Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateKate Green
Main Page: Kate Green (Labour - Stretford and Urmston)Department Debates - View all Kate Green's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New schedule 1—‘Consequential amendments—Marriage according to usages of approved organisations—
The following amendments are made to the Marriage Act 1949—
(1) In section 26 (marriages which may be solemnized on authority of superintendent registrar’s certificate) in subsection (1) after paragraph (c) there is inserted—
(ca) a marriage conducted under the auspices of an approved organisation;”.
(2) In section 35 (marriages in registration district in which neither party resides) after “the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation”.
(3) In section 43 (appointment of authorised persons) in subsection (3) after “the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation authorised by the Registrar General under section 47A”.
(4) In section 50 (person to whom certificate to be delivered), in subsection (1) after paragraph (d) there is inserted—
(da) if the marriage is to be solemnized according to the usages of an approved organisation, a registering officer of that organisation”.
(5) After section 52, the following section is inserted—
“52A Interpretation
In this Part of this Act “approved organisation” has the meaning given to it in section 67.”.
(6) In section 53 (persons by whom marriages are to be registered), after paragraph (b) there is inserted—
(ba) in the case of a marriage solemnized according to the usages of an approved organisation, a registered officer of that organisation;”.
(7) In section 54 (provision of marriage register books by Registrar General), in subsection (1) after the words “the Society of Friends,” there is inserted “registering officer of an approved organisation”.
(8) In section 55 (manner of registration of marriages)—
(a) in subsection (1) after the words “the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation”; and
(b) in subsection (1)(b) after the words “the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation” and after the words “the said Society” there is inserted “or organisation”.
(9) In section 57 (quarterly returns to be made to superintendent registrar), in subsection (1) after the words “the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation”.
(10) In section 59 (custody of register books) after the words “the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation”.
(11) In section 60 (filled register books) in subsection (1), paragraph (b), after the words “registering officer of the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation”; after the words “members of the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of the said organisation”, and after the words “the said Society” there is inserted “or organisation”.
(12) In section 63 (searches in register books) after the words “the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation”.
(13) In section 67 (interpretation of Part IV), there are inserted in the list of definitions the following—
““approved organisation” means an organisation approved by the Registrar General under section 47A of this Act;” and
““registering officer of an approved organisation” means a person whom the principal officer of the said organisation certifies in writing under his or her hand to the Registrar General to be a registering officer in England or Wales of that organisation;”;
and in the definition of “superintendent registrar” after paragraph (b) there is inserted—
(ba) in the case of a marriage registered by a registering officer of an approved organisation, the superintendent registrar of the registration district which is assigned by the Registrar General to that registering officer;”.
(14) In section 75 (offences relating to solemnization of marriages) in subsection (1), paragraph (a), after the words “the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation”; and in subsection (2), paragraph (a), after the words “the Society of Friends” there is inserted “or of an approved organisation.”.’.
Amendment 19, in clause 2, page 3, line 28, at end insert—
(iA) section 47A (marriage according to the usages of approved organisations).’.
Amendment 20, in clause 5, page 6, line 29, after ‘solemnized’, insert
‘and includes an organisation approved under section 47A(1).’.
Amendment 21, schedule 7, page 49, line 16, after ‘celebrated’, insert
‘and includes an organisation approved under section 47A(1).’.
New clause 14—Civil union—
‘(1) Two people, whether they are of different or the same sex, may enter into a civil union if—
(a) they are both aged 18 or over;
(b) they are not within prohibited degrees of relationship;
(c) they are not currently in a civil union with someone else.
(2) A civil union must be solemnized by a Registrar.
(3) No religious service is to be used while the civil union registrar is officiating at the signing of a civil union document.
(4) A civil union ends only on death, dissolution or annulment.
(5) The Marriage Act 1949 is repealed.’.
New clause 18—Marriage solemnized other than at a religious ceremony to be termed Civil Marriage—
‘(1) Any marriage solemnized (whether before or after the passing of this Act) under Part 3 of the Marriage Act 1949 (Marriage under Superintendent Registrar’s Certificate), the Marriage (Registrar General’s Licence) Act 1970 or an Order in Council made under Part 1 or 3 of Schedule 6 (other than a marriage according to religious rites and usages) shall be termed a Civil Marriage.
(2) The Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor may, by order, make such provision (including provision amending UK legislation) as the Secretary of Sate or Lord Chancellor considers appropriate in consequence of this section.’.
Amendment 58, in clause 9, page 9, line 5, at end insert
‘and such a marriage shall be a civil marriage’.
Amendment 59, in clause 15, page 12, line 15, at end insert—
‘(ba) an order under section (Marriage solemnized other than at a religious ceremony to be termed Civil Marriage).
