I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 14—Sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders, etc.
Government new clause 15—Saving and transitional provision.
New clause 5—Child sexual abuse prevention orders—
‘(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) For sections 123 (Risk of sexual harm orders: applications, grounds and effect) to 129 (Effect of conviction etc. of an offence under section 128) substitute—
“123 Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Orders: Applications and grounds
(1) On the application of a qualifying person, or on conviction of a qualifying offence, a magistrates’ court may make a ‘child sexual abuse prevention order’ if it is satisfied that it is necessary to make such an order for the purposes of protecting children generally or any particular child from serious sexual harm from the defendant.
(2) A qualifying person under subsection (1) shall be a chief officer of police or an officer, of superintendant rank or above, in the NCA or other relevant agency to be decided by the Home Secretary.
(3) In subsection (1) a defendant shall be considered to be convicted of a qualifying offence who—
(a) is convicted of an offence listed in schedules 3 and 5;
(b) is found not guilty of such an offence by reason of insanity;
(c) is found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged against him in respect of such an offence;
(d) is cautioned in respect of such an offence;
“(1) A chief officer of police may apply for an order under this section in respect of a person who resides in his police area or who the chief officer believes is in, or is intending to come to, his police area.
(2) An application under subsection (1) may be made to a magistrates’ court whose commission area includes—
(a) any part of the police area, or
(b) any place where it is alleged that the defendant committed one or more offences listed in schedules 3 and 5.
Section 123: supplemental
‘(1) In this Part, ‘Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Order’ means an order under section 123.
(2) Subsections (3) and (4) apply for the purposes of Section 1.
(3) ‘Protecting children generally or any particular child from serious sexual harm from the defendant’ means protecting persons under 18 or any person under 18, in or outside the United Kingdom, from serious physical or psychological harm caused by the defendant committing one or more offences listed in Schedule 3.
(4) Acts, behaviour, convictions, and findings include those occurring before the commencement of this Part.
(5) In subsection (1)(1), a person shall also be considered to have been convicted of a qualifying offence if, under law in force in a country outside the United Kingdom and whether before or after the commencement of this Part—
(a) he has been convicted of a relevant offence (whether or not he has been punished for it),
(b) a court exercising jurisdiction under that law has made in respect of a relevant offence a finding equivalent to a finding that he is not guilty by reason of insanity,
(c) such a court has made in respect of a relevant offence a finding equivalent to a finding that he is under a disability and did the act charged against him in respect of the offence, or
(d) he has cautioned in respect of a relevant offence.
(6) In subsection (5), a ‘relevant offence’ means an act which—
(a) constituted an offence under the law in force in the country concerned, and
(b) would have consituted an offence within schedules 3 and 5 if it had been done in any part of the United Kingdom.
(7) An act punishable under the law in force in a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law for the purposes of subsection (6), however it is described in that law.
(8) Subject to subsection (9), on an applicatioin under section 1 the condition in subsection (6)(b) above (where relevant) is to be taken as met unless, not later than rules of the court may provide, the defendant serves on the applicant a notice—
(a) stating that, on the facts as alleged with respect to the act concerned, the condition is not in his opinion met,
(b) showing his grounds for that opinion, and
(c) requiring the applicant to prove that the condition is met.
(9) The court, if it thinks fit, may permit the defendant to require the applicant to prove that the condition is met without the service of a notice under subsection (8).
Child-SAPOs: effect
‘(1) A Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Order—
(a) prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order, and
(b) has effect for a fixed period (not less than five years) specified in the order or until further order.
(2) The only prohibitions that may be included in the order are those necessary for the purpose of protecting children generally or any particular child from serious sexual harm from the defendant.
(3) Where a court makes a child sexual abuse prevention order in relation to a person already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
(4) Section 3(3) applies for the purposes of this section and section 5.
Child-SAPOs: variations, renewals and discharges
‘(1) A person within subsections (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a child sexual abuse prevention order.
(2) The persons are—
(a) the defendant;
(b) the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides;
(c) a chief officer of police who believes that the defendant is in, or is intending to come on to, his police area;
(d) where an order was made on an application under section 1(1), the chief officer or other qualifying person who made the application.
(3) An application under subsection (1) may be made—
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with rules of the court;
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
(4) Subject to subsections (5) and (6), on the application of the court, after hearing the person making the application and (if they wish to be heard) the other persons mentioned in subsection (2), may make any order, varying, renewing or discharging the child sexual abuse prevention order, that the court considers appropriate.
(5) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions on or to lift prohibitions from the defendant, only if it is necessary to do so for the purposes of protecting children generally or any particular child from serious sexual harm from the defendant (and any renewed or varied order may contain only such prohibitions as are necessary for this purpose).
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of five years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and—
(a) where the application is made by a chief officer of police, that chief officer, or other qualifying person or
(b) in any other case, the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides.
(7) In this section ‘the appropriate court’ means—
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the child sexual abuse prevention order, the Crown Court;
(b) where a magistrates’ court made the order, that court, a magistrates’ court for the area in which the defendant resides, or where the application is made by a chief officer of police, any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes any part of the chief officers’ police area or any area where the alleged offences occurred.
(c) where a youth court made the order, that court, the youth court for the area in which the defendant resides or, where the application is made, any youth court whose commission area includes any part of a chief officer’s police area or any place where the alleged offences occurred.
(8) This section applies to orders under—
(a) Section 5A of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 (c.51) (restraining orders),
(b) Section 2 or 20 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) (sex offender orders made in England and Wales and Scotland),
(c) Article 6 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I., 1998/2839 (N.I. 20)) (sex offender orders made in Northern Ireland), and
(d) as it applies to child sexual abuse prevention orders.
Interim Child-SAPOs
‘(1) This section applies where an application under section 123(1) (‘the main application’) has not been determined.
(2) An application for an order under this section (‘an interim child sexual abuse prevention order’)—
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
(3) The Court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim child sexual abuse prevention order, prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order.
(4) Such an order—
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
(5) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim child sexual abuse prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
(6) Subsection (5) applies to orders under—
(a) Sections 2A or 20(4)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) (interim orders made in England and Wales Scotland), and
(b) Article 6A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I., 1998/2839 (N.I. 20)) (interim orders made in Northern Ireland),
as it applies to interim child sexual abuse prevention orders.
Child-SAPO and interim Child-SAPO appeals
‘(1) A defendant may appeal to the Crown Court against the making of a child sexual abuse prevention order under section 123(1).
(2) A defendant may appeal to the Crown Court aginst the making of an interim child sexual abuse prevention order under section 127(3).
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under section 127(3), or the refusal to make such an order—
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
(b) in any other case, to the Crown Court.
(4) On an appeal under section (1), (2) or subsection (3)(b), the Crown Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
(5) Any order made by the Crown Court on an appeal under sections (1) or (2) (other than an order directing that an application be re-heard by a magistrates’ court) is for the purpose of subsecitons 126(7) and 127(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought (and not an order of the Crown Court).
Offence: breach of a Child-SAPO or interim Child-SAPO
‘(1) A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, he does anything which he is prohibited from doing by—
(a) a child sexual abuse prevention order;
(b) an interim child sexual abuse prevention order,
(c) an order under section 5A of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 (c.51) (restraining orders);
(d) an offender under sections 2, 2A or 20 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) (sex offenders orders and interim orders made in England and Wales and in Scotland);
(e) an order under Article 6 or 6A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I., 1998/2839 (N.I. 20)) (sex offender orders and interim orders made in Northern Ireland).
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for at term not exceeding five years.
(c) where a person is convicted of an offence under this section, it is not open to the court by or before which he is convicted to make, in respect of the offence, an order for conditional disharge or, in Scotland, a probation order.
(3) The Home Secretary shall issue guidance on the use of child sexual abuse prevention orders and interim child sexual abuse prevention orders within six months of this section coming into force.”.’.
New clause 7—Possession of prohibited written material about children—
‘(1) Section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (offence of possession of prohibited images of children) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), after “prohibited image of a child” insert “or prohibited written material about a child”.
(3) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) Prohibited written material about a child is written material which—
(a) is pornographic,
(b) falls within subsection (6), and
(c) is grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character.”
