnecessary additional process. Moreover, the consultation provisions will allow expert voices to input on whether the licence modifications are effective in facilitating investment, which, of course, is exactly the purpose of the clause. I therefore hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

We do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I will say that we think it is a good idea, which adds to the Bill’s transparency. The Minister has given examples where certain elements of that transparency would be facilitated by other components of the Bill, but I would note that most of those are post hoc rather than before the process. Nevertheless, I take some assurances from what the Minister has said about the proper transparency of the process, so we will not pursue that this afternoon. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 6, page 5, line 13, at end insert—

“(ba) the interests of existing and future consumers of electricity in relation to their prospects of recouping their contribution at the conclusion of the construction phase of the project;”.

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the interests of electricity consumers in recovering the value of their contribution to the construction of a nuclear power plant.

We have now reached the point where we have the first consideration of the consumer in the Bill, in clause 6(4)(b), dealing with the licence modification arrangements. Hon. Members will note in subsection (4) the things that the Secretary of State must have regard to when exercising the power under subsection (1), subject to what we have just discussed about subsection (2) in terms of the design, construction, commissioning and operation of nuclear energy generation projects.

Subsection (4)(b) says that the Secretary of State must have regard to

“the interests of existing and future consumers of electricity, including their interests in relation to the cost and security of supply of electricity”.

I understand that to mean that the Secretary of State, in modifying licences, particularly in respect of a RAB agreement, must look at the interests of consumers with respect to the cost of electricity and the extent to which it may be produced at a better price as production develops in the years following the adoption of a RAB, and the extent to which security of supply to customers can be maintained.

What is lacking in that list of things that the Secretary of State must have regard to—along with many other things—as far as the consumer is concerned is a recognition that the consumer has an active interest as well as a passive interest in this process. If we are setting out to produce a RAB arrangement that effectively requires a levy on customers at all stages of the process—during development, construction and production—then the consumer surely has rather more of an interest in that process than just the passive interest in price and security that is suggested in subsection (4)(b).

For example, the consumer has a considerable interest in making sure that the cost to them is reasonable at all stages of the process, and that it does not simply set out to milk the consumer for the purpose of sorting out the project regardless of its vicissitudes. The consumer has a particular interest not only in the way that the RAB contract talks about the price of electricity, but in how it addresses the extent to which the consumer’s investment may be recouped as the RAB process comes to its conclusion and goes down its path.

Of course, in that context, the RAB arrangements that we are discussing have, during their latter stages, a two-way process. If the production of electricity goes above the ceiling of the allowable costs limit, then it is expected that the company producing the electricity, because the model is regulated, will restore money to the consumer in one way or another. If its production is under that allowable costs ceiling, however, it will take money from the consumer to allow that process to continue smoothly. Indeed, in the RAB consultation, we had a rather optimistic, smooth little curve down as the process comes to its end. I do not think that will quite be the reality as the RAB process goes on, but it is important.

[Alan Brown]

I share the hon. Gentleman’s concerns about protecting consumers from costs and so on. That is actually why we are against large-scale new nuclear. Can he explain a wee bit more about recouping costs? Recouping costs sounds like getting money back in terms of the asset, which does not make sense. The amendment also mentions recouping contributions

“at the conclusion of the construction phase of the project”.

That is effectively rent on a 60-year contract for the RAB, so I am not sure why it would be at the conclusion of the construction stage.

[Dr Whitehead]

It is at the conclusion of the construction stage because the construction stage gives way to a production stage. That is the point at which electricity is produced, when the customer—I am assuming we can describe the consumer and customer as an entity—or those acting on behalf of the customer can start to think about the extent to which some of that money may come back as a result of the way that production is carried out within the ceiling set for overall RAB programme costs.

There could be circumstances under which, as the RAB process comes to an end, the customer recoups—in lower bills, dividends and so on—a lot of the money that was put in. There will always be excessive production over the allowed costs level, so money will come back to the customer. We will see later in the Bill the methods by which that money might be restored to the customer. Yes, there is a real interest, post the construction phase, in recouping those costs.

A second issue for the consumer is the eventual outcome of the ownership of the plant at the end of the RAB period, as it goes into production. As it is a regulated asset base, by the end of the RAB period, the company that has undertaken the construction and run the production of the plant will have received all the money it should have received through the regulated asset base arrangement, and will have worked successfully as a result of the support that the RAB process provides.

Depending on how many years are set out for the RAB process to take place, if it reaches its end within the working life of the nuclear plant, the question then arises of who owns the nuclear plant at the end of that period. Does the consumer own it at the end of that period? If they do, that is a little bit like a mobile phone contract, whereby the consumer would expect the charges to reduce substantially after paying off the cost of the phone in their contract. Clearly, it is in the interests of customers to have an active involvement not just in spending their money wisely, but in recouping or changing it into a different form as the RAB process sets its course. Indeed, under those circumstances, the Secretary of State might need to consider the length of the RAB contract, and how far it goes into the operating life of the nuclear power station, to carry out the terms of the contract and to consider what arrangements might be made for life at the end of that contract.

I suggest that those are all things that the Secretary of State ought to have regard to over and above the passive involvement of consumers that is set out in subsection (4). That is why we tabled the amendment, which states that the Bill should take account of

“the interests of existing and future consumers of electricity in relation to their prospects of recouping their contribution at the conclusion of the construction phase of the project”.

That is an active consideration in the management of customers’ contracts, not just a passive one where the customer stands by and waits for the money to be deducted from their account to pay for these projects forever. The Secretary of State should have an active view on that in terms of how to get the best value for the customer from the project overall, over and above the best value for the project itself.

[Greg Hands]

Amendment 9 addresses how the interests of consumers, which are vital in this process, will be taken into account and what the consequences of that would be. In the Bill as currently drafted, the Secretary of State must have regard to a number of matters when modifying a designated company’s licence. That includes the UK’s net zero ambitions and the interests of existing and future consumers in relation to the future cost and security of electricity supply.

The amendment requires the Secretary of State also to have regard to the prospect of consumers recouping what I think the shadow Minister described as their “investment” at the end of the construction phase. I appreciate hon. Members’ enthusiasm for ensuring that consumers will benefit from any RAB project, and, in that sense, I welcomed their support on Second Reading. However, the amendment is not compatible with how the RAB model works.

The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun got to the heart of this: the amendment would make RAB effectively inoperable. It treats consumers as investors, but they are not investors. Consumers will benefit from a new nuclear power station. He and I might disagree on whether that should have happened in the first place, but none the less, the benefit to consumers is in electricity rather than in a return on any investment.

Fundamentally, the amendment misunderstands how the RAB model will work. The RAB model will mean that consumers contribute to meeting project costs from the start of construction and reducing the cost of capital, which is the main driver of project costs. That is why we are seeking consumers’ contribution. What they get in return is a nuclear power station that produces low-cost, low-carbon electricity.

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[Dr Whitehead]

Let me say two things. First, if someone contributes in a penny fund to a co-operative society account of some description, that does not mean that they are not an investor; it just means that they are investing in a certain way and at a certain rate. The fact that the RAB arrangements will be passed on to customers’ bills and that there will be a known and determined amount of levy on those bills, which can be quantified, means that the customer is, in effect, adding an investment into the process on top of their bills. That is what I am trying to say, and I am sure that the Minister would agree that that is a form of investment in the process, even though the consumer is not a conscious investor in the way that a corporation might be. This is one of the problems of how we best protect the consumer interest in this process. Nevertheless, I suggest that that is a consumer investment in the overall process.

Secondly, I am sure that the Minister would agree that the RAB process continues after construction for a considerable time in the production period, as the RAB consultation set out. Therefore, that part of the process needs to be considered equally as an investment in the overall outcome of the project, as it is in the construction period. If he thinks that it is something different, he ought to explain why.

[The Chair]

Order. Interventions are getting very long. There will be an opportunity to respond at the end of this debate, Dr Whitehead.

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[Greg Hands]

Again, I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. The cost of different forms of power generation is a very interesting part of the energy debate. Obviously those costs move around and will be based on any number of factors, including global market prices and the cost of extracting and producing particular forms of energy. Nuclear’s advantage is its ability to provide a steady, constant baseload, which is not always the case with some of the other technologies the hon. Lady is comparing it with.

I hope I am not digressing too far, but when it comes to offshore wind, the UK has had enormous success. We have the world’s largest capacity. None the less, when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining, we have to have something else to provide that baseload. That is the purpose of nuclear power. The Bill is about making it more cost-effective and reasonable for consumers. That is the Government’s position.

I hope I have convinced hon. Members that this amendment would not achieve their goals of helping consumers. The concept of consumers investing in a plant and then recouping their money somehow is incompatible with the RAB model. There are mechanisms in place to give confidence that any RAB project will successfully lead to the means of delivering large amounts of stable, low-carbon energy to consumers. I hope the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

This really worries me. What does the Minister think consumers are doing in contributing to a RAB process? If the Minister does not think that that is in any way a form of investment in the plant and that consumers are just completely passive recipients—that they are good for whatever money is required to get the system through and should have no interest in the proceedings, other than being a milch cow for the process—I am afraid that we differ.

[Kirsty Blackman]

On that, consumers are investing in the significant profits for private companies that are in many cases not based in the UK. That seems to be the essence of the hon. Gentleman’s concerns and the reason he moved the amendment. Is that correct?

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[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, indeed. This is perhaps a separate debate, but we have a position not just on this particular instance of nuclear power, but on similar arrangements that relate to the RIIO process for energy distribution and network companies, whereby they are enabled to charge an additional amount on bills in order to secure assets that they own and that consumers or the public do not. The consumers, however, are expected to pay for the privilege of having that piece of technology at their disposal subsequently, but the question of ownership never comes into it, because they pay collectively for someone else to have an asset to call its own. That is exactly the situation with the nuclear plant.

We therefore need to take the consumer rather more seriously than just being a passive contributor in the way often set out in such processes—“Oh well, the customer will pay an additional levy in the bill. As long as it doesn’t look too serious at any particular time, that’s okay.” Not only is that not okay, in particular for levies with no consequences if applied to customers, but it is not okay to have a cumulative set of levies that put a lot of money on electricity and gas bills over a period for particular purposes that the consumer has no hand in at all.

I agree that the concept of the consumer being a part investor in the process might sound a little odd to those who have a traditional view of an investor and how an investor works, it is nevertheless a real thing: the consumer is in effect investing in the success of the plant. The Secretary of State—the Minister; I have promoted him already—has set out how he sees the customer being involved in the process, but that completely ignores the proper interest and protection of the consumer and bill payer as far as the overall process is concerned.

The amendment would not make the RAB process impossible; it merely states that as part of that process—we will come to the debate about where allowable costs have been exceeded—yes, the customer invests in it, but the customer also has reasonable expectations of some quid pro quo for that investment. That ought to be looked after. The quid pro quo in this instance, as I set out—I am sure the Minister agrees that this takes place in the RAB process—is that in the production process, if there is an excess over the allowable costs of production, the fact that it is a regulated asset means that that money goes back to someone. In this instance, it should be the customer.

That is what I mean by the customers’ interests being protected in recouping their investment. The Minister surely cannot deny that that is part of, not instead of, the RAB process in the production period. That is actually set out in the notes that accompany the Bill. I am therefore a bit mystified as to how the Minister takes the position that he does, given what is in his own Bill and in the arrangements for RAB that he himself is putting forward. I see no reason why he should not accept the amendment if he has the customers’ interests at heart, because it does not detract from RAB; it adds to it by recognising who is paying the money, what their interests are and how they should be protected.

I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I want to record my disappointment in the Minister’s apparent lack of either understanding or empathy for the customer’s position. We are discussing a Bill in which the customer is central, because they are bankrolling a substantial part of the project as it goes forward. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

I will try to speed up a little. As we know, the clause allows the Secretary of State to make the necessary licence modifications to apply a RAB model to a designated nuclear company. Subsection (2) clarifies that the effect of a licence modification is that the company would benefit from being able to receive an allowed revenue to construct, build, commission and operate a new nuclear power plant. Subsection (3) requires that the power be exercised only in relation to a nuclear company that is designated in accordance with the provisions of the Bill.

