Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, it has already been pointed out that under the current terms of the Bill, the powers of the police and crime panels are limited to a veto over the appointment of the chief constable and a veto over the precept. The purpose of this group of amendments, moved by my noble friend Lady Henig, is to provide police and crime panels with the powers to act as a much more effective check on the way the proposed police and crime commissioners exercise the considerable powers given to them under the terms of the Bill. As my noble friend Lady Henig has said, the main amendments refer specifically to conduct and complaints, and to the issues of accounts and audit.
The amendments provide for an independent sub-committee or sub-committees to deal with the issues of conduct, complaints and audit, with an independent person chairing the sub-committee, at least three other independent members and up to another three who are police and crime panel members, at least one of whom must be a co-opted member. These independent sub-committees must be established by the police and crime panels.
The amendments provide also for a police and crime panel to require information it needs from the police and crime commissioner and they would change the criteria relating to the powers to suspend the police and crime commissioner to include where the commissioner has breached any required standards of conduct pending investigation of the allegations brought against them. The amendments provide also for a code of conduct for police commission members to be formulated by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, covering standards of behaviour, commitment to equalities and conflicts of interest.
The amendments proposed by the Government, to which the Minister will presumably refer, appear to lack the strength and robustness in relation to police and crime panels of those proposed by my noble friend Lady Henig and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond. As has been said, those amendments come back to the issue that has been raised on a number of occasions during our discussions on the Bill: namely, where are the checks and balances to address the abuse or misuse of the considerable personal powers given to the police and crime commissioners? What is the effective role and purpose of a police and crime panel if it is not to be able to provide part of those checks and balances and thus help ensure that a police and crime commissioner pays regard to the views and concerns of such panels, providing them with the information they need to carry out a meaningful role and thereby helping enhance confidence in the system and structure on the part of the public?
If the Government have really been listening to concerns expressed in your Lordships' House, including over appropriate financial and ethical governance arrangements, they will support the thrust of these amendments.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, parallel to our discussions on this Bill, the Localism Bill is in Committee. In that, there has been discussion both on a code of conduct and on the need for a standards committee. There has been discussion around whether the code of conduct should be voluntary or statutory—there is a strong view, I think, in your Lordships' House that it should be the latter. On standards committees, which are likely to be abolished under the Bill, I also detected in your Lordships' House strong support for each local council having such a committee.
Irrespective of that, there are two major issues of principle here. The first is the role of audit, which, it is important to bear in mind, is not the same as scrutiny and which has statutory force in local government. The second is that audit should be independently led. The powers currently given to the panels are insufficient to deliver those two principles.
Audit is not just about finance; it is also about a whole range of matters including procurement policy, contracting, managing very large budgets, procedures being followed, human resources policies and equal opportunities. An amendment is being made here which I hope the Government might find helpful. It proposes that audit be fundamental part of the checks and balances we need in relation to a police and crime commissioner. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause is right in stating that every police and crime panel should deal with complaints and conduct matters, monitor the discharge of the police and crime commissioner’s functions and monitor the accounts and audit matters of the relevant police commission, police and crime commissioner and chief constable as the case may be.
The question is whether that task should be undertaken simply by the panel or whether a slightly different structure is needed. I think that a different structure is needed, because audit is an important issue when public money is being looked after. There should be two sub-committees—I refer here to subsection (2) of the proposed new clause—one of which looks specifically at audit and the other at conduct and complaints.
The proposal in Amendment 117 relates to the nature of the independence of the sub-committee. To have someone who is independent and appointed according to Nolan principles chair that sub-committee is important. To have then at least three other independent people, balanced by up to three panel members, means that the public would gain confidence in that structure because they would see that there were more independent members than members of the panel.
At the heart of the problem is the fact that no governance structure lies underneath an elected police and crime commissioner. In other words, there is a perception in the Bill if you simply have direct election of a commissioner there is legitimacy in that. Well, of course there is, but one has to have checks and balances—which the coalition agreement has identified and said have to be strict. Having a clear audit function which is publicly accountable is a matter of fundamental importance; otherwise, those checks and balances cannot be properly delivered.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, for her very detailed amendment and for the care and attention which she has given to this important area of checks and balances. She offers in effect an alternative model to that offered in Clause 32 and Schedule 7 and wishes to replace Schedule 7 with this lengthy and detailed amendment. Schedule 7 sets out that regulations subject to affirmative resolution will be brought to this House to set up a model that is not fundamentally different from what the noble Baroness is proposing, but in which we see the police and crime panel as the body which provides the checks and balances to the police and crime commissioner. To that end, the police and crime panel would set up its own committees, which would be part of the process through which the ongoing process of scrutiny is attended. Schedule 7 talks precisely about that level of complaints which goes underneath criminal activity; that is, inappropriate behaviour, referred to in Clause 32 and Schedule 7 as “conduct matters”. Schedule 7 states specifically that the police and crime panel will deal with conduct matters which are below the level of criminality.
The amendment would expand the panel's role as a scrutiny body, but presents an alternative model. We have set out in the Bill a framework which addresses the conduct of commissioners, including complaints against them. We have been careful also to read across—I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley—to the Localism Bill and the changes made there. We are doing our best to balance out some of the problems that we have been left with from the previous regime which arose from the Standards Board for England being exploited by some political parties against their opponents. We stress throughout the Bill that all those involved in the management and scrutiny of policing are subject to the Nolan principles on conduct in public life.
The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, talked about the importance of audit and the extent to which the audit function is allied to but separate from the ongoing process of scrutiny. The police and crime panel will receive audit reports and will be designated as such for the purposes of the Audit Commission Act. The police and crime panel will thus hold to account the police and crime commissioner for the group audit of the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable. The police and crime commissioner will hold the chief constable to account for their audit. It will be entirely appropriate for the police and crime commissioner to form an audit committee, if he or she wishes to do so, in order to monitor the chief constable’s fulfilment of that purpose. The police and crime panel, or a committee of the police and crime panel, will act as an audit committee for the PCC. The detail of the PCC complaints regime will be in regulations. It is not in the Bill, as Schedule 7 sets out. Regulations will state that complaints not involving criminal allegations will be resolved by the PCP. This is the appropriate-level approach that I suggest the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, is asking for. We are already providing for police and crime panels to be able to require the attendance of the PCC, or members of its staff, in order to answer questions.
The PCP will have a role in referring allegations to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and in receiving reports from the IPCC. Where the IPCC determines that there are reasonable grounds for an investigation to be established, the PCP shall receive a report of that investigation once it has been concluded. The government amendments, which are intended to address criticisms made of the Government’s preferred model, will mean that any criminal allegations against the mayor, the deputy mayor for policing and crime and the deputy PCC would be the subject of scrutiny by the IPCC. I apologise for the acronyms.
In the case of the mayor, criminal allegations would be the subject of scrutiny by the IPCC whether or not the allegation was connected to his or her role as the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. Where a complaint against the mayor, or against a deputy mayor for policing and crime who is an Assembly Member, is not serious enough to require investigation by or under the management of the IPCC, the regulations will provide for it to be dealt with under the local government standards legislation that is applicable to the mayor and Members of the Assembly. Subject to the will of Parliament, that legislation will be amended by the Localism Bill, with which a number of the noble Lords taking part in these discussions are at present engaged.
We accept that removing the reference to “other corrupt behaviour” would achieve greater clarity without significantly reducing the scope of the provisions. Behaviour that could be regarded as corrupt is highly likely to involve the commission of some criminal offence in any event. Any complaints or allegations which fall below this test will be left for the police and crime panel, or for a committee of the police and crime panel, to handle. The mechanism for these complaints will also be set out in the regulations. These regulations will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, and noble Lords will therefore have the opportunity of debating the finer detail of these procedures when they are introduced to the House. I hope that that provides some assurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, and will persuade her to accept and support government Amendments 151, 152, 153 and so on.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Shipley
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 121 and 123. I mention in passing that it seems clear that the objective of Amendment 140, on which we might have said some things, has been achieved by Amendment 139.
I share some of the concerns of my noble friend Lord Newton. This is a complex matter that requires further thought. We have had some concern about the small size of the panel, so the Government’s proposal is welcome. We had wanted four co-opted members and 15 local authority members, making a total of 19 altogether. It is important that the panel is not too big—otherwise it might become unwieldy—but it has to be big enough to enable the diversity and geographical requirements to be met as part of the construction of that panel. Otherwise, it will not represent the area that it seeks to represent.
There are two outstanding issues. The first relates to the political balance of parties. It could be possible for a party-political label to be attached to the elected commissioner, and that party could have a massive majority of the local authority representatives nominated to the panel. That is not in the interests of the general public, and there has to be a system of meeting what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, pointed out—that the issue of proportionality must be delivered. Otherwise, the public will not have confidence in the ability of the panel to scrutinise independently and objectively the work of the commissioner.
