(10 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend has a good point. The hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) lectures me from the Opposition Front Bench, but it is noticeable that during that long period after 2001 when there appeared to be no limit to the scale of public spending and no limit to the level of taxation and borrowing and spending that the then Government were prepared to engage in, the armed forces did not share in that cornucopia and the consequences are here for all of us to see today.
The Conservative party continued to promise a larger Army even once the scale of the challenge facing our public finances and the country was known. Does he accept that that did a disservice to the British public and the armed forces on whom we rely?
I know that Opposition Members do not like this, but the truth is that we discovered a black hole in the finances of the Ministry of Defence that had to be dealt with if we were going to have sustainable armed forces in the future and eliminate our armed forces being asked to deploy without the equipment and protective personal equipment that they required to do so safely. We had to put that right. That has meant that some tough decisions have been made, but my understanding is that the Opposition accept the restructuring and resizing of our armed forces and that we have to have an Army of 82,000 going forward. If I am wrong about that, I should be happy to be corrected from the Front Bench and to have an explanation of how the Opposition propose to pay for a larger Army.
(10 years, 7 months ago)
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My hon. Friend makes a good point, and recruiting ex-regulars is an important part of our strategy for building the reserves, not least because ex-regulars drop straight to the trained strength if their regular Army service is recent enough. As he will know, we are currently offering an enlistment bounty for ex-regulars to join the reserves, which reflects some part of the cost saving that we make through not having to take ex-regular recruits through the full reserve training process.
This administrative quagmire is the latest part of what is becoming a worrying and costly pattern of events under the Secretary of State’s stewardship. He had a good reputation for competence around Whitehall before he took up his latest job. What has happened?
The important thing in a Department as large and complex as the Ministry of Defence, with a budget of £33 billion a year, is not to pretend that we can operate the vast range of contracts and arrangements we have in place without some failures. That is never going to happen. The challenge is to grip failure when it becomes apparent, and to manage and resolve it as quickly and efficiently as possible. I am prepared to stand on my record of delivering that kind of outcome.
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is absolutely right. There is a long history of failure in defence procurement by Governments of both main parties going back decades. We now have to construct a model that works. As I just said to the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), the former Defence Secretary, we can do a lot within the public sector in DE&S plus, but we cannot make the culture change that some people think is necessary. It is right and proper that we do what we can in the public sector to make DE&S, as a public sector body, as high a bar as we can for a private sector challenger to have to match and exceed, but we should not be afraid, once we have done our internal reform work, to allow the private sector to make proposals again to see whether it could deliver yet more value for money for the taxpayer. That is, after all, our principal responsibility.
There was surely no reason the Secretary of State had to wait until the GoCo option had collapsed before coming forward with these amended DE&S plus proposals. Does that not show that he was never truly neutral on the choice between an in-house option and a GoCo, that he wanted to rig the process in favour of a GoCo, and that that bias has blown up in his face, costing taxpayers and his own personal reputation?
I remind the hon. Gentleman that his Front-Bench spokesman welcomed the competition and said that we needed to test the GoCo proposition against the DE&S plus proposition—
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes a very good point. As the process goes forward, there is obviously a lot of concern among people who work in defence procurement. It is important that things are brought to a conclusion so that they can have some reassurance. It will be interesting to see how the process goes ahead with just one bidder. We need to ensure that that is scrutinised in the other place, as I am sure it will be. I hope that the Minister will keep us informed in the House about that ongoing process.
One of the key concerns was that if a new provider was created to run the GoCo it would effectively be difficult for another provider ever to come in and take it on. Are not those concerns aggravated by the fact that we have only one bidder going through the process to start with?
I thank my hon. Friend for that question and for his work in Committee. He raises an interesting point, as one of the concerns raised in Committee was what would happen after the nine-year process as regards renegotiating the contract. We will now have only one contractor who, if successful, will certainly be in pole position come the renegotiation at the end of the contract, whether or not any others are able to bid. We must consider those issues very carefully in the coming months as the process develops.
The other issues on which we spent a lot of time and about which there are still concerns are those on intellectual property and single-source procurement, about which we had numerous discussions in Committee. I think that industry still has concerns on those points. Part of the process is about not only reassuring the work force but ensuring confidence about working with the defence sector, because it is a major employer in this country. It is also important to ensure that we are at the leading edge of not only defence technology but security technology. Full involvement of the sector throughout the process will be very important. I think that the Bill will have an interesting passage through the other place.