Licence modifications will not take effect unless the nuclear company whose licence has been modified subsequently enters into a revenue collection contract with a revenue collection counterparty, as set out in subsection (9). The modifications will be subject to negotiation between the Government and the nuclear company. It is therefore not possible to describe the exact modifications that would be required; however, subsection (5) highlights possible examples, such as the revenue that a company is allowed to receive, how that revenue is to be calculated, and the kinds of activities that may be undertaken by the company.

When making any modifications to a licence, subsection (4) requires the Secretary of State to take into account both our commitment to decarbonising the power sector and the interests of existing and future consumers with respect to the cost and supply of electricity. Alongside that, and to ensure that any RAB project is financeable, the Secretary of State, when making modifications under the clause, must have regard to the costs incurred in delivering the project and the need for the company to finance that activity. Together, those obligations will ensure that the modification powers are used so that the project contributes to a transition to a low-carbon, low-cost energy system.

As set out in subsection (3), the power to make modifications to a licence will last while the designation for a nuclear company is in effect. That is important to allow the Secretary of State to make modifications to the licence to take into account developments in negotiations and engagements with the financial market. When making any modifications in that period, the Secretary of State will need to continue to take account of the consultation that he undertook with all bodies named in clause 8. In addition to the modification of the designated nuclear company’s licence, subsections (7) and (8) allow him in very limited circumstances to modify the standard conditions of generation licences if necessary. The Secretary of State can make those modifications only if he considers it appropriate for consequential, supplementary or incidental purposes.

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[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution. The Government are satisfied that the amount of information included in the Bill is sufficient. Far be it from me to suggest that Members table amendments, but perhaps he might seek to do so if he wants to see more transparency and more information. I realise I was not quite right earlier in saying that the SNP had not tabled any amendments; I know that it has tabled some new clauses. If he wants additional publications, he might table some amendments on Report to be a little more precise about what additional information he thinks the Secretary of State should publish.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Licence modifications: relevant licensee nuclear companies

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 7, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(3A) When exercising the power in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must not cause the excess of expenditure being incurred over the allowable revenue cap to lead to further charges upon revenue collection contracts.”

This amendment prevents the Secretary of State from allowing the levy of further consumer charges should an increase in allowable revenue be agreed following increases in costs or timescale of a nuclear project.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 12, in clause 7, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“(3A) When exercising the power in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out how an adjustment in the company’s allowed revenue is to be made without relying on revenue collection contracts.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to set out how an adjustment to allowed revenue, following an increase in costs or time, is to be provided for by means other than additional customer levies.

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[Dr Whitehead]

With these amendments, we get to the heart of the consumer interest in the Bill. They are closely related, so it is appropriate that they are grouped and spoken to together.

As I think hon. Members know, when the RAB process gets under way, one of the first things that will happen is that Ofgem will be required to draw up a programme of allowable revenue. That is the sum total of the amount that is considered to be within the RAB process. Much of the rest of the Bill is about how that allowable revenue is collected from customers, placed with the counterparty and allocated out to the nuclear company that undertakes the construction and subsequent production of a nuclear plant, and about the safeguards and concerns surrounding that process. The question of allowable revenue is crucial to the rest of the Bill.

Allowable revenue is made up of a number of building blocks. The return on capital must be assessed, as must depreciation, operating costs, the project’s taxation, grid costs, the funded decommissioning programme, incentives and other adjustments. Those all go into the pot of the allowable costs regime, which sets a ceiling for the amount of money that can be taken from the consumer, albeit that that is a contribution towards the process made by lots of people in small amounts on their bills over a period of time. It sets out the quantum of those contributions, and many adjustments can be made to how that works, in relation to the timescale of the process, the part of the allowable costs element that is placed into construction and the part that is placed into production. That is set out later in the Bill as part of the process of allocation from the counterparty body to the body that carries out nuclear construction and production.

As was mentioned earlier, it is not always the case that nuclear power plants are constructed exactly to cost and exactly to time. Indeed, if we look at the construction of nuclear power plants across the world, we find that all but one has run over time or over cost or both—in some instances by very large amounts. The allowable costs ceiling is therefore important for us to get a clear scope of what the customer will have to bear in this process. However, there is also a process in the Bill that allows that allowable costs ceiling to be raised, on the Secretary of State’s consideration, if the circumstances change. If the costs rise or the timescale slips, the Secretary of State can allow the allowable costs ceiling to be raised.

What that means in principle for the consumer is potential catastrophe, because the consumer thought they were in for a particular allowable costs ceiling that had been determined. We have heard already about the rather heroically optimistic cost assessments provided for in the Bill, and on that sort of allowable costs arrangement consumers would have about £1 put on their bills in the design phase, with a lot more—perhaps £10—on their bills in the construction phase. The amount would then taper down as production gets under way, with the possible payback of some money in the process. The overruns on construction costs or time costs could double or treble that amount, particularly during the construction period, in a way that the consumer would not have anticipated.

In the amendments, we suggest that the consumer should be in for the initial allowable costs ceiling estimate—and that is it. In circumstances where the Secretary of State is contemplating what should happen with the allowable costs ceiling, he should not cause any excessive expenditure simply to be plonked on to customers’ bills. At that point, if the costs or the timescale have changed, there are a number of options open to him as to how to deal with the new cost ceiling; that need not necessarily be done by simply raising the allowable costs ceiling. For example, it could be by adding a particular taxpayer’s investment to the project, or it could be by issuing nuclear bonds, which puts additional money into the company but does not impact on customer bills.

We are seeking to cap the RAB in terms of what the customer expectation of it is. That does not necessarily mean that the function of the RAB is determined by that cap; it just means that the exponential milking of the customer to fund the RAB does not take place and that the Secretary of State has recourse to other means and should publish, as amendment 12 says, what the plans would be in the event of an excess over the ceiling to make the project a success.

That is a very important part of the new deal as far as RAB is concerned. The customer is now being asked to invest, in the first instance, in the hope for a plant, well before the plant has been established; that is new—the CfD process is post the construction of the plant. They are being asked to underpin the expensive costs that are incurred during the construction period. They are also being asked to engage in a two-way process whereby, yes, they get cheaper bills but they are still potentially contributing to a RAB process as the production phase continues. So the very least we should expect on behalf of the customer is that they know what they are letting themselves in for at the time of the outcome of the project.

We are not talking about capping costs necessarily; we are talking about how those additional costs are paid for under the circumstances where they do rise. We obviously hope that, as the project progresses, those costs and timescales do not increase, but if they do we do not see that the customer needs to foot the additional bill; there needs to be other recourse. That is what we have put in these amendments, and should the Secretary of State consider in any way that the customer is an investor in this process, we hope he would consider that a reasonable way of dealing with the investment that the customer is undertaking in the process as a whole.

[Greg Hands]

I will speak for a little longer than I might ordinarily do, because this is an important question of consumer protection. I will try to deal with all the points raised by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test.

Amendment 11 would limit the ways in which the Secretary of State could exercise the powers under clause 7. As we know, clause 7 allows for a nuclear company’s allowed revenue to be increased should its financing cap be exceeded in construction, but only in certain circumstances and where a clear procedure is followed. The amendment seeks to prevent the Secretary of State from creating any additional recourse to consumer funding in the exercising of his or her powers under the clause. Amendment 12 proposes that the Secretary of State should be transparent about the funding of a nuclear RAB project were they prohibited from funding an extension to the allowed revenue through a revenue collection contract.

First, I draw the House’s attention to the remoteness of the scenario under which the Secretary of State may choose to exercise the power under clause 7. Under a RAB model, the licence would determine a risk-sharing mechanism, whereby construction cost overruns up to the agreed financing cap are shared between investors and consumers. We expect that any RAB structure will ensure that financial incentives are in place to ensure the company’s investors manage project costs and schedules. The financing cap will be based on robust risk analysis, including best-practice, reference-class modelling, and set at a level that is sufficiently remote that there is a very low chance that it would be reached.

However, in the event that the financing cap is reached, investors would not be obliged to provide the capital to complete the project and this risks considerable sunk costs to consumers if the project is discontinued. Given the size and importance of the project, the Government consider it crucial that there is a mechanism in place to allow the additional capital to be raised to ensure completion of the project, and that decisions to extend the project’s revenue rest with the Secretary of State.

I would emphasise at this point that any decision taken by the Secretary of State to adjust the allowed revenue is one that is subject to a robust process of scrutiny and transparency. The Secretary of State could exercise the power to extend the allowed revenue only following consultation with the licensee, the ONR and Ofgem, which, I remind the Committee, has as its primary statutory duty the need to protect the interests of existing and future consumers with respect to the cost and security of the supply of electricity.

In exercising the power, the Secretary of State must continue to have regard to those matters detailed in clause 6(4), which includes the interests of existing and future consumers with respect to the cost of supply of electricity. As is consistent with our approach across the Bill, we have sought to ensure a transparency process whereby the Secretary of State is required to publish a statement setting out the procedure to be followed when exercising this power. That is set out in subsection (6).

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I would remind everybody that that provision is further strengthened by the Secretary of State consulting Ofgem. Ofgem has a statutory duty to protect consumers during the consideration of the application from investors before any decision is made. That will ensure that consumer interests are rightly protected as we maximise the likelihood that consumers will reap the benefits of the project they helped to build. That is the consumer protection embedded in this Bill. I therefore hope that hon. Members will respect the process that we have put in place, and I ask them not to press amendments 11 and 12.

[Dr Whitehead]

That is very disappointing. The Minister has effectively said that the customer has no say in this arrangement. He used the phrase “reduce the options to Ministers”; yes, this would reduce the options available to Ministers—it would make them think about how they should put forward other ways of covering a breach of the allowed expenditure without simply fleecing customers. The Minister may think that one of his options ought to be to fleece customers—that might be the universe he inhabits—but we do not think that should be the case. We think that the customer must have much clearer lines of protection, other than the very woolly things that the Minister has said that might cause the customer to be given some consideration in this process. For those reasons, we would like to divide on amendment 11.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Question negatived.

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 7, page 7, line 17, after “operations” insert

“and have generated power for placement onto the National Grid”.

This amendment amends the definition of the completion of construction of the nuclear project to include initial generation of power.

The amendment relates to statements made, for the purpose of licence modifications, about the completion of the construction of a nuclear project. Clause 7(5) states that completion of the project should be based on

“successful completion of such procedures and tests relating to the project as constitute, at the time they are undertaken, the usual industry standards and practices for nuclear energy generation projects in order to demonstrate that they are capable of commercial operations.”

I wonder whether hon. Members can spot what is missing from that subsection. This is not a quiz, and I think hon. Members have long gone to sleep—but in case not, the answer is that there is no suggestion in it that the nuclear power station actually has to produce anything. Construction could be regarded as complete provided that all the hoops have been jumped through, even if no button has actually been pressed. Presumably what one would regard as the original purpose of the whole operation is that it should produce some power that goes into people’s homes, buildings and so on.

The amendment simply says that not only must all those things be completed, but the project must do what it was originally supposed to do: generate power. As the amendment describes it, the project must

“have generated power for placement onto the National Grid”.

That seems a very modest amendment, but it would put right what I think is rather a serious omission in clause 7(5) with respect to the whole idea of what a nuclear power station is for. Surely we must agree that generating power is the purpose of a nuclear power station, and that completion must therefore be based on that purpose.

I cannot see any great reason why the amendment should not be accepted, but I am sure that the Minister has a very good argument why not.

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for moving his amendment. It is important that we consider that the scenario is remote; before allowing any project to have a RAB, we will obviously have conducted robust due diligence, using best practice benchmarking analysis to set the financing cap at a remote level. The project’s investors will be incentivised to control costs below that level and will be penalised for project overruns. We are clear that this power of modification should be exercisable only during the construction of the plant, and have sought to do this in clause 7(4). This determines that this power cannot be exercised at any point once construction has been completed. For the purposes of this clause, we have defined the construction phase in clause 7(5).

The amendment would provide further qualification to the definition of the end of a project’s construction phase. It seems to make it explicit that the purpose of the construction phase of the nuclear project is to build a plant that will contribute electricity to the national grid, and that might appear fair enough. However, the clause is intended to cover both the period of construction and the testing of the plant, to ensure that it can operate commercially to provide power. An early part of this testing is the connection of the plant to begin to provide power to the national grid. However, there is further testing that follows, to ensure that the plant can operate effectively throughout its life. We consider it appropriate that the option to increase funding to complete the project should run until all testing completes.

