HMS “Queen Elizabeth”

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Thursday 2nd March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I cannot give the noble Lord that precise assurance. I say that because we are clear—and I am sure that most noble Lords in this House are clear—that NATO must remain the cornerstone of this country’s defence and the defence of western Europe. It is very important that we remind ourselves of the significance of NATO in that context.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the first thing to say is that we should be extremely proud of these carriers. They are going to be a force for stability and good all around the world. They are the only conventional capability we have with true strategic global significance, and that is why the Americans are so keen that we should have them. My question is similar to that of the noble Baroness. We last lost an aircraft carrier in 1942, and she did not have her air group with her. It is actually very difficult to find and kill an aircraft carrier, but she did not have an air group. When HMS “Queen Elizabeth” sails on her first operational deployment, particularly if it is east of Suez, will she have a full air group of Sea Lightnings, Crowsnest and the supporting ships—frigates, destroyers and nuclear submarine—which make a carrier battle group? The group I took to Hong Kong had 14 ships. Will we be able to do that, looking at the pressure on resources at the moment?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the initial operating capability for carrier strike, which is scheduled for no later than December 2020, will consist of one carrier, one squadron of Lightnings and Crowsnest. As the noble Lord will know, the carriers will operate as part of a maritime task group which will be tailored to meet the required task, so the precise number and mix of vessels deployed will have to depend on the operational circumstances of the time. We will be able to draw from a range of modern and highly capable vessels to support the carriers, such as the Type 45 destroyers, Type 23 frigates, Astute class submarines and, in the longer term, Type 26 frigates.

Defence: Industrial Strategy

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 27th February 2017 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord West of Spithead]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government, in the light of their plans for a national shipbuilding strategy and significant investment in the United Kingdom defence nuclear enterprise, whether they intend to develop an overall defence industrial strategy.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, the Ministry of Defence is actively involved in the cross-government work on an industrial strategy. Many of the themes in this apply to defence, and we do not plan a separate defence industrial strategy. A substantial amount of work is already under way to encourage the growth and competitiveness of UK industry, including as part of the commitment in the strategic defence and security review to refresh defence industrial policy.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, although I like the cut of the noble Earl’s jib, which is not surprising considering his naval pedigree, I am disappointed by the Answer. There is a complete absence of analysis of the defence industrial base and no proper study of its real costs. These were identified in the King’s College study instigated by the noble Lord, Lord Sterling, but nothing seems to have been done to focus on them. We know very well the value for this nation of things such as the agile supply cycle, but we also know their value in terms of jobs, through not having to pay welfare payments or unemployment benefit. There are all these benefits, yet we do a simple calculation of costs, which does not make sense. Does the Minister not agree that we have to look very closely at the real cost of equipment and weapons before we decide to buy from abroad, with a loss of jobs, a loss of agility and a loss of ability to keep running our systems here, and that we really must get the balance right rather than taking the simplistic approach of saying, “This costs £4 there and £5 here”?

[Earl Howe]

I agree with the central thrust of the noble Lord’s proposition. As I said, many of the industrial strategy themes, particularly around removing barriers for UK companies to do business with government are well aligned with our refreshment of defence industrial policy. It is all about updating our terms of trade with industry to continue to deliver the best equipment for the Armed Forces at the best value for money, but in a way that supports UK industry to grow and compete successfully. That is the balance we are trying to strike.

NATO: Eastern Flank

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 30th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

The noble and gallant Lord will know that there is a NATO operation currently in train in the Aegean in which the UK is playing a leading role. As to a wider involvement in the eastern Mediterranean, I will write to him if I can find out any more plans which can be disclosed. What I can say is that we are conscious of the need to defend NATO’s southern border as well as its eastern borders, and that is why we are deploying RAF aircraft for southern air policing later this year.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, it is quite clear that we are not spending enough on defence, but that is not my question. I am delighted that we are showing support for our eastern allies in NATO, but I am wary of military involvement within Ukraine. Does the noble Earl agree that we must keep open at all levels every line of communication we can with the Putin Administration so that any incident does not actually become something far more serious? We are dealing with someone where things could become very nasty indeed.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord makes an extremely good series of points. NATO’s renewed focus on deterrence and defence is, we believe, a proportionate response by NATO allies to the changed security environment in eastern Europe as demonstrated by Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine. However, that does not change our approach to bilateral relations with Russia. Despite the challenges I have referred to, we will continue to engage where necessary in areas of shared interest, and engage in dialogue as well through the channels we have available to us, such as the NATO-Russia Council.

