Ukraine: Military and Non-military Support

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Yes, I reassure my noble friend that any donations are made within the limitations of ensuring that we have residual supplies for our normal operational needs. These donations—he is quite correct to emphasise that that is what they are— are specific: to aid self-defence if that need should arise.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the UN charter authorises the Security Council and General Assembly to take action against any nation that jeopardises world peace. What discussions have we had with our men at the UN to see if any action is going to take place? While understanding that the Security Council would be vetoed by Russia, there are other actions that might help and would show the opprobrium in which the world holds Putin’s actions.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord will understand that there has been a range of diplomatic and military engagement by the United Kingdom Government, not least by my right honourable friends the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary. As to whether that extends to speaking to the men—or, may I say, women—in the United Nations, I do not have specific information, but I can assure him that the widest possible diplomatic activity has been embarked upon.

Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for tabling this Motion to take note of the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement. It was announced in a joint statement in September last year and immediately had strategic impact. Although China was not mentioned, the whole thrust of Australia’s decision to opt for nuclear vice conventional submarines was to counter the threats of China’s aggressive posture in the vast Indo- Pacific region.

China is, for example, building a military base on Vanuatu. Why is she doing that? She is building islands on reefs in the South China Sea and claiming ownership of the waters around it, contrary to international law; breaking agreements regarding Hong Kong; threatening Taiwan; and claiming the Japanese Senkaku Islands. One can add to this the impact of the belt and road initiative—China has, for example, now taken over the best deep-water port in Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, which we used to call Trincomalee, because Sri Lanka was not paying the money it owed—and its treatment of the Uighur population; it is quite apparent that China has no respect for the world order established post World War II.

Individual nations have little impact on what China does. She does not really care what each one of them is doing separately but, when they join together, she pays much more notice. There is no doubt that the Quad, which has already been talked about—the alliance between Australia, India, Japan and the USA—was something China did not like. We have seen that from a lot of things that have been said. AUKUS, the next alliance to confront China, also had an impact and was followed very shortly afterwards by the Japan-Australia agreement. Unsurprisingly, China reacted very negatively to the announcement of AUKUS, which confirms in my mind that we are going down the right route and that it was a good thing to do.

As noble Lords are aware—a number of speakers have mentioned it—this is about much more than a geopolitical move. AUKUS potentially comes with very lucrative defence and security opportunities for UK industry and opportunities within the scientific world, not just in submarine build but in lots of the other areas mentioned: cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional undersea capabilities.

Our American allies are taking this very seriously. Jim Miller, former Defense Under-Secretary, has been named to lead the US efforts on AUKUS. He reports directly to their national security adviser and has been tasked with designing an architecture for how the three countries will work more proactively on defence and share perspectives on the Indo-Pacific co-ordinating region. He will also co-ordinate, on a day-to-day basis, how defence, state diplomatic and other officials from all three countries will meet regularly to harmonise views and positions on the Indo-Pacific. Most importantly, the US has said that Miller will

“do whatever possible to provide the Royal Australian Navy with options to build nuclear submarines as rapidly as possible.”

Miller has 18 months to pull all that together. I ask the Minister: who in the UK is the point of contact for Mr Miller. Do we have a Mr Miller lookalike?

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Watkins of Tavistock) (CB)]

My Lords, the debate can now continue. I have agreed that if we have further votes, we will try not to take the full 10 minutes, if everyone has managed to vote electronically, so that we can proceed.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the United States has also established a US submarine advisory committee, which is advising the Australians on options. Can the Minister say whether we have anyone on that committee? What relationship does that advisory committee have with the US nuclear-powered submarine task force currently working with the UK to identify the best way for Australia to acquire a nuclear submarine fleet? I hope this is not a separate group doing separate work. We need to make sure this is all properly co-ordinated, otherwise we will find that we miss out on things. I am surprised that we have not established a post similar to Jim Miller’s post. Rather our national security adviser is pulling together all the strands from various departments such as the MoD, the FCDO, BEIS and others and is a very busy man. Surely we need to have someone who can focus full-time on this programme, or something will fall between the cracks and we will be outmanoeuvred by our great American friends, who are very good at doing business, and we will be caught out.