We spent most of the afternoon on the reserves part of the Bill. I reiterate the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), the shadow Secretary of State: Labour Members—and Members generally—look with pride on the contribution that reservists make to our armed forces. I have seen them at first hand, in both Iraq and Afghanistan; they are very brave men and women, doing a fantastic job on our behalf.
On the process ahead, I welcome the Government’s slight change of heart on producing an annual report. May I say thank you to the Secretary of State for including mental health in that report? If he wishes for any assistance with the organisation involved, in terms of how it approaches that, I am quite willing to engage, or point him in the direction of other organisations that will be interested in knowing how mental health can be seen as a priority, because there is an issue, whether we like it or not, with reservists and mental health. I know that the Government have followed through on work that we did in government and have added to that, in terms of making sure that veterans’ mental health is seen as a priority.
On the overall position of reservists, after this afternoon’s debate, I would say that the jury was still out, but we did get some clarification from the Secretary of State on the reduction in the Regular Army. Remember, when the strategic defence and security review was first announced by the Prime Minister, there was to have been a reduction of 7,000; then the figure went down from 95,000 to 80,000. I think the Secretary of State was very candid this afternoon: that was about money, not about what was best for our armed forces.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe have not yet contracted but, as I said in response to the question asked by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), we believe that the costs of replacing the Trident deterrent will fall within the estimates set out in the 2006 White Paper. I should say to my hon. Friend that we have made significant strides to reform the way in which the submarine enterprise is conducted, and we believe that the MOD has a much firmer control of the enterprise’s cost base than has previously been the case.
Is the right hon. Gentleman keeping an open mind about the timetable? If experts and the industry tell him that there could be a more cost-effective solution for the taxpayer if the main-gate decision were to come earlier than the scheduled date of 2016, will he be alive to that, rather than sticking to the current agreement within the coalition?
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberYou know me well, Mr Deputy Speaker. Since we were serious, we have always said—[Hon. Members: “Ooh!”] Sorry: since we are being serious about our nation’s defence and have a passing affection for the public’s opinion, we have always said that we are committed to the minimum credible independent nuclear deterrent, which we believe is best delivered through a continuous at-sea deterrent. It would require a substantial body of evidence for us to change that view, but the review published today does not appear to offer such evidence. We will continue to scrutinise today’s report on the grounds of capability, cost and disarmament. Labour will also continue to look at ways in which a minimum, credible, independent nuclear deterrent can be delivered most efficiently, based on protecting our capability, delivering value for money and advancing disarmament objectives.
If you will permit me for a moment to continue straying off the topic slightly, Mr Deputy Speaker, may I put on the record the fact that the shadow Defence team deserves a great deal of credit for keeping both sides of the House on the right path, both for the thousands of jobs in my constituency and for our future defence for generations ahead?
Order. May I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that he should try to hold back his speech for tomorrow? I would not want him to use it all up today, and I think he got the point across.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
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It is a pleasure, Mr Rosindell, to see you in the Chair this afternoon. I am pleased to have secured this important debate on the supply chain for Britain’s submarines. It is particularly timely given the expected publication, perhaps within the next few days, of the Trident alternatives review—the taxpayer-funded vehicle that one half of the coalition Government set in motion to prove that they were right all along about their idea to scrap Trident in favour of some sort of mini-deterrent. How the Government respond to the review will have a direct bearing not only on thousands of jobs across the country but on Britain’s standing as a cutting-edge manufacturing nation.
The submarines that are built by the skilled workers in my constituency are truly extraordinary. The Astute-class boat currently under construction and the Vanguards, which carry Britain’s nuclear deterrent, are among the most technologically sophisticated vessels on the planet. It is no exaggeration to describe them as more complex than the space shuttle.
Barrow is rightly proud of the role that its boats play in ensuring Britain’s security. As an aside, may I say how much I am looking forward to welcoming the Minister to Barrow shipyard next week for the laying of the keel of the six Astute-class submarines? It would be a serious mistake to think that submarine building happens only in Barrow-in-Furness. In fact, this is an enterprise that brings together at least 1,200 firms from every corner and nation of the United Kingdom. The high-tech components and parts, the cutting-edge design skills and the essential services are ultimately brought together in Barrow for the Royal Navy.