I am moving new clause 15 to introduce humanist marriage, along with new schedule 1 and amendments 19, 20 and 21 that are consequential to new clause 15. May I start by paying tribute—
Order. I will not say that I was heckled by the Clerk of the House from a sedentary position, as he was rather helpfully advising me from his usual position on a point on which we need to be clear. I am sorry if the hon. Lady thinks this is a pedantic point, but it is quite important procedurally. The hon. Lady can speak to the other amendments in the group, but the only item she is moving at this stage is new clause 15. We anoraks like to get these things right.
Thank you for that exceptionally helpful advice, Mr Speaker. I am, of course, moving new clause 15 and speaking to new schedule 1 and amendments 19, 20 and 21.
I should like to pay tribute to the British Humanist Association for its support with drafting and its general and wider advice. This proposal seeks to put right a long-standing injustice in a simple and uncontroversial way.
I would like to make a little more progress and then take some interventions. Let us start by establishing the ground on which I shall make my case and I will accept interventions later.
Whereas Christians and most other believers have a choice when they marry of a civil ceremony in front of a registrar, or a religious ceremony that reflects their beliefs, non-religious people have no choice: it is the local registrar at a register office or in a so-called approved place or nothing.
The Government have objections to my proposals. It is important to say this afternoon that we are absolutely crystal clear about what those objections are. If there are problems with the way in which the new clause seeks to achieve its objective, we stand ready to work with the Government to address those concerns. There is a very strong wish for humanist weddings to be recognised and for any perceived problems to be overcome.
It has been suggested that the proposals before us are in some way a wholesale departure from what has been described as fundamental English marriage law. I question whether any such fundamental law in fact exists. Our marriage laws are an accretion of changes and legislative and social developments over many centuries, but I accept that the broad framework in which our English marriage system operates goes back in many regards to the 18th century when Lord Hardwicke introduced his Marriage Act 1753, which required all marriages to be conducted in parish churches and after due notice had been given.
The hon. Lady is right to highlight the general importance of the premises in English law in relation to most faiths, but I think she should bear in mind that in the Church of England the clergy are registered, that registrars are registered in our civil system and that, as I have said, Jews and Quakers already operate in a different legislative framework from that governing religions as a whole.
I know my place.
When I first received communications from humanists supporting this approach, I looked up “humanist weddings”, and discovered from the humanism.org.uk website that there are wedding celebrants who can take services now. It is recommended that people obtain a civil marriage certificate at the register office and then hold the ceremony wherever they want, perhaps in the open air: they are not limited by buildings in any way. I understand that that applies to a number of religions, as well as to humanists. I am therefore wondering whether we need to have this debate.
What the hon. Gentleman says about other religions may be correct, but it is not the case that all religions are required to go through a dual process. Jews and Quakers are not. My contention is that we should recognise the strong popular support for humanism, just as we recognise popular support for other forms of marriage. Many organisations can perform legal marriages in their own right, and do so for smaller numbers than the humanists would and, indeed, than the humanists do now. While I would not for one minute suggest that our marriage laws should be based on some sort of numbers game—although I believe that some Members sought to suggest as much in Committee, an approach that I found somewhat offensive and regrettable—my contention is supported, in this context, by the fact that not only is practice in relation to humanist marriages already fairly widespread, but the numbers are increasing. The popularity is growing.
I hope the hon. Lady will accept that I make my comments in a completely neutral way and that I appreciate what she is trying to achieve, but I have absolutely no doubt that the new clause, if passed, would render the Bill incompatible with the provisions of the European convention on human rights, because it identifies a group that is not a religious group and gives it a special status. The first thing that would happen is that all sorts of other secular groups would claim non-discrimination rights under article 14. I realise that that may be capable of being cured, but I can only say to the hon. Lady that the new clause would make it impossible for the Minister to sign a certificate under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998, enabling the Bill to proceed to the other place.
First, although of course I respect the Attorney-General’s expert advice, I must point out that the narrow drafting of the new clause follows advice from the Government’s own officials. We had been given to understand that it would be possible to prescribe, very tightly, a mode of marriage for humanists, legally recognised, and we are surprised that human rights objections are being raised now.
I will give way in a moment, but I have not quite finished dealing with the points raised by the Attorney-General.
Secondly, although I am encouraged to learn that the Attorney-General believes that there is potential for some of the objections to be “cured”—
I must say, with respect to Government Members, that I need to respond to the first point before I can respond to points two, three and four.
I understand that the possibility of challenge on the grounds suggested by the Attorney-General exists, broadly, in England and in Scotland, where humanist marriages are already being conducted. While I accept that there is one significant difference between humanist marriage and the religious forms of marriage that are recognised in English law—namely, that they are not religious forms of marriage—they are none the less a belief form of marriage.
I venture to suggest that if we could have the benefit of a fully worked and argued opinion from the Attorney-General, I might be able to take on board his complaint, but, having engaged in a series of discussions with Government officials to reach this point, I am very disappointed to find that we are now being presented with what appears to be one potentially significant legal objection that has not been properly raised with us until now.
