Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateJulian Huppert
Main Page: Julian Huppert (Liberal Democrat - Cambridge)Department Debates - View all Julian Huppert's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf I may, I will first pay tribute to the hon. Lady, who has campaigned on these issues for a long time and deserves much of the credit for raising public awareness. If I may, I will come to the details of the offences shortly.
New clauses 14 and 15, and new schedule 1, will repeal the sexual offences prevention order, foreign travel order and risk of sexual harm order in England and Wales, and replace them with two new orders: the sexual harm prevention order and the sexual risk order. I welcome the engagement of hon. Members on this issue and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon will be pleased to note that we have sought to include her points as far as possible in the Government amendments. Indeed, following consultation with front-line professionals, including the police, the courts, the National Offender Management Service and the National Crime Agency, in a number of respects the Government amendments go further than her new clause 5.
The sexual harm prevention order will be available for those with convictions for sexual or violent offences. It may be made by a court on conviction, or by the magistrates court on application by the police or the National Crime Agency. A court may impose an order for the purposes of protecting the public in the UK and/or children or vulnerable adults abroad from sexual harm.
The sexual harm prevention order may prohibit the person from doing anything described in it, including preventing travel overseas. Any prohibition must be necessary for protecting the public in the UK from sexual harm or, in relation to foreign travel, protecting children or vulnerable adults from sexual harm. It lasts a minimum of five years and has no maximum duration, with the exception of any foreign travel restrictions which, if applicable, lasts for a maximum of five years but can be renewed.
The second new civil order is the sexual risk order, which will be available for those who have not been convicted of an offence but who none the less pose a risk of sexual harm to the public. It may be made by the magistrates court on application by the police or the new National Crime Agency where an individual has done an act of a sexual nature and poses a risk of harm to the public in the UK or adults or vulnerable children overseas.
When the Minister mentioned the sexual risk orders, he helpfully highlighted the fact that they will apply to people who have not been convicted of any offence. What level of proof and standard of evidence will be needed to show that someone has done something of a sexual nature, and what would be included in that?
There is a specified list, which applies to the existing orders, and they are the obvious acts of a sexual nature. I take my hon. Friend’s point and, like him, I am very keen to see proper safeguards. That is why even the sexual risk order has to be made by a magistrate, so it will have judicial oversight and will not simply be available on the application of the police. That is a significant safeguard, and I hope that he would welcome that.
Any prohibition in the sexual risk order must be necessary for protecting the public in the UK from sexual harm or, in relation to foreign travel, protecting children or vulnerable adults from sexual harm. Such an order will last a minimum of two years and has no maximum duration, with the exception of any foreign travel restriction which, if applicable, lasts for a maximum of five years, but can be renewed.
Before I give way to the hon. Gentleman, I will address the point made by the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey). The two new orders will apply to both over-18s and under-18s.
I thank the Minister for his earlier comments and for his understanding of the need for safeguards. I do not think he addressed the level of proof required in the court—whether it would be beyond reasonable doubt, or the balance of probability. Will he also explain, on the sexual risk order in particular, why the orders cannot be for less than two years? Why does he want to constrain magistrates?
We wish to avoid impracticalities in the system—we do not want to clog up the court system. The orders are serious enough to have that minimum period, and one hopes that it will make them effective and not mean a constant throughput of extra cases in the magistrates court. I will come on to more of the details, which I hope will reassure my hon. Friend.
The new regime will extend to England and Wales, although the protections afforded by the new orders will continue to relate to persons elsewhere in the UK, or beyond where necessary. We have included provision for cross-border enforcement and continue to liaise closely with the devolved Administrations.
I can perhaps answer my hon. Friend’s question directly by addressing what has changed. A number of key changes make the new sexual harm prevention order and the new sexual risk order more robust, more flexible and therefore more effective than previous orders. The new orders may be made to manage broader categories of risk, allowing them to be used in particular to manage risk against adults and vulnerable adults, as well as children. All members of the public deserve to be adequately protected from sexual harm. This change will ensure that dangerous individuals can be managed, regardless of to whom they present a risk.
Furthermore, the condition for the availability of the new sexual risk order is that the defendant has done an act of a sexual nature as a result of which it is necessary to protect the public. The previous “non-conviction” order required that the person concerned must have done at least two acts from a specified list of risky behaviour. The new provisions allow for an order as soon as an individual presents a risk.
As well as local police forces, the National Crime Agency will be able to apply for either of the new orders. This is a reflection of its expertise and access to intelligence on aspects of sexual offending, particularly against children. The NCA will be required to notify the relevant force area, which will continue to be responsible for managing offenders. I hope that that reassures my hon. Friend that the standard of proof will be the criminal standard of proof—the highest standard.
The remit of the new orders will be wider. For example, either will allow foreign travel restrictions to be applied. Our determination to prevent harm to children and vulnerable adults applies outside the United Kingdom as well as within. Individuals subject to the new sexual harm prevention order will be required to inform the police whenever their name or address changes. This will improve the police’s ability to monitor and manage individuals subject to these orders.
