Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

When the police were asked why they wanted this law, they said that when they ask people to remove their masks, they go to another part of the demonstration and put them back on. Is not the solution to grab the mask off them? I am not very good on policing themes, but I do not think we need to ban masks—to ban anonymity, in effect—on demonstrations as a way of dealing with the fact that the police think there are practical problems with the law at the moment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I too support the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that Clauses 118 to 120 should be removed altogether from the Bill.

My reasons are twofold. First, I regard it as wrong and unjustified to prohibit people from concealing their identities at demonstrations, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has said, let alone prohibiting anyone in a designated locality concealing their identity if they so wish. That is what the Bill does, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out. My second point is that the purpose of the clause can only be to enable the use of live facial recognition technology to monitor demonstrations, to enable the authorities to determine who is attending them and, frankly, to take action against them subsequently. I regard that as an offensive justification, certainly given the present state of the technology and the present lack of regulation of live facial recognition.

On the first reason, overall, the prohibition of individuals concealing their identity involves introducing a Big Brother role for the state that is unwelcome and foreign to our notions of democratic freedom. The power may not be Orwellian in scale, but it has nasty totalitarian echoes of Nineteen Eighty-Four. We should remember that the catchphrase of the dictatorship in that novel is, “Big Brother is watching you”, the justified implication being that state observation of individuals is a principal instrument in the toolkit of dictatorship.

No doubt that is the reason why the power to prohibit such concealment is hedged around in the Bill by the complicated regime of designated localities, exempted purposes and limited durations. Those limits on the prohibition of concealing identity are intended to act as a brake on the power, but, in fact, all the weaknesses—mentioned by my noble friend Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others—emphasise how far the power is a fetter on individual freedom.

I fully appreciate that the power to designate a locality under Clause 119 would arise only if a senior police officer reasonably believed that a protest was likely to involve, or has involved, the commission of offences, and that it would be expedient to exercise the power to prevent or limit the commission of offences. However, that must be measured against not only the seriousness of the offences to be avoided, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger pointed out, but the right of individuals to wear a disguise, which may be, as others have pointed out, a perfectly reasonable thing to do.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, spoke of protesters against the Iranian regime. What about journalists, of whatever political persuasion, who wish to report on a protest but do not want to be recognised by the protesters or the public? What about employees, who would rather not be recognised attending a protest by their employers? The employers may have a political objection to the cause that the protesters are pursuing. Any figure who may be publicly recognisable who wishes to take part in, or even just attend, a protest, and wishes not to be recognised, may legitimately have that right to conceal their identity. What about parents who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their children, or adult children who do not want to be recognised at a protest by their parents?

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, relied on the public protests of Emmeline Pankhurst and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly objected to that comparison. There were countless other suffragettes who did not want friends or family to know of their support for, or activity as, suffragettes in protests because they might disagree with their family, parents, husbands, wives or friends, or simply out of concern for their own safety. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, expressed the position of ordinary citizens who wish to keep their identities private. I go further: in peacetime, it is the right of people to keep their identities private. The state would have to justify any limit on that power, and it has not done that.

We all agree that everyone has a right to protest but we must all acknowledge that protests can, and often do, involve the commission of offences by some. But the fact that protest may involve, or be likely to involve, the commission of offences by some people does not justify the police or the state in denying everybody in the designated locality the right to conceal their identities. This prohibition says to people that if you take part in or attend the protest, or are in the locality covered by the designation, you must be recognisable. I say to the Minister that that is an unjustifiable arrogation of power by the state. It must be justified by the Government if they wish to legislate for it, and they have not gone anywhere near justifying that arrogation of power.

My second reason for opposing this clause is that the prohibition on concealment of a citizen’s identity can have only the one purpose of enabling them to be monitored on camera, with a view to being identified later. Let us examine that. At its most benign, the power may be directed only against those who commit offences. Where it is for that limited purpose, it can be argued that preventing offences by the persons identified on camera may be a legitimate exercise of the power of the state, but I will repeat the points made by my noble friend Lord Strasburger on that. Just as police officers justify surveillance, so this power, if it were sufficiently defined and limited, might be justifiable, but the purposes of surveillance in the Bill go much further and unacceptably so. A dictatorial state may regard it as permissible to identify supporters of a particular view, political party or cause for the purpose of keeping them under further surveillance; worse still, branding them as trouble-makers for the future; or, at the extreme, taking action against them, ranging from pulling them in for questioning to arrest and unlawful imprisonment.

We have seen abuse of powers such as that in countries all over the world; the country that is currently under consideration is Iran, but it has happened in many others. We prevent abuse of power only by being astute to limit police powers and state infringement of individual liberties in the first place. This is not just an argument about live facial recognition technology, which my noble friend considered—we will discuss that more later—but an important argument about the legitimate limits on state power. Clauses 118 to 120 come nowhere near falling within those limits, even had they been tightly drawn—which they are not, as my noble friend and others have pointed out. For that reason, these clauses really ought to go.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for tabling these stand part notices. However, we on these Benches are unable to support her as we have general support for Clauses 118 to 120.

The clauses address a very real and increasingly familiar problem in modern protest policing: the deliberate concealment of identity to frustrate lawful policing and avoid accountability for criminal acts. I am sure that all noble Lords have seen videos circulating on the news and online of protests where large groups of people arrive masked or disguising their identity. Often, the only reason for that is to embolden themselves and each other to commit offences, knowing that their identification and subsequent prosecution will be next to impossible. This undermines both public confidence and the rule of law.

