UK Submarine Supply Chain

Lord Walney Excerpts

Wednesday 10th July 2013 Westminster Hall

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure, Mr Rosindell, to see you in the Chair this afternoon. I am pleased to have secured this important debate on the supply chain for Britain’s submarines. It is particularly timely given the expected publication, perhaps within the next few days, of the Trident alternatives review—the taxpayer-funded vehicle that one half of the coalition Government set in motion to prove that they were right all along about their idea to scrap Trident in favour of some sort of mini-deterrent. How the Government respond to the review will have a direct bearing not only on thousands of jobs across the country but on Britain’s standing as a cutting-edge manufacturing nation.

The submarines that are built by the skilled workers in my constituency are truly extraordinary. The Astute-class boat currently under construction and the Vanguards, which carry Britain’s nuclear deterrent, are among the most technologically sophisticated vessels on the planet. It is no exaggeration to describe them as more complex than the space shuttle.

Barrow is rightly proud of the role that its boats play in ensuring Britain’s security. As an aside, may I say how much I am looking forward to welcoming the Minister to Barrow shipyard next week for the laying of the keel of the six Astute-class submarines? It would be a serious mistake to think that submarine building happens only in Barrow-in-Furness. In fact, this is an enterprise that brings together at least 1,200 firms from every corner and nation of the United Kingdom. The high-tech components and parts, the cutting-edge design skills and the essential services are ultimately brought together in Barrow for the Royal Navy.

It was great to welcome the representatives of some of those firms to Westminster last week when I hosted, along with BAE Systems and the Keep our Future Afloat campaign, a well-attended reception to mark the importance of the supply chain. We were grateful to the Minister for attending and speaking so warmly about the importance of those jobs. The workplaces represented included Rolls-Royce in Derby, which produces the nuclear reactors that power the submarines; Sheffield Forgemasters, which rolls and cuts the high-quality steel for the boats; Babcock, which has employees across the country including Clydeside, Chesterfield and Ludlow; Thales from Glasgow, which makes the periscopes and other communication systems; Truflo Marine, a valve maker from Birmingham; Ultra Electronics from west London; Meltog, a tube-making firm from Leeds and MacTaggart Scott, a naval component engineers from Midlothian.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on bringing this important matter to the Chamber. He is talking about the manufacturing skills across England, Scotland and other parts of the United Kingdom. Does he feel that the retention of manufacturing skills is vital for our future and that the Government need to give a commitment to retaining the number of submarines, so that we can have a continuity of skills and supply?

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[John Woodcock]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. This is a finely balanced exercise. We are talking about enterprise stretching across the United Kingdom. Any gap, delay or reconfiguration of the programme could endanger the nation’s whole capacity to build submarines.

The firms that I have just mentioned account for at least 13,000 high-skilled manufacturing jobs—the exact sorts of jobs that everyone in this place agrees are essential if we are to rebalance the economy away from an over-dependence on the City of London and financial services. At Westminster last week, those firms made it clear just how vital the submarine programme is to them. Indeed, the chief executive of Forgemasters said that his iconic firm simply would not be able to continue trading if it lost its steel orders for naval submarines. Firms such as those, which are in almost every constituency, will be watching closely when the Trident alternatives review is published and as the debate continues on deterrent renewal in the run-up to the vote on main gate approval in 2016.

Of course the final decision on renewing Britain’s nuclear deterrent, and on what form it should take, cannot be made solely on the basis of jobs in the manufacturing sector. Quite rightly, it will primarily be an assessment of what is needed to guarantee the security of the nation against a nuclear threat in future decades. None the less, we must guard against superficially attractive half measures in the name of economising that will in fact save little or no money, seriously damage Britain’s high-tech manufacturing sector and jeopardise the country’s defences for many decades to come.

[Jonathan Lord (Woking) (Con)]

We know that the Liberal Democrats, the party of half-measures, are very half-hearted and mealy-mouthed about this issue, and it is no surprise to me that they are not represented here today. I think the direction of travel of my Conservative party, ably led and assisted by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) here, is absolutely clear; we wish to have a Trident replacement. Will the hon. Gentleman give me some assurances that the Labour party, another potential party of Government, has the same view on this matter?

[John Woodcock]

Indeed I can, and I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. As he knows, it was the previous Labour Government who took the difficult but right decision to press ahead with Vanguard renewal. We set in place that programme, and we were disappointed that, following the coalition agreement, a delay was put on main gate and the in-service date. That has stretched the programme to its limit, but the Labour party remains committed to a minimum credible deterrent as long as other countries have it. Once one makes that call and genuinely believes it, as we do, the argument that I am setting out today is that there is only one logical conclusion, which is to renew Vanguard on the programme that is under way at the moment, or indeed even to speed it up.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

My apologies for being slightly held up; the Defence Committee over-ran by a couple of minutes. I had the great privilege of visiting the yard with my hon. Friend a few weeks ago. Given the experience of the Astute programme, will he share with the Chamber the consequences of introducing another delay?

