(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move amendment 72, in clause 1, page 2, line 36, at end insert—
“(11) The governing body of a registered Higher Education Provider must present to the OfS, at least once a quarter, a report detailing the steps their organisation has undertaken to fulfil its positive duties under subsection (2).”
You anticipated my opening remarks, Sir Christopher, although of course your seniority in all we do permits that and makes it entirely agreeable to me, so I echo your sentiments about the Minister. We are delighted to have her with us today, and she will be delighted with the amendment in my name.
The amendment is entirely in tune with the purposes of the Bill. We have had a useful debate so far during our scrutiny, and I have been reminded of Dickens:
“An idea, like a ghost, must be spoken to a little before it will explain itself.”
The ideas that have been spoken to a little during our deliberations have affirmed in the minds not only of the members of the Committee, but more widely, the significance of free speech and, in particular, the importance in higher education of open discussion and debate as a means to explore new ideas—to explore and discover, one might say.
We have also established that the argument that this is not a problem—that, in the words of Professor Biggar, who was also one of our witnesses,
“Concern about threats to free speech…in universities is sometimes dismissed as a manufactured distraction”—
does not stand up to close scrutiny. He and other witnesses made it clear that, in his words,
“There is empirical evidence that freedom to speak and research of significant minorities of university students and teachers in the UK are being inhibited.”
He went on to write:
“For every individual who finds himself censored, ostracised, made ill, or bulldozed, there are hundreds of others who look on aghast and resolve to keep their mouths shut, lest they attract trouble.”
We could have a debate—though I do not think that it would be helpful to do so this morning, and I am not sure you would permit it anyway, Sir Christopher—about the true extent of that problem, but clearly there is a problem to be addressed. The Minister and the Government have recognised that—thus the Bill.
The right hon. Gentleman said that we will not discuss this, but is not one of the main arguments put by people who support the Bill that self-censoring is going on? In a lot of the evidence that we have taken so far, everyone has said that they cannot actually say what the scale of the issue is. If we are to use that as a central plank of the reason why the legislation is needed, is it not important for someone to come up with the evidence to support it?
I will take that as a helpful remark in support of my amendment, for reasons that I will explain in a second. I have spent a great deal of time with the right hon. Gentleman in discourse of all kinds. In fact, I sometimes think that I spend more time with him than I do with my family, given the Committees that we serve on together, and the onerous nature of the business. We both take that seriously, and we feel that it is a worthwhile thing to do. I always listen to him carefully, because he is a former Minister and a distinguished Member of this House. The point that he is making is that, in order to gauge and to respond to the real extent, we need information. My amendment provides the mechanism by which that information can be brought forward.
In my amendment, I argue simply that universities should provide evidence quarterly, at least, of how they are coping with and responding to the legal demands that the Bill, which I presume will become an Act, enshrines. This is about really getting to the root of the problem and the root of the solutions to the problem.
With respect to the hon. Lady, the amendment is very simple, as she will see detailed in the papers before us. It simply adds to clause 1, line 36, a requirement that the governing body
“present to the OfS, at least once a quarter, a report detailing the steps their organisation has undertaken to fulfil its positive duties under subsection (2).”It does not say that all else in the university must be brought to a halt, or that this is the overweening or overwhelming priority of the university.
Universities have many statutory duties, as other bodies do. It is not uncommon for legislation to require bodies to report on their statutory obligations, so this is not in any way unprecedented or irregular. I agree with the hon. Lady that universities will have many priorities, and some of those will be fundamental to their purpose.
Good teaching and learning and good-quality research are at the very heart of the business of the university, but we have said repeatedly in this Committee, and it has been emphasised by Members across the Committee, that free speech, the free exchange of ideas and the formulation of innovative thinking are central—critical—to good higher education. If we think it is vital, and the Government must do, or they would not have brought the Bill forward in the first place, and if we think there is a problem, which again the Government must do, or else there would be no need for further requirements of this kind, then why on earth would we not want to hear from the frontline—in the spirit of the intervention made by the right hon. Member for North Durham—what the university was doing, which would, by its nature, reveal the character and extent of the problems we have discussed?
The spirit that has emerged across the Committee—the point was well made by the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington—is that we are trying to make this legislation as effective as it can be. That must involve communication between universities and the new body that is being established to ensure that the legislation has its effect. My amendment quite simply does that. I do not think it is in any way unhelpful to the Government’s intention. I do not think that any university that is ready and willing to do its job will resent it. I do not think that it necessarily involves great bureaucracy, although I take the point of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle that if it were to, we would need to review that. If a university said, “We cannot do this, because we have produced 10 pages, but the person who fulfils the new role wants a thesis or a book,” it would clearly have to be looked again. However, I am thinking a summary describing what the university is doing to meet its positive duties, as the amendment suggests.