(4) In subsection (3), after “image” insert “or written material”.
(5) After subsection (5) insert—
“(5A) Where (as found in the person’s possession) written material forms part of a series of written material, the question whether the written material is of such a nature as is mentioned in subsection (2A) is to be determined by reference to—
(a) the written material itself, and
(b) (if the series of written material is such as to be capable of providing a context for the written material) the context in which it occurs in the series of written material.
(5B) So, for example, where—
(a) written material forms an integral part of a narrative constituted by a series of written material, and
(b) having regard to those written materials as a whole, they are not of such a nature that they must reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal,
the written material may, by virtue of being part of that narrative, be found not to be pornographic, even though it might have been found to be pornographic if taken by itself.”
(6) In subsection (6), insert “or written material” after the word “image” each time it appears.’.
Government new schedule 1—Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
Government amendments 63 and 92 to 94.
The Government proposals are in my name and that of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. New clauses 14 and 15, and new schedule 1, will simplify and strengthen the existing civil order regime under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The inspiration for the reforms is the Childhood Lost campaign of my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood), who has attracted more than 100,000 signatures to her online petition and the support of 67 right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House, who have added their names to my hon. Friend’s new clause 5. I pay tribute to her and those on both sides of the House who have campaigned so effectively on this important issue.
The Government essentially agree with the campaign and we are determined to do everything we can to protect the public from predatory sexual offenders. The UK has some of the toughest powers in the world to manage the risks posed by sex offenders, but in recognition of the important points highlighted by my hon. Friend’s campaign we are bringing forward amendments to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to make our powers even more effective.
I seek clarification from the Minister. The risk of sexual harm orders, which the new sexual risk orders would replace, can be given only to offenders aged 18 and over. Will the new sexual harm prevention orders also only apply to offenders over 18? If they will apply to offenders under 18, what consideration has he given to introducing accompanying rehabilitative provisions for child sex offenders?
If I may, I will first pay tribute to the hon. Lady, who has campaigned on these issues for a long time and deserves much of the credit for raising public awareness. If I may, I will come to the details of the offences shortly.
New clauses 14 and 15, and new schedule 1, will repeal the sexual offences prevention order, foreign travel order and risk of sexual harm order in England and Wales, and replace them with two new orders: the sexual harm prevention order and the sexual risk order. I welcome the engagement of hon. Members on this issue and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon will be pleased to note that we have sought to include her points as far as possible in the Government amendments. Indeed, following consultation with front-line professionals, including the police, the courts, the National Offender Management Service and the National Crime Agency, in a number of respects the Government amendments go further than her new clause 5.
The sexual harm prevention order will be available for those with convictions for sexual or violent offences. It may be made by a court on conviction, or by the magistrates court on application by the police or the National Crime Agency. A court may impose an order for the purposes of protecting the public in the UK and/or children or vulnerable adults abroad from sexual harm.
The sexual harm prevention order may prohibit the person from doing anything described in it, including preventing travel overseas. Any prohibition must be necessary for protecting the public in the UK from sexual harm or, in relation to foreign travel, protecting children or vulnerable adults from sexual harm. It lasts a minimum of five years and has no maximum duration, with the exception of any foreign travel restrictions which, if applicable, lasts for a maximum of five years but can be renewed.
The second new civil order is the sexual risk order, which will be available for those who have not been convicted of an offence but who none the less pose a risk of sexual harm to the public. It may be made by the magistrates court on application by the police or the new National Crime Agency where an individual has done an act of a sexual nature and poses a risk of harm to the public in the UK or adults or vulnerable children overseas.
When the Minister mentioned the sexual risk orders, he helpfully highlighted the fact that they will apply to people who have not been convicted of any offence. What level of proof and standard of evidence will be needed to show that someone has done something of a sexual nature, and what would be included in that?
There is a specified list, which applies to the existing orders, and they are the obvious acts of a sexual nature. I take my hon. Friend’s point and, like him, I am very keen to see proper safeguards. That is why even the sexual risk order has to be made by a magistrate, so it will have judicial oversight and will not simply be available on the application of the police. That is a significant safeguard, and I hope that he would welcome that.
Any prohibition in the sexual risk order must be necessary for protecting the public in the UK from sexual harm or, in relation to foreign travel, protecting children or vulnerable adults from sexual harm. Such an order will last a minimum of two years and has no maximum duration, with the exception of any foreign travel restriction which, if applicable, lasts for a maximum of five years, but can be renewed.
Before I give way to the hon. Gentleman, I will address the point made by the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey). The two new orders will apply to both over-18s and under-18s.
I thank the Minister for his earlier comments and for his understanding of the need for safeguards. I do not think he addressed the level of proof required in the court—whether it would be beyond reasonable doubt, or the balance of probability. Will he also explain, on the sexual risk order in particular, why the orders cannot be for less than two years? Why does he want to constrain magistrates?
We wish to avoid impracticalities in the system—we do not want to clog up the court system. The orders are serious enough to have that minimum period, and one hopes that it will make them effective and not mean a constant throughput of extra cases in the magistrates court. I will come on to more of the details, which I hope will reassure my hon. Friend.
The new regime will extend to England and Wales, although the protections afforded by the new orders will continue to relate to persons elsewhere in the UK, or beyond where necessary. We have included provision for cross-border enforcement and continue to liaise closely with the devolved Administrations.
I can perhaps answer my hon. Friend’s question directly by addressing what has changed. A number of key changes make the new sexual harm prevention order and the new sexual risk order more robust, more flexible and therefore more effective than previous orders. The new orders may be made to manage broader categories of risk, allowing them to be used in particular to manage risk against adults and vulnerable adults, as well as children. All members of the public deserve to be adequately protected from sexual harm. This change will ensure that dangerous individuals can be managed, regardless of to whom they present a risk.
Furthermore, the condition for the availability of the new sexual risk order is that the defendant has done an act of a sexual nature as a result of which it is necessary to protect the public. The previous “non-conviction” order required that the person concerned must have done at least two acts from a specified list of risky behaviour. The new provisions allow for an order as soon as an individual presents a risk.
As well as local police forces, the National Crime Agency will be able to apply for either of the new orders. This is a reflection of its expertise and access to intelligence on aspects of sexual offending, particularly against children. The NCA will be required to notify the relevant force area, which will continue to be responsible for managing offenders. I hope that that reassures my hon. Friend that the standard of proof will be the criminal standard of proof—the highest standard.
The remit of the new orders will be wider. For example, either will allow foreign travel restrictions to be applied. Our determination to prevent harm to children and vulnerable adults applies outside the United Kingdom as well as within. Individuals subject to the new sexual harm prevention order will be required to inform the police whenever their name or address changes. This will improve the police’s ability to monitor and manage individuals subject to these orders.
Those are the changes. What we are keeping are the aspects of the old orders that have been shown to be effective. In line with the old order, the new sexual harm prevention order will make the offender subject to the notification requirements for registered sex offenders—it will put them on the sex offenders register. For both new orders, in line with the existing position, breach is a criminal offence punishable by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment. Conviction for a breach of a sexual risk order would also make that individual subject to the sex offender notification requirements.
The Minister is being very generous in giving way and I thank him. One of the things he is keeping the same is the list of acts in the Sexual Offences Act, one of which states:
“giving a child anything that relates to sexual activity or contains a reference to such activity”.
There are some cases where that would clearly be inappropriate, but it might include a wide range of literature and textbooks, and that is presumably not the intention. How will the Minister ensure that there is no misinterpretation? We are keen to ensure the safeguards are correct.
As I said, I very much share the hon. Gentleman’s desire for the safeguards to be effective. That is why I laid great stress on the fact that this order will have to be made in court, so that if, as he suggests, a textbook has been given to a child, one imagines that—except in very odd circumstances—no sensible magistrate would regard that as in any way disturbing or warranting this type of activity. In this instance, we can rely on the protections that the courts rightly afford individuals to ensure that sensible decisions are made on these types of orders.
I completely agree. Much of this is about not just the tools available, but the culture in the local agencies, whether they be the council, the Crown Prosecution Service, the police or the NHS and its primary care services.