The second issue that will have to be addressed is that of substitutes. Whatever the size of the panel, the fact remains that if people send apologies some local authority areas simply will not be represented at a key meeting. It would not be sustainable for a debate on the precept level to be undertaken without some councils being present at it. The issue of substitutes has to be urgently addressed. It is entirely possible that there could be an outcome, given the vote that we have just had, where, thanks to a majority of the members of the panel, if people were not present at the meeting, a different result could have been obtained had there been a higher turnout because of the way in which the veto operates. There is then a question of whether telephone or video attendance would be acceptable.
These are not secondary matters; they are fundamental. If a local authority finds that it cannot be present at a critical meeting and yet, for example, a precept is approved that it would not have supported, that is not going to be sustainable even in the short term. The Government will have to come up with some amendments regarding that.
Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton
My Lords, I am slightly confused now. Those of us who argued for the “of those present” amendment now see the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, talking about the need for substitutes, without which the right result may not come out. That is a little confusing.
I am standing up because I have a déjà vu about a déjà vu. I remember advising the Minister to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, about the way that he achieved the political balance that her Bill seeks to achieve but I believe, from the contributions today, does not achieve. Like the noble Lord, I, too, live in an area where the police authority has a lot of different local authorities—Essex also has many different local authorities—which is a situation that arises across the country. However, the noble Lord, Lord Howard, as Home Secretary, spent a great deal of time achieving a balance to counteract political dominance of police authorities that was unrepresentative of the local community, and ensuring that no one party—rather than no one person—could dominate and pervert the views of the local area.
The proposal before us today puts most of the power in the hands of an individual who may have been one of the people whom Michael Howard, as he was in those days, thought was unsuitable to dominate what was happening in policing, backed up by a system on the panel that will not give diversity. I hope the noble Baroness will be able to assure me that this proposal, rather than my noble friend’s amendment, carries the Michael Howard seal of approval to ensure balance. Although I did not always agree with him when he was Home Secretary, I recollect that he worked very hard to do something that the present Government are busily unpicking. They ought to stop it.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Shipley
My Lords, I shall be very brief. This is an extremely important group of amendments. As noble Lords have said, the amendments address the importance of having appropriate checks and balances in place. In this grouping, while welcoming government amendments, I suggest that it should be possible for the Government to go further in line with some of the amendments that have been tabled and spoken to already in this group. The appointment, suspension and dismissal of a senior officer is a very serious matter where checks and balances are essential if proper procedures and natural justice are to be followed.
On the first day of Report, I commented on the lack of checks and balances on both the commissioner and the commissioner’s deputy in making senior appointments to the commissioner’s staff. This group of amendments relates to senior officers, and it is important to ensure that proper procedures are followed and that individuals making appointments are subject to appropriate checks and balances. What I am seeking to do in supporting some of the amendments in this group and in what I said on day one of Report about the commissioner’s own office is to ensure that the public have confidence in the process that is being followed. It is helpful, therefore, to have amendments that clarify the role of commissioners in senior police appointments and it is important that they be consulted as part of any changes to those appointments. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look at Amendments 186A to 186F, 189A and 193A very carefully because they clarify a lot of detail, not least the circumstances in which suspensions should be considered and who should be involved in those.
At the heart of all this is public confidence in the system—the appointment, the suspension and the dismissal of senior officers. The public know that, at different stages, the chief constable, the chair of the panel, the panel, the Chief Inspector of Constabulary and indeed the Secretary of State all might have roles in considering the position of a senior officer. With these amendments, there would be a significant improvement in public understanding and confidence in the system that is being followed. That is why I hope that my noble friend the Minister will consider very carefully what is said in debating this group of amendments.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Dear
My Lords, I do not speak in favour of this amendment. We are probably dancing on the head of a pin. It seems we all agree that a protocol or a memorandum of understanding is vital. It is the form that it will take that is a matter of debate for us today and, perhaps, in further stages of this procedure. It seems that one can hardly discuss the detail of this while it is still in draft. We are promised the draft before the full stage is passed in your Lordships’ House, but I find that a difficulty in itself.
My main concern is that by putting it into the Bill or having it standing part and parcel alongside the Bill with statutory force, it would become too prescriptive. This Bill is already in grave danger of being too prescriptive on a number of issues. One has to leave things such as this to the good nature, good judgment and experience of those who will be handling those issues, and while I support the protocol we should not necessarily go so far as to give it statutory authority.
I would say in passing that although ACPO has quite wisely kept well away from making political statements about this Bill—its fingers were burned two or three years ago by getting too closely involved in politics, and it is wise to keep out of this at the moment—I would be surprised if chief constables and chief officers of police would want to see a protocol bound into such an Act. I would think that they would want to operate against a background of advice that can be amended in the light of experience. That is my view, not theirs; I am not in a position to speak for them but that is how I would expect them to react.
On a small point of detail in Amendment 4B, I noticed that the Central Motorway Police Group is included in a group of police authorities. I ask those who tabled the amendment, if they take it to a vote, to check whether the Central Motorway Police Group now has the same statutory basis as a police force. When it was set up it was subject to a collaboration agreement. To the best of my understanding it is still subject to such an agreement, which is very different from the statutory basis that other forces enjoy. It is a small point of which I ask noble Lords to take note. I do not support the amendment.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I shall make two comments on quite a fundamental matter. First, I am clear that there needs to be a memorandum of understanding. I am less clear about whether it needs to have statutory force. However, the public will expect to understand what the powers of a chief constable and a commissioner are when they are being asked to vote for a police and crime commissioner. That seems a basic point; the public must have a clear understanding of the two roles. Unless this is written down in the form of a memorandum of understanding, it will be difficult for them to do so.
Secondly, there is also an operational aspect to this. Amendment 4A asks in particular,
“how the operational independence of chief constables and police forces will be protected”.
This relates to the joining point between the operational independence of the chief constable and the power of the police and crime commissioner over both the budget and the annual plan. In other words, the chief constable is to be required to undertake, with operational independence, the work in a plan that was agreed by the police and crime commissioner. The budget for that plan will be agreed by the commissioner and supplied to the chief constable. There is a clear joining point that must be bridged here. There is a grave danger that there will be operational interference by the police and crime commissioner when that commissioner feels that the budget and plan that he or she created is not being implemented. Unless this is clearly written down in the form of a memorandum of understanding, that operational independence will not be clear to anyone and trouble will ensue.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, we should not get too carried away over what this memorandum will do. My noble friend Lord Hunt quoted some remarks that I made when I said that if the memorandum is referred to more than twice in any interaction between a commissioner and a chief officer of police, it will look as though the relationship between the two has irredeemably broken down. It will be too late by that stage. The draft of the memorandum that has finally emerged from the Home Office is helpful in setting these things out. Its value lies in striking a balance between the legitimate role—to question, challenge, set an overall strategy and direction and so on—of those who hold the police to account and the operational professional decision-making that chief officers of police must exercise all the time. It is helpful to have that in the background to avoid the mavericks and to put constraints on those who might press a matter far beyond where any of us in your Lordships’ House, or any other sensible people, might see this balance being struck.
However, we should not see this as some magic wand that will solve all the problems and issues that might arise from these new systems of governance. Therefore, it is helpful to have the memorandum. It would be helpful, as my noble friend suggests, for there to be reference to it in the Bill. However, we should not believe that it is a magic wand. It will not prevent circumstances in which chief officers of police find that they have lost the confidence of those who are responsible for their governance. Those individuals, when they have lost that confidence, will in effect be unable to continue. This measure does not prevent that, but it draws some lines in the sand for what are or are not acceptable areas in which those responsible for oversight and governance should get involved.
In Committee, I think I mentioned my experience of being told firmly that the policing of the Notting Hill carnival was entirely an operational matter in which it was inappropriate for the police authority, as it then was, to be involved. I do not accept that advice and did not at the time because this is a major policing decision that impacts fundamentally on the relationship between the police and the community and involves substantial expenditure of resources. However, that was not the same as a chair of a police authority in this case—it could be an elected police and crime commissioner—saying, “I am quite clear that you should close such and such a road”. However, I can see that it is helpful to have set down somewhere something that reminds people that there are lines that you should not cross and that it is not appropriate, when you are responsible for oversight and governance, to say, “In this investigation you should arrest this person or not arrest that person”. We all accept that, but perhaps, just occasionally, some people will need to be reminded of that.
Baroness Henig
My Lords, I have one amendment in the group, Amendment 228. Before I speak to it, I apologise in advance if I do not fully appreciate all the nuances of the amendments that the Government have laid. I was thinking about that in our debate on the previous amendment when the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, took us gently to task for not having appreciated how much the Government had moved on this. If the Government table amendments only the day before the debate, it makes it extremely difficult for those of us who, with the best will in the world, want to follow the changes, to do so in the short time available. As I said, I apologise if I have misunderstood some of the amendments. I have tried very hard to follow them, but it takes time for that knowledge to come across.