In a nutshell, I think the cut-off point proposed by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test is too early in the process. The point at which the power station connects to the national grid is not the point at which one can have 100% confidence in the project from there. Therefore, I thank the hon. Gentleman for his interest and concern, and of course we would not wish to see consumers being penalised, but unfortunately I think he strikes the wrong point in the process at which this clause would kick in. I urge him to withdraw the amendment.

[Dr Whitehead]

I concede that I may not have fully understood all the various tests that are undertaken to usual industry standards, but nowhere in this clause does it say that those tests include the production of power. That is my central point. It is a bit like going into a car showroom and being shown a really nice vehicle. It has all the bells and whistles on it, and all the guarantees; it looks greats and the paint is really good. But when one asks to go for a test drive, the person in showrooms says, “I’m sorry, you can’t do that, Sir; it hasn’t got an engine in it.” Surely it must be about producing power. That ought to be explicitly in the Bill. That is my only point. If the Minister thinks that, concealed in all these various tests is the production of power, which does not seem to be the case to me, then maybe that is not needed on the face of the Bill. I think it would be rather good if it were on the face of the Bill.

[Dr Jamie Wallis (Bridgend) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we are in a very sorry place indeed if all the usual industry standards and practices for nuclear energy production do not actually include the production of energy?

[Dr Whitehead]

We would be in a sorry place, but that is effectively what the clause appears to state. It is all about the fact that it could produce energy, not that it does produce energy. Those are two potentially different things. The hon. Gentleman is right about the industry standards that set it all up to make sure that energy can be produced. I merely think it might be a good idea if we found out if it did produce that energy.

[Alan Brown]

I do not want to go on for too long but, further to the previous intervention, is it not the case that it can easily be argued that the EPR reactors currently being built are capable of generating electricity, but not one of the two EPRs under construction in Europe have started generating electricity for the grid? They are actually 10 years late, which underlines the point made by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member makes a good point. We have a number of nuclear reactors in Europe that look like they can produce energy, and they are still standing there not producing energy, many years after they were supposed to do so.

We will not press the amendment to a vote. I am a little disappointed that the Minister did not take the opportunity to add to the Bill what I think an average person reading the Bill would think obvious, but I know we cannot get what we want all the time. He has put forward reasons why he thinks that point is covered elsewhere in the clause. It would have been good if it was more transparent and up front. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

The financing cap will be set out at the beginning of the project by the Secretary of State. It will be available to be scrutinised. The purpose of the power in the clause relates to what happens in the event that we approach the financing cap.

The clause would have relevance in the very unlikely situation that, during construction, the project is likely to breach its financing cap under a RAB. The financing cap is the point at which investors are no longer required to put money into the project. What happens then? The cap is set at a remote overrun threshold. This means that before committing to a company having a RAB, the Secretary of State should be confident that the prospect of costs hitting that threshold is really very unlikely. Under the RAB licence, mechanics will be in place to incentivise investors to minimise costs and schedule overruns, such as overrun penalties. That will ensure that the breach of the financing cap is a remote risk.

When deciding whether to exercise the powers, subsection (3) means that the Secretary of State will need to have regard to the achievement of carbon targets and the interests of consumers, and whether the company is able to finance its activities. Those are the same considerations as when deciding whether to amend the company’s licence to insert the RAB conditions in clause 6. Given the strategic importance of a new nuclear plant, and the wider considerations, such as our need to secure resilient low-carbon energy, it is more appropriate that such a decision is made by the Secretary of State in this instance.

The Secretary of State is also the most appropriate person to balance the interests of consumers, taxpayers and investors. It is not about putting additional burdens on consumers. The RAB is designed to protect consumers by giving them a more cost-effective nuclear power plant, as shown by the steps that we have taken in the Bill. That includes robust due diligence before the final investment decision to be confident that the project will be effectively managed, incentives on the project in construction, penalties for investors in any overrun scenario, and the option for the Government to step in if the project hits extreme overruns.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Procedure etc relating to modifications under section 6 or 7

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 8, page 8, line 11, leave out from “power” to end of line.

This amendment strengthens the requirement on the Secretary of State to publish details of license modifications.

Ms Fovargue, as there are no amendments or objections to the clauses from this one to the end of part 1, I suggest that it might be possible to dispose of them collectively to get to the end of part 1 this afternoon. The Opposition would have no objection to that.

I will be brief. Amendment 13 simply says that if the Secretary of State is going to publish something, they should get on and publish it. As it stands, the clause states:

“The Secretary of State must publish details of any modifications made under a relevant power as soon as reasonably practicable after they are made.”

That is a weaselly dilution of the “must” at the start of the line—if the Secretary of State must publish details, they should just get on with it. Hon. Members will see that the following subsection states:

“If…the Secretary of State makes a modification…the Authority must…publish the modification.”

That does not have the little weasel phrase at the end, so why is that weasel phrase in subsection (5) and not subsection (6)?

[Alan Brown]

I do not want to be a pain, but does not deleting

“as soon as reasonably practicable after they are made”

make the timescale for the Secretary of State to publish open-ended? In a way, the amendment is not tightening the timescale but leaving it more open-ended.

[Dr Whitehead]

My concern in this clause is that the phrase

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

gives the opportunity for almost limitless delay to publication. If the Secretary of State must publish details of any modifications, he must, and if he does not, he can be called up under the terms of the Bill. If that weasel phrase is in it, however, the delay could last for a long time. I suggest that the amendment tightens it up by saying that it should be published and that is it.

[Alan Brown]

I realise that we are arguing over semantics, but perhaps it should be amended to be “must publish details of any modifications made under a relevant power once that modification has been made” to try to bring absolute clarity that it needs to be published right away.

[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, that might have been a good idea, but unfortunately it is not on the amendment paper this afternoon. My amendment is, so I hope the Minister will consider ensuring that subsections (5) and (6) are consistent, so that both modifications made under both are required to be published, full stop.

[Greg Hands]

Amendment 13 addresses how soon the Secretary of State should be obliged to publish the details of any modification made under the relevant powers, as already referred to. We think the clause already provides a clear and transparent process, which includes consulting the named parties before exercising these powers and modifications, and then publishing medications made

“as soon as reasonably practicable”

after the fact. Of course, publication can exempt matters that are commercially sensitive or that relate to national security.

The purpose of the amendment is to remove the obligation on the Secretary of State to publish the details of any modifications as soon as practicable after they are made. The Secretary of State would therefore not be subject to an express time obligation on when the details of the modifications must be published. I welcome the Opposition’s focus on ensuring transparency throughout the process of setting up a RAB for a project. We recognise that decisions to modify licences are important, and we believe it is necessary to provide a transparent decision-making process in legislation, as the Bill seeks to do.

I believe the amendment would reduce transparency, not increase it. I do not consider that it will help us to achieve the objective of a clear and transparent decision-making process. Removing the express obligation on the Secretary of State to publish details of any modifications as soon as reasonably practicable could result in uncertainty about when they should be published, which might cause the Secretary of State to unnecessarily delay the publication informing the public, stakeholders or industries of the modifications made. I hope that the hon. Members for Southampton, Test and for Greenwich and Woolwich will agree with that position; the amendment would reduce transparency, not increase it. I therefore ask that amendment 13 be withdrawn.

[Dr Whitehead]

I think we perhaps have a slight divergence of opinion here. We were seeking to simplify and create an imperative for publication by reducing the qualifications on that publication. The Minister has sought to suggest otherwise. We will have to disagree on that; however, we do not wish to push this to a vote this afternoon, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Expiry of modifications made under section 6

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 10 to 14 stand part.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Tuesday 16th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Greg Hands]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that we will always prefer British gas production to foreign imports. Some 50% of the gas we currently consume comes from the UK continental shelf, with an additional 30% from Norway. My hon. Friend is right to mention the transition; I know how much he fights for his constituency’s huge extent and variety of energy producers. Earlier this year, we were delighted to agree the North sea sector transition deal, which will offer a fantastic future for my hon. Friend’s constituents and those right across north-east Scotland.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I think the technically correct answer to the question posed by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood) is (a) none and (b) none.

The Secretary of State claimed that he was in talks with the Treasury about assistance for energy-intensive industries a month ago; it turns out that he was not, and nothing has happened since. Meanwhile, wholesale gas prices remain at around 200p per therm, compared with 39p per therm a year ago. Industry is suffering grievously and 40% of energy companies have now gone bust, leaving more than 2 million customers without a supplier and forced to take on new suppliers, often at great cost to their bills. Even with the price cap, bills are likely to rise by a further £200 in the spring. This is a train wreck, so what is the Minister doing now to rescue passengers from the carriages and put the rolling stock back on the lines? Or will he just continue to act the part of a disinterested bystander?

[Greg Hands]

That allegation is rather unfair. We are engaging continuously with the Treasury on these matters. We have already put in place £2 billion of funds to help with the cost of electricity and to protect jobs. We have the £350 million Industrial Energy Transformation Fund, and the Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Derbyshire (Lee Rowley), meets regularly—and has done so very recently—with the Energy Intensive Users Group.

Nuclear Power Funding

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Tuesday 9th November 2021 Westminster Hall

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I have been confused in the past with Phillip Whitehead, the MP from some while ago, and also I have been called Alan Whitehouse on a number of occasions, which is a slightly less felicitous comparison.

I am delighted to say a few words on behalf of the Opposition. First, I congratulate the hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Virginia Crosbie) on securing this debate, and on putting her case so well and succinctly. She is a powerful advocate, from the point of view of her constituency, for the future of Wylfa nuclear power station. I share her great concern that what looked like a future for the new Wylfa power station a little while ago was dashed in the way that it was. I had conversations about that with her predecessor, Albert Owen, who was also a strong advocate for Wylfa and the area.

The case the hon. Member makes is essentially about how Government can secure the future of power stations by ensuring that they are financed and organised in the best possible way so that they actually do go ahead. The UK has had a serious problem over the past 10 years or so. Originally a number of consortia were interested in bringing forward a nuclear power station. There was the Horizon consortium, associated with Hitachi, which brought forward the Wylfa proposals. There was NuGen, associated with Toshiba, which brought forward proposals for a power station at Moorside. There was also, of course, the EDF consortium, which at the beginning of the decade brought forward proposals for Hinkley C, which is now being built, for Sizewell C and for Bradwell in Essex.

All of those consortia have, in one way or another, bit the dust. They have suspended their operations. In the case of Wylfa, the Horizon consortium first suspended operations and has now this year finally declared that it no longer has an interest in Wylfa as part of its future nuclear programme. All of that came about essentially because of the Government’s insistence on trying to secure new power stations by means of private sector investment. Wylfa and Moorside were closed down even after discussions with Government about assistance; the consortia did not like the way in which the arrangements would have been structured. There were some quite high-level discussions with the Japanese corporations involved in both of the consortia that I mentioned. A combination of their own balance sheets, their ability to fund those projects themselves and what they thought was on offer from the UK Government led them to decide that the projects should not go ahead.

As the hon. Member for Ynys Môn mentioned, building and financing a nuclear power station is a really hefty commitment. One has to put the money forward and not get any return on it for about 14 years, while the processes of generic agreement for the reactor, planning, construction and so on all proceed. One does not make a penny from the production of electricity from the power station before that. We know that funding new nuclear by private sector means is not a viable way of financing new nuclear. We must put that behind us.

EDF is building Hinkley C power station partly with its own finances, and that has caused a lot of problems for the viability of the company as a whole. However, it is aided in this build by a second form of nuclear financing, which is, effectively, a foreign Government part-financing the operation. In this instance, that is the 35% interest in Hinkley of the China General Nuclear Power Group, which was the result of a deal brokered by the then Chancellor, George Osborne, in 2015. The Chinese state nuclear corporation would have a 35% stake in Hinkley C, a 20% stake in Sizewell C and complete control of the third programme in that consortium’s plans, the Bradwell power station, whereby the China General Nuclear Power Corporation would install its own reactor—known as the Hualong One, I think—and have complete control of the financing, the planning and the operation.

