(10 years ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman will be aware that we have done more for victims than his party’s Government did in 13 years. We are making sure that victims, who are often very vulnerable, have proper treatment and are looked after carefully. We have brought in measures that allow victims to have a say in court, which was certainly not the case before. We are bringing up the courts to be fit for the 21st century, which Labour failed to do in its 13 years. That will mean a better experience for victims, as some of the most vulnerable people who attend courts.
My hon. Friend has twice referred to the 21st century. Will he build into the courts system a free, searchable online record of judgments of civil courts, including, particularly, the property chambers?
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI intend to speak to the amendments for which I am at least in part responsible, and which were necessitated by our proceedings in Committee: amendments 1, 17, 45, 46 and 39 to 41. Before I do so, however, let me welcome my hon. Friend the Minister to his new post, and congratulate him on his promotion. Let me also welcome the hon. Member for Croydon North (Mr Reed) to his place on the Front Bench. He has been in the House for only a short time, and I am sure that his promotion is well deserved. No doubt we shall see a great deal more of him in due course.
Having congratulated the hon. Gentleman, however, I am afraid that I must take issue with some of the points that he made this evening. I have to tell him that while there was a lot of hot air about Labour’s great policy of the ASBO, the truth of the matter on the streets—whether in urban or in rural Britain—has been very different. Year on year, ASBOs have been breached in increasing percentages. While the hon. Gentleman, as the former leader of Lambeth council, may well have thought that he had solved problems by securing ASBOs for those who were engaging in antisocial behaviour which was affecting people in the area, the truth is that merely securing the orders achieved precisely nothing. It was their enforcement that was important. As I am sure the Minister will tell us in his response, breach rates now stand at 70%, 80% or 90%.
Drawing the attention of those on the Opposition Front Bench to the speech that my hon. and learned Friend is making may be to their advantage, as opposed to the advantage of the House. Would it be possible for them to stop talking to each other and listen to my hon. and learned Friend, who is making rather a good speech, mainly about the Opposition spokesmen themselves?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention, but I fear that it may be counter-productive. I thought I was having rather an easy ride, at least in terms of how my speech will read in Hansard. There has been no intervention so far from the hon. Member for Croydon North, and I suspect that there can be no intervention from him now, because he has not heard anything that I have said. Be that as it may, however, this is not Third Reading, so I shall now deal with the amendments with which the House is being troubled principally as a result of what some would describe as my intransigence in Committee.
Let me begin with amendments 1 and 17. They relate, I am afraid, to words that were inserted in the Bill as a consequence of amendments to clauses 1 and 7, which were suggested by me and were carried in Committee. Clause 1 concerns the general power to grant injunctions. Subsection (5) states:
“Prohibitions and requirements in an injunction under this section must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid”
a list of occurrences including, for instance,
“any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”.
In the form in which it was considered in Committee, the Bill made no reference to the fact that those against whom injunctions might be granted might have caring responsibilities, particularly in regard to children. Because I thought that that was an important omission, I proposed—and the Committee agreed, in circumstances that I shall describe in due course—that the court should be required to take into account
“any conflict with the respondent’s caring responsibilities including, in particular, any caring responsibilities for a child”.
That seemed to me—and still seems to me—to be particularly important. Children’s life chances are not fixed, and if an IPNA is granted against their parents, they may be significantly and substantially affected by something for which they are not responsible. In those circumstances, it seems appropriate for the court expressly to take into account caring responsibilities, particularly caring responsibilities for children—and, perhaps, for those who suffer from disabilities. The Government’s position is, as I understand it, that those matters will be taken into account by a court under the general powers in the Bill—that is the assurance I have been given. Indeed, the draft guidance produced last week in accordance with the undertakings given to the Public Bill Committee contains wording that requires those seeking IPNAs—regard will no doubt be paid to this by courts as well—to take into account caring responsibilities.
On that basis, and although the decision has not been easy, I am not minded to oppose the Government’s desire to remove my first attempt at legislation in this House, successful as it was, because the Committee did not divide on the amendment I was proposing to clause 1. My amendment was accepted by the Minister who was then in charge, although there was a reservation when the “like” amendment was proposed to clause 27 that the Government reserved the right to come back to this matter on Report, as they have now done. Be that as it may, I am not going to take further the point that the Committee did not divide. The simple fact is—the Minister needs to make this clear from the Dispatch Box, so that it is clear to courts in due course—the one matter that has to be taken into account when an injunction is granted are the caring responsibilities of those against whom it is to be granted. That addresses amendments 1 and 17.
Government amendments 45 and 46 relate to clause 93 —we are see-sawing around a lot because of how the amendments have been grouped—which deals with community remedies and the community remedy document. As the House will know, every Member having read the Bill in detail, that is a list of community remedies—punishments, if one prefers—that can be handed out, which is drafted by a local policing body. Before it came into Committee, the Bill provided no guidance as to what that document might contain. As I pointed out in Committee, it might have provided that one punishment or remedy that could be handed out was to place someone in the stocks for two or three hours and have oranges hurled at them. Many of our constituents would doubtless think that a very sensible community remedy to be contained in a list of punishments or remedies that might be handed out to those guilty of antisocial behaviour. Obviously, the police and crime commissioners who gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee indicated that some form of guidance would be both desirable and necessary, and that has been taken on board by the Government. I tabled, but did not move, a probing amendment in Committee and it has been picked up by the Government, in that they have tabled amendments 45 and 46 to deal with the possible problem that one might have ended up with rogue and inappropriate remedies. Those measures therefore have my full support and I hope they will also have the support of the House.
I do not wish to detain the House for too long, but I wish to discuss amendments 39 and 40, which relate to clauses 70 and 73 and the time within which those who obtain orders must return to court. The Bill specifies a relatively short period—no doubt the Minister knows precisely what it is—but for the purposes of computing time no account is taken of days when the courts might be closed. I proposed to the relevant Minister somewhat longer periods, because it seemed to me that a problem might arise in respect of bank holidays and public holidays, as the courts would not be able to deal with these matters sufficiently quickly to enable the time limits to be complied with. Some of that has been taken into account, because the Government now propose that Christmas day will be removed from the period of calculation in these clauses, but there remains a difficulty with which the Minister needs to grapple.
I wrote to the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice and it was suggested that specifying Christmas day was sufficient in this regard, but what about Easter? As we know, it consists of two public holidays, Good Friday and Easter Monday, so we are talking about a four-day period. The Home Office’s response has been, “The courts are able to deal with this because they may open over the weekend.” The Minister needs to reassure the House that that is the position and that there is therefore enough time over the Easter holiday, in particular, for these orders to be dealt with appropriately and for the Bill’s time limits to be addressed.
Government amendment 41 would alter clause 81, which deals with the recovery of costs against the owner of premises where an order is made—I have forgotten which part of the Bill this relates to, but the Minister will doubtless remind me. The Government’s point is that where such an order is made—for example, against a nightclub—the police should be able to recover their costs, and that is absolutely right. However, as I pointed out in Committee, nightclubs or late-night premises often are not owned by the people who occupy the premises where the nuisance occurs. For that reason, we need to include the word “occupier”, as the Government are now proposing. I am pleased that that piece of advice, which I gave for free—that is rare—was accepted. The amendment is therefore sensible and I hope it will command support across the House.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberThank you for that exceptionally helpful advice, Mr Speaker. I am, of course, moving new clause 15 and speaking to new schedule 1 and amendments 19, 20 and 21.