I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, who, I believe, first proposed this measure as an amendment in Committee.
Mine will be a triangular intervention, inviting the Attorney-General to intervene on the hon. Lady again. Given that humanist weddings have taken place in Scotland since 2005, and given that the United Kingdom, rather than England and Wales, is the signatory to the European convention on human rights, why has the Registrar General for Scotland not been subject to a legal challenge under the convention? Perhaps the Attorney-General can explain. [Interruption.]
My hon. Friend—if I may call him that in this context—has raised an excellent point. I hear mutterings from Government Members, who are suggesting that the answer to his question is that in Scotland it is the person who is registered. Let me say, with the greatest respect, that I do not see how that can possibly deal with the human rights point.
I do my best to provide advice on the law of England and Wales—Scottish law is unquestionably different historically—but, according to my limited understanding of the position, in Scotland it is not just humanists who may be registered for this purpose; pagans and all sorts of other groups may also qualify. I simply make the point that in the context of the Bill as drafted and as proposed today—I realise that the hon. Lady may be upset about this, but I have no role in it—the new clause undoubtedly introduces a serious human rights problem, which I think is obvious because of its discriminatory nature. That is really all that I can say on the matter.
I make no great claims for my understanding of Scots law, despite having a rather elderly and unused degree in it, but—
I really cannot take an intervention before I have dealt with the preceding one. I will give way to the Minister in just a moment.
Although I understand the premise of the Attorney-General’s concern, I think that there are arguments to be advanced on the other side. The Equality Act 2010 provides for the recognition of “religion or belief”, and we strongly contend that our approach falls within the same legal territory. We are also mindful of the fact that in Scotland, where such challenges have also been possible—I recognise that Scotland has a different legal system, but in this context I do not think that that is an issue—registrars have been able to prevent organisations with no apparent legitimacy or justification from being registered to undertake weddings. I should be grateful if it could be explained to me why, given the tight drafting of the new clause, that could not be the case here.
I would not normally intervene on the hon. Lady, but she said that Government officials had advised her in a certain way, and I wanted to make clear that they did not advise the narrowing of the new clause. They drew attention to the problems with the earlier amendment, which—I say this for the benefit of Members who may not have had an opportunity to read the report of the Committee’s proceedings—covered both religious and non-religious organisations, and created real and unnecessary uncertainty about who would actually be covered. I think that the hon. Lady is aware of the genuine problems raised by amendments tabled in Committee. They confused the distinction in marriage law between religious and civil ceremonies, and it was therefore unclear how the religious protections in the Bill would work within such a system.
I do not accept that. I do not wish for one second to impugn the messages received from officials. It is quite possible that there was some gulf in understanding between those who delivered the message and those who heard it. I was not present at the conversations myself, and the Secretary of State is, of course, right to put forward her description of what took place, but my understanding is that the way that they concluded led the British Humanist Association, which is advising me, to understand that a more tightly worded proposal, such as the one that I have put before the House this afternoon, would meet the concerns. Although that may not have been the intention intended to be conveyed, it was certainly the intention that it came away with.
The hon. Lady is making an extremely strong and compelling case, and I look forward to expressing my support for it in more detail later. I have here a letter from the Culture Secretary and Minister for Women and Equalities, saying:
“I note the changes that have been made to narrow the scope of the amendments to cover the humanist organisations only, as we discussed.”
Does the hon. Lady agree that that strongly suggests the Government supported this change?
I was at a wedding on Sunday. I only attended the evening part, but during the day there was a humanist ceremony, and everyone said it was a wonderful occasion. It was held in the Royal Botanic Gardens in Edinburgh. Does my hon. Friend agree that humanists in Scotland cannot understand why their fellow humanists in England might not enjoy the same rights as they do and feel very disappointed about that?
I, too, have attended humanist weddings in Scotland, including that of my niece last October, which was an incredibly special occasion. I can fully understand what my hon. Friend says about the concern and hurt humanists across the UK will feel that these ceremonies that have worked so successfully in Scotland since 2005 have not been replicated here in England.
The hon. Lady is making a powerful case. There are now 2,500 humanist weddings a year in Scotland. It is now the third most popular form of marriage that we have in Scotland, yet the Attorney-General has suggested that these weddings are somehow illegal under European law. However, the UK is the signatory to European human rights treaties, so what he says is a lot of nonsense. Will the hon. Lady confirm that the UK is the signatory to the European human rights treaties and that, if these weddings are illegal in England, they must also be illegal in Scotland?
Obviously, I do not answer for the Government, and I will not respond to any specific interventions on that point. The hon. Gentleman may wish to make a speech later.
I will take one more intervention, and then I am going to develop the compelling case for why we want humanist weddings in this country, not why there are apparently so many legal objections to be overcome.