It was great to welcome the representatives of some of those firms to Westminster last week when I hosted, along with BAE Systems and the Keep our Future Afloat campaign, a well-attended reception to mark the importance of the supply chain. We were grateful to the Minister for attending and speaking so warmly about the importance of those jobs. The workplaces represented included Rolls-Royce in Derby, which produces the nuclear reactors that power the submarines; Sheffield Forgemasters, which rolls and cuts the high-quality steel for the boats; Babcock, which has employees across the country including Clydeside, Chesterfield and Ludlow; Thales from Glasgow, which makes the periscopes and other communication systems; Truflo Marine, a valve maker from Birmingham; Ultra Electronics from west London; Meltog, a tube-making firm from Leeds and MacTaggart Scott, a naval component engineers from Midlothian.
I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on bringing this important matter to the Chamber. He is talking about the manufacturing skills across England, Scotland and other parts of the United Kingdom. Does he feel that the retention of manufacturing skills is vital for our future and that the Government need to give a commitment to retaining the number of submarines, so that we can have a continuity of skills and supply?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. This is a finely balanced exercise. We are talking about enterprise stretching across the United Kingdom. Any gap, delay or reconfiguration of the programme could endanger the nation’s whole capacity to build submarines.
The firms that I have just mentioned account for at least 13,000 high-skilled manufacturing jobs—the exact sorts of jobs that everyone in this place agrees are essential if we are to rebalance the economy away from an over-dependence on the City of London and financial services. At Westminster last week, those firms made it clear just how vital the submarine programme is to them. Indeed, the chief executive of Forgemasters said that his iconic firm simply would not be able to continue trading if it lost its steel orders for naval submarines. Firms such as those, which are in almost every constituency, will be watching closely when the Trident alternatives review is published and as the debate continues on deterrent renewal in the run-up to the vote on main gate approval in 2016.
Of course the final decision on renewing Britain’s nuclear deterrent, and on what form it should take, cannot be made solely on the basis of jobs in the manufacturing sector. Quite rightly, it will primarily be an assessment of what is needed to guarantee the security of the nation against a nuclear threat in future decades. None the less, we must guard against superficially attractive half measures in the name of economising that will in fact save little or no money, seriously damage Britain’s high-tech manufacturing sector and jeopardise the country’s defences for many decades to come.
We know that the Liberal Democrats, the party of half-measures, are very half-hearted and mealy-mouthed about this issue, and it is no surprise to me that they are not represented here today. I think the direction of travel of my Conservative party, ably led and assisted by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) here, is absolutely clear; we wish to have a Trident replacement. Will the hon. Gentleman give me some assurances that the Labour party, another potential party of Government, has the same view on this matter?
Indeed I can, and I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. As he knows, it was the previous Labour Government who took the difficult but right decision to press ahead with Vanguard renewal. We set in place that programme, and we were disappointed that, following the coalition agreement, a delay was put on main gate and the in-service date. That has stretched the programme to its limit, but the Labour party remains committed to a minimum credible deterrent as long as other countries have it. Once one makes that call and genuinely believes it, as we do, the argument that I am setting out today is that there is only one logical conclusion, which is to renew Vanguard on the programme that is under way at the moment, or indeed even to speed it up.
My apologies for being slightly held up; the Defence Committee over-ran by a couple of minutes. I had the great privilege of visiting the yard with my hon. Friend a few weeks ago. Given the experience of the Astute programme, will he share with the Chamber the consequences of introducing another delay?
My hon. Friend touches on a key issue. I will come on to that in a moment if I may, because I have some important questions on which the Minister can give us some reassurance.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. I should like to revert to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Jonathan Lord), whom I thank for his kind remarks, which I did not deserve. Will the hon. Gentleman cast his mind back to the last Defence questions, when the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) made the excellent point from the Dispatch Box that if the alternatives study says that the choice is between a full-time deterrent and a part-time deterrent of, say, only two submarines, then at least we should get round to signing the contract straight away for the two submarines? I was encouraged by that and I shall be pressing the Secretary of State for a meeting to discuss that proposal so that Trident cannot again become a political football between the Liberal Democrats and the two major parties that support it.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his wise words on this issue, which we hear so often from him. There could well be a number of reasons why it makes sense to bring forward the main gate decision. Indeed, if that requires a new coalition for that one issue in this Parliament, then I know that many of us, from across the House and in this Chamber today, will be prepared to be a part of it.