I cannot see a reason in the world why, when the Minister rises to respond, no doubt preceded by the Opposition spokesman giving the amendment a warm welcome, she would not—I do not want to put words in her mouth, particularly given her new, elevated status—say, “John, we should have thought of this ourselves.” When she does, needless to say, I will immediately say it was simply a probing amendment intended to be helpful and supportive. In that spirit, I will leave further discussion to wiser heads than mine.
I add my congratulations to the Minister on her promotion, although she tells me she does not receive any more remuneration for her extra work. We should possibly be arguing that she should join a trade union to argue for more, but I wish her well in her new role.
I look back nostalgically to a day when I knew where the Conservative party stood. It was the party of deregulation and cutting red tape, and at any Conservative party conference, attacking the monster of red tape that was strangling business and our public institutions would get a huge cheer. I find the world we live in today rather confusing because we have a Government who, in this Bill, seem to be intervening very clearly in universities and bringing in more regulation. The amendment from the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings adds more burdensome red tape for our academic institutions. It makes me wonder where the planets are aligning in the modern Conservative party, because the amendment would be onerous for academic institutions.
The problem is that this is a one-size-fits-all approach for all academic institutions, but we know they range hugely, from large universities to some very small further education colleges, whose capacity to take on this burden even annually would be limited, let alone quarterly. The party that used to pride itself on setting organisations free seems to want to restrain them, which is strange.
I am so pleased my right hon. Friend mentioned that, because when we think about higher education institutions we tend to think about those in the Russell Group such as Oxford or Cambridge, and not Hull College’s further education department, which has only a few hundred students and yet would be bound by everything in the Bill.
My hon. Friend makes a good point. There are many such institutions up and down the country. The Minister now has responsibility for the FE sector, which—this always annoys me—is treated as the poor relation in education by Governments. When we were in government, we did not do enough in that sector, but we know from my own constituency and others that many people would not get access to life chances and qualifications if it did not exist. More importantly, the colleges are community-based and have a good reputation as providers. Anything that adds to their burden is wrong.
Another problem is that there is no detail on what will be in the report. We would surely have to have a standardised, meaningful report. Somebody will have to come up with a matrix or form for it to be equal across all institutions. It will be pretty meaningless if it is left to institutions to decide.
That is sensible. One reason why I tabled the amendment was to ensure a degree of consistency across universities. because everyone has to produce the report, and all universities will be expected to behave consistently. The right hon. Gentleman’s suggestion is a good one, and a straightforward means of achieving that consistency could be provided by the new office.
It could but, again, there is a problem because that detail is not in the amendment. There is a difference between a huge academic institution and a small FE college, and I do not know how we get one standard format to deal with that.
There is another issue, which was mentioned in the evidence. The amendment says:
“a report detailing the steps their organisation has undertaken to fulfil its positive duties under subsection (2)”.
That is about freedom of information. It comes back to the problem with this legislation and what we define as freedom of speech. Not only would we need a form or standardised format across all the institutions, but we would need to try and get a definition of what that freedom of speech is. We struggled with that with all the witnesses. It is a bit like motherhood and apple pie: we are all in favour of freedom of speech, but trying to define it is very difficult, especially if we want to ensure that all institutions promote the same thing, because there might be very different interpretations of what the duties would be, and I can see practical difficulties in that.
The right hon. Gentleman, who I have great affection for and have worked closely with, said that the Government must think there is a problem. Well, that is the problem with the entire piece of legislation—it is legislation looking for a problem, rather than solving an existing problem. The onus it will put on universities and the higher education sector is impractical.
Also, what is the sanction if, for example, an institution does not submit its report? What happens if it does not do something? We need criteria in the reporting that says, “You have to do X, Y and Z to meet this threshold” or whatever it is we are trying to achieve. Again, what is the sanction? What happens if an institution says, “I am just not bothering to do this”, or, “I do not have time”? Some might take a principled stand and say, “We are not going to do it.” What is the sanction and where does it say in the Bill, “You have to do it”? So there is a problem there. Are we suggesting that funding or other things should be withdrawn?
That comes back to my big concern about the Bill. I have said it before and I will say it again: it is a very un-Conservative approach to this sector, for the state to interfere directly in organisations that should have the ability to self-govern. What they want to achieve is ensuring that young people have a fulfilling and rich academic education, as we all do. It comes back to the issue of where the legislation lies; as well-intentioned as it may be, there are huge problems with it. It would be not only burdensome, but practically impossible to implement.