The amendment builds on the Government's welcome recognition that if we are to have commissioners covering very large areas—for example, 10,000 square kilometres or 2.3 million people—for 365 days a year, it is necessary for there to be a deputy. It is necessary just in case the individual does not have your Lordships’ stamina, or even if the commissioner might like to have a holiday.
On a less happy note, although a standards regime for commissioners and panels has been noticeable by its absence from the Government's plans, a deputy should be enshrined within the Bill as one step towards ensuring probity and preserving public confidence. That should be one element. For example, what would happen if a commissioner had to make a decision about contracts or appointments but had a personal or prejudicial interest in the companies or individuals concerned? In such circumstances, it would seem essential that they could call on a trusted deputy who could maintain public trust and confidence in the institution of commissioner if the individual had to stand aside for whatever reason. I can see the rationale behind that, and I am pleased that the Government have listened, taken those arguments on board and come back with a firm proposal to insert the provision for a deputy into the Bill.
At the same time, I feel I have to point out that the Government’s concept of the deputy and the job specification for it seem to me antithetical to the entire rationale for commissioners: that of democratic accountability. I listened earlier with great attention as the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, in his usual inimitable style, laid out the great advance that we are now making towards democratic accountability. I understand the arguments, so I would expect to proceed beyond the commissioner to the deputy commissioner.
It seems odd to me that, despite pushing on with this reform and spending more than more than £100 million on introducing that direct democratic accountability into the oversight of policing, the only thing that we have heard so far is that the deputy commissioner is likely to be unelected—although I just heard that political restrictions will not apply, so that person could be a councillor. I had not appreciated that until the noble Baroness pointed it out. It is now conceivable that the deputy could be elected, but also very possible that they would not. With this direct accountability and great change, it would seem more logical to me if the deputy was elected.
I would find it difficult to find any logic in an elected commissioner handing over, for whatever reason, the bulk of their portfolio powers over policing and precept to someone who was not elected and perhaps not identified with a political party. If there is a theme running through this reform, we need to bolster it.
The main aim of my amendment is to ensure that when a commissioner is unable to act, whether because of illness, legal issues or whatever, their role should be covered by an elected acting person drawn from the panel and not by an unelected officer. That is my main concern. In a way, that is separate from the question of the deputy. There can be a deputy who is unelected. I am mainly concerned that when the commissioner is not acting, that role should be undertaken by someone who is elected.
I have to remind the Minister that there was great strength of feeling on that point in Committee, to which the Government have not entirely responded. They have responded a little by saying that the deputy might be elected but that they do not have to be. It is the “do not have to be” that worries me. The deputy could remain the deputy, but I would not want a non-elected individual dealing with a precept, for example, or a whole range of sensitive political issues and public concerns for what could be a period of many weeks. That would be totally against the central objectives of the Bill. That is what I am trying to get at; when a commissioner, for whatever reason, stands aside, the acting commissioner should be someone who was elected.
Under my amendment, it would be an elected member of the panel. I can see that there being an elected deputy might meet my concerns, but I am very sensitive to arguments that the deputies, given how they will be appointed, might be seen as cronies or pals of the commissioner. We need to look at that a little more closely. I did not altogether understand how the commissioners would choose the deputies. There are clearly issues about that appointments process, with people being seen to merit their appointment and not, in a sense, being appointed through jobs for the boys, cronyism or whatever. Perhaps I am sensitive on this matter because of my gender—I do not know—but it is a point that I feel I need to raise.
That is the purpose of my amendment. As I said, I am very interested to hear what the Government have to say, because their amendments have cut across my thinking to some extent but probably not fully.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 229, but it needs to be placed in the broader context of this group. The amendment relates to our view that a deputy should be a member of the panel and, in the context of that specific amendment, not a member of the commissioner’s staff.
If one looks carefully at Amendment 60 in this group, one will see that it gives a commissioner the power to appoint a person as the deputy for that police area and also for that deputy,
“to exercise any function of the police and crime commissioner”.
There is a very great difference between our view that the person appointed as the deputy should be from the panel and Amendment 60, which gives absolute power to the police and crime commissioner to appoint a deputy to exercise any function of the commissioner.
In Amendment 6 a number of restrictions then apply, most of them welcome. Proposed new paragraph 7A(4) is surprising. It tells us:
“Section 7 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (appointment of staff on merit) does not apply to the deputy police and crime commissioner”.
That is an unfortunate way of putting it because it relates to a statutory provision. However, should we not have deputies who are appointed on merit, as opposed to people who are not appointed on merit? Nevertheless, there is then a proposal in proposed new paragraphs 7B, 7C and onwards for the scrutiny of senior appointments, one of which is the deputy, the others the chief executive and chief finance officer, and there is a process for a hearing in public of the person whom the commissioner wishes to appoint as deputy. However, proposed new paragraph 7E says:
“The police and crime commissioner may accept or reject the panel’s recommendation”,
and sub-paragraph (2) of that paragraph states:
“The police and crime commissioner must notify the panel of the decision whether to accept or reject the recommendation”.
In other words, a proposal is made to the panel and the panel will go through a process. It will comment and report in public, but the commissioner can turn down its view. Therefore, broadly speaking, we are now where we were before with absolute power being given to the commissioner. I have great reservations about that.
Proposed new subsection (2A) in Amendment 63 on page 15 of the Marshalled List says that the deputy police commissioner, having been appointed by the commissioner,
“may arrange for any other person to exercise any function of the police and crime commissioner which is, in accordance with subsection (A1)(b), exercisable by the deputy police and crime commissioner”.
There are restrictions in the amendment largely on the functions that are prescribed. A number of key functions are restricted; nevertheless, a number of functions still exist for the deputy.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
My Lords, I apologise to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and your Lordships’ House for being late. Having waited all day for licensing, it is very embarrassing to be late. I shall therefore be extremely brief.
I speak primarily to the proposed new clauses in Amendments 242 and 243. I was approached by the mayor’s office. I am not entirely clear why, but I am a veteran of the passage of the Licensing Act 2003 through your Lordships’ House, in which I participated heavily because for 24 years I had represented the swathe of the West End which ran from W2 in Bayswater to the far end of the EC postal district, an area in which a great deal of alcohol is consumed. I listened closely to the mayor’s representatives. I agreed my support. It would be wrong, given that I did not hear the start of the debate—although I came in on the speech of my noble namesake—for me to speak at length. However, on the basis of what the mayor’s representatives explained to me in their presentation, I am strongly in favour of an experiment along the lines of these two proposed new clauses.
I realise, rather bleakly, that this idea runs up against the risk of those initials, NIH: “Not invented here”. However, I hope that the Government will be sufficiently open-minded to think that it is worth an experiment. I hope very much that that takes place.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I will say a word about Amendment 237A. It is one of the most important amendments that we have on the subject of licensing because of the principle it lays down.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
That is an amendment in my name, but I have agreed to degroup it. We will be coming to it shortly.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
While I am on my feet, I will make one or two points before the Minister responds. The noble Viscount, Lord Astor, made an interesting point. As a number of speakers have said, we will have to come back to this from time to time during debates on this portion of the Bill. I sense around the House an acceptance that, as a society, we have not really grasped the evidence before us that there is a need now for an overarching policy on all psychoactive substances, including drugs, tobacco and alcohol. If we do not grasp that opportunity now, we will all suffer. I accept what the noble Viscount said—that in this case there will be an element of drugs—but the greater problem is that we are not dealing with this in a holistic way.
Secondly, the figures that we have heard today about how alcohol influences our society are really terrible. They are growing and getting worse, and we must do something about it. The frustration I have also heard around the Chamber is that there has not been a scheme—or schemes—that we could get behind which would really have an impact. In that sense, the sobriety scheme seems an appropriate and attractive way to go forward. We will be supportive of that if the Minister is minded to take it further. It seems to give a triple win: it reduces alcohol-related crime and disease; it reduces the costs to our public services, particularly to those of the police and health; and, most importantly, it will help to shift our culture. For those reasons, taken together, one would want to support it.
Having said that, one of the arguments used to persuade your Lordships’ House was that the Mayor of London wants to introduce this as a pilot and would be giving his full support to it. Of course, that name, attached to any project, does not commend itself to this side of the House, but we will be gracious and not oppose it on this occasion.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I also support this group of amendments. When Kit Malthouse, the deputy mayor of London—for those who are not aware, he is the putative deputy MOPC for London, so clearly a person of great relevance to these discussions—first raised this matter with me, I admit to being rather cynical about it; first, for the reasons my noble friend Lord Stevenson alluded to about this being just another mayoral gimmick, but also because I did not immediately see that the experience of South Dakota was necessarily relevant to London. However, having looked in detail at the proposals that have come forward from the mayor’s office, and the thought that has gone into them, I think that it is worth reflecting on the fact that nothing is lost by going down this road, having a trial in one or two London boroughs and seeing how it works. If it is useful, you can extend it and use it more widely. That is its basis.