Finally, I welcome the proposals. This is Parliament at its best. We are amending existing legislation, not creating something completely new. This is about listening to the concerns of Back Benchers and their campaigns, and about getting cross-party support, which I welcome.
I thank hon. Members from all parties, not just for their universal support for the measures, but for the sensitive and sensible tone with which they have conducted the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood) will by now be blushing because of the amount of praise she has received. She should note that it has not been conventional praise—it is not a case of the House being conventionally polite—but that everyone, from all parties, really means it. She and the charities she has rightly mentioned have conducted an exemplary campaign on an issue of great contemporary importance. It is a subject that a few people have cared about hugely for ages, and now the whole country understands the important and urgent need to take effective action, which is precisely what we are seeking to do.
The Minister has said that a few people campaigned on the issue. Does he agree that others failed to follow through on this because they did not understand and recognise what was happening, and that some people perceived that earlier than they did?
Clearly, there were widespread failures in a number of institutions and that is what a large number of people are seeking to rectify now. That brings me on naturally to my next point—this addresses many of the questions that have been rightly asked and the powerful point made by the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert)—which is that, although what we are doing is necessary, it is certainly not sufficient to believe that it will eradicate this terrible crime.
We seek to protect children as a high priority beyond legislation, and it is the need for that much more widespread change of attitude and culture in institutions that informs the work of the National Group on Sexual Violence against Children and Vulnerable People, which I chair and whose membership is indicative of the widespread group of people necessary to act on this terrible crime. It includes not only a number of Departments, such as the Home Office to deal with the criminal elements and the Under-Secretary of State for Education, my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr Timpson) and his representatives, but the health service, local government and the police, which have important roles to play. The group also includes many non-governmental organisations and charities. Such organisations often sit outside governmental structures and shout through their megaphones about how Government should be doing things better. It seems to me that in a matter of such seriousness and urgency, having them sitting at the table from the start saying, “This is how you should do things,” is likely to produce a much faster and more sensitive response to the problems.
On the support that is available in court for vulnerable witnesses, does the Minister agree that it is not acceptable that registered intermediaries are appointed in so few cases? If we are to support vulnerable witnesses, particularly child witnesses, we must make it a matter of course that registered intermediaries are appointed at the earliest possible stage, even before the first police interview.
Appointing registered intermediaries before the first police interview may be difficult in practical terms, but I accept the hon. Lady’s general point that we need better support mechanisms for vulnerable witnesses. Some of those mechanisms will involve institutional change, as I have said, but the provision of intermediaries may also be required.
The fourth priority of the group is online protection and, in particular, attacking the use of vile child abuse images online. There is therefore a lot of work to do beyond this legislation.
I will respond to some of the individual points that have been raised. The right hon. Member for Oxford East (Mr Smith) asked about close reporting on the monitoring and extent of the powers. Various other Members talked about the necessity for guidance. The Government amendments require statutory guidance to be issued. We will work closely with the police, the NCA and others in considering the best way to apply the new orders.
We have had a vigorous debate about the use of the criminal standard of proof. If I may try to reconcile what has been the only scratchy part of this debate, there is a balance to be struck. We could apply the civil standard to the new order, but one consequence would be that a breach of the order would not be a criminal offence punishable by up to five years in prison. I hope that those who are doubtful about the level of proof will accept that what we are proposing strikes the right balance, given the risk of harm to children and vulnerable adults. As my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon explained, it is not the criminal standard of proof that led to the disappointing use of the original three orders in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North asked about legislation on the grooming of children on the internet. The orders that we are discussing may be used to restrict internet use, so they will hopefully have a direct effect on that type of criminal behaviour. However, it is worth repeating that the principle that what is criminal offline is criminal online always applies. There is no separate law that applies to the online world. If something is a crime in the real world, it is a crime in the online world. As I have said, cybercrime is one of the four immediate priorities of the national group.
I was asked about the appeal mechanism. An individual who is the subject of either kind of order will be able to appeal against the making of that order under the proposed new sections of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. In addition, after an order is made, there is the right to apply for it to be varied or discharged. I hope that the appropriate safeguards are in place for people to make appeals.
I welcome the protections that allow defendants to apply for variation and discharge. However, I notice that under the Government amendments, only local chief officers are able to apply for the variation or discharge of an order. I understand that that is intended to maintain the management of the offender at a local level. However, the NCA might come across evidence of different forms of offending and might want to get involved in an application for variation. I hope that the guidance will make it clear how that will work.
That is a valid point. To deal with the practical point, once an order is made, the supervision of it will be in the hands of the local police. It is sensible for them to be on the front line of making any application to vary the order. Obviously, the NCA will make it a habit to work closely with local forces when they are working together in specific areas, as they will be in this case. It should become entirely habitual for the NCA to pass evidence to local forces. I know that the leadership of the NCA is determined to do that. There needs to be better connections between policing at the national and local levels, and we are seeking to address that problem. My hon. Friend should rest assured that she is not the only person who will be watching closely to ensure that that co-operation takes place.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) explained, new clause 7 seeks to extend the offence of possessing a prohibited image of a child in section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. That offence is committed when a person possesses a pornographic non-photographic image of a child that is grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise obscene. My hon. Friend, together with the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), wants to extend that offence to include the written word. I add my thanks to the many that have been given this evening to both Members for their personal efforts in the fight to protect children from abuse. Their motivation for the new clause is entirely laudable, and it is quite right for the House to have the opportunity to discuss it.
Written material that describes the sexual abuse of children is undoubtedly distasteful and disturbing. As my hon. Friend said, he and I have had many discussions and meetings on the matter, and I put it to him that criminalising the possession of the written word in any context is a significant step, and we should pause before taking it. In our view, it is a step that should be taken only once we know the full extent of the problem. In this case, there are two particular requirements. First, there must be evidence that possession of such material is causing harm to children. Secondly, it must be practical for the police—in this case CEOP—to go through all the material on people’s computers. It is much more difficult to do that with the written word than with images. As my hon. Friend said, there is special technology that allows speedy checks of images. We are working on improving that technology, but it is more difficult in the case of the written word. If, after considering those caveats, we conclude that there is a case for changing the law, we will need to ensure that we go about it in the right way so that it has some practical effect and improves child protection.
New clause 7 touches on a number of sensitive issues, and any changes that we bring about need to be both proportionate and effective. I cannot commend it to the House today, but I absolutely assure my hon. Friend and the right hon. Gentleman that we intend to continue considering thoroughly whether the law should be changed in the way that they suggest. As my hon. Friend said, CEOP has already provided some information, and my officials continue to work with it to investigate the issue further and get the full body of evidence that is necessary if we are to take the drastic step suggested. As soon as we reach a conclusion on that, we will decide what action to take. I know that my hon. Friend will continue to play a role in gathering evidence and discussing it with Ministers, but I hope that he will agree not to press new clause 7 to a Division.
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon on her commitment and her drive to ensure that we have the necessary powers to protect children from sexual harm. I now know that she and the House agree that the Government amendments will deliver what new clause 5 was intended to achieve, and more, so I commend them to the House.
I cannot use ignorance of the law as an excuse, but my hon. and learned Friend knows considerably more about these matters than I do. He makes a relevant point, which is that we do not necessarily have to go entirely down that route. The ASBO legislation and this concurrent legislation is designed to look at the whole issue of antisocial behaviour in a constructive and codified way. The problems to which I have referred apply not simply to the City of Westminster, Southwark or inner-London boroughs. Increasingly, it will become apparent in places such as Manchester, Leeds and Birmingham, so we should look at it fairly urgently. Without being overly negative about the potential open-door arrival of a significant number of people from Romania and Bulgaria, there is no doubt that some of the specific problems in central London in recent months have come disproportionately from groups who have already come to this country from those other EU states. We need to ensure that local authorities are given a chance to take action. As such, I feel strongly that the Bill should be amended better to reflect the circumstances that affect inner-city areas, recognise the particular challenges that are faced in the UK’s major cities and specifically enable a court to grant IPNAs with automatic powers of arrest in a wider variety of circumstances.