The last thing that I want to do is interrupt the hon. Lady’s flow, but I want to reply very briefly to what was just said. I am not suggesting in any way that what is happening in Scotland is unlawful. Instead, I am highlighting that there is a serious defect in the amendment. Given the discriminatory nature of the favour it gives to humanists as opposed to other secular organisations, it would have the consequence of making the measure incompatible with the convention rights. I think that that is obvious when we examine the amendment.
It may be challengeable under the convention, but I do not think we know at all whether such a challenge would be successful.
Let me develop some aspects of the case for humanist weddings. So far this has been a rather unpleasant and legalistic debate, and in the same spirit as our debates on same-sex marriage, I want to make the case that the House should feel joyful about humanist weddings and celebrate them.
For those who are concerned about protections, the new clause provides that the Registrar General could issue a certificate to any organisation that
“(a) is a registered charity principally concerned with advancing or practising the non-religious belief known as humanism;
(b) has been in continuous existence for five years; and
(c) appears to the Registrar General to be of good repute.”
That provision addresses some of the wilder claims that unlikely organisations would or could either qualify or mount a human rights challenge.
The details are closely modelled on the existing law, and they were drafted following conversations with the Government—although perhaps not conversations in which both sides fully understood each other—and address the specific points rightly raised by Ministers in Committee, when the hon. Member for Bristol West (Stephen Williams) first proposed the amendment. We have taken as much account as possible of the concerns that we believe the Government have about this proposition, and we are therefore disappointed and startled to see a whole new front of opposition opened up this afternoon.
For my own information really, can the hon. Lady say how much consultation she has had with the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church and other Churches on this amendment and its possible implications?
I think that it is fair to say that the Churches are not displaying tremendous enthusiasm for this proposal. I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that it is not easy for the official Opposition to carry out extensive consultations, but the issue was raised in Committee, when we took evidence from some of the Churches, and I detected no great appetite or enthusiasm from them for further discussion of this kind of proposal.
Of course, we would like the Government to adopt this proposal and take it forward wholeheartedly and in a way that delivers a robust and settled legal right to humanist weddings. In the absence of that, we simply need to take the evidence of the number of people who are coming forward asking for a humanist ceremony, the number of humanist ceremonies that are taking place and the very high popularity they enjoy both among those who participate in them and those who attend them.
Let me read the remarks of one couple:
“A humanist wedding offered us the chance to make the wedding ‘ours’, it enabled us to construct our own vows and create a ceremony that felt immediately very personal to both us and our guests, it also portrayed exactly what marriage meant to us and how we see our marriage growing in the future.”
We should be celebrating that in the context of this Bill, and I greatly regret that a sense of celebration is being lost as a result of the way that this afternoon’s debate is proceeding.
I should declare an interest: I am a member of the BHA. Is the hon. Lady aware that civil registrars are increasingly offering full ceremonies, so we already have a secular alternative, and this proposal does not make a new one but just adds one that a lot of people want?
I am disappointed in that question. Secular and humanist are not the same. I am not a humanist. I would want a purely secular ceremony were I to be marrying, but others want a ceremony that reflects their beliefs. Humanism is recognised as a strand of belief. A ceremony to accommodate that deep-held feeling has to be organised and provided if we are to meet the legitimate desires of our humanist friends and neighbours.
The hon. Lady will be well aware of my opinions and views on this matter. In Committee evidence, there was among the Churches and other religious organisations an overwhelming majority opposed to humanist weddings. Is she saying we should ignore that vast strand of public opinion—the many millions of people who oppose this—in favour of a small minority?
With the greatest respect, I do not think the hon. Gentleman has any evidence whatever that millions of people are opposed to this proposal.
No, not until I have dealt with the question fully. I do not believe the hon. Gentleman has evidence of millions of Church members opposing this proposal. I fully accept that there is quite likely to be a lack of enthusiasm among those at the top of the Church hierarchy, but I would not necessarily take even that for granted in all cases. Many people, including people of faith, attend humanist weddings, and value and celebrate their participation in them, either as family or friends.
I will give way to the hon. Gentleman; he is next.
Many people of faith—I think this is the position of Ministers—who believe marriage itself to be a ceremony of huge social value and importance would welcome a humanist marriage ceremony founded on belief and commitment in preference to a secular ceremony or to no ceremony at all.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way, and I must point out that my hon. Friend the Member for Redcar (Ian Swales) was supporting humanist marriage. As a churchgoer and a Christian, I was privileged to be able to have a ceremony that I believed reflected my faith and my beliefs. I think it is vital that people with humanist beliefs who are not Christian and not churchgoers have the opportunity to have a celebration that reflects their beliefs. It is extraordinary that anyone of faith should oppose someone else having such a ceremony, and I do not understand such objections.
I am grateful for that welcome and helpful intervention and for the intervention from the hon. Member for Redcar (Ian Swales).