Clause 118 creates a relatively tightly drawn offence that would apply only where a locality has been designated by the police because there is a reasonable belief that a protest is likely to involve, or has involved, criminality. It is not a blanket ban on face coverings. Rather, the clause provides clear statutory defences for those wearing items for health reasons, religious observance or work-related purposes. I do not have concerns that these defences may be abused, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide some assurances as to how he intends that this will not be the practical reality.

Clauses 119 and 120 provide for necessary safeguards and structures relating to the powers of Clause 118. They stipulate that designation must be time limited, based on a reasonable belief and authorised at an appropriate level. There are explicit requirements to notify the public of the designation, the nature of the offence and the period for which it applies. These safeguards are consistent with other provisions of the Public Order Act that relate to police powers to impose conditions on assemblies and processions.

Removing these clauses would make policing protests even more difficult, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, outlined. Offenders who attend protests with the primary intent to commit crimes, whether related to the protest topic or not, will be able to evade justice more easily. The vast majority of peaceful protesters are unfairly associated with disorder that they did not cause. Effective policing protects the right to protest by isolating and deterring criminal behaviour within it. For those reasons, we cannot support the stand part notices in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There were a number of points there. If my noble friend will allow me, I intend to answer the points made during the course of the debate. I say to her straightaway that we have published our analysis of the ECHR obligations; I can refer her to it. I will ensure that if she does not have it to hand, I will send it to her. It is published and is available for that.

As I will come on to in a moment, the rights that we are seeking in this piece of legislation for protesters, the community, the Government and police forces are measured in a way that I believe is acceptable. In recent years, policing large-scale protests has posed significant challenges; the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, referred to that. While most participants exercise their rights peacefully and lawfully, a small minority have engaged in criminal acts while concealing their identity. It is because the police have highlighted this issue with existing powers to identify those committing offences during protests that we have brought these issues forward. It is essential that the police can identify those committing offences during protests, not only to ensure accountability and justice but to protect peaceful demonstrators and the wider public from harm.

As a whole, Clauses 118 to 120 strike a careful balance. This will not apply to all protests. It applies only to protests that have been designated by a senior police officer of inspector rank or above. In addition, as was mentioned by a number of contributors to the debate, although the police currently have powers to remove face coverings in designated areas, they themselves have said to us—this goes back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—that those measures are not always effective in the context of managing protests. People often comply but then replace a face covering later, which is difficult to monitor in large gatherings. The new offence addresses this by making it unlawful to wear a face covering once a locality has been designated by a police officer—not by a Minister or by the Government—in the light of upholding rights as a whole.

That senior police officer, who will be at least of the rank of inspector, must reasonably believe that a protest is likely to occur, that it is likely to lead to criminal behaviour—that is the critical point, which comes to the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others—and that it is necessary to act to prevent or reduce such offences. That is an important caveat, not the Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seems to—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

In a moment. It is not a Nineteen Eighty-Four dystopia, me becoming Orwellian or the Government becoming Big Brother and being all-seeing. It is about potential criminal activity where a police officer—not the Government, this House or the House of Commons—determines that this action should be taken. If a police officer determines that that designation needs to occur at that space and time, that is a reasonable thing, allowing protests but also stopping criminal behaviour.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I simply want to ask him this question: how far have the Government stress-tested these clauses against the test posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti? Under the auspices of a future Government less benign than this Labour Government—whom I respect, and he knows that—to what extent has that stress-testing tested, for instance, how far the promotion of police officers to the rank of inspector may produce benign results, or how far the results could be Orwellian? I do not suggest that this Government are Orwellian. My suggestion is that there is potential, in these clauses as drawn, for bad consequences.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will say two things to the noble Lord in our defence. His presumption assumes that a police force in five years’ time will be dominated by right-wing Conservatives, Reform members or Socialist Workers Party members, who instruct the police force to instigate that designated area. I happen to believe— I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, would agree with me—that the police are independent of government, they have integrity, and they determine policies based on legislation.

This does not give a police officer the power to be a political commissar, whether of right or left, but gives the police the power to say, “There is potentially criminal action in this designated space; therefore, in this space we need to ensure that we can remove face coverings”. If there is another Government who he fears in the future—all of us may fear different Governments of different authoritarian natures—I guess that they will have won an election and will have 400 or so Members of Parliament, and they can pass what the heck they like anyway.

Therefore, there is an argument to say to the noble Lord that his fears are undermining the integrity and the independence of the police force, and all I am doing in this legislation is giving the police the power to take action should they, as the police, determine that they want to do it.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned that it does not require someone to know they are committing the offence. Clause 119(2) requires the police to notify in writing that the designation has been made, the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period for which it applies. So it could even be a designation in writing for a limited time and in a limited place, but it is important that we do so.

A number of noble colleagues have raised religious and medical exemptions and further loopholes. The purpose of the new offence is, as I have said, to prevent protesters concealing their identity in order to avoid conviction for criminal activity in the designated place.

The measure does provide a reverse legal burden on the defendant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that they wore a face covering for work purposes, or religious or health reasons. But, as with any charge, that is a defence in the Bill, in the future Act, in law, that allows people to say, “I am a paint sprayer”, or that they were seeking to prevent illness that might cause further illness if they did not wear a mask, or that, potentially, they had a religious reason to wear a mask. That is a defence in the event of any charge being made. But, again, it is a defence at the time when the police officer might well say to an individual that that mask needs to be removed.