Trident Missile Test

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the most important assurance is the one that I have already given: this is a system in which we have absolute confidence. It has never been the practice of government to give Parliament details of submarine operations or of the systems and subsystems that are tested during a demonstration and shakedown operation. But I hope I have said enough to reassure noble Lords about our deterrent and its reliability.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, in naval parlance, this is a complete pot mess. A very successful DASO, which proved that “Vengeance” and her crew are well capable of being part of the CASD rotation, was carried out, but because of the way it was handled it has failed to reassure us all. I have spent my life fighting for Trident and I understand all the complexities and all the security issues. For 20 years, we have shot and sent out films of every single DASO and made an announcement about it. We did not do it this time, and consequently we are in a position where we have embarrassed our own Prime Minister—which is not very clever—and have given succour to those people who do not like the deterrent, do not understand why we need it and want to find some way of attacking it. That is what we have achieved. Does the Minister not agree that our failure to handle this openly has caused huge problems? It has given succour to those who do not like the deterrent, which our nation needs, and has embarrassed our Prime Minister. It has made a complete mess and was handled badly.

A159 Wildcat Helicopter

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 9th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord will recognise that decisions on aircraft procurement, as indeed procurement across the defence piece, have to represent best value for the UK taxpayer. On the Wildcat issue, I think the noble Lord will accept that there is no requirement or pressing need for the Government to make a decision yet because no export orders have been received by Leonardo helicopters. However, we clearly have an interest in this. We are working with the company to ensure that UK work content is maintained, and I hope enhanced, for any export orders. The decision on whether to allow the jigs and tools to be relocated offshore will be based on a balanced assessment focused on what is best for UK prosperity.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, does the Minister believe there is a strategic requirement for our nation to have the ability to develop, design and build complex fast jets, and to do exactly the same for helicopters and warships, or is there no strategic requirement for this? Has this issue been considered by the National Security Council?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Government are committed to keeping the UK as a leading aerospace nation. We are fully engaged with Leonardo on future helicopter work in that region. For example, we have signed a 10-year strategic partnership agreement with Leonardo, which of course is key to maintaining cost effectiveness, driving exports and innovation. The Aerospace Growth Partnership, which is being managed by my colleagues in BEIS, will undoubtedly be of benefit in the long term to the UK aerospace industry.

Royal Navy: Frigates

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Thursday 8th December 2016 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord West of Spithead]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government, in the light of the publication of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, when they intend to replace the Type 23 Frigates.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, eight Type 26 global combat ships will be built to replace the current eight anti-submarine warfare Type 23 frigates on a one-for-one basis. The build schedule for the Type 26 is being addressed as part of ongoing contractual negotiations. As announced in the SDSR, the general purpose Type 23 frigates will be replaced by a new class of lighter, flexible, exportable general purpose frigates. This project is in its pre-concept phase.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

I thank the noble Earl for his Answer. He has told me on the Floor of this House on at least two occasions that a report on shipbuilding would come out this autumn which would lay down a steady drum beat of orders. Sir John Parker’s report has no financial basis—there is no detail there of a drum beat of orders—and now, as I understand it, the shipbuilding report will come out next spring. I know from my time in government that spring can be as late as July. Is it still our Government’s intention to increase frigate numbers by the 2030s, which is not far away in shipbuilding terms, and how will they achieve that with regard to these general purpose frigates? How quickly will they need to be built to achieve that figure?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, yes, it is the Government’s intention to increase the size of the fleet through the general purpose frigate. We are talking now in the long term, but that is our intention. As the noble Lord is aware, we published Sir John Parker’s report on 29 November. It contains 34 detailed recommendations, and it is not unreasonable that the Government should take a little while to give those recommendations due thought. Some of them are pretty adventurous, but all of them are designed to ensure that we can in the long term deliver growth to the fleet, which we all want.