Concerns and doubts have been expressed about the quality of the service, if I may call it that, that humanists would offer, but the British Humanist Association runs a long-established ceremony service. We have already identified that many people, including many of us, have already attended humanist weddings and some of us might have attended humanist funerals or baby-naming ceremonies. There is a very long and extensive experience in this country of participation in such ceremonies and to my knowledge no adverse comment or criticism of them has been made at all—indeed, quite the reverse.
It is also important to note that the British Humanist Association is extremely concerned about maintaining the highest quality. It trains, accredits, insures and provides a form of continuing professional education for its hundreds of celebrants throughout the country. Perhaps we should therefore not be surprised that the ceremonies attract high satisfaction as a result; more than 95% of clients, if I may call them that, give them a five-out-of-five rating. That is not an experience that all people report from their registry office or other wedding.
Humanist weddings, in particular—this is based on the testimony of those couples who have had one—are greatly valued as reflecting those couples’ beliefs and allowing the ceremony to be devised, in collaboration with the celebrant, in a way that meets their own wishes. I have read some letters over the course of the past few weeks from couples who write eloquently about how much the ceremony has meant not only to them but to their relatives and friends. I am sure that over the past week or so, many right hon. and hon. Members will also have heard from the 3,000-plus humanists in this country, including many couples who have had a humanist wedding, about the importance of the ceremony to them. It is clear that we already have in this country a precious form of ceremony that is highly valued by many couples, and my new clause would simply seek to recognise and acknowledge that in law.
I have one fairly fundamental disagreement with the British Humanist Association, which is that I think they are wrong about God, but I fully believe that we need to acknowledge humanist weddings. Two generations ago, the established Church did not allow nonconformist Churches to hold burial rites in their churchyards. This is a dangerous precedent. As an Anglican, I do not feel in any way offended in my faith by knowing that humanists can celebrate weddings in such a way.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. The Secretary of State has been extremely eloquent throughout the passage of the Bill about the importance that she personally attaches to marriage, so I say to her that my proposal goes with the grain of her position by seeking to extend marriage to more couples precisely because they share that sense of its importance and want to value it.
The whole Bill is about equality, although I recognise that it is predominantly about equal marriage for lesbian, gay, transsexual and, indeed, bisexual people. My new clause is also about equality; it is about the equal recognition of humanist marriages. We should remember that they are already legal in many countries, where they contribute to an increase in the number of marriages, going with the grain of the Secretary of State’s ambitions to strengthen and extend marriage in our society. In Scotland, for example, the number of marriages has been rising in recent years, with an increase of more than 1,500 between 2009 and 2011, more than half of which are accounted for by humanist marriages.
There is plenty of evidence of public demand for reform. I believe that this proposal is a reform that disadvantages no one and costs the public purse close to zero. In an age of equality, it removes an unnecessary injustice based on religion or belief, and it will strengthen the institution of marriage, going with the grain of Ministers’ intentions for the Bill. I believe that today we need to move forward to introduce legal humanist marriages in our country, as they have been successfully introduced in other countries across a range of legal jurisdictions. If the Government have concerns, we need to see a written view from the Attorney-General about those objections, so that they can be scrutinised not just by amateur Scottish lawyers such as me, but by properly qualified expert human rights lawyers and others. That would allow us to see in detail the reasoning behind the view that he has expressed at the Dispatch Box.
Will the hon. Lady give way?
I will not, as I am just coming to a conclusion.
If during this afternoon’s debate the Government can provide undertakings that they will put before us that full, reasoned legal opinion and give us the time properly to test and explore it, so that the concerns can be taken forward appropriately when the Bill reaches the House of Lords, we will of course be happy to take that time to ensure that the legislation is wholly fit for purpose. Without those detailed explanations, it is difficult for us to accept that there is some endemic objection in principle to introducing humanist marriage into English law, and that I is why I have tabled new clause 15.
Let me start by saying that I have great admiration for humanists. My mother was a Quaker and I was brought up and educated at a Quaker school. I often think that Quakers are simply humanists who believe in God—[Interruption.] If the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) is going to heckle throughout my speech, he will just indicate the discourtesy he shows for the views of anyone who disagrees with him. If we heard a little less from him, we would all do a lot better.
As the House will know, when the Bill was introduced the Church of England and other faith groups did not greet it with unalloyed joy. However, we sought to engage constructively with Ministers and officials and they constructively engaged with us. Ministers and the Government made it clear at the outset that they wanted to ensure that faith groups that did not wish to perform same-sex marriages would not be obliged to do so. The legislation therefore has at its heart protections for faith groups such as the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, Muslims and others who do not wish to perform or celebrate same-sex marriages. That is enshrined in the quadruple lock for the Church of England, because of canon law, and in the other locks for other faith groups. Those locks are essential to ensuring the freedoms that the Government made clear at the outset would be there to protect faith groups.
Of course I will give way to the hon. Lady, but may I finish the point?
Those locks are based on the assumption enshrined in English marriage law: English marriage law is based on buildings and not on celebrants.
