Question to the Ministry of Defence:

To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Coaker on 19 November 2024 (HL2338), whether the investigations referred to are now complete.

Answered by Lord Coaker - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)

Investigations into this matter are still ongoing and I will write to the Gallant and Noble Lord once these investigations are complete.

A copy of my letter will be placed in the Library of the House.

Question to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office:

To ask His Majesty's Government whether, beyond the previously announced restrictions on 10 ships, they have taken any further action against Russia’s "shadow fleet" following recent events in the Baltic.

Answered by Baroness Chapman of Darlington - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)

The Government has led the way in targeting Russia's shadow fleet of vessels transporting Russian oil and gas in breach of sanctions. On 17 December we sanctioned a further 20 oil tankers, bringing the total designated by this Government to 89, alongside 9 Liquified Natural Gas carriers. We have also sanctioned 7 vessels involved in the transport of military goods.

Sanctions against individual tankers are working. UK sanctioned ships have transported at least $695 million less in Russian crude and refined oil in the 3 months since we introduced sanctions compared to the previous quarter; and a significant number of tankers have ceased trading altogether.

Following the incident damaging the Estlink 2 undersea cable between Finland and Estonia on 25 December, the UK as a framework nation for the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) activated NORDIC WARDEN. This harnesses AI to track potential threats to undersea infrastructure and monitors the movements of the shadow fleet. On 10 January, the UK and US introduced further sanctions to clamp down on Putin's flow of energy revenues. The launch of BALTIC SENTRY on 14 January further improves Allies' ability to respond to destabilising acts.

Question to the Ministry of Defence:

To ask His Majesty's Government, further to the Written Answer by Lord Coaker on 27 January (HL4169), whether the proposal to convert the Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations into a non-departmental public body is supported by members of the Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations; and what consultations with members have taken place.

Answered by Lord Coaker - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)

As stated in my Written Answer of 27 January (HL4169), the views of the membership of the Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations (RFCAs) were taken into account as part of the 2019 Review of the RFCAs which recommended that the Council of RFCAs (CRFCA) and the 13 RFCAs should be merged into a single Executive Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB), with a National Office and a set of regional organisations.

There will of course be divergent views in any organisation which is potentially subject to change. However, notwithstanding individual perspectives, it is critical that the delivery model is regularised as it currently does not comply with the principles set out in Managing Public Money: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/managing-public-money

Under current legislation, the CRFCA was not intended to be a separate legal entity. Through section 116 (s116) of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA96), it is a Joint Committee that is part of, and subordinate to, the Associations that have created it. This means that in its current form, RFA96 vests in the Association Voluntary Membership executive authority which, through s116, has been delegated to the CRFCA Board via Association Chairs and then sub-delegated to the CRFCA Chief Executive. As noted in the RFCA Framework Agreement 2016, this creates inevitable tension between an Association’s autonomy and its application of delegation, and any directive authority vested in CRFCA Chief Executive.

Question to the Ministry of Defence:

To ask His Majesty's Government what work is being undertaken, and by who, regarding the integration of AI in nuclear (1) command, (2) control, and (3) communications systems; and whether they have commissioned research to identify and manage high-risk AI applications.

Answered by Lord Coaker - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)

The UK’s nuclear weapons are operationally independent and only the Prime Minister can authorise their use. It is a long-standing policy that we do not discuss detailed nuclear command and control matters and so will not be able to provide any additional detail.

Research to identify, understand, and mitigate against risks of AI in sensitive applications is underway. We will ensure that, regardless of any use of AI in our strategic systems, human political control of our nuclear weapons is maintained at all times.

Question to the Department for Business and Trade:

To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the risks of private maritime security companies becoming non-compliant through expiry of anti-piracy licences; and what impact this would have on international shipping.

Answered by Baroness Jones of Whitchurch - Baroness in Waiting (HM Household) (Whip)

All Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) operating in the former Indian Ocean High Risk Area (HRA) require approval under the Open General Trade Control Licence for Maritime Anti-Piracy (OGTCL MA-P). Once granted by the Export Control Joint Unit, this approval is open-ended for as long as the PMSC remains active in the maritime anti-piracy sector and abides by the terms of the OGTCL MA-P licence.

ECJU would inform His Majesty’s Revenue & Customs, which is responsible for the enforcement of the UK export licensing regime, if they became aware of any breaches of licence conditions.

Question to the Department for Business and Trade:

To ask His Majesty's Government what proportion of vessels transiting the Indian Ocean with armed guards have UK-licensed firearms onboard.

Answered by Baroness Jones of Whitchurch - Baroness in Waiting (HM Household) (Whip)

The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) is responsible for licensing Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) which provide armed security guards to protect vessels transiting the Indian Ocean High Risk Area from the threat of piracy. It also licences the vessel-based armouries which PMSCs use to store their weapons.

The licensing process for PMSCs and vessel-based armouries does not require information about where firearms originated, and therefore ECJU has no record of this information.

ECJU does not proactively monitor or record the number of vessels within the Indian Ocean.

Found: Letter dated 28/01/2025 from Lord Coaker to Lord West of Spithead regarding an issue raised during a