Those are the changes. What we are keeping are the aspects of the old orders that have been shown to be effective. In line with the old order, the new sexual harm prevention order will make the offender subject to the notification requirements for registered sex offenders—it will put them on the sex offenders register. For both new orders, in line with the existing position, breach is a criminal offence punishable by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment. Conviction for a breach of a sexual risk order would also make that individual subject to the sex offender notification requirements.
The Minister is being very generous in giving way and I thank him. One of the things he is keeping the same is the list of acts in the Sexual Offences Act, one of which states:
“giving a child anything that relates to sexual activity or contains a reference to such activity”.
There are some cases where that would clearly be inappropriate, but it might include a wide range of literature and textbooks, and that is presumably not the intention. How will the Minister ensure that there is no misinterpretation? We are keen to ensure the safeguards are correct.
As I said, I very much share the hon. Gentleman’s desire for the safeguards to be effective. That is why I laid great stress on the fact that this order will have to be made in court, so that if, as he suggests, a textbook has been given to a child, one imagines that—except in very odd circumstances—no sensible magistrate would regard that as in any way disturbing or warranting this type of activity. In this instance, we can rely on the protections that the courts rightly afford individuals to ensure that sensible decisions are made on these types of orders.
I have been following everything that the hon. Lady says. I presume that she is not suggesting that someone should be jailed for five years without requiring a criminal standard of proof. Surely that is not what she is suggesting.
I find it extremely annoying that when Liberal Democrats get to their feet on child protection issues, when we are making sure that our children have the protection that we all want to see, this is the issue that is pursued. I am asking how best we can protect our children. There is genuinely a question to be asked about the standard that is used in the orders. The Government have chosen to introduce some new orders, which I fully support, but it is worth considering whose side we are on. Given some of the abuse cases that we have heard, particularly in the constituency of the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon, we need to think long and hard about where our instincts should lie in ensuring that our children are protected.
I will continue, because I have a feeling that this debate could go on all night with the Liberal Democrats.
I want to ask the Minister and the hon. Lady whether they feel that the threshold might be too high. I accept—the Liberal Democrats will like this bit—that there is a significant cost to the individual on whom an order is placed, reputationally, and particularly if that becomes public. We know that, because of public disgust associated with sex crimes, the effect of a sex offence order being imposed on an individual, whatever it is called, will be devastating to that individual.
It has not helped that the risk of sexual harm orders that were previously in place have been called, I think wrongly, sex offence ASBOs, because the higher standard of proof makes that comparison unhelpful. At the same time, we must accept that there will be many occasions when the police have a well founded, reasonable belief that someone poses a risk to children but are not able to secure a conviction, because, for example, they cannot present in open court the evidence required. In particular, the situation could arise if a vulnerable witness is not in a position to give evidence in court. In such cases, we may want a civil protection order, precisely because we cannot get a conviction at the higher criminal standard. Will the Minister comment on whether the new orders will allow for far more cases to be subject to the orders?
I echo those congratulations. One thing I have discovered in this House is that it is possible for Back Benchers with a really good cause to push it and persuade a Government—whatever Government. The other thing to be said about this evening’s debate, at least until 7 o’clock, is that there is cross-House agreement —and, I hasten to add to the Opposition Front Bench, even the Liberal party is on board—and that has been the case on this area for some considerable time.
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is the legislation being changed tonight. Although the Act came in under a Labour Government, I am sure the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), who was a Minister at about that time, would agree that there was huge cross-party support and thinking behind the scenes. Indeed, I was on the Home Office taskforce that did a lot of the work leading up to the child protection part of that Act.
Tonight, however, I want to focus on my new clause 7, which would amend section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, entitled “Possession of prohibited images of children”. Those prohibited images are pornographic images, and they may take various forms, including photographs, pseudo-photographs, cartoons and computer-generated images. They may be moving or still, too. The link between the possession and the viewing and actual action against children is generally accepted, as the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) said from the Opposition Front Bench.
The ludicrous situation is that an individual will be liable for prosecution for possession of photographs, pseudo-photographs, computer-generated images and so on, but not for the written word describing child sex abuse in pornographic, and often lurid, detail. All, including the written word in this form, are designed by the individuals concerned for sexual stimulation over the sexual abuse of children. If an individual wrote from his or her imagination a graphic description of child sexual abuse—which could, and often is, more emotive and more graphic than any picture of any form—even if he or she described one of those pictures or cartoons, that individual could not be prosecuted for the possession of this graphic material, even though for many of these individuals the written word is more powerful.
Let me give a simple example that I gave in speaking to my ten-minute rule Bill last Wednesday. CEOP provided me with the details of a man from Kent who wrote describing his wish to kidnap an early-teenage girl, strip her, sexually abuse her in an exceptionally unpleasant way and then, in an even more unpleasant way which I will not detail, slowly kill this girl. It is horrific, especially as his writings then inspired this individual to actually carry it out. He is in prison, hopefully for a very long time if not for ever, but the teenager is gone. One would have thought that the early discovery of the writings could have helped, but if the police had found them they would have had no power to act. This new clause has developed out of discussions with members past and present of the Metropolitan police paedophile unit and with the team leading CEOP in this area, and is supported by it, including Peter Davies.