I congratulate the Minister, although, having sat in the shadow Cabinet, I am not completely sure that she will enjoy sitting in the full Cabinet. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings said that he did not want to put words in the Minister’s mouth and then went on to put words in my mouth. I want to be absolutely clear, on every occasion, that I think the Bill is an unwarranted intervention. It is completely unnecessary and on the edge of being crackers. However, we will try to make the best of a bad job.
I understand where the right hon. Gentleman is coming from: there has to be a line of accountability. It should be public, open and transparent, and doing the reports is one way. However, my problem is that it is heavy on regulation. I thought that there was a rule in the Government: one regulation in, one regulation out. I look forward to hearing which regulation is coming out to accommodate this going in.
I have worked in local government, both elected and as a civil servant. We know what will happen to this requirement if it is on a quarterly basis. It will either be a simple checklist and that is it—almost meaningless—or it will become a burden that some institutions will fail to fulfil effectively. Therefore, I think it is best left to the annual reports undertaken by the universities and colleges, rather than quarterly reports.
I add my personal congratulations to the Minister on her expanded responsibilities. After yesterday’s sitting, I hope that she will have a lot of time to apply to the guidance that we discussed, in addition to all her new responsibilities. I am sure she will, and that she will have many more staff to support her. I wish her well.
I understand where the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings is coming from with the amendment. As we have heard throughout our proceedings, this piece of legislation is not only burdensome—and, we argue, not necessary—but has not been fully thought through. It seems to have been rushed. The 90-odd—whatever number—amendments we may be up to now seem to suggest that there is a lot wrong with the Bill.
My concern, as has been articulated by my right hon. Friends the Members for North Durham and for Hayes and Harlington and my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, is about the additional work that the Bill will lead to for students, student unions and universities, as was well said. I think back to the days of 2010 and what might be described as the Cameron Government, and there was a great blaze of “We are going to rip up legislation”, or, “We are going to reduce all the red tape and burden on business and organisations”, and yet here we are with a Government who seem to be acting in quite the reverse way. They seem to be putting more and more constraints on businesses and the public sector.
I remember those days with affection, because at least we knew where the Tory party was. The Tories said that they would have a “bonfire of red tape”. Now, not only do we have an Administration for which that is smouldering embers, but we have the Government putting fuel on to that fire, rather than putting it out.
I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend. I am just not sure where this reporting will end. Will we end up with universities having to report about whether people are tweeting from a particular political persuasion, or the political leanings and make-up of those on the governing board, and so on? I think that is an alarming direction to be going in.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAmendment 52 seeks to make clear that the duty of higher education providers to take reasonably practicable steps to secure freedom of speech applies in relation to the use of online platforms as well as physical premises. As drafted, section A1(3) requires that providers must take reasonably practicable steps to secure freedom of speech, including by securing that the use of premises is not denied because of the ideas, beliefs and views of an individual or body, and that the terms of the use are not based on such grounds.
Importantly, the provision uses the word “includes”. In other words, the duty in section A1(1) is not limited to what happens on the physical premises. Therefore, the requirement for a provider to take reasonably practicable steps may apply to online events hosted by the provider every bit as much as to physical events held by the provider.
Of course, it is important to be clear that the lawful speech of students, staff, members and visiting speakers in online spaces is covered by the Bill. The Government believe that the Bill as drafted achieves that aim, and I absolutely expect that the new director for freedom of speech and academic freedom will set that out clearly in the guidance in due course. I hope that I have reassured the Committee. However, I also commit to the Committee to keep this under further consideration.
I am concerned that a lot is going to be left to guidance. I want to explore the Minister’s role in ensuring that the commitment that she has given today will actually get into that guidance. If the operation of the Bill is going to be reliant on the guidance, that guidance is going to be very important.
I have committed to the Committee today to consider this further as the Bill progresses through the House.
Over the past few years it has increasingly been the case that the bite is found in guidance rather than on the face of the Bill. I am trying to understand what the Minister or the Department’s input will be in terms of framing that guidance, because that is going to be very important in determining whether the Bill works.
The right hon. Gentleman can be assured that I work very closely with the Office for Students and intend to continue to do so in the formulation of the guidance. It is important that that guidance is robust and comprehensive and that it enables both universities and student unions to know exactly how to work with the legislation. It would be impossible for the Bill to detail all of the things that the guidance needs to address.
I now want to turn to amendment 31.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Professor Layzell: I think the definition is fine. We have the concept of academic freedom of speech within the law already. This puts a nuance on it, but I think we are quite happy with the definition as it is.
Q
Professor Layzell: That is why you would want the full internal and existing apparatus to be fully utilised before we go into that final stage.