This matter will have to be dealt with in amendments in another place. To answer directly the question put by the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes), I hope that we will have a further amendment to clause 3 to add an additional subsection applicable only in major city centres or other designated areas, which varies the conditions under which a power of arrest attachment can be made to include wording such as “deliberately organised antisocial behaviour”. That will have to be dealt with in our further deliberations on the Bill.
I take this opportunity, Mr Deputy Speaker, to thank you for allowing me to make a brief contribution. I accept that the Minister is aware of some of the specific concerns for Westminster, but I also very much accept that he may wish to deal with this in writing rather than going into it in great detail this evening.
May I take the opportunity of my first outing in my new capacity to thank Members on both sides of the House for their good wishes and congratulations. I am deeply grateful for the support that has been shown across the House over the last week following my appointment. I look forward to working constructively with Members on both sides of the House as we take this agenda forward.
I am also delighted to see my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton Deane (Mr Browne), in the Chamber. I pay tribute to him for the significant work that he has done as a Home Office Minister. His attention to detail and his commitment have been exemplary, and I look forward to trying to emulate that in my role. I also welcome the hon. Member for Croydon North (Mr Reed) to his new role on behalf of the official Opposition.
I will now deal with the various Government new clauses and amendments. Overwhelmingly, they follow up points raised in Committee, which is a testament to the effectiveness of the scrutiny the Bill underwent upstairs. There are a number of drafting and technical amendments in this large group. So as not to delay the House unduly, I will focus my remarks on the amendments of substance.
The injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance and the criminal behaviour order are important new powers to deal with individuals who commit antisocial behaviour. Courts will be able to use them both to prevent certain behaviour and to require positive actions—for example, addressing a drug or alcohol problem that is an underlying cause of an individual’s antisocial behaviour.
The Committee agreed non-Government amendments tabled by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) to clauses 1 and 21. These would require a court to avoid any conflict with a person’s caring responsibilities when attaching such conditions. This would be in addition to the duties that were already in the Bill, to ensure that conditions are suitable and enforceable and, so far as practicable, to avoid conflicting with a person’s religious beliefs, work, educational commitments or any other court order imposed on them. As my hon. Friend the Member for Taunton Deane said in Committee, we always expected courts to take account of caring responsibilities, which are clearly a relevant factor in ensuring that conditions are suitable and enforceable, and I repeat that for the benefit of the House.
There is a concern that references to caring responsibilities might weaken the new powers in practice. A number of the agencies that would use and enforce injunctions and orders tell us that there is a real danger that specifically including caring responsibilities in the Bill would make it more difficult to secure appropriate conditions, and that is not in the interests of the victims that these injunctions are designed to protect. I can assure my hon. and learned Friend that we do expect these matters to be taken into account by courts considering injunctions as they relate to caring responsibilities.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Southwark and Bermondsey—I think he has gained a north somewhere; Bermondsey North and Southwark—asked why the words on religious belief were qualified with the phrase “as far as practicable”. I am advised that it is similar to the right to manifest one’s religion set out in article 9 of the convention. The right is qualified and can be limited where necessary and proportionate. For example, it is not necessary for someone who professes to be a Christian to attend church every single day. I hope that is helpful and answers his point.
The Committee also agreed an amendment to clause 4, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch), to add head teachers and principals of further education colleges to the list of persons who can apply to a court for an injunction. The intention was to tackle bullying in schools and colleges. I agree that it is vital that powers are in place to address that problem, which blights the lives of too many young people, but we need to get the detail right. She rightly referred to the consultation that has taken place and the responses to it, and I am grateful for her analysis and her decision on how to proceed. However, I want to assure her that we have drafted guidance to explain how the injunction could be used to address bullying, with the help of front-line professionals and the BeatBullying organisation, which has advised us on the matter. I entirely accept her point about online bullying, a matter I was considering only this afternoon in the Home Office. I can assure her that, as far as I am concerned, bullying will not be taken off the agenda.
Amendments 10 to 15 to clause 12 relate to the power to exclude the subject of an injunction from their home. As I have said, the Bill provides for prohibitions to be attached to an injunction. In extreme cases where the antisocial behaviour has involved actual violence or the threat of violence against another person, or where there is a significant risk of harm, someone can be excluded from their home, but only if they live in social housing.
My hon. Friend has said that his amendments deal with an issue that was clearly controversial: the ability to deal with social housing tenants but not others and the need for a level playing field. I hope that he will not forget to deal with amendment 166 from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which would add some additional requirements, and that he might be persuaded that they are useful additions.
My right hon. Friend is as eager as he was when he first arrived in this House many years ago. If he will allow me, I will get to the Committee and the amendments he referred to in his opening remarks in due course.
Another important issue raised in Committee relates to the application of the new powers in relation to antisocial behaviour in or around a respondent’s home, this time in relation to the criminal behaviour order. The first condition that must be met before a criminal behaviour order can be made is that the court is satisfied that the offender has engaged in behaviour that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as the offender. In Committee the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) tabled an amendment to remove that limitation. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice made it clear at the time that the criminal behaviour order is not intended as a tool for tackling domestic violence, as other more suitable powers are available for that, and that remains the case. However, having considered the matter further, we recognise that there might be cases where antisocial behaviour is inflicted by one member of a multi-occupancy household on another and where the flexibility to apply for such an order could be helpful. Amendment 16 therefore removes that limitation.
I turn now to the amendments to clause 93, which relate to the community remedy. That welcome initiative gives victims of low-level crime and antisocial behaviour a say in the punishment of offenders out of court. Police and crime commissioners will work with the public and chief constables to compile a menu of out-of-court sanctions that can be used in appropriate cases following consultation with the victim. At the heart of the community remedy is our commitment to empowering victims and communities to say what is right for them. I do not think that that will include use of the stocks, which was referred to earlier.
We have brought forward amendments 45 to 48, which have three elements. The first two will put on the face of the Bill what had always been our expectation: the actions included in the community remedy document must promote public confidence in the use of out-of-court disposals and include an element that is punitive, restorative or rehabilitative. The third change is a power for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to which police and crime commissioners must have regard when preparing a community remedy document. A draft of that forms part of the document for practitioners, which we published last week.
The other Government amendments in the group are largely technical in nature, and I have placed a detailed letter in the Library. I commend the Government amendments to parts 1 to 6 of the Bill to the House.
I turn now to amendment 96, tabled by the shadow Home Secretary and spoken to today by the hon. Member for Croydon North. I am firmly of the view that antisocial behaviour still ruins too many lives and damages too many communities. There are, of course, problems in our inner cities, but there are also problems in our smaller towns, and that concerns all Members of this House.
Up to March 2013, 2.3 million incidents of antisocial behaviour were reported to the police and we know other incidents were reported to councils and social landlords. The previous Government tried—genuinely, I think—to address the problem, but after more than 10 pieces of legislation introduced before 2010 we have been left with a mishmash of powers that is confusing for the public and for the professionals who have to use them, and that is less and less effective. The antisocial behaviour order may have worked well in individual circumstances, but overall it has not worked well. Such orders are too often seen as a badge of honour and, as has been said, over 50% of them have been breached at least once and just over 40% have been breached more than once. Also, the number of orders issued has been falling year on year. People are losing confidence in ASBOs.
Why are the Government seeking to decriminalise antisocial behaviour when 80% of the public feel it is on the rise? How does that help?
I will come on to the powers we are introducing, but the hon. Gentleman spent a lot of his contribution talking about the injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance, which is one of the tools we are proposing, but we are also proposing a criminal behaviour order, a breach of which is a criminal offence. The CBO is in some ways most akin to the ASBO we are seeking to replace, the injunction being an extra tool.
I know Members on the Opposition Benches are still wedded to ASBOs, despite the evidence, but by any reasonable assessment the statistics show it has been increasingly failing. I want a system that is more effective at tackling antisocial behaviour and has the confidence of the professionals who use it. We know that agencies such as the police, local councils and social landlords are working hard to protect victims and stop antisocial behaviour, but they need the right powers to do this. That is why we are replacing the existing powers with six streamlined, more flexible, quicker and more effective ones to protect the public better.
