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Written StatementsThe Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) will today publish the report of the triennial review of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), which the former Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr William Hague), launched in February 2014. The WFD currently receives funding from the FCO and the Department for International Development. The review has recommended that the WFD retain its status as a non-departmental public body at arm’s length from Government. The review also recommends a range of organisational, policy and governance measures to increase the relevance and impact of the WFD’s work, enabling it to become a world-leading organisation in the field of democracy assistance.
The Government consider the WFD an important tool for building open, inclusive and accountable democratic systems overseas, which are strongly in our national interest. We are working with the WFD and its board to ensure implementation of the review recommendations.
The review is available online at: http://www.parliament. uk/writtenstatements
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Written StatementsI have today laid before the House a departmental minute proposing the gifting of equipment to the 3rd Land Border Regiment of the Lebanese armed forces.
Contagion from the worsening crisis in Syria is having a direct effect on its neighbours, particularly in areas adjacent to Lebanon’s eastern border. The UK remains firmly committed to Lebanon’s stability, and in supporting the Lebanese armed forces (LAF) to minimise contagion from the Syrian conflict, and to combat the spread of ISIL. As part of this commitment, since 2012, the UK has been assisting the LAF, through the rapid land border security assistance project, to establish and mentor the LAF land border regiments (LBRs). The mission of the LBRs is to observe, identify, deter and interdict activities by illegal armed actors in the near border areas, in line with agreed international human rights standards. Between 2012 and 2014 around £20 million of conflict pool funds was allocated to provide observation, protection, mobility and communications equipment to 1 and 2 LBRs, and to establish the lead elements of a 3rd LBR, as well as a programme of training and mentoring.
The command element of 3LBR has been established and equipped, and 3LBR is preparing its deployment plan for a 50 km area of responsibility south of Arsal to Tfail. Recent ISIL actions in the Arsal area, and the threat that ISIL poses to UK interests, make it imperative that the LAF completes the expansion of the LBRs southwards, as part of an overall strategy to bring the entire eastern border with Syria back under the authority of the state.
The departmental minute laid today therefore sets out our intention to gift a package of £3,056,975 of protection, IT and communications equipment to complete the establishment of the 3rd Land Border Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The proposed gift will be funded by the Government’s conflict, security and stability fund and will consist of the following UK sourced equipment:
Community outreach and LBR operations performance measurement IT hardware and software, with training (£349,997)
Three protected border observation posts and two mobile observation platforms, with observation aids and ballistic protection for fixed 3LBR positions (£1,207,027)
Radio equipment to allow the operational elements of 3LBR to link back to 3LBR HQ (£1,499,951)
Alongside the gift, the UK is continuing its existing package of training and mentoring with additional operational expertise worth £1,932,783. The combined total of £4,989,758 of equipment plus training and mentoring aims to complete, between April 2015 and March 2016, building the capacity of the 3rd Land Border Regiment of the Lebanese armed forces to observe, identify, deter and stop the illegal movement of weapons and personnel across the central sector of the eastern land border with Syria.
The proposed gift has been assessed against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria. The proposed gift has been scrutinised and approved by a senior, cross-Whitehall Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) approval board, which has confirmed that it fits with the Government’s strategic and delivery objectives. Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials also assessed the project for human rights risks, using the overseas security and justice assistance guidelines established by the Foreign Secretary in 2011. They concluded that the risk of human rights violations arising from the project’s delivery could be successfully mitigated.
The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle, and given the need to provide the LAF with suitable equipment at the earliest possible opportunity to allow them to retain the initiative in blocking and containing ISIL, has agreed the proposal to reduce the period for parliamentary scrutiny, pending the Dissolution of Parliament. If, during the period to 26 March 2015, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a parliamentary question or a motion relating to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.
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Written StatementsThe Government have today published a memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Committees on Arms Export Controls on post-legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has carried out the post-legislative scrutiny, which includes a preliminary assessment of how the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 has worked in practice, and has set out its findings in a Command Paper (Cm 9021) to the Committees.
Copies of the Command Paper are available from the Vote Office and Printed Paper Office.
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Written StatementsThe Foreign and Commonwealth Office has today laid a departmental minute proposing the gifting of search and rescue equipment to Syrian civil defence teams.
The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate. An estimated 200,000 people have been killed since the war began four years ago, many of them innocent civilians. The Assad regime continues to use the most barbaric military methods and tactics available, including the use of indiscriminate artillery fire, chemical weapons and barrel bombs. The UK remains committed to doing all it can to promote a political settlement to end the conflict, to alleviate the humanitarian suffering, and to protect UK national security through countering terrorist and extremist threats.
In January and May 2014, my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr Hague), laid departmental minutes before the House of Commons and issued written ministerial statements setting out our plans to gift equipment to civil defence teams operating in opposition-controlled areas of Syria. No objections were received to either gift and the UK distributed the equipment to civil defence teams along with comprehensive training packages. These defence teams have now saved over 10,000 lives by rescuing civilians trapped in damaged buildings, fighting fires and by providing emergency first aid. Our assistance has helped increase the legitimacy and capacity of local councils and supported communities in dealing with the aftermath of attacks. Other donors, including the US, Denmark and Japan, have also contributed to the civil defence initiative.
The UK intends to continue its support to this programme by increasing the communications capability and mobility of the teams, providing more medium-weight rescue equipment and equipping further emergency medical teams. The departmental minute laid today set out our proposal to gift £3.5 million in equipment to Syrian beneficiaries operating within civil defence. The proposed list of equipment includes cutting and rescue tools, personal protective gear including helmets and goggles, stretchers, medicines and medical supplies, radios, fire-fighting equipment and 4x4 vehicles. The programme will also increase co-ordination between the Syrian interim government and civil defence teams, and provide civilian outreach for the civil defence teams, improving the resilience of local communities. The programme is expected to cost £10 million and will be funded through the Government’s conflict, security and stability fund (CSSF).
The use of CSSF funds to cover the costs of the gift has been approved by members of the Middle East and North Africa strategic programme board from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defence. The gift has been scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations. All our assistance is carefully calibrated and legal, is aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting moderate groups and is regularly monitored and evaluated.
The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of 14 parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which the departmental minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a parliamentary question or a motion relating to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.
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Written StatementsThe Foreign and Commonwealth Office has today laid a departmental minute proposing the gifting of equipment to the Free Syrian Police.
The conflict in Syria remains catastrophic, with an estimated 200,000 people killed and more than half the Syrian population in need of humanitarian assistance. The UK will continue to do all it can to end the conflict through a political settlement, while also alleviating humanitarian suffering and protecting UK national security.
The UK is committed to working with the moderate opposition to help develop their capacity to meet needs on the ground and to reduce suffering and to save lives, thereby also helping reduce the space for extremists to operate. In line with this approach, on 6 February 2014, my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Mr Hague), laid before the House of Commons a departmental minute which set out our plans to expand a UK-funded pilot project to train and equip Free Syrian Police officers, enabling them to provide community policing. I am pleased to present a further UK contribution of practical support to the Free Syrian Police, aimed at furthering their work.
The UK is working with international donors to provide training, technical assistance, maintenance funds, and basic equipment to the Free Syrian Police operating in opposition-controlled areas of Syria. The UK is also supporting the development of greater community oversight and monitoring ‘of the police to help ensure that they are responsive to local needs. Through this support the UK is aiming to build community resilience and moderate governance to help counter the threat from extremist groups. Following the success of an initial pilot and subsequent phases, developing the capacity of community policing has become a core aspect of the UK’s ongoing support to the moderate opposition in Syria.
The departmental minute laid today sets out in more detail our plans to gift office and communications equipment, uniforms, non-armoured vehicles and other operational equipment to the Free Syrian Police. Subject to assessment under the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria, it is proposed that this will include a limited amount of controlled equipment, namely body armour and helmets (for conducting vehicle checks outside towns), CS spray (small canisters for individual personal protection), handcuffs (for making arrests), and night-vision goggles (early warning system for approaching regime helicopters).
The goods will be procured, distributed and delivered by an implementing partner carefully selected through competitive tender. The total cost of the proposed gift is up to £750,000, which will be met by the Government’s conflict, stability and security fund (CSSF). The UK’s assistance forms part of an approach co-ordinated with other donors that will help deliver the best value for money. Other donors, including the US, Denmark and the Netherlands, are also contributing on a similar scale.
The gift forms part of a renewed comprehensive UK programme of training and technical assistance worth approximately £2.5 million in the current financial year, which will be delivered by implementing partners. The training aims to build the capacity of the Free Syrian Police including through developing their strategy, planning and management mechanisms and enhancing co-ordination between Free Syrian Police units, as well as strengthening the relationship between police actors and local communities.
The Free Syrian Police are responsible for providing basic civilian policing in large areas of opposition-controlled territory. Police actors, local administrative councils and the National Coalition’s interim Ministers have all underlined to us the need to improve policing and security, and we have worked closely with Syrian partners and other donors to design a comprehensive programme of support.
The gift is being scrutinised to ensure that it is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations. All our assistance is carefully calibrated and legal, is aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting moderate groups and is regularly monitored and evaluated. We have assessed the project for human rights risks, using the overseas security and justice assistance guidelines established by the Foreign Secretary in 2011 as part of ensuring these risks are effectively mitigated.