I should like to pay tribute to the British Humanist Association for its support with drafting and its general and wider advice. This proposal seeks to put right a long-standing injustice in a simple and uncontroversial way.
I would like to make a little more progress and then take some interventions. Let us start by establishing the ground on which I shall make my case and I will accept interventions later.
Whereas Christians and most other believers have a choice when they marry of a civil ceremony in front of a registrar, or a religious ceremony that reflects their beliefs, non-religious people have no choice: it is the local registrar at a register office or in a so-called approved place or nothing.
The Government have objections to my proposals. It is important to say this afternoon that we are absolutely crystal clear about what those objections are. If there are problems with the way in which the new clause seeks to achieve its objective, we stand ready to work with the Government to address those concerns. There is a very strong wish for humanist weddings to be recognised and for any perceived problems to be overcome.
It has been suggested that the proposals before us are in some way a wholesale departure from what has been described as fundamental English marriage law. I question whether any such fundamental law in fact exists. Our marriage laws are an accretion of changes and legislative and social developments over many centuries, but I accept that the broad framework in which our English marriage system operates goes back in many regards to the 18th century when Lord Hardwicke introduced his Marriage Act 1753, which required all marriages to be conducted in parish churches and after due notice had been given.
The hon. Lady is right to highlight the general importance of the premises in English law in relation to most faiths, but I think she should bear in mind that in the Church of England the clergy are registered, that registrars are registered in our civil system and that, as I have said, Jews and Quakers already operate in a different legislative framework from that governing religions as a whole.
I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, because I promised that I would.
I know my place.
When I first received communications from humanists supporting this approach, I looked up “humanist weddings”, and discovered from the humanism.org.uk website that there are wedding celebrants who can take services now. It is recommended that people obtain a civil marriage certificate at the register office and then hold the ceremony wherever they want, perhaps in the open air: they are not limited by buildings in any way. I understand that that applies to a number of religions, as well as to humanists. I am therefore wondering whether we need to have this debate.
What the hon. Gentleman says about other religions may be correct, but it is not the case that all religions are required to go through a dual process. Jews and Quakers are not. My contention is that we should recognise the strong popular support for humanism, just as we recognise popular support for other forms of marriage. Many organisations can perform legal marriages in their own right, and do so for smaller numbers than the humanists would and, indeed, than the humanists do now. While I would not for one minute suggest that our marriage laws should be based on some sort of numbers game—although I believe that some Members sought to suggest as much in Committee, an approach that I found somewhat offensive and regrettable—my contention is supported, in this context, by the fact that not only is practice in relation to humanist marriages already fairly widespread, but the numbers are increasing. The popularity is growing.
I welcome the debate. I strongly support new clause 15 and the associated amendments, and believe that it would be a massive, progressive step if the provisions were enacted. I declare an interest as vice-chair since 1997 of the all-party parliamentary humanist group, and as an active member of the British Humanist Association. In that sense, I have a vested interest, but even if I were not a humanist, I would passionately support the proposal to permit humanist weddings.
I have been searching for information but cannot find it on how many humanist weddings there are in England each year on average at the moment. Does the hon. Gentleman have that information?
The Bill passed its Second Reading by 400 votes to 175. The amendments wrecking it were rejected by seven to one.
We last redefined marriage in 1973 when we brought in the prohibition on same-sex marriage. I think it is time to undo that and define marriage as being between two people who are qualified to marry.
Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberBreach will be a matter for the public probation service. May I take advantage of the fact the right hon. Gentleman is a Welsh Member to pay tribute to the leaders of the probation trust in Wales, who have been enormously helpful in shaping the proposals? Their work on plotting a new path for probation has been very influential. I also say to the people of Wales that we envisage there being a distinct entity for Wales within the new national probation service, as there should be.
The target must be to have fewer crimes committed by fewer people and for criminals to continue committing crimes for a shorter period.
Will my right hon. Friend see whether figures can be published every six months on the number of people who have committed a serious criminal offence for the first time, the proxy for which will be those who have been convicted? I believe that the figure is about 1,800 a week.
Will he try to obtain a report every now and again on the people who have been released from jail that week who have a home, a worthwhile activity such as a job or training, and some kind of champion to help them go straight?
I am happy to look at what we can provide for my hon. Friend. He is right that we need to have the best possible understanding of what happens to people post-prison. We are putting in place a justice databank so that voluntary organisations that work in the area can understand the impact of their work. I will do my best to provide as much information to the House as possible about the issues that he raises.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe Court of Appeal disagreed with that and said—the case is called Sperrings, if the hon. Lady is interested—that there was no basis for suggesting that Jimmy Goldsmith was misconducting himself, albeit that a reasonable person could comment that he was using his financial wealth to bully those defendants. The same could be said of Robert Maxwell, who stole Daily Mirror employees’ money in order to run libel actions against every Tom, Dick and Harry he could lay his fingers on.
What is the difference between complaints about financial wealth or strength in the hands of individuals being used to bully defendants, compared with financial wealth in the hands of corporate claimants being used to do that? If the case is an abuse—if it does not come within the terms of the currently unamended clause 1—the court will stop it. However, what has happened is that a general case has been built up, but on the basis of about two, three or four cases—I congratulate the campaigners and those who have seduced my hon. Friend and the Opposition into believing that what they are doing is in the public interest. That is illogical, although it has been highly effective politically—you can perhaps hear from the frustration in my voice, Mr Deputy Speaker, that I recognise defeat when I see it. I am about to be defeated, because the Government have simply whipped the people who voted one way last week to vote another way this week.
Although my hon. Friend was not here at the beginning of the debate, I will, if I may, permit him to intervene.
My hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right, but as soon as I saw that he was on his feet, I came as fast as I could, dropping everything else. Last week I voted the way I intend to vote this week.
And I still think I am right. Can my hon. and learned Friend give some examples of where corporations have taken defamation or libel cases that were necessary and could not have been dealt with in another way? As he says, the problem with illustrative cases is that they do not always make good law, but the cases involving Dr Peter Wilmshurst and Simon Singh were examples of how the law did not bring justice within a time scale and for an amount of money that ordinary people or publishers can afford.
Obviously I cannot give my hon. Friend a catalogue of cases one way or the other. What I can tell him is that if clause 1 is amended as he always wanted and as the Government now want, the case of Wilmshurst, in which he was sued by NMT Medical, would probably pass the “serious financial loss” hurdle. If my hon. Friend thinks that he is helping Dr Wilmshurst or those like him by amending the Bill in that way, I am afraid he is wrong. If he wants to lock future Dr Wilmshursts into satellite litigation about “serious financial loss”, then make my day, as they say. That will be the unintended consequence of what is going to happen.
As I said last week and as was said in the other place yesterday, the great and sadly late Lord Bingham said in the case of Jameel that corporations have trading reputations that ought to be worthy of protection. A corporation’s trading reputation is a thing of value. However, the Government and those who support them on this particular volte face confuse themselves because they have separated out—no doubt for well intentioned reasons—non-trading companies and trading companies for the purposes of the amendment to clause 1. However, trading companies have different types of reputation, as Mr Justice Tugendhat said in the case of Thornton last year. Individuals—and certainly companies—have different segments of their reputation that are susceptible to being defamed.