CEOP last year published a research document on paedophile cases. It is mentioned in the report, almost as a sideline, that some offenders possess graphic notes or writings of child abuse. The Home Secretary has written to me on this matter stating she is asking for a report from CEOP on the need for this change. As the Minister will recall, some months ago both CEOP and the head of the Metropolitan police paedophile unit joined me in making a presentation to him. They brought some of the literature; I did not. The officers supported the need for this change. They explained that they had seen volumes of material in their search for illegal child abuse photographs. As the possession of such written material is not illegal, they obviously disregarded it, seeking only, at high speed and using computer technology, child abuse images.
The hon. Gentleman is clearly talking about some horrific material, and I am listening carefully to his case. He is far more expert in this area than I am. How does this link in with the Obscene Publications Act 1959? Does not that provide some protection in this area?
No, it does not. I am looking at changes to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, not to the Obscene Publications Act. Otherwise I would wander into deep mire, which I am sure that Liberal Members would help me wallow in further.
It is a pleasure to speak in this debate. I pay tribute to my colleague on the Home Affairs Committee, the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood), who gave a fantastic example of her grasp of the details of this subject and her attitude to it. I served with her on the Committee during its inquiry into child sexual exploitation in response to localised grooming, when we all shared experiences that will stay with me and, I am sure, with her for the rest of our lives. Some of the things we saw and heard about were absolutely horrific. It is to her great credit that she has responded in a very measured way to try to address this. Her speech was exemplary in that regard.
We all think that abuse of children and of any vulnerable adult is completely and utterly unacceptable. It is a heinous crime. Everybody in this House opposes it and wants to see it ended; that is absolutely clear. It is also clear that a crime of this nature is a crime regardless of where it happens. When people go overseas to abuse children, that cannot be okay just because those children happen not to be British. That much is absolutely, completely and utterly clear.
The hon. Lady outlined very well a number of improvements in what the Government are suggesting. For example, it seems odd that a rule was brought in saying that there must be two offences before a breach of something becomes a serious matter. I struggle to think of any other examples where someone would have to do something twice before there was perceived to be a problem. It is absolutely right to get rid of that.
I was very surprised by several of the comments by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson). There is a danger that we get trapped in the idea that we must do anything to protect children. It becomes a mantra: “Won’t somebody think of the children?” We do need to protect children but in a way that will work and will not cause us problems. It is an important principle that people do not get jailed based on anything less than the criminal standard of proof. I was genuinely horrified by her suggestion that it would be worth considering something else. I accept that this is a deeply emotional area, and we all want to protect children. I hope that on reflection she will reconsider some of her comments about my perspective on that. We all want that protection to happen, but we must also ensure that we do not break some of the principles of the rule of law.
In discussing civil orders I merely raised a question about the appropriate standard of proof. I was not suggesting that we should move to a lower standard but merely questioning whether keeping the higher standard was the best thing to do and asking the Minister and the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood) to reflect on that. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will express that properly when he refers to my views and not try to suggest that I was putting forward any other view.
I thank the hon. Lady for that clarification. My own view is that I would not even want to consider the idea of jailing somebody without going through the criminal process, because that is a fundamental position of our law. She was indeed only questioning it, but I am still surprised that it would even be questioned.
The record will of course show this, but does my hon. Friend agree that his point was to raise a concern that Labour Members might allow someone to be jailed for five years on the basis of balance of probabilities? All we heard back from the shadow Minister was an ad-hominem, or at least ad-party, attack on him, as though only a Liberal Democrat could object to such a thing. That is extraordinary.
I agree factually with the hon. Gentleman, but I do not want to dwell on that, because it detracts from the excellent work that has been done by the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon and so many others.
Questions still need to be answered for us to understand the details and the guidance, as the hon. Lady said. That is critical. I listened carefully to her comments about the idea that not everyone subject to an order could be jailed, but I would hope that that would be the principal aim. I think we would all like people who abuse children or vulnerable adults to go to jail, rather than receive a civil order. The gap between the two should be closed as much as possible.
I am concerned that there will still be strange applications. The case of Simon Walsh was interesting—it was surprising that it was brought in the first place— and he was eventually found not guilty, but I think he might have been caught by new clause 5, so I remain concerned about how we can avoid that happening when people have been found explicitly not guilty. I think we will have a chance to look at that and clarify the details.
Finally, I accept new clause 5 and have no problems with it becoming part of the Bill. I congratulate the hon. Lady on tabling it and the Minister on accepting it. One of my key findings during the Home Affairs Committee inquiry was that, yes, there is room for legislative change, but the vast majority of the problem was caused by organisational failures and by people not trusting or listening to young people—a series of things that will not be fixed by legislation. We must not delude ourselves that passing a law that makes certain behaviour illegal and that implements orders will, in and of itself, make the difference needed.
I am sorry that I was not able to be here for the beginning of the debate; unfortunately, I had Select Committee business. I have no doubt that I would have enjoyed the contributions, particularly the alleged verbal attack on the Liberal Democrats.
I want to discuss two things: first, the great contribution made by the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood), and, secondly, the Government’s proposals on sexual predators and the use of the orders to prevent such behaviour.
I pay tribute to the hon. Lady for her exceptionally good campaign. Members will be aware of what has become known as the Rochdale grooming scandal. The Home Affairs Committee did excellent work on that and other cases of on-street grooming. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) has also done much to raise concerns about such issues. The campaign run by the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon has been second to none, and that is a credit to her. It will play an important part—this should not be underestimated—in helping to protect young people from sexual predators, such as those we have seen not just in Rochdale, Oxford and Rotherham, but in many other towns and cities across the country.