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[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for raising the issue of Miznon and Erev in Notting Hill. There have been a number of protests outside that restaurant, which is actually on my street. The owners of the restaurant and the residents who use it, including me, have been subjected to the vilest form of antisemitism, and the police have done nothing.

So I support this and will ask the Minister a number of questions about it. It is not enough to say that the senior officer should be responsible for this; much clearer principles and rules are needed around what is and is not acceptable, if the police are evidently—based on recent events—not capable of exercising that judgment themselves. So I support this and hope that the Minister will take it seriously.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will confine what I say to a few points in response to some of the speakers we have heard from.

I found myself in considerable agreement with the general concerns about balance expressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. It seems to me that, in some of the consideration of these clauses, we have lost sight of what we agreed in Committee last week. Everybody agreed that questions for the courts and others about considering breaches of public order law—as well as the introduction of new public order provisions—do raise the question of balance between, on the one hand, the right to protest and, on the other, the rights and freedoms of others.

I will resist the temptation to respond in detail to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in spite of his claim that he relished the Minister’s demolition of my arguments about stress-testing this legislation for the future and not relying on the benign intentions of this Government. I have concerns about the noble Lord’s amendments; I am sure that the Minister will deal with them. They include questions about what “serious disruption” is and what should amount to “essential services” within the meaning of the Act, as well as he whole question of cumulative disruption, to which we will turn later.

Those concerns—and the Minister’s comments in the previous group on the publication of the review of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven—raise an important issue about the timing of this legislation, compared with the timing of the noble Lord’s expected report. I share the confidence that he will consider all these issues with great care, but might it not have been better had the review come first and the introduction of this legislation and its consideration in this House come second? From what the Minister said in his speech on the previous group, I take it that it is the Government’s present intention to give further consideration to public order law in the light of the noble Lord’s expected report. If that is the case—and if that attention will be given objectively and carefully, and then lead to such legislation as is necessary—that may be the best we can do with the timing that we have now. But my comments stand about the order in which this has been done stand.

I turn to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I do not propose to give him many hours of pleasure in listening again to arguments about balance as a matter of law; however, I do repeat the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, about how confident he is that police officers, including senior police officers, always get the balance right. That is a difficult assertion to make or defend. I am not suggesting that he went as far as that, but it is very important, not only for the Government but for us as parliamentarians, to consider the possibility that police officers sometimes fail to get the balance right.

I take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made that it is often a very difficult balance to strike. We need to be very careful in commenting on how the police should strike it and not place too much confidence in the police in the future and, in particular, in the event of changes in government that, as the noble Lord recognised, might be unwelcome to many of us. Nevertheless, they could be changes of an elected Government.

That brings me to Amendment 382H, which was welcomed by the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, and elegantly presented by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I will draw the Committee’s attention to one problem. Proposed new subsection (5) is not simply definitional; it is designed to act—and would act, in some sense—as an ouster for the purposes of domestic courts of the effect of the convention rights. It uses the language of Article 11 when it states:

“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.


Article 11 requires that the rights that are respected

“are necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.

If Parliament legislates that a section must be treated as necessary, it precludes within this jurisdiction any testing of the proposition that such provisions, as interpreted, are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. That is the province of the European Court of Human Rights to consider. It is a requirement of the Human Rights Act that domestic courts here give effect to the European convention and interpret legislation, where they can, as compatible with the convention.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

Of course, this is an amendment, so the Government will not have given the certification of compliance with the European convention. Were the Minister to accept the amendment and it to become part of the Bill, the Government could then certify that it did comply with the European convention and it would be unnecessary to put that particular provision in. But, as an amendment, it is making clear that that particular provision takes into account that there are convention rights and, notwithstanding those convention rights, the amendment is to have the effect that it does.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, that is a complicated justification of the inclusion of that subsection in the amendment. I just about understand what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is saying there. But were his amendment to be accepted, it would raise difficulties about the compliance or cohesion of that amendment with the European Convention on Human Rights. I leave the point there. It is for the Minister to deal with it. If he says he can accept the amendment, subject to later adjustment to take out that subsection, so be it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

369: Before Clause 118, insert the following new Clause—
“The right to protestBefore section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 (advance notice of public processions), insert—“10A The right to protest(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.(2) Public authorities have a duty to—(a) respect the right to protest,(b) protect the right to protest, and(c) facilitate the right to protest.(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to—(a) protect national security or public safety,(b) prevent disorder or crime, or(c) protect public health, or the rights and freedoms of others.(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (acts of public authorities).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would introduce an express statutory right to protest, imposing both negative and positive obligations on public authorities while recognising that the right to protest may need to be limited to protect other legitimate public interests.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in this group I have Amendments 369 and 371. Amendment 369 is co-signed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and is itself subject to two amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB. Our other Amendment 371 is co-signed by my noble friends Lady Doocey and Lord Strasburger, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I am grateful to them all for their support.

Amendment 369 seeks to enshrine in statute the right to protest as it has long been enjoyed in this country. The right to protest is, of course, enshrined in the ECHR. Article 10 concerns the right to freedom of expression and Article 11 concerns the right to freedom of assembly and association. The right to protest is, and always has been, circumscribed in English law, just as Articles 10 and 11 rights are circumscribed in the convention.

It is worth reminding ourselves reasonably briefly of the limits placed on the two freedoms by the convention. The right to freedom of expression under Article 10 expressly includes the

“freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority”,

but it is limited, as it may be

“subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society”,

and, most relevantly,

“in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals”,

or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The Article 11 right to freedom of association and assembly accords to everyone

“the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests”.