Picking the right design for the Royal Australian Navy’s nuclear-powered submarines is extraordinarily complex, and difficult choices will need to be made. There are two prime contenders: the Royal Navy’s Astute class and the US Navy’s Virginia-class Block V submarine or possibly the Astute successor or the Block VI Virginia-class which is going to replace the Block V. None of them will require refuelling. In answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, they will be provided straightaway with a core and a reactor that runs through their entire life.

Numerous issues will need to be considered, including fleet size, submarine service life, Australian defence self-reliance, Australian industry, content, design risks, size, crewing, payload delivery, sustainment of operations, training regimes, export controls and nuclear controls within Australia. It has been assessed that a critical mass of 10 Australian SSNs would be required to sustain sufficient certified personnel at sea and ashore and that it will be at least 15 years from now before there are enough qualified Australians to run even one nuclear submarine in a self-reliant manner. Provision of the boats will take even longer than that. This is highly complex and difficult to organise.

I believe that the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement should be welcomed with acclaim. It will help global stability because it will make the Chinese think and it will, I hope, give great opportunities to UK defence firms and science.

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[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I wish to reassure my noble friend and the Committee that the spirit and intention of the Government is that scrutiny is important; it is at the heart of what they wish to see Parliament do, and it would be exceptional if scrutiny were denied. I hope that reassures my noble friend to some extent.

Moving on to the substance of AUKUS itself, it is a security and defence partnership between three like-minded, democratic allies to enhance security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. AUKUS is not a new treaty, it is not a mutual defence agreement, and it does not replace nor cut across other alliances, such as NATO or Five Eyes; it complements them and supports their aims.

As your Lordships will be aware, the main effort under AUKUS is the delivery of a nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia. In September last year, an 18-month programme of work commenced to understand how we can best achieve this goal. I want to be clear that Australia asked for our help in acquiring a nuclear-powered submarine; we are meeting the request of a close partner with whom we have a long history of co-operation, including on submarines. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, spoke with authority on our long-standing United Kingdom/Australia relationship.

Our work to deliver this capability for Australia reflects the unique level of trust and co-operation between our three countries, and we can rightly be proud of that. This will help Australia to fulfil its defence and security responsibilities and to promote stability and security in the region, which this Government strongly support. As your Lordships will be aware, we have built and operated a world-class nuclear-powered submarine capability for more than 60 years. We bring deep expertise and experience to this partnership, as indeed do our American allies. AUKUS showcases the UK’s competitive and innovative defence industry and our role as a global leader in science and technology.

I emphasise, because a number of your Lordships alluded to this, that the programme of work will be fully in line with our international obligations. Australia has impeccable non-proliferation credentials, and it does not, and will not, seek nuclear weapons. It is important to reiterate that the proposed submarines will use a nuclear reactor uniquely as a power source. All three partners take their obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty extremely seriously and have been in regular close contact with the International Atomic Energy Agency as this agreement moves forward into the next stage.

Let me try to deal with some specific points that arose during the debate. My noble friend Lord Lansley raised the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement. We enjoy a close and growing bilateral security relationship with Japan. AUKUS does not replace or reduce the importance of any other strands of our relationship with Japan. Instead, through AUKUS, we intend to deepen, not limit, co-operation in the Indo-Pacific region. The Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement is for these Governments to comment on, but is a sign of their developing strategic partnership.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Liddell and Lady Smith, raised the transfer of intellectual property. The agreement provides protection for the originating parties under Article VIII. As part of the ongoing programme of work, we will further consider how to deal with the exchange of intellectual property.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter and Lady Smith, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh raised the important issue of international relations, not least with France, Europe and China. We fully recognise the French disappointment. We are keen to move forward and are keeping channels of communication open. As the Prime Minister said to President Macron, we are committed to the United Kingdom-France relationship and we believe in the powerful role we can play together.