I am going to give way to the hon. Lady, but let me finish the point because it is important.
In Scotland, there is celebrant-based marriage, whereas the protections in marriage in England are based on buildings. If new clause 15 is passed, it will in effect unpick all the protections in the Bill that relate to the locks and to the protections for other faith groups.
The Speaker acknowledged earlier that he was an anorak. There are degrees of anorakism in the House, and I too am a bit of an anorak, in the sense that I believe that if public Bills that will make substantial changes to public law are to be introduced, there should be proper consultation. As the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green) honestly and properly acknowledged, there has been no consultation with faith groups on the proposed provisions, which would completely unpick the protections in the Bill that Parliament has sought to give to faith groups.
I do not see why faith groups should be singled out for consultation. If there is to be consultation, it should include those of no faith, and other organisations too. I do not understand at all how this proposition unpicks locks which are intended to protect religious institutions and individual celebrants within those institutions. I simply do not understand that, and I do not accept that marriage under English law is confined to religious institutions that have premises. As I say, English law also provides for Jews and Quakers to conduct marriages according to their own rites.
My hon. Friend is wrong. I have made it quite clear throughout that English marriage law is buildings-related, except, for historic reasons, where it relates to Quakers and Jews; it has never been celebrant-related.
Let us consider the Scottish example. In Scotland we have seen pagan weddings celebrated, spiritualist weddings celebrated, and weddings celebrated by the White Eagle Lodge. That is a question on which our constituents should properly be consulted. I cannot speak for other Members of the House, but I have had enough problems in my constituency with same-sex marriage. If I go back to the shires of Oxfordshire and tell constituents that Parliament is about to endorse pagan marriage in England, they will think that we have lost the plot completely. If they think that the Opposition support pagan marriage and masonic marriage, they really will think we have lost the plot.
The new clause would not allow pagan marriage to take place. It would allow humanist marriage to take place, and the Bishop of Chester supports it.
The hon. Lady is a lawyer so, with the greatest respect, she has no excuse for not listening to the advice of the Attorney-General. He made it clear to the House—any hon. Member would follow the logic very straightforwardly—that it would not be possible in the Bill to give privileges to one non-faith organisation, the humanists, without its being challenged by other similar non-faith groups, such as the pagans or the secularists, who have had weddings celebrated in Scotland. Pagans would say, “We are allowed to have marriages north of Hadrian’s wall. Why cannot we have marriages south of Hadrian’s wall?”
May I make a tiny bit of progress before taking my hon. Friend’s intervention?
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to restrict the approved organisations approach only to humanism. There can be no basis to justify a difference of treatment between one belief organisation and another, and if we did so we would be vulnerable to legal challenge—the very point that the Attorney-General made. If the amendment were accepted, I would have to consider whether I could sign a section 19(1)(a) statement, indicating that in my view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the European convention on human rights, on the introduction of the Bill in another place. I would probably have to sign a section 19(1)(b) statement that I cannot state that in my view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the convention, because of the different treatment of humanists and other belief organisations. That is clear, it is a statement of fact and it is entirely consistent with the situation outlined by the Attorney-General.
As my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General said, the amendment would clearly make the Bill incompatible with the European convention on human rights. This is a complicated issue that could be looked at further in the other place, but I want to make it clear to the House today that if the issue is discussed in the Lords, further information can be provided if that is requested and required. I am happy to write to the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston, and to place a copy of my letter in the Library, setting out the legal objections offered to the House today. I hope that would help to inform proceedings in the other place. I would be happy to copy the letter to the Liberal Democrat spokesman.
May we ask that that letter sets out in detail the Government’s objections in the context of the convention on human rights, and that there will be no gaps? It seems to us that new objections have emerged even in the course of the debate this afternoon, so I would be grateful for the right hon. Lady’s assurance that that will be a comprehensive statement of the Government’s concerns in relation to the European convention on human rights.
I am happy to say that the letter would be a comprehensive statement of the concerns that I have. I have covered many of those today, but I will consider whether there are any that I have not included for reasons of time. I am happy to be as helpful as I can.
I entirely agree with what my right hon. Friend says and think that is what the Bill delivers. It delivers the ability of civil marriage to accommodate same-sex couples and enables religious organisations that wish to opt into that to do so, but allows others not to if that is what they choose. That is an important and fundamental principle of the Bill that I think reflects what he has just said.
I believe that the changes proposed in the amendments are an unnecessary and potentially unhelpful diversion from the important objective we are trying to achieve: removing the unfairness that excludes same-sex couples from being able to marry. We must remain focused on that objective and not be sidelined into discussions on other issues at this point. I ask hon. Members not to press these amendments, so that we can proceed to discuss the next group.
I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have contributed to this interesting and, at times, passionate debate. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), who tabled the amendment that led us to new clause 15, and the hon. Member for Bristol West (Stephen Williams), who first tabled it in Committee, for the work we have been able to do across parties to bring the proposal to the Floor of the House this afternoon.