It limits the restrictions that may be placed on those rights to those that are

“prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety”,

and the list goes on in the same way as Article 10.

I repeat the words of the two convention articles not because they are in any sense new but because they demonstrate the balancing exercise that the state must carry out when considering how far it may or may not be legitimate to restrict the exercise of the convention freedoms in this country, not as a matter simply of compliance with the convention but as a matter of sound public policy.

The right to protest has never been explicitly enshrined in English or UK legislation, although the restrictions on it have been. Considerable changes were made by the Conservative Government in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, with new statutory offences of public nuisance, more police powers to impose conditions on demonstrations that were deemed likely to be noisy or disruptive, and harsher penalties for obstructing highways.

The Bill now proposes further restrictions. For example, Clauses 118 to 121, to be considered in the next group, would create a new offence of concealing identity at protests in localities designated by the police. In the light of the development of live facial recognition technology, that looks and sounds ominous. Clause 121 will ban the use of pyrotechnic articles at protests, which I take to include any type of firework, unless exempted by the regulations. Collectively, the new restrictions on liberty and the further police powers, particularly taken with the new powers and conditions legislated for in the 2022 Act, mean that the right to protest is being progressively restricted. That highlights, we say, the need for a very public statement in domestic law of the right to protest and of the criteria to be applied when limiting it.

Our amendments seek to provide that in a way that is proportionate and balanced, but firm. We start Amendment 369 with the statement:

“Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others”.


Our amendment then imposes on public authorities three-pronged duties to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest. We appreciate that there are or can be significant resource implications for police and public authorities in policing protests. It can be an expensive exercise. We also appreciate that there is a difficult balance for the police to draw between overpolicing protests and underpolicing them, and that it is very often difficult to predict what is the right level of policing to maintain the balance between protecting the right to protest and risking disturbance if things go wrong. But the right to protest is a very valuable right, and it is extremely important to freedom and democracy that public authorities appreciate that they have the legal duty to respect, protect and facilitate it that our amendment describes. That legal duty must be backed by resources for the police and local authorities to ensure that this duty can be effectively performed.

The Government have appointed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, to carry out a review of public order and hate crime legislation. Its terms of reference were published last month, and the final report is expected next month, February 2026. In spite of the tight timescale, the noble Lord will, no doubt, carry out a thorough review of the law in this area, guided by the three principles that are set out in his terms of reference. The review will consider, first,

“whether the legislation is fit for purpose”,

secondly,

“whether it adequately protects communities from intimidation and hate”,

and thirdly,

“whether it strikes a fair balance between freedom of expression and the right to protest with the need to prevent disorder and keep communities safe”.

We maintain that proposed new subsections (2) and (3) in our amendment set out succinctly and clearly that balance. In order to be permissible, interference with or restriction of the right to protest must be necessary and proportionate and for the purpose of protecting national security or public safety, preventing disorder or crime, or protecting public health or the rights and freedoms of others. Those, we say, are the public interests that justify restriction of the right to protest.

In many ways, it is a pity that the Macdonald review was not commissioned before the Bill was introduced, given that deferring this legislation until after the report might have given the Government and Parliament a better opportunity to look afresh at some of the provisions in the 2022 Act and consider the proposals in the Bill. But we are where we are, and it is for Parliament to set out the policy objectives. So I suggest that it is more important than ever that we set out in statute the balance that is to be struck, even if this Bill will not be passed in its final form before the Macdonald review is published.

Our Amendment 371 seeks a review of the existing legal framework of protest and its interaction with Article 9, which covers freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as Articles 10 and 11, which I have considered above. If our Amendment 371 is accepted, that review will no doubt build on the work of the Macdonald review in the light of the passage of the Bill.

I turn to the two amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, with the balance between the right to protest and justifiable restrictions thereon as the touchstone. Amendment 369ZA would put public authorities under a duty to

“ensure that all other members of the public … are not hindered in any way from going about their daily business”,

and 369ZB would say that public authorities could interfere with the right to protest by restriction to

“prevent inconvenience to any member of the public”

or to

“permit any persons from going about their daily business”—

I suspect that the noble Lord must mean to “permit any persons to go about their daily business”.

The implication of both amendments is that it could be legitimately seen as necessary and proportionate to interfere with or restrict the right to protest for such a reason. Yet there is no requirement in either amendment that a significant number of people have to be inconvenienced or troubled in their daily business for a restriction to be justified. Far from it: Amendment 369ZA talks about any member of the public and Amendment 369ZB talks about permitting “any persons”. Those amendments are far too draconian.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, on that point. The right to free speech is extremely important, and there is no stopping the right to free speech about the issue of Palestine in any way, shape or form. If a determination is made under the Terrorism Act 2000 that an organisation has crossed that threshold, the Government have a duty to act on that, which is what we have done in this case. With due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, I just did not want to allow the comments he made to colour the position on a protest around Palestine. He can protest around that, but he cannot support an organisation that still has some outstanding court cases and has undertaken some severe action to date.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

May I press the Minister on that? I quite understand his analysis of the law: that the Palestine Action group became a proscribed organisation when Parliament said it should and, as a result of that, it follows from the terms of the Terrorism Act that there were and are continuing to be prosecutions of people who express support by perhaps sitting wearing a placard, or by wearing an item of clothing that expresses such support.