France is an important partner to the United Kingdom. We have a long-standing security and defence relationship with France that is underpinned by the Lancaster House treaties and by us being close NATO allies. We continue to consult each other daily on international defence and security matters, and that defence relationship remains strong. As was recently illustrated, our close collaboration on Afghanistan and our military deployments in the Sahel to tackle terrorism indicate that we are working together and consulting each other, just as we are working together to tackle global challenges such as climate change.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, focused particularly on China. I make clear that AUKUS is not aimed at a specific country; it is about supporting our allies and promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific region. AUKUS will work to protect our people and support a peaceful and rules-based international order. It is about the long-standing and deepening defence and security relationship between the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter, Lady Liddell and Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, specifically raised Five Eyes. That remains a unique and highly valued partnership. We have been sharing intelligence to address global threats and support international security and stability for over 60 years. We noted that Prime Minister Ardern of New Zealand welcomed the increased engagement of the United Kingdom and United States in the region. We compare notes and work together as five like-minded countries on a range of issues and in a variety of formats. Of course, each of us also has its independent foreign policy and works with different partners and in different groupings, according to context and need.

My noble friend Lady McIntosh asked about devolution. In this context, defence and foreign affairs are matters reserved for the Westminster Government, so there is no specific devolved locus on this matter. When the MoD receives inquiries from representatives of constituencies in the devolved nations or from the devolved Governments, we respond and always do our best to co-operate and be helpful.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, particularly raised the nuclear aspect to this and the responsibilities of the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. I give the reassurance that we want to reinforce the global non-proliferation architecture and set a precedent for the future that retains confidence in the fulfilment of our NPT obligations. We regularly update the International Atomic Energy Agency and are fully engaging with it throughout the 18-month feasibility study. We will continue to be transparent and consultative, especially on issues regarding nuclear materials, facilities and activities relevant to the IAEA.

The noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Bilimoria, were interested in the inherent character of this new security partnership. That is what it is. I think they were seeking clarification and reassurance. This is a partnership focused on joint capability development and technology sharing. It reflects the unique level of trust and co-operation between the UK, the United States and Australia. It is about nuclear propulsion, not nuclear weapons and, very specifically, it does not include any obligation to consider an attack upon one as an attack against all participating states. That is not the character of this agreement.

The noble Lord, Lord West, sought detail about specific representation on various groups within the UK, the United States and Australia. I do not have specific information to that level, but I shall investigate, and if I am able to share information with him, I shall do so.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My other question relates to the fact that the Americans have nominated a very high-ranking person to drive this programme. It seems that we are allowing our National Security Adviser, who is responsible for all sorts of things, to do it. As we know, because of the sheer complexity of this and the impact it might have on our CASD, our nuclear programme and all the other things, having one person to whom we can say, “Right, this is your job. You’re responsible to the National Security Adviser and the Prime Minister, and if it goes wrong, it’s your head that gets chopped off” is the sort of thing we need rather than leaving it quite so loose. Are we going to do that?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for expanding on that. As I said, I do not have specific information and I would not want to mislead him by giving him some general position that may be completely inadequate. I undertake to go back, inquire and share with the noble Lord whatever information it is possible for me to disclose.

The noble and gallant Lords, Lord Houghton and Lord Boyce, raised legitimate and understandable concerns about how all this impacts on our nuclear submarine-building programme and whether it puts any of it in jeopardy. In relation to Dreadnought, I want to make it clear that the programme remains on track to deliver to schedule and within the original budget as provided for in the strategic defence and security review in 2015. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked about the overall budget situation. I gently remind her that the defence budget settlement which we saw last year is one of the most generous that we have seen in generations. That has been recognised widely and within the defence community.