I am pleased with and welcome the Government’s proposals, which consolidate and strengthen the provisions put in place by the previous Labour Government. Had the orders been in place some years ago, I am convinced that, had agencies such as Greater Manchester police used them, they would have stopped a lot of the abuse that occurred in Rochdale. We now know that there was a failure by Rochdale council social services and its exceptionally unhealthy culture at the time.
I wish to speak to the new clause and amendments that I and the hon. Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis) tabled, and I will also say a word about the Government amendments and Labour’s amendment 96.
Our amendments all arise from the deliberations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which has just completed its report on the Bill. I welcome the Minister of State, Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewes (Norman Baker)—if I can have his attention for a second—to his new responsibilities. I hope it will help him and the House if I say that we do not intend to seek to divide the House on the new clause or the amendments, but I hope that he will be able to give me a positive and constructive response. On many occasions we have been on the same side, trying to get positive and constructive responses from previous Conservative and Labour Governments. We have not always succeeded, but I hope that the new form of double act will allow me to ask for some reasonable changes and him to agree, either today or very shortly, to the changes that we seek.
I will put on record the relevant parts of the summary of the Joint Committee’s report, which we published on 9 October. It was the Committee’s fourth report of this Session. It states:
“The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 9 May 2013…It is a substantial Bill containing many provisions with significant human rights implications”.
The new clause relates to one of those implications. All the amendments in this group have human rights implications, which is why Mr Speaker has grouped them
We should like Ministers to pay attention to the issue of antisocial behaviour, which I shall come to expressly; to that of forced marriage; and, probably most politically controversially, to those of powers to stop, question, search and detain at ports, and compensation for miscarriages of justice. We shall come to those matters later in our deliberations.
We are grateful for the way the Bill team facilitated the Committee’s scrutiny of those issues, but we have three qualifications, as set out in our unanimous report. It states:
“First, we doubt whether the mechanisms for ensuring that a systematic analysis of the impact of laws and policies on children’s rights is carried out are yet embedded across Whitehall. We repeat our call for the Government to reassure Parliament that in future it will conduct a thorough assessment of the impact of legislation on the rights of children under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child before the legislation is introduced. We propose to raise with the Children’s Commissioner the question of what can be done, in practical terms, to accelerate the Government’s progress towards implementing its undertaking to Parliament of nearly three years ago.
Second, the number of significant Government amendments to the Bill with potentially significant human rights implications has made our scrutiny—”
any Committee’s scrutiny, but ours in particular—
“of the Bill’s human rights compatibility more difficult”.
We take up that issue with the Leader of the House on a regular basis, because the more amendments are tabled late in the day, the more difficult Committees such as ours find it to report to the House and advise colleagues on how to respond. The summary continues:
“Third, the Government has not always provided us with information it has promised in sufficient time to enable us to scrutinise it adequately. We call on the Government, once again, to ensure in future that we are provided with the information we request in time to inform our scrutiny of Government Bills.”
Let me address the new clause and amendments to the antisocial behaviour proposals collectively, and then I will consider them individually although I do not anticipate detaining the House for too long. Parts 1 to 6 of the Bill reform current measures on antisocial behaviour, and the Committee’s view is that preventive measures against antisocial behaviour are, in principle, a welcome fulfilment of the state’s positive obligation to protect people against having their rights interfered with by others—that is the important context in which we consider all human rights implications of the Bill’s antisocial behaviour provisions.
New clause 33 would add to the Bill the requirement that
“The courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration”
when imposing an injunction. It is a common principle of criminal and welfare law that the best interests of children be taken into account, and we would like that written into the Bill. The new clause simply states that the best interests of the child should be taken into account in four situations, namely when the courts are deciding to impose
“an injunction;
the terms of any prohibition or requirement;
sanctions for breach of an injunction; and
when determining reporting of a child’s case.”.
The Committee considered the human rights compatibility of the new civil injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance—an IPNA. The Bill states that an IPNA may be imposed if the court considers it “just and convenient” to prevent antisocial behaviour—a lower test than the test of necessity required by human rights law. We also considered that the new IPNA definition of antisocial behaviour is too broad and not clear enough. I hope Ministers will consider positively the idea that the Bill should be as clear as possible and compatible with other legislation; we should not start introducing concepts not found in other legislation, which would mean that people would not know how the law would be interpreted.
In the Committee’s view, the Bill’s current provisions on the prohibitions and requirements that can be attached to an injunction are far too broad. Furthermore, we have not been persuaded that it is necessary to state expressly that prohibitions and requirements in an IPNA must “so far as practicable” avoid any conflict with religious beliefs. The Committee is clear—the House has been clear about this on many occasions—that the freedom to hold religious beliefs, or any beliefs that may not be from a religious perspective, is not a relative right but an absolute right that cannot be interfered with. The power to exclude a person from his or her home through the use of an IPNA is a severe measure, and the Committee believes further provision is required to ensure that such a power is used only when necessary.