Given the cynicism that sometimes surrounds mayoral initiatives in London, it was interesting to note that when the measure was presented to a cross-party grouping of colleagues in the Metropolitan Police Authority, after people had got over their initial cynicism they said, “This is an idea that is worth trying. Let’s see how it goes. It would certainly be worth supporting and we hope that the Government will support it as well”. Therefore, we have an entirely unanimous debate in this House.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I wish to put on record the support of my noble friend Lord Palmer for this amendment as he is not able to be here. We agree that this would be a very useful trial to undertake.
Baroness Browning
My Lords, this has been a helpful and interesting debate. I fully acknowledge the picture that was painted by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, when she explained what happens in the NHS as a result of this problem. From the Home Office perspective, we are particularly concerned about crime associated with alcohol consumption and the cost to public services overall. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Soley, will not mind when I say that I suspect that he and I are of a generation who might be described as baby boomers. Things are very different from when we were younger. That does not mean to say that I did not try alcohol. Like most people, I did and I still enjoy a drink. However, a change has occurred. There is a culture now in this country that it is acceptable to be drunk in public places. For several people to be drunk at one time is no longer regarded as shocking.
Under my new portfolio I have personal ministerial responsibility for both drug and alcohol policy. I want to try to bear down not just on what is seen as an adolescent problem but on a situation that is very different from that which pertained when I was young. Some people who hold down responsible jobs by day do not think that they have had a good time unless they get absolutely bladdered on a Friday and Saturday night. That is causing damage right across the piece. The noble Baroness mentioned the effect of that particularly on the NHS and it certainly affects crime figures as far as the Home Office is concerned. I had an emergency admittance to an A&E department at one o’clock in the morning on a Saturday and observed the chaos that was going on around me. A nurse told me that I was the only sober patient in that department. These are not unique occurrences; they happen regularly up and down the country on a Friday and Saturday night.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I apologise to the Committee. I was part of the discussions, but I did not double-check that everybody knew. I apologise to the Benches opposite.
Lord Shipley
I shall speak first to Amendment 237A. It is an extremely important amendment because it defines not just the responsibility of a local council—here I declare an interest as a member of Newcastle City Council and as chair of the regional advisory group for public health in the north-east of England. The amendment builds in to the general duty of a licensing authority, which has a quasi-judicial role, the responsibility to protect and, crucially, to improve public health. Through other legislation, local authorities are being given enhanced responsibilities for public health. The responsibilities relate to a range of things around smoking, obesity, road safety and so on, but given some of the evidence we have heard this afternoon, not least the fact that the latest figures seem to show that at the weekends 50 per cent of hospital admissions are alcohol related, the cost to the National Health Service and the economy is very great, and the responsibility for addressing that problem has to lie with some democratic structure. In general terms, it lies with the local authority but critically, because a licensing authority is quasi-judicial, it is important to have a general duty applying to that licensing authority to protect and improve public health. I think this very clear statement will make a difference in the way in which licensing authorities operate in future.
I referred to regional advisory groups on public health. One of the consequences of the abolition of government offices in England is that a range of regional structures are no longer in existence or are about to go out of existence. One of the things we are having to address at the moment is how issues of public health can be discussed and how research evaluation and good practice can be spread in a context bigger than a single local authority.
I hope that the Government might look at ways in which we can develop this general duty to protect and improve public health so that local authorities are required to work together more closely on that agenda. Reducing the consumption of alcohol, reducing the incidence of smoking, improving road safety figures and so on all apply to more than just one local authority in a given part of the country. However, this is a very important amendment and its impact should not be underestimated.
Viscount Astor
My Lords, in commenting on the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I should perhaps explain to your Lordships my interest in this matter. In 1997, when an electorate sent me from this side of the House to the other side of the House, I founded a late-night bars business. I do not have to declare an interest any more because we sold it two years ago. It was floated on the Stock Exchange. It was a very responsible operator and I gained a certain knowledge of the industry. On the last Saturday night we operated, we had over 30,000 patrons in our various bars round the country, in Wales and Scotland as well as England. So I had a little interest in the business. We saw ourselves as encouraging drinking, but not to excess, and we did not encourage drunkenness. Indeed, the Prime Minister was on our board, so, as you can see, we were enormously respectable.
However, our biggest problem was not what happened inside our bars but what happened outside, for numerous reasons. First, supermarkets were selling tins of lager for 50p when we were selling a pint of lager for up to £5. The problem was that people arrived having had too much to drink before going out. The Government have made some statements about minimum pricing. It will be interesting to see whether my noble friend the Minister can say any more on that.
The other problem, I have to say, was drugs. Someone would take drugs before they came in, with the result that one or two drinks magnified the effect to the extent that they could have been drinking all night. That was the issue. The ones that ended up on the street might have looked drunk but the reason behind it was a combination of drink and drugs. That is important, and that is why in the interest of public health you must bring in the whole thing; you cannot lose one and not the other. That is why I think the amendment is extremely interesting.
I would say in defence of bars that in the cities we operated in we had a very good relationship with the local authorities and with the police. We found that if there were no facilities for young people in cities, the problems were even worse because they had nowhere to go. They would go to the supermarket or the garage, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would say, buy alcohol and end up being on the street, or wherever, causing a much greater problem than if it was properly regulated.
I do hope that your Lordships will think that drinking is not bad if it is properly regulated and properly organised. I recognise that my grandmother, who was the first woman to sit in another place, campaigned for 30 years against drink being sold. However, on her 80th birthday we persuaded her that Dubonnet was non-alcoholic and she drank away. I hope in that spirit your Lordships will see that drink in moderation can be quite a good thing.
Viscount Astor
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because I am concerned about the drafting, particularly in Clause 106(3)(a), which allows anyone who is “involved in a business”. However, that might be totally unrelated to pubs, clubs, bars or anything like that. What is important is to allow people who live in the local area to have a view. It should not be restricted to local authorities because if you are dealing with the city of London, local authority division might be down the middle of a street. People can live 100 yards away but be in a different local authority. I commend what the Government are trying to do but I am concerned about the wording and how it will be interpreted.
I remind your Lordships that we are trying to keep pubs open in rural areas and, indeed, all around the country. We should not allow interest groups who have no interest and live nowhere near that particular pub to have an influence on whether it should get a licence. It is also important to remind your Lordships that, 20 years ago, 70 per cent of the drinks sold in this country were sold in pubs, bars and clubs with 30 per cent being sold in retails outlets. The reverse is now the case: only 30 per cent is sold inside a pub, club or bar and 70 per cent is sold in supermarkets and other outlets. If we are concerned about excessive drinking, we should make sure that we do not blame those who have only 30 per cent of the market. We must look much more closely at those who provide 70 per cent of the alcohol in this country.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I have two comments to make on Amendment 237B and the related Amendments 238 and 239, in the name of my noble friend Lord Palmer of Childs Hill. There would be benefit in getting some clarification of what some definitions, such as “sufficiently close” and “adjoining area”, actually mean. The Bill would be improved if we got that. First, on Amendment 237B, there is a problem in removing the power of an interested party to make representations. As an example, if the amendment was approved, it would mean that a residents’ association could not make an objection in its own right. It would have to be on behalf a person with a direct interest who lives in the area or a person who has a direct business interest in that area. Amendment 237B is too tight in how it restricts those who can comment.
The second problem relates to the issue that my noble friend Lord Palmer is trying to address in Amendments 238 and 239. At present, those who wish to object can do so only if they live in the licensing area. But in some urban areas, of course, a main road can divide a licensing area from the area that would be impacted upon. That problem would be addressed by Amendment 237B because the definition of “sufficiently close” could mean across the road. A good example of this is Edgware Road, where one side comes under the London Borough of Brent and the other side comes under the London Borough of Barnet. If the application is in one borough, those who can object must be residents of that licensing area as things stand. Through his amendments, my noble friend Lord Palmer is saying that it is important that those who are living sufficiently close to the premises can object even though they may be outside the licensing area of the application.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and I shall speak to Amendment 240N, which has a similar concept, and Amendment 240L.
Training orders would be a more proportionate way of addressing instances of underage selling where there has been no intent to do so. They would provide a positive alternative to a fine or a closure order and give an additional discretion to the authorities. Under Amendment 240N, a training order would require a business to close for a period of 24 hours to train staff in their legal obligation not to sell alcohol to those aged under 18 and on the importance of checking proof of age. There would be a cost to business in terms of lost revenue but the staff would still be paid, which would not be the case in the event of a closure order. Training orders would provide a remedy that would address the issue and provide a long-term solution. At the same time the business concerned would still suffer the penalty of a temporary closure, resulting in loss of sales for the period of the order. Both Amendment 240KA and Amendment 240N are to be commended.