As we have seen, that way of doing things appears to no longer be regarded as tenable. The Government have not said this explicitly—it would be interesting to hear whether the Minister is able to do so this afternoon—but the Bradwell proposal under Chinese control is no longer a reality because of the Government’s desire to remove Chinese influence from the future of the UK nuclear programme. I am sure we will discuss that further when we debate the Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill over the next few weeks, as mentioned by the hon. Member for Ynys Môn. That second financing option—namely, getting a foreign Government involved—is probably not a good idea. As the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands) said, the latest Budget costings include a sum of £1.7 billion, which I understand is to be put towards not only the development of and early works on Sizewell C, but buying the Chinese out of their Sizewell stake. I do not expect the Minister to confirm whether that is the case, but I think it is fairly probable that at least part of that sum will be directed towards removing that 20% stake from Sizewell C.

Further on financing, there is the possibility, as was tried with Hinkley, of funding the end product of the power station—that is, the energy that comes out when the permissions, the planning and the construction are finally complete. In the case of Hinkley, that will happen a long time after the original date of 2026 or 2027. I distinctly remember the then chief executive officer of EDF saying we would be roasting our Christmas turkeys on new nuclear power from Hinkley C in the winter of 2017. That is how far they are behind the original plans. I have on my wall the chart of the original EDF plans for the development process for Hinkley.

As the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North said, the contract for difference arrangement for Hinkley was probably one of the worst deals that could be entered into for nuclear funding. Although it was supposed to introduce a back-loaded arrangement to secure the price for production and therefore increase investor confidence that the project would generate income when construction was concluded, the deal struck was disadvantageous for the customer and for this country’s electricity production. The CfD deal is at twice the likely market price for electricity over the period, and we are stuck with that for 35 years down the line. It is very unlikely that such a deal would be repeated, especially since it does not overcome the problem of how investors get any money back from their investment before the plant has started production. Hence the RAB—regulated asset base—arrangement that the Minister and I will discuss over the next few weeks as the Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill makes its passage through the House.

The RAB arrangement has advantages and risks. An advantage is that it enables investors who might not have put their money into Wylfa or Moorside to invest in a project because they know they will begin to get a return on their capital before production starts. The RAB model, among other things, allows that to happen by setting, as the hon. Member for Ynys Môn mentioned, an allowable cost ceiling, which enables that cost to be distributed throughout the life of the project rather than only at a certain point. It has a substantial advantage from that point of view, but at the same time it has risks. It is a deal that lands on the public consumer’s purse. It effectively puts a levy on energy bills for the whole life of the project––40 years from now for Sizewell C––on consumers’ backs at various levels at various points of the process. There is a high levy during construction and a tail-off as the project proceeds.

Should the project not go well––go over cost or, as at Hinkley, go well over time—there is an increased risk to the consumer. There is an even worse risk if the project does not go ahead, as was the case with a couple of projects in the United States that were built on the RAB model. Consumers then have nothing to show for a large amount of money they have spent in their bills in the expectation that there might be a plant that would give them cheaper electricity in the end. I know that the Government have taken some steps in the Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill to mitigate that risk and ensure that there are ways out of a company being unable to deliver. Nevertheless, the risk remains. Using RAB repeatedly for new projects simply adds to the cost of consumer bills by aggregating the total levies, making it potentially even worse for the consumer, if that is the model that is proposed.

That leaves one method of financing, which is simply that the Government pay for the construction of a new nuclear power station and then lease it out to the operator at the end of the construction period. I am not suggesting that the Government get together their own workforce to build it. They would put the contract out for bids to build the power station, which would be owned by the public and leased out for operation. That will have to be considered for any further nuclear power stations, rather than these various devices that, to a greater or lesser extent, have either failed or have some risk attached to them.

From our side, as the Minister knows, we gave the Second Reading of the Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill a clear run and we look forward to Committee discussion when we deal with some of the finer points of RAB. Nevertheless, we will go forward on the basis of a supportive environment for the construction of Sizewell C, since it is the only nuclear power station that could conceivably get under way before 2030, because of all the other withdrawals.

We look forward to our debates in the House and to discussing some of the issues I have raised this afternoon about how best to finance nuclear power for the future. The hon. Member for Ynys Môn made a powerful case for ensuring that Wylfa at least gets noticed in the next phase of discussions, but I suspect that if that happens, it may be under yet another model of financing and different from Sizewell C’s.

[Mr Virendra Sharma (in the Chair)]

Before I ask the Minister to respond, I would appreciate him leaving a few minutes for the hon. Member for Ynys Môn (Virginia Crosbie) to wind up.

Fireworks: Sale and Use

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Monday 8th November 2021 Westminster Hall

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

The debate has been characterised by passion and unanimity. Across the House, hon. Members have joined together to say two things. No. 1 is that none of us is in the business of saying that fireworks should be banned completely. The way in which the debate has been characterised in some areas is a severe misrepresentation of what people are saying across the piece. The second issue on which there is pretty much unanimity in the Chamber is that the status quo cannot prevail in the end. It really is not acceptable to carry on in this way regarding firework displays.

I think today’s debate is the sixth on this subject. I cannot claim that I have been present for all of them, but the cast assembled for last year’s debate was pretty identical to today’s. Certainly I, as the Opposition spokesperson, and the Minister were in identical places. I hope we were not saying identical things, but I fear that we are looking at yet another identical response this evening to what hon. Members are saying. What I said last year pretty much coincides with what hon. Members have been saying across the Chamber. As the petition says, there is a strong case for looking at restricting firework sales to organised displays where we can be confident about the quality and safety of the display, and the extent to which proper arrangements, such as notice in advance, will be made that will allow fireworks to be enjoyed, as they should be, in both safety and reasonable peace.

[Jim Shannon]

The hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Patricia Gibson) referred to legislation in Northern Ireland. I just want to say that there is a reason for that: the terrorist campaign. The legislation in Northern Ireland works. It does not stop people getting fireworks, but they have to buy them under licence and it is controlled. Does the hon. Gentleman feel that that should be the example for the whole of the UK, England in particular?

[Dr Whitehead]

There is a strong case for looking seriously at what other legislatures have considered on fireworks and taking from them the sense that is embodied in their legislation. We should make evidence-based inquiries into what other legislatures, such as Northern Ireland, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned, and Australia have done and the effect of their legislation on the enjoyment of fireworks in those countries. As far as I know, that has not been done in the UK. It continues to be an area of silence, shall we say.

I am afraid that there are other areas of silence in terms of getting an evidence base together, as I have mentioned previously, particularly last year. The first is that we have heard, and continue to hear, about the effect of fireworks on domestic animals. We heard powerful testimony not just on domestic animals, but on the effect on children and people with mental health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder. We have not heard about––there is little research on it––what the random use of fireworks does to wildlife. We know virtually nothing about that, yet we continue to allow random instances of letting off very noisy fireworks in both urban and rural areas, which I imagine has a substantial and continuing effect on wildlife.

We also have little information about the climate effects of fireworks, in terms of their constituents and their residues. We know that they put a great deal of CO₂ into the atmosphere on fireworks night and that the atmosphere changes quite considerably the morning after. We must think of the effect of the chemicals in fireworks on the environment, on which several environmental organisations have commented.

Above all, we know from our direct experience––I can comment from my own constituency experience––just how inappropriate it is that we are subjected to the unconscionable noise of fireworks every year. As hon. Members have said, it is not just on 5 November, the lunar new year or Diwali but throughout the year. It is acts of extreme noise spaced regularly across the year.

On Friday—I cannot blame my constituents for this, because I was just over the border in the neighbouring constituency, so the 550 people from Southampton, Test who signed the petition were not responsible—there was a private display 100 yards away from my constituency. I do not know whether it was a legal or illegal firework, but an airborne firework made repeated noises six or seven times that echoed across the entire neighbourhood. It was the equivalent of a pretty loud military explosion taking place just down the road from where I live. I cannot believe that we find it acceptable these days for those kinds of fireworks to be readily sold and readily set off in private displays, and something has to happen about it fairly urgently.

In his response to a Westminster Hall debate on fireworks last year, the Minister claimed that some progress had been made in this area. He said:

“Fireworks clearly require some explosive content to be set off. However, as part of the evidence-based work, we have commissioned a test of fireworks to determine the range of decibel levels, and that will help to identify a lower acceptable decibel level. It will also look at the potential impact of such a classification. We will publish the report based on that work in due course.”—[Official Report, 2 November 2020; Vol. 683, c. 19WH.]

I am not aware that the report based on that work has been published. If it has been published, I am not aware that anybody has drawn any conclusions yet about what an acceptable decibel level might be and what the potential impact of such a classification might be. Will the Minister tell us where the report is? If it has been published, what conclusions is he drawing from it? If it has not been published, will he hurry up and ensure that it is published? When it is published, will he also publish what the Government think are acceptable decibel levels for fireworks? That is the nub of the issue.

[Alison Thewliss]

The hon. Gentleman is making a very good point about decibel levels. I am aware of somebody who bought some fireworks on the basis that they were being marketed as reduced-noise fireworks. When they were set off, the person was mortified to find out that they were actually louder than the ones that would have been bought originally. Perhaps there needs to be more regulation, even on that matter.

[Dr Whitehead]

We clearly need legislation from the top that, first, enforces who lets off fireworks and where and that, secondly, enforces how noisy and disruptive those fireworks might be. We certainly have what I would call firework washing going on at the moment, whereby some fireworks are claimed to be less noisy but are not. There is no objective measure or enforcement that we can take to ensure that the claimed levels of noise are accurate, and we still have the problem that enforcement is down to local authorities, the enforcement bodies of which have been starved of money for many years and are really hard pressed to take meaningful action on firework displays, particularly in private areas. We clearly need something from the top in order for us to get going on the road to safer, more acceptable and enjoyable firework displays across the country. That has to come from the Government, and it has to come shortly.

I do not want to be here yet again next year saying the same things, and I am sure that hon. Members do not want that either. We want to be here when the tests on decibel levels have been completed, when there is a conclusion about decibel levels, and when there is perhaps legislation on the statute books, or on the way to the statute books, that starts getting the guidance that can shape our firework displays properly for the future. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Sarah Owen) for her private Member’s Bill, which I hope will go a long way, if successful, towards getting some of these things under way. But as she said, however valiant the intentions with which private Member’s Bills are put forward, rather like fireworks they land with a thump on the ground after initially going off quite brightly.

We need Government assistance in this area now, and I hope that the Minister will be able to say today just what is in train and what will be coming forward, both in terms of evidence and action, over the next year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

We are never going to get a perfect situation. It was terrible to hear what the hon. Lady faced. One Member talked about the Republic of Ireland having tougher restrictions than we do, and it was terrible that only last month a lady in Galway had a firework fired into her face. Even with those tougher restrictions, there is no perfect situation, but we need to take an evidence-based, careful, proportionate approach. As I say, there is always more we can reflect on, but local police are best placed to understand what is driving the behaviour in question and the impact it is having, and to determine the most appropriate response.

[Dr Whitehead]

I hope that the Minister will not conclude his remarks on the question of evidence-based activities without saying where the report he mentioned last year actually is, and what he intends to do about it.

[Paul Scully]

I was not going to. Let me tackle that issue now: I talked about the fact that legislation already exists to limit the noise levels of fireworks available to consumers to 120 dB, and we said that we were going to work on a report on that topic. I freely admit that that report has not been published: the testing work on the noise was delayed due to covid and adverse weather conditions impacting the laboratory’s ability to carry out the necessary testing. However, the result of that testing will be available in due course, and we will reflect on what is in that report as we proceed.

Draft Green Gas Support Scheme Regulations 2021

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd November 2021 General Committees

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

The subject that we are

talking about this morning is, as the Minister mentioned, green gas and how we can best incentivise the processes by which it is produced, which is primarily anaerobic digestion. He mentioned that biogas plants and biomethane plants are predominantly situated in rural areas. Indeed, a fair amount of the biogas produced in this country essentially comes from farm AD plants. Those who follow “The Archers” will remember the considerable controversy about a biogas plant around the village. Essentially, it is an arrangement whereby waste—farm waste, food waste and a number of other processes—can contribute through a biodigestion process, which does not involve burning or emissions in the sense that incineration has previously, and can be converted into biogas, which can, under many circumstances, be injected into the system.