As the new sanctions can be imposed on children as young as 10, the Committee also scrutinised the provisions and considered their impact on the rights of children. To reduce the potential negative impact of IPNA measures on children, we recommend that the courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in any IPNA legal proceedings. That explains the Committee’s position, and I will now consider quickly other amendments in the group.
My right hon. Friend is making an extremely good point. Has he had a chance to consider the report by the Home Affairs Committee which, during pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, came up with many of the concerns he has highlighted? Perhaps the fact that two different Committees raised the same concerns will mean that our hon. Friend the Minister might reflect more on the issue.
I am aware of the report by the Home Affairs Committee. One good thing is that since I started—my hon. Friend was very young; indeed, he may not have been alive, or just about, I think—Select Committees have become more useful and effective. They play a strong and useful part not just in considering issues, as the Home Affairs Committee has done, but in looking at legislation and reporting to the House. If we set up Select Committees like the Home Affairs Committee, or the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I and the hon. Member for Aberavon have the privilege to serve and which he has the honour to chair, it is nonsensical if our recommendations are not properly considered by the Government.
Amendments 158, 163, 164, 159 to 162, 165 and 166 relate to part 1 of the Bill. They do not require any great supporting speech as I hope they are drafted clearly and make their point. Amendment 158 would amend clause 1 on the power to grant injunctions, and would add to subsection (2) the words “might reasonably be regarded”. If amended, the clause would read:
“The first condition is that the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage in conduct that might reasonably be regarded as capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”.
That seeks to introduce an objective rather than a subjective test, which we believe would be helpful in ensuring the law is clear.
Amendments 163 and 164 go together and would mean that one test a court should apply when considering whether to impose an injunction, in addition to whether it is “just and convenient”, should be whether it is “proportionate”. That is a simple proposition, and as I know from my constituency work—and, I guess, the same is true for colleagues—it is always difficult to judge whether going to court and getting an injunction is the right way to deal with what may be growing, yet still relatively modest, antisocial behaviour. We think proportionality is appropriate and that it is better to write that into the Bill.
Amendments 159 to 162 ask for greater specificity about what the injunction prohibits, and we have tried to tidy up the language a bit—to put it bluntly—and remove some relatively loose wording. Clause 1(4) currently reads:
“An injunction under this section may for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour—
prohibit the respondent from doing anything described in the injunction;
require the respondent to do anything described in the injunction.”
There is a prohibition provision and a requirement provision. We ask the House to consider whether, rather than “do anything” the clause could be a bit more specific—that is a pretty general phrase not normally found in legislation. Amendment 159 would prohibit the respondent from “specified actions”, so the injunction would state, “You cannot throw stones through windows”, rather than, “You cannot do anything,” which may or may not be specified. “You must stop behaving badly” seems a rather unsatisfactory and general instruction, whether it is men behaving badly, or women or anybody else.
My right hon. Friend is making an extremely good series of points. Does he share a concern about positive actions? There may be cases where somebody, through no fault of their own, cannot perform a positive action. There were cases with indeterminate sentences, for example, where prisoners were required to do various courses, which in some cases were not available for them to do. Would that also be checked?
One of the things that I hope we do better now because of Select Committees is take time to get Bills right. We have pre-legislative scrutiny which—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) knows that I was critical of large parts of the Health and Social Care Bill and I have been critical about the process for dealing with the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill, which has just gone through this House. I said here, and I have not changed my view, that the Government should have submitted the Bill for proper pre-legislative scrutiny. Unless it is absolutely impossible, pre-legislative scrutiny should always take place because draftspeople may do a good first job, but they may not think of all the issues that we, representing all parts of the United Kingdom, might spot and be able to use our experience to deal with. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), and I hope the Government will be positive. I am sure these issues crop up in Lewes as much as in Cambridge and in Bermondsey and Southwark.
The religious beliefs issue is the last in this set of amendments. We ask the Minister to consider removing clause 1(5)(a). At present there is a list of four things which the prohibitions and requirements in an injunction must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid: any conflict with the respondent’s caring responsibilities, any interference with the times at which the respondent normally works or attends school or any other educational establishment, and any conflict with the requirements of any other court order or injunction to which the respondent may be subject. The fourth one is
“any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”.
As I indicated earlier, we think that that cannot properly be there because somebody’s right to hold a religious belief is absolute and therefore should not be qualified by the words
“must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid—
(a) any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”.
I am encouraged to think that the Minister in particular will be helpful because he has a good human rights record and I am sure he will want to say, on behalf of the Home Office, that the Home Office is positive about that.
There is one more amendment in the group relating to part 1—amendment 166— which deals with whether people can be excluded from their homes. We are clear that the sanction of excluding somebody from their home should be a sanction of last resort. It is a very serious thing to take away that right. At present there is a power to exclude a person from home in cases of violence or risk of harm. Clause 12 states:
“(1) An injunction under section 1 may have the effect of excluding the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives only if—
(a) that place is owned or managed by a local authority or a housing provider,
(b) the injunction is granted on the application of the local authority or housing provider, and
(c) the court thinks that—
(i) the anti-social behaviour in which the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage consists of or includes the use or threatened use of violence against other persons, or
(ii) there is a significant risk of harm to other persons from the respondent.”