Amendment 240L is rather more radical. It would remove the proposed extension to closure notices. A closure of more than 48 hours could have a severe impact on any licensed premises and their staff, not least in the current difficult economic climate. The current system has, I am reliably informed, worked well, and it is unlikely, the licensed trade tells me, that many premises would accept a notice to close for longer than 48 hours but would instead opt to go to court.
The need for and benefits of extending the current norm of 48 hours is therefore questionable—certainly the upper two-week period, 336 hours, would seriously damage businesses, particularly small hospitality businesses, which have been among the hardest hit by the recent recession. A two-week closure would affect the income not only of the business itself but also of its employees who, in most instances, would not be paid. Such extended closures could be justified only where the underage sale was made with intent; otherwise training orders, as we have discussed, as proposed by Amendments 240KA and 240N, would be a more effective and fairer solution.
No one would condone deliberate sales to those who are under age. However, a closure notice extending to 336 hours is an extraordinarily draconian proposal. I hope that the Government will accept that many breaches are not with intent but are inadvertent; and that where staff need proper training the concept of training orders is a more constructive way forward.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I make the fairly obvious point that training of staff should apply before people take up a job. Training orders cannot just be applied for persistently selling alcohol to children. “Persistent” implies several occasions. Surely a training order should apply from the first offence. It is a small but important point that training should apply at the beginning of the process, not after persistently failing to abide by the law.
Lord De Mauley
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for tabling these amendments because the Government take a very serious view on the sale of alcohol to children. Amendments 240KA and 240N would enable those premises found to have sold or persistently sold alcohol to those under 18 to undertake a training order. I acknowledge training is a useful way to ensure that staff are made aware of the importance of age verification, but we do not consider that the proposed measures are an adequate sanction for such a serious offence. There is already a requirement, as part of the mandatory code for retailers, to implement an age verification policy for premises. Retailers therefore, as a matter of best practice, already train their staff on the age verification policy to ensure that they adhere to the law. They must take this responsibility seriously.
The mandatory age verification condition already addresses this issue and is designed to ensure that staff are well trained, competent and aware of the consequences of selling alcohol to children. There are already schemes in place that offer training and examinations for staff on underage sales and the proof of age, including the national award scheme Best Bar None. I am also most grateful to my noble friend Lord Shipley for his point, which I agree with. Police and trading standards officers need to be able to take tougher action in these cases and I question whether a maximum closure period of 24 hours—which Amendment 240N includes—sends retailers an adequately clear message.
We are committed to taking tough action against those persistently selling alcohol to children. In tandem with doubling the maximum fine, extending the period of voluntary closure will send a very clear message that selling alcohol to children is a serious offence and will not be tolerated. A training order could be seen as a soft option, particularly since it would discharge criminal liability and allow those premises to continue to trade. Amendment 240L would mean that the period of voluntary closure should remain at a maximum of 48 hours. We do not feel that provides a strong enough sanction for those seeking to avoid prosecution and a heavy fine. As I have said several times, selling alcohol to children is a very serious offence and it is vital that irresponsible businesses recognise this. Some businesses see a 48-hour closure as a much softer option than a fine. We believe that the period of closure should reflect the severity of this offence and send a strong preventive message. For this reason, I believe that the flexibility in the duration of a closure notice from 48 hours to 336 hours, from two days to two weeks—and I should say it is a maximum—is essential to make a voluntary closure notice a viable alternative sanction. For these reasons, I hope your Lordships will agree to withdraw the amendment.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Shipley
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 193, 195 to 199, 200, 201 and 216. All are pretty brief. Amendments 193 and 194 would replace the word “necessarily” with “reasonably”. This is about returning officers incurring costs for services and how those services are charged for. We are concerned that “necessarily” is complicated to define. A better and safer definition would be to use the word “reasonably”. That would benefit returning officers, who would, in most cases, get the benefit of the doubt as to what was reasonable expenditure. One person’s definition of what is reasonable is very much like another person’s. One person’s definition of the word “necessarily” might be more problematic.
Amendments 195 to 199 relate to the voting system. Thankfully, the first past the post system is not proposed in the Bill. We will have quite a large number of candidates for the post of police commissioner. The great danger in an electoral system that does not work well, such as first past the post—and I guess that this is why it is not the preferred option—is that you could end up with someone being elected on a very low percentage of votes cast. The difference between the supplementary vote as proposed and the alternative vote system that we would prefer is that, on a supplementary vote system, electors can vote twice whereas on the alternative vote system they can vote in a sequence, as far down the list as they wish to go. I appreciate that your Lordships’ House has had a lot of discussion of voting systems in recent months, but the point remains extremely important. The benefit of the alternative vote is that you are likely to get a better outcome—that is, one with greater public support.
There is a danger under the supplementary vote that candidates will end up very closely bunched. If they are, it would be in the interests of a good, strong outcome if more of the choices of those whose candidates came lower down the list were counted. My wish here is simply that someone models the impact of a vote using the supplementary vote as against the alternative vote. Maybe, prior to Report, we could have some further discussion about what that modelling shows.
Amendment 200 relates to a concern from the Electoral Commission. It would add a regulation about spending by those who seek to influence the outcome of an election—that is, campaigners who are not themselves standing in that election. In the briefing that was supplied to Members of your Lordships’ House, the Electoral Commission asked that there should be some regulation of spending by campaigners who are not standing for election. I hope that that can easily be agreed.
Amendment 201 would limit the powers of the Secretary of State to make only such modifications and exceptions to normal processes for elections as are required to apply the relevant provisions to the election of these police and crime commissioners. In other words, it would simply prevent the Secretary of State from adding things that may not be essential in the conduct of these specific elections.
Amendment 216 seeks to make it absolutely clear that all staff and suppliers are within the restriction presented. It is an attempt to clarify the wording so that there is no doubt about how restrictions apply to those who have close working or supplier relationships.
Those are the amendments that I wish to speak to. These issues all cause me a lot of concern, but most of them are easily put right. However, the issue of the voting system may come back to haunt us if the wrong one is applied to these elections next year. I very much hope that the modelling that I have asked for might demonstrate what could happen in these elections and what might be the lowest threshold that a candidate would have to secure to get elected.
Lord Campbell-Savours
I intervene briefly on this issue of voting systems to register a counter-case with the Government, in case they are minded to carry out the work suggested by the noble Lord. Under the AV system that the noble Lord proposes, outsider and fringe candidates can win. That is why the supplementary vote has been selected. It concentrates the mind of the elector on voting for mainstream front-running candidates. The danger under AV is that outsider and fringe candidates will end up winning, which means the BNP. The AV system for the election of these commissioners would be extremely dangerous. I counsel very strongly against it.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Shipley
“( ) Before making a crime and disorder reduction grant, the elected local policing body shall consult the relevant police and crime panel and shall have regard to its views.”
Lord Shipley
My Lords, in moving Amendment 81 I shall speak also to Amendments 88A and 89A. Essentially, these amendments are about a similar thing. They are about who consults whom and who co-operates with whom between the four bodies of the police and crime commissioners, the chief constables, the local police and crime panels and local authorities. Amendment 81 simply tries to make it clear that:
“Before making a crime and disorder reduction grant, the elected local policing body shall consult the relevant police and crime panel and shall have regard to its views”.
I hope that is felt to be a non-contentious proposal.
Amendments 88A and 89A seek to add, alongside paragraphs on obtaining the views of victims of crime, that the views of victims and witnesses should be secured on matters concerning the policing of the area. There is a view that witnesses are extremely dependent upon responsive and sensitive police support to keep them updated on investigations, prepare them for giving evidence in court and provide protection if there is any perceived danger to them. It would be a good thing if consultation about a plan did not take place just with victims of crime but also with those who might have witnessed those crimes. These three small amendments seek better ways of ensuring that consultation occurs and that witnesses and victims of crime or those who have received a crime reduction grant can all feel that due consultation on the process being followed has taken place before decisions are made.
Baroness Henig
My Lords, first I declare an interest as a former chair of a police authority, a former chair of the Association of Police Authorities and the current president of the Association of Police Authorities. I wish to speak to Amendments 83ZZA, 83C, 85B, 92AA and 167ZA in this group. As the previous speaker said, I hope that my amendments are also considered non-controversial as they are extremely important. They are a constructive attempt to ensure that the Bill helps to deliver effective public consultation on policing and build on the strong relationship between police authorities and local crime and disorder reduction partnerships; and on our knowledge, after a dozen years or so, of what works best at local level in terms of co-operation between different policing bodies.