Brexit: Armed Forces and Diplomatic Service

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Thursday 8th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, we will all have seen the Prime Minister aboard HMS “Ocean” earlier this week in Bahrain. Did she know, as she spoke to the assembled ship’s company about the Navy and the importance of its global role post-Brexit, that that ship will be paid off in 2018, after a recent £65 million refit, with nothing to replace her? It is yet another cut to our perilously reduced fleet.

We inhabit a dangerous world in which illiberal power is growing and liberal power declining. It is a world made dangerous by Europe’s retreat from power and its wilful refusal to invest in power. The Brexit decision compounds the problems relating to the UK’s defence and security. The dramatic rise in numbers of migrants either fleeing war and persecution or economic hardship is a stark reflection of all these pressures. In addition, we cannot be sure how much longer the United States will remain the ultimate guarantor of a rules-based international system. Russia is a particular concern, after events in the Crimea and Ukraine, cyberattacks across Europe and threats to the Baltic states. What is it doing? President Putin is a revisionist. He believes in areas of control and he understands and respects power.

In this highly dangerous world, we also have responsibilities for our 14 dependencies and for global shipping run from London. Post-Brexit, we will have to enforce our sea borders and exclusive economic zone much more fully than in the past. We have five Border Force vessels for about 8,000 miles of coastline. To give an example, the Netherlands has 16 for 280 miles of coastline. Perhaps we have got it wrong.

Faced with these global challenges, what are the Government doing? SDSR 2010 cut our military capability by 30%, as has been mentioned, and it has not recovered from that. It is no use pretending otherwise. There is not enough money in the defence budget. In particular, the Navy has too few ships and men, and is having to make incoherent cuts to keep within its budget; for example, paying off “Diligence” and “Ocean” and not having any surface-to-surface missiles. Far from increasing in numbers, as was stated by both the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary in 2015—they said it would increase in numbers by 2035—the Navy is actually shrinking. I fear the Royal Navy is not capable of doing what our nation expects it to do.

We have only 19 escorts, which is a national disgrace, as I have said before. Two of these are tied up alongside because of lack of manpower due to the cuts made by the coalition in 2010. Of the 17 remaining ships, five destroyers have major intercooler problems and there is no rapid programme fixed for exactly when they will be repaired. The reality is that we have 12 escorts fully capable of operations, of which at least one will be in major repair. These 12 are Type 23 frigates. The oldest is 25 years old and the youngest 14; the ships were designed for an 18-year life. The Ministry of Defence has yet to explain how it will replace these ships, which are due to leave service at the rate of one per year from 2023 onwards, let alone increase the total number of escorts by the 2030s, which the noble Earl kindly confirmed is the Government’s aim.

Our forces are underfunded. There is no new money—it is, in theory, being produced by efficiencies. These efficiencies are impacting on the lives of our sailors, soldiers and airmen. I was given a recent example of an Army football team which could not go to a match because there was no bus because of the efficiency measures. This is unacceptable for a nation such as ours.

The Royal Navy has ensured the survival and wealth of our nation over several hundred years. We need to wake up to the fact that successive cuts have gone too far. No matter how stalwart the people—and, my goodness me, they are stalwart—or their professionalism, and we have the most professional forces in the world, without sufficient ships, it is as nothing. We are taking risk upon risk and suddenly, quite unexpectedly—because that is what happens in this chaotic and nasty world—it may affect our nation’s survival.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon (LD)]

My Lords, it is a privilege and a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. I look back with great affection and gratitude at the work that we did together and the way he helped me when he was Secretary-General of NATO and I was the high representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One thing seems crystal clear: having taken the decision to Brexit, Britain is now much more alone and our defence choices are far starker than they were in the hours before President Trump was elected one month and one week ago. Before, during the Brexit debate, we argued that we did not need the European Union because we had NATO, but we will now have an isolationist American President who has made it perfectly clear in his speeches that he does not much believe in NATO and would not even mind seeing it unstitched.