The proscription is of course the subject of challenge in the courts here and may well be the subject of challenge in the European Court of Human Rights, so I will say nothing further about that. But subject to that, have the Government not had any concern about the fact that because of the way the Terrorism Act works, the proscription of any organisation means that any expression of support, as the noble Lord said —however peaceable or however others might regard it as simply peaceable protest—renders it illegal and renders the person expressing such support liable to being prosecuted? Do the Government not feel that this is a reason for having a review of the validity and sense of the law in this area, where the Terrorism Act carries, as it stands, that unfortunate consequence?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We have strayed, with due respect to all noble Lords, slightly wider than the amendment. I just wanted to make the point about Palestine Action because the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned it.

The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is looking at all aspects of prosecution and all aspects relating to legislation. We keep all matters under review at all times.

The 2000 Act sets down certain criteria. That threshold was passed and crossed in this case. I defended that in this House, and the House supported it on a cross-party basis. That is political life. The noble Lord can move an amendment at any time to strike that legislation down, if he wishes to.

I hope that the noble Lords will not press the amendments before us today. The right to peaceful protest is vital. The Government support it. The Government are making changes still to allow that right but also to try to get a fair balance so that communities and others can also enjoy life when a protest occurs. We have the wider review from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, which will report in due course and which will colour, no doubt, further discussions. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will be as brief as I can. On the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, I welcome his support for the principle of Amendment 369, but our amendment does fully respect the rights and freedoms of others and does so expressly in proposed new subsection (3)(c). That does not mean that any inconvenience to citizens should be accepted as a reason for restricting the right to protest. I make the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and others have made: that nearly all protests cause some inconvenience and noise without unduly infringing the rights of others. I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that, certainly as they are framed, his amendments smack of intolerance in their failure to countenance any inconvenience.

All noble Lords have accepted that the rights of neither side of the argument are absolute—the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Goodman, made the same point. I believe, along with others, that the toleration of some inconvenience is the price of the democratic right to protest.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is absolutely right that we have the ECHR rights, and he knows that I regard them as of critical importance. He makes the point—supported by the others, and it would be echoed by me—that Amendment 369, in part, duplicates the ECHR rights; I am bound to say that I do not regard it as likely that there will be satellite litigation about the difference between the two sets of rights. One point that bears on his argument is that the statement in domestic legislation that directly bears on the right to protest—whereas the Article 10 and Article 11 rights do bear on it but not as directly as our amendment —is of great importance. But that is only part of the picture.

I am also absolutely clear that I am not criticising and have at no stage criticised the police for enforcing the law. Indeed, as it happens, I take the contrary view. I do not believe that the police should have discretion not to enforce the law except on quite serious grounds of convenience.

I criticise the fact—I say it is relevant, when the Minister said it was not relevant—that the need for reconsideration of the Terrorism Act in the light of what has happened, and it has left us in the position that peaceful protest can lead to prosecutions that are unintended, means that a full review is necessary. I, of course, welcome the review of noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and I welcome the fact that the Government have put that in train, but a further full review over a longer period is necessary.

However, the absolutely crucial point about the need for Amendment 369 is the one the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made: it would impose an express statutory duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest, which is not anywhere in the ECHR. There may be resource implications to that, but it only reflects the importance we place on preserving democracy and the right to protest along with it.

For the time being, I will of course seek leave to withdraw the amendment, but I will reconsider the position between now and Report, having regard to the support I have received from some quarters around the House, but not universally.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)]

It is now appropriate for the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to tell the Committee whether he wishes to withdraw Amendment 369.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I apologise for intervening too early, and I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 369 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

347: After Clause 109 Insert the following new Clause—
“Controlling or coercive behaviour by persons providing psychotherapy or counselling services(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if—(a) A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person (“B”),(b) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards B that is controlling or coercive,(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will or may have a serious effect on B.(2) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if—(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or(b) it causes B psychological harm which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that—(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.(5) A is to be taken to have shown the facts mentioned in subsection (4) if—(a) sufficient evidence of the facts is adduced to raise an issue with respect to them, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.(6) The defence in subsection (4) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour by providing psychotherapy or counselling services.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment is in exactly the same form as that which I, with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and my friend Lady Jolly, who is now retired, moved to the Domestic Abuse Bill in 2021. The aim of the amendment, which would introduce a new clause after Clause 109, is to criminalise controlling or coercive behaviour by so-called psychotherapists or counsellors who are in fact no better than charlatans or quacks who prey on their clients, generally young people, taking appalling advantage of their vulnerabilities, abusing their misplaced trust, and often charging them substantial fees in the process.

I should make it clear that this amendment does not imply any criticism of the many honest, altruistic and understanding psychotherapists and counsellors who daily help patients and clients up and down the country with advice and therapy. Such honest psycho- therapists offer counselling and help to their clients or patients and generally assist them through very difficult times in their lives.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hear what the noble and learned Lord says. I have tried to tell the Committee that the Department of Health and Social Care is taking forward a programme of reform to professional regulation and legislative frameworks for healthcare professionals. Responsibility for that lies with the Department of Health. On this Bill, I speak in response to the amendments on behalf of the Home Office. I am arguing, and I have done so previously, that legislation would not be the appropriate route forward. There may be a common thread with previous Ministers there, but that is the argument that I am putting to the Committee.

I am happy to reflect with colleague as to whether I can ask my colleague Ministers to examine the issues that the noble and learned Lord has put to the Committee, but it is ultimately for them to consider the evidence provided. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, thinks that that is a brush-off. I hope it is not, but he can judge that in reflecting on what I have said today. If he wishes to then there is the opportunity to raise this issue on Report; the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has already shown his tenacity in doing so on several occasions.

