Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Kate Green]

What the hon. Gentleman says about other religions may be correct, but it is not the case that all religions are required to go through a dual process. Jews and Quakers are not. My contention is that we should recognise the strong popular support for humanism, just as we recognise popular support for other forms of marriage. Many organisations can perform legal marriages in their own right, and do so for smaller numbers than the humanists would and, indeed, than the humanists do now. While I would not for one minute suggest that our marriage laws should be based on some sort of numbers game—although I believe that some Members sought to suggest as much in Committee, an approach that I found somewhat offensive and regrettable—my contention is supported, in this context, by the fact that not only is practice in relation to humanist marriages already fairly widespread, but the numbers are increasing. The popularity is growing.

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

rose—

[Kate Green]

I will of course give way to the Attorney-General.

[The Attorney-General]

I hope the hon. Lady will accept that I make my comments in a completely neutral way and that I appreciate what she is trying to achieve, but I have absolutely no doubt that the new clause, if passed, would render the Bill incompatible with the provisions of the European convention on human rights, because it identifies a group that is not a religious group and gives it a special status. The first thing that would happen is that all sorts of other secular groups would claim non-discrimination rights under article 14. I realise that that may be capable of being cured, but I can only say to the hon. Lady that the new clause would make it impossible for the Minister to sign a certificate under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998, enabling the Bill to proceed to the other place.

[Kate Green]

First, although of course I respect the Attorney-General’s expert advice, I must point out that the narrow drafting of the new clause follows advice from the Government’s own officials. We had been given to understand that it would be possible to prescribe, very tightly, a mode of marriage for humanists, legally recognised, and we are surprised that human rights objections are being raised now.

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[Kate Green]

My hon. Friend—if I may call him that in this context—has raised an excellent point. I hear mutterings from Government Members, who are suggesting that the answer to his question is that in Scotland it is the person who is registered. Let me say, with the greatest respect, that I do not see how that can possibly deal with the human rights point.

[The Attorney-General]

I do my best to provide advice on the law of England and Wales—Scottish law is unquestionably different historically—but, according to my limited understanding of the position, in Scotland it is not just humanists who may be registered for this purpose; pagans and all sorts of other groups may also qualify. I simply make the point that in the context of the Bill as drafted and as proposed today—I realise that the hon. Lady may be upset about this, but I have no role in it—the new clause undoubtedly introduces a serious human rights problem, which I think is obvious because of its discriminatory nature. That is really all that I can say on the matter.

[Kate Green]

I make no great claims for my understanding of Scots law, despite having a rather elderly and unused degree in it, but—

--- Later in debate ---

[Kate Green]

Obviously, I do not answer for the Government, and I will not respond to any specific interventions on that point. The hon. Gentleman may wish to make a speech later.

[The Attorney-General]

rose—

[Kate Green]

I will take one more intervention, and then I am going to develop the compelling case for why we want humanist weddings in this country, not why there are apparently so many legal objections to be overcome.

[The Attorney-General]

The last thing that I want to do is interrupt the hon. Lady’s flow, but I want to reply very briefly to what was just said. I am not suggesting in any way that what is happening in Scotland is unlawful. Instead, I am highlighting that there is a serious defect in the amendment. Given the discriminatory nature of the favour it gives to humanists as opposed to other secular organisations, it would have the consequence of making the measure incompatible with the convention rights. I think that that is obvious when we examine the amendment.

[Kate Green]

It may be challengeable under the convention, but I do not think we know at all whether such a challenge would be successful.

Let me develop some aspects of the case for humanist weddings. So far this has been a rather unpleasant and legalistic debate, and in the same spirit as our debates on same-sex marriage, I want to make the case that the House should feel joyful about humanist weddings and celebrate them.

For those who are concerned about protections, the new clause provides that the Registrar General could issue a certificate to any organisation that

“(a) is a registered charity principally concerned with advancing or practising the non-religious belief known as humanism;

(b) has been in continuous existence for five years; and

(c) appears to the Registrar General to be of good repute.”

That provision addresses some of the wilder claims that unlikely organisations would or could either qualify or mount a human rights challenge.

The details are closely modelled on the existing law, and they were drafted following conversations with the Government—although perhaps not conversations in which both sides fully understood each other—and address the specific points rightly raised by Ministers in Committee, when the hon. Member for Bristol West (Stephen Williams) first proposed the amendment. We have taken as much account as possible of the concerns that we believe the Government have about this proposition, and we are therefore disappointed and startled to see a whole new front of opposition opened up this afternoon.

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[Kelvin Hopkins]

It is bizarre, but I must say that I am not a lawyer—I am only a humble economist—so these things escape me. Perhaps I can look forward to legal explanations later in the debate.