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[John Woodcock]

My hon. Friend touches on a key issue. I will come on to that in a moment if I may, because I have some important questions on which the Minister can give us some reassurance.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. I should like to revert to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Jonathan Lord), whom I thank for his kind remarks, which I did not deserve. Will the hon. Gentleman cast his mind back to the last Defence questions, when the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) made the excellent point from the Dispatch Box that if the alternatives study says that the choice is between a full-time deterrent and a part-time deterrent of, say, only two submarines, then at least we should get round to signing the contract straight away for the two submarines? I was encouraged by that and I shall be pressing the Secretary of State for a meeting to discuss that proposal so that Trident cannot again become a political football between the Liberal Democrats and the two major parties that support it.

[John Woodcock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his wise words on this issue, which we hear so often from him. There could well be a number of reasons why it makes sense to bring forward the main gate decision. Indeed, if that requires a new coalition for that one issue in this Parliament, then I know that many of us, from across the House and in this Chamber today, will be prepared to be a part of it.

I will make a little more progress. Although it seems that the Trident alternatives review is set to dismiss such options as a land-based, air-based or surface ship delivery system, and indeed to give up finally on the Liberal Democrats’ mini-deterrent fantasy of adapting Astute-class submarines to carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, recent media coverage has suggested that the review may set out proposals to abandon the UK’s posture of continuous at-sea deterrence, which for decades has ensured that at least one British deterrent submarine is operational at all times.

We read that that could take place either when the Vanguard submarines reach the end of their life or perhaps even within the next few years, if the extensive leaks to the national newspapers can be believed. Colossal savings could be realised, says the unnamed brain-box who briefed the Financial Times in May. We are also told that we could build half the boats and save half the capital costs. As the submarines are predicted to cost, on average, about £2.5 billion each, that must mean a £5 billion saving to the Exchequer. Also, we are told that £1 billion a year could be saved by downgrading Britain’s nuclear capability to a part-time deterrent. Perhaps we could even keep Britain’s nuclear warheads in a cupboard, as the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) has curiously put it in the press. Alternatively, perhaps the main gate decision could not be brought forward but further delayed, and the proposed in-service date for the new submarines could be put back yet again.

Unfortunately, I am afraid that like so much that the Minister’s coalition partners transmit on defence issues, all of that is complete bunkum. For starters, does the Minister agree that it is nursery school logic to believe that we can save half the capital by building half the boats? The outlay on the submarine fleet is not simply a matter of purchasing these submarines; it is also about investing in the ability to design and build them. Those costs are fixed, whether we order two, four or more submarines—I am not necessarily suggesting that we order more than four submarines. Therefore, can the Minister confirm that he anticipates that the first of class would cost effectively double the average across the fleet, and that the fourth boat would be the cheapest of the batch? Can he also confirm that there would be significant savings from placing a four-boat order from the outset, rather than ordering two with the option to order two more? Also, can he confirm that if the Government were inclined to press ahead with the main gate decision in this Parliament, as was originally planned, there could be further substantial savings for the British taxpayer?

Similarly, with running costs the savings would not be anything like the amount that the antis boast it would be. Will the Minister confirm that at least 70% of those costs are fixed, covering the fuelling and basing facilities, and that they will be the same whether Britain operates patrols around the clock or takes the submarines on the occasional fishing expedition once or twice a year? What is his estimate—if he can share it with the House—of the annual savings that would accrue from stepping down from a class D posture?

Also, given the high fixed costs, does the Minister agree that abandoning class D would mean a disproportionate downgrading of the deterrent’s capacity to deter the grotesque horror of a nuclear war, by removing the guarantee that currently exists, namely that any nation that launched a nuclear attack on the UK could be hit by a counter-strike no matter what damage our country sustained? Furthermore, does he agree that it would be highly perverse if those who pursue disarmament—admittedly for absolutely laudable motives—were actually to increase the risk of nuclear conflict in future decades through their unilateral gestures, rather than making the world safer? Also, if I can tempt him to speculate, does he think that it was that woolly thinking from the Liberal Democrats that has left the party in the extraordinary position of having no representation at all in the defence ministerial team at this vital moment?

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Thank goodness for that. [Laughter.]

[John Woodcock]

Well, let us see.