I am happy to try to facilitate for a Minister of Health to examine the issues put before the Committee, and I think it is reasonable that I draw this debate to the attention of the appropriate Minister for Health, including the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which test the assumptions of the proposed new clause as well. Ultimately, however, I am standing here on behalf of the Government and the Home Office, and speaking for all these matters now. The legislative route is not one that we consider appropriate. I have said what I have said, and I would be very happy, if the noble Lord wishes to withdraw his amendment, to draw the attention of the appropriate Health Minister to this debate, including the noble Lord’s comments and those of other Members. I have heard the request for a meeting from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and I will draw that request to the attention of the appropriate Health Minister. If Members remain unhappy after that process then there are a number of options open to them; they are experienced parliamentarians and no doubt they will exercise them.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all those noble Lords who have spoken movingly and persuasively in favour of our amendment. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, for giving the added suggestion in relation to spiritual abuse. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for the support for our amendment from the Opposition Benches. I am bound to say that I am disappointed by the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, on behalf of the Government, for a number of reasons.

First, I have the greatest respect for the way that the noble Lord has handled matters in this House since becoming a Minister, but I have never heard him make a brush-off or an excuse quite as specious as the one that he just made, when he said that the fact that the same excuse made by him had been made by the Conservative Government gave it validity. It does not. There is no validity to such an excuse and, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, the excuses really do have to stop now, because we raise a very real issue.

Secondly, I will consider the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, whom I count as a friend as well as a very wise lawyer. If he has doubts about the drafting then those are something we will discuss, and no doubt can discuss with the Government. I also agree with the points made by those noble Lords who said that regulation is desperately needed for psycho- therapists and therapists. Of course it is, but the fact that we need regulation does not mean that we do not also need the help of the criminal law for those who are unscrupulous enough to use quack psychotherapy and false counselling to dupe people into parting with money and ruining their lives in the process. It is all very well for the Minister to say that he will get the Department of Health involved. We heard that from the Conservative Government, and it is not enough. This is a Crime and Policing Bill that introduces new offences: the protection of victims and vulnerable people, and the visiting of penalties upon unscrupulous and criminal behaviour, is what the criminal law is and ought to be about. The time has come to deal with it.

We have heard about the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, to regulation. He has worked on that for many years. He wanted to be here this evening, but I am afraid that he was stuck in traffic in south Oxfordshire—something that happens to many of us, even in south Oxfordshire. The noble Lord has also supported the proposition that this behaviour ought to be criminal, and he supports it now. I suggest that the Government need to take that very seriously indeed.

I do not accept that the wording of the offence is so broad that it does not penalise the correct behaviour. The way that it is phrased in subsection 1(a) is that A commits an offence if

“A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person”.


The point taken by the noble Lord, Lord Hanson—that there may be other people who need regulating—does not count. The number of counsellors that he described would all be caught by this.

This should not now be the subject for an excuse. It is a time for action. We need to legislate now. I would like to meet the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and anybody else who is interested. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who has also co-signed this amendment, for which I am very grateful, has worked on this for years and so has the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. If we can have a meeting, work out between now and Report how to get the drafting right, and produce a criminal offence that will work and will outlaw this behaviour then that is something that I would very much like to do, and I will have achieved the end that I seek. I invite the Minister—indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, put it, I beg him—to take this seriously and end this scourge once and for all with this Crime and Policing Bill. With that said, and at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but we will come back to it on Report.

Amendment 347 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, although this Bill is extremely wide-ranging, as has been pointed out, and plainly lacks focus, we have had an interesting and diffuse debate and we can discern something now of the Government’s central aims: first, to help halve violence against women and girls; secondly, to protect children from criminal exploitation and abuse, on which my noble friends Lady Benjamin, Lady Hamwee and Lady Featherstone, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Cash, and others spoke so compellingly; and then to cut street violence, particularly knife crime, to reduce anti-social behaviour and to increase neighbourhood policing and public confidence in the police. On these Benches, we support all these aims. However, as it stands, the Bill risks many unforeseen and undesirable consequences.

Broadly, we will seek to ensure that the Bill does not unjustifiably reduce citizens’ rights and liberties; that it should not unnecessarily create new or duplicatory offences; that it will keep the law up to date with new technology, as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones explained; that it will enhance police effectiveness and community confidence, and will not increase pressure on the police or local authorities; and, generally, that it will not make managing the criminal justice system more difficult, either by increasing court backlogs or making it harder for courts to handle their workload effectively and justly, or by increasing the prison population when our aim is to reduce reoffending, reverse sentence inflation and rehabilitate more offenders in the community.

I can make only a few points. The detail we will leave to 11 days in Committee, and we may need even more for proper consideration of the many expected amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, predicted.

I turn first to the protection of citizens’ rights, particularly the right to peaceful protest. Whatever our differing views on the horrors in the Middle East, many have been frankly shocked that the Terrorism Act was deployed in the proscription of Palestine Action, whether or not that was sanctioned by the legislation. Many hundreds of protesters face prosecution for offences labelled as “terrorist” for taking part in protests in an entirely non-violent way. Such prosecutions may prevent them finding employment or travelling to the States, as my noble friend Lady Miller pointed out, or indeed the EU when the European travel authorisation scheme is launched next year. These are not groundless scare stories; they are points made by the Government and senior officers to deter attendance at these protests. We will be seeking stronger statutory protection for the right to peaceful protest and a review of the threshold for so-called “terrorist offences”.

I am concerned that the generally very clear and helpful opening by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt—for which I thank her—revealed on these issues a lack of balance in government. The speeches by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and my noble friends Lord Strasburger and Lady Miller, and numbers of others, provided a welcome counterweight.