I used the example of the BBC last night on “The World Tonight”, at about quarter past 10. The BBC is a large trading corporation. It sells things for profit—programmes—but it has another reputation as a source of unbiased and disinterested news reporting. It has another reputation as a supporter of good causes such as Children in Need and another reputation as an employer. I could libel the BBC in its trading capacity and it might or might not overcome the hurdle that clause 1, as about to be amended, would present. However, I could also accuse it of being, let us say, a hotbed of or a magnet for child sex abusers. That would not necessarily cause it serious financial loss, but it would most certainly defame the BBC and undermine its reputation as a place to be employed or a place to go and visit. Despite the fact that that would cause it serious reputational loss, the BBC would be unable to vindicate its reputation, because it would be unable to show serious financial loss.
It strikes me that as I begin to repeat myself and say what I said last week—
My hon. and very elderly Friend says, “That’s age.” Well, he has more experience of—
It is true, it is justifiable and I do not even have to—
It is all sorts of things and it will not cause my hon. Friend financial loss, but he will still be able to sue me if I repeat it outside—assuming that accusing somebody of my hon. Friend’s distinction of being elderly were defamatory. But anyhow, I digress—I am amused to be led to digress by my hon. Friend, because he is an amusing and diverting person.
I will not call a Division this afternoon, because I can do a bit of arithmetic and also because by not calling a vote I will create more embarrassment for the Government. I urge them to think carefully about what they think they are doing, why they have done it, and whether they can justify what they have done. Are they able to answer accusations of backstairs deals, and allegations of incoherence or producing a measure that will have huge and unintended consequences of deleterious effect?
I understood that and I will say why I think the measure is a reasonable last change that the House should support. I wish to pay tribute to several people, including Lord Lester of Herne Hill who introduced a private Member’s Bill to Parliament some years ago and in many ways triggered this reform of our defamation legislation. I also pay tribute to my noble Friend Lord McNally, who has steered a controversial Bill through many stages. He referred in his speech yesterday to the fact that it has been through the pre-legislative stage and the legislative stage. It has been considered by the Liberal Democrat party; there were conference debates and resolutions were passed on it, and there have also been many cross-party conversations.
I was a little troubled that the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Robert Flello) was slightly churlish about the point we have reached. His party and mine, as well as the Conservatives and Cross Benchers, have worked together on the threshold for dealing with corporate claims, and we have made progress on that. Therefore, today is progress along the lines that he wanted, and that he knows colleagues from all three parties wanted. He pretends to be naïve—which he is not—about the way these things work, whether or not there is a coalition Government. At the end of a political process in Parliament, negotiations take place in the public light and also behind the scenes. As he knows perfectly well, that has happened with all three parties to try to get to the most agreeable and consensual place. My party has been as much a part of that process as the Labour party and the Conservatives in arriving at this point.
The Minister rightly says that this is not about what is known as the Derbyshire principle. For those outside the House who have no clue what that is, in essence—I do not pretend to be legalistic about this—it is a principle enunciated by the courts in a case to do with a local authority, which effectively stated that local authorities cannot generally sue to protect their reputation because they are public authorities. However, as I think everybody has agreed in both Houses, common law will evolve, which does not stop it being dealt with by further judgments of the courts across the United Kingdom. In light of the Localism Act 2011, there may be further definitions of a public authority that seek to deal with the issue of a private body that does public authority work. That business remains unaltered by the Lords amendment.
The Lords amendment, which has returned to this House in a form I hope will be accepted, would provide one additional hurdle for people who are seeking as companies to use this country’s defamation legislation. It states:
“For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that trades for profit—”
therefore not a body that makes no profit—
“is not “serious harm” unless it has caused or is likely to cause the body serious financial loss.”
I heard the previous speech and we can debate whether that is the perfect wording. It is, however, a clear statement that there must be “serious financial loss” before someone gets to a position from which they can win a defamation case. The Government rejected the idea of a pre-hearing. I understand that and think they were right because it would have meant going round the courts twice.
The Government have accepted that the bar for companies should be higher than that for individuals, which I am sure is right. That measure is meant to deal with the sort of cases that my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) alluded to where in the past individuals were clobbered by companies with huge resources and assets in a way regarded as totally unfair. As Lord McNally pointed out yesterday in the House of Lords, not only have we now, I hope, protected the little person in financial terms against the big corporate giant, we have also done things to protect academic reputations and academic dispute, and to allow that to go on without the threat of defamation. We have also, I hope, made the law clearer and brought it up to date.
The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent South said that if the Labour party returns to government, it may wish to return to these matters, and I suppose any Government may want to do that. In this country, however, we understandably do not reform defamation law—generally a cross-party exercise—very frequently. This is a major piece of legislation and I hope that we have dealt with the last tricky issue in a way that provides greater protection for the individual against the big corporate. I think that is a job well done in both Houses of this Parliament.
I apologise for not being present at the start of the debate, and I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) for introducing my interest. I should declare that I have been successful in three major defamation actions, and I hope I shall not have to take another.
I want to tell the story of Richard Doll, who drank too much college beer when applying to study mathematics at Trinity college, Cambridge. He did not get chosen, so he went to St Thomas’ instead. He had an interest in asthma and lung diseases. In 1950, he did a quick study on whether motor fumes or tarmac caused lung cancer, as was suspected at the time. He and his colleague, Bradford Hill, discovered that the common factor was smoking. They did not show until 1955 beyond any doubt what had first been suspected by German scientists in the 1930s, namely that, if a person smokes 25 cigarettes a day, their chances of developing lung cancer or associated serious illnesses increased by 25 or 50 times—I forget the actual figure.
If the too-frequent current habit of commercial companies suing for damage had been prevalent when Richard Doll published his material, I suspect that the tobacco companies would have shut him down. When he later came out with the proposed link, which was proved, between asbestos and serious lung conditions, the same thing might have happened. One vital question is how we protect scientific speculation and the publishing of preliminary findings without the risk of action.
I believe we should accept the Lords amendments in lieu because they give conditions in which court authority is necessary if the action is to start. There is one condition by which the court “must” rule action out. I hope the courts realise that they “may” disqualify such action on other grounds. There is a “must”, but the measure leaves open the “may” option for disqualifying cases.
Beyond clause 1—the serious harm test—we have clause 6, on peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals. Clause 6 comes to the aid of scientists or medical experts such as Professor Doll if they make statements of that nature that are published in a peer-reviewed magazine or whatever, but there are plenty of other ways in which they could be assisted, such as through the common law, other measures in the Bill and earlier Defamation Acts.
Indeed—that is why my hon. and learned Friend’s career will not be interrupted by the passage of the Bill. Plenty of people will seek his advice. The condition in the proposed new clause in lieu states:
“(2) The permission of the court must be obtained in order to bring an action…(3) The court must strike out an application under subsection (2) unless”
it can show X, Y and Z. My point is that the courts also have a “may” power, which I hope they use.
The Trafigura event, which involved super-injunctions, was another example of people trying to shut down public knowledge, inquiry, discussion and debate.
I am aware of that—my hon. and learned Friend is guiding me into making my speech longer than I had intended.
When I was appointed to the Joint Committee on the draft Defamation Bill, I had hoped that the Government and their Law Officers would introduce positive proposals that went further than the Bill and that gave more power to people to speculate in public, defend their arguments and themselves. Defamation provides limits in that context.
When I had to take defamation action, I did so as a private individual. What was said about me made such action necessary—I was labelled, in effect, as a paedophile on the front page of a major Sunday paper. It struck me that it was not true, not privileged and damaging, and therefore that it provided justification for action. Auberon Waugh made a living for four years out of calling me all sorts of things under the sun. One journalist said, “Why don’t you sue him?” I said, “First, I don’t mind; secondly, it might be true; and, thirdly, it is not compulsory to sue.” It would be fair if those who take defamation action justified why they were taking it, so that they do not just pile up costs, which can become too great.