On the timing of main gate, will the Minister confirm that a further delay to the build process is effectively ruled out by his Department’s assessment, which was communicated to me by the Secretary of State at the last oral questions, that the Vanguard hulls would be rendered unsafe if their life was extended beyond the current 35-year plan, which of course is the longest period that any British submarine has ever been in service?

Finally, building two boats rather than four means that work across the UK supply chain could grind to a halt as early as 2031, six years earlier than is currently expected. Without more submarines to build, Barrow’s unique specialised work force will break up, as they did the last time there was a gap in the submarine drumbeat. However, as we have just discussed, the consequences would be felt in every part of the United Kingdom. That would leave us with two expensive choices. Either the Government, and taxpayers, would have to pick up the tab for the sustained unemployment of that work force, and consign to history the nation’s capacity to build submarines, with the loss of valuable skills and export spin-offs that would occur as a result, or alternatively—this is surely more likely—the Government of the day would bring forward the next submarine programme. That programme would involve the successors to the Astute class submarines, which of course have not been built yet, sooner than those vessels are actually needed from a military naval capability assessment, to keep the industrial drumbeat going. Can the Minister confirm that because that would mean that the bulk of capital spending on that next generation of boats would be required as early as the Parliament after the next one, bringing that spending forward—by bringing forward the successor to the Astute class—would completely wipe out the savings from ending continuous at-sea deterrence?

Bluntly, that is the choice that we would face if the decision was made to abandon class D. We would have to be prepared either to put at grave risk a significant part of Britain’s cutting-edge industrial base or to bring forward a significant amount of spending well before it would actually be needed.

Everyone in this House has a responsibility to guard against siren voices peddling false economies. The submarine supply chain is one of Britain’s great unsung assets, providing high-skilled manufacturing jobs that will rebalance the economy. We must not sacrifice those 13,000 jobs on the altar of cuts that would end up saving nothing significant at all but would leave the country vulnerable in future decades.

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[Mr Dunne]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reinforcing the commitment of the Conservative party, from the highest levels, to continuous at-sea deterrence. I was not aware that he had requested a meeting with the Secretary of State. I am happy to take that up, and if the Secretary of State is unavailable I am happy to meet him as a fall-back, in the first instance.

The Astute programme is crucial to sustaining the skills and the work force that we need. Through that programme, we are undertaking the planning required to prepare for the successor submarines that will replace the Vanguard class from the late 2020s. Hon. Members will be aware that we are taking the steps necessary to be ready to start building the first submarine as we lead up to a main gate decision in 2016.

The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness asked whether this decision could be advanced, saying that this might help both cement the decision and, potentially, reduce the cost. Another lesson that we have learned from shipbuilding programmes is that unless the design is mature enough at the time that the investment decision is made—in other words, if a decision is rushed—additional frictional cost could be built in, through changes to the design programme after the contract has been priced, which can delay the programme and add significantly to the cost thereafter. We do not want to repeat the mistakes made at the time of the Astute contract being laid, by making a premature decision on the successor design.

[John Woodcock]

That is a good point. Could we have main gate and then do the pricing at some point later?

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Walney Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am afraid I do not agree with him. I suspect this is a retired rear admiral—well, I know it is; and if it isn’t, he soon will be—to whom the hon. Lady refers. We are clear that the retention of the continuous-at-sea deterrent is vital to ensure Britain’s national security and is the ultimate guarantee of our sovereignty.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

I very much look forward to welcoming the Minister for defence equipment, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), and the shadow Secretary of State to my parliamentary reception on 1 July about the high-end manufacturing jobs that the submarine supply chain produces. The durability of the submarine hulls is critical to the decisions and the timing of renewal. Will the Secretary of State give the House an update on his Department’s assessment of extending the hull life to 35 years, as is currently the case, and any possible decision to extend it further in future?

[Mr Hammond]

First, I will check my diary. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind invitation.

I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman is asking if we have considered whether it is possible to extend further the life of the existing submarines or to design the successor class with a longer in-service life. On the first question, he will know that we have already extended the life of the Vanguard class once, and it is not judged possible or safe to extend it further. On the second question, we will of course be looking to design the successor class with the longest possible in-service life.

Better Defence Acquisition

Lord Walney Excerpts

Monday 10th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I hear my hon. Friend’s point but, to be blunt, I think that we have to be realistic about this and acknowledge that military personnel are not necessarily trained to be best equipped to deal with world-class industrial project managers employed on eye-wateringly large salaries by the defence contractors we have to negotiate with. It is to try to allow DE&S to engage with those multinational corporations and world-class project managers on a level playing field that we are considering these changes. There will be a role for the military in this organisation, but it will not generally be as lead project mangers.