I believe that effectiveness is most likely to result from arrangements that are transparent and co-ordinated between different agencies and that make a meaningful link between neighbourhoods and the strategic force level. Amendment 83ZZA sets out to ensure that the local policing body works as effectively as possible with the local crime and disorder reduction partnerships and community safety partnerships. This amendment would remedy the Bill’s proposal to break the link which exists under the current arrangements between those local crime reduction co-ordinating bodies and the strategic level of the police authority.
In many ways the Bill builds on the innovation of crime and disorder reduction partnerships that were introduced almost 15 years ago, with their simple premise that tackling crime and disorder requires the concerted insight and action of a range of local public, private and third-sector agents. I was very surprised to find that, in trying to join up agencies concerned with crime, the Bill does not carry forward the requirement on the strategic policing oversight body to play a full role in local crime and disorder reduction partnerships. There are countless examples of these local crime and disorder reduction partnerships and CSPs providing a crucible within which creative solutions to local crime problems have been found. It would be senseless for the strategic policing body not to have an effective two-way channel of communication with such a body. I chaired my own local crime and disorder reduction partnership for six years from 1999 to 2005 and I know what an important body it can be in working to reduce crime locally, and the importance of having links directly from the crime and disorder partnership at local level through to the strategic policing body. That is what my amendment seeks to bring about.
I will not repeat the concerns voiced by many noble Lords that a single police and crime commissioner would be too remote from communities spread across literally hundreds of miles in areas such as that of which the Minister has exemplary knowledge, the Devon and Cornwall force area, or the 2.4 million people within Greater Manchester. Meaningful links between the members of the panel and the local crime and disorder reduction partnerships or community safety partnerships can help to bridge the gap and tackle perceptions of remoteness. Panel members being on these partnerships at local level can ensure that the strategic oversight of the police is not excluded from but can be influenced by, and benefit from, the insight of local partners working together to tackle crime. As I have said, I hope that this is non-contentious. To me it is common sense.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
I apologise. I did not get through all my notes; I was a little distracted at one or two points by former members of Lancashire County Council. It is our view that this requirement is already covered in Clause 12(1)(b), which requires PCCs to report the progress that has been made in meeting the objectives set out in the police and crime plan.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his response. I had not realised that this matter would be quite so complicated or contentious, because I said in moving the amendment that I thought that it was relatively straightforward. The amendment goes to the heart of something very important: the nature of scrutiny. The Minister said that scrutiny was of the commissioner by the panel, but that raises the question where the panel gets its information from, because panel members need to be involved at all levels. When the number of bodies involved in running or managing something is increased, the level of consultation, scrutiny and representation has to be improved, otherwise things will go wrong. Scrutiny cannot just be about what happened; it has to be scrutiny of what might happen and what people feel should happen. The only way of delivering that kind of scrutiny is through a more formalised mechanism for consultation. Therefore, to have members of panels who are members of a partnership body is central to enabling the scrutiny function to take place.
However, we have had an interesting debate. My noble friend the Minister has given a commitment that there will be further discussion prior to Report. I remind him that I raised a point about witnesses, which will no doubt be discussed as well. Given that we have had a detailed discussion of the issue and that those further discussions will take place, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am indebted to my noble friend Lady Henig for her amendments. As she said, some are consequential and some help with interpretation, particularly in relation to the vote on day one in Committee. I also share her concern about the corporation sole concept and delegation to chief officers and I welcome her proposal to streamline collaborative processes.
My amendment in this group, Amendment 211ZB, returns us to a matter that I have raised a couple of times before. It relates to one of the most bizarre provisions in legislation that I have ever seen before your Lordships’ House. Clause 62(2) states:
“The police and crime panel may appoint a person as acting commissioner only if the person is a member of the police and crime commissioner’s staff at the time of the appointment”.
Clause 62(1) states that the police and crime panel must appoint a person as an acting commissioner if,
“no person holds the office of police and crime commissioner … the police and crime commissioner for that area is incapacitated, or … the police and crime commissioner for that area is suspended in accordance with section 30”.
If we track back to Clause 30, we find the circumstances in which a police and crime panel may suspend the relevant police and crime commissioner. They relate mainly to whether a commissioner has been charged with an offence that carries a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding two years. We shall come back to the issue of whether two years should be reduced to six months, which it ought to be.
In essence, in circumstances where the commissioner is either incapacitated in one way or another or has been charged under the provisions of Clause 30, the panel is to appoint an acting commissioner who will be a member of the staff of that commissioner. This is extraordinary. Who will the people appointed be? I do not want to repeat what I said on our last day in Committee, but who will they be? Who will the commissioners appoint? They will be media people, because the commissioners will want to be re-elected and so a great deal of their focus will be on communications. We should look at the staffing. There is no control over the police and crime commissioners. There is no corporate governance and there are no non-executives; it is solely up to the commissioners whom they appoint. Clearly they are going to appoint people who will help them in their political endeavours—and yet it is suggested that, if the police and crime commissioner is no longer able to carry on in the job, a member of their staff will be appointed.
What would happen if a police and crime commissioner was charged with corruption and the sentence carried more than two years? What would happen if the senior members of the commissioner’s staff were also charged with corruption? Who then would the panel turn to? Even if it was only the police and crime commissioner who was charged with corruption—and, as we are giving so much power to one individual, with very few checks and balances, it is not impossible that one of the PCCs may find themselves in that situation—are we saying that the public would have confidence if a member of the staff of the person so charged were then to become the police and crime commissioner?
So far, apart from the issue of the memorandum of understanding and the clear hint that the Government are prepared to reduce the veto requirement on the precepts from 75 per cent to two-thirds, we have had very little give from them about recognising some of the serious concerns being put forward. On this one, surely the Government must think again.
Lord Shipley
I can speak briefly on Amendments 234T onwards because they are all broadly the same. They are consequential amendments that relate to the fact that the description “police authority” has been changed to “local policing body”, obviously because that is the basis of the Bill. The difficulty with this is that a police authority has a number of members whereas a local policing body will have many fewer members. There is a major issue of principle, both about the centralisation of power in one person and about how the scrutiny, representation and consultation are all undertaken. We think it is clear that it is essential that the policing body should operate in conjunction with the police and crime panel. That gives it a more democratic legitimacy, but also enables it to make better decisions, because it enables the views of the panel to be fed in as part of scrutiny at an earlier stage than that at which a decision might get made.
Finally, there is an important issue of public perception and confidence in the new structure, which goes right to the heart of what the Government are trying to do. The public would expect a police and crime panel to be at the heart of decision-making before decisions are made. This is in conflict with what the Government are intending, but communication and consultation is central to making good decisions. That is why the set of amendments to this schedule, Amendments 234T to the end of the group, stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee.
Lord Shipley
My Lords, I wish to comment on the amendments in this group standing in the names of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and myself. Amendment 124 is a preliminary amendment relating to the situation in Wales. I will not speak about that situation, and the amendments relating to that, as my noble friend Lady Randerson will do so. I wish to raise a broader issue relating to the discussion we have had so far about the nature of the panels, the number of members on them and their proportionality. Once the Committee stage is completed and before Report a number of issues will need to be discussed in detail.
I am not convinced that every panel needs to be the same size. It is proposed that there should be 15 members on a police and crime panel, but geography, population and other factors need to be taken into account. There may need to be lower and higher numbers of members in certain cases. I have a real difficulty with the proposal in Amendment 122AB that a police and crime commissioner could be appointed by a majority vote of a police and crime panel, which under this amendment would have 15 members, as a majority vote implies that eight people could appoint the police and crime commissioner. This will be a very powerful, highly paid and responsible job. I do not think that we should allow eight people to make an appointment of that kind. I would much prefer a directly elected police commissioner than one who might be appointed on the votes of eight people. A number of issues in Amendment 124A then become clearer. It proposes that each police and crime panel should have 15 members, but six of those will be,
“independent members to be co-opted by the panel”.
Therefore, the amendment implies that the panel will have only nine members, and that five of the nine can co-opt the six independent members. This concentrates and centralises power too much. At a time when we are trying to disperse power and make those who are elected to posts more accountable, I do not think that that proposal will work. Indeed, I assume that Nolan principles should apply in appointments of this kind. Therefore, there is a discussion to be had about what the powers of the panel members might be, how many there should be, who they represent, and how that will be done.
As regards having a discussion prior to Report about how proportionality will be delivered, broadly speaking proportionality on joint boards and police authorities can work reasonably well. However, it may not work reasonably well. It depends whether people want it to work well. There is a very strong argument for saying that proportionality in this case should depend not on the numbers of councillors by political grouping within the police authority area but rather on votes cast at the previous general election. There are a number of ways of doing this but it is very important that there is public support for the way in which the panels are constructed because if there is no public support it will make life very difficult for the chief constable, the commissioner, the panels themselves, the partnerships and the local authorities. At the heart of all this, the amendments carry a real risk of building single-party political control into the structure. One of the great benefits of the current structure, of which I am a strong supporter, is that it is a plural structure which enables everyone to work together with a common objective in their geographical area.