The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of 14 parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which the departmental minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a parliamentary question or a motion relating to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.
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Commons Chamber2. What recent discussions he has had with his counterparts in North Africa on the political and security situation in Libya.
The political and security situation in Libya remains a concern. We call on all parties to agree to a ceasefire, to engage with the UN dialogue process to find a lasting solution, and to unite to defeat the Islamist extremism which is establishing a foothold in that country. I speak regularly to my Egyptian counterpart. I visited Algeria on 19 and 20 February for discussions which were dominated by the situation in Libya.
I welcome the Egyptian Government’s response to the terrible murder of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya and especially the bridge building shown by President Sisi and religious leaders to the Coptic community. What more can the UK do to support Egypt in its vital role in working for stability in Libya?
My hon. Friend is right that Egypt will play a vital role in the solution in Libya, as all European countries, many of which are very concerned about the situation there, and the United States recognise. Similarly, there are still significant challenges in the human rights situation in Egypt. We were very pleased with the clear statement that President Sisi made on the rights of religious minorities in Egypt. However, as with many other elements of the Egyptian constitution, we now need to see that being delivered on the ground.
Following engagement with ourselves, the Prime Minister appointed the National Security Adviser to engage with the Libyan authorities on reconciliation and finding ways forward for compensation for victims of IRA terrorism that was sponsored by the Gaddafi regime. Will the Foreign Secretary update the House on what progress the National Security Adviser has made in that work?
I regret to have to tell the right hon. Gentleman that the reality on the ground in Libya is that there is no authority to engage with. I am afraid that at the moment I can report no progress on those measures. The urgent need now is to see a Government of national unity created and for the Libyan people to deal collectively with the threat to their society that is posed by the establishment of ISIL cells. Once we have such an authority in place, we will of course re-engage with that agenda.
As the United Kingdom was one of the leading countries that helped the Libyan people overthrow Colonel Gaddafi, do we not have both a political obligation and a political interest to help all the democratic forces in Libya trying to create a new, decent country? While I recognise that the Government do indeed have a priority in that respect, I urge my right hon. Friend to ensure that the British Government do all within their power—perhaps even more than they are doing at the moment—over the crucial weeks and months that will determine whether Libya does indeed become a moderate, secular force or continues to be a hotbed of anarchy and potential terrorism.
I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that the next few weeks and months will be crucial for Libya. Would that it was as simple as getting behind the democratic authority in Libya—it is not clear that there is a democratic authority behind which we can get. We need a coming together. I do not want to overplay the prospects, but the UN Secretary-General’s special representative, Bernardino León, is making some progress, and the Prime Minister’s envoy, Jonathan Powell, is also working hard. We will continue to engage, because having a stable Government in Libya is vital to our security.
The Tobruk-based Government have agreed to return to the UN talks, but on the condition that they are recognised as the only authority that can take part in those negotiations. What is the view of Her Majesty’s Government? Do they support the Tobruk-based Government?
Our view is that both the Tobruk regime and the Misratans, and indeed the regime in Tripoli, must attend the talks with the UN Secretary-General’s special representative on a no-preconditions basis and on the terms he proposes in order to discuss how they can form a Government of national unity of some kind so that we can begin to rebuild Libya, which could be a prosperous and successful country, and one whose stability is vital to our own interests.
3. What recent assessment he has made of progress with the middle east peace process.
I have to be candid with my hon. Friend: progress has stalled pending the Israeli general election on 17 March. The British Government strongly supported US Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts to reach a final status agreement and were disappointed that the parties did not make more progress in 2014. I have discussed many times with Secretary Kerry, most recently when we met in London on 21 February, what the next steps will be. We will press the US to revive the initiative and all the parties to resume serious negotiations as soon as possible after the Israeli elections, and I urge them to be ready then to step up and show the bold political leadership that will be necessary to achieve peace.
I am glad to hear that my right hon. Friend will join me in asking for renewed international pressure on Hamas to disarm and renounce violence. Does he agree that unless that happens it is difficult to envisage a unified and prosperous Palestinian state existing alongside Israel?
My hon. Friend is right that for an enduring solution Hamas must disarm and be prepared to accept Israel’s right to live in peace, but Israel must also stop making illegal settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. We need to keep up the pressure on both sides if we are to get a sustainable solution.
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that one of the most positive possibilities for advancing peace in the middle east would be the success of the international negotiations with Iran on its nuclear projects? Will he take this opportunity to make it clear that any attempt to disrupt those talks by the Israeli Prime Minister when he addresses the United States Congress later today would be bad for the whole of the middle east and bad for Israel too?
My reading of the US Congress is that it probably does not need much encouragement to instinctively be very sceptical about the process of dialogue with Iran on the nuclear dossier. However, some small progress is being made there, and I would very much regret any attempts to destabilise or derail that process. On the wider question, settling the Israel-Palestine issue is the big roadblock to a more enduring peace in the middle east.
Does the Foreign Secretary think that peace will not be forthcoming until Hamas renounces violence and can speak with a single voice? In Israel, we have seen the emergence of a moderate centre ground. Does he think that either condition is going to happen?
I am going to be slightly careful about the second part of my right hon. Friend’s question because Israel is two weeks away from a general election, so I do not want to speculate about different parts of the political spectrum. What is clear is that there needs to be a broad-based movement within Israel that seeks peace, understands that trade-offs are required in order to achieve peace, and places the greatest premium on getting an acknowledgement of Israel’s right to live inside peaceful pre-’67 borders in perpetuity.
Is it true that Tony Blair is still a so-called middle east peace envoy? What progress has he secured on the ground, and do the UK Government still have confidence in his efforts?
It is true that Tony Blair remains the Quad envoy to the middle east. Mr Blair has made a large number of visits to the region; most recently he has been in Gaza. He continues to engage, and I have no doubt that his role will be kept under constant review.
May I take my right hon. Friend back to the question of settlements, which it is accepted throughout this House are wholly contrary to international law? More to the point, the continual encroachment by the Israeli Government makes it impossible for East Jerusalem to become the capital of a Palestinian state. Can he conceive of any circumstances where a leader of the Palestinians would be able to accept a peace arrangement based on giving up East Jerusalem?
I think that is highly unlikely. As my right hon. and learned Friend knows, the Government’s position is that that should not be the case. I have said in this House before and I will say again that settlements are just buildings. Buildings can be built and buildings can be removed, and we must not allow illegal building to stand in the way of a sustainable solution if it can otherwise be found.
I am sure that the Foreign Secretary agrees that the middle east peace process will be more difficult to restart if reconstruction in Gaza continues to proceed as slowly as it is currently. What further efforts, if any, will Ministers be making to speed up the delivery of aid, including British aid, that was promised by the international community at the Cairo conference, before they hand over the challenge to this Front Bench on 8 May?
If I may say so, I think that the hon. Gentleman is getting a little bit ahead of himself there.
We have a good track record on the delivery of our aid pledges in respect of Gaza. A number of other countries have made very forward-leaning aid pledges but they have not yet been followed through. So there is a problem with money, but there is also a physical problem of being able to get materials into Gaza and get works progressed. That is caused partly by the security situation in Sinai and the Egyptian response to that, and partly by the situation between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza. I do not think, honestly, that we are going to get much progress before the Israeli general election, but as soon as that election is out of the way, this has to be a major priority.
4. Whether he has had discussions with the Argentinian Government on the future of the Falkland Islands; and if he will make a statement.
10. What steps his Department is taking to ensure a lasting ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine.
We support all diplomatic efforts that aim to bring about a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Ukraine. Since the latest Minsk agreement was signed on 12 February, Russian-backed separatists have seized control of the strategically important town of Debaltseve. It is not yet clear that Russia has any intention of honouring the commitments it made in Minsk. I held talks with Secretary Kerry last weekend, and I will discuss Ukraine with EU Foreign Ministers on Friday in Riga. In all such discussions, we will continue to argue for a strong and united response to Russia’s actions until such time as we see full compliance on the ground.
I am sure that the House will want to take this opportunity to send its condolences to the friends and supporters of Boris Nemtsov, following his horrific murder last weekend.
The death toll in eastern Ukraine has reached 6,000 according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. It also detects an escalation in hostilities, despite the signing of the ceasefire agreement. Does the Secretary of State agree that the EU standing together on tougher sanctions is the only way we can make it clear to President Putin that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are unacceptable?
I of course share the hon. Gentleman’s view on the appalling murder of Nemtsov in Moscow.
The hon. Gentleman asked about stepping up sanctions in response to Russia’s failure to comply with Minsk. The Minsk agenda runs until the end of this year, so it will not be until the end of December that Ukraine will regain control of its border with Russia, even if all the milestones are complied with. We believe that the tier 3 sanctions should be extended to last until the end of the year, so that we have a tool with which to ensure compliance. We can always suspend or partially suspend the sanctions if the milestones are being met, but we need to have the tool in place right the way through the programme.
Many of my constituents have asked me why, when President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel met Putin, there was no senior British political presence or representation. When will Britain play its full part in protecting the sovereign nations of Europe?