On my hon. Friend’s other point, I am grateful to him for drawing the House’s attention to the fact that the majority of the US nuclear programme is in the hands of non-public sector organisations—federally funded research and development corporations—which look very much like GoCos.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

The strategic defence and security review in October 2010 resulted in a four-year delay to the in-service date for the Vanguard class replacement submarines. It was by no means the first project that has been shifted to the right with increased costs, but it caused particular disappointment because it was done by an Administration who, when in opposition, criticised the former Administration for doing similar things. If a GoCo is in place when such decisions are considered in future, on submarines or anything else, will it be taken out of Ministers’ hands?

[Mr Hammond]

As I have already said, Ministers will retain the ability to provide strategic direction. If the hon. Gentleman does not mind, I will take no lectures from the Opposition on shifting projects to the right at huge cost, because the previous Government shifted the carrier project two years to the right at a cost of £1.6 billion. What was actually done in 2010, in relation to the submarine enterprise, was a reconfiguration of the programme between the Astute class submarines and work on the Vanguard class replacement submarines, which resulted in a delay to the introduction into service of the Vanguard class, but within the overall constraint that we have in this country of needing to sustain a submarine yard at Barrow, and the minimum level at which we can sustain a submarine yard is building one submarine at a time. However we configure them—Vanguard class first or Astute class first—we have to provide that work flow if we are to keep that sovereign capability. That is the kind of single-source procurement that we are targeting in the announcement I made today on the single-source procurement rules.

Nuclear Deterrent

Lord Walney Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey). I am glad that he did not repeat his assertion that the world would be a better place if my constituents were sacked and sent to the Bahamas with the money from the deterrent in their back pockets. It is also good to be back speaking here again for the first time since I banged my head. All will be fine, but if at any point, Mr Speaker, I look confused and ask what all these people are doing in my bedroom, please intervene and reassure me—no, I am not that bad.

The devastation of nuclear war would be an affront to nature itself, which is why I have said on many occasions that, if we could genuinely be confident that the UK disarming would make this horror less likely, that should come ahead of even the many thousands of jobs that the industry supports in my constituency and across the country. I am proud that the last Labour Government shifted Britain’s nuclear policy for the first time towards the aim of a global zero, but we should advance non-proliferation in a way that will maintain the security of the UK and, most of all, in a way that will make a nuclear catastrophe less likely, not more so.

That is one reason why I am wary of a party that up until now has been grossly irresponsible on the question of nuclear weapons and has suddenly be given access to the levers of power. It is one thing to be a fringe concern, making up positions that sound good on the doorstep. “When money is tight”, say the Liberal Democrats”, “Let’s have a mini-deterrent”—the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on the Astute class submarines already being built in my constituency. “They would cost less”, they say, “providing more money for schools and hospitals, and they would be much less destructive than those awful Trident missiles to which the main parties are wedded. Vote for us!”

If that policy becomes a genuine possibility that could be enacted by a party of government, it will be put under scrutiny in the run-up to an election and its fundamental weaknesses exposed. The apparent savings evaporate when considered against the enormous cost of procuring new missiles—probably without a cost subsidy from the Americans this time—building new warheads from scratch, making considerable adaptations to the Astutes and writing off the £3 billion that will already have been spent on the successor by then. When the operational capacity of this “mini-deterrent” is scrutinised, we will come up against the points that the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) made so adeptly in opening this debate. All in all, this option is not a winner.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

It is really delightful to see the hon. Gentleman back in his place. The problem with using cruise missiles is precisely that they are vulnerable. The whole point of deterrence is that there should be an invulnerable system. Cruise missiles are vulnerable, which destroys the concept.

[John Woodcock]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Most of all, such cruise missiles are indistinguishable on an enemy radar from conventional cruise missiles, raising the chilling prospect that in the confusion of battle, a conventional attack by the UK could trigger nuclear retaliation against British cities.

[Sheryll Murray]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if we took up this idea, we could see another tuition fees scenario?

[John Woodcock]

I certainly know what the hon. Lady means—I am reluctant to compare tuition fees to the ultimate deterrent, but in political terms she is absolutely right.

To those looking to the latest review into the future of the deterrent and hoping that a major—and needed—push on global non-proliferation could make it possible for the UK effectively to wait and see before committing to renew, I put two questions. First, is it really realistic to expect a breakthrough within the next few years in global security—involving not just the former Soviet Union and America, but the whole world—that would give us sufficient hope that a hostile nuclear power could not plausibly threaten the United Kingdom 20, 30 or 40 years hence? That is the judgment that we have to make now. Secondly, what would be the industrial and financial consequences of a further delay, on top of the already significant increase in cost caused by the coalition Government’s delay, which enabled them to kick the main gate decision on a successor into the next Parliament?