I have a suspicion that in the next few weeks words will be dragged out of Mr Trump’s mouth, saying he did not really mean that and that he does believe in NATO, but NATO and alliances do not depend as much on words as they do on will. No one can doubt that the will of an isolationist American President who admires President Putin will not be the same as the will we have experienced before from our partners across the Atlantic by any measure. The reliance we have placed on NATO in its present form has to be weaker than it was before.

We are left with two very stark choices: either we find a means to work with our European partners to integrate as far as we can; alternatively we will have to be more dependent on the United States, led by a President in favour of isolationism. The effect of his election, and that decision, and the effect of Brexit, taken to improve our independence, has, on the contrary, made us more dependent on the United States. Is that what we really want? Do we believe that that is right?

There is a way round this, of course. The Government can declare that while we will follow through with the Brexit decision and withdraw from political and economic co-operation in Europe, we will nevertheless deepen our integration on defence. If the Minister says that, I will feel comforted, but I do not believe for a moment that that is a spirit of the Government or that they will say that. In that case, we will be increasingly dependent on America led by an isolationist President, whose relationship with Britain might well be judged from the fact that he now believes he can appoint our ambassador in Washington. That does not seem to be any other than a relationship that in its end will turn out to be one of subservience, if not something worse, for our country. I do not believe that that is the right way to go, and I do not believe anyone else can either.

Let me widen the debate a little to a second issue which now confronts us, which depends on us having friends and contacts. Here is a little bit of history. When the Wright brothers turned up in London and sought to sell to the Admiralty their new invention—the design for their aeroplane—the Admiralty was somewhat shocked and perplexed and had an inquiry The inquiry went on far too long—it took two years—and on 7 March 1907, the First Lord of the Admiralty wrote to the Wright brothers, saying,

“I have consulted my expert advisers with regard to your suggestion as to the employment of aeroplanes, and I regret to have to tell you, after the careful consideration of my Board, that the Admiralty … are of the opinion that they would not be of any practical use to the Naval Service”.

That was a mistake and we soon recognised it. But we then made a second mistake, which was that we believed that these were add-ons that we could put on to the Army and the Navy.

[Lord West of Spithead]

My Lords—

[Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon]

The time is limited. I know that the noble Lord wants to defend the Admiralty.

We discovered during the Second World War that they were not add-ons but an entire new theatre of war—not only a theatre of war but the vital ground in winning a war. In the first 3,000 years, the winner was who won on the land; for the next 100 years from Trafalgar, the winner was who won on the sea; since Guernica to the present day, who wins in the air wins the war. Now I believe that he who wins in cyberspace wins.

We have to recognise that this is not just an add-on; it is not just a gadget. We have to recognise it as the new theatre of war. Unless we do, dedicate a service to that and commit resources to it we will not be able to succeed where we need to in any future conflict. Unless we look at it in that synoptic fashion, in that same way that we understood about air, then I fear that if our Armed Forces are weak in that arm, however strong they are in all other arms, we will find ourselves crucially weakened. The whole point about winning in cyberspace is that we have to have a policy that crosses borders, links up with others, and which cannot be conducted in isolation because our enemy is now inside the gates as well as outside. That means that if you deliberately remove yourself from a framework for active co-operation with your neighbours and with those who share your interests, you are bound to diminish and weaken your own nation’s defence. The consequence of Brexit, by removing that possibility with our European partners, and with a NATO now weakened by an isolationist US President, cannot other than mean that the long-term defence of this country will be weakened. The measure of the modern age is that what you do is less important than what you can do with others, and we have just deliberately decided that what we can do with others is less than it was previously—and for that I fear we shall pay a very heavy price.