I do not recognise the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s question. We are playing our part. While Mrs Merkel and President Hollande have done a good job of negotiating the Minsk implementation agreement under the Normandy process, which always involved the four countries of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia, our role has been, is and will remain to stiffen the resolve of all 28 EU members to be united and aligned with the United States in deploying what has proved to be a powerful sanctions weapon.
I certainly echo the sentiment of the Foreign Secretary’s final remarks. At this difficult and dangerous moment, it is vital that Europe and NATO stand united in ensuring that the Minsk agreement is implemented in full. However, may I bring him back to his remarks about tier 3 sanctions? Does he believe that new EU restrictive measures should be on the table at the next European Council meeting, as opposed simply to the roll-over and extension of existing measures that he described in his answer?
The European Commission has been tasked to look at a menu of possible additional measures that could be taken. As I have indicated, I think that we need two tools. We need an extension of the existing tier 3 measures through to the end of December. Putin has been telling oligarchs around Moscow that the sanctions will be over by the end of July: “Just hold your breath and it’ll all be fine.” We need to show him that that will not be the case. Alongside that, we need a credible set of options that we can implement immediately if there is a failure to comply with milestones in the Minsk implementation agreement or a serious further outbreak of conflict in the region.
I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s answer, but let me return to the appalling murder of Boris Nemtsov on Saturday in Moscow, to which he has referred. Clearly, the priority needs to be a thorough and impartial investigation into the murder. President Putin has a personal responsibility to show that the Russian authorities are willing and able to identify Mr Nemtsov’s killers and to bring them to justice. Will the Foreign Secretary confirm whether he has raised this matter with the Russian authorities, and give his assessment of the steps that have been taken by the Russian authorities to begin investigating the case?
We have heard a lot of noise from Moscow, but we have not yet seen any serious action. The omens are not promising. I heard just this morning that some countries’ intended high-level delegations to the funeral have not been able to obtain Russian visas. That probably tells us all we need to know.
The intransigence of the Russians is exemplified by the fact that they still hold in custody two Members of the Ukrainian Parliament, both of whom are members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. When will my right hon. Friend get tough and insist on expelling Russia from the Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Europe itself?
We do not have plans to take that step at this stage, but I assure my hon. Friend that we raise the matter regularly—indeed, the Minister for Europe raised it with the Russian ambassador only last week. I am going to Kiev later this week, and we will continue to work with the Ukrainians to try to secure the release of those two Ukrainians, as well as the Estonian border guard who was captured by the Russians six months ago.
7. What reports he has received on displacement of Bedouin in southern Israel.
11. What assessment he has made of the level of public demand for a renegotiated settlement between the UK and the EU.
I assess that mainstream opinion in the UK is that the EU is not currently delivering for Britain. We need to fix that problem, and only the Conservatives have a clear plan to do so. We will negotiate a new settlement with our EU neighbours, and one that works for Britain. We will then put that new settlement to the British people in an in/out referendum before the end of 2017. Only a Conservative Government will make that commitment. Labour and the Liberal Democrats do not want change, and UKIP cannot deliver it.
The Conservative party is the only sane and significant party to guarantee, following a renegotiation, an in/out referendum on our membership of the EU. How many countries has the Foreign Secretary visited to discuss that renegotiation, what levels of engagement has he had, and is there a positive desire for change in other states that matches ours?
I am grateful for the right hon. Lady’s three questions. The Foreign Secretary is a specialist in providing a pithy answer on a postcard.
Thank you, Mr Speaker, for that vote of confidence.
I have currently visited 23 of our partners in the European Union. In a nutshell, there is a very strong view that all member states want Britain to remain in the EU, an understanding that that can happen only if there is significant change in the EU, and a clear willingness to engage with us, particularly on our demands for improved competitiveness in the EU, which all member states want.
19. The Conservative manifesto at the last general election states:“European countries need to work together to boost global economic growth, fight global poverty, and combat global climate change. The European Union has a crucial part to play…A Conservative government will play an active and energetic role in the European Union to advance these causes.”Will that be the Conservative party’s policy in the next Parliament?
That is exactly what we are doing. The hon. Gentleman seems to subscribe to the view of the world in which Britain sits isolated on the edge. We are a major player in Europe. We have the second largest economy in Europe. We are leading the way in so many areas within the European Union. We have to seize this opportunity to shape the European Union in a way that works for Britain. It went off the rails somewhere over the past 20 years, and we must take this opportunity of reform and renegotiation to get it back on the rails. Crucially, we must then let the British people have the final say on whether the package we have negotiated is good enough or not.
16. Like you, Mr Speaker, I have complete confidence in the Foreign Secretary. I am sure he has sensed not only that there is increased public demand for renegotiation, but that there is absolutely no movement in public demand for that referendum. Is that his assessment, and will he commit to a referendum prior to the end of 2017?
I reiterate the commitment that the Prime Minister has already made that there will be a referendum by the end of 2017 if there is a Conservative Government. There is virtually no movement in polling evidence in the demand for a referendum. I will say something else to my hon. Friend: by creating the referendum we have—I will use the phrase again—lit a fire under our partners in Europe. They now know that they have to deliver change that is substantive and meaningful; not some backroom political deal, but something that will satisfy the British people in a referendum. That is what is driving the debate.
It is clear that the European Union needs to reform to create more growth, more jobs and more competitiveness, so what is the Minister’s reaction to the warning issued this morning from the executive vice-president of Ford, Mr Jim Farley, who said, on the prospects of “Brexit”,
“We really hope that doesn’t happen and we believe that the UK being part of the EU is critical for business”?
Why does the Conservative party call for the march of the makers in one breath, yet pursue a policy that poses a direct threat to manufacturing jobs, manufacturing investment and trade? Is it that the Foreign Secretary does not see the contradiction, or is it instead a complete and utter absence of leadership when it comes to the European Union?
It is that we need to resolve this issue. Of course, most people in this country recognise the value of the single market to Britain’s economy, but that comes at a price and it is a price we pay in loss of sovereignty and loss of control over many of our own affairs, including some that we do not need to lose control of. The debate will be on the correct balance between what is done at national level and what is done at European level, on the accountability of the European Union institutions to the people of the European Union, and on the European Union’s ability to drive economic growth across all our economies. That is what people in this country want resolved, and by resolving it we will create a more certain climate for business in the future.
The Foreign Secretary has kindly shared with us that he has spoken to 23 other member states and that they all support the United Kingdom’s remaining in the European Union. Can he tell us whether he supports Britain remaining in the European Union? Does he understand the damage that his policy is doing to British business and British interests in order to maintain a temporary peace in his party?
What would cause continuing damage to British industry is not resolving this issue once and for all. The only way to do that is to have a frank and open discussion about the problems in the European Union, to renegotiate the package and to put it to the British people—and then we have settled it for a generation.
12. What steps he is taking to secure the return of the UK citizens who were aboard the MV Seaman Guard Ohio when she was detained by the Indian authorities.
T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.
This week, we are delighted to welcome the President of Mexico and Senora Rivera on their state visit to the United Kingdom. Indeed, right about now, they should be being received by Her Majesty on Horse Guards parade. The UK and Mexico enjoy an excellent bilateral relationship, and we look forward to broadening and deepening that partnership this week.
My three key priorities continue to be Russia and Ukraine, the struggle against violent Islamist extremism and our plans for the reform of the European Union. Later this week, I will visit Ukraine to discuss the situation on the ground and to assess implementation of the latest Minsk agreement. I will then travel to Warsaw and on to Riga to meet my EU counterparts over the weekend.
As part of the Mexican state visit, it is good to see the flags of the British overseas territories flying in Parliament square today. I am encouraged to hear that London and Madrid are talking about better relations over Gibraltar. I seek assurances from my right hon. Friend, however, that there will never be any discussions over the future of Gibraltar’s sovereignty so long as the people of Gibraltar wish to remain loyal to this country.
That is our position, and I confirm that it will remain our position so long as there is a Conservative Government.
Last year, 2014, was dominated by news of horrendous violence against those of different faiths, from Boko Haram abducting Christian girls in Nigeria to the attacks by ISIL against Christians, Yazidis and other religious minorities within Iraq. In the light of those developments, does the Foreign Secretary agree that a global envoy for religious freedom, reporting to the Foreign Secretary should be appointed? If this Government choose to act, we will support them; if they do not, a Labour Government will act.
Our general approach is to try to get things done using the mechanisms we have. We have an extensive diplomatic network around the world, and we have large amounts of soft power at our disposal, including the leverage that our large aid budget gives us. I do not think simply creating new posts and ticking a box delivers in the way the right hon. Gentleman and the previous Government seem to think it will.
T4. The Minister will know that the UN has delayed by six months its report on human rights in Sri Lanka. A number of Sri Lankan constituents in my constituency are waiting for this report and are actively contacting their MP about it. Will the Minister push for the urgent release of this document, and will he please update us?
T6. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine and our relationship with Russia have real implications for the United Kingdom’s energy security. Many might say that, had energy security been a more key component of strategic foreign policy for successive European Union Governments, we might now have more room for manoeuvre with Putin. Can the Foreign Secretary assure us that full consideration of our long-term energy security is currently at the forefront of, and central to, our response to the evolving situation in Ukraine?