As part of my exciting life as shadow energy Minister, I visited a large anaerobic digestion plant near Poundbury that has for a number of years very successfully processed food waste particularly and crop waste, which I will come on to in a moment, into biogas, which is then injected into the system, initially around Poundbury but covering quite a lot of the grid on a good day. The system works really well and, as the Minister said, produces substantial carbon savings by the process of injecting biogas into the system, thereby replacing the gas that is going into it at the moment. I therefore thoroughly endorse the intention behind the green gas support scheme, designed to bring on further those anaerobic digestion plants, which can substantially replace elements of our gas distribution system by the process that I described.

I do not have many criticisms of how the scheme has been set up, save for two potentially important ones. The scheme is set to last, as the Minister said, until March 2041, and the individual support that it will produce will be for 15 years, so the producers will have a good line of support in green gas plants as they build them and production gets under way. However, as he also mentioned, that is being underpinned by what we might say is yet another levy. The Minister mentions that the cost of the levy will be perhaps £2.50 a year on gas bills. This is a gas bill levy for green gas production, which sounds a fairly neat connection, but in practice the vast majority of bill payers pay a dual fuel tariff for energy, so in that instance, a levy is a levy is a levy; it will go on that dual fuel bill in exactly the same way as the substantial levies that are already on electricity bills.

I understand that the Government are considering a migration of levies from electricity bills to gas, but this is not a migratory levy; it is a new levy. Some while ago, the Government told me that that would not happen—there would be no new levies. Indeed, I have had some fairly arcane discussions in Committees and elsewhere about what is a new levy and what is not. The principle that we should not continue to put levies on customer bills as a way of funding new schemes was reasonably well established in those discussions. However, here we have a new levy. By the way, this afternoon, as I am sure the Minister is absolutely aware, we will discuss a possible further substantial levy for new nuclear build. We have a situation in which levies on customer bills are pretty substantial. I appreciate the Minister stating that this is not what he might call a serious and heavy levy, but it nevertheless represents a not insubstantial increase on customer bills over the period.

The previous support scheme—the non-domestic renewable heat incentive—which at least to some extent supported anaerobic digestion production was not a levy; it was funded from general taxation. I would be grateful if the Minister briefly expanded on the decision to make this transfer from general taxation, as was the case for the renewable heat incentive, to the levy that we are discussing. On reflection, the Minister might consider that, certainly in the long term, this scheme might be best funded through general taxation, rather than continuing with the levy.

My second question for the Minister is rather more detailed and relates to the purpose of the levy, which is to produce biomethane for injection into the grid. The explanatory notes for the draft regulations state that support payments will only be made for biomethane injected into the grid. That sounds fairly straightforward, but we need to reflect on two things. First, biomethane does not necessarily go exclusively into the grid. That is a substantial part of its purpose, but it has a number of other destinations as well. Biomethane can and is being used to fuel gas engines for district heating schemes as a replacement for the gas going into the engine, so the replacement arrangement is exactly the same as if that green gas went into the grid, but it is going into a mini-grid, as far as district heating is concerned.

There are a number of instances whereby methane is being used on-plant for purposes related to industrial commercial activity. Near my constituency, there is a biomethane plant that is associated with a water company’s sewage treatment arrangements, which produce biomethane that is used in the plant to continue the water company’s activities. As the Minister will know, the gas grid by no means covers the whole country. There are a substantial number of properties that are off grid and there is certainly the beginning of an industry where biomethane can be supplied as a replacement for tanked or bottled gas going into those properties for heating purposes.

Important as those categories are for reducing carbon emissions, driving out traditional gas and replacing it with low-carbon gas in exactly the way the scheme intends, none of them would, in my understanding, qualify for support because of the suggestion in the guidance that only direct injection to the grid would qualify for support. Can the Minister reflect on that and let me know whether he is prepared to consider—not necessarily today but for the future—a review of those arrangements so that where biogas is being produced and is not necessarily going into the gas grid, it can nevertheless remain supported or be supported? I think we can all agree that the direction of the biomethane is essentially the same. It is a scheme that undertakes reduction of emissions through biogas production in substitution of gas.

[Jerome Mayhew (Broadland) (Con)]

In support of that latter argument, I draw attention to British Sugar’s Cantley factory for sugar-beet processing in my constituency, which wants to put in an anaerobic digester. It is on the gas grid but it is a mile away from the main pipe. It is currently faced with the prospect of building a new pipe for a mile to connect the anaerobic digester to the grid, then take it back off the grid a hundred yards further down the pipe and bring it a mile back to the factory.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member emphasises the point that I was making, which is that quite a lot of biomethane production cannot easily be categorised as simply going into the grid. He has given a good example near his constituency, which substantially underlines my point.

The other matter that I want to raise briefly is the definition of feedstock for anaerobic digestion plants. According to the guidance notes, biomethane producers will be required to produce

“at least 50% of their biomethane from waste or residue feedstock.”

I assume that that means primarily food waste, but also farm waste and other residues. However, as I am sure the Minister understands, it is a little difficult accurately to determine what is and is not waste in relation to those categories. For example, I assume that forest trimmings, which can be used in certain circumstances for biomethane production, would be regarded as waste, but chopped-up wood would not be regarded as waste. Food waste, as the Minister will know, can be categorised both as proper food waste and as food waste that actually has not been used for food production but could quite well be used for food production in different circumstances. Therefore I wonder whether the Minister is satisfied that the definitions that there are in the scheme adequately determine what is and is not waste in relation to the 50% requirement.

I support the 50% requirement, because we do not want to see crops that could go into other activities being used to feed biodigestion either because the supply of waste is not good enough or just because people want to put the crops into the biodigester as an easy way of producing bioenergy, at the expense of feedstock that could be used for other purposes. It is a question of ensuring that the scheme is as well defined as it can be. I wonder whether the Minister has any comments to make on that in order to ensure that we get off to the best start possible with the scheme.

Other than having those hopefully brief and not very taxing questions, the Opposition support the green gas support scheme and we support that scheme starting as soon as possible in order to ensure that biodigestion takes its proper place in the panoply of measures that can lead us towards net zero in a coherent way.

Nuclear Energy (Financing) Bill

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Labour believes that new nuclear has an important supporting role to play in the energy mix, alongside the decisive shift to renewables that we need to deliver the climate transition and secure our energy security. As set out by the Climate Change Committee, we need all the low-carbon power sources at our disposal to deliver the rapid and fair transition that is required.

I am sorry that the Minister, in presenting the Bill, has chosen the partisan knockabout route, rather than giving it the serious consideration that it deserves. If we want to go down that path, we can reflect on the decade of dither and delay on the Government’s part, with mixed messages from the Conservative Government on new nuclear. The result is that, after 10 years, we have one half-finished nuclear plant, which is funded by a mechanism that, as the Minister himself accepts, is quite disastrous in terms of future prices. The record of this Conservative Government on new nuclear is frankly very poor. At last we have a Bill that might rectify some of that poor performance over the last 10 years. We need to support the need to finance new nuclear. We will scrutinise this Bill to guarantee fairness for bill payers, including protecting consumers against any potential cost overruns, protecting the poorest households, and scrutinising the balance between public spending and bill payers.

It is welcome that at long last we are coming to the key issue in nuclear power, which is how we build the power stations that we seek to place in the mix of low-carbon energy for the future. We know how not to do it, as I mentioned. We have already seen from the passage of building Hinkley C, and the disappearance of many nuclear projects and programmes, that the model that the Government have long stood for—that power stations should be built entirely by the private sector, and that private-sector security can be bought by price mechanisms that grossly inflate the cost of energy to the customer in the end—is highly flawed.

We are facing a last-chance saloon for new nuclear build that requires us to throw away those principles and start again, because most of the programme of new nuclear power stations that the Government have been envisaging over the past 10 years has been washed away. As late as 2018, there were possibly three consortia actively pursuing an interest in building five new nuclear power stations. These have progressively fallen by the wayside. Consortia have fallen apart, companies with an interest in financing projects have pulled out, and we are now left with one proto-consortium—effectively just EDF—building Hinkley C and with active plans to build a new power station at Sizewell. It is not only an active interest. Sizewell is designed to be effectively a clone of the plant that is currently being built so that it can start to build as Hinkley completes its construction phase and the workforce currently undertaking construction at Hinkley can transfer to the building of its clone at Sizewell.

We ought to add two other factors that will have a substantial bearing on how we proceed with building plants—or in this instance, a plant, because that is all we have under consideration right now. First, the consortium proposing to build Sizewell is not exactly champing at the bit to finance it. EDF has effectively mortgaged itself to the hilt in financing 65% of Hinkley C and has stated unequivocally that it is not about to do the same with Sizewell C. Secondly, we still have the arrangement in place concluded by the then Chancellor George Osborne to arrange a fast track into the heart of our nuclear programme for the China National Nuclear Corporation via a Secretary of State’s investment agreement to help fund Hinkley C power station to the tune of 35% of the upfront capital; 20% of the second in the EDF consortium’s programme, Sizewell C; and the big prize for the Chinese—control of the financing, build and running of a third nuclear power station at Bradwell in Essex, which is now unlikely, to the point of impossible, to happen.

It is likely that the Chinese will not be able to get their hands on a real nuclear power station all of their own and they will not be investing into 20% of Sizewell—indeed, the Government seem to have set aside £1.7 billion in the Budget to buy out their interest in Sizewell C. Labour has long warned that the Government are playing a dangerous game when they outsource the funding of critical national infrastructure to foreign Governments. We are now seeing the results of a decade of Conservative Governments doing exactly that, and mostly failing to get anywhere. There we have it in terms of the UK’s nuclear programme for the foreseeable future—only one plant in prospect for a start before the late 2020s.

[John Redwood]

The shadow Minister is very thoughtful on these matters. How much standby capacity does he think we need to back up the wind and solar that will be the majority of our generation in due course?

[Dr Whitehead]

Interestingly, the Climate Change Committee, which has looked into this matter in great depth, considers that in the overall long-term future make-up of our energy mix, about 8 to 10 gigawatts of standby power—therm power—is likely to be required in the shape of new or existing nuclear power stations. That is about the size of the difference with an overwhelmingly renewable but variable economy, with elements of firm power backing it up.

I have mentioned that one plant only that would be included in the suggested 8 GW to 10 GW is in prospect for a start before the late 2020s, because every other proposal has fallen away. However, it is not financed and is probably not financeable by private capital. It is only part financeable by a state financer, with which we do not now want to do business. Let us be clear before we go any further: this Bill is about finding a formula to fund and build Sizewell C power station. Whatever its generic pretensions, that is the issue we should be concentrating on. Even so, getting that plant going would cover most of what the Climate Change Committee considers is the presence in the mix needed.

[Dr Dan Poulter (Central Suffolk and North Ipswich) (Con)]

Before the hon. Gentleman moves on from discussing the financing for Sizewell C, does he agree that it is important, when we are talking about financing, that the financing is not just in place for the build of the power station itself, but for the necessary infrastructure and mitigation measures for the local communities in the area, who will be suffering from construction traffic and the like for potentially a 12-year period?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the build cost and financing of a nuclear power station has to include not just the obvious things that we think are associated with a nuclear power station, but all the other infrastructure around that nuclear power station and contributions to decommissioning costs. That is what we are talking about in terms of an overall financing package, and that is why a financing package has to last over the whole life, effectively, of that nuclear power station. I do not intend to move on from the financing of Sizewell C, because that is essentially what this Bill is all about. It is about all those things that the hon. Gentleman mentions, so far as that particular project is concerned.

This plant, if it goes forward—we hope it will go forward with something like this kind of financing—would cover a substantial part of what the Climate Change Committee considers necessary in the mix of low-carbon energy to drive power towards net zero by 2050. I have mentioned that it thinks about 8 GW to 10 GW of new nuclear power would be needed to complement a predominantly renewable power line-up so that firm power considerations are met, without being in such numbers that it puts the development of renewables into jeopardy. That 8 GW to 10 GW includes new nuclear power, but also the one existing power station that will probably last beyond the 2030s in Sizewell B.