I should return to my earlier point. What comes before peer review? Suppose I am a scientist or someone else who suspects that there is a link between a commercial product and a bad consequence. I should not have to keep absolutely silent about it until I have managed to do a research study, which would involve getting the funding for the research study, finishing it, delivering it to the magazine so it can send it to other publications, and getting permission to make it public. Speculation requires people having the ability to speak more openly, but perhaps not always with certainty—they may have to put their views in terms of speculation rather than of direct accusations.
We have had the recent case—it is now finished—of the fraud related to the device that was supposed to detect improvised explosives. If someone had spoken up against that company long before there was evidence for the court case, would they have faced a defamation action? We should remember that many magazines and newspapers do not have a great deal of money.
If we accept the Lords amendment and pass the Bill, we will have done good, but not enough. I therefore make a plea to the Minister—she does not need to answer this point today—to work out how the relevant Departments can, either by themselves or by proxy, monitor defamation actions. They should have studies that report on the kinds of actions that are being taken, the writs that are being issued, the writs that are served having been issued, and the results—whether there is a settlement or whatever.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI fully understand those reasons, and if the hon. Gentleman will bear with me and allow me to progress on to an explanation of those amendments, I hope that all will be revealed to him.
The separate but related issues are whether there should be any restrictions on the rights of bodies corporate and other non-natural persons to bring an action in defamation and whether any non-natural person, which is performing a public function, should be prevented altogether from bringing a claim in relation to a statement concerning that function. In relation to the first issue, the amendment would mean that in order to bring a claim, a non-natural person would first have to obtain permission of the court. The court would be required to strike out any such application, unless the claimant could show that the publication of the statement complained of had caused, or was likely to cause, substantial financial loss. We believe that a permission stage for this purpose would create unnecessary duplication and additional costs for both parties.
If the claimant was required to show substantial financial loss in order to satisfy the permission requirement, it would in effect mean that the claimant would satisfy the serious harm test introduced by clause 1. We have asked the civil procedure rules committee to consider rule changes to support a new early resolution procedure under which either party could apply at the outset of proceedings for the court to decide certain key issues, including whether the serious harm test is satisfied. The addition of a permission stage would therefore add little or nothing, because any case where the existence of serious harm was disputed could have that issue resolved at a very early stage in any event.
I am grateful to the Minister for taking us through this matter. The problem comes when a body—not a person—sends a threatening letter to an ordinary member of the public. Were I to go to a pop concert and be abused by security staff, and then tell my friends not to go to anything organised by those people, and if they then issued and served a writ, what chance would I have, with no money? Do I go straight to court and say, “They’ve shown no loss. Cut it out. They are not a person. They’ve got no feelings. They should not be allowed to do it.”?
Just two names: Peter Wilmshurst and the hundreds of thousands of pounds by a corrupt organisation, a company that had not allowed clinical research to be published properly; and Dr Simon Singh and the half a million pounds of costs over £5,000 of damages, and the court could not find a way of dismissing the case. That is the problem: such cases should not be allowed to start.
As I intimated earlier, fixing the problem of fairness and creating the right balance between the claimant and defendant is not just about an early strike-out procedure. It is about a package of proposals that create fairness, are proportionate and allow for freedom of expression while protecting the reputations of individuals.
My hon. Friend will be pleased to know that I think it is good manners and courtesy to take an intervention when someone on the Front Bench tries to make one, so if the Minister seeks to intervene I shall allow her to do so.
I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman in a moment.
I was talking about the huge amount of support for Lords amendment 2. It should also be supported by the Liberal Democrats, whose manifesto stated that they sought defamation reform that would require
“corporations to show damage and prove malice or recklessness”.
That is a far higher threshold than that in Lords amendment 2. If the Liberal Democrats stick to their manifesto and their principles and vote with us this evening, we can defeat this attempt to stifle free speech. I urge them and others to vote with us to support the retention of this crucial clause in the Bill.
I like to keep my promises, so I shall now give way to the hon. Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley).
The right hon. Gentleman might get as far as I did by doing that.
Atos does disability checks for the Government and a number of disability claimants had a forum where they made their comments about that. Atos, I understand, sent a legal letter that closed it down because the threat was sufficient. The Government could not have done that and Atos should not, so the public function issue matters. There are plenty of other ways in which large corporations can defend their reputation, but using money and legal threats is not one of them.
The hon. Gentleman might have been in the House in 1993, when Lord Keith made his judgment, but the numbers of private companies undertaking public functions in ’93 were far fewer than they are in 2013. The hon. Gentleman knows that I have huge respect for him, but if his party has its way, with the support of the Liberal Democrats, even more public services will be tendered and will be run by private companies.
Large elements of the Bill show how Parliament should legislate. Political consensus on the overarching need to reform followed by detailed, expert debate on the substance in both Houses, all informed by a dedicated set of campaigners and non-governmental organisations, has helped to turn the original substandard Bill into a better set of proposals. I hope that today the House will agree with us one more time on the importance of retaining the key changes made to the Bill in the Lords. Do you know what? Defamation Bills do not come around very often—this is only the third since 1853. We must grasp the opportunity and deliver the modern, updated defamation laws warranted by our tradition of open and free speech.
That is not only fundamental; it is highly uncontroversial. Human beings can get damages for hurt to their feelings; companies cannot. One cannot libel a company by accusing it, for example, of adultery, whereas one can so libel an individual. There are plenty of obvious and not very surprising differences between the law relating to individuals and the law relating to companies, but there are examples of things which affect companies’ trading reputations, which should be susceptible to protection.
We should also bear it in mind that there are different types of company. There are not-for-profit companies which are not in the business of making money and which, if they were libelled, would not lose money. It may well be said in response to me that the amendment deals with that. They would get permission from the court to bring that action, but that just creates another hurdle, as the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant), made clear.
I would be grateful if my hon. and learned Friend could advise briefly on two points. First, at which stage should the courts have said, “We are not going to go further with the claim against Dr Simon Singh or against Dr Peter Wilmshurst”? Secondly, with reference to loss, in 1950 two doctors said that tobacco is very bad for people’s health and asbestos is very bad for people’s lungs. That was not the general view. It was an insight, and the companies involved in selling tobacco and selling asbestos could have sued for loss. That should have been struck out as well. There should be no libel for such cases. How would my hon. and learned Friend stop that kind of thing without the proposed new clause?
I shall not unwind the case of Singh or the Wilmshurst case; they have been before the courts and have been dealt with. As it happens, the case of Simon Singh became controversial because it was an argument about whether the words complained of constituted allegations of fact or whether they were capable of constituting comment. That is the point on which it went to the Court of Appeal.
There was an action in South Africa brought by a tobacco company which sued and recovered damages on the allegation that its products promoted cancer. Things change. That is the advantage of having an organic system of law which enables the courts to deal with evidence and reach conclusions about whether a company or anyone else has been attacked inappropriately.
As I was saying to the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), it is not all that hard to think of statements which seriously injure the general commercial reputation of trading and charitable organisations. An arms company—
The hon. and learned Gentleman has forgotten that the proposal does not apply to non-profit-making organisations.