Amendment 127 seeks to ensure that,
“each relevant local authority has at least one of its councillors as a member of the panel”.
I believe that is very important. There is a discussion to be had about the nature of district councils, county councils, unitary councils and single-tier councils—whether they have only one or two members, high populations or more members than others. The amendment is a statement of our intent that,
“each relevant local authority has at least one of its councillors as a member of the panel”.
There may be a case for saying that in this situation district councils should give way to county councils but we need to discuss that.
Amendments 136 and 137 concern who can be a co-opted member of the panel. I do not think that a directly elected mayor of a local authority covered by the police area should be able to be co-opted to the panel—they should actually be on it. There is a fundamental issue here. We should add the proviso that a directly elected mayor cannot be co-opted to the panel because it should surely be assumed that they are members of it, otherwise there will be friction and that is one of the things that we are trying to avoid in the Bill.
Lord Beecham
Perhaps the noble Lord will bear in mind that there may be elected mayors in one authority in a metropolitan area, but not in others. Would that not promote friction between the authority with the mayor and those that have an elected leader?
Lord Shipley
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his intervention, because that is absolutely true. Insufficient work has been done on the impact of having an elected mayor in some cities but not in a whole police area. Of course, the boundaries in London are coterminous, but they are not coterminous in the larger urban areas in the rest of England. That is a potential problem. I take the noble Lord’s point. How the situation can be properly addressed, should there be a mayor, has to be talked through.
As to Amendment 137, the Bill states that a local authority member is excluded from being co-opted. I think that the opposite will prove to be the case. There may well be a need for a local authority member to be co-opted, perhaps to demonstrate political balance but, more likely, to demonstrate diversity or geographical interest. Preventing a local authority member who has not been directly appointed by the local authority from being a member of the panel is a potential mistake.
Finally, Amendment 138 states that:
“Panel arrangements may not include provisions for the approval of any member other than by that member’s nominating authority”.
This simply makes it clear that the power of appointment should lie with a member’s nominating authority.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, I hope that our discussion has highlighted to the Minister why the composition of these panels is a complicated matter to which a great deal of thought should be given. Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, waxed eloquently about how wonderful these panels would be, how they would have a member from each relevant local authority in an area, how all this was going to be fine and that this meant that this would be the channel by which all the necessary consultation and discussions could take place. However, the reality is that the panels as envisaged in the Bill will not deliver that in that way. They will end up being cumbersome because of the other things that need to be taken into account as a consequence.
The Government cannot have it both ways. In one part of the Bill there are proposals for panels, but in London there is a proposal for a panel of Members of the London Assembly. Therefore, none of the 32 London boroughs will have an automatic right to be represented on the panel that will scrutinise the actions of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. There may be one or two Members of the London Assembly with a dual mandate—something of which many political parties disapprove, but many members have a dual mandate—and, by chance, some people may represent an individual local authority. However, the norm will be that the members of the panel in London will not cover all local authorities in the area. Indeed, there may not be an elected Member of the London Assembly panel who covers a particular part of London, because the constituencies of the London Assembly Members may preclude that. It is also possible that none of the London-wide members may be elected. Therefore, in one part of the Bill there is a proposal for a panel that does not cover every local authority, while in the rest of the Bill panels are proposed for England and Wales that cover every local authority in the area.
The Government must address the question of which is the important principle. If the principle is that every relevant council should be represented, why does that not occur in London? If the principle is not so important in London, why is it more important outside London, where there is the additional complexity of districts, counties and unitary authorities? Also, if the Localism Bill goes through, there will be a whole series of directly elected mayors in addition to those we have at the moment.
These are questions that have to be resolved, as do the questions of proportionality and the balance between different geographical areas, because under the current Bill you could end up with all sorts of inequalities in terms of the balance of power within those panels. I am sure that that is not what the Government intend, which is why I am sure they will want to revisit this in our limited time available before Report.
The other point on which I wanted to pick up related to Amendment 123B, spoken to by my noble friend Lord Beecham, about the importance of having panels with separate panels to review the audit issues relating to the actions of the police and commissions in their areas. I chair the equivalent of the audit panel for the Metropolitan Police, and I have to say that this is not a small responsibility because of the number of audit issues that arise on a regular basis. These are matters that for the purposes of good governance must be addressed properly. There must be a route whereby internal and external audit can report, and it must be seen that those issues have been properly addressed. The danger of the present arrangement is that there is a vacuum regarding how audit issues can be properly dealt with. We discussed this briefly at an earlier stage in Committee, and I know that Ministers are having to think about this again. However, the principle remains that there should be some clear mechanism whereby these audit issues are considered, and if we are looking to strengthen the work of the police and crime panels, a requirement for there to be separate panels to consider audit issues would be a sensible way forward.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Soley
Perhaps I may follow on briefly from what my noble friend Lord Harris said. He made a very thoughtful and, as usual, very forensic analysis of this part of the Bill. When he referred to the Taser issue, I was reminded that police forces have purchased contentious weapons on a number of occasions. Many years ago, there was a big argument about rubber bullets, for example. It is not immediately clear to me from the Bill but, as I understand it—I do not think I am wrong about this—when police forces purchase guns, which they have to have in store, there are very tight Home Office controls on what they can buy and in what number and so on. With the corporation sole model, to which my noble friend referred, I am not sure whether they would be able to choose the number of their weapons and, more importantly in a sense, the nature of the weapons, which can determine the outcome in certain critical situations. That may not change at all and the Home Office may retain full control over it. However, in view of my noble friend’s comments about Tasers, I should like reassurance that there will be some control over the overall picture and that it will not be left to individual police forces to determine what they need.
Lord Shipley
What seems to be missing in this debate and in the Bill as a whole is a clear indication of the net cost of these proposals. There are existing costs both within a police force and within a police authority, but everything I hear and read suggests that the cost of police commissioners, with their offices and staff, will be significantly higher than the costs that we currently meet. There will be 41 full-time police and crime commissioners. They will have an undefined number of staff, with buildings to house them in, and they will have their running costs. Given that the police commissioner will work full time and, I understand, be paid a low six-figure sum of money, the implication is that the cost of a police and crime commissioner’s office is likely to run into several million pounds a year. The figure is very hard to estimate and it is not clear from the Bill documentation what it is likely to be. It seems to suggest that the net cost will not be significantly different from current spending. We will see, but I have come to the conclusion that the total net cost of police and crime commissioners, with the structures that will underpin them, is likely to be somewhere between £100 million and £200 million. I could be out and it could be higher than that.
It goes back to the nub of the issue about duplication, on which we have had a very good debate and I hesitate to repeat things. I have not understood who will be making exactly what decision on spending. I understand that there is operational and there is strategic, but there is also the challenge from the commissioner’s office on day-to-day spending on the basis of the police and crime plan and the challenge from the finance staff of their colleagues on the operational side of finance about what money is being spent. The Bill says that a chief constable will have a chief finance officer. Words matter because a chief implies that there will be others as well. A chief constable will have a chief finance officer for the police force’s financial affairs and the commissioner will have a chief finance officer for the commissioner’s financial affairs.
These are not different things. The commissioner is responsible for constructing the police and crime plan. That plan implies a budget as a budget is a statement of policy. The statement of policy is therefore the plan. There is the budget, the heads of expenditure and the precept. I find it hard to understand how you will not end up with conflict if you run two separate staffing structures on finance. There will be conflict and difficulty because there will have to be an assessment of whether the police and crime commissioner’s plan, which is the budget, is being carried out operationally. That requires the staff to work very closely together. I think there is great cause for concern about how the structure is being put in place. At the moment the costs on the police authority side are comparatively low, and certainly a great deal lower than the costs on the force side.
We are about to put up the overall costs of a public service at a time when there are major reductions in the numbers of police officers on the beat. The priority needs to be to keep neighbourhood policing at a high level rather than increase the costs of accountability. It is in that accountability between the two parts—the police force and the police commissioner’s office—that we will end up with it not being clear who is in charge of what. That will cost money because people will be challenging it. There will be more meetings, more reports, more audits, more explanations, and so on.
I am very concerned about this. Amendments 43 and 44 are probing amendments to see whether there is clarity on who would be responsible for what. I feel that some work now needs to be done to get these issues clear. That would start with a clear costing of the overall cost of this. That then would produce a definition of what the policy really is.
Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked about the office of chief constable and the business of corporation sole. I shall not take up the Committee’s time longer than to say that it needs to be looked at in terms of where the office of chief constable and corporation sole stand in a legal context.