Q
Professor Grant: This is one of those things that is really hard to get good evidence on. In the survey we did of 2,000 students, about a quarter said that they felt unable to express views in their university because they were nervous about disagreeing with their peers. That is a big number; if a quarter of the students in a class are nervous about expressing their views, that worries me. We then followed up that survey data through focus groups. In those groups, this was the issue that the students landed on. Focus groups are by definition small numbers so we need to treat some of this evidence carefully, but they were saying that they felt that reading lists in certain topics were biased to one view or another and were not balanced, and that lecturers quite often had some political view that they would express in the classroom, and if the students disagreed with that, they were nervous about expressing contrarian views in that context.
We followed that up with a focus group with a mix of vice-chancellors from the UK, Australia and the US. What was interesting for me was that when we put that evidence on the table, the response from the vice-chancellors was “We cannot tell our lecturers what to put on their reading list because that would breach academic freedom.” What I find interesting in the Bill is that tension between the desire to promote free speech––and cool the chilling effect––and the concept of academic freedom, and how it is actually the academic who decides what to teach in the classroom. That is why I am not convinced that regulation or legislation is going to solve this. I think it is deeper: it is cultural, it is values-driven.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMore than half of the time allocated has already been used up. I hope that colleagues will make their questions very brief, in the hope of encouraging succinct answers.
Q
I am going to interrupt, because we are not taking evidence from you. We are trying to invite the witnesses to express their views.
As you cannot challenge the director, if you had an authoritarian Government, that could potentially be very difficult. The other point, to Professor Goodwin, is on employment: the Bill will not stop academics being sacked. Surely there should be something in the Bill, or some change in terms of employment law, to give protection to those individuals you talked about? Finally, Professor Kaufmann, on the tort issue: does the Bill not open universities up to a huge amount of litigation? For example, the United Front—a front for the Chinese Communist party—operates widely on our campuses today; will it not use the Bill as a mechanism to ensure that it gets across its ideas and arguments, while being possibly well-funded by the Chinese Communist party and Chinese Government? Is there not a danger of giving weapons to our opponents, and doing the opposite of what we are trying to achieve?
Professor Kaufmann: There are some really good questions there; the one about the state is interesting. It can seem paradoxical that the state is needed to protect individual liberty, but actually it has happened many times in the past. Think of society as three layers, Government, institutions and individuals, instead of two, Government and individuals. The institutions can become illiberal, in which case the Government need to step in to protect the liberty of the individuals. In the United States, in the early 1960s, there were universities that segregated black and white students—essentially barring black students from entering the university, such as at the University of Mississippi. The US federal Government had to more or less step in and desegregate those universities, and they essentially violated the universities’ autonomy to do so. That is an example of where the Government were needed to protect the freedoms of students.
Q
Professor Kaufmann: Sure, McCarthyism. All I am saying is: it is not unusual. If you have a corrupt police department or a school that is taken into special measures, government action is needed to protect liberties. This is clearly one of those situations.
I do not think that universities can reform themselves. The pressures on them are simply too powerful. I have seen this up close, as a head of department: in committee meetings, no one will speak up against what is an illiberal policy but will make them look like a racist or transphobe, and so the policy gets through. In the US, they have had speech codes in universities since the late 1980s. There have been complaints about them—they are a violation of the first amendment right to free speech—but they persist because the institutional forces are too strong. You need an outside force to come in to reform the system. Government action is absolutely central to this, and that is why the Bill is so important.
Professor Goodwin: To keep it brief, I think the Cambridge vote was very revealing. Publicly, you have an academic who struggles to get two dozen signatures, but the moment you ask academics to express their view in an anonymous situation under secret ballot you find that most academics are willing to speak up and challenge the consensus. That is, to me, direct evidence of the chilling effect, and the way in which once you remove the threat of being exposed people are more than willing to challenge that orthodoxy.
If the current system with regard to sacking and dismissal were working, we would not be having this conversation. We would not have had dozens of academics appearing in the newspapers. There was another one this weekend from the University of Bristol who was accused of being Islamophobic. The university had ruled that he was not Islamophobic, but had none the less removed his course in response to student satisfaction.
That is another example of how, to be frank, the broader system needs a good overhaul. We have generated a market-based system that is overwhelmingly skewed around student satisfaction rather than the pursuit of truth and intellectual exploration. If the current system were working, we would not be having this conversation. It is why, on the director of academic freedom, people who are dismissed for, they feel, political reasons need to have somebody to whom they can turn to explore their case and interrogate it.
Q
Professor Goodwin: My view would be that the protection of academic freedom should apply not just to established academics but, in particular in some cases, to academics who are at the beginning of their career and perhaps on fixed-term contracts, or who perhaps are doctoral students. They are the most likely to self-censor, for obvious reasons. They do not want to irritate their colleagues. They do not want to suffer reputational consequences.