In relation to Astute submarines, which, again, the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Houghton and Lord Boyce, were interested in, my understanding is that they are making good progress and that they are all committed to be delivered by 2026.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, also raised the 1958 agreement regarding nuclear weapons. He also mentioned other historical agreements which focused on nuclear weapons. I remind the Committee that AUKUS is commencing a programme of work to identify ways to deliver a nuclear-powered but not armed submarine capability to the Royal Australian Navy. That is a gentle reminder that we are dealing with matters of nuclear propulsion under this agreement.

The noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, wished to understand how all this relates to the Five Eyes defence alliance. Let me reassure her that that is first and foremost a highly valued intelligence-sharing partnership. Over the years, it has grown beyond intelligence sharing to respond to changing threats and challenges. AUKUS is an enhanced trilateral security partnership with a specific remit. Both as individual Five Eyes nations and as a group, we will continue to work with other like-minded allies, forming the right alliances to better face specific common challenges.

The noble Baroness was also interested in how AUKUS contributes to the United Kingdom’s Indo-Pacific strategy—forgive me for sounding hoarse; as far as I am aware, I have nothing infectious, and I tested this morning before coming to mix with you all.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

A likely tale.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

It would have been difficult for the noble Lord to corroborate it; I was doing it in the privacy of my bedroom.

AUKUS is a concrete demonstration of the commitment made by the UK in the integrated review to deepen co-operation, partnerships and engagement in the Indo-Pacific. We are committed to deepening relationships with countries in that region. By 2030, the region will represent more than 40% of global GDP, so the announcement is a clear demonstration of both our interest in and commitment to that area.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, said, “Well, this is all fine and well, and we understand what it means for the Indo-Pacific area, but what about everything else in defence?” I say to her that if we take in conjunction the integrated review and the recent defence Command Paper, not to mention the recent Future Soldier paper which was the subject of a Statement in the Chamber, we see in all of those, detailed information on how we meet threat, wherever that is coming from, whether it is directed at us within the UK or at our partners and allies. We have a clear plan as to how we think we should meet that, and it is a plan that will endure in the forthcoming decades.

This is an important agreement for Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, as it is for the wider issues of stability in the region. The noble Lord, Lord West, commented both shrewdly and authoritatively on those issues. The agreement certainly reflects the importance we attach to the area in terms of the integrated review—that was also recognised by my noble friend Lord Lansley.

Ukraine: Military Equipment

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord will be aware that we engage in discussions with and make representations to Russia. Indeed, the Prime Minister spoke to President Putin on 25 October and was very clear about the views that we hold. We understand and sympathise with Ukraine, which obviously feels vulnerable, and it is our duty along with our allies and partners, particularly in NATO, to provide support and reassurance. That is what we are endeavouring to do.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the greatest risk to the survival of mankind is not global warming, it is an accidental thermonuclear war. One has only to look at the dreadful behaviour of Putin, not just around Ukraine but in a number of other ways, and his very loose talk about his de-escalatory policy of using a nuclear weapon should he be losing a conventional war, to see what the real risks are. I believe it is very important that we get the people who were around the table in Minsk when we made the Ukrainians get rid of their nuclear weapons who have failed since that time in terms of their handling of Russia. Does the Minister agree? We dealt with Crimea badly; everything that has happened with Ukraine has been dealt with badly. We need urgently to get back round the table or there will be a mistake—and, goodness me, that will be it.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

That would be a very alarming prognosis and a very unwelcome outcome, which I obviously hope can be avoided. The noble Lord is aware of the programme of engagement that has continued over a number of years with Ukraine. It is not just on the part of the UK, it is with our other allies, not least, as I said, within NATO. Ukraine enjoys a strong bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom; it is a relationship that we value and nurture and, as recent events have indicated, is it one that we support by deeds in addition to words.