Despite the fact that the proposal has been before the House in some form or other since 5 February, as the hon. Member for Cambridge pointed out, it seems that the legal doubts expressed this afternoon by the Attorney-General have come to us rather late in the day. That does not mean that we do not take them extremely seriously; of course we do, but it would have been helpful to know that discussions were taking place with officials, whether or not they were proactively suggesting that such changes to the original proposal would help to strengthen it. The fact that discussions took place some weeks ago means that it is a matter of particular regret that the legal difficulties with the proposal were not highlighted earlier.
The Secretary of State said that my amendment and, I think, others in the group were unnecessary. For humanists, it is not unnecessary at all. Yes, they can choose to have a civil marriage and a humanist ceremony, but they do not have available to them a ceremony that they feel would properly recognise them as marrying one another and making that public commitment in front of family and friends. That is the discrimination that we seek to address. However, I take very seriously her wish, which she knows we share very strongly, to see this Bill proceed. We do not want it to be delayed or have its development and progress inhibited by arguments about these proposals.
I want to pick up on one or two of the objections that were raised not only by Ministers but by other hon. Members around the Chamber, suggesting that there are still genuine uncertainties about what is and is not provided for in current law and what we now seek to achieve. If the Secretary of State is willing to come forward with a statement of the Government’s legal concerns, that would be extremely helpful in properly facing off all the objections that have been raised in time for them to be understood and considered before the Bill is debated in the House of Lords. We do not want a re-run of objections arriving late or being raised without justification. It is clear from what has been said today that many hon. Members would like the Government’s position to be fully argued in good time for a fully informed debate in the House of Lords.
Some Members, particularly the hon. Member for Banbury (Sir Tony Baldry) and the Secretary of State, have said repeatedly that these proposals in some way undermine the quadruple lock that has been put in place. The Secretary of State suggested that that is because it is not clear whether the protections that it affords would apply to humanists, and if so, that might undermine the protections for religious organisations. If so, it would be extremely helpful to understand exactly how that is. We would be grateful if the Secretary of State fully clarified that in the letter that she says she will make available to the House.
A misunderstanding has come up repeatedly this afternoon. We recognise that the system in England is different from the system in Scotland, which registers celebrants. The system in England is not based only on the registration of premises for Jews and Quakers, for example. There is no requirement for them to hold their ceremonies in certain premises, but they are required to hold ceremonies in accordance with their usages. What is more, the amendment would not attach registration to celebrants. It is about registering organisations, and one form of organisation in particular—that which is a belief organisation, a charitable organisation or a humanist organisation that secures the approval and authorisation of the Registrar General. It is very clear which kind of institution we are trying to cover.
The most serious objection is the human rights objection, which, sadly, only emerged at the beginning of this afternoon. I would be grateful if any hon. Member who participated during the earlier stages of the Bill and who remembers differently could correct me, but I do not recall the human rights objection being raised at any point before this afternoon. Of course it is vital that we take account of the Attorney-General’s concerns and advice on this matter; it would be utterly irresponsible of us not to do so. However, even the Attorney-General’s advice changed over the course of this afternoon. At the beginning of the afternoon, he said that there was a problem with the proposal because it could apply so widely that any organisation, including a society for the promotion of tiddlywinks, might potentially be discriminated against if it were not authorised to carry out marriages as well. I think that he rowed back from that later on and acknowledged that only belief organisations would be authorised. He was right to say that the possibility of discrimination between different belief organisations is the central human rights issue that must be addressed.
Let me make it quite clear that it has to be a belief organisation because unless there are some grounds for belief, I assume that there is no reason for carrying out a ceremony. I am sorry if my point sounded flippant, because it was not intended to be. My point was that belief organisations can be very wide in their scope and are certainly not confined to humanism.
I appreciate the Attorney-General’s concern that there could be human rights challenges on those grounds. It would be useful to know how he assesses the chances of such a challenge being successful and to understand on what basis a challenge might be argued. It would also be useful to know what precedent there is of such challenges being successful elsewhere.
I am prepared to wait for the fully analysed opinion to be presented to the House. I welcome the Secretary of State’s commitment to provide that in good time before the Bill proceeds through the House of Lords. I hope that she will take note of our interest in having a proactive opinion, as the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt) said, that identifies how any defects in the proposal could be cured, as the Attorney-General has mentioned. Given the commitment from the Secretary of State, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9
Conversion of civil partnership into marriage
I beg to move amendment 15, page 10, line 24, at end add—
‘(9) Where a civil partnership formed under part 1, section 96 of the Civil Partnership Act (Civil Partnership with former spouse) is converted into a marriage under this section—
(a) the civil partnership ends on the conversion, and
(b) if both partners so elect, the resulting marriage is to be treated as having subsisted since the marriage dissolved under Schedule 2 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was formed.’.