Industrially, we must think in terms of jobs now and over coming decades. Let us not forget that we are talking not just about 5,000 or 6,000 jobs in Barrow shipyard, critical to the regional economy though they are, but about the 4,000 jobs and rising in the nuclear submarine supply chain, stretching right across the country. We must also consider the UK’s prized capacity to manufacture submarines of any kind. We rightly say that, for security reasons, we should not procure from abroad, but if we leave another gap in production like the one in the 1990s—the Astute programme is still suffering from the attempt to recover from that—we could lose those highly honed skills from these shores for ever.

Of course we should always examine new evidence, but so far all credible evidence has pointed to the same place: that like-for-like renewal is the most effective—and the most cost-effective—way of maintaining the UK’s minimum independent deterrent and that the decision to renew should be kept at arm’s length from our profound moral obligation to pursue a world free from the threat of nuclear war.

Defence Equipment and Support

Lord Walney Excerpts

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

My hon. Friend makes good points on the difficulties that SMEs believe they currently have in some of our big procurement projects. Since the move to the MOD contracting directly with prime contractors, which then handle subsidiary contracting, it would be true to say that the MOD has rather lost the skill set of managing SMEs. By the time the reforms are complete, I hope that a GOCO of the sort I have described will reinvest in those skill sets and that we will be better able to manage SMEs directly.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

In the light of what the Minister has said on sovereign capabilities, and the fact that Aldermaston is already a GOCO, how will the successor deterrent programme be different if it is transferred into a GOCO?

[Nick Harvey]

There will be very little difference. The fact of the matter, however, is that the project management undertaken on behalf of the MOD by DE&S will—I say this with considerable confidence—be better, because there will be a higher level of skills in DE&S. It will bring in a variety of new commercial skill sets of which it is currently short. That will secure better value for money and more efficient delivery of the contract.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Walney Excerpts

Monday 16th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am not aware of any such cases, but I am happy to talk to my hon. Friend outside the Chamber and to write to him.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

Further to the previous unclear answer, is the Secretary of State categorically ruling out revisiting the “cat and trap” system for the aircraft carriers?

[Mr Hammond]

I do not think that there was a previous unclear answer. We have made a decision to revert to the STOVL––short take-off and vertical landing—solution. We are highly confident of the delivery of the F-35B STOVL variant, which the US Marine Corps depends on. We have had the highest level discussions with the US Administration, who strongly support the programme. I am looking forward to seeing US Marine Corps aircraft flying at Pax River on Wednesday.

Defence Reform

Lord Walney Excerpts

Tuesday 26th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

I am sure we all wish the family member well. I did say that no criticism attaches to the shadow Secretary for his absence and I mean that most emphatically.

The matter before us is this nonsensical motion. It seems to say that the Opposition recognise the need to make the changes we are making, but the fact is that they ducked these changes year after year. They went for 12 years without a defence review, with pressure building up in the defence programme all the time, and there was a black hole of whatever size—we will come back to that in a minute—by the time of the strategic defence and security review. They left our armed forces overstretched, under-equipped and underfunded for the tasks they were set. That is the legacy of the Government in which the hon. Member for North Durham served. The blame for the need to remove platforms, reduce manpower and make the other reductions we have had to do sits very squarely at the previous Government’s door. They wrecked the economy, they wrecked the defence budget and they failed to make the changes necessary to prepare our armed forces for the future.

The hon. Member for North Durham made heavy weather of the black hole. When we began the SDSR process in the summer of 2010 we asked the officials who were presiding over it at the MOD, “What is our baseline and what is the true financial situation as we start this process?” The explanation came that if we took the manpower commitments, all the overheads and all the committed expenditure, including the contracts that had been signed for procurement and those that had been announced by the previous Government as Ministry of Defence policy, and planned to bring them on stream when the Labour party said they would be, over the 10-year period, there was a gap between all that and a “flat real” terms assumption on funding—not a “flat cash” assumption—in relation to the 2010-11 budget. We were told that the gap over the 10-year period would amount to £38 billion. It was a 10-year period because that is the length of time over which the MOD plans its budgets.

The hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) said that that was an unreasonable thing to view as a starting point. She compared it with the situation of someone who was about to go personally bankrupt aspiring to buy a Ferrari, but I do not think that is very kind to the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth). When he came to the Dispatch Box a few weeks before Christmas in 2009, he announced that there would be 22 new Chinook helicopters. He did not sign a contract or find the money to pay for them but he announced there would be 22 new Chinook helicopters. I do not know whether in the fantasy budget of the Labour party it does not think that that was a commitment, but it was one of the commitments that that Defence Secretary made, and it was on that basis that the £38 billion black hole was presented to us by officials.