Autonomous Weapons Systems

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am sorry that the noble Lord is disappointed, because I know the extent of his interest in this issue. I have tried to facilitate engagement with the department to enable him to better understand what the department is doing and why we take the views that we do. He will be aware that international consensus on a definition of laws has so far proved impossible. At this time, the UK believes that it is actually more important to understand the characteristics of systems with autonomy that would or would not enable them to be used in compliance with IHL, using this to set our potential norms of use and positive obligations.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, nations are sleepwalking to disaster. Engineers are already making autonomous drones the size of my hand that have cameras that act completely autonomously. They can, for example, have facial recognition and carry a small shaped charge, and will kill a person that that facial recognition shows. Once you release them, you release them and off they go. The firms producing these are talking in terms of, “Yes, if we had several thousands of these, gosh how wonderful, because we could kill a great chunk of a city without damaging it at all and get rid of the people there.” I find this quite horrifying. Also, these things are AI: they learn; therefore, they will learn how to kill even more than they have been programmed to. This is extremely dangerous. Do the Government agree completely that, wherever there is a kill-chain that ends up with a dead human being, there should be a human somewhere in that kill-chain to make that decision, rather than a robot?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

All weapon systems, whether with autonomous functions or not, must fully comply with the principle-based international humanitarian law framework. A robust application of that framework, I would suggest, is the best way of ensuring the lawful and ethical use of force in all circumstances. That applies to all states that might be developing autonomy in their weapons systems.

France: AUKUS

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Tuesday 19th October 2021 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord West of Spithead]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what discussions they have had with the government of France since the announcement of the AUKUS agreement.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, as neighbours, allies and partners, we have continued to engage with the French Government across a wide range of business since the AUKUS announcement.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her Answer—what there was of it. This AUKUS treaty makes a lot of sense for the Australians. We often forget the huge sea ranges in that area. For example, it is 9,000 miles from the submarine building yards in south Australia to the Chinese yards; that is the same as the distance from London to Singapore. Nuclear submarines, not conventional ones, are needed to cover those ranges, so the Australians have made the right decision. Indeed, the fact that our three countries are working together confronts the Chinese on the grey-zone work they are doing against our agreed global values; that is a good thing.

However, it rather seems that we have left the French out on the side. They are very angry. At the NATO discussions this week, they were throwing their toys out of their cot. I would like to think that we have been talking closely with them. What I really want to ask the Minister is: are we still as close as we were in terms of Royal Navy-French navy liaison and the work that both navies do together, both in NATO and outside it?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I seek to assure the noble Lord that we recognise the significance of the French Government’s reaction to AUKUS and the strength of the feeling it has generated. We have a long-standing relationship with France in global security and defence; that is founded on firm lines, not least the Lancaster House agreements. We are both committed to the same things, whether that is NATO, Euro-Atlantic security or broader global security in the Indo-Pacific and south-east Asia. A lot binds us together. We value France’s presence as a defence partner and look forward to continuing to work with it closely.

Royal Navy: Ships and Frigates

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Thursday 14th October 2021 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord West of Spithead]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government when they expect to place orders for (1) the remaining five Type 26 frigates, (2) the three Fleet Solid Support Ships, (3) the new flagship, (4) the underwater research vessel, and (5) the Type 32 frigates.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Ministry of Defence expects to place an order for the Batch 2 Type 26 frigates in the early 2020s and to award a manufacturer contract for the fleet solid support ships within two years from May 2021. The Defence Secretary has said that he aims to have the national flagship in the water by 2024 or 2025. No decisions have yet been taken on order dates for the multi-role ocean surveillance ship or for the Type 32 frigates.