Hinkley and Sizewell C together therefore would go a long way towards meeting that assessment by the end of the decade, with two 3.2 GW power stations with reactors in each, and the remaining Sizewell B power station continuing in action. It is not surprising then that we are talking about nuclear financing, which is pretty much all the Bill covers. Exam question: how do we finance an unfinanceable nuclear plant when we know we have got to do it because there is no other option? Even if we did decide to repeat the frankly disastrous device of providing a CfD for the plant at Hinkley, which is likely to produce power at twice market cost, it still would not work, because that does not solve the problem of getting investors into the plant for the lengthy period before production starts. There are ways in which nuclear finance can be sorted out.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the very considered manner in which he is presenting his case. Is there anything in his mind that would stop the UK Government using this new financing model for other technologies, such as the tidal lagoon in Swansea, or is it blatantly unfair that one technology has a very favourable financing scheme, while another technology that could provide many of the solutions that he seeks is stuck on contracts for difference?

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Member mentions tidal power. Of course, a regulated asset base system can be used for any sort of major infrastructure project—and indeed has been already, as I will come to. I do not see the discussion on that system as being about just nuclear power, but a method of funding a large infrastructure project that has certain requirements that must be met by continuous funding throughout its operation. He is right that infrastructure projects other than nuclear in the energy sector could and should be funded by that system.

The National Audit Office discussed those options when it reviewed the decision making and value for money that the CfD process for Hinkley entailed. The route adopted by the Government, after much internal wrangling and delay, is a regulated asset-based model that is essentially constructed along the lines that it has been used for already in capital projects such as Heathrow terminal 5 and the Thames Tideway project. That is, the whole project is part-funded by the proceeds of a levy on bills. The levy varies in size during different phases of the project and, in the latter phases of production, lowers or even goes negative if the project’s income exceeds the ceiling of allowable costs under RAB.

There are substantial advantages to the RAB model for making the project investable. It provides returns for investors as the project proceeds rather than at the end of it, as does the CfD model, which allows investment to be brought into the frame for the project from sources that might otherwise baulk at the timetable between investment and return. It also reduces the hurdle rate for investment in the project, thereby in theory substantially reducing the overall cost of financing the project and likely resulting in cheaper prices for the energy produced by the plant.

There are also substantial risks with RAB that need to be managed. It places the cost and risk of financing the project on the shoulders of customers, in this instance electricity bill payers, which adds to bill costs through a levy on their bills before anything has materialised. In the event of the plant not being completed, it lumbers them with bill costs without the benefit of the plant for which they have paid producing relatively cheaper electricity.

RAB also adds to the burden of bills unpredictably if the project overruns on cost or time—both of which, as we know, nuclear plant development is rather prone to. The extension of the construction period for a project, when the highest effect is felt on bills, lengthens that higher take period. An increase in cost may also cause revisions to be made to allowable costs ceilings, and hence cause heavier costs on bills.

We are in somewhat uncharted waters with a project such as Sizewell C because of its size, complexity, timescale and investment costs compared with the more modest sums and shorter timescales involved in existing RAB projects. Nuclear power stations elsewhere in the world have been funded along RAB lines, but have simply not been completed, which has left consumers with a huge bill and no benefit.

In short, we need to go into this kind of arrangement with a clear eye about the advantages and risks of a RAB model for nuclear. As far as we can, we should attempt to mitigate the risks and play up the advantages. It is workable, but only if the Government have a serious plan.

The Government have sought to alleviate at least some of the disadvantages by introducing to the Bill a special administrative regime for the project in the event of a failure of the company involved during construction. We will look carefully at those provisions, but they seem to be a useful commitment to ensure the robustness of the overall project, even if its prime developer fails to deliver. We also accept that provisions in the Bill on who may be involved in legacy and decommissioning costs will help to clarify the risks for security trustees and secured creditors.

There is much to agree with in the Bill, given the evident need to secure a mechanism that enables Sizewell C to be developed and come into production at a reasonably early date. There are measures to lower the overall cost of the project so it is investable and less price inefficient than its immediate predecessor, and to ensure that the project stays on track and delivers at the end of it. However, there are still many questions to be answered, particularly on the robustness of the RAB model under circumstances where the inevitable “optimism bias” of project costings—that candid acknowledgement comes from the Bill’s impact assessment—proves to be disadvantageous and costly to consumers who, after all, are supposed to be paying up for a benefit later on. It is important that we look at such matters carefully, with a clear eye on consumer protection, and do not just assume that the mechanism will milk customers for whatever it takes to produce an outcome in the end.

We need much greater clarity about the Government’s intentions on the difficult situation concerning Chinese investment in Sizewell. That may not be central to the Bill and the RAB model, but it is indirectly affected. The project’s overall shape will be affected by whether the Government take over the Chinese share, offer it to other investors or even calculate that RAB is a sufficiently powerful tool to enable investors easily to come in and scoop it up once the Secretary of State’s investment agreement provisions are untangled. We need to know in the Bill’s early stages what the Government will do about that and through what mechanisms.

As the Bill progresses, the Government can expect Labour’s overall support but also a proper, critical eye on aspects of the mechanisms they are adopting and a particular emphasis on protecting the people, who will either stand to benefit from a reliable power station producing needed energy at reasonable cost if it goes right or suffer grievously if it goes wrong. In other words, the customer must be first in our minds in taking such decisions, and we will stand up for them as the Bill progresses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

We now come to the wind-ups, but the shadow Minister is slightly detained.

[Dr Whitehead]

He’s gone to the loo, Mr Deputy Speaker.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

He has, yes.

Climate Change Committee Progress Report 2021

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Thursday 21st October 2021 Westminster Hall

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

Thank you, Sir Christopher. I am always guided by your wisdom. I will attempt to restrain my remarks as much as possible, although, I am not sure whether I can get them done in 45 minutes. I hope I will be much briefer than that, because quite a lot of what I wanted to say this afternoon has already been said. That is a reflection of the very high quality debate that we have had.

I do not want to go overboard about this and start saying things such as, “Better fewer, but better”—better being the watchword for these sorts of occasions—which is actually a quote from Lenin, but it reflects very well on the Members present. I could not have asked for a better group of parliamentarians to debate this issue. Between us, we have addressed in a sober manner both the pluses and the minuses of where we stand on emissions. For the second day running, I congratulate the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire (Anthony Browne) not only on securing the debate, but on the quality and content of what he had to say. I know that is probably a career-limiting move on the part of an Opposition Front-Bench spokesperson, but I really think that the hon. Gentleman did ample justice to his brief, albeit perhaps he pulled some punches a little because of his party political position. Overall, his speech was a sound and good exposition of both the pluses and minuses of our progress on climate change.

[Mrs Sheryll Murray in the Chair]

I will come back to one or two things that the hon. Gentleman said, but I also want to say that valuable additional points were made by Members from my party and the Scottish National party. My hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Tony Lloyd) emphasised the importance of buildings, heat pumps and the seismic change in delivery that we have to get into over the next period. Those were well made points, which reflected how we talk about what we have achieved so far and what we have to do in the future. That is a central point in our discussions.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) made some important points about transport and the difference between what we think we have achieved by putting something down on a piece of paper, and, when we follow it through, where we think that has got to. That was exemplified in her comments on the 900 buses that have allegedly been procured. Indeed, I was present at the visit to the buses yesterday, along with her and other hon. Members. That exemplified that we have some things that are an obvious next step in the decarbonisation of the transport sector. If it is possible to embrace an entire bus, we should be running off with those examples and planting them everywhere in the country as quickly as possible, yet we appear to be falling down badly in terms of how we roll out that fine ambition over a period of time.

My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel) emphasised the role that local government and a cross-departmental approach can play in the fight to reduce emissions across the board. He made a number of very telling points about what local government can and cannot do, and how much needs to be entrusted to local government in order to bring about emissions reductions.

I return to one or two of the comments made by the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire. He made the important point that if we are to have a balanced assessment of where we have come from and what we are trying to get to, we should neither condemn a Government—or, in this case, the two Governments we have had from the turn of the century to today, or three if we count the coalition—for doing nothing, nor praise them for doing everything. We have to have a clear line between those two positions to make a sober assessment of just how much we have to do, and to place our successes and failures so far in context.

As the hon. Member also said, it is only possible to decarbonise our power sector once, which is an important observation for our record so far. Some people, talking about where we have got to, might say that we have done better than a number of other countries in the world, that we have reduced emissions substantially while expanding our economy, and then stand back with folded arms and say, “There we are—it is pretty much done, isn’t it?” The Climate Change Committee’s report gives a telling antidote to that stance. It draws our attention to not just changes in UK emissions over the period 2000 to 2020, but changes by sector.

A useful chart appears on page 20 of the report—I see hon. Members flicking through their copies to find it—which shows that there has been a stupendous change in emissions from electricity supply. We have done a fantastic job of decarbonising our emissions from electricity supply, which have plummeted from annual emissions of about 160 megatonnes of CO₂ in 2000 to less than 45 megatonnes of CO₂. We see the wisdom of the point made by the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire—we can only decarbonise these things once. Although we should go much further, and it is good that we have seen a proposal for the complete decarbonisation of the power sector by 2035, we will not be able to repeat that reduction in emissions in that sector, so we cannot set that achievement against what we need to do next in the areas we need to concentrate on for the future.

That same chart is alarming in a number of areas. We must enter a caveat about the deep reduction in emissions from aviation and surface transport during the pandemic, because all the evidence already suggests that they will pretty quickly return to their previous levels. In general, despite some reduction in emissions from manufacturing and construction over the period and a smaller reduction in buildings—albeit a flat line in recent years—emissions in most other sectors are flat or increasing. That means that, in effect, measures in those sectors either have not started or have been completely ineffective in reducing emissions. As we look at the overall picture, it is important to be able to say, “We have done well here and we have done badly there,” and, when we are judging the totals, we must carefully take that into account.

We must also carefully consider the proportion of emissions in those sectors. For example, electricity supply—power stations—currently accounts for 15% of emissions. Yes, we can achieve a reduction in emissions there, but those emissions as a percentage of total emissions are now about the same as those from agriculture and land use, yet emissions from that area have stayed static in the period. Therefore, among other things, if we continue to make progress in particular areas, as has been described, but others stay static, they will represent an increasing, and increasingly intractable, part of our emissions over the next period. To do nothing about aviation, shipping, surface transport and, certainly, agriculture and land use, or to ignore them or put them in the background, is nearing criminal. If we leave them out, they will be impossible to pull back later.

We need to look at the progress made under the plans in those areas and how well they are getting us towards the same emissions curve as we see in the power sector, and as soon as possible. In that context, the Climate Change Committee’s report to Parliament is telling. The committee is the most polite organisation that one could come across. Not only is it unfailingly courteous in personal dealings with Members but all its reports have “courteous” written through them, like a stick of rock. It does not jump up and down and scream, and it does not over-hype its statements; quite the opposite. Where necessary, it is careful to caveat them as far as possible. In those circumstances, it is sometimes accused of being a bit soft. I do not think it is, but it is rigorously careful and accurate in what it tries to do.

However, in reading between the lines, the progress report is a pretty coruscating condemnation of progress, particularly in the areas that I have represented to hon. Members. As hon. Members have mentioned, page 24 of the summary report shows the areas where progress falls far short of the Government’s stated ambition and commitments. In some areas the Government’s commitment meets what the Climate Change Committee said should be the pathway. However, in a number of other areas their commitment is failing very badly, and those areas represent a large chunk of the overall emissions coming down the road, while those where they are succeeding often account for relatively small amounts of emissions. We need to try to get that into proportion as well.

Looking at what the Climate Change Committee said, something that we ought to think carefully about, which we have not done particularly this afternoon, is that the progress report is about not only mitigation but adaptation. Although there is a separate adaptation report, it comes under the overall ambit of the general report to Parliament. On adaptation, the committee says:

“A robust plan is needed for adaptation. The UK does not yet have a vision for successful adaptation to climate change, nor measurable targets to assess progress. Not one of the 34 priority areas assessed in this year’s progress report on adaptation is yet demonstrating strong progress in adapting to climate risk. Policies are being developed without sufficient recognition of the need to adapt to the changing climate. This undermines their goals, locks in climate risks, and stores up costs for the future.”