I will make a little more progress. Although it seems that the Trident alternatives review is set to dismiss such options as a land-based, air-based or surface ship delivery system, and indeed to give up finally on the Liberal Democrats’ mini-deterrent fantasy of adapting Astute-class submarines to carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, recent media coverage has suggested that the review may set out proposals to abandon the UK’s posture of continuous at-sea deterrence, which for decades has ensured that at least one British deterrent submarine is operational at all times.
We read that that could take place either when the Vanguard submarines reach the end of their life or perhaps even within the next few years, if the extensive leaks to the national newspapers can be believed. Colossal savings could be realised, says the unnamed brain-box who briefed the Financial Times in May. We are also told that we could build half the boats and save half the capital costs. As the submarines are predicted to cost, on average, about £2.5 billion each, that must mean a £5 billion saving to the Exchequer. Also, we are told that £1 billion a year could be saved by downgrading Britain’s nuclear capability to a part-time deterrent. Perhaps we could even keep Britain’s nuclear warheads in a cupboard, as the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) has curiously put it in the press. Alternatively, perhaps the main gate decision could not be brought forward but further delayed, and the proposed in-service date for the new submarines could be put back yet again.
Unfortunately, I am afraid that like so much that the Minister’s coalition partners transmit on defence issues, all of that is complete bunkum. For starters, does the Minister agree that it is nursery school logic to believe that we can save half the capital by building half the boats? The outlay on the submarine fleet is not simply a matter of purchasing these submarines; it is also about investing in the ability to design and build them. Those costs are fixed, whether we order two, four or more submarines—I am not necessarily suggesting that we order more than four submarines. Therefore, can the Minister confirm that he anticipates that the first of class would cost effectively double the average across the fleet, and that the fourth boat would be the cheapest of the batch? Can he also confirm that there would be significant savings from placing a four-boat order from the outset, rather than ordering two with the option to order two more? Also, can he confirm that if the Government were inclined to press ahead with the main gate decision in this Parliament, as was originally planned, there could be further substantial savings for the British taxpayer?
Similarly, with running costs the savings would not be anything like the amount that the antis boast it would be. Will the Minister confirm that at least 70% of those costs are fixed, covering the fuelling and basing facilities, and that they will be the same whether Britain operates patrols around the clock or takes the submarines on the occasional fishing expedition once or twice a year? What is his estimate—if he can share it with the House—of the annual savings that would accrue from stepping down from a class D posture?
Also, given the high fixed costs, does the Minister agree that abandoning class D would mean a disproportionate downgrading of the deterrent’s capacity to deter the grotesque horror of a nuclear war, by removing the guarantee that currently exists, namely that any nation that launched a nuclear attack on the UK could be hit by a counter-strike no matter what damage our country sustained? Furthermore, does he agree that it would be highly perverse if those who pursue disarmament—admittedly for absolutely laudable motives—were actually to increase the risk of nuclear conflict in future decades through their unilateral gestures, rather than making the world safer? Also, if I can tempt him to speculate, does he think that it was that woolly thinking from the Liberal Democrats that has left the party in the extraordinary position of having no representation at all in the defence ministerial team at this vital moment?
Well, let us see.
On the timing of main gate, will the Minister confirm that a further delay to the build process is effectively ruled out by his Department’s assessment, which was communicated to me by the Secretary of State at the last oral questions, that the Vanguard hulls would be rendered unsafe if their life was extended beyond the current 35-year plan, which of course is the longest period that any British submarine has ever been in service?
Finally, building two boats rather than four means that work across the UK supply chain could grind to a halt as early as 2031, six years earlier than is currently expected. Without more submarines to build, Barrow’s unique specialised work force will break up, as they did the last time there was a gap in the submarine drumbeat. However, as we have just discussed, the consequences would be felt in every part of the United Kingdom. That would leave us with two expensive choices. Either the Government, and taxpayers, would have to pick up the tab for the sustained unemployment of that work force, and consign to history the nation’s capacity to build submarines, with the loss of valuable skills and export spin-offs that would occur as a result, or alternatively—this is surely more likely—the Government of the day would bring forward the next submarine programme. That programme would involve the successors to the Astute class submarines, which of course have not been built yet, sooner than those vessels are actually needed from a military naval capability assessment, to keep the industrial drumbeat going. Can the Minister confirm that because that would mean that the bulk of capital spending on that next generation of boats would be required as early as the Parliament after the next one, bringing that spending forward—by bringing forward the successor to the Astute class—would completely wipe out the savings from ending continuous at-sea deterrence?