The Minister talked about trusting the police and local councils and adding more tools to their armoury, so instead of abolishing ASBOs why does he not leave them on the statute book so that police and councils can choose whether it is appropriate to use them or IPNAs, or any of the other tools the Government are providing in this Bill?
First, ASBOs have been increasingly ineffective and have become a badge of honour in some cases; secondly, we want to streamline the powers so they are clear; and, thirdly, we want to use powers that are quick and efficient and that do the job, which is what Members on both sides of the Chamber want: we all want a swift reduction in antisocial behaviour.
As I have said, the main replacements for the ASBO are the injunction under part 1 of the Bill and the criminal behaviour order under part 2. In drawing comparisons with the ASBO, they should be seen together, rather than be taken individually. The injunction is a purely civil remedy. That means it has a lower test than the ASBO on application, coupled with the lower civil standard of proof, so it will be quicker to obtain than the existing order. Front-line professionals will be able to use it as a preventive measure to nip emerging problems in the bud before they escalate into something more serious—which I think is good news for victims— but, crucially, the court could also include “positive requirements” in the order. That is missing from the ASBO arrangements; indeed, that is one of their major flaws. That has meant the focus has been on stopping the behaviour, but not on getting individuals to deal with the underlying drivers of their behaviour. If we are to prevent reoccurrences of bad behaviour, it is very important we address that.
Unlike for the ASBO, breach of the IPNA will not be a criminal offence. This means there is no risk of criminalising under-18s. It will also help to reduce the burden on the police and others in gathering and providing evidence. That does not mean that the injunction has no teeth if it is breached: it does. Adults can be imprisoned for up to two years for breaching the terms of the IPNA, and the court can detain an under-18 if it thinks that, due to the severity or extent of the breach, no other power available to the court is appropriate.
We must not look at the injunction in isolation. It is complemented by the CBO, which will be available to deal with the most serious antisocial behaviour. Breach of a CBO will be a criminal offence with a maximum sentence of five years in prison. That is the same sanction as is available for the breach of an ASBO, but the CBO will be more effective than the ASBO because, like the injunction, it can have positive requirements attached to it to help the offender turn their life around.
These reforms are about putting the victim first and providing streamlined, effective powers for enforcement agencies to do just that. Amendment 96 seeks to retain a discredited regime that has left people across the country suffering from antisocial behaviour. I therefore hope, perhaps optimistically, that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment in due course.
If the hon. Gentleman is going to withdraw it, I will gladly give way.
I am not planning to withdraw it. I wonder whether the Minister is dismissing out of hand the views of the organisations that wrote a letter to The Times saying that this is “Ill-thought-out legislation” that will waste police time and clog up the courts. The signatories to that letter include the Standing Committee on Youth Justice, Barnardo’s, Liberty, the National Council for Voluntary Youth Services, JUSTICE, the Children’s Society, the Howard League for Penal Reform, UK Youth, the Prison Reform Trust, and the Children’s Rights Alliance for England. It is disappointing to hear the Minister dismiss the legitimate concerns raised by those well-respected organisations.
I am certainly not dismissing them, and they have been looked at carefully, but it is important to look at the IPNA and the criminal behaviour order in tandem rather than merely concentrate on one of them.
Does my hon. Friend agree that rather then relying on letters from the great and the good, perhaps the best thing to do is to rely on the British people? He will no doubt remember that in 2012 Angus Reid conducted a survey in which only 80% of people said they thought that ASBOs had been effective in tackling antisocial behaviour. Is not that why we need to change the regime?
That is exactly right. The shadow Minister said that the recent crime survey showed that 80% of people think that antisocial behaviour is increasing. That suggests to me that the current regime is not working and needs to be replaced by something more efficient.
The shadow Minister mentioned a list of people who have concerns about IPNAs. I think they would agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) and I that we could look at those concerns, and I am sure that the Minister will do so. They do not support ASBOs, as he suggests; they would like to get rid of ASBOs and have an improved, more sympathetic IPNA.
I am grateful for that intervention, which puts the matter on the record.
The shadow Minister expressed concern about the costs of dealing with IPNAs and the new regime that we propose to introduce. It is worth quoting the chief constable of Thames Valley police, Sarah Thornton, who said:
“So in terms of improving the effectiveness, yes we are going to have to train officers, but I think that is worthwhile…If there is a bit of additional training cost, it really would be well worth it in terms of additional effectiveness in tackling anti-social behaviour locally.”
In other words, the relatively modest amount spent on training on IPNAs will more than repay itself in terms of the results that accrue. It is also worth pointing out that ASBOs were not without their costs either; it would be foolish to think that they were. A cost was involved in dealing with breaches of ASBOs just as there is with anything else. If I remember correctly, the shadow Minister quoted a cost of £1.5 million for breaches of IPNAs—allegedly; I am not quite sure where that figure comes from—but ASBO breaches cost money as well. If he wants to make a fair comparison, he ought to include that in his assessment.
Let me turn to the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Southwark North and Bermondsey—[Interruption.] I am sorry—Bermondsey North and Southwark. I want to call it Southwark and Bermondsey because that it is what it was for so many years. Anyway, I mean my very old friend who moved the amendments. His amendments and those of the hon. Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis) pick up a number of points raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is of course a very important Committee of this House. I am grateful to the Committee for its detailed scrutiny of the Bill. Taken together, the amendments would introduce additional requirements that professionals and the courts would have to meet in order to use the new powers. While I agree that we must ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place, I believe that those are already built into the Bill and fear that the Committee’s amendments would lose some of the benefits of our reforms in streamlining powers and processes to help victims and empower front-line professionals.
New clause 33 is concerned with the use of injunctions in cases involving children and seeks to place in the Bill a requirement that the interests of the child are treated as a primary consideration when imposing an injunction, any associated conditions or sanctions for a breach. In shaping our reforms, we have, naturally, carefully considered the needs and rights of young people, which are important, so that we get the right balance between enforcement and helping those who commit antisocial behaviour to turn their lives around. I am a little concerned, to be honest, about the use of the word “primary” in new clause 33 with regard to setting that balance.
I wonder whether the Minister could re-read the script that he has just read. He spoke about an individual having
“engaged or threatened to engage in conduct causing nuisance or annoyance”.
The wording in the clause is
“conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance”.
That is the problem. That is where judgment enters into it. That is why amendment 158 was tabled. It would put the emphasis on reasonableness in that judgment.
I understand entirely the point that the hon. Gentleman is making. I make no promises, but I have a lot of time for his analysis of the legislation and will consider the point carefully.
I will turn to the amendments that my right hon. Friend has tabled to clause 12, which sets out the limited circumstances in which an injunction may exclude someone from their own home. I agree that the courts must consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to exclude someone from their home, regardless of whether they live in social housing, rent privately or own their own home. However, I am not persuaded that those principles need to be included in the Bill.
We have made it clear in the guidance that not only do we expect that the exclusion power will be used only rarely, but that the court will pay special attention to whether it is proportionate to use the power, taking into account the individual’s article 8 rights. As such, applications should be made only in exceptional cases that meet the high threshold set out in clause 12—that is, where there is a threat of violence or a significant risk of harm.
Several of my right hon. Friend’s amendments to clause 21, which provides for the criminal behaviour order, are similar to those that he tabled in respect of the injunction and are unnecessary for the same reasons. The draft guidance to the Bill makes it clear that we expect that the courts will follow existing case law from the House of Lords in relation to antisocial behaviour orders and that they will apply the criminal standard to criminal behaviour orders. The amendments to clause 21 are therefore unnecessary.
My right hon. Friend has also tabled an amendment to the new dispersal power to explicitly exempt all peaceful assemblies from its use. I agree that that is an important point, but I would argue that the safeguards that we have built into the legislation will ensure that the dispersal power is used proportionately, while maintaining the flexibility to allow the police to act quickly to protect victims and communities from antisocial behaviour. Where behaviour is lawful and is not causing harassment, alarm or distress, the test for using the dispersal power will not be met. Mere presence in an area is not itself a ground for dispersal, so the power could not be used. The test will be met only if someone’s behaviour is causing or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to members of the public, or crime or disorder in the locality.