That almost sounds not terribly polite. It is waving a red flag about the disgraceful complete lack of any plan for serious Government action in this country on adaptation, which will really turn around to bite us in the near future if we do not get our act together. If the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire is minded to apply for a further debate in this Chamber, I would suggest a specific debate on adaptation. It is a very important area, which we have largely missed out on, and we do so at our peril.

The committee’s report also reflected on the fact that, at the time it was written, the Government were in the process of producing a number of reports that had been promised for quite a while but had not arisen, such as the net zero plan, the transport plan, the hydrogen plan, and the heat and buildings strategy, which the Climate Change Committee was unable to incorporate into its report to Parliament because they were still anticipated. Just this week, no fewer than 1,800 pages of material finally came tumbling out of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Treasury and so on, with 10 days to go to COP26, rectifying a number of those emissions. I am afraid that, try as I might, I have not been able to get through all 1,800 pages by any means. It is apparent from reading those just how far off we are from getting to grips with things that the Climate Change Committee mentioned in its report.

Let me take the “Heat and Buildings Strategy”, which has just come out, as an example. I do not particularly blame the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy for this, and hon. Members will have to take it from me, but the “Heat and Buildings Strategy”, which is an interesting report, has been written, in what we might call Shakespearean authorship analysis, by several different hands—I do not include the Minister in that. Broadly, I can say that the right questions have been written by one series of hands, and the wrong answers have been written by another series of hands, so the report does not cohere.

The answers to the ambition that the Climate Change Committee was concerned to underpin in its report to Parliament are not very ambitious at all. There is a really lame response to the question of how we go about the insulation and energy efficiency uprating of our homes, which, as everybody knows by now, is a sine qua non of a load of actions in other areas, as we have mentioned already.

The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) unpacked some of the issues on heat pumps. We know that they will not work in badly insulated homes. We have an ambition for heat pumps, but there are all sorts of issues even within the report about the difference between the ambition of 600,000 heat pumps a year by 2030 and the practical issue of who will be trained up to install them, whether they will be manufactured in this country, and which sectors will have heat pumps in them. I note, for example, on the Government’s ambition for 300,000 homes a year, that it is suggested that heat pumps will go into only about 60% of them, so we have the prospect of new homes being built with gas boilers in them, which will have to be retrofitted pretty shortly afterwards, but we will perhaps let that pass us by.

On how the paper addresses our overall ambitions, the sector, as the strategy sets out, occupies 23% of emissions just on heat. So when we talk about the energy sector, we are talking about heat being much more important in terms of emissions than power, and it is heat that we have made virtually no progress on at all. The overwhelming majority of our homes are still heated by gas, and that figure has remained fairly static for a fairly long time. A strategy that proposes more heat pumps only works if we deal with other heat factors, particularly how much heat we lose from our buildings, how meaner we could be in our use of heat in buildings in future, and what sort of win-wins we might have in insulating our homes, and we must deal with fuel poverty and various other such things.

One would think that a strategy of energy efficiency should run alongside everything else that we do on heat generation. That one thing, with the exception of some short-term, fairly small amounts of funding for particular projects in the strategy, is sorely missing. I do not know, but I would speculate, bearing in mind the different authors of the report, that perhaps a much more ambitious strategy was in the minds of BEIS, and certain other people came along and crossed a nought off the end of each of the amounts of money in the strategy. It woefully misses the opportunity to really go forward on getting heat firmly in our sights as far as decarbonisation is concerned.

The hydrogen strategy that has come out is interesting, premised on the progress report to Parliament. It does not have any path by which we can develop green hydrogen, which of course is the element of hydrogen that will do the work of decarbonisation. Unless we have a decent path for developing green hydrogen over the period, we will not make the progress that we should on climate change and emission reductions.

As I said, I have yet to go through all of this, but I think we are simply not articulating our own ambition on carbon reduction and getting the details of how we do it right. Indeed, not only are we a long way from that in some instances, but in others we are not even addressing it. I am interested to reflect on the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North West about the nudge unit report that came out recently. It was nudged into public view and pretty immediately nudged out again, within I think a day of being published. One of the reasons for that is because the nudge unit drew our attention to some very difficult areas that we have to get to grips with, but we have hitherto walked on by on the other side of the street.

I know that to my cost. Recently, I think at a fringe meeting at the Labour party conference, I ventured the opinion that we will have far fewer livestock farmers in our country in 20 years’ time. That is a straightforward statement of understanding of what we have to do in the agricultural and land use sector, what we have to do about our diets and how we deal with emissions in our food chain, and many such things. I got absolute grief. Indeed, I got a number of angry invitations in my in-tray to visit some farms and see what is really happening, and so on. I know it is a really difficult issue, and that we will have to do a lot of just transition-type work in getting it right, but it is an issue that we have to face. I am afraid that the Government are not doing that in a number of areas as far as emission reductions are concerned.

My conclusion, which I hope will be pretty widely shared across the Chamber, is that although we have done well so far in our emission reductions process, we need to unpack that to understand where we have done quite well and where we have done badly, so that we have better pointers for the future. As things stand, we appear to be nowhere near meeting the challenges ahead of us on climate change reduction. A lot more new policies and new thinking will be needed to get us anywhere near those targets. Regrettably, as the strategies come out they do not appear to rise to that challenge. I hope that this afternoon the Minister will be able to respond to the debate in that vein, because I hope that I have given a reasonably accurate picture of what the Climate Change Committee says and what hon. Members have said in this Chamber today.

I have not quite taken my 45 minutes, Sir Christopher—[Interruption.] Sorry, Mrs Murray; while I was talking, you snuck into the Chair.

[Mrs Sheryll Murray (in the Chair)]

I snuck in.

[Dr Whitehead]

Obviously, the previous Chair just could not stand the idea of being there for the entirety of my speech and has left.

I hope that this debate will serve as almost a watchword for how we approach our task over the next period. We need to work soberly, carefully and, as far as possible, on a consensual basis, for the future of our climate goals, but also with a clear-eyed recognition of just how far we have to go and how difficult many of the choices will be. We need to face them together, creating solutions that can actually work in our national and, indeed, international interests.

By the way, even though it was very late in the day, I understand just how much work has gone into these documents and how hard people have worked at getting them out, and indeed how they have attempted to address the choices in front of us in a real way. I do not underestimate any of that. My criticisms are based on what we have to do politically to address these issues for the future. I am not in any way attempting to denigrate the people who have put these documents together.

That is the offer from the Opposition, and that is what we want to do—to move us forward in the face of this tremendous challenge and the really daunting task ahead of us. And if we can manage to conduct our future debates as well as we have managed to conduct today’s debate, that will be a great help in this process.

[The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Greg Hands)]

Let me begin by thanking the Backbench Business Committee for nominating this important debate today, and I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Cambridgeshire (Anthony Browne) for his very able introduction to it. We were sitting in exactly these seats yesterday during his last Westminster Hall debate, which was on the interesting subject of carbon capture and storage, a subject that has also cropped up in today’s debate.

Of course it is vital that we focus on clean growth and the Government’s vision for transitioning to a net zero economy. This has been a very useful debate, with a very high degree of consensus, which of course the Government welcome.

First, the Government welcome the Climate Change Committee’s 2021 “Progress in reducing emissions” report, which highlights our successes in setting an ambitious climate mitigation agenda while also providing healthy challenge to our progress to net zero by 2050. The point of having this kind of Committee is for it to keep challenging the Government and to ensure that the Government are straining every possible muscle to get to that target and get there in good time.

The report correctly emphasises that the journey to net zero is not yet half-completed and that this decade is the decisive one for tackling climate change, which Britain must take a leading role in. Of course, that is why on Tuesday we published our net zero strategy, which has been referred to many times; I welcome the Opposition’s praise for my officials and my ministerial team for the work that they have put into it. I know that a lot of my team have been working very long hours to get the strategy out there and to do so on time.

The strategy delivers a comprehensive set of measures to support and capitalise on the UK’s transition to net zero by 2050. It outlines measures to transition to a green and sustainable future, and to help businesses and consumers to move to clean power, supporting hundreds of thousands of well-paid jobs and leveraging up to £90 billion worth of private investment by 2030.

We have already set out a lot about our journey to net zero. Over the past year alone, we have published the Prime Minister’s 10-point plan for a green industrial revolution, the energy White Paper, the North sea transition deal, the industrial decarbonisation strategy, the transport decarbonisation plan, the hydrogen strategy and, most recently, our heat and buildings strategy.

[Dr Whitehead]

Would the Minister be able to provide us with some helpful guidance on the production of those documents, and set it against what the Climate Change Committee has been doing with its carbon budgets and so on? Does he consider that as a result of those documents being published and their contents, we are now on course to meet the terms of the sixth carbon budget?

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

Again, that is a temptation down a particular road, but let me say this. The Government are absolutely clear that all further airport expansions must be consistent with our climate change obligations. Government policy is absolutely clear on that.

[Dr Whitehead]

Will the Minister give way?

[Greg Hands]

I will make a bit more progress.

Nothing in a trade agreement prevents our ability to regulate environmentally or prevents the UK fulfilling its climate change obligations. The hon. Lady asked about COP26 leaders, and I can give her an update. We have a stellar array of world leaders coming for COP26, including President Biden and the four Ms—Prime Minister Modi, Prime Minister Scott Morrison of Australia, President Macron and Chancellor Merkel. We have leaders of medium-sized economies who will be really important. I spoke earlier today with the Vietnamese Energy Minister Dien and the Vietnamese Prime Minister Chinh is coming. Vietnam is an important player, as well as an important ally and friend to the UK. Its current plans are to double coal usage over the next decade, which will not set the right tone at COP26. We are looking forward to welcoming a wide variety of leaders, some of which are close friends and allies of the UK, and developing economies, of which Vietnam is just one, are also coming.

In terms of the carbon border adjustment mechanism, we watch all the proposals very closely. We need to make sure they are World Trade Organisation compatible, that they are not a disguised form of protectionism and that they do not discriminate unnecessarily against developing countries. Departmental policy decisions are consistent with net zero. We have established two Cabinet Committees dedicated to climate change. The Environment Bill requires the Government to reflect environmental issues in national policy making through consideration of the five environmental principles.

Where are the two EV buses? We have delivered the national bus strategy, investing £12 billion in local transport systems over the current Parliament and delivering 4,000 new zero-emission buses.

The hon. Member for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel) spoke of a scenario where one person on a street puts in solar panels and everybody else says, “I want a piece of the action.” That is a great example of the Government simulating demand. It does not mean that the Government should come down the road and install everybody’s solar panels, though. It shows the effectiveness of Government policy in getting people to sit up, take notice and want to take advantage of something. That is what the role of the Government can be. Heat pumps will be exactly the same.

[Greg Hands]

I have already outlined the support we are giving to the housing sector overall. If the hon. Gentleman or any other hon. Member wants to write to me with a specific proposal, I am happy to look at it. I have to say, I was not entirely sure about his recent history—he mentioned COP21 in relation to the election of Donald Trump, which of course came after that, but I may be misremembering his speech, so I will not go down that road.

How many people have been trained in heat pumps so far? We want more to be trained. The figure is around 3,000 and we require 35,000, so that is definitely a challenging position. We have set out Government policy and the direction of travel on heat pumps very clearly and we are waiting for the market to respond.

[Dr Whitehead]

Will the Minister give way?

[Greg Hands]

I am going to make progress. On Germany’s net-zero strategy, I shared a platform with the German ambassador last night, and both of our countries are very supportive of each other’s policies on net zero and the environment. We consider ourselves to be world leaders in this space. On retrofitting, we are committed to supporting businesses and households to upgrade energy efficiency in buildings.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Whitehead]

Will the Minister give way?

[Greg Hands]

I am going to make a bit more progress. We intend to upgrade as many homes as possible to energy performance certificate band C by 2035.