Bluntly, that is the choice that we would face if the decision was made to abandon class D. We would have to be prepared either to put at grave risk a significant part of Britain’s cutting-edge industrial base or to bring forward a significant amount of spending well before it would actually be needed.
Everyone in this House has a responsibility to guard against siren voices peddling false economies. The submarine supply chain is one of Britain’s great unsung assets, providing high-skilled manufacturing jobs that will rebalance the economy. We must not sacrifice those 13,000 jobs on the altar of cuts that would end up saving nothing significant at all but would leave the country vulnerable in future decades.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reinforcing the commitment of the Conservative party, from the highest levels, to continuous at-sea deterrence. I was not aware that he had requested a meeting with the Secretary of State. I am happy to take that up, and if the Secretary of State is unavailable I am happy to meet him as a fall-back, in the first instance.
The Astute programme is crucial to sustaining the skills and the work force that we need. Through that programme, we are undertaking the planning required to prepare for the successor submarines that will replace the Vanguard class from the late 2020s. Hon. Members will be aware that we are taking the steps necessary to be ready to start building the first submarine as we lead up to a main gate decision in 2016.
The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness asked whether this decision could be advanced, saying that this might help both cement the decision and, potentially, reduce the cost. Another lesson that we have learned from shipbuilding programmes is that unless the design is mature enough at the time that the investment decision is made—in other words, if a decision is rushed—additional frictional cost could be built in, through changes to the design programme after the contract has been priced, which can delay the programme and add significantly to the cost thereafter. We do not want to repeat the mistakes made at the time of the Astute contract being laid, by making a premature decision on the successor design.
That is a good point. Could we have main gate and then do the pricing at some point later?
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am afraid I do not agree with him. I suspect this is a retired rear admiral—well, I know it is; and if it isn’t, he soon will be—to whom the hon. Lady refers. We are clear that the retention of the continuous-at-sea deterrent is vital to ensure Britain’s national security and is the ultimate guarantee of our sovereignty.
I very much look forward to welcoming the Minister for defence equipment, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), and the shadow Secretary of State to my parliamentary reception on 1 July about the high-end manufacturing jobs that the submarine supply chain produces. The durability of the submarine hulls is critical to the decisions and the timing of renewal. Will the Secretary of State give the House an update on his Department’s assessment of extending the hull life to 35 years, as is currently the case, and any possible decision to extend it further in future?
First, I will check my diary. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind invitation.
I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman is asking if we have considered whether it is possible to extend further the life of the existing submarines or to design the successor class with a longer in-service life. On the first question, he will know that we have already extended the life of the Vanguard class once, and it is not judged possible or safe to extend it further. On the second question, we will of course be looking to design the successor class with the longest possible in-service life.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI hear my hon. Friend’s point but, to be blunt, I think that we have to be realistic about this and acknowledge that military personnel are not necessarily trained to be best equipped to deal with world-class industrial project managers employed on eye-wateringly large salaries by the defence contractors we have to negotiate with. It is to try to allow DE&S to engage with those multinational corporations and world-class project managers on a level playing field that we are considering these changes. There will be a role for the military in this organisation, but it will not generally be as lead project mangers.
On my hon. Friend’s other point, I am grateful to him for drawing the House’s attention to the fact that the majority of the US nuclear programme is in the hands of non-public sector organisations—federally funded research and development corporations—which look very much like GoCos.
The strategic defence and security review in October 2010 resulted in a four-year delay to the in-service date for the Vanguard class replacement submarines. It was by no means the first project that has been shifted to the right with increased costs, but it caused particular disappointment because it was done by an Administration who, when in opposition, criticised the former Administration for doing similar things. If a GoCo is in place when such decisions are considered in future, on submarines or anything else, will it be taken out of Ministers’ hands?