The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and I both raised that last matter. I understand my hon. Friend’s argument, but I do not see how it is logical to protect picketing and processions in the Bill, as was done in Committee, but not the general right of free assembly. I do not think that the Bill should say that one can do certain things and not face a dispersal order, but not make it clear that one can do other lawful things without facing a dispersal order.
There was particular concern about processions and picketing. That is why they were singled out for mention in the Bill. I have made it plain this evening that where a behaviour is lawful and is not causing harassment, alarm or distress, the test for the use of the dispersal power will not be met. I hope that that gives my right hon. Friend the reassurance that he seeks.
Amendment 177 would remove the ability of landlords in England to seek to evict tenants when they or members of their household have been convicted of an offence at the scene of a riot anywhere in the United Kingdom. The Government believe that clause 91 sends out the strong and important message that if somebody gets involved in a riot, whether it is near their home or not, there may be consequences for their tenancy. However, Members have asked me to reflect on that matter and I will, of course, listen to the House and reflect on it without prejudice to the outcome of that reflection. We will respond fully to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in due course. For now, however, I hope that my right hon. Friend will not press amendment 177 or new clause 33.
The shadow Minister and the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), who is no longer in his place, spoke about amendment 82, which is a consequential amendment to the Government of Wales Act 2006. Provisions on antisocial behaviour orders are among the exceptions to the legislative competence of the National Assembly for Wales in respect of local government matters. Amendment 82 simply updates that exception to recognise the abolition of the ASBO, thus preserving the status quo with regard to the Assembly’s competence. The UK Government is firmly of the view that amendment 82 is purely consequential upon the abolition of antisocial behaviour orders, so a consent motion is not required. It is also difficult to wait for the outcome of the Silk commission, as a failure to amend the Government of Wales Act now would alter the legislative competence of the National Assembly. Our intention is therefore to preserve the status quo and no more.
Is it not a difficulty, though, that even though the amendment may be intended simply to be consequential and to replace the provision relating to the ASBO, it is drawn so broadly that, as Opposition Members have pointed out, it might also have an effect in other areas in which the Assembly currently has legislative competence?
The advice I am getting from officials is very clear—that this is an appropriate conclusion to reach. However, three Members have now raised that matter, and they have done so in quite strident or convinced terms, so I will write to them with a firm conclusion.
We are raising these issues because the Welsh Assembly Government have raised them. Perhaps, rather than driving something through after the UK Government have legal advice that is clearly different from the Welsh Assembly Government’s, the Minister will commit to speaking to the Welsh Assembly Government before taking further steps.
As I understand it, we have spoken to the Welsh Assembly Government, but I think I have made a generous offer in saying that because Members have raised a constitutional point, although I believe the Government’s position is sound—that is the clear advice I am getting from officials—I will ask officials to set that down for me in writing, and I will write to the three Members who have raised the matter this evening. I think that is quite a good offer, if I may say so.
I hope that I have been helpful in responding to the amendments and new clauses that Members have tabled. I think we have a good Bill, and I commend it to the House.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Minister for dealing with all the new clauses and amendments—those that I moved not on my own behalf but on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights; the Opposition Front Benchers’ amendment; and his own Government amendments.
For the record, first, my constituency is called Bermondsey and Old Southwark. I know that it is the fourth formulation of the name in 30 years, but none the less, we have to keep up. Secondly, the Minister is still a good friend, but for him to call me “my very old friend” was not a way to get off on the right foot. He is not that much younger than me, although I accept that there is a gap between us.
On the substance of the new clause and amendments, I am clear that we are right to say no to antisocial behaviour orders, for reasons that Members of all parties have given evidence of. We are also right, as a Government, to introduce two options—a criminal order and a civil order. I hope that when the Bill becomes law, Ministers will produce something that makes clear the benefit to youngsters of not having a criminal record, because they will not have committed a criminal offence.
In relation to certain of the new clauses and amendments, I believe that the Joint Committee and other colleagues will not want to let the matter rest. I refer particularly—I am guessing, because the Committee will form its view collectively—to new clause 33, amendments 158, 165 and 166, and, most importantly, amendments 176 and 178.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 4—Firearms’ licensing—
‘(1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 28A (Certificates: supplementary) insert—
“28B Assessing public safety
(1) When assessing the threat to public safety under sections 27, 28, 30A, 30B or 30C the Chief Police Officer must ensure that a range of background checks are performed.
(2) Where these checks uncover substantiated evidence of violent conduct, domestic violence, mental illness or drug or alcohol abuse, the presumption is that the Chief Police Officer should refuse the licence application unless exceptional evidence can be brought forward by the applicant as to their suitability to possess a weapon.
(3) When assessing public safety within this section the Chief Police Officer must follow any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.”.
(3) Section 113 of the Firearms Act 1968 (power of Secretary of State to alter fees) is amended as follows.
(4) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Before making an order under this section the Secretary of State must consult with chief police officers to ensure the level of fees collected by the police under sections 32 and 35 are appropriate after considering the costs they incur through the administration and assessment of firearms’ licences made under this Act.”.’.
Government amendments 100 to 105.
The purpose of the amendments is to preserve the position of the authority of Scottish Ministers under section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968. The new firearms offence of possession for sale or transfer of any prohibited weapon is committed where the conduct is undertaken
“without the authority of the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers”.
The existing functions of the Secretary of State under section 5 were transferred to Scottish Ministers by order under section 63 of the Scotland Act 1998 on devolution. Additional functions under section 5 need to be transferred to Scottish Ministers in relation to new offences created by the Bill. Therefore, new clause 20 revokes the entry in the 1999 order in respect of section 5 of the 1968 Act, and transfers afresh all the Secretary of State’s functions under that section to Scottish Ministers. Amendments 100 to 105 are consequential on new clause 20.
I suspect it will help the House if I respond to new clause 4 before the Opposition deal with it, in that peculiar way we sometimes have. The new clause has been tabled by those on the Opposition Front Bench and relates to two firearms licensing issues that we discussed in Committee and during the Westminster Hall debate initiated by the hon. Member for Easington (Grahame M. Morris) in early September. The first part of the new clause seeks to create a presumption that if an applicant for a firearm meets one of the stated criteria, the police should not grant a licence. The stated criteria include evidence of domestic violence, mental illness, and drug or alcohol abuse.
As I said in Committee, the police already have the ability to take those factors into account when assessing the risk to public safety. I understand that there are particular concerns about domestic violence and abuse, and in response to those, on 31 July we published specific guidance on that issue, providing greater detail on how the police should handle such cases. Just last week, we published a new consolidated guide on firearms licensing law. It is therefore fair to say that the Government have taken on board the many important points that were raised in Committee, and we have been quick to act. As the House will agree, decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis, but guidance is clear that evidence of domestic violence will generally indicate that an application should be refused. That new guidance is being applied now by police forces up and down the country, which I hope will be welcomed across the House.
New clause 4 also seeks to introduce a requirement that the police must follow any guidance issued by the Home Secretary when assessing public safety. I consider, however, that guidance must remain just that. It is right that chief officers have discretion to assess applications for firearms in their local area, taking into account the merits of each case and the newly published guide. Chief officers are ultimately responsible for public safety at local level. The Government have sought to make decision making a local responsibility wherever possible. I do not want to undermine that, which is what new clause 4 would do.
We are ensuring that where national action can support local decision making, it does. We are working with the national policing lead for firearms and explosives licensing to ensure that police have a more detailed awareness and understanding of the Home Office guide. The College of Policing will be publishing authorised professional practice on firearms licensing, which will complement and cross-refer to our guidance. In order to assess standards, Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary has carried out a scoping exercise on how firearms licensing is conducted in practice, and we will use the findings from the exercise to drive up the consistency of decision making across the country. Again, that was a legitimate point made in the course of our debates and outside. People wanted greater consistency and, again, we have taken action. As I said, HMIC is now doing that work.
The second part of new clause 4 seeks to introduce a legal requirement for the Secretary of State to consult all chief police officers before revising the licence fees so that they achieve full cost recovery. I reiterate that consultation with the police is integral to the fee-setting process and we accept the need to consider the impact of licensing on police resources. That is why we are introducing a new online licensing system, which cuts the administrative burden of the old paper-based system. We do not need primary legislation to make this happen.