Yes, it is a key agenda item. I can reassure my hon. Friend that the United Kingdom is in a much better energy security position than many of our European Union partners. However, as our non-military response to Russia essentially depends on EU unity, we often find that we are as weak as the weakest link in that chain. There is an urgent need to ensure that the European Union as a whole improves its energy security over the coming years, both for reasons of competitiveness and for the sake of our own national security.
T3. What work will the Foreign Secretary do with his international counterparts to build on the progress that was made at the United Nations climate change conference in Lima last December? What role does he think that the Commonwealth has in that regard, given the vulnerability of a number of small island states?
T7. We know that 163 Palestinian children are being held in Israeli military detention, and that many are being held inside Israel in direct violation of the fourth Geneva convention. What representations is the Secretary of State making to the Israeli authorities with a view to ending that brutal aspect of the illegal occupation?
We routinely make representations to the Israelis on all aspects of illegal conduct—of which that is just one example—and we will continue to do so.
As the Government prepare for renegotiating the European treaties, will they give their full support to the Swiss in their efforts to change their terms of free movement of people as a sign of their sincerity and a symbol that free movement of people is not an unchallengeable part of the European state?
As everybody knows, Switzerland is outside the European Union and has negotiated terms for access to the single European market, as has Norway, but those terms require the Swiss and Norwegians to accept wholesale the body of EU law without having any say in the making of it, to contribute financially and to abide by the principles of free movement. The Swiss have sought unilaterally to change that arrangement and they have been firmly rebuffed by the EU.
T8. Does the Secretary of State agree with his fellow Conservative and counterpart in Norway Vidar Helgesen that with the single market needing bold leadership for its completion and with Europe facing its biggest security crisis since the cold war, it would be a disaster for Britain to sleepwalk out of the EU?
Is the Foreign Secretary able to update the House on any progress in the Syrian peace talks and in particular, if it remains the Government’s ambition to remove President Assad, what progress we have made in building up an alternative Government capable of taking on IS?
I have to tell my right hon. Friend candidly that the co-ordination between the civilian Syrian opposition and the moderate armed opposition is still disappointing. It is one of the areas on which we and our allies are working. We are committed to taking part in the programme of training and equipping members of the moderate Syrian opposition outside Syria, and that programme is beginning to gather pace now.
Was it the UK that first offered, or was it Ukraine that first requested, the presence of British military advisers, and can the Foreign Secretary assure us that their presence is more likely to lead to a peaceful settlement, rather than an escalation of the process?
My hon. Friend is right that this is a new piece of information. We have no corroboration of that report at the moment, but he is absolutely right that we will need to look into it and be clear before we reach any conclusion with Iran in the nuclear negotiations.
The Minister, the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), earlier said that he did not feel it was right to do anything about the Israel-Palestine situation until after the Israeli election, yet given that none of the major parties in that election is committed to withdrawal from the occupied territories, is not now the time to say that Britain intends to recognise Palestine?
If only it were that simple. I understand that the hon. Lady’s point is well made, but I can tell her exactly what any such statements now will do: they will play to the hard right in the Israeli elections. That will not make a settlement more likely; it will make it less likely.
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Written StatementsThe latest six-monthly report on the implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong was published today. A copy of the report is also available on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office website at: www.gov.uk/government/ organisations/foreign-commonwealth-office. The report covers the period from 1 July to 31 December 2104. I commend the report to the House.
It is also available online at: http://parliament.uk/writtenstatements
[HCWS307]
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on the situation in Ukraine.
The past month has seen an escalation of violence in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Fighting has been intense around the town of Debaltseve, a strategically important rail and road hub between the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. The Ukrainians have suffered indiscriminate missile attacks on buses in Donetsk and Volnovakha and on the port city of Mariupol. What is happening on the ground now resembles, to all intents and purposes, a small-scale conventional war. Over 5,000 people have been killed since the crisis began last spring, and over 1.5 million people have been displaced from their homes.
In recent weeks, Russia has aggravated the effects of its initial incursion by stepping up the military support it provides to its proxies. It has transferred hundreds of heavy weapons, including rocket launchers, heavy artillery, tanks and armoured vehicles; and it maintains hundreds of regular soldiers, including special forces, in Ukraine, as well as command and control elements, air defence systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and electronic warfare systems. The Russian army is also the source of ex-regulars who resign their army posts to fight in Donbass as “volunteers”. The recent escalation in fighting would not have been possible without the military support and strategic direction that Russia provides.
In these circumstances, it is vital that all the countries who have a stake in the rules-based international system remain clear and united against Russian aggression. In Normandy last summer, we agreed with the US and our European partners that the most effective channel of communication with the Kremlin would be through a small group. This is known as the Normandy Format, comprising Germany, France as the host of the Normandy meeting, Ukraine and Russia.
Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande met President Poroshenko in Kiev last Thursday, and President Putin in the Kremlin on Friday. On Saturday, in Munich, I held meetings with Secretary of State Kerry and German Foreign Minister Steinmeier to assess the prospects for a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. On Sunday, the German Chancellor and the French President held a conference call with Poroshenko and Putin, agreeing to meet in the Normandy format in Minsk tomorrow. Their aim is to reach agreement on an implementation plan for the Minsk ceasefire agreements that the Russians entered into last September, updated, as they need to be, to reflect subsequent changes on the ground.
The UK welcomes these efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the situation in eastern Ukraine, while remaining sceptical of Russian commitment to such a resolution. It is clear that Putin respects strength, so Britain’s focus has been, and will continue to be, on ensuring that the EU remains robust, resolved and united on the maintenance of economic sanctions, and closely aligned with the US.
The consensus within the European Union that Russia must pay a price for its disregard of the international rules-based system remains strong. Equally, there is a clear consensus that the EU does not, and will not, recognise Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. The emergency EU Foreign Affairs Council on 29 January agreed to roll over all the Crimea-related tier 2 sanctions against individuals and companies. That is another clear sign that the EU remains united in its response to Russian action in Ukraine.
The package of economic sanctions which the European Union and the US has imposed on Russia, coupled with the catastrophic impact on the Russian economy of the decline in the oil price, is a critical element of the pressure on President Putin to change his behaviour. Britain was and remains at the forefront of the successful effort to build and maintain an EU-wide consensus on a sanctions regime on Russia, to the evident surprise and dismay of the Kremlin. Yesterday in Brussels I represented the UK at the EU Foreign Affairs Council, which discussed Ukraine and reconfirmed its decision to apply additional sanctions, but, at the suggestion of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister and as a gesture of support for the political process, decided to delay their entry into force until next Monday. The informal European Council of Heads of State and Government will have further discussions about Ukraine on Thursday.
The crisis has inflicted substantial damage on Ukraine’s economy. The World Bank estimates that it shrank by 8.2% in 2014. Public debt has risen sharply, foreign exchange reserves have fallen and the currency has lost nearly half its value against the US dollar. Ukraine clearly needs support from international partners to stabilise the economy, in return for which it must pursue the reforms to which it has committed under the association agreement with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund programme. Britain is providing £10 million in technical assistance to support economic and governance reforms and the humanitarian effort. The EU will make a substantial contribution to the immediate estimated $15 billion financing needs of the country, the majority of which will be provided through an IMF-led package.
We shall also continue to work through NATO to offer technical support to the Ukrainian armed forces and reassurance to our eastern NATO allies. At the NATO Wales summit last September, NATO allies sent a strong message to Russia, agreeing to maintain NATO’s long-standing capacity building work in Ukraine by setting up five dedicated trust funds for Ukraine, one of which will be co-led by the UK.
The Wales summit also agreed a readiness action plan to reassure our eastern allies. As part of the package, NATO allies agreed to a new spearhead unit—the very high readiness joint taskforce—within the NATO response force, which, supported by the newly created forward integration units in the Baltic and eastern European states, will be able to deploy at very short notice wherever they are needed.
On 5 February, NATO Defence Ministers agreed the size and scope of that mission. My right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary has announced that the UK will lead the force in 2017 and on a rotational basis thereafter. The UK also made a commitment to contribute to headquarters in Poland and Romania and the six NATO forward integration unit headquarters in the Baltic states, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. In addition, the UK will contribute four RAF Typhoons to operate alongside Norway in support of the Baltic air policing mission.
The UK also remains a strong supporter of the OSCE’s monitoring mission in eastern Ukraine. We have provided funding of more than £2 million, the second largest number of monitors and 10 armoured vehicles to allow monitors to move around dangerous areas in a more secure manner.
Our policy since the start of the crisis has been to supply non-lethal assistance to Ukrainian armed forces, in line with our assessment that there must be a political solution to this crisis. We have increased our defence engagement with Ukraine and are providing additional support on crisis management, anti-corruption, defence reform and strategic communications.
We have offered three members of the Ukrainian armed forces who were wounded in the Donbass life-changing specialist medical assistance in the form of reconstructive surgery at the Queen Elizabeth hospital in Birmingham. We are providing a substantial package of non-lethal equipment to Ukraine, comprising medical kits, winter clothing and equipment, body armour, helmets and fuel. The package is focused on reducing fatalities and casualties among members of the Ukrainian armed forces.