I do not call into question the personal commitment of the hon. Member for North Durham, but he has to recognise that his motion opposes everything that this Government are doing and is pretty scant when it comes to proposing any alternatives. He says that he recognises the need for defence reform, but the only response in his motion is to be concerned, “anxious” and “worried” about how we are clearing up the mess he made. He has not presented one properly costed plan or given us a coherent alternative. He has not given us a plan A, let alone a plan B. He needs to recognise that he has to do better if he wants to hold us to account for what we have done.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does the Minister think the decision he has just criticised was better or worse than switching to a “cat and trap” system when first coming into office and then reversing that decision at great cost only a year later?

[Nick Harvey]

I think it was a perfectly sensible alternative to explore the “cat and trap” option. As we said at the time, it would have given us the ability to project a much better aircraft type off the carrier. I think that to commission the detailed work on that proposal was entirely responsible. If it ends up costing us the maximum, as the Secretary of State suggested, of £100 million, that is a small sum compared with the £1.5 billion the previous Government added to the carrier project in one afternoon, when they announced from the Dispatch Box that it was to be postponed by a year. That was a far greater drain on the defence budget than the relatively small bounded study, which unfortunately concluded that the costs of going ahead with the plan were such that it was not viable.

The shadow Defence Secretary has identified £5 billion of cuts that he says he supports, but that would barely scratch the surface of the black hole that his party’s Government left behind. Of course, his cuts are not new; they are already being made. On Labour’s current public plans, the defence budget would still be in chaos. They have pledged neither to make any extra savings, nor to restore the cuts that have been made. What is interesting is not what they are saying in public, but what they are saying in private. Earlier, reference was made to the interesting correspondence between the Leader of the Opposition and the shadow Defence Secretary. It is worth quoting the letter from the Leader of the Opposition to his colleague, dated 23 January this year:

“You have powerfully made the case in your recent interventions that there is no easy future for Defence expenditure and clearly in the context of the current fiscal position we can expect to have to make further savings after the next election.”

In public, the Opposition are against the cuts that we are making, but in secret, they are planning even deeper defence cuts. Today’s debate is not simply opposition, but opportunism as well.

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[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

We got a lot of heat from the Minister, but we are not much clearer on the key issue on which I want to expand—defence procurement. My hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) have already made excellent points on the issue. It is of course true that any incoming Government at the last election would have had to make savings and the process could have been difficult. The Labour Government put in place the process to consider how we should do that, but the important thing was to learn and see where the next Government could improve. So far, the signs are that this Government have comprehensively failed to do that.

When the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), who became Defence Secretary, was not making promises in opposition about increasing the size of the Army, he used to tell the House how terrible it was that Ministers increased the costs of projects by delaying them, but in government his party is doing precisely that, with significant added cost to the taxpayer.

As we have seen again today, Ministers are patting themselves on the back as if they have finally and magically squared the circle on defence procurement. I am afraid that what they have done is simply seek the appearance of order, in the manner of a child tidying his bedroom in great haste. They have done this in a number of ways. Some costs have been swept under the bed, increasing the burden on taxpayers and storing up risk for future years. In that category, of course, I include the successor deterrent.

Ministers can announce the necessary long-lead items initiated in recent weeks with as much fanfare as they like—they know that I have welcomed the commencement of each one so far—but they know that that is now being done to a tight timetable and with increased costs caused by the delay they imposed in bringing the successor into service when they first came into office. When the Defence Secretary boasts about balancing the procurement budget, he knows that that has been made possible only by shifting the project’s cost profile to the right, largely out of this spending round, which is precisely what Conservative Members used to rail against from the Opposition Benches. The extra cost of refuelling the existing Vanguard class submarines alone, which was made necessary by the delay, was estimated at between £1.2 billion and £1.4 billion by the former Secretary of State. We are yet to hear the full cost of this exercise in political management and short-term debt clearing. Perhaps the Minister will seek to enlighten us when he winds up.

In their desperation to present a false image of order, the Government have gone beyond simply sweeping things out of immediate sight. Some projects have been subjected to the procurement equivalent of being hastily hurled out of the window, with little thought for the waste that that causes or, most importantly, the implications for national security. Any claim they might have made to have got to grips with defence procurement was surely destroyed by the farce over the aircraft carriers, which my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham set out well in his speech.

The final trick for those worried about their shoddy work being exposed is simply to turn off the lights. The Government have produced no credible evidence today or in the past about where this £38 billion has come from or how it will be filled in future. We are left with a lingering lack of certainty over the cost of big-ticket items and the personnel are bearing the brunt, with the Army that the Government promised to expand possibly set to get another whack. The books are cooked on the assumption of long-term increases in MOD funding post-2015, and black holes, which were never properly described in the first place, are apparently filled. The truth is that Ministers do not have a grip on procurement or cost overruns and have failed to put considered policy and the defence interests of the nation ahead of political posturing.