My hon. Friend makes a good point. I have tried to dig around to find out the size of liabilities and which companies are doing this, but unfortunately I cannot find that information. It is fair to say that many corporates take great pleasure in trumpeting in their annual reports what they would regard as their social responsibility, but I think that they should be saying loud and proud—to coin a phrase—that they are treating civil partners in the same way as heterosexual widows and widowers.
I hope that my ministerial colleagues can give some ground and say that the Government are willing to reconsider the matter. The cost is not even a rounding error in the Government accounts or for the pension industry, but the benefit to the recipients is beyond value.
It is a particular pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer), whose contributions to our debates on this Bill at every stage have been exemplary, moving, powerful and reasoned.
I am very pleased to welcome warmly many of the amendments on transgender issues. I particularly welcome Government amendments 40 to 47, and I thank Ministers, who I know have taken on board issues raised in Committee about pension protections for transgender couples. I am pleased that the concerns raised in Committee have been addressed in the amendments. They will create no new liability for pension funds and will remove for some couples the hideous decision about whether a member of the couple should proceed with gender reassignment and, in the process, remove the pension rights of a much-loved spouse. I know that following the debate in Committee, transgender people and their partners are pleased by the Government’s response and I want to put on record my thanks to Ministers for that.
I also welcome the other amendments on transgender issues in the group. Although I have some concerns about the compensation provision, the calculation given to us by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) suggests that there is relatively—indeed, microscopically—little cause for any Chancellor to be concerned. I hope that the Government will consider very carefully the whole package of amendments on transgender issues proposed by the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) and others. As I think the hon. Gentleman said, many of the injustices that the amendments seek to address are probably inadvertent injustices, but they are none the less deeply wrong injustices suffered by transgender couples. I invite Ministers to look, even as the Bill continues its passage through Parliament, at ways in which we might put rectifying action in place.
On amendment 49, on pensions, I too recognise the anomaly that exists between the treatment of pension rights for married couples and same-sex civil partners. I also recognise that resolving this anomaly is not without difficulty. We have always accepted the estimate of £18 million potential additional cost to private contracted-in occupational pension schemes, and I agree with hon. Members who have already said that in the scheme of overall funds under management for pension companies, that seems a very small amount indeed, although I also accept the concern that extending pension rights to civil partners could have a disproportionate impact in a very small number of cases, particularly in small and often charity employer schemes.
In relation to other schemes and the possible wider effect, for example on contracted-out occupational pensions, where Ministers have suggested a potential impact of £90 million, or in relation to public sector schemes, I must say that I am still puzzled as to why we think there is any further implication. In February I obtained a note from the House of Commons Library which pointed out that civil partners are already entitled to survivor benefits in contracted-out and public sector schemes in relation to benefits going back to 1988. That is a result of the Civil Partnership (Contracted-out and Appropriate Personal Pension Schemes) (Surviving Civil Partners) Order 2005. The Library said that the same was true of public sector schemes, as I say. So I am not clear how the exemption would affect those contracted-out and public sector schemes.
Although I have great sympathy for the amendment, the Government should come forward with a full analysis in order for Parliament to take an informed decision on what the cost implications would be. That is why I tabled new clause 17, which was not selected for debate. I understand the reasons for that, but it would have asked for the full report of the pensions costs implications for all forms of occupational pension and the impact on pension funds and pensioner poverty to be presented to Parliament. Although the new clause has not been selected for debate, I join the hon. Member for Finchley and Golders Green in asking Ministers to present the fullest possible information to Parliament so that we can make a proper decision. I recognise that if we get it wrong, we could drive very small pension schemes out of business, which would exacerbate inequalities in other ways.
As things stand, we are without a proper review of the cost. Ministers have expressed concerns that it could be more—potentially considerably more—than £18 million, and on the basis of the information before us, I regret that I cannot support amendment 49 today. However, I want to place on record my strong support for the principle that underpins it, and I very much hope that information that will enable us to move forward will be available to the House as soon as possible.
It is nice to be able to make a contribution at last to this important debate, after sitting on the Front Bench for quite a few hours.
I will first speak to Government amendments in the group. This is a large group of amendments that, in broad terms, concern pension entitlements, gender reassignment, devolution and a number of miscellaneous matters. Government amendment 25 ensures that the protection for the Church of England in the Bill is both full and clear. We have been continuing our discussions with the Church since we knew that it had doubts about whether the power provided in clause 11(5)(c) would be sufficient to enable us to provide full protection for Church of England ecclesiastical law from the effect of clauses 11(1) and 11(2). It is an important part of the protection that Church of England canon law should not be affected by the provisions in the Bill and that references to marriage shall continue to mean marriage between a man with a woman only. Having consulted the Church of England, we have decided to provide further protection by referring to ecclesiastical law in the Bill. The amendment affects only law applying to the Church of England in the limited cases where the effect of marriage is at issue.