It is a national decision for each country in the NATO alliance to decide whether to supply lethal aid to Ukraine. The UK is not planning to do so, but we reserve the right to keep this position under review. Different members of the alliance take nuanced positions on this question, and are entitled to do so. However, we share a clear understanding that while there is no military solution to this conflict, we could not allow the Ukrainian armed forces to collapse.
By its illegal annexation of Crimea and its destabilising activities in eastern Ukraine, including its direct military support of the separatists, Russia has demonstrated its disregard for international law. It is clear that President Putin respects only strength, and by standing united, using our combined economic muscle to impose significant economic costs on Russia, the international community has shown its determination to rebuff Russia’s anachronistic behaviour.
The ball is now firmly in Russia’s court. Until we see Russia complying with the terms of the Minsk agreement on the ground—withdrawing troops, stopping the flow of weapons and closing the border—there must be no let-up in the pressure. Fine words in a declaration tomorrow will, of course, be welcome, but we have seen them before. The proof of the pudding will be in actions on the ground. We will monitor the situation carefully, and we will agree to a relaxation of the pressure only when we see clear evidence of changed Russian behaviour and systematic compliance with Russia’s obligations under the original Minsk agreement.
Meanwhile, there will be no let-up in our efforts—with the US, in the EU and through NATO—to ensure that Mr Putin hears a clear and consistent message: civilised nations do not behave in the way Russia under Putin has behaved towards Ukraine, and those of us who live by the rules-based international system will be steadfast in defending it against such aggression. I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement, and for advance sight of it.
Although the conflict in Ukraine is clearly a geopolitical crisis, it is also a conflict of profound civilian suffering. As the Foreign Secretary has just reminded us, in a neighbouring European state more than 5,000 lives have already been lost, 5 million civilians are living in conflict-affected areas, and nearly 1 million people are internally displaced as a result of the fighting. The House was united in welcoming the Minsk agreement negotiated last year, but even after it was reached, the fighting, although it briefly subsided, did not stop. The situation has yet again deteriorated, with more than 200 civilians killed in the last week of January alone.
President Putin appears to have miscalculated the west’s commitment to sustained economic diplomacy. So long as the Russian Government refuse to change course, we must continue with a robust and united international response. With the collapse of the oil price in recent months, the sanctions still hold out the prospect of altering the calculus of risk in President Putin’s mind regarding Russian actions in eastern Ukraine.
The Foreign Secretary made it clear that, at the request of the European Foreign Minister, a decision was taken yesterday to delay the implementation of a further set of EU restrictive measures. While credible negotiations are ongoing, all efforts must be focused on ensuring that they are successful. In the absence of an agreed deal this week, however, does the Foreign Secretary believe that new EU restrictive measures, as opposed to simply an extension of existing measures, should be on the table at the upcoming EU Council meeting? In particular, in the absence of meaningful progress tomorrow, will the Prime Minister call for new tier 2 or 3 sanctions when he meets European Union leaders?
In recent days, attention has turned to the question of sending lethal arms to the Ukrainian army. I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s reassurance that the UK will continue to work through NATO to offer technical support to the Ukrainian armed forces. This weekend, he said that
“the UK is not planning to supply lethal aid”.
He repeated that statement in the House today.
The Foreign Secretary has said:
“Ukrainians can’t beat the Russian army”,
and that the policy remains “under review” by the UK Government. Given those two statements, will he tell the House in what context he envisages that Britain could decide to export lethal arms to the Ukrainians?
I welcome the recent German and French initiative to help broker an agreement between President Putin and President Poroshenko. Talks in Moscow with Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany were held alongside US Secretary of State Kerry’s visit to Kiev, and followed up by Chancellor Merkel’s visit to Washington yesterday. Further talks are scheduled in Minsk for tomorrow. The ultimate test is whether these talks are successful in ending the conflict, and it is in that sprit that I ask the Foreign Secretary about the extent of British engagement.
Does the Foreign Secretary agree that given Britain’s unique assets and alliances, we could make a key contribution to help ensure that the diplomatic effort is successful? If so, why has the UK chosen to take such a back seat in trying to resolve the crisis? The Foreign Secretary does not need to take my word for that judgment. As General Sir Richard Shirreff—the top British commander in NATO until last year—warned last weekend, the Prime Minister is a “foreign policy irrelevance” and a “bit player” on the world stage. When questioned about the former general’s comments, the Foreign Secretary rather flippantly quipped:
“Having a sort of committee of ten traipsing in and out trying to talk to the Russians would simply not be effective”.
I agree with that judgment, but suggestions that Britain’s diplomatic role could only ever be part of a so-called “traipsing committee of 10”, tells us a great deal more about the Foreign Secretary than it does about the United Kingdom.
Does the Foreign Secretary agree that under past Governments of all complexions, Britain has played a leading role in diplomatic negotiations of this sort? In his statement the Foreign Secretary tried to defend the British absence from the latest talks by claiming that the Franco-German leadership role was established in Normandy last year. Nevertheless, whether last year, this year or this month, the decision to exclude Britain, or to be excluded, raises real questions and concerns on the Opposition Benches. Can the Foreign Secretary offer any more hope that Britain in the months ahead—unlike in past months—will be an active, engaged and influential part of efforts to resolve the crisis?
The starting point surely must be to remain on guard against Russia’s efforts to find and exploit weaknesses among its European neighbours. Some European states have, of course, been weakened by recession and are vulnerable to subversion, subsidy and corruption, but the challenge is surely to sustain western unity in advancing robust economic diplomacy, while continuing with a more engaged effort to find a resolution to the crisis. If that is the approach of the British Government in the months ahead, they will have our support.
Despite the slightly churlish remarks towards the end of his remarks, I welcome the right hon. Gentleman’s generally supportive approach to this issue, and he is right that Vladimir Putin evidently miscalculated the resolve of the international community to stand firm on this issue. That resolve did not appear without prompting, however, and required a lot of consensus building. Candidly, I will say also that the catalyst of the destruction of Malaysia Airways flight MH17 pulled some of, shall we say, the weaker brethren into line, and ensured a clear and robust alliance on this issue. In particular, the UK and the Netherlands can claim credit for having been key elements in stiffening resolve in that crucial European Council meeting last July.
The right hon. Gentleman asked a sensible question about new restrictive measures, and our priority will be to achieve an early roll-over of the tier 3 sanctions. The package of tier 3 sanctions is due to expire at the end of July, and the strongest possible signal that could be sent to the Kremlin would be an early decision to extend that sanctions period, perhaps to the end of 2015. The Kremlin’s knowledge that sanctions will continue, and—most importantly—that it will not have the leverage point of the EU, at 28 member states, having to re-agree a consensus to renew them, removes a lot of its incentives for mischief making, so that will be our priority. I expect that tomorrow, if matters have not progressed or there is bad news from Minsk, the European Council will task the European External Action Service to scope options for further sanctions.
A number of perfectly robust allies are now beginning to be slightly concerned about the scale of damage being inflicted on Russia’s economy. We want to hurt the Russians and we want them to pay a price for their aggression in Ukraine, but we do not want the Russian economy to collapse. There is now concern about the scale of damage being inflicted.
The right hon. Gentleman asked me to clarify the position on lethal aid. He is right to say that Ukraine cannot beat the Russian army—it does not have the scale of forces, and the Russian army has enormous reserves that it could potentially throw into the conflict. He asked about the circumstances in which we would supply lethal aid, but we have not defined those circumstances. All I have said is that we will not rule out the possibility of supplying lethal aid, and we want to reserve the right to review that position. In my statement I said clearly that we cannot afford to see the Ukrainian army collapse, so perhaps he will take from that a steer as to where our thinking lies.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the UK contribution to the diplomatic effort, and there are two strands to that. There is a forward strand that includes discussions with the Ukrainians and the Russians. In my judgment—being perfectly objective about this and not waving a little flag for the sake of it—the German Chancellor is in the best position to conduct such discussions with the Kremlin. She has channels open with the Kremlin that we, the Americans, and others do not have.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about opening out the Normandy process, but if we were to open out that grouping—it is currently four: Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France—we would not be able just to insert the UK but would have to widen that group quite significantly. The United States, naturally, would say, “Well, if the UK is going to join, we must have a seat,” and other European Union partners would also expect to be present, most obviously Poland and Italy. We would therefore have a significantly wider group, and our judgment is that for this phase of the process, maintaining that Normandy format is the best way forward.
The second strand of diplomatic activity is behind-the-scenes activity to hold together the European Union consensus and ensure that the EU is aligned with the US, Australia, Japan and other partners. That is a significant diplomatic-legwork task—unglamorous but vital—and I assure the right hon. Gentleman that the UK has played a leading role in designing the sanctions packages, identifying the individuals, companies and sectors to be targeted by sanctions, and building and maintaining consensus in Brussels and around the capitals of Europe. General Sir Richard Shirreff says that the Prime Minister is a “diplomatic irrelevance”, but I suggest that perhaps he should consider carefully the meaning of the word “irrelevance” and where it might best be applied.