It is one of the principles of policing in this country to be apolitical and independent in terms of delivery. A little bit of work could be done to ensure that your Lordships’ House is more satisfied that there is no conflict between the two. The area in which I would ask for caution to be used is finance. The Metropolitan Police historically had two commissioners: one to deliver on the operational side; and the other who then became the received person to deal with the financial side. With a budget of more than £3 billion, which it was when I was commissioner, I had a delightful relationship with the noble Lord, Lord Harris. Being a pussycat we always got on together; I was the pussycat and he was the other. It was essential for delivery on the financial side that there was an expert on financing in the Metropolitan Police. More importantly, there had to be political accountability outside that for creating contracts, sometimes for hundreds of millions of pounds, which could have got in the way of delivering what we were doing over a period of time in the Metropolitan Police, namely driving down crime and keeping the terrorists away.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Shipley
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 212, which I hope has the status of a drafting amendment since its aim is simply to make sure that any enactment in relation to an acting commissioner includes this Act. It would have the additional benefit of bringing the wording in line with that of Amendment 31B, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, which I find extremely helpful because it imposes a very important check and balance on the police commissioner. It would mean, put simply, that the deputy cannot be a member of the police commissioner’s own staff, appointed to their substantive job by that police commissioner. Rather, it must be a member of the panel who can be appointed as a deputy by the police and crime commissioner. That seems a much better approach to providing a deputy role and cover for incapacity. It is much clearer to the general public; it would occur at an early stage and it would mean that an elected not an unelected person would have the mandate of being a deputy.
Baroness Henig
I rise to support the amendment. Given that thus far with the amendments that have been moved there has not been that much sense of give in the Government’s responses, I would like to know what the thinking was on this provision. I find this whole area of the Bill quite extraordinary and quite out of line with anything else that I have experienced in policing or local government. Given that it is seen by many of us as an extraordinary suggestion, would someone explain where the idea has come from? It is so unprecedented, in my experience. If the response follows the same pattern as on previous amendments and the Minister stands up and tells us why the arguments that we are putting forward are not going to work and why what is being proposed is absolutely perfect and that therefore we should not be challenging it, in this particular case I would like to probe why this provision is in the Bill. It seems bizarre to a lot of people.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Shipley Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Shipley
Lord Shipley
I shall also speak to Amendment 52. Amendment 16 is very short. It has only six words and I hope I will be brief in moving it. In our view, it is, despite its brevity, very important as a principle. It lies right at the very start and at the heart of the Bill.
The amendment says that the police and crime commissioner for a police area must,
“in conjunction with the chief constable”,
secure the maintenance of the police force of that area and ensure that the police force is efficient and effective. It makes clear that the principle of the central involvement of the chief constable in securing the maintenance of the police force and ensuring it is efficient and effective is seen as a matter of co-operation and partnership as opposed to being simply the responsibility of the police and crime commissioner. The words “in conjunction with” are important because they are stronger than simply saying that the commissioner must consult or the commissioner must co-operate with the chief constable; “in conjunction” means it has to be much more of an equal partnership between the two. It is as simple as that. It may seem a very small amendment but in principle it is extremely important because it clearly defines the responsibility of the commissioner to work in conjunction with the chief constable. I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
We have effectively moved back to the first group of amendments as Amendment 15 was not moved and we moved onto the second group. I have rather a lot of amendments in this group—Amendments 20, 21, 29, 36B, 37ZA, 37ZB, 40A, 55A, 64D and 249. This is a very important group of amendments. They are as relevant to the Government’s original proposals as they are to Amendment 31, the consequential amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris.
The House will know that there is concern about the relationship between the police commissioner and the chief constable and the possibility that the commissioner will seek, one way or another, to intervene in operational issues which will be the responsibility of the chief constable. Indeed, the noble Baroness rather anticipated some of our discussion in a very helpful response to the previous group of amendments. This is a very genuine and realistic concern. It is held by many responsible organisations and people who have experience, expertise and judgment in areas of police, crime and justice.
Let us think briefly about the role of the commissioners. They will be full time, rather well paid, working entirely on their own with no other responsibilities. What are they going to do? The Home Secretary said yesterday, in her speech to the Police Federation, that the result of introducing police commissioners would be to reduce bureaucracy. I wonder. I suspect that chief constables are going to have PCCs crawling all over them. After all, they are going to have a manifesto if they are elected and even if they are appointed by the panel, as the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, suggests, they are going to be appointed, I should have thought, on the basis of some kind of statement about what they would do.
Commissioners will set their own targets. They will call for all manner of reports and reviews. Indeed, in our previous debate, when we discussed public engagement, it was clear that any commissioner worth their salt is going to have lots of public meetings. When you have public meetings you write notes and you go back and you talk to the chief constable. There is going to be an enormous amount of traffic between the commissioner, who has nothing else to do except be the commissioner, and the chief constable. The commissioner is full time and will spend countless hours worrying about this and talking to the chief constable. The chief constable is going to have a hell of task in trying to run a service and deal with this commissioner.
This is what is so worrying to us about how this is going to operate. I think about my experience as an NHS non-executive chair. I must again declare my interest in that and as a consultant in the health service and as a trainer. One of the reasons I do not try to run the trust is because it is a part-time role. There is a clearly accepted corporate governance understanding of what non-executives do. In essence, we are appointing an executive commissioner on some kind of programme or manifesto and they are bound to want to influence, in a very strong way, what the police will do. I am sure the noble Baroness will respond by saying that that is fine because they are there to set the strategic direction. That is a very good answer but I believe that inevitably commissioners will be drawn into operational matters.
One of the great problems here is that whether elected or appointed they will have political labels. Under the noble Baroness’s amendment they will be members of the police and crime panel so they will be local councillors under the current construct of the Bill. Regarding elected commissioners, I am still hopeful that the Government might listen to your Lordships’ House—my goodness me they will have to listen if it is elected under PR. Just on the current basis, surely it is going to be very difficult to constrain those commissioners as they will have political banners. I am afraid forces will be known as Labour forces, Conservative forces and Lib Dem forces—they are bound to be. This is our real concern about the proposals. It is not about the Government’s efforts to enhance accountability. Indeed, if they had come forward with proposals around police authorities, which could have done many of the things they are seeking to do, that would have been a much more satisfactory debate. These are real concerns about day-to-day politics intervening in the affairs of the police force.
I want at this point to refer to the draft protocol. I acknowledge that this is a draft. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for ensuring that we received it before the first day of Committee. She will know that there have been comments which seem to suggest that it does not ensure operational independence. I have also received comments that the commissioner’s control over the budget may be used unduly to influence operational matters. I think of our good friends in the Treasury and their control over departments. Maybe life has changed but I rather doubt it. I found that the Treasury took an unhealthy interest in the affairs of the departments I had a responsibility for. It was able to do so because it had the dosh. Again, there is a concern here that budgetary control, in the end, will ensure that the chief constable has to take account of what the commissioner says and that in turn could lead into areas of operational business. I think, for example, of where the chief constable is well aware of the national priorities in relation to policing but the commissioner really wants to spend more money in another area. Again, one could see a case where the chief constable felt that he was being unduly pressurised.
My amendments do three things. First, they make the protocol into a statutory form in one way or another. Secondly, they reinforce the benefit of the police form of declaration. I do not want to read out the form of declaration, although it is a very impressive declaration indeed. It says that the police officer,
“will serve the Queen in the office of constable without favour or affection, malice or ill will”,
and so on. I understand, of course, that nothing in this Bill would affect that oath, but my amendment just seeks to reinforce its importance. Thirdly, they set out a set of principles to which I think it desirable for the Home Secretary, commissioners and chief constables to have regard. These are probing amendments that seek a response from the Minister about this issue of the line between commissioners and the chief constables. I am very glad to have taken part in this debate.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, responds to this important debate, I shall make just two comments. First, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her comments about discussions over whether the draft protocol could become statutory in due course. I also say to my noble friend Lord Harris that I understand the point that he has raised. There is always a dilemma over the wish of Parliament usually to dot the “i”s and cross the “t”s to safeguard a position—in this case the operational independence of the chief constable—without creating such a list of items that it inhibits a good relationship. I am very mindful of the balance to be drawn here. A discussion between noble Lords and others who are interested would be very welcome.
Secondly, there is a difference between making representation to a chief constable as a Member of Parliament and doing so as a police commissioner who is appointed or elected on a programme. That changes the relationship considerably. I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, that it is quite fair to take the Bill and speculate about how it might work in practice. That is why I am pretty confident in saying that a police commissioner will be working full-time and will be on the back of the chief constable.
Lord Shipley
I thank the Minister for her comments. I still have some residual concerns about the nature of the relationship and partnership between the commissioner and the chief constable. However, there is now to be, I hope, a substantial discussion about how the protocol will work. Given this proviso, and the fact that the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, raise some very important issues—which I hope we can develop, maybe to improve the Bill as a whole—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in my name.