We also worry about the indiscriminate use of live facial recognition, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger explained. While it may have uses—for example, in connection with retail theft, car break-ins, bag snatches and other street crime—I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie, and others that its use needs careful review and control. Unsafeguarded access to DVLA information, or electronic information on which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, spoke, presents similar risks. So, while agreeing with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, we do not always go along with his approach to police access to personal information. However, I suggest that the concept of stewarded public interest data trusts—introduced, for example, in Canada, Australia and Belgium—offers balance on these privacy issues and deserves serious consideration. We must not slide inadvertently, carelessly or by stealth towards being a surveillance state.

The respect order proposals are not risk-free. Although making these orders will be for the courts, applications for them will be largely for our underresourced police and local authorities. How confident can the Government be of their usefulness? Will not the financial and administrative burden of securing these orders, organising their supervision and then policing and punishing their breach, outweigh their effectiveness in reducing crime and anti-social behaviour? Are the procedures robust in respecting citizens’ liberties? Before respect orders are made, there must be wide consultation on the guidance and an independent review of existing powers.

The Bill will create many new offences. I started in preparation to count them but ran out of steam. A number of them duplicate existing offences and will make the criminal law more complicated. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, pointed out, and as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, so graphically described, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Vaizey, Lord Russell of Liverpool and others, other provisions increase existing penalties.

This mixture is generally not helpful. More prosecutions for complex new offences will tend to clog up the courts and exacerbate the appalling backlogs we so desperately need to clear. More and longer prison sentences will do nothing to reduce reoffending or its massive cost to society. We already imprison more people and for longer than other countries in western Europe. Our prisons are still overcrowded, understaffed and in many cases dilapidated, often serving more as academies of crime than as centres of reform. We should be reversing sentence inflation, relying on more and better community sentencing and focusing on rehabilitation and training. The Sentencing Bill will cover these issues, but this Bill betrays a lack of co-ordination across criminal justice issues

While opposing unnecessary new offences, I will relay the amendment I proposed to the Domestic Abuse Bill, to criminalise psychotherapists who exercise controlling or coercive behaviour over their patients, often vulnerable young adults. When I moved this amendment in 2021 with all-party support, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, who is now in a stronger position to influence these matters, argued that we had made a powerful case for change and said that he hoped the Government would, as he put it,

“set out a pathway to remedy this undeniably serious problem”.—[Official Report, 10/3/21; col. 1776.]

I hope to hold this Government to his word.

Finally, on police effectiveness and public confidence, and on pressure on the police and local authorities, my noble friend Lady Doocey rightly said that pressure on the police largely comes down to resources—for example, on drug testing and law enforcement. This Government, like the last, persistently understate both the shortage of resources for policing and the pressures on the police, which diminish both police effectiveness and public confidence. Public confidence means community confidence, which requires a genuine commitment to neighbourhood policing, which was addressed by my noble friend, and to ending racism and hate crime, on which the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and others spoke. We will seek progress on these issues.

I add one final point on policing and police resources. The prevalent minimum, or zero, response to so-called minor crime undermines public confidence. It is said that minimal response is acceptable for crimes that are low-level and low-value. But, just as the noble Lord, Lord Birt, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, described, crimes such as bike theft, car break-ins, shop theft and mobile phone, watch and bag snatches are committed on an industrial scale. Such offences may often be low-value in isolation, but these are not isolated incidents; they are largely the work of multiple repeat offenders and professional gangs. Concerted efforts to ensure they are policed more effectively would do much to restore public confidence in our policing.

King’s Speech

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 24th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I had the pleasure of welcoming the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, during the discussion on the prison Statement much earlier today, and I now add my congratulations to him on his powerful maiden speech. His extremely warm and enthusiastic welcome from the whole House is a tribute to his long history of achievement in rehabilitation and reform, and his appointment gives fresh heart and hope to those of us—and in this House there are many—who have argued this case for a very long time. My hope is that we can now look to government to direct our criminal justice system towards reducing reoffending and turning lives around. That is not achieved simply by banging up offenders for as long as possible to keep them away from the public, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, just succinctly made clear. Taking dangerous offenders out of society for an appropriate period is, of course, a proper function of punishment, but I only wish more of the popular press would climb off that bandwagon.

I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, on an interesting and thoughtful maiden speech, in which he drew inspiration from his grandfather’s history to express his commitment to intercommunity cohesion. We also look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, at the end of a very long debate.

I will concentrate on justice; my noble friends Lady Doocey, Lord Taylor and Lady Ludford, and others from these Benches, have spoken on home affairs. But before I turn to the substance, I wish to make a point about the Arbitration Bill and the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, thought I might, because I have a serious criticism of our processes, which we must, I suggest, change.

The Arbitration Bill follows detailed recommendations made by the Law Commission for improving and updating our highly regarded Arbitration Act 1996. Legal services, and arbitration in particular, make an important contribution to the UK economy. London has long been the pre-eminent seat for international arbitrations—tied for the first time this year with Singapore. It is vital that we maintain our position.

The Bill was introduced into this House in the last Parliament following the special Law Commission procedure. A special committee was established under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and we took lengthy evidence in writing and orally from a long and distinguished list of witnesses. Two Government Ministers and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, were also members of the committee. We agreed important amendments, all of which are now incorporated into the new draft. Huge amounts of time and money were expended. The Bill was non-controversial, and everyone was happy to agree it. Yet, when the July election was announced, the Whips in both Houses could not make the time to agree that it should be put before them in the wash-up. Why not? It was because of an absurd and outdated convention that, if a Bill has not gone through all stages in one House, it cannot be introduced in the other so as to go through the speeded-up wash-up procedure, however much the Bill is needed and however uncontroversial it is. We could have completed the passage of the Bill in a couple of hours of parliamentary time before the Dissolution, but no: we lost it, and months of time, and we have sustained significant damage to our economy and loss of prestige for our legal services as a result.