The right hon. Gentleman talked about Russian coercion and the energy exposure of the European Union to Russian pressure, all of which we are acutely aware of. There is also Russian corruption and the influence of Russian money in the politics of some Balkan countries—even now, one party in the recent Bulgarian general election launched its manifesto in the Kremlin, which may provide a clue, and we are acutely aware of all those things. Europe must make itself more resilient against Russian influence, and that is an important part of the agenda going forward.
The Foreign Secretary and I were both at the Munich security conference when Chancellor Merkel explained her position and her opposition to helping with military assistance to the Ukrainians on the grounds that, even with that assistance, Ukraine would not be able to defeat the Russians. The Foreign Secretary has repeated that observation today, but may I respectfully suggest that that is missing the point? The question at issue is not whether the Ukrainians could defeat the Russians—of course they could not. At the moment, however, as the Foreign Secretary has pointed out, the Russians are flooding in a whole supply of military equipment—heavy weapons, rocket launchers, heavy artillery, tanks and armoured vehicles—to their supporters in Donetsk and Luhansk. If the Ukrainians are deprived of the military means to defend their territory, that matter will be resolved in the next few weeks. It will be no use coming to the aid of the Ukrainian army when it has already been defeated and when the territory controlled by the Russians has greatly expanded. At this stage, the objective must surely be to impress upon President Putin that Ukraine will be able to defend itself, and therefore that, if the Russians try to resolve the matter by military means, it will take not days or weeks, but months. Against that background, would there not be a much greater likelihood that President Putin would also see the inevitable need for a political and not a military solution?
I am afraid that my right hon. and learned Friend and I will probably have to agree to disagree on that. The position is this: if Russia was intending to make a full-scale military push into Ukraine, it has the forces available to do it. Approximately 10,000 Russian forces are along the border with eastern Ukraine, and it has sophisticated weaponry in large quantities and air forces that could be mobilised. The Russians are already able to do that.
We judge that the intervention the Kremlin is making is carefully calculated to improve the position of the separatists on the ground and to apply pressure to the Ukrainian regime, but there has not so far been a wholesale land grab—it has been the consolidating of separatists’ positions. We judge that the Ukrainian army at the moment is able to hold the line and that, broadly speaking, it is doing so.
I have said that we will reserve the right to keep under review the question of supplying lethal aid. As my right hon. and learned Friend very well knows, many in the United States are debating openly whether a large package of military equipment assistance should be provided to Ukraine. That would clearly change the parameters of the debate. We are watching that debate very closely.
The right hon. Gentleman said in his statement that it was a national decision for each country in the NATO alliance whether to supply lethal aid to Ukraine. He is absolutely right—that is a matter of fact—but does he accept that this cannot be left to unilateral decisions by individual countries? The Russians, for certain, would regard any provision of lethal aid—I certainly do not rule that out in certain circumstances—as a consequence of collective decision making within NATO and seek to respond in a similar way.
While accepting the reality the Foreign Secretary describes—it is a national decision—what efforts is he making to ensure that there is some co-ordination, not least so that we do not end up with a situation in which, within the NATO alliance, two policies are being pursued, which the Russians would skilfully exploit?
I am afraid that the reality is that, if the United States decides to supply lethal aid, there will be two policies within the NATO alliance, because the German Chancellor could not have been clearer about her position, which she set out on Saturday, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said. This is a matter for individual national Government decision, and individual countries will make their own decisions. As far as I am aware, no countries within the NATO alliance apart from the United States are actively contemplating the supply of lethal assistance to the Ukrainians.
Will my right hon. Friend stick to his opinion that, however well trained and equipped the Ukrainian army is, it is inconceivable that it could resist the Russian army, or even slow it down significantly, so long as President Putin determined that he was going to put in the necessary resources? Does my right hon. Friend therefore agree that the British contribution must be to remain resolute and comparatively hawkish on stepping up economic sanctions if Putin maintains his present stance of military aggression, because the President of Russia cannot protect himself against economic sanctions, and it is the only reasonable response we can make?
I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend. That is indeed the role we have defined for ourselves, being the most forward-leaning partner within the European Union, urging, cajoling and persuading the others about the need to remain robust. When I say that we are the most forward-leaning country, I mean that we are the most forward-leaning large country—some of our small Baltic partners are very much forward leaning on this issue.
The underlying truth is this: hon. Members know, and the history of the Soviet Union reminds us, that, in the end, we cannot ignore the economics. Russia spends something like 20% of its GDP on defence and security. That is unsustainable in the long term. A small and shrinking economy—it is much smaller than the UK economy—attached to a very large military force is ultimately an unsustainable and unstable situation.
I agree with much of what the Foreign Secretary says, including that President Putin is a calculating, ruthless and lethal authoritarian. Does not the whole crisis spring from the failure after the cold war ended to establish a common European security system to which Russia felt attached? Instead, there has been a kind of cold peace. Surely the way forward is a negotiated solution, or an attempt at one, in which there are limits to NATO expansion and European Union expansion in return for an end to Russian aggression.
The situation is that, after the cold war, when 19 ex-Soviet republics, or whatever it was, liberated themselves from the Soviet Union and became independent countries able to set their own path in the world, we sought to build a normal relationship with Russia—one in which Russia would join the community of nations and become richer and more normalised, and one in which the Russian people were able to become more prosperous. President Putin has chosen to set his face against that future and to hark backwards to the Soviet Union or perhaps to the Russian empire. We should remember that he is on public record as saying that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the worst disaster of the 20th century. Many of us would think it was one of the great achievements of the 20th century.
I do not think we can compromise with somebody whose avowed intention is to exercise control over independent neighbouring countries in such a way that they cannot determine their own future, whether that is a future aligned with the European Union and NATO or a future aligned with Russia and other allies. That must be for those people in those independent countries to choose for themselves.
I strongly welcome the clarity of the Foreign Secretary’s statement and his commitment to a united European response to the invasion. Does he agree that it is vital to pursue the diplomatic path, but equally important to ensure that diplomacy does not simply provide the space and time for the great chess player Putin to weaken Ukraine, regroup and attack again at a later date?
That is the great risk—that the Russian objective is simply to achieve a frozen conflict, and a situation in which, de facto, Russia exercises very extensive leverage over Ukraine, and Ukraine operates not as a truly independent sovereign nation, but as a semi-independent nation. We have seen Russian attempts elsewhere to manage frozen conflicts.
I sometimes think that one of the diseases we suffer from in the west is tidy-mindedness. We tend to think of conflicts such as this one as things that have to be solved and that have to have an end. I suspect that the mindset in the Kremlin is that the Russians can have any number of those conflicts, and that they can remain open, simmering for ever. That would suit them quite nicely.
It sounds to me as if President Putin is getting exactly what he wants. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) was absolutely right. I was at Munich, too. Not only was it obvious that the UK’s views were utterly irrelevant—nobody in the room asked what the United Kingdom thought—but it was clear that Chancellor Merkel was not going to arm the Ukrainians. More remarkably, she did not mention the possibility of further sanctions. The Secretary of State said that we should not weaken Russia any further. It seems to me that we are not supplying arms and not applying any more serious sanctions, with the explanation that that would destabilise Russia even further. If so, Putin will have got what he wanted.
No. If the existing sanctions are rolled over for a further period, the pressure on Russia will be maintained. It is not the case that we have imposed a bunch of sanctions that are not having any effect, and now we should be asking whether we should impose more. We have imposed a bunch of sanctions. Alongside the declining oil price the absence of access to the capital markets is having a crippling impact on Russia.
While the hon. Lady was listening to Mrs Merkel in the room at Munich, I was talking to the Iranian Foreign Minister, so I did not listen to the speech, but I spoke to the German Foreign Minister afterwards. We are actively discussing the maintenance and extension of the sanctions regime with the Germans. Of course, they want to explore the opportunity that tomorrow’s meeting, if it goes ahead, might offer, but the Germans, and the German Chancery in particular, are robust. They have been admirably robust on the case for maintaining sanctions.
This is a very serious and growing crisis. As my right hon. Friend knows, I have consistently warned that Russia plans to complete its illegal annexation of Crimea by forming a land link. Are Her Majesty’s Government content for that to happen? If not, at what point do we exercise that demonstration of strength, which the Foreign Secretary mentioned Mr Putin respects, to show we are no longer prepared to see him completely redraw the boundaries of Europe?
Sometimes we underestimate the influence that we have collectively. If Russia wanted to force a land link to the Crimea, it easily has the military capability in the area to do so and would have done so some time ago. However, it understands clearly that there would be a significantly higher price to pay. In circumstances where it is already suffering very significant impacts from the international response to its behaviour, it has shown no inclination to use the military capability it has in the area to achieve that objective.
We wish Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande well in their search for peace. I personally wish my constituents from RAF Lossiemouth well. They have been deployed to the Baltic as part of the air policing mission. In the past few years, the Russians have been restructuring their armed forces around professional personnel and units that are deployable, based entirely around deployable personnel. What analysis has been done by the UK Government on the reports that have emerged in recent days that the Russians are extending the period in which their conscripts are being made to serve, and what impact that may have on the situation in Ukraine?