This is the only part of the Bill, until we see the civil procedure rules, that provides for early strike-out. That would have helped Peter Wilmshurst, sued by NMT, who could not ultimately pay the bills that he had racked up, leaving aside the worry for his family in putting everything on the line. The amendment would get around the distinction drawn in the Simon Singh case—the artificial discrimination between corporate bodies and non-incorporated bodies that allowed the British Chiropractic Association to sue him in the first instance.
The Lords amendment is sensible and proportionate. It would not prevent individuals in companies, particularly private companies, from suing if they felt defamed by an article that attacked their company. It would also, as the hon. Member for Worthing West said, extend the Derbyshire principle to contracted-out firms where they are providing public functions—Atos, for example. In short, it keeps up with the times.
I put my name to Lords amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Worthing West, partly, again, on the grounds of reducing costs. Beliefs are very subjective and decisions are more objective if the courts interpret them sensibly. I also wanted to tease out from the Government why, having rejected all our concerns in the Bill Committee about having another tick list, as the Reynolds defence had proved so costly, they had so radically changed their mind. The Minister has not elucidated that. However, by virtue of the fact that the matter was uncontested in the Lords, I am happy that a court can consider all circumstances of the case. I hope that in a spirit of cross-party truce, my colleague the hon. Member for Worthing West will speak to his amendment.
I want to make two points that were not those I intended to make originally. My third point is that I disagree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) almost completely about this, so I will not put those arguments.
Tesco Lotus in Thailand sued a journalist for £1.9 million—perhaps it was dollars or something, but it was quite a lot—because it wanted an apology, and it eventually got an agreement to have a clarification of the words on an inside page. It later sued a former MP, a business journalist, in the same way.
Corporations such as Tesco, whether in joint venture overseas or in this country, should not be able to choose to sue an individual journalist; it simply should not happen. They have plenty of power, plenty of weight, plenty of thick skin and an umbrella, and they should not be able to do it.
I would have stopped corporations suing for libel at all.
I believe strongly that public functions should fall under the Derbyshire principle, irrespective of whether we want private businesses doing public jobs. Earlier I gave the example of a security guard at a pop festival. I regard security as a public function even if it is privately hired, and such people should not be able to sue for libel. The court should not issue the writ; it should not be allowed.
Let me make a point on behalf of Colin Channon, the editor of my local newspaper, the Worthing Herald, who says that were he to report that a group of unauthorised campers was in the constituency and he were then sued, he would have to pay £3,000 for initial advice before he got to a panel. We are in danger of our local newspapers being threatened.
As for people conspiring to say that the police would not confirm whether someone had been arrested, the idea that someone could sue for a libel that claimed they had been arrested but which had not been confirmed, even though true, makes the issue even worse. I am unhappy with most of this but I am particularly unhappy that the Government have not yet found a way of having new clause 2, in effect, there for all of us.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley), with whom I have had many promising discussions on the issue. I am delighted that the Bill is back in the Commons. There was a period when, due to the actions of the Labour peer Lord Puttnam, there was a risk. I am glad that that risk did not eventualise and that it turned out not to be a problem.
This Bill will make a significant change to the costs of libel and to free speech and it will reduce libel tourism. I am particularly pleased about clause 6, which provides specific protection for peer-reviewed academic and scientific publications. That is something that I value greatly and I am delighted that we will be able to make those protections, because we have heard of too many cases of learned journals being silenced.
The issue remains, however, of corporations and non-natural persons. As I argued earlier, they are different. They do not have feelings. They are categorically separate and there should be different rules for what happens when they wish to bring libel actions. Significantly, we have heard that they can abuse power, as in the cases of Peter Wilmshurst and Simon Singh. I was going to talk more about them, but a number of speeches have covered them.
There is, largely, cross-party agreement, with the notable exception of the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier).
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes, there are all sorts of anomalies in the legislation that was presented yesterday, but today is not the time to debate those. We will have plenty of opportunity to do so. It is interesting that the Church of England was asking for Parliament to protect it from itself, so to speak, over equal marriage, yet it is still rather resistant, as things stand, to our helping it to legislate on something that its says it wants to do but so far has not been capable of delivering for itself.
Before we get diverted down discussions that we had yesterday and will have in future on other subjects, will the right hon. Gentleman return briefly to what has happened in the other provinces? Can he say slowly and clearly that where they trusted diocesan bishops to make suitable arrangements, those arrangements were made, and the heavens have not fallen in on those who might be regarded as conservative or dissenters?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. New Zealand, Australia, the United States, Canada and South Africa all have women bishops, and they have systems that are without any legislative alternative for episcopal oversight; they have voluntary pastoral care. From what I hear, that works well and people are perfectly happy with it, and the women bishops themselves deal with it very sensitively.
The hon. Lady and I are on the same wavelength on that. I understand the arguments for establishment, but I believe that a radical Church should not be part of the establishment. We should be outside the establishment campaigning for Christian values, but we have ended up being in the establishment by accident. That is a debate for another time, and we will not resolve it today.
One paradox is that the established Church of England has decided not to have women bishops when the head of the Church of England, the supreme governor, is a woman. The whole thing is inconsistent. There is another anomaly in the argument that, because of the relatively recent history of the Church, only men can be priests, and that people want to be under the pastoral responsibility of a male bishop. The Church has provided that option in relation to priests, and it works. Now it has come up with a similar proposal for those who want a male bishop. It seems to me that if the first worked, the second is likely to work. I ask people to be generous and less suspicious and untrusting. It is understood that some people have a different view, and everybody has tried hugely hard to accommodate it.
I remember my wife, as a female Secretary of State, taking the present Bishop of London to see the Queen to present the bishop, who would not ordain women, to be head of the Church of England.
The right hon. Gentleman said that the Church of England decided not to have women bishops. The fair way to put it is that the Church of England Synod decided by a very large majority to have women bishops, and it is now a question of how and when, rather than rejecting that.
I agree.
I am clear that, in theory, there is no objection to women priests according to the Bible and Christian teaching. I am not a theologian, but the theology seems clear to me. However, it also seems to me that the Anglican Church has accepted women bishops all around the world. According to the information that I have, there are five Anglican provinces that already have women bishops, one of which has a woman presiding bishop—New Zealand and Polynesia, Australia, Canada, southern Africa and the United States. There is also the diocese of Cuba, which is not in any province.
A further 12 provinces have agreed that they can have women bishops and they are not, as it were, the usual suspects—Bangladesh, Brazil, central America, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, north India, the Philippines, Scotland, Sudan and Uganda. If I may say so, for heaven’s sake, if all those places have dealt with the theological argument and concluded that this is possible, then the Church of England is far from leading the Anglican communion; rather, it is following behind. There is a remaining group of provinces that have not yet accepted that they can have women bishops, but which have women priests, so they are clearly on the way. It therefore seems that many people in the Anglican communion have addressed this issue both in theory and theology and in practice.
Let me repeat what has been said strongly by others. My experience is that the Church has benefited enormously from allowing women into the ministry of the priesthood in the last 20 years, not just through their life experience, pastoral, academic and intellectual qualities and preaching ability, but simply through the sheer numbers. The right hon. Member for Exeter, who opened the debate, referred to that. At the moment, 20% of ministers in the Anglican Church are women. Across the Christian denominations in the UK, 20% is the average—the Methodists have 40%, but the average is 20%. In 2010—the last full year—more women than men were ordained as Anglicans into the priesthood for the first time. There are now 50% more women in the Church of England in full-time parochial appointments than 10 years ago. One in five of the paid clergy are women. All the evidence is that people are saying—from evangelicals to those in other parts of the Church, from women to men, from old to young—that they believe there should be women bishops in the Church.