As I have already said, Ministers will retain the ability to provide strategic direction. If the hon. Gentleman does not mind, I will take no lectures from the Opposition on shifting projects to the right at huge cost, because the previous Government shifted the carrier project two years to the right at a cost of £1.6 billion. What was actually done in 2010, in relation to the submarine enterprise, was a reconfiguration of the programme between the Astute class submarines and work on the Vanguard class replacement submarines, which resulted in a delay to the introduction into service of the Vanguard class, but within the overall constraint that we have in this country of needing to sustain a submarine yard at Barrow, and the minimum level at which we can sustain a submarine yard is building one submarine at a time. However we configure them—Vanguard class first or Astute class first—we have to provide that work flow if we are to keep that sovereign capability. That is the kind of single-source procurement that we are targeting in the announcement I made today on the single-source procurement rules.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey). I am glad that he did not repeat his assertion that the world would be a better place if my constituents were sacked and sent to the Bahamas with the money from the deterrent in their back pockets. It is also good to be back speaking here again for the first time since I banged my head. All will be fine, but if at any point, Mr Speaker, I look confused and ask what all these people are doing in my bedroom, please intervene and reassure me—no, I am not that bad.
The devastation of nuclear war would be an affront to nature itself, which is why I have said on many occasions that, if we could genuinely be confident that the UK disarming would make this horror less likely, that should come ahead of even the many thousands of jobs that the industry supports in my constituency and across the country. I am proud that the last Labour Government shifted Britain’s nuclear policy for the first time towards the aim of a global zero, but we should advance non-proliferation in a way that will maintain the security of the UK and, most of all, in a way that will make a nuclear catastrophe less likely, not more so.
That is one reason why I am wary of a party that up until now has been grossly irresponsible on the question of nuclear weapons and has suddenly be given access to the levers of power. It is one thing to be a fringe concern, making up positions that sound good on the doorstep. “When money is tight”, say the Liberal Democrats”, “Let’s have a mini-deterrent”—the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on the Astute class submarines already being built in my constituency. “They would cost less”, they say, “providing more money for schools and hospitals, and they would be much less destructive than those awful Trident missiles to which the main parties are wedded. Vote for us!”
If that policy becomes a genuine possibility that could be enacted by a party of government, it will be put under scrutiny in the run-up to an election and its fundamental weaknesses exposed. The apparent savings evaporate when considered against the enormous cost of procuring new missiles—probably without a cost subsidy from the Americans this time—building new warheads from scratch, making considerable adaptations to the Astutes and writing off the £3 billion that will already have been spent on the successor by then. When the operational capacity of this “mini-deterrent” is scrutinised, we will come up against the points that the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) made so adeptly in opening this debate. All in all, this option is not a winner.
It is really delightful to see the hon. Gentleman back in his place. The problem with using cruise missiles is precisely that they are vulnerable. The whole point of deterrence is that there should be an invulnerable system. Cruise missiles are vulnerable, which destroys the concept.
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Most of all, such cruise missiles are indistinguishable on an enemy radar from conventional cruise missiles, raising the chilling prospect that in the confusion of battle, a conventional attack by the UK could trigger nuclear retaliation against British cities.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if we took up this idea, we could see another tuition fees scenario?
I certainly know what the hon. Lady means—I am reluctant to compare tuition fees to the ultimate deterrent, but in political terms she is absolutely right.
To those looking to the latest review into the future of the deterrent and hoping that a major—and needed—push on global non-proliferation could make it possible for the UK effectively to wait and see before committing to renew, I put two questions. First, is it really realistic to expect a breakthrough within the next few years in global security—involving not just the former Soviet Union and America, but the whole world—that would give us sufficient hope that a hostile nuclear power could not plausibly threaten the United Kingdom 20, 30 or 40 years hence? That is the judgment that we have to make now. Secondly, what would be the industrial and financial consequences of a further delay, on top of the already significant increase in cost caused by the coalition Government’s delay, which enabled them to kick the main gate decision on a successor into the next Parliament?
Industrially, we must think in terms of jobs now and over coming decades. Let us not forget that we are talking not just about 5,000 or 6,000 jobs in Barrow shipyard, critical to the regional economy though they are, but about the 4,000 jobs and rising in the nuclear submarine supply chain, stretching right across the country. We must also consider the UK’s prized capacity to manufacture submarines of any kind. We rightly say that, for security reasons, we should not procure from abroad, but if we leave another gap in production like the one in the 1990s—the Astute programme is still suffering from the attempt to recover from that—we could lose those highly honed skills from these shores for ever.
Of course we should always examine new evidence, but so far all credible evidence has pointed to the same place: that like-for-like renewal is the most effective—and the most cost-effective—way of maintaining the UK’s minimum independent deterrent and that the decision to renew should be kept at arm’s length from our profound moral obligation to pursue a world free from the threat of nuclear war.