This is a well publicised issue. In my borough, both when my colleagues were running the administration and when it has been under Labour administration, there has been discussion publicly as well as among councillors about whether an injunction should be used to kick people out of their council home or their housing association home, and if so, in what circumstances. In a way, such a provision is slightly discriminatory because it applies only to people who are in publicly funded housing; it does not apply to someone in private rented property. That remains an issue. We want the Minister to be positive about our amendment 166, which would add to subsection (c) one more condition—that the court has to be satisfied that the exclusion is necessary and appropriate. Of course, if someone has engaged or threatens to engage in violence, or has threatened other people in the house, whether it is domestic violence among members of a family or household or otherwise, the logic might be that they should be excluded. I do not resile from that at all, but because it is such a draconian solution the court needs to be clear that it is necessary and appropriate. That is the run of amendments in relation to part 1.
There is a smaller number of amendments relating to part 2, which is about criminal behaviour orders. The Committee recommends that the appropriate standard of proof required to establish anti-social behaviour for the purpose of a criminal behaviour order, which is a new order being introduced by the Government, should be made clear on the face of the Bill. The reason we say that is that it could be assumed that it was a civil standard of proof, as opposed to a criminal standard of proof. We think we ought to make that clear, not just so that the public know, but so that law enforcers and the public authorities know.
The Bill provides that a criminal behaviour order may be imposed if the court considers it “will help in preventing” anti-social behaviour. The Joint Committee on Human Rights does not consider this to be an appropriate or clear legislative test and we recommend that it is amended. As with the previous section, we consider that the broad and open-ended definition of the prohibitions and positive requirements that may be included in a criminal behaviour order do not satisfy the requirement of legal certainty, and we recommend to colleagues and to Government that the Bill be amended to achieve greater certainty.
Amendment 167 inserts after “satisfied” the words
“according to the criminal standard of proof”
in clause 21.
Amendment 168 would replace the words “help in preventing” with the single word “prevent”. Deciding whether something will help in preventing some behaviour gets us into rather esoteric territory and does not provide as clear a standard of proof as we would wish.
Amendment 169 is the same as an amendment we suggested to part 1, and would mean that instead of using the words “doing anything” to describe the actions, “specified actions” would have to be set out.
Amendment 170 is also similar to one of our amendments to part 1, and would ensure that the criminal behaviour orders
“relate to the anti-social behaviour which the respondent has engaged in”.
That would mean that there was a link between the activity and the public response.
Amendment 171 is a further amendment to clause 21 to make it is slightly more specific and, again, uses the phrase “specified actions” rather than “anything”. Amendment 172 makes the same change as amendment 170 a little further on, ensuring that the order relates to the antisocial behaviour in question.
Amendment 173 would leave out line 3 on page 12, which contains the same qualification as earlier about religious beliefs. The amendment would mean that the absolute right to religious beliefs would not be qualified when prohibitions and requirements in a criminal behaviour order were being considered by the authorities. We are trying to ensure that parts 1 and 2 are consistent and we hope that the Government will be positive about that.
Amendments 174 and 175 would add the following sentence, which reflects the principle I set out at the beginning of my speech, to the end of clauses 22 and 29:
“The courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration when determining reporting of a child’s case.”
We are seeking to ensure that the duty of the court is on the face of the Bill.
Amendment 176, the last in the group, applies to clause 34, which can be found on pages 19 and 20 of the Bill. Its last subsection states:
“A constable may not give a direction to a person under section 33 if the person is one of a group of persons who are—
(a) engaged in conduct that is lawful under section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (peaceful picketing), or
(b) taking part in a public procession of the kind mentioned in subsection (1) of section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 in respect of which…written notice has been given…or…written notice is not required”—
that is, a lawful public procession. We think that, after that, a provision should be included so that a police officer cannot give a direction if people are engaging in any other lawful form of public assembly. There are public assemblies that are not marches or picketing but that are perfectly lawful, and we do not think that they should be interfered with under the powers in the Bill. I hope that my civil libertarian colleagues on both sides of the House will fully support that.
That is part 3 dealt with, which leaves only part 5. It deals with the recovery of possession on riot-related antisocial behaviour grounds. The Committee’s view is simply put:
“While we recognise the seriousness of riot-related offences, we are not persuaded by the Government’s justification for the new discretionary ground of possession for riot-related anti-social behaviour. We are concerned about its potential serious implications for family members, and consider that it may disproportionately affect women and children. We also consider that it amounts to a punishment rather than a genuine means of preventing harm to others. We therefore recommend that this provision is removed from the Bill.”
Let me pause and say that I am conscious that that area is controversial. The controversy arose in my constituency a year and a bit ago, in the summer, when we had “riots” on the streets of Southwark and—not to a huge degree, but to some degree—on the Walworth road and in Peckham. Other cities in Britain as well as other parts of London were affected by riots. The question is how we deal with those who are caught rioting. The issue that was the subject of widespread discussion was whether it is right to take away a home when one of the people living there has been involved in rioting. Is it right that a 15 or 17-year-old youngster living in a council property in Lewes, Cambridge, Southwark, Kingston-upon-Hull or anywhere else, should have their home taken away?