I am not aware of any specific analysis relating to the Russian decision on the conscription period. I suspect that that may reflect a demographic challenge that the Russian Federation faces. It has a dramatically ageing population and it is clear that maintaining force numbers when there are declining cohorts of young men will be a challenge. However, the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The Russian military has been modernising and professionalising itself. There are now two parts to the Russian armed forces: a mass conscript body and an elite professional force. In our military planning, we need to be conscious of that evolution.
NATO was formed originally so that no aggressor could try to pick off one country after another without knowing that he would immediately be at war with the major powers. Is it not vital that we maintain the distinction between NATO countries and non-NATO countries? Is not the best way to reinforce the impression of the strength of NATO to give an open-ended commitment in future, as we have in the past, that we will spend 2% of GDP—the NATO recommended minimum on defence?
As my hon. Friend knows, at the Wales summit all NATO partners signed up either to maintaining that level, for those who are already spending 2% of GDP on defence, or to making progress towards achieving that level. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the cornerstone of our security in the UK is the article 5 guarantee. Our allies and partners in the Baltic states are acutely conscious that their position is different from that of Ukraine, simply because they are inside NATO and benefit from the article 5 guarantee. He is absolutely right that we need to maintain the clear distinction between the guarantee that we extend to NATO, which is absolute, and the opprobrium we heap on those who launch the kind of attacks we have seen on non-NATO members, but we will deal with attacks on non-NATO members in a different way from attacks on NATO members.
The commitments to give support to the front-line states in the Baltic and Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, and very firmly to enforce and maintain article 5 are absolutely vital at this time. Can it be made absolutely clear to the British public that we are in a very, very potentially dangerous situation given the pattern of Russia’s behaviour—Georgia, the frozen conflict in Transnistria and behaviour towards Armenia in trying to get it away from the European Union—and that we face a fundamental problem here unless there is a change of behaviour by Putin?
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. I am almost sick of hearing myself say it, but this is not just a Ukraine problem. This is a Russia problem. Even if the problem in Ukraine solved itself tomorrow, we would still have a Russia problem. Other former Soviet Union republics are looking nervously at the scope for Russian intervention or interference in their affairs. The disappointment is that public opinion, neither in the UK nor in other EU countries, appears to have understood the significance of this threat. I was personally hoping that the events in the Crimea and the threat to gas supplies might have galvanised German public opinion into feeling willing to support a more forward-leaning German response on strategic and defence matters, but the opinion polling suggests that attitudes have hardly moved at all since the incursion in Ukraine. Hopefully, we can have a cross-party consensus to alert public opinion to the significance of this challenge to the established international order.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that, while the immediate priority must be to try to stop the bloodshed in eastern Ukraine, if Ukraine is to have a future and avoid complete financial collapse it will require an international bail-out on a scale that is not yet under discussion, as well as very urgent political and economic reform to deal with the endemic corruption at every level throughout the country?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend and I thank him for the important work his all-party group on Ukraine does to maintain Anglo-Ukrainian relations. He is right that Ukraine is going to need massive international support, but it cannot be delivered unconditionally. We cannot pour the money of our taxpayers and our international financial institutions into the sink of corruption that is, frankly, the Ukrainian economy at the moment. Ukraine has to make progress on sorting out the endemic corruption if we are to be able to support it towards a better economic future.
I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement. I wish the summit well and hope some good comes out of it. May I take him back to the answer he gave to my right hon. Friend the Member for Neath (Mr Hain)? There is an issue that goes back to the early 1990s, when there was an agreement that Ukraine would become independent and non-aligned—it would not join NATO. In return, Russia would respect its neutrality and divest itself of nuclear weapons. That was a very good statement and very good progress. Does he not think that there would be a better chance of reaching some kind of agreement with Russia if there was a clearer statement that NATO does not intend to expand into Ukraine, and that in return Russia should withdraw from its border regions, so that we do not build up to two huge armed forces meeting in central Europe yet again?
On that last point—two huge armed forces meeting in central Europe—the hon. Gentleman will know that NATO has refrained from stationing non-national NATO troops in the front-line new NATO member states precisely to avoid that build-up. It is part of the Russia-NATO agreement to avoid that build-up of forces in a confrontational way. I am personally rather reluctant to dictate to independent third countries what they can and cannot do. I think Ukraine is perfectly entitled to aspire to membership of the EU or NATO if it chooses to do so. However, it is very, very clear that membership of either organisation would be many, many years away. Ukraine would have a huge amount of work to do before it was ready for membership of either organisation.
I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s clear articulation of the economic limits to Russia’s stance, but what is his assessment of the economic impact on Ukraine’s ability to sustain its position and the period of conflict with Putin’s proxies?
The Ukrainian Government are facing significant financial constraints. As the hon. Gentleman will know, they entered a Government-to-Government agreement on the supply of gas from Russia that required them to prepay and clear some old gas debts. That is why we are focused, alongside the strategic channel, on facilitating the $15 billion facility from the IMF, to which the EU will contribute $2.3 billion. That will give the Ukrainians some breathing space. They have to get their economy in order, deal with the corruption issues and make essential reforms, and if they do so, $15 billion will not be the last of it; it will be the first instalment of an ongoing support programme for the country.
Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the guarantee of peace in Europe and the world has been largely based on a strong EU and NATO and the strong defence capacity of this country? Does he believe that the reason some people say we are peripheral to the main foreign policy discussions in Ukraine at the moment has been the weakness of our support for the EU and NATO and the fact that we have had to be begged by President Obama not to run down our military forces any further?
I shall take that question in two parts. I agree with the first part. It is important that we have a strong EU response. We have already demonstrated, in relation to Iran, that the economic weapon can be a hugely important strategic tool. The EU and the US together represent about 46% of the world’s GDP, so if they align to impose economic sanctions on a third party, they will have an impact. We have shown that that is an important strategic weapon. NATO, of course, remains the cornerstone of our hard defence, and we must maintain the strength of that organisation, including by maintaining European NATO members’ level of defence spending in order to make a fair contribution and balance that of the US.
It is simply not true, however, that we are peripheral in this debate. It is true that we are not leading the discussions with Mr Putin. Mrs Merkel talks to him in Russian, and he talks to her in German; they have common languages and communicate with each other. We should use the best channel available, and that communication channel is the best available for that part of the task. We, on the other hand, are focusing on maintaining the backbone of the EU. Any of my EU colleagues who have been present in the Foreign Affairs Council meetings will confirm that we have been boringly insistent on the need to maintain these sanctions, however long the discussions take. We cannot afford casually to reduce our stance, because the Russians will take any sign of weakness or division, and open it out in a way that will be fatal to our position.
With respect to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), there is no point making war-like noises unless we are prepared to engage in war and see our sons and daughters die. The reason European public opinion is so relaxed is that we do not have a great stake in this matter. We talk about, “Putin this, Putin that”, but it is not just him; the overwhelming majority of Russians believe, for better or worse, that eastern Ukraine is inhabited by Russians who want to be autonomous and for centuries have been associated with Russia. If we go down the route advocated by my right hon. and learned Friend, we will have war without end. Russia could be in Kiev within four days. Surely we should support the present Foreign Secretary and the German Chancellor in trying to find a peaceful solution based on an autonomous eastern Ukraine.
My hon. Friend could hardly expect me to disagree with that last sentiment. His point about Russian public opinion is, of course, true. Sadly, nationalism is easy to whip up, and at the moment Mr Putin is riding on a tide of nationalist sentiment, but as we move through 2015 and the consequences of his actions begin to bite on Russian consumers—let us remember that the entire burden of the economic sanctions and the decline in the oil price is effectively being transferred to Russian consumers in the depreciation of the rouble—they will find life getting very difficult, and I suggest that such a level of public support might not last.
There are many thousands of Ukrainians and people of Ukrainian descent living in all parts of the UK, and obviously they are becoming ever more worried for the safety of their family and friends. Will the Foreign Secretary ensure that the UK-based Ukrainian organisations can make representations to the Foreign Office and will be kept informed as the situation unfolds?
Yes, I assure the hon. Gentleman that they do make representations to the Foreign Office, and of course we take them into account. I should be clear, however, that we have excellent communications with the Ukrainian authorities. I met the President and the Foreign Minister of Ukraine the week before last at the Auschwitz commemorations. We have regular dialogue with them, and they are hugely active in their engagement with the EU and hugely appreciative of how we collectively have responded to their plight.
Will my right hon. Friend describe what he thinks a successful outcome to the French and German-led talks with Russia would look like? Would it involve the de facto partition of Ukraine, and how would that be anything else than a permanent reward for Russian aggression?
No, a good outcome would not look like that. It would look like an agreement to a ceasefire and a withdrawal from the current lines of contact, along the lines already suggested, and not just an agreement to its happening tomorrow, but evidence by the end of the week that Russian forces were pulling back; it would look like an agreement on the effective policing of the Russian-Ukrainian border so that once Russian equipment had moved back across the border into Russia, there was an effective, transparent regime for monitoring further equipment crossing the border; and it would look like an explicit withdrawal of Russian support for and endorsement of the separatist forces.