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[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for her Answer. Indeed, it sounds marvellous. Having a Prime Minister who says that nothing does more for the security of our nation than building a warship for the Royal Navy obviously cheers up a sailor like me, but the reality is that he made these statements 12 months ago and not a single order has been placed since then. I am scarred by 56 years on the active list of hearing numerous things told about ships coming and their never joining the fleet. The Government said that we would have and keep a minimum of 13 frigates, which is, after all, pretty damning for a maritime nation like us. When one looks at the order rate for frigates and the possibility of the rolling programme which so many shipyards need, one has to say that we are not going to have 13 frigates as we move into this decade. Can the Minister confirm that that is the case? I do not expect her to say how many, but as somebody with an intelligence background I would think it will be considerably less.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I have outlined what is currently happening. With construction of the Type 26 progressing on the Clyde and the Type 31 progressing on the Forth at Rosyth, we have, for the first time in 30 years, two classes of frigate simultaneously under construction in UK shipyards. That means that several classes of Royal Naval ships will be in build this decade. I would have thought that, to an old seadog such as the noble Lord opposite, that would bring a beaming smile to his naval face.

Sheffield Forgemasters

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Wednesday 8th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, Sheffield Forgemasters provides key parts for our deterrent submarines and, as such, it is absolutely right and proper that the Government should ensure its continued operation under UK control. This ensures sovereign capability, which is a key plank of the integrated review. In the light of that, can the Minister say how the Government view the large number of foreign takeovers of very successful, high-tech UK firms during the past few years and the possible takeovers of Arm, Meggitt and Ultra, which are being considered at the moment?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As the noble Lord will be aware, the Government take a very keen interest in and keep a vigilant eye on security of defence supply. In relation to the specific issue that he mentions, the Government are closely monitoring the proposed acquisition of Meggitt by Parker-Hannifin. The Government have powers, as the noble Lord will be aware, under the Enterprise Act 2002, to intervene in transactions that raise national security concerns and will not hesitate to use those powers as appropriate if the UK’s national security interests are at risk.

Afghan Interpreters: UK Relocation

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Tuesday 6th July 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I think it was Plato who said that only the dead have seen the end of war, and there is no doubt that our service men and women will continue to be involved in fighting in foreign lands. Therefore, as well as the moral imperative to look after locals who have assisted us and risked their lives, there is also a self-interest, in that we will continue to need such people to help us in the future. How do other NATO nations treat similar interpreters, and has there been any discussion within NATO to try to get a common policy on how these people are handled?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I would say to the noble Lord, in alignment with my answer to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, that the UK has very much proceeded on the basis of what it considered its obligation as a sovereign state to be. That is why we have proceeded with our particular scheme. I understand that the United States has a scheme. I am not privy to the details of that scheme but we are in close contact with our US colleagues. We understand that they are not only running a similar relocation programme but doing so under their special immigration visa scheme.

Defence: Continuous At-sea Deterrence

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Yes, I can confirm to my noble friend that, to maintain the credibility of the deterrent and the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that it does remain credible and effective against a whole range of state nuclear threats from any direction, an assessment has been made. The UK will move to an overall nuclear weapons stockpile of no more than 260 warheads—an increase of 15% from the previous ceiling of 225. I make it clear this is neither a target nor the current number of warheads, but it represents the upper limit of what we think we might need to maintain the credibility of the deterrent.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, for over 50 years, the submarine-based nuclear deterrent has ensured peace and acted as the ultimate guarantor of our nation’s security against nuclear blackmail. Those involved in this complex, difficult and continuous enterprise deserve our thanks. Does the decision to run the Vulcan Naval Reactor Test Establishment at Dounreay in Scotland for three years longer than planned, to meet

“the need to support the extended scope of the operational work”,—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/21; col. 101WS.]

mean that it is related to the life extension of the Vanguard class? As the PWR2 reactor will be running innumerable submarines for many more years, has there been any reassessment of the Royal Navy reactor prototype review of 2015 to see whether Vulcan should remain operating even longer?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As the noble Lord will be aware, we are conscious of the obligations of seeing through the transition from the existing class of nuclear-armed submarines to the new Dreadnought class. That Dreadnought submarine programme remains on track to enter service in the early 2030s. There will be no compromise to the UK’s continuous at-sea deterrent. On the specific points he raises, he will understand I am unable to release specific information about supply, support and logistics. But we are satisfied that our continuous at-sea deterrent is operating effectively now and discharging all its tasks and, in the transition and beyond, will continue to do that.