Until we have driven out the inefficiencies in the current paper-based approach to the licensing function, it would not be appropriate to raise the fees fourfold in order to achieve, in one giant step, full cost recovery, which I assume is the purpose of new clause 4. As I have said in other forums, we are considering proposals for an interim fee increase and I will make an announcement on that in due course.
In conclusion, I hope the Opposition Front-Bench team will acknowledge that progress has been made in all the significant areas where criticism of the system could legitimately be made a few months ago. I hope I have persuaded them that further legislation is unnecessary. On the off-chance that I have been unsuccessful in persuading the Opposition Front Bench that new clause 4 is unnecessary, I will have no hesitation in inviting the House to reject it.
I thank the Minister for setting out his amendments. The Opposition think these are entirely sensible and we support them. However, we depart from the Government on what more needs to be done. That is why I shall speak to new clause 4 tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson).
The new clause would do three things. First, it calls for a broader range of better background checks to be included as part of the licensing process. Secondly, it would amend the Firearms Act 1968 to introduce an explicit presumption that anyone with a history of domestic violence, drug or alcohol abuse, or mental illness would be prevented from acquiring a firearms licence unless they could provide exceptional evidence to the contrary. Thirdly, it would introduce full cost recovery to ensure that the cost of a licence reflects the cost to the police of processing it.
Why is this needed? There are 146,426 people in the UK who have firearms certificates, covering 498,048 individual firearms, and 570,726 people who have shotgun certificates, covering 1,333,701 individual shotguns. Given that this involves nearly 2 million weapons, we should be thankful that gun crime is a relatively rare phenomenon in the UK. This is an indication that in most cases the licensing system does work and the overwhelming majority of members of the shooting community are very conscious of their responsibilities and of public safety. The problem is that when a gun crime does occur, its effects tend to be catastrophic.
We all know of the horrendous case of Derrick Bird, who killed 12 people, including himself, with a legally owned firearm. In the past five years there have been 43 female gun deaths in Great Britain and in at least 23 of them a legally owned weapon was used. In the past 12 months, 75% of female gun deaths occurred in domestic incidents. In 2009 that figure was 100%.
I want particularly to mention the case of Michael Atherton, to which the Minister referred. Michael Atherton killed his partner Susan McGoldrick, her sister Alison Turnbull, her niece Tanya Turnbull and himself on new year’s day 2012. He did that with a legally owned shotgun. Michael Atherton had three legally owned shotguns despite a history of domestic violence, alcohol abuse and mental health problems. A note attached to Atherton’s first application for a firearms licence in 2006 said:
“Four domestics, last one 24/4/04, was cautioned for assault. Still resides with partner and son and daughter. Would like to refuse, have we sufficient info to refuse re public safety?”
Durham constabulary decided that it could not refuse; in fact, Michael Atherton was allowed to keep his weapons despite the police being called to domestic incidents on another two occasions, including one in which he threatened to blow his head off with his own guns.
Since that tragedy, Alison Turnbull’s son, Bobby Turnbull, has been campaigning for a change in the law to prevent such tragedies from happening again. I pay tribute to Mr Turnbull for the brave and committed way in which he has gone about his campaign. I know that the Minister has met Bobby Turnbull and that the Minister, along with all members of the Public Bill Committee, received a letter from Mr Turnbull supporting Labour’s new clause.
There were multiple police failings in the case, but, as I have pointed out, it was not a one-off and the Durham coroner, the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the Select Committee on Home Affairs have all proposed tougher rules to prevent people with a history of drug or alcohol abuse, mental illness and violence, especially domestic violence, from acquiring firearms. That is why Labour is proposing new clause 4 to enshrine a clear principle that there should be a presumption that anyone with a history of domestic or sexual violence, drug or alcohol problems, or mental illness should not be allowed a firearm. I do not agree with the Minister that that undermines local decision making; it helps and strengthens it.
Never again should the police, looking at the file of a violent offender, think, “I would like to refuse this application but I am not sure whether I can.” Owning a gun is a privilege and not a right. In Committee, a number of hon. Members were very concerned about using mental health in such a way. We have had a number of debates to discuss mental health and the discrimination that might be faced by people who have had mental health problems. I reiterate that the proposal is to set down a presumption that can be rebutted if there is good evidence—for example, if someone had mental health issues many years ago but has not suffered recently. We are also not saying that people with a history of mental illness cannot take part in shooting. They can, but at registered clubs, not with their own guns to which they would have access at home.
The Government claim that the introduction of the new guidance, which the Minister mentioned, addresses that issue. The Opposition question whether that is enough. We know that the Gun Control Network has said:
“The Home Office says it is issuing new Guidance to the Police on Firearms Licensing but the new draft does not change the ethos. There is no statement anywhere that gun ownership is a privilege and not a right.”
The problem is not just whether the new guidance is sufficient but whether guidance could ever be sufficient. Let me share with the House the case of Mr X, in which the police attempted to block a firearms application only for that attempt to be turned down on appeal.
Mr X’s shotgun licence was seized after he was arrested on suspicion of sexual assault against a 17-year-old woman. The police thought the allegation was plausible, but the young woman did not want to appear in court so the charges were dropped. That was not the first allegation against Mr X. Other women had previously made complaints about him. His GP also reported that he was suffering from acute stress. The deputy chief constable of the relevant police force took the decision to revoke Mr X’s shotgun licence. However, despite the deputy chief constable’s taking a day to appear in front of the court, Mr X had his shotgun licence returned by the court. I appreciate that the Minister will not want to comment on individual cases, but I would like him to confirm to the House that the outcome of that case would not have been altered by the new guidance.
The Opposition have tabled new clause 4 because we believe that the firearms licensing system, particularly for shotguns, needs to be more robust to protect the public, but we also recognise that the system could be better. I pay tribute to the work of the British Association for Shooting and Conservation and the constructive way in which it has engaged in the debate on gun licensing. It has considerable expertise and I am grateful for its assistance. The association is right to point out that the firearms licensing system often fails to serve the shooting community. There are big discrepancies between police forces and sometimes big delays. It is not uncommon for a renewal to take many months. There is a general consensus that the system needs to improve.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right that if the burden can be transferred to another expense and taken from the police force budgets to subsidise this practice, it could only be good for law enforcement in the country. Last year, Devon and Cornwall police estimated that they spent a total of £1.2 million on completing firearms licence applications, but recouped only £514,000 in fees—phenomenally disproportionate.
Unsurprisingly, I am very much of the opinion that we should implement full cost recovery in the UK. In 2012, the police spent almost £20 million on administering firearms licences. I do not believe that the public would deem that to be a good use of declining police resources. I understand that the Government are in the process of implementing a new fees system, to which the Minister just referred. Unfortunately, it represents a missed opportunity because it will not include a full cost recovery proposal, only an increase in the fees.
I shall finish by sharing with the House the remarks of Lord Justice Openshaw who, in April this year, sentenced seven members of the notorious Croxteth Crew gang to a combined total of 113 years in prison. The Crocky Crew and the Strand gang from Norris Green terrorised parts of the border between my constituency and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg). Lord Justice Openshaw’s words paint a picture of how crimes can escalate and how the pattern of crime develops in parallel with continued feelings of social isolation. In all too many cases, criminal activity is a graduated process.
Obviously, only a minority progress to the most serious crimes, but for many it starts as antisocial behaviour and becomes more serious with burglary, violent assault and drug use. Then, before long, it becomes gun crime, punishment shootings and murder. What is more startling is that this pattern is developing quicker than ever before, and the accused are often mere teenagers or predominantly young men in their early 20s when they are caught and prosecuted.
These words should make us all think about how we vote and about the message that this Bill sends to criminals across the country. The judge said of the gang:
“Their days were spent posturing outside…shops dealing drugs. It is as if they belong to some sort of outlaw tribe which has rejected all society’s moral standards and conventions. Their minds are spent towards feuding and prosecuting vendettas against former associates.”