The Church desperately needs more people willing to be its priests, its bishops and its leaders, to get out there and do the job of preaching and teaching. To say that women cannot be allowed any further than the first two rungs of the ladder—that they cannot be in the leadership—is ridiculous. It is to deny a pent-up opportunity that all of us who have watched women at work in the Church have seen—and I would not be forgiven if I did not say that among them is my wonderful sister-in-law, who is currently a chaplain for a hospice in Essex and who has served in the Chelmsford diocese for many years as a wonderful priest and member of the Church.
Let me refer to what we do now, because that is the question. I do not think we should take over the role of the Church of England now, not just because I believe in disestablishment, but because I think it would be inappropriate. I share the view of the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr Field)—that we may however want to take control of what happens at the other end of this building in deciding who is admitted to represent the Church of England as bishops. It has long been anomalous that in the House of Lords—the Lords itself is anomalous—one bloc has to be all-male. That seems inappropriate.
Government and Parliament need to offer their best offices to the Church of England so that the new proposal—which the bishops mercifully have today announced they will make for Synod next year—can receive their support and technical advice and therefore pass both the Synod and this place. The bishops need to know in advance—I pay tribute to other colleagues on the Ecclesiastical Committee—that what they come up with will not be tripped up in Parliament, and we need to know in advance that it is compatible with our principles of equality, of which colleagues have spoken around the House.
The majority of people who go to church in this country are women. The leadership that the country calls for must include the majority of people in Britain, who are women. I hope the Church has learnt its lesson. I have every confidence in the leadership of the Archbishop of Canterbury-designate, who is coming to meet us tomorrow. I hope that by this time next year we will be celebrating not just the change in the Church’s rules, but the beginning of a transformation that will embolden the Church, improve it and increase the effectiveness of the ministry of the Church to proclaim the gospel to everybody, which is best done by everybody who is capable of doing it.
(11 years, 12 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis is a rare situation for me. We have come to the second private Member’s Bill of the day, both of which I wholeheartedly support—an unusual occurrence for a Friday. I find myself in a slightly uncomfortable situation in that regard. I have tabled the amendments not to bury the Bill, but to try to improve it. It is already an excellent Bill, but it could be further strengthened. I hope to persuade my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey (Stuart Andrew), whom I congratulate on getting the Bill to this stage, that my amendments would enhance his Bill, and I will give it my best shot.
I begin by congratulating you, Mr Speaker, on not selecting my first amendment. It is what is known, I believe, as a consequential amendment, and it suggested leaving out the word “or” and inserting a comma instead. The House would probably not have wanted to have had a Division on such a lead amendment, so I congratulate you on not indulging the House with it. The other amendments are well worthy of at least consideration.
On the disposal of unauthorised or unattributable property, clause 1 states:
“an article found inside the prison or in a prisoner escort vehicle”.
Amendment 2 suggests an addition to include:
“any other location that the prisoner attends while in custody,”
Obviously, the Bill covers the prison and prison escort vehicles—that is perfectly reasonable. I am concerned, however, about all the other places prisoners might find themselves while in custody. It would be bizarre if something was not covered because of a technicality—because the prisoner did not happen to be in prison or a prisoner escort vehicle at the time.
I understand my hon. Friend’s point. When I attended a hospital out-patients department on the Isle of Wight, half the people there appeared to be prisoners under escort. That is an example of precisely what he describes
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He might think it easy for me to say—now he has made the point—but I was specifically thinking of hospitals when I drew up the amendment. As he said, lots of prisoners have health problems and require medical treatment, entailing a trip either to a doctors’ surgery for an assessment or to hospital for treatment or a more detailed assessment. The last Government did an awful lot in that regard, taking forward telemedicine so that people could be seen while still in prison via video link. That was a perfectly good innovation, but it does not apply in every case. As my hon. Friend said, prisoners often have to visit hospital.
It is not just about hospitals, however; lots of prisoners go out to work on day release, if they are coming to the end of their sentence, as part of their rehabilitation. Many people in open prisons go out to work or out into other parts of society to do some rehabilitation work. As things stand, however, it seems that the Bill would not cover those people. People in custody also go to court, either to have their remand hearing considered or to have further charges put to them, and it would be bizarre if something was found while somebody was in court but was not covered by the Bill just because they happened to be in court rather than in prison.
I genuinely do not know—perhaps the Minister will tell us—how many trips are paid to hospital, how many people go out to work each day or how many court appearances are made, but I am sure there are people with better minds in this place who do know. It would help to have that information. It seems to me, however, that many people make such trips, so there might be a large loophole when prisoners are away from their prison and prisoner escort vehicle and therefore not covered by the Bill.
I am also slightly concerned about the use of the term “prisoner escort vehicle”. I wonder exactly what it covers. Again, I would not want people to get away on a technicality. We have lots of clever members of the legal profession in the House, my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) being one of them, and I would not want any of those clever people—much cleverer than me—to be able to find a loophole by which it could be claimed that a vehicle was not strictly speaking a “prisoner escort vehicle”. I wonder, therefore, if we have a definition of exactly what it means.
I was misguided in thinking that my hon. Friend momentarily wanted to intervene, but he did not. He has obviously been so persuaded by my case that he could not think of anything in amendment 4 to disagree with, as he could with amendment 3.
Proposed new section 42A of the Prison Act 1952, in clause 1, deals with
“Disposal of unauthorised or unattributable property”.
Where an article is being used for any of the purposes set out in subsection (3), it is not authorised. Those purposes include
“concealing an article which a prisoner is not authorised to have in his or her possession…causing harm to the prisoner or others…prejudicing the security or operation of the prison.”
My amendment 4 would add another category, in proposed new subsection (3)(d), which reads:
“for any unauthorised or unlawful purpose.”
Again, the amendment is designed to strengthen the reasons in the Bill for which property may be confiscated and destroyed. Perhaps it is too restricting simply to use the criteria currently set out in subsection (3). There could be circumstances where property was being used for another unlawful or unauthorised purpose, which would not be covered without my amendment. Surely we are not talking just about things that cause harm to the prisoner or prejudice the security or operation of the prison. Subsection (3)(a) refers to
“concealing an article which a prisoner is not authorised to have”,
but what if someone is caught red handed with an article that they are not concealing, but brandishing openly in front of everybody? Would we then find ourselves in the ridiculous situation where if a prisoner was hiding the article, that would be covered, but if they were brandishing it openly, that would not?
Perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey is satisfied that everything is covered by the Bill. However, there is certainly no harm in the belt-and-braces approach adopted by my amendment. For example, what if an item was being used to facilitate the taking of drugs? That would not necessarily fall under either “concealing” an item or
“causing harm to the prisoner or others”,
nor would it be
“prejudicing the security or operation of the prison”,
yet I am sure we would all want to ensure that those things were covered. My amendment would introduce a catch-all element to ensure that any property associated with any unauthorised or unlawful use could be seized and disposed of.
Amendment 5 would insert
“recycling it or donating it to any charity”
at the end of proposed new section 42A(5)(c) of the 1952 Act, as set out in clause 1. Again, I guess—[Interruption.] I am pleased to see the return of my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North, because this might be another area where he can help out, with his undoubted expertise on legal matters. As the Bill stands, proposed new subsection (5) says:
“In this section…references to disposing of an article include selling it”,
but I do not know whether the Bill is trying to say, “You can do that if you want to,” or whether that is the preferred way of dealing with such articles. In any case, if references to the disposal of an item are to include selling it, it seems perfectly worth while to include other options, including recycling things or donating them to any charity. If items could only be either destroyed or sold, that would leave out some of the things that most people would consider to be the most appropriate ways of disposing of them. If we were talking about things of particular use to a charity or things that could be recycled, why would we not want to do that?