My view would be that it should also apply to students, given that we have around a quarter, if we look at the King’s study, for example—I would add lots of emails from students in my 20-year career of teaching in universities—of students feeling that they cannot speak out about particular issues. I think you heard from Tom Simpson who made that point regarding his experience at Oxford, so I think that students definitely need to be included.
Professor Kaufmann: I agree with that absolutely.
Q
I know that in the modern-day Conservative party there is a lot of political cross-dressing going on, but what I find quite frightening about the legislation is that one individual, or a future Government of any persuasion, will have a very Orwellian view of deciding what is and is not acceptable. That is a great departure from my usual understanding of what traditional Conservatives have argued for in this place over the years. Would you say that that one of the problems of this is that the final arbiter will be a political appointee?
Sunder Katwala: I think that there are risks if it is the whims of an individual. We will have to have a clear framework. Say we create an event titled “Are there any limits to free speech?”—I remember people used to create that event when I was an undergraduate student—and we say, “We’ll be joined by the Taliban, David Irving, Anjem Choudary and Zhirinovsky of Russia for that debate about whether there are any limits.”
The question then for the Government, the regulator or the vice-chancellor is to say, “Is that a jolly good way to establish the debate? There are some risks of Anjem Choudary because we know that he radicalises a lot of people towards terrorism, but he dances within the law,” and so on, or is that a kind of lawful speech? I would not have that in my charity. I would have a very robust debate, but I would not have it with Anjem Choudary and Britain First. Are we going to say to universities, “You can’t make any of those choices about the boundaries within your expansive protection of free speech”? That is the key practical question.
Q
I mentioned earlier the issue of the operation in our universities of the United Front of China. They will be able to take cases and argue them and no doubt they will be well financed. There is a danger that they will use it to get their own way through their very deep pockets.
Sunder Katwala: You are going to have to have a transparent policy on which cases are decided. That is where my principles are about “What can you say about gays, women or Jews?” and “What can you or can’t you say about the lurid conspiracies that don’t seem to have any value to academic freedom?” How do you deal with those tensions?
Q
In light of that, do you not think that any Government in a liberal democracy such as ours would find that those three specific issues––clashes with the Equality Act, those advocating against academic freedom and those with very extreme views that they try to cover with academic freedom––could easily be contained within that direction of free speech, thereby ensuring what we all want: the extension of free speech by the academics who tell us that they are mass self-censoring now, so that the professors who just appeared before us can be allowed their academic freedom? We are actually protecting the freedom of perfectly reasonable people, not people who are doing the things that you suggested. Do you see where I am coming from?
Sunder Katwala: In principle, I think the approach you have is very good. We have been having this debate about free speech on campus in society more broadly for several years and we never really get to the difficult issues.
What I would like is for people on both sides of the debate––there should not be sides––to look through the other end of the telescope. If you are someone who is very worried about racism and hate crime, you have got to be clear about the robust, tough stuff that you are going to allow so that you can be clear about where you draw the line.
The liberal or left side of the debate has a reputational point. The people worried about the incursion of free speech have not yet gone to these hard cases and said, “That is what we would do on this boundary, this boundary and this boundary.” If, instead of always just using their overall slogan, the two sides engaged with the value of the point on the other side, we would actually get to the hard cases.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ Do you think that academic freedom needs stronger definition?
Professor Layzell: I think the definition is fine. We have the concept of academic freedom of speech within the law already. This puts a nuance on it, but I think we are quite happy with the definition as it is.
Q The problem with the Bill as it is written is that there is no stipulation that, per your very sensible suggestion, people would have to go through the internal complaints process first, which is the usual thing for ombudsmen and anything else. If we are not careful, we could end up with people resorting straight to law if they want to make a political point. That is going to cost the universities a lot. In some cases, they will settle just to get rid of them.
Professor Layzell: That is why you would want the full internal and existing apparatus to be fully utilised before we go into that final stage.
Q Professor Grant, I agree with your analysis that the bigger concern seems to be self-censorship, but we are a little unclear on the levels of evidence around this. Could you outline some of the evidence of self-censorship that you have seen? Is this something that affects you in your department at King’s?
Professor Grant: This is one of those things that is really hard to get good evidence on. In the survey we did of 2,000 students, about a quarter said that they felt unable to express views in their university because they were nervous about disagreeing with their peers. That is a big number; if a quarter of the students in a class are nervous about expressing their views, that worries me. We then followed up that survey data through focus groups. In those groups, this was the issue that the students landed on. Focus groups are by definition small numbers so we need to treat some of this evidence carefully, but they were saying that they felt that reading lists in certain topics were biased to one view or another and were not balanced, and that lecturers quite often had some political view that they would express in the classroom, and if the students disagreed with that, they were nervous about expressing contrarian views in that context.