Nuclear-powered Submarines

Lord Walney Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

This welcome announcement underlines just how many skilled jobs are sustained across the UK by the submarine programme, not only in Barrow. May I press the Secretary of State on what he said about the review of alternatives informing the main gate vote in 2016? Is he really saying that Ministers will form no conclusion about the review until then?

[Mr Hammond]

No, I am not saying that. I am saying that the conclusion of the review will come before the main gate decision in 2016 and will clearly therefore inform it.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Walney Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

I can assure my hon. Friend that we understand the vital importance of keeping the minimum effective nuclear deterrent for precisely the reasons she sets out so eloquently.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

The decision finally to go ahead is welcomed on the Opposition side of the House, and indeed in my constituency, but the previous Secretary of State put the cost of delaying at between £1.2 billion and £1.4 billion, so is the new Secretary of State’s estimate of the extra cost of delay higher, lower or about the same?

[Peter Luff]

I must be honest and say that I am not sure what delay the hon. Gentleman refers to, so I suggest that we have a conversation about it later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Philip Hammond]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady. My understanding, although I will have to check this, is that attrition is measured by ethnic group in the army. I will take the matter up with my Afghan counterpart on my next visit and let the hon. Lady know what I find out.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

How is the review into the alternatives to Trident going?

[Nick Harvey]

The review is making good progress and is on target to report to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister at the end of the year, as was announced by the previous Defence Secretary.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Lord Walney Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am obviously not privy to the advice given to Ministers in the previous Government by their defence advisers, nor should I be, but if the previous Government were succumbing to recommendations from the defence chiefs, they were doing them no favours by pretending that they could deliver equipment programmes for which there were no funding lines or budget cover, and when there was no prospect of their materialising.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

rose—

[Mr Hammond]

I am going to make some progress.

Does it matter that Labour’s programme was stuffed full of projects that would never and could never be delivered? I would argue that it did matter, because so long as the fantasy persisted, the doctrine and philosophy of our armed forces—[Interruption.] If the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) listens, he might understand the point being made. So long as the fantasy persisted, the doctrine and philosophy of our armed forces were built around the notion of those platforms being delivered, when what the forces really need is a realistic programme that we can deliver and that they can have confidence in, so that they can start rethinking their doctrine and operating philosophy for the future around the platforms and capabilities that we will have.

[John Woodcock]

To aid this debate, could the Secretary of State just remind the House whether his party in opposition argued for a smaller or larger Army than the then Government were prepared to support?

[Mr Hammond]

What I say to the hon. Gentleman is that we face the situation that we face. We came into office with a massive deficit, which we inherited from the previous Government, and as I shall argue, we have taken the tough decisions that, frankly, the previous Government shirked over the last few years, thereby doing the armed forces and the country no favours.

By 2010, Britain’s armed forces had endured a decade of high-tempo operations without a formal defence review and were faced with a period of acute fiscal pressure. The case for reform to ensure that the armed forces were restructured and re-equipped to protect our national security against the threats that we would face, within a budget that the nation could sustain, was unanswerable. Tough decisions were necessary to deal with problems on the scale of the inherited defence deficit, and this Government took them. I am clear, as the Prime Minister and my predecessor have been, that whatever the pain, our first duty is to put our armed forces on a sustainable basis by restructuring them for the future and putting the budgets that sustain them on a stable footing. As the SDSR acknowledged, the process of transitioning to Future Force 2020 will require us to take some calculated and carefully managed risks against certain capabilities, most prominent among which are wide-area maritime surveillance, to which the hon. Member for Bridgend referred, and carrier strike.

I regret in particular the cuts in personnel that are required to deliver that rebalancing and make the armed forces sustainable. However, in case any confusion has been created over the last few days, let me clear up one point. The headcount of military personnel will have been reduced by around 18% by 2020 compared with the 2010 baseline. That is in contrast to a 38% reduction in civilian headcount. Regrettably, some of that reduction will have to be achieved by redundancy. Where that is necessary, every opportunity is being given, and will continue to be given, for military personnel at risk of redundancy to retrain for alternative roles of which there are shortages in the armed forces.

I heard the comments of my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire earlier. Following the publication of the Select Committee’s report, I have asked for a specific briefing on the point that he raised. I would be happy to share that with him after the debate—[Interruption.] I will share it with the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) as well, if he wishes. It includes a list of the shortage trades for which suitably qualified individuals who are facing redundancy are invited to apply.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am not quite sure how to follow that quotation, so I shall confine myself to saying how moving those remarks those were.