No doubt the Minister will in time sort this issue out for us, but proposed new section 42A(1) of the 1952 Act says:
“The governor or director…may destroy or otherwise dispose of”,
so clearly there are ways of disposing with such property other than destruction, otherwise that phrase would not have been included. However, we are still left with the question, which my hon. Friend is raising, why selling is then specified. If something is not sold, the only other thing that can be done is to give it away—or perhaps leave it somewhere for someone else to steal, although if one does not want it back, I suppose that is not stealing. We await with interest to hear what my hon. Friend the Minister has to say.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. As ever, he is eagle-eyed on these matters. The point he makes about proposed new section 42A(1) is a good one, but like him, I would have thought that if “otherwise dispose of” included any other method, there would be no need for the words “selling it” in proposed new subsection 42A(5). Perhaps the Minister may like to explain that. My concern is that the Bill might encourage prisons to go down that line—it is as though that kind of behaviour is being encouraged. Personally, the behaviour I would most like to encourage is recycling or donating to charity. The things that are most likely to be caught include mobile phones, for instance, which mobile phone companies are trying to encourage us to recycle. It would be bizarre if we ended up destroying things that could otherwise be recycled.
I welcome the interest of my hon. Friend and constituency neighbour the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies). I have no doubt that he wants to do all he can to make sure that the Bill achieves what we all want it to achieve.
It was said on Second Reading and in Committee that this was a simple Bill—led by a simple person, I suppose—and I hope that we are not going to over-complicate it. As I say, I want the Bill to do what we set out to achieve through it. Let me go through all the points that my hon. Friend made, as I hope to persuade him that many of the legitimate issues he raised are already covered in the Bill.
Beginning with amendment 2, the power already exists for these items to be confiscated wherever they may be. If a prisoner is in a hospital or at another venue as my hon. Friend described, they will, on return to prison, be searched, and if an item is found, it will be confiscated. Equally, if it is found on them in the hospital, it can be confiscated and taken back to the prison where it will be dealt with through the processes that we seek to introduce through the Bill.
On that point, proposed new subsection (1)(a) refers to
“an article found in the possession of a prisoner who is not authorised to have it in his or her possession”,
while (1)(b) refers to
“an article found inside the prison or in a prisoner escort vehicle”.
My hon. Friend may be able to assist us now, or perhaps the Minister later, to clarify why the prisoner escort vehicles provisions are sufficient to deal with the point that the amendment addresses.
My hon. Friend is challenging me, so I am going to defer that one to the Minister. I thank him for his interest, but I am going to move on to amendment 3.
The issue here is that the item can be taken from prisoners, but that the confiscation process would happen back at the prison. I believe that the provisions cover this point clearly.
My hon. Friend wants to intervene, so perhaps he can help me.
I think we are beginning to get closer to the issue, but the Minister will no doubt be able to sort us all out. As I pointed out before, (1)(a) talks about
“an article… in the possession of a prisoner who is not authorised to have it”.
Wherever the prisoner has such an article, it can be removed from them. On the other hand, (1)(b) refers to prison-controlled areas
“inside the prison or in a prisoner escort vehicle”,
so everything else is presumably not controlled by the prison. If the prisoner happened to be somewhere else and either leaves property there himself or it is left there for him, the escort officers may not be able to show that the item is the prisoner’s or was left for him, so they may not be able to take it. If people are trying to pass items to prisoners in a non-prison-controlled area, it should be possible for someone to say, “This item is suspicious” and something should then happen to it. My guess is that either the Minister or my hon. Friend will tell us that the item will go to the police who will judge it on its merits, and they will probably have powers of disposal.
I think that is probably correct, but we need absolute clarification from the Minister. I see the point, but as I understand it, the processes involved are clearly dealt with in the Bill and in the guidance notes for governors that will follow implementation. Let us wait for the Minister to clarify.
On that point, we may be able to help the Minister. Amendment 9 refers to items that
“might contain or constitute evidence of a criminal offence.”
With a criminal offence carried out outside the prison or outside the prison vehicle, the article may need to be taken back by the prison, and the police may need to liaise with it. There is therefore going to be an issue about what happens in practice. It may not be essential to the Bill or to the amendment, but if we are trying to deter crime, knowing how often people in prison or under prison control obtain illegal or unauthorised substances—mobile phones or street drugs—we need to ensure that any potential evidence is taken and linked to the prisoner. I add a last statistical point. On how many occasions when a prison has illegal drugs is it recorded as a crime? If it is detected by the prison warders, it probably is not, or if it is detected by the police, it probably is. There is a degree of uncertainty regarding liaison between the two services.
We are talking about unauthorised items here. Illegal items would be referred to the police, and there would then need to be a criminal investigation. I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s points, and I feel sure that the Minister has taken note of them and will answer them in due course.
On amendment 3, I support what my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley said. The people at the front line are often those who know the circumstances best. It is not true to say that we do not trust them. Prison officers currently have the ability and the right to confiscate items under powers given to them by the prison governor. They have the delegated authority of the governor to confiscate the item in the first place, and it is then up to the governor to decide what to do with it.
I used to feel the same way as my hon. Friend, but I think that if a prison officer decides that an unauthorised item should be destroyed or disposed of, a senior manager of the prison ought to agree with that. The issue is not about whether an article is unauthorised or being used in a way that is unauthorised; it is about the disposal of the article afterwards. I am now convinced that the right approach is for a prison officer to be able to confiscate an article and for the governor or director of the prison to decide about disposal.
My hon. Friend makes a valuable point, and he has persuaded me on it. I would be interested to know, however, whether the Minister has had any feedback on amendment 3, perhaps from the Prison Officers Association.
Amendment 4 is a sensible proposal, and I have nothing further to say on it this morning.
Amendment 5 is of considerable interest. I asked in an intervention whether my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley had deliberately not put “registered” before “charity”. Whether or not that is the case, it is the right decision, as it overcomes any bureaucratic problems that might arise over whether a local charitable organisation had gone through the registration process. Such an organisation may be in the process of registration—indeed, that is often the case. The amendment would serve to avoid long-winded discussions as to whether individuals who are doing good work should be prevented from benefiting from confiscated property. Most of this property is mobile phones and there is a considerable market in recycling them, so they have a great value, especially as nowadays most of them are, in fact, small mobile computers.
Amendment 9 addresses the question of the data on these phones. The right solution is for the data to be routinely taken off the phones and stored on a central hard disc, logged with the prisoner’s name and number. Therefore, if at any point in the future it turns out that some of that information is pertinent to an alleged offence, it can be used in evidence.
That is right. Our concern is that property that was disposed of might later turn out to have contained evidence that was central to securing a conviction. I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey, the promoter of the Bill, would not want that information to be unavailable. There is a great deal of merit in having routine cleansing of phones, but only after having saved all the data contained on them on a central hard disc for possible future use.
We know from the Minister’s comments on Second Reading that 41,000 phones are currently stored, so I accept that storing these data would be a major task. We were told on Second Reading that the cost of storing the phones is £20,000 a year, and they are seized at the rate of 800 a month. This is a major problem, therefore, and there would be a great deal of merit in the Minister’s exploring the possibility of a standardised system whereby information is taken off phones and stored for future reference.