We followed that up with a focus group with a mix of vice-chancellors from the UK, Australia and the US. What was interesting for me was that when we put that evidence on the table, the response from the vice-chancellors was “We cannot tell our lecturers what to put on their reading list because that would breach academic freedom.” What I find interesting in the Bill is that tension between the desire to promote free speech––and cool the chilling effect––and the concept of academic freedom, and how it is actually the academic who decides what to teach in the classroom. That is why I am not convinced that regulation or legislation is going to solve this. I think it is deeper: it is cultural, it is values-driven.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMore than half of the time allocated has already been used up. I hope that colleagues will make their questions very brief, in the hope of encouraging succinct answers.
Q Professor Kaufmann, you used the words “chilling effect” and “tip of the iceberg”. We heard this the other day from other witnesses. Getting your head around the idea of self-censorship is like having blancmange in your hands. Frankly, there is no firm evidence for it. My problem with the Bill is that it is a very un-Conservative piece of legislation. It is about involving the state directly in the running of universities. You mentioned the director for freedom of speech, and that may be fine, under the present Conservative Government, but, as I said last week—
I am going to interrupt, because we are not taking evidence from you. We are trying to invite the witnesses to express their views.
As you cannot challenge the director, if you had an authoritarian Government, that could potentially be very difficult. The other point, to Professor Goodwin, is on employment: the Bill will not stop academics being sacked. Surely there should be something in the Bill, or some change in terms of employment law, to give protection to those individuals you talked about? Finally, Professor Kaufmann, on the tort issue: does the Bill not open universities up to a huge amount of litigation? For example, the United Front—a front for the Chinese Communist party—operates widely on our campuses today; will it not use the Bill as a mechanism to ensure that it gets across its ideas and arguments, while being possibly well-funded by the Chinese Communist party and Chinese Government? Is there not a danger of giving weapons to our opponents, and doing the opposite of what we are trying to achieve?
Professor Kaufmann: There are some really good questions there; the one about the state is interesting. It can seem paradoxical that the state is needed to protect individual liberty, but actually it has happened many times in the past. Think of society as three layers, Government, institutions and individuals, instead of two, Government and individuals. The institutions can become illiberal, in which case the Government need to step in to protect the liberty of the individuals. In the United States, in the early 1960s, there were universities that segregated black and white students—essentially barring black students from entering the university, such as at the University of Mississippi. The US federal Government had to more or less step in and desegregate those universities, and they essentially violated the universities’ autonomy to do so. That is an example of where the Government were needed to protect the freedoms of students.
Q Also McCarthyism, which was the reverse of that.
Professor Kaufmann: Sure, McCarthyism. All I am saying is: it is not unusual. If you have a corrupt police department or a school that is taken into special measures, government action is needed to protect liberties. This is clearly one of those situations.
I do not think that universities can reform themselves. The pressures on them are simply too powerful. I have seen this up close, as a head of department: in committee meetings, no one will speak up against what is an illiberal policy but will make them look like a racist or transphobe, and so the policy gets through. In the US, they have had speech codes in universities since the late 1980s. There have been complaints about them—they are a violation of the first amendment right to free speech—but they persist because the institutional forces are too strong. You need an outside force to come in to reform the system. Government action is absolutely central to this, and that is why the Bill is so important.
Professor Goodwin: To keep it brief, I think the Cambridge vote was very revealing. Publicly, you have an academic who struggles to get two dozen signatures, but the moment you ask academics to express their view in an anonymous situation under secret ballot you find that most academics are willing to speak up and challenge the consensus. That is, to me, direct evidence of the chilling effect, and the way in which once you remove the threat of being exposed people are more than willing to challenge that orthodoxy.
If the current system with regard to sacking and dismissal were working, we would not be having this conversation. We would not have had dozens of academics appearing in the newspapers. There was another one this weekend from the University of Bristol who was accused of being Islamophobic. The university had ruled that he was not Islamophobic, but had none the less removed his course in response to student satisfaction.
That is another example of how, to be frank, the broader system needs a good overhaul. We have generated a market-based system that is overwhelmingly skewed around student satisfaction rather than the pursuit of truth and intellectual exploration. If the current system were working, we would not be having this conversation. It is why, on the director of academic freedom, people who are dismissed for, they feel, political reasons need to have somebody to whom they can turn to explore their case and interrogate it.
Q Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. The Bill speaks of freedom of speech in relation to students as well as staff; however, academic freedom in the Bill is defined in relation only to academic staff. Should that definition also include students? I am thinking not only that academic freedom is important generally for anyone at a university, but that some students, such as doctoral students, may also be tutoring.