[The Attorney-General]

I will say this one last time. It has nothing to do with the merits or otherwise of wanting to extend marriage to humanist or secular groups. The way the amendment has been drafted confined it to groups promoting humanism, but there are many other secular groups. The local tiddlywinks club might wish to become a registered charity and to conduct weddings, so by its very nature, and for that reason, it is discriminatory, and by being discriminatory it is in serious danger, I suggest, of violating article 14 of the European convention on human rights. I can only say that. It might be curable, and there might be all sorts of other things that can be done—[Interruption.] Well, not in this House. As matters stand, the amendment is in that condition. I made that point simply to help the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kate Green]

I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have contributed to this interesting and, at times, passionate debate. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), who tabled the amendment that led us to new clause 15, and the hon. Member for Bristol West (Stephen Williams), who first tabled it in Committee, for the work we have been able to do across parties to bring the proposal to the Floor of the House this afternoon.

Despite the fact that the proposal has been before the House in some form or other since 5 February, as the hon. Member for Cambridge pointed out, it seems that the legal doubts expressed this afternoon by the Attorney-General have come to us rather late in the day. That does not mean that we do not take them extremely seriously; of course we do, but it would have been helpful to know that discussions were taking place with officials, whether or not they were proactively suggesting that such changes to the original proposal would help to strengthen it. The fact that discussions took place some weeks ago means that it is a matter of particular regret that the legal difficulties with the proposal were not highlighted earlier.

The Secretary of State said that my amendment and, I think, others in the group were unnecessary. For humanists, it is not unnecessary at all. Yes, they can choose to have a civil marriage and a humanist ceremony, but they do not have available to them a ceremony that they feel would properly recognise them as marrying one another and making that public commitment in front of family and friends. That is the discrimination that we seek to address. However, I take very seriously her wish, which she knows we share very strongly, to see this Bill proceed. We do not want it to be delayed or have its development and progress inhibited by arguments about these proposals.

I want to pick up on one or two of the objections that were raised not only by Ministers but by other hon. Members around the Chamber, suggesting that there are still genuine uncertainties about what is and is not provided for in current law and what we now seek to achieve. If the Secretary of State is willing to come forward with a statement of the Government’s legal concerns, that would be extremely helpful in properly facing off all the objections that have been raised in time for them to be understood and considered before the Bill is debated in the House of Lords. We do not want a re-run of objections arriving late or being raised without justification. It is clear from what has been said today that many hon. Members would like the Government’s position to be fully argued in good time for a fully informed debate in the House of Lords.

Some Members, particularly the hon. Member for Banbury (Sir Tony Baldry) and the Secretary of State, have said repeatedly that these proposals in some way undermine the quadruple lock that has been put in place. The Secretary of State suggested that that is because it is not clear whether the protections that it affords would apply to humanists, and if so, that might undermine the protections for religious organisations. If so, it would be extremely helpful to understand exactly how that is. We would be grateful if the Secretary of State fully clarified that in the letter that she says she will make available to the House.

A misunderstanding has come up repeatedly this afternoon. We recognise that the system in England is different from the system in Scotland, which registers celebrants. The system in England is not based only on the registration of premises for Jews and Quakers, for example. There is no requirement for them to hold their ceremonies in certain premises, but they are required to hold ceremonies in accordance with their usages. What is more, the amendment would not attach registration to celebrants. It is about registering organisations, and one form of organisation in particular—that which is a belief organisation, a charitable organisation or a humanist organisation that secures the approval and authorisation of the Registrar General. It is very clear which kind of institution we are trying to cover.

The most serious objection is the human rights objection, which, sadly, only emerged at the beginning of this afternoon. I would be grateful if any hon. Member who participated during the earlier stages of the Bill and who remembers differently could correct me, but I do not recall the human rights objection being raised at any point before this afternoon. Of course it is vital that we take account of the Attorney-General’s concerns and advice on this matter; it would be utterly irresponsible of us not to do so. However, even the Attorney-General’s advice changed over the course of this afternoon. At the beginning of the afternoon, he said that there was a problem with the proposal because it could apply so widely that any organisation, including a society for the promotion of tiddlywinks, might potentially be discriminated against if it were not authorised to carry out marriages as well. I think that he rowed back from that later on and acknowledged that only belief organisations would be authorised. He was right to say that the possibility of discrimination between different belief organisations is the central human rights issue that must be addressed.

[The Attorney-General]

Let me make it quite clear that it has to be a belief organisation because unless there are some grounds for belief, I assume that there is no reason for carrying out a ceremony. I am sorry if my point sounded flippant, because it was not intended to be. My point was that belief organisations can be very wide in their scope and are certainly not confined to humanism.

[Kate Green]

I appreciate the Attorney-General’s concern that there could be human rights challenges on those grounds. It would be useful to know how he assesses the chances of such a challenge being successful and to understand on what basis a challenge might be argued. It would also be useful to know what precedent there is of such challenges being successful elsewhere.

I am prepared to wait for the fully analysed opinion to be presented to the House. I welcome the Secretary of State’s commitment to provide that in good time before the Bill proceeds through the House of Lords. I hope that she will take note of our interest in having a proactive opinion, as the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt) said, that identifies how any defects in the proposal could be cured, as the Attorney-General has mentioned. Given the commitment from the Secretary of State, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 9

Conversion of civil partnership into marriage