The hon. Gentleman argues the case for ASBOs passionately, but I am not sure hon. Members agree that they were as effective as he suggests. Has he seen opinion polls such as the one done by Angus Reid last year? Its survey found that only 8% believe that ASBOs have been successful in curbing antisocial behaviour in the UK.
I am hoping that the relationship the right hon. Gentleman has with the Minister is so influential that accommodation can be reached on this matter. If there is not accommodation, I think the amendment will come back at a later stage, because the measure will be seen to be unacceptable. If it did go through, I think it would cause future Governments—here and elsewhere in Europe—immense difficulties as these matters are contested, because the right to free speech is being undermined, as well as the articles of human rights legislation that allow people to enjoy the freedom of being in their own home.
On that basis, I support the amendments and hope we will get a positive response to them from the Minister.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell). I agree with much of what he said, particularly about the consequences of the riots, which I shall come back to. Let me start by welcoming the Minister of State, Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewes (Norman Baker) to his new post and by congratulating him on his promotion to Minister of State. His injection of liberalism into this Department will be hugely welcome after decades in which Conservative and Labour Governments have clamped down on civil liberties and taken illiberal approaches wherever possible, playing to populism’s worst flaws. I greatly look forward to him playing his role as Minister of State in this Department.
I disagree with what the hon. Member for Croydon North (Mr Reed) said about the effectiveness of ASBOs. I do not think they were effective at all, but I do think substantial improvements can be made to the Bill. I hope this new Minister will take the opportunity to reflect on our comments and come up with something that takes them all into account.
Whether or not ASBOs were effective originally, does my hon. Friend agree that, over time, they have become increasingly less effective? The breach rates are now so significant—up to 90% for most orders—that they have become utterly meaningless.
I agree; my hon. Friend is right that ASBOs simply do not work, so the idea of continuing them does not make much sense.
Before the 1997 election, my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) and I campaigned for ASBOs. We did so because when we knocked on doors in certain estates, we often found that elderly people were being terrorised by gangs. In that part of Coventry, those people used steel doors to protect themselves. That is why we need to be careful when we say that ASBOs work or do not work. It depends greatly on the local authority and the police to make ASBOs work. I do not quite buy what the hon. Gentleman said; he had better put something in place that is stronger than ASBOs. Anybody who deals with inner-city problems in Coventry, London and other places knows that people can be terrorised on estates. That is why we need to be very careful about what we do to ASBOs.
I absolutely accept that there are problems of antisocial behaviour, including in many areas of my constituency. I am sure that all hon. Members’ constituencies are affected by it. The fact that there is an antisocial behaviour problem, however, and the fact that the words “antisocial behaviour” appear in the name of the order does not mean that the one is a solution to the other. I simply do not accept that they have been a very effective mechanism. Much better approaches have been taken by a number of innovative councils. Islington, for example, has tried antisocial behaviour contracts, which have been far more successful and there has been a range of successes elsewhere.
Simplifying the toolkit available is another issue. I welcome the idea of going down from 19 powers to six, which will make it much it much easier for people to find out what the options are. That is another reason why I reject the idea of keeping ASBOs together with IPNAs—injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance—which seems to me to be the worst of both worlds. The Bill must be aimed at trying to prevent harm and I hope that we will be able to solve that problem, helping people to get their lives back on track by dealing with the problems, rather than basing things on mediaeval punishment and state-aided revenge.
There are some concerns about the changes to IPNAs. ASBOs dealt with behaviour in
“a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress”,
while IPNAs talk about
“conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”.
I certainly hope that my hon. Friend the Minister causes nuisance or annoyance to the Secretary of State; I expect that to be part of a working relationship and I am rather nervous about Secretaries of State being allowed to apply for IPNAs on this basis, if only for health-related issues. There is concern about what is meant by
“conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”.
I suspect we all carry that out on a regular basis or could find people whose conduct could be described in that way. That worries me, as it could be used more broadly. We heard from the Association of Chief Police Officers that IPNAs could stigmatise and criminalise young people unnecessarily, and they also tend to blur the distinction between criminal activity and nuisance.
The report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights—I commend my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) for his excellent speech, clarifying detailed and important amendments—says that
“the new…definition of anti-social behaviour is broad and unclear”.
I agree completely; the definition must become rather more defined.
When the Home Affairs Committee carried out pre-legislative scrutiny, we argued that there should be a test of intent or recklessness and that any action taken should be “necessary”. Something in that space is absolutely essential: whether it be through the wording used or by the introduction of a mens rea to try to offset the lower threshold to avoid hitting people with mental health issues, we need something to tighten up the definition of IPNAs without being overly broad.
My right hon. Friend was absolutely right about positive requirements. These are, in principle, very good and very helpful, but the concern was, as we heard in the Select Committee, that the councils would struggle to deliver those positive requirements in some cases. We know that the court
“must receive evidence of suitability and enforceability before a requirement is imposed”,
but not that the positive option will be available to someone. We must check that the positive requirements are doable, which I hope can be confirmed.
We have to deal with the issue of children because a huge number of these IPNAs will be issued to children. They have to be heavily involved in the resolution programme while being viewed as victims. I agree with new clause 33, sponsored by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, as the courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in any of these legal proceedings. I hope that the Minister will focus particularly on that.