Queen’s Speech

Lord West of Spithead Excerpts

Wednesday 19th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, on his maiden speech and welcome him to the House.

After every Queen’s Speech, I bemoan the lack of reference to defence, but this time, there is a whole paragraph. It refers to

“the biggest spending increase in thirty years.”

Unsurprisingly, it does not reflect that the cuts in 2010 were also the biggest for 30 years, resulting in a 30% reduction in our military capability since that date. Defence remains under huge financial pressure. However, one could only applaud the reference in the Speech to

“reinforcing the United Kingdom’s commitment to NATO.”

President Macron has given some very mixed messages about support for NATO, but despite that, it is the bedrock of European security in the face of Russian adventurism.

I am also delighted that the Government have been clear about the need to increase the size of the Royal Navy; the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newham, referred to my pleasure at that. They appear to be taking shipbuilding seriously. There is no doubt that the Royal Navy is too small and in desperate need of frigates. The ageing Type 23s, our present frigate force, are paying off year on year. The Type 31 programme for new frigates is moving ahead, although the delivery dates of 2027 and beyond will put further pressure on overall escort numbers. The Type 26 programme, our very smart frigate, is too slow, and BAE Systems needs to sharpen up its act. The three ships ordered and being built are taking for ever—the first not in service until 2027. The remaining five are still not ordered, with consequent penalties to SMEs and supply chains. The much-vaunted Type 32 programme is still not even on the drawing board. I ask the Minister: will frigate numbers drop below 10 this decade?

More broadly on the shipbuilding front, hopefully, the three fleet solid support ships will be ordered from United Kingdom yards shortly, as well as an ocean research ship and, possibly, a jack-of-all-trades royal yacht. I know how that excites people. The UK shipbuilding enterprise requires a strong order book to be able to invest for the long term and improve its competitiveness. The best way to achieve this is for the Government to take a more strategic approach to procurement and facilitate access to finance.

Today, I wish to highlight two things. First, the events in the waters surrounding Jersey throw into stark relief the dearth of Royal Navy ships patrolling, monitoring and protecting the United Kingdom’s exclusive economic zone and territorial seas. The overseas patrol squadron responsible for this consists of four minor war vessels, which assist the Marine Management Organisation in fishery protection. Two were monitoring the situation off Jersey, hence the remaining 300,000 square miles of exclusive economic zone and our territorial seas had two small RN ships for coverage. As well as fisheries duties, these ships have a responsibility for the security of oil platforms and wind farms, plus all assets in the seas around the United Kingdom, as well as a duty to assist other government agencies in protecting our coastline from illegal immigrants, terrorists, drug runners, people smugglers and organised crime. The UK coastline is 11,000 miles long. The issue of adequate monitoring and protection of this space and our coastline needs urgent attention and requires cross-departmental agreements, plus an overall increase in the number of small ships for the Navy, and other departmental assets allocated. Is such a review planned?

Regarding the sea areas around our dependencies—covering just under 3 million square miles—the Government are to be congratulated on establishing the largest marine diversity protection areas in the world. But with no vessels to monitor them, they are meaningless.

Lastly, I have a plea for a forgotten jewel in our nation’s crown: BBC Monitoring. Working in conjunction with the World Service, this organisation provides invaluable data, enabling the Government to enhance our nation’s soft power and hence its global influence. It provides detailed information on terrorist trends, jihadist or right-wing, and recently has done some incredible work on disinformation and the impact of Covid worldwide, allowing our Government to take certain actions. It also helps our hard power, with insightful reports on hotspots and trends. Does the Minister agree that the contribution of BBC Monitoring and the World Service to UK and global security is vital, and can she confirm that it will be a factor when making decisions about the future funding level of the licence fee at the next spending review?