Professor Goodwin: My view would be that the protection of academic freedom should apply not just to established academics but, in particular in some cases, to academics who are at the beginning of their career and perhaps on fixed-term contracts, or who perhaps are doctoral students. They are the most likely to self-censor, for obvious reasons. They do not want to irritate their colleagues. They do not want to suffer reputational consequences.
My view would be that it should also apply to students, given that we have around a quarter, if we look at the King’s study, for example—I would add lots of emails from students in my 20-year career of teaching in universities—of students feeling that they cannot speak out about particular issues. I think you heard from Tom Simpson who made that point regarding his experience at Oxford, so I think that students definitely need to be included.
Professor Kaufmann: I agree with that absolutely.
Q So it is the Government who determine it, not the vice-chancellor.
Sunder Katwala: It would depend. The Government will decide in the case of holocaust denial that it needs to be very clear that it is not welcome on campus. I am saying that there are analogous cases to holocaust denial for other reasons, for other minority groups.
Q On that point, it is quite clear in the legislation who will decide: it will be the director of free speech, whose decisions are not even legally challengeable. To me, that is very clear.
I know that in the modern-day Conservative party there is a lot of political cross-dressing going on, but what I find quite frightening about the legislation is that one individual, or a future Government of any persuasion, will have a very Orwellian view of deciding what is and is not acceptable. That is a great departure from my usual understanding of what traditional Conservatives have argued for in this place over the years. Would you say that that one of the problems of this is that the final arbiter will be a political appointee?
Sunder Katwala: I think that there are risks if it is the whims of an individual. We will have to have a clear framework. Say we create an event titled “Are there any limits to free speech?”—I remember people used to create that event when I was an undergraduate student—and we say, “We’ll be joined by the Taliban, David Irving, Anjem Choudary and Zhirinovsky of Russia for that debate about whether there are any limits.”
The question then for the Government, the regulator or the vice-chancellor is to say, “Is that a jolly good way to establish the debate? There are some risks of Anjem Choudary because we know that he radicalises a lot of people towards terrorism, but he dances within the law,” and so on, or is that a kind of lawful speech? I would not have that in my charity. I would have a very robust debate, but I would not have it with Anjem Choudary and Britain First. Are we going to say to universities, “You can’t make any of those choices about the boundaries within your expansive protection of free speech”? That is the key practical question.
Q I agree, but the danger in the legislation as it is written is about those individuals. My concern is more that foreign states that want to change the direction that we argued for on freedom of speech in this country will use this to challenge academic institutions, and will be allowed to.
I mentioned earlier the issue of the operation in our universities of the United Front of China. They will be able to take cases and argue them and no doubt they will be well financed. There is a danger that they will use it to get their own way through their very deep pockets.
Sunder Katwala: You are going to have to have a transparent policy on which cases are decided. That is where my principles are about “What can you say about gays, women or Jews?” and “What can you or can’t you say about the lurid conspiracies that don’t seem to have any value to academic freedom?” How do you deal with those tensions?
Q You have raised three interesting points at the margins. The entire point of the legislation is that there are things that are not in these extreme examples that are currently being challenged at universities. That is basically the evidence that we have received from the academics who have appeared before us in these evidence sessions.
In light of that, do you not think that any Government in a liberal democracy such as ours would find that those three specific issues––clashes with the Equality Act, those advocating against academic freedom and those with very extreme views that they try to cover with academic freedom––could easily be contained within that direction of free speech, thereby ensuring what we all want: the extension of free speech by the academics who tell us that they are mass self-censoring now, so that the professors who just appeared before us can be allowed their academic freedom? We are actually protecting the freedom of perfectly reasonable people, not people who are doing the things that you suggested. Do you see where I am coming from?
Sunder Katwala: In principle, I think the approach you have is very good. We have been having this debate about free speech on campus in society more broadly for several years and we never really get to the difficult issues.
What I would like is for people on both sides of the debate––there should not be sides––to look through the other end of the telescope. If you are someone who is very worried about racism and hate crime, you have got to be clear about the robust, tough stuff that you are going to allow so that you can be clear about where you draw the line.
The liberal or left side of the debate has a reputational point. The people worried about the incursion of free speech have not yet gone to these hard cases and said, “That is what we would do on this boundary, this boundary and this boundary.” If, instead of always just using their overall slogan, the two sides engaged with the value of the point on the other side, we would actually get to the hard cases.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesUnder the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, I declare that my wife works at a university. I am not sure if it is necessary to declare that, but I want to put it on the record for this session.