About 13 years ago I became rather conscious of what was going on in prisons. I had taken part in a campaign to help overturn the convictions and to free Ruth Wyner and John Brock, who had been working at the Wintercomfort project in Cambridge, helping the homeless. I remember helping to lead a procession across London that had the slogan, “Help the homeless: jail the social workers?” An account of these events is given in Alexander Masters’ book, “Stuart: a life lived backwards”. With the knowledge of the police, these two people were running a project for homeless people, some of whom were addicted to illegal street drugs. Another police officer found that some people were exchanging drugs on or outside the premises, and for some ludicrous reason the people running the project were prosecuted and jailed.
In jail, Ruth Wyner was asked to sign a confidentiality agreement so as to give counselling to other prisoners who were getting illegal street drugs in prison. I asked how many times each year someone in prison was detected as having used illegal street drugs. The answer was about 20,000, which is really quite high. I then asked somebody who had worked for me but who went on to work in the Prison Service how the drugs got into prison. The answer was, “Sometimes they’re thrown over the wall.”
I also refer Members to the first book Lord Archer wrote about his prison experience. It described how new prisoners, most of whom were inexperienced at crime—and at life—were sent to a high-security prison for a period, and if they were not on drugs before they went, they were often on drugs by the time they had finished their three weeks there, because the senior, experienced prisoners would arrange for the new prisoner to get their family to pay the experienced person’s family or associates outside the prison. That demonstrates why the mobile phones issue is important and why detecting unauthorised possession of mobile phones matters.
We ought to support the Bill. The question of how to deal with the amendments will be determined by the Minister’s responses to the points made by my hon. Friends the Members for Shipley (Philip Davies) and for Bury North (Mr Nuttall). I am grateful to the Bill’s promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey (Stuart Andrew), and I wish him success with it.
We must address the underlying issue, which is that 800 mobile phones are detected a month, and many more surely go undetected. A technical fix ought to be possible, so that any use of a mobile phone in a prison is linked to the identification number of a phone, and if any phone is used that is not part of the approved list, investigations should take place and people should find out where it is. The technology cannot be that difficult. Perhaps that is how it is done anyway, and that is why the detection rate is as high as it is.
I am a great believer in helping prisoners to be rehabilitated, but if there is a currency in mobile phones in a prison, let alone in controlled or illegal drugs, we need to stop it. The Bill is about the particular issue of how one can dispose of or destroy items that are not illegal to possess but that are unauthorised in prisons. Its limited purpose is one that this House should support, and I do support it.
I am grateful to everybody who has contributed to the debate on the amendments, and to the Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey (Stuart Andrew) for addressing the points that I raised.
Let me take the amendments in a rather jumbled-up order. Amendment 3 refers to “prison officer” as well as “prison”. The Minister’s explanation that the definition of “prison officer” would not include prison custody officer did not entirely convince me, because that suggests that my amendment needs to be expanded rather than left out. However, I took the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey—my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) made the same point—that nothing stops a prison officer confiscating an item, and that it may be in everybody’s best interests, not least the prison officer’s, if the authority to dispose of property was taken by a senior manager or the prison governor. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West, I was much persuaded by the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey. I am grateful to him for that.
I was reassured to a certain extent by the explanation that amendment 4 is already covered. I hope that the Minister is right that
“prejudicing the security or operation of the prison”
has exactly the same effect as,
“any unauthorised or unlawful purpose.”
I am not entirely convinced that the amendment is covered by the Bill, but I am happy to leave it and see who turns out to be right.
I am not convinced by the Minister’s explanation about amendment 5 and “otherwise dispose of”. My hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey said that he thought that the amendment might be too prescriptive, but that does not explain why the Bill includes “selling it” in the “references to disposing of”. The Minister claims that the phrase “otherwise dispose of” covers
“recycling… or donating it to any charity”,
in the amendment. Again, that does not explain the paragraph,
“references to disposing of an article include selling it”,
if the Minister claims that everything is covered by “otherwise dispose of”.
We have picked up that if the Prison Service was going to make a profit or a gain, that would need a separate provision. The item could be sold in other ways—for example, the money could be given to a charity, so that the Prison Service did not gain, but that is not being proposed. Therefore, at the risk of sounding like someone who is after a job, I would say that the Minister explained the matter quite well.
My hon. Friend is obviously more easily persuaded than me, but I know that, like me, he does not do anything to try to get a job. Nobody could ever accuse him of that, and I hope that he would never accuse me of it. However, I was not persuaded because I am not sure what “otherwise dispose of” means. I am concerned that “dispose of” implies getting rid of something, perhaps by throwing it in a bin.
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies). I have gone into the private Members’ Bills ballot on 36 occasions and I have not come up once. I suppose that that is roughly right, given that there are some 650 MPs. That might be wrong, but my maths has deserted me this afternoon.
I join in the congratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey (Stuart Andrew). It seems a bit odd that we have had to wait this long to put right the consequences of a decision by an administrative judge, but that is life. It might be worth it if the judiciary got to understand the consequences of some of the decisions that they make. Obviously, they have to judge the issues on their merits, but the consequences of their decisions ought to be one of the merits. We are trying to put right a situation that has caused a great deal of confusion.
The way in which the Bill has been prepared and presented has been admirable. If it has the blessing of my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley, it must be very good indeed.
(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberAbsolutely not; I intend to be as helpful as possible to Parliament. Indeed, my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General has already been extensive in his evidence-giving to Parliament about the legal position. There is no secret and nothing to hide; we want Parliament to have access to all the sensible advice. I am certain that my right hon. and learned Friend will be willing to give evidence before the Joint Committee.
Just because there may be a bipartisan consensus does not mean that it is right or rational, and it certainly does not include me. May I volunteer to serve on this Joint Committee, and may I ask those who give evidence the following? Is denying the vote to someone who has been sentenced to jail after being convicted of a crime a deterrent? It clearly is not. Is it a punishment, given that most criminals have not voted in their lives? Is it a penance? Or is it part of rehabilitation? Having discussed Strasbourg, we ought to start discussing why we are doing this to prisoners.
It is clearly a matter for Parliament to decide. There may be divided opinions, in different ways, on whether or not to give votes to prisoners and on which form any reform should take. That will be debated in the coming months, but surely it is ultimately the job of Parliament to decide which of many options it wishes to adopt.
(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberNo, my hon. Friend is quite right. We would not be giving guns back; they would, of course, be given to the police to deal with. However, there will be anomalies along the way, and I am sure that many hon. Members will help me to ensure that the Bill is as tight as possible on such issues.
As my hon. Friend has made such a generous offer, let me congratulate him on introducing the Bill and ask whether during its progress, perhaps in Committee, he might consider the question of illegal drugs. The last time I looked, which was some time back, prisoners were being found with illegal drugs more than 20,000 times a year. Are those recorded as crimes, or does it depend on whether the drugs are discovered by the Prison Service or the police? What happens afterwards? Presumably drugs will not be given back if they have not been consumed already.
This debate is already demonstrating that there will be a lot to talk about in Committee. Indeed, I hope that my hon. Friend will consider joining me on that Committee. He is absolutely right: items that are illegal would never be returned. They would be sent to the police to deal with.
To return to the point I was making, it is frankly astonishing that items seized by the governor are held in safe keeping simply to enable prisoners to claim them back on their release. That is not only a perverse part of the law; it is frankly wrong. It is also astonishing to discover that the system is having a huge impact on the public purse in what are very difficult times.