We lost the Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill in the same way, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, have said. The litigation funding companies are, on any view, really important for access to justice, supporting litigation such as that brought by the sub-postmasters arising out of the Horizon scandal, which otherwise would not have got off the ground. They may need regulation in future, about which we may argue, but no one doubts that they should be permitted to function. Yet they are now an industry in limbo. That is because of the Supreme Court’s decision, in a case called PACCAR, that their agreements are unenforceable. The Bill, supported by all parties, would uncontroversially have reversed that decision. We have to change this absurd and outdated approach to the wash-up at the end of a Parliament to avoid a waste of time and money.

Turning to the substance, we welcome the proposed crime and policing Bill. Liberal Democrats have long been committed to community policing. Fostering close relationships between police officers and their communities is a proven and important way to build and maintain trust in the police, and so to increase the flow of information to and public confidence in the police. That is crucial after the number of horrific incidents over the last few years.

The victims, courts and public protection Bill will build on the Victims and Prisoners Act, which was a good example of cross-party co-operation in this House, but there is unfinished business. Strengthening the power of the Victims’ Commissioner by statute will give victims a more powerful voice. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and welcome her speech today and her unflinching commitment to improving support for victims.

I have some reservations about forcing offenders to attend sentencing hearings. It is probably right in principle that they should, but I am not sure what courts would do when they refuse. Are we to drag such offenders to court by force? It might be better simply to make it clear that a refusal to attend could properly be treated as a sign of a lack of remorse.

Commitment to reducing delays in the court system is an important priority—the noble Lord, Lord Meston, stressed that—but it will not be achieved only by allowing associate prosecutors to work on appropriate cases, as is suggested in the briefing. It will need more resources, yes, but also new efficiencies and new thinking, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, suggested.

The emphasis on tackling violence against women and girls is particularly welcome. We need a far more understanding, sympathetic and determined approach to protecting women and girls from harm. Over the years we have failed in this, and the results have been underreporting of offences because of an unsympathetic approach to victims and, furthermore, very low conviction rates when offences are prosecuted. I hope that the Government listen carefully to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, that far too often women and girl victims find their privacy and digital records invaded and violated, which acts as a deterrent to victims becoming involved in the criminal process.

We should not forget that underreporting inculcates an arrogant overconfidence among sexual predators that they will get away with abuse and violence in both public and domestic contexts. The noble Baroness, Lady Gohir, made the important point that tackling violence against women and girls depends on measures to change the attitudes of male perpetrators throughout diverse racial communities.

I add a word on psychotherapists, about whom I have spoken to the House before. I hope there will be an opportunity to secure in one of these Bills a requirement for the regulation of unqualified people holding themselves out as psychotherapists, and for the criminalisation of abusive coercive control by psychotherapists using their power and influence over vulnerable and usually young clients and patients to cut them off from their families.

Turning—or returning—to prisons and the penal system, many noble Lords have made a strong case for a complete change of approach to prison and punishment, starting, of course, with the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Timpson. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester eloquently made the point that reliance on imprisonment as a complete answer to criminality is not supported by the evidence, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, repeated.

The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, mentioned the role of a number of voluntary organisations in Oxfordshire, some of which I know, but her speech raises a wider point, which is that local organisations have an important role in supporting the rehabilitation of prisoners and in fostering linkage between prisons, prisoners and the communities in which they work. The noble Lords, Lord Waldegrave and Lord Meston, made similar points. The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, spoke of purposeful activity, training for employment and life within prisons. We have heard mention of farms, gardens and libraries, but there is also scope for sports, music and drama.

My noble friend Lord Beith made a number of points about sentencing and the importance of a sentencing review. We must reverse the trend to ever-longer sentences. My noble friends Lady Burt and Lord McNally, and other noble Lords, made the clear point that not enough has been done to end the stain on our justice system of the continued incarceration of IPP prisoners.

My noble friend Lord Dholakia stressed the role of probation services in delivering community sentences and emphasised the degree to which the Probation Service is stretched. We also need through-the-gate support from probation officers, with contact with clients both before and after release. Three things help prisoners most to avoid reoffending: a job, a home, and family and community ties. Release into prisoners’ communities is very important, but that needs the prison capacity crisis to be addressed so that we can get over the shuffling issue.

On a general point that I call “spend to save”, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, mentioned the unwelcome effect of the capital cost of new and better prisons—unwelcome for Governments, that is. Yet that and the annual cost of imprisonment, currently £47,000 for a prisoner, are only part of the picture. Reoffending has been estimated to cost the country £18 billion, and that is not including the knock-on cost to the public of social care, family housing and lost tax revenues. I hope the Treasury will learn to adopt a more holistic approach to spending on rehabilitation that is less bunkered and more cross-department. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bach, on legal aid, on which more liberality would avoid significant unnecessary costs, not to mention widespread unhappiness.

I close, finally, by saying that on these Benches we are greatly encouraged by this Government’s clear commitment to the rule of law, including international law, as stressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, and in particular to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act, which I for one regard as one of the finest triumphs of the Labour Party. We hope that in Government we will have some more.