Sometimes, of course, the best interest of the child is to have discipline from outside the family. It is not a one-way street that says that the best interest of the child is always a soft option; it may sometimes be a tougher option when the family is not up to the job.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right, highlighting why it is important to have this provision.
Since I first saw the Bill in its pre-legislative form in the Home Affairs Committee, I have been extremely concerned about clause 17. This disapplies section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 for both IPNAs and CBOs. It disallows the rules that say that children should not be named and shamed publicly. We should all be extremely alarmed about that because children make errors. They may do something very silly when they are 14. Particularly in today’s age when data is freely available, what they have done could stay with them for the rest of their lives, and there is very little that anybody could do to stop that. That makes it hard for them to rehabilitate, to grow up and to become someone who regrets what they did when they were 14, as so many people will do.
I have heard the Government comment that the intention is to apply this only in rare circumstances, so that judges would not automatically name and shame young people, but do so only where it was an essential part of the order. The guidance must be absolutely crystal clear on this—on minimising the naming and shaming. This should be disapplied only where it is necessary to do so rather than applying it willy-nilly. Otherwise we will breach the UN convention on the rights of the child and a lot of other provisions.
On dispersal powers, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark said that in response to the Select Committee report the Government have protected peaceful picketing and public processions, but I think it would be good to go even further to ensure that we do not prevent peaceful protest when we deal with antisocial behaviour. I agree with the amendment on that.
Lastly, I agree with the comments made by my right hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington about clause 91, which deals with riot-related offences. These have arisen from the time of the riots and the Prime Minister’s reaction to them. Now, however, we have calmed down and recovered from those awful events, so it is time to reflect on whether we need this special sanction. As right hon. and hon. Members have said, these provisions deal with a situation for which solutions are already available, so we do need to deal with the problem in the way proposed. The JCHR’s report says that it recognises
“the seriousness of riot-related offences”,
but questions whether we need a special rule for riot-related antisocial behaviour, because it looks like
“a punishment rather than a genuine means of preventing harm”.
I therefore hope that the Government will reflect on whether the clause is still needed.
Overall, the Bill has been improved, but I hope it can be improved even further. I am very excited at the role that my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to play. I look forward to hearing his response to the amendments, which I hope, in the fullness of time, he will be able to recommend.
I agree with what the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) and the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) said about amendment 158, and indeed about other amendments. Objectivity is vital. In the absence of objectivity, the police officer will be judge and jury, deciding everything on the spot, and—with the best will in the world—in a difficult, fraught situation on a busy Saturday night, things could go badly wrong. If we do not bring some objectivity to bear, we shall be on a very dangerous and slippery slope. I hope that the Government will consider this reasonable amendment.
That is exactly right. The shadow Minister said that the recent crime survey showed that 80% of people think that antisocial behaviour is increasing. That suggests to me that the current regime is not working and needs to be replaced by something more efficient.
The shadow Minister mentioned a list of people who have concerns about IPNAs. I think they would agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) and I that we could look at those concerns, and I am sure that the Minister will do so. They do not support ASBOs, as he suggests; they would like to get rid of ASBOs and have an improved, more sympathetic IPNA.
I am grateful for that intervention, which puts the matter on the record.
The shadow Minister expressed concern about the costs of dealing with IPNAs and the new regime that we propose to introduce. It is worth quoting the chief constable of Thames Valley police, Sarah Thornton, who said:
“So in terms of improving the effectiveness, yes we are going to have to train officers, but I think that is worthwhile…If there is a bit of additional training cost, it really would be well worth it in terms of additional effectiveness in tackling anti-social behaviour locally.”
In other words, the relatively modest amount spent on training on IPNAs will more than repay itself in terms of the results that accrue. It is also worth pointing out that ASBOs were not without their costs either; it would be foolish to think that they were. A cost was involved in dealing with breaches of ASBOs just as there is with anything else. If I remember correctly, the shadow Minister quoted a cost of £1.5 million for breaches of IPNAs—allegedly; I am not quite sure where that figure comes from—but ASBO breaches cost money as well. If he wants to make a fair comparison, he ought to include that in his assessment.
Let me turn to the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Southwark North and Bermondsey—[Interruption.] I am sorry—Bermondsey North and Southwark. I want to call it Southwark and Bermondsey because that it is what it was for so many years. Anyway, I mean my very old friend who moved the amendments. His amendments and those of the hon. Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis) pick up a number of points raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is of course a very important Committee of this House. I am grateful to the Committee for its detailed scrutiny of the Bill. Taken together, the amendments would introduce additional requirements that professionals and the courts would have to meet in order to use the new powers. While I agree that we must ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place, I believe that those are already built into the Bill and fear that the Committee’s amendments would lose some of the benefits of our reforms in streamlining powers and processes to help victims and empower front-line professionals.
New clause 33 is concerned with the use of injunctions in cases involving children and seeks to place in the Bill a requirement that the interests of the child are treated as a primary consideration when imposing an injunction, any associated conditions or sanctions for a breach. In shaping our reforms, we have, naturally, carefully considered the needs and rights of young people, which are important, so that we get the right balance between enforcement and helping those who commit antisocial behaviour to turn their lives around. I am a little concerned, to be honest, about the use of the word “primary” in new clause 33 with regard to setting that balance.