The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) talked about the heat pump grant scheme. I am amazed by that. It is a devolved matter, but there have been discussions with the Scottish Government about the Scottish Government joining up with us and participating in this scheme; but if I understand the situation correctly, they have refused. The irony is that the Ofgem team that will be administering the England and Wales scheme will be based in Glasgow, with more than 100 new members of staff. Unless they have a very long commute, they will not be able to benefit from the scheme that they are helping to administer, due to the fact that the Scottish Government have said that they will not be joining the UK Government in the scheme. That is a great pity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

The Barnett consequentials will of course be enacted in the usual way as we would expect, but why not join with a scheme that has been very well received, that I think will be a market leader and that will, ironically, be administered out of Glasgow? It makes perfect sense for the Scottish Government to come on board with us.

We have made huge investments in offshore wind and other renewables in Scotland. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun mentioned the 5 GW target for hydrogen being less than in Germany. It is the same as Germany’s target—they have exactly the same target. On wave and tidal, we have already put down more than £175 million in innovation funding across this country, with 10 MW already deployed. In many senses, they are still pre-commercial technologies, but we are making the investment to increase the optionality that will be available in wave and tidal.

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s overall support for the UK’s targets and ambitions. He mentioned reforms to the electricity market. We recently published a call for evidence on actions to align capacity markets with net zero and actions to encourage the participation of more low-carbon capacity. We are committed to accelerating the deployment of low-cost renewable generation through the contracts for difference regime and by undertaking the review of the frequency of CfD options.

The hon. Member for Southampton, Test, in a comprehensive speech, congratulated us on our success in decarbonising electricity generation. I go back to the commitment given to complete that process by 2035. He said that we are ignoring other areas. I do not think that is fair and I do not think that is the case. He talked about adaptation. We are currently developing a national adaptation programme, which is due in 2023. DEFRA published the response to the Climate Change Committee’s adaptation report, which goes into more detail on our progress on adapting to climate change.

On fossil fuels and net zero, of course net zero does not necessarily mean zero residual emissions in all sectors of the economy. It is, after all, a net zero figure. In aviation, agriculture and industry it may not be feasible, practical or cost-effective to eliminate all emissions.

I thank the hon. Member for Southampton, Test for his praise for the hard work put in by my officials on producing the reports.

The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun asked, “Where is the Treasury review of the cost of net zero?” I have news for him—I emailed it to him about 15 minutes ago. It was published on Monday night. It is entitled, “Net Zero Review: Analysis exploring the key issues”. There are 135 pages for him to digest before I see him next, when he can ask me questions about it. It was published at the same time as, or just before, the net zero strategy.

In the past few years, the Government have gone further than ever before to ensure that the climate is at the heart of our decision making. We have taken new approaches to embed net zero in spending decisions, including requiring Departments to include greenhouse gas emissions in their spending review bids and their impact on meeting carbon budgets and net zero. As I already said, we have established two Cabinet Committees. The integrated review reflects that and ensures that it is the Government’s No. 1 international priority. We are also using the Environment Bill to require the Government to reflect all these issues in national policy.

We are committed to taking a whole-system approach to the net zero challenge, ensuring that we understand and can navigate the complex ways that our climate goals will interact with other priorities for the country. As I mentioned, we published the heat and buildings strategy, which sets out the required actions to decarbonise buildings over the next decade, helping meet near-term carbon budgets and getting us on track for net zero by 2050.

[Dr Whitehead]

Now that he has almost finished, will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Greg Hands]

I will finish, as I have been speaking for almost half an hour. The net zero strategy sets out clear principles on how we will engage the public and support them to make green choices. We will explore how to enhance public-facing climate content and advice on gov.uk and our Simple Energy Advice service to provide homeowners with advice for decarbonising their homes, including tailored retrofit advice in local areas.

I thank the CCC once again for its expertise and advice in producing its annual report. The Government are committed to delivering a net zero economy, and we welcome the committee’s contribution to this obligation. The net zero strategy sets out a roadmap to cut emissions and create new jobs across the whole country. It comes as the UK prepares to host the UN COP26 summit next week, where the Prime Minister will lead by example and call on other world economies to set out their own domestic plans for cutting emissions. Through the strategy, we are accelerating towards more resilient futures, towards our green recovery and towards protecting our planet for this generation and those to come.

Carbon Capture and Storage

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Wednesday 20th October 2021 Westminster Hall

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire (Anthony Browne) on securing this debate and the exemplary way he put forward the case for carbon capture and storage—a case that has many other articulate exponents on both sides of the Chamber as well as him. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) particularly comes to mind. He has championed the cluster, CCS and all that goes with it over many years, and he is, I think, substantially responsible for the moves forward in CCS.

We do not need to spend much time clarifying among ourselves that the case for CCS is overwhelming. We are, after all, moving to a net-zero target. In this context “net” is a very important word. To achieve the net-zero target, we have to concentrate on not only keeping minerals and energy and such in the ground, but putting stuff back into the ground, and we have to think of methods of doing that, because there will be a carbon overhang in 2040, 2050 or whenever. The methods of doing that include growing trees and direct air capture, which has been mentioned, though that has to go in the ground as well. Other methods are CCS and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, which involves attaching CCS to an already relatively low-carbon method of producing power, thereby making it net carbon-negative.

CCS is important across all these fields and the industry as a whole. It is not just a question of the power sector. Most heavy and energy-intensive industries will need CCS if they are to have lower-carbon processes; they have processes besides power production that produce a lot of carbon. It is important across the board. I was indeed pleased to hear in the statement yesterday that the north-east cluster and HyNet had secured strong backing for going ahead with precisely that combination of activity—with providing CCS for industry, or with providing the proper transport for CCS and then sequestration. It is important to recognise that there are a number of different components to CCS.

As the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire said, this is not an experimental technique that we need to do a lot more work on. We know how it works. We know what we have to do and where we have to put CO₂. The North sea, for example, has capacity to take 78 billion tonnes of CO₂—200 years’ worth of the country’s CO₂ emissions. We know where it is going. As I have said, I have seen a full-chain CCS plant in operation at Boundary Dam in Saskatchewan, Canada. It captures the emissions it transports and sequesters them. What it does with the sequestered CO₂ is a matter for another debate. The system works really well and is complete. We should be aiming to get whole systems working together in those industrial clusters in the north-east and the north-west, so that everything works well for the benefit of industry, hydrogen production and low-carbon heavy industrial activities.

It is perverse that the Acorn Project has been designated as first reserve—whatever that means—in this process. I do not understand how a first reserve is meant to come in if the first two clusters do not work very well, or change their minds and decide that they do not want to do it. It is clear to me that we need to go with three, and that the Acorn Project should be one of them.

I want to emphasise that we are no longer in the chamber of discussion on CCS. We are in the chamber of action, and we need to apply that to as many things as possible, as soon as possible, in this country. In that context, I want to ask the Minister very briefly—

[Mrs Maria Miller (in the Chair)]

Very briefly, please.

[Dr Whitehead]

Very briefly indeed, Mrs Miller. What is the status of the various support measures that will be introduced for CCS? I have perused carefully the various updates on the design of the CCS infrastructure fund and the business models, but it seems to me that there is no clear line on the exact support to be offered to the different CCS sectors that I have talked about. There may be a contract for difference, for example, for heavy industry. That will need to be led by a 10-year plan, with a levy control framework or similar, but that is not in place.

[Mrs Maria Miller (in the Chair)]

We need to move on to the Minister’s comments now.

[Dr Whitehead]

There is no CfD in place, either. How is that coming on, and will the Minister guarantee that the arrangements will be in place as soon as possible so that we can roll out CCS as quickly as possible?

Oral Answers to Questions

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Tuesday 21st September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Greg Hands]

Yes, of course we take community renewable initiatives very seriously indeed. We also take the Environmental Audit Committee very seriously indeed and I look forward to appearing before its Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Philip Dunne), in due course.

The hon. Gentleman is wrong to say that the CCC progress report was damning. For example, the report says:

“The UK has a leading record in reducing its own emissions”,

and:

“The UK has been a strong contributor to international climate finance”.

Recently, John Kerry himself, the President’s special envoy on climate, praised the UK approach.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I too welcome the Minister to his new post, my opposite number in the Department, and hope that he will last a little longer in the post than his immediate predecessor.

The Climate Change Committee’s report to Parliament highlights how little progress has been made with the upgrading of insulation in buildings and points out that

“insulation rates remain well below the delivery achieved in 2012 before key policies were scrapped.”

Does the Minister accept that, had those insulation policies been pursued, energy customers would have been in a much better position to cope with the energy prices rises and the cost of living crisis that we have currently. Does the Minister now take responsibility for the abject failure of the Government’s home insulation policies, and, most importantly, what will he now do about it?

[Greg Hands]

The hon. Gentleman has managed to pack a lot into that question. Let me try to answer it in three ways. First, when it comes to the heat and buildings strategy, he will just have to wait until we publish it. We are doing the right thing. Secondly, when it comes to energy price rises, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State pointed out at great length the action we are taking to protect customers, including vulnerable customers, with the rest of the support that the Government provide. Thirdly, when it comes to the Climate Change Committee, we have done very well on achieving, for example, last year’s recommendations. Actually we have achieved in full or in part 40 of the Committee’s 92 recommendations last year; 32 are already on their way. We are looking forward to responding as well to this year’s recommendations.

Draft Ecodesign for Energy-Related Products and Energy Information (Lighting Products) Regulations 2021 Draft Ecodesign for Energy-Related Products and Energy Information (Amendment) Regulations 2021

Alan Whitehead Excerpts

Wednesday 8th September 2021 General Committees

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under the chairmanship of my near neighbour. You will be pleased to know, Mrs Miller, that the Opposition do not intend to pit our mighty forces against the Government in a vote this morning, because we consider the two SIs to be very uncontroversial.

These measures are an obvious thing to do to ensure that the labelling processes for ecodesign and energy efficiency, which I have long supported, remain an excellent way of ensuring that people know what they are getting in terms of the energy efficiency of the products they are purchasing. Indeed, over time that drives changes in consumer choices and hence manufacturing arrangements for the energy efficiency of products. We have seen that in operation already with the emergence on the market of products that seek to get the highest energy rating on the scale in their marketing.

We are all together on the desirability of ensuring that, post the UK’s exit from the EU, those labelling arrangements are maintained in the best possible order for the future, and that is essentially what these SIs are about as far as lighting is concerned.

The Minister said that, for ease of both transition and continuing reputational arrangements as far as labelling is concerned, the closest alignment with EU regulations and arrangements would be achieved. I think that is right, in terms of the interaction of products between EU countries and the UK. I assume that by that, the Minister means that should there be future changes in the labelling arrangements within the EU, the UK will seek to ensure that those are mirrored, if not now, then for the future.

However, I am not sure whether one of the changes that has been made to the regulations applies to the UK alone or is mirrored by changes in EU regulations. That is the change—on lighting—from the A to E scale that we are familiar with to a simpler A to G scale. Common sense suggests that that is necessary given that, as a result of the substantial improvements in energy efficiency in lighting and other electrical products, the scaling as it stands has tended to bunch towards the A++, A+ end of the scale, so there is a danger of the scales becoming incoherent for the public. Moving to a simpler A to G scale is therefore the right thing to do. However, I do not know whether that has happened in the EU as well, and whether, in Northern Ireland, scales might differ on products that are EU-certified, as opposed to those with a UK label.

In most of the UK that is not an issue, inasmuch as such products will all be labelled appropriately for the UK market, but it may not be the case in the interaction between Northern Ireland the rest of the UK. Can the Minister tell us whether those changes in scaling mirror the EU arrangements, or whether they apply to the UK only?

The change in scale, while logical, common-sensical and important, is almost totally unknown to the public. Such changes have been made in other product areas. I have personal experience of turning up to, as it were, rate a dishwasher, only to find that the products had the new A to G scale labelling on them, which made what had previously looked very energy efficient look very energy inefficient—until one understood that products labelled D or E, which looked at first sight energy inefficient, were the equivalent of, say, A+ under the previous arrangements. Will the Minister reflect on the possible need for publicity and some public-facing general explanation, so that we all know why these changes in lettering have been made and how important they are to get the system working properly for the future?

I have no further comments to make about the detail of the statutory instrument, which, I have to say to hon. Members, is some of the most tedious stuff I have ever read—[Laughter.]—from which they may deduce that I did actually read it. I look forward to further enlightenment from the Minister.