If it does not look like that, what will happen? It is clear already that Russia denies it even has troops in eastern Ukraine, and the Speaker of the Duma denied at the recent meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe that Russia was even a party to the Minsk agreement and protocol, saying it was a mere bystander. What will happen? Russia could be playing for time, and in the meantime the frozen conflict is increasing. What will my right hon. Friend do to ensure that something happens? For starters, how about expelling Russia from the Council of Europe for being in breach of its statutes?
We do not know the Russian game plan—one difficulty is the absence of a debate about this in Russia; it is one man making all the decisions. We do not know whether Mr Putin has agreed to this process over the last few days because he has seen the light, understood the pressure on him and genuinely wants to find a solution, or because there is an EU Council meeting on Thursday. Traditionally, his tactic has been to ramp up the rhetoric of peace ahead of Council meetings, and then to drop it like a stone afterwards. In response to my hon. Friend’s specific question, however, the single most effective measure we could take to signal our continued displeasure at the failure of this initiative would be to extend the tier 3 sanctions to the end of 2015. That would send a clear message to the Russians.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is an opportunity for peace at present, and that by suspending further sanctions, having Chancellor Merkel, who understands Russian interests, negotiating, and not at this stage reinforcing the Ukrainians, rather than proceeding with further economic pressure, particular given Russia’s circumstances at the moment, there is the chance of an honourable peace that the Russians would be wise to accept?
My hon. and learned Friend is right. The key term is that there is a chance for “an honourable peace”. We understand that face will be important to Mr Putin. The German Chancellor grew up in East Germany under Russian control, so she understands the Russian mentality and how to engage with the Russians to try to reach a constructive solution. I am optimistic that we may see something coming from these discussions, but I will not believe it until I see it being delivered on the ground.
Is my right hon. Friend aware that President Putin’s grievances with the west can be traced back to the comments of the US Secretary of State James Baker at the time of the negotiations over the reunification of Germany, when he categorically said that there would be
“no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction or NATO’s forces one inch to the East”.
Having gone to Moscow and met President Yeltsin with John Major, at his request when he was Prime Minister, and having personally talked to President Gorbachev in Moscow, I tell my right hon. Friend that I think we completely underestimate Russia’s security concerns and insecurity. The very minimum we are going to need for a negotiated settlement is a land corridor to Crimea, which most Russians believe to be part of Russia—whatever administrative changes President Khrushchev introduced.
I do not underestimate Russian paranoia, as Russia’s fears of encirclement are an historical phenomenon. Living as we do in a free, democratic NATO member state, we all know that NATO represents no offensive threat to anyone. That is not the way NATO works. It would be inconceivable that public opinion in the NATO countries could be persuaded to support any kind of offensive action against a peaceful neighbour. So Russia has nothing to fear from NATO. As for a land corridor, I have to say to my hon. Friend that I do not think it is our business to sit here discussing whether bits of the Ukraine’s sovereign territory should be given away to a foreign power. If the Ukrainians want to negotiate territory with the Russians, it is of course their prerogative to do so, but it is certainly not for us to do.
I personally would support further immediate economic sanctions led by the EU, but, whatever happens there, for how much longer can we in this country allow Russian nationals to have the benefit of secure and fine living here and to enjoy our banking facilities, for example, while their country wages war and terrorises people on our own continent?
Many Russians living in this country are not exactly friends of the current regime. Indeed, some of them live in pretty much permanent fear of the long arm of the current regime, so I do not think we should tar all Russians with the same brush. We need to be clear that while we have a fundamental disagreement with Mr Putin’s Government, we do not have a fundamental disagreement with the people of Russia. In the medium to long term, we must want to see Russia joining the international community of nations, becoming a normalised economy and the Russian population getting richer, more integrated and freer as the populations of the eastern European countries that lived under the Soviet yoke for so long have now done.
I agree with my right hon. Friend that a full-scale invasion could be mounted by Russia if she wanted to—she has the resources and there is nothing we could do about it. Her policy is “softly, softly catchee monkey”—not full-scale invasion, which would of course alert NATO, whose reaction to that would be far more aggressive than it has been to date. I agree, too, that jaw-jaw is better than war-war. However, there surely comes a time when the jaw-jaw no longer works, and we have to ensure that NATO’s counter-measures are up to the standard to meet such a threat. Let me reiterate a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) that we in this country and the rest of NATO must meet this minimum 2% commitment to NATO. I hope my right hon. Friend can tell us today that this will be in our manifesto for the general election.
It is not my role to write the election manifesto for the Conservative party, and still less to announce the details of it from this Dispatch Box today. I have a certain degree of sympathy for what my hon. Friend says, as he will be well aware. It is essential to maintain our defences against Russia’s asymmetric aggression, but it is also important to understand that economic sanctions are now a weapon in our toolbox alongside military forces. We have used them against Iran, and we are using them in respect of Ukraine. They are part of the new pattern of asymmetric warfare. We should hone and nurture these sanctions so that we can use them effectively in the future.
I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement. What discussions have taken place with Latvia, which currently has the presidency of the EU and indeed is a Baltic neighbour of Russia and former Soviet republic?
We have excellent relationships with our Latvian counterparts. I recently visited Latvia because it holds the current presidency. Various UK Ministers will be in Riga over the course of the next weeks and months. I had a discussion in Brussels yesterday with the Latvian Foreign Minister. As one of the Baltic states, Latvia is quite forward leaning on these issues, but in its role as EU president it takes a more measured position, stewarding the EU. We have good relations; we well understand the Latvian position; we greatly appreciate the insight that its knowledge of its Russian neighbour allows us.
It seems to me that the current sanctions are having a limited effect in halting the incursions into Ukraine. What will happen if these current sanctions fail? Further sanctions are implied, so what would those sanctions look like?
We have two levels of sanctions in place at the moment. We have sanctions targeted on individuals and companies—named individuals and companies—that include asset freezes, travel bans and so forth. Then we have the tier 3 sanctions, which are sectoral. These impose prohibitions on the export of goods and on trade with certain sectors of the Russian economy. In particular, there is an exclusion of Russian institutions, public and private, from the capital markets of the free world. We could clearly extend both lists if we chose to do so. We have to make a judgment about the balance of economic harm. There are costs to us as well as costs to Russia, so we need to target our sanctions carefully to make sure that the balance of harm is to the disadvantage of the Russians.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Written StatementsI wish to inform the House that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, together with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development, is today publishing the forty-third progress report on developments in Afghanistan since November 2010. With the conclusion of the NATO led ISAF Mission on 31 December 2014, this will be the final progress report.
On 4 December the UK Government and the Afghan Government co-hosted the London conference on Afghanistan. At the conference, President Ghani set out his reform agenda for Afghanistan and the International Community, led by the Prime Minister, signalled its strong support for the new Afghan Government.
The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) were ratified by the Afghan Parliament between 23-27 November. NATO Foreign Ministers provided formal agreement to the launch of the new NATO Resolute Support Mission on 2 December.
During November and December President Ghani and CEO Abdullah failed to agree on nominations for Cabinet Ministers. A Cabinet was finally announced on 12 January.
On 27 November, a British Embassy vehicle was attacked in Kabul, resulting in the death of a UK national security contractor and an Afghan member of British Embassy staff. An Afghan civilian was also killed in the attack. A further UK civilian was wounded as well as 33 Afghan civilians.
The last UK personnel left Southern Afghanistan on 23 November.
I am placing the report in the Library of the House. It will also be published with attachments online at: http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/afghanistan-progress-reports.
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(9 years, 10 months ago)
Written StatementsI have today laid a departmental minute proposing the gifting of non-lethal equipment to the Jordanian armed forces.
My right hon. Friend the former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr William Hague) informed the House on 6 March 2013, Official Report, column 961, that he intended to provide additional non-lethal equipment to the Syrian opposition in order to help save lives. He then laid a departmental minute on 15 April 2013 and issued a written ministerial statement, Official Report, column 16WS, containing details of that gift which included, among other equipment, five 4x4 vehicles with ballistic protection. The equipment was due to be donated to the Syrian opposition National Coalition’s Assistance Coordination Unit based in Turkey. Although we have been able to deliver some of the equipment, regrettably, we have been unable to deliver the five 4x4 vehicles as planned.
There are two reasons for this:
1—only the US government and United Nations have been granted permission by the Turkish Government to use such vehicles in Turkey; and
2—the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) was not a registered entity at the time and therefore the ACU would have only been permitted to store and use the vehicles within Syria.
Our assessment is that delivering the vehicles to Syria carries too much of a risk of them ending up in the wrong hands. For example, on 7 December 2013 the Islamic Front raided the Syrian Military Council’s headquarters in Bab al-Hawa and took some of their equipment. We therefore now consider that the best option is to gift the vehicles to the Jordanian armed forces (JAF). The JAF would use them in their efforts to manage current insecurity on their border with Syria, including cross-border smuggling activity. This option represents the least risk of the vehicles falling into the wrong hands and is most cost-effective to the taxpayer given that the vehicles are already stored in Jordan.
This gift has been scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations.
The value of these vehicles is £386,375.70 which will be met by the Government’s conflict pool fund.
The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of 14 parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which this minute was laid before the House of Commons, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a parliamentary question or a motion relating to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.
[HCWS224]