Central to this gang’s dominance was an arsenal of weapons, including several pistols, a double-barrelled shotgun and grenades—in this country! While the fear of crime is much greater than the likelihood of being a victim of crime, firearms are a major problem and we should never be complacent about them. That is why the whole House should support the Government’s reforms and the Opposition amendments. Together, we can redouble our efforts to get guns off our streets.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Steve Rotheram) for his very thoughtful speech. I am also grateful to Opposition Front Benchers for their support for new clause 20.
It is clear from today’s debate that there are three separate issues to be discussed. There is the illegal use of guns that are held illegally, there is the illegal use of guns that are held legally, and there are the costs associated with guns that are entirely legally held and legally used. The first thing that we must do is ensure that those issues do not become confused with each other. Each of them relates to an extremely serious area of public policy, but the response to each of them needs to be different.
I cannot improve on much of what was said by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton about how tough we need to be on the criminal use of illegally held guns. I am grateful to him for his support for clauses 100 and 101 and the amendments to those clauses. They plug loopholes in the existing law, which will hopefully make policing the criminal use of illegally held guns—and illegally distributed guns, to which he rightly referred—less difficult.
As was made clear by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) and by me in my opening remarks, the illegal use of legal guns can lead to terrible tragedies. The Atherton case, which was raised by the hon. Lady, left a huge scar on a family and, indeed, on a whole area, and gave rise to a number of recommendations. In my view, all that divides the two Front Benches on the issue is how effective we consider each other’s proposed methods of dealing with it would be. I shall not weary the House by repeating a speech that I made at the outset of the debate, but we have thought long and hard, and, moreover, have taken significant action since the Committee stage, when we last debated the issue. We published the new firearms guidance at the end of July.
Let me address directly the points that the hon. Lady reasonably made about individual court decisions. As she rightly said, I cannot comment on such decisions, not least in view of the fact that her comments were slightly opaque because, understandably, she could not mention names. I can only reiterate that the new guidance makes it absolutely clear that evidence of domestic violence and abuse will generally indicate that an individual should not be permitted to possess a firearm. It would be difficult to make it clearer that that is the way in which the court should interpret the guidance in the event of an appeal.
One of the other lessons that the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the coroner drew in the Atherton case was that police enforcement needs to be more effective. We can write laws or guidance, but ultimately it is the human beings who execute those laws that make the difference. We are working with the national policing lead for firearms licensing to ensure that police all over the country, in every police force, have a more detailed awareness and understanding of the Home Office guide. As I have said, the College of Policing will publish authorised professional practice on firearms licensing, which will complement and cross-refer to the Home Office guide. In addition, Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary has been conducting a scoping exercise, and will use the evidence from that to decide whether a full firearms licensing inspection should take place.
I hope that, in the course of his deliberations, the Minister will consider some of my constituents who, although they are by no means wealthy, enjoy participating in target practice or clay pigeon shooting. I hope that, as a result of this process, shooting will not become the preserve of the rich.
My hon. Friend has made a good point. I shall deal shortly with the third issue that I identified earlier, namely the costs of legally held guns.
What guarantees or safeguards will be in place for husbands or partners who are firearms holders but who have had malicious allegations made against them? What legal protections will be in place for them when the investigations by the police are completed and the malicious allegations are found to be untrue?
The protections are the new guidelines, the new professional standards issued by the college and any recommendations that Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary comes up with from its inspection. Those things will make the whole system more robust, so that the specially trained individual police officers who will be making those investigations will be better trained than ever before to judge whether, for example, an accusation is malicious or whether it is a genuine accusation and there is evidence of domestic violence or abuse and that therefore the individual should not be permitted to possess a firearm. Clearly, what one can expect and demand in such cases is that the individual officer taking the decision is as well trained as possible and is operating to very clear guidelines. That will be the case, and it is the best protection against malicious accusations. Equally, or perhaps more importantly, it protects those who may have been victims of domestic abuse and who may be victims of something worse if a gun is left in the wrong hands. That is what hon. Members on both sides of the debate are seeking and, as I say, it is an argument about practicality.
The third aspect to this debate relates to the costs. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North asked a number of questions, and the answer to her question about e-commerce and the new system is that 24 forces are already signed up to phase 1, which comes into force either this year or next year, with eight other forces involved in phase 2. Thirty-two forces have therefore already agreed to do this, and I know that the national policing lead on firearms is energetically going around the country to ensure that all other forces eventually sign up.
The hon. Lady made the point, quoting the Treasury document, about full cost recovery. It is true that, in principle, full cost recovery within the Treasury’s policy on managing public money does apply to firearms licensing. Of course, we are in discussion with the Treasury on the subject of firearms fees. As I said, we are working towards full cost recovery as our ultimate objective. However, in this period our commitment is to increase the efficiency of the licensing process, as a first step. That is essential to achieve a balance between increased income and increased efficiency. The trick—this is true in all areas of public spending—is not to regard full cost recovery as a given, because we can always bring the costs down. We have already seen in the early pilots of the use of an electronic system for licensing not only that people get a quicker and better service, but that it is considerably cheaper for the police to operate, and so there is a benefit all round. One hon. Member cited a figure of £200 from the Gun Control Network, and I know that the police have come up with a figure of about £190 for full cost recovery, but the figure will be much lower under an e-commerce system. That is to the benefit of the police and of those applying for licences, be it for working purposes, as is the case in many rural parts of the country, or for recreation, which various hon. Members have mentioned.
Given that such huge cuts are being made to public services these days, does the Minister feel entirely comfortable saying that he thinks it is acceptable for the public purse to subsidise people who want to have a gun and get a gun licence to the tune of £18 million? I understand what he is saying about the future, but the reality today is that lots of police forces are under pressure, so should the full cost recovery not be brought in now, rather than at some future date?
The point that I am making is that it is today; the use of an electronic licensing system is available. Some police forces are piloting this already and this will lead to a much more efficient system. As I say, our ultimate aim is full cost recovery. We are moving towards that, but at the same time making sure that the full cost that is recovered is much less than it was before, not just to save the money but because that will lead to a much better and more efficient system.
Surely, using e-commerce for firearms licensing will still involve police time in investigating in detail the circumstances of an applicant, including a visit to ensure that the premises can hold firearms in a secure and safe fashion, hidden from general view, and certainly from young people and those who are less able. Surely the standard charge of £190 or £200 cannot be reduced that much.
The short answer is that it can. Yes, the police will want to do thorough checks of the premises and so on, but the more that one can reduce the work of processing pieces of paper, which is a lot of what is involved now, with all the attendant inefficiencies and expense for the police, the more the police can do the checks that the hon. Lady and I both want to see happen.
Can the Minister give me some idea of what the police feel the cost would be if they were to use the e-commerce system? I remind the Minister yet again that the cost of a morning’s shooting—clays—to which my hon. Friend the Member for Sherwood (Mr Spencer) referred is not cheap. This is leisure and recreation.
The hon. Lady may be right, but the more people use electronic systems, the more savings there are, so it is quite difficult to put an exact figure on it, particularly with a network system, where the costs will be considerably lower than the figures we have been quoting. I can tell from the hon. Lady’s face that I will not necessarily convince her on this matter, but I hope that I have convinced the House. I urge the House to reject the Opposition’s new clause 4, and I am grateful for the general support for the Government’s new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 20 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
Firearms’ licensing
‘(1) The Firearms Act 1968 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 28A (Certificates: supplementary) insert—
“28B Assessing public safety
(1) When assessing the threat to public safety under sections 27, 28, 30A, 30B or 30C the Chief Police Officer must ensure that a range of background checks are performed.
(2) Where these checks uncover substantiated evidence of violent conduct, domestic violence, mental illness or drug or alcohol abuse, the presumption is that the Chief Police Officer should refuse the licence application unless exceptional evidence can be brought forward by the applicant as to their suitability to possess a weapon.
(3) When assessing public safety within this section the Chief Police Officer must follow any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.”.
(3) Section 113 of the Firearms Act 1968 (power of Secretary of State to alter fees) is amended as follows.
(4) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Before making an order under this section the Secretary of State must consult with chief police officers to ensure the level of fees collected by the police under sections 32 and 35 are appropriate after considering the costs they incur through the administration and assessment of firearms’ licences made under this Act.”.’.—(Diana Johnson.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.