Multilateral Disarmament

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, does the noble Earl agree that this resolution is not very helpful at all? As he says, there are other areas that we need to focus on such as: reactivating some of the existing agreements; trying to take weapons off immediate readiness for release, which our nation does not do but some countries still do; getting rid of short-range missiles; holding a debate about ballistic missile defence; and finding methods of talking immediately with the Russians and others about de-escalation where necessary.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord makes some very good points. Among the actions that the UK has recently been taking is work with Norway on disarmament verification, as my noble friend Lord Trefgarne referred to. We initiated the P5 process in 2009 to bring together nuclear weapons states to build the trust and confidence that I referred to. We proposed a programme of work at the conference on disarmament held in Geneva in February this year with the aim of reinvigorating the conference’s work—in fact, that was eventually blocked but we made a good attempt at it—and we continue to press for the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. So there is work that we are trying to push along.

Royal Navy: Harpoon Anti-ship Missiles

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd November 2016 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord West of Spithead]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what intelligence assessment they conducted before making the decision to withdraw the Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Royal Navy service at the end of 2018 without replacement.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, the Royal Navy continuously reviews the capabilities it requires. Inevitably, this means choices must be made on where to invest. Work is ongoing across the MoD to consider options for Harpoon replacement. It has long been the established practice not to comment publicly on intelligence matters, as to do so would likely prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

I thank the noble Earl for his Answer but it fills me with despair. We are paying off HMS “Ocean” and HMS “Diligence” early. We are paying HMS “Bulwark” into reserve for five years. We have 19 escorts, which is a national disgrace, two of which are tied alongside because of lack of manpower due to cuts made by the coalition. Six destroyers of the 19 have major intercooler problems and there is no programme for exactly when they will be repaired. The House of Commons Defence Committee said it is appalling that we have no real replacements for the ageing Type 23s, and now we are removing Harpoon. This is not an abstract issue. For a number of years we will have ships deployed that might suddenly come across an opponent and have to fight—as happened to me and others. We will have ships sunk and people—boys and girls, as mine were—killed. That is not a good thing. Is it possible to look at having available, on standby, some Block II Harpoons, ready to be pulled out very quickly should we need them for our ships? If not, we are standing into danger.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the noble Lord paints a false picture of the Royal Navy, which for the first time in a generation is growing. We need to be aware of that. He asked a specific question about Harpoon. The current batch of Harpoon missiles we carry has now reached its natural end of life. To replace it would require significant investment in a new missile stockpile. It was the Royal Navy’s judgment that that would be a less than optimal use of its budget for future investment.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

It is too early for me to answer the last part of the noble Baroness’s question, but I acknowledge that the last few percentage points in that 30% target are challenging—there is no doubt about that. At the same time, what we are impressing on our people is that to the extent that they are able to save money from a reduction in the Civil Service headcount, all that money is to be ploughed back into the defence budget under the efficiency agreement with the Treasury.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I am afraid that the comfortable words about our defence forces just will not wash. I am delighted that, in this Chamber and in the other place, there is a growing ground-swell of people who understand that we have not got sufficiently strong defence forces. That awareness is now growing in the public at large. This is a real concern, bearing in mind the risk. Is it possible to get the NSC to have a half-day’s discussion, or ideally a day’s discussion because it always meets for such short periods, to look at what capabilities we have—and my goodness me, they have been suffering death by a thousand cuts—and what that means for our position in the world and what we can do about the threats that are all around us?

[Earl Howe]

Again, my Lords, I am sure that that message can be conveyed very easily to the National Security Council. I recognise the concerns that the noble Lord has. It is no use denying that we live in a more dangerous and troublesome world. I come back to the Joint Force 2025 concept. It is a long-term programme, but it is designed to enable our Armed Forces to respond to a wider range of more sophisticated potential adversaries and complex real-world challenges. I believe that that is the right direction in which to go.