I have to confess that I had not intended to speak today, but Members will understand why, in the circumstances, I thought I should stress the importance that my party continues to attach to retaining and renewing the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent.

I say at the outset that the nuclear deterrent should primarily and ultimately be a matter of national and global security, not of employment. If we could genuinely be confident that the UK unilaterally disarming would make the world safer for future generations of UK citizens, and would make the almost unimaginable horror and destruction of nuclear war less likely, that should of course come ahead even of the thousands of jobs that renewing the deterrent would support in my constituency and the many thousands more that it would support across the country in the supply chain. However, my simple point is that unilaterally disarming would do no such thing.

If we were to take the view that deciding now not to renew would make the UK safer, we would have to be able to make decisions about the world as we thought it would look in 30 or 40 years’ time. We would also have to believe that the unilateral gesture would pave the way for a change in behaviour by other regimes. On the latter point, disarming would show a fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of other regimes and groups that seek, or may in the future seek, nuclear capability. They do that to increase their capacity for aggression, not primarily because they fear the UK’s independent deterrent. On the former point, the pace of change has been so great in the past decade that we simply cannot possibly say with confidence that a deterrent will not be needed decades hence.

[Thomas Docherty]

My hon. Friend is demonstrating that he is probably the most knowledgeable Member on the issue of the deterrent. [Interruption.] I can see that the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) will get me afterwards.

Has my hon. Friend made any assessment of the Liberal Democrats’ current review of the deterrent and what the pitfalls might be?

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock]

That is a very important point with which I shall deal at some length in a moment. Suffice it to say for the moment that it is not simply the Liberal Democrats’ review; it is the Government’s review. They have commissioned it. The Conservative Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff), looks like he is in two minds about it, but his own party’s former Defence Secretary sanctioned and announced it. The right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), was clearly not booted out because of that particular misdemeanour.

We have to ask whether it is right for the UK to maintain its independent deterrent. It strikes me as strange that it is often the very people who rail against the hegemony of the United States of America in world affairs who are prepared to sit quietly under its nuclear umbrella and suggest that the UK should not take responsibility for its own defence. I do not include my right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown) in that comment. I am glad to see him back in his place for my speech—I think.

We should redouble our efforts to tackle the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I am proud that the previous Labour Government were explicit in setting the ultimate target of zero nuclear weapons—of a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons—but we should not accept the argument that renewal is an act of proliferation. It is not. In fact, non-renewal would be an act of unilateral disarmament. It is right that our party has left those days behind.

Given the magnitude of destruction that the use of nuclear weapons would inflict, nuclear weapons are rightly an uncomfortable issue for all hon. Members and the country, but they are a deterrent. Our holding of nuclear capability is designed to make a nuclear war less not more likely. So far, that has been successful.

[Bob Stewart]

To slightly corrupt the saying, if we wish to avoid war, we should prepare for it and have the means to stop it. I fully support what the hon. Gentleman says about deterrence.

[John Woodcock]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right—he put it far more succinctly than I did and I am grateful to him for doing so.

I want to stress in the concluding part of my speech that the current Administration are creating a level of risk around the deterrent. That should be a matter of concern to Members on both sides of the House. As an aside, I hope the Minister who winds up could address the matter that was raised this week—

[Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Moor View) (Lab)]

The Minister does not wind up.

[John Woodcock]

Oh, there are no wind-ups. Perhaps the Minister could find time to intervene in the short time remaining to make something clear. There are significant cuts to the MOD police. Do they mean that there are plans to reduce the MOD police presence at Faslane or Coulport? Would the Minister like to intervene?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)]

indicated dissent.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock]

Okay. If he wants to write and make the position clear at a later stage, that is absolutely fine.

[Peter Luff]

indicated assent.

[John Woodcock]

On the risk that has been created around renewal, the alternatives to Trident review, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East referred, will be led by the Minister for the Armed Forces—it is a shame he cannot be here for the debate. Essentially, the review uses Government resources actively to explore the idea of adapting Astute class submarines for nuclear capability that falls far short of being a deterrent. That could be a cause of increased proliferation and could increase the risk of confusion. If a cruise missile is launched from a submarine at a point of war and the aggressor nation does not know whether it is nuclear or conventionally tipped, the prospects of escalation and horrible consequences increase. The Government have put that in train and we await the review.

In conclusion, the delay in the proposed in-service date of the successor to the deterrent is—it must be stressed—driven not by national security or primarily industrial concerns, but by a political fudge to delay the vote until the next Parliament. That creates increased costs for taxpayers because the overall cost of renewing our deterrent will increase. In addition, it risks stretching the life of the current Vanguard class submarine to the limit of safe operation. Pressure on the delivery timetable of the successor has been increased by putting political deals above the national interest.