Chair, this morning it was said that hon. Members have to declare their interests every time they speak. My understanding, and that of the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), was that as long as the interest is declared at the beginning of the session that should be enough. Have the rules changed or are the right hon. Member and I just being old fuddy-duddies?
I thank you for that plea for clarification. I am happy for any Member to make a declaration at the beginning of each session, as making a declaration every time they speak seems excessive.
Q
“introduction of the statutory tort will almost certainly involve universities in more legal action”.
Could you briefly expand on the consequences, both intended and unintended?
Smita Jamdar: As I understand it, the tort is designed to enable people who feel that their right to freedom of speech, as defined in the legislation, has been infringed to go to court and argue their cases. The reason why I fear that could have a number of consequences, not all of them intended, is that in order to issue a case before court you simply have to pay an issue fee, in most cases, write the particulars of claim and set it out, so you set out your case. It then locks both parties into a set of proceedings. Ultimately, you can cut those proceedings short, so you can apply to the court to have a case struck out, but that nevertheless involves a certain amount of time, expense and resource in dealing with the litigation.
In relation to the statutory tort, there is not any threshold level of harm that anyone has to show. Ultimately, for a remedy, any tort requires some form of damages, but that would not necessarily stop people from bringing claims simply to make the point. Especially where the threshold of harm is very small, it could be brought in the small claims court, where no costs are recoverable by either party. On one analysis, you would say that is at least a level playing field, but again it could mean that a few thousand pounds in every case could be spent getting rid of claims that are either very trivial or unmeritorious generally. That is the concern.
Q
This morning, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) raised the issue of Chinese students. We all—or I do and at least one other person in Committee does—know about the United Front activities of the Communist party on campuses throughout the UK. Sometimes they are intimidating students, and they are pushing an agenda—for example, on the Uyghurs in China—that is pro the Chinese regime. Under the Bill, I fear that that could be opened up, as my right hon. Friend raised this morning.
A group of students could on the face of it just be students, but they might have financing behind them that we and other people do not know about so that they could pursue a freedom of speech claim to push an agenda that might, for example, be in the interests of the Chinese Government. That would not only involve a lot of cost, but would clearly be financed by some very deep pockets, so it could lead not only to that agenda being pushed but to a lot of expense for the universities. Do you agree with that?
Smita Jamdar: The legislation obviously covers freedom of speech within the law, so as long as what these people were purporting to want to speak about was within the law—or at least arguably within the law, because obviously one of the things that you might wish to have the court adjudicate on is whether the speech was within the law—I cannot see anything that would stop that kind of funded litigation. Ultimately, you can try to seek clarification about where money has come from to fund litigation, but there are always ways of passing money through so that it comes from the pockets of the claimants in the first instance. So, yes, we would not necessarily know who was funding the litigation, or to what end. Ultimately, the question for the court to decide would be: was it an infringement of freedom of speech within the law?
Q
Smita Jamdar: There is definitely a lot of complexity here about the different roles that these bodies will play and the different routes that somebody could go through to get compensation. The Charity Commission, for example, would not normally be involved in making decisions about compensation for individual complainants; it would be looking more at whether the body in question had complied with the charity law obligations. But the other three, under the model that we have seen in the Bill, could all be involved.
Without a great deal of clarity about the relative responsibilities or indeed the pecking order—there is a rule that you cannot go to the OIA, and I think under the Bill you could not use the OfS free speech complaints process without first exhausting the internal processes of the university to challenge the decision that you are unhappy about. However, there is no such restriction when you go to court. You are free to go to court when you feel that your rights have been infringed, rather than having to go through another internal process. That said, the courts tend to encourage people to utilise internal processes first, because it is a good way of managing court resources. Does that answer the question?
Four more Members have indicated that they want to ask a question. I call Kevan Jones.
Q
Perhaps I am old-fashioned, because I do not believe that the state should intervene where it is not necessary. That is why I find the Bill, which comes from the Conservative party, very interesting. I am someone who believes that, with guidance—I am not suggesting that the existing guidance should not be used—academic institutions should be allowed to police themselves. Apart from Policy Exchange wanting to do a paper, and the examples that you have picked up, what is the extent of the problem? No one has been able to explain it to me. The Minister did not explain it on Second Reading, and you have not done so either. What is it?
Thomas Simpson: One of the things that really strikes me is often overlooked in this debate is the structural similarity between discussions around free speech and discussions around other forms of discrimination. We have rightly been thinking very seriously about racial discrimination in the past year and a half in particular, and one of the features of that debate is that people who may not themselves be subject to discrimination on those grounds are often cautious or outright sceptical that there is a problem here, whereas those who are subject to it, or at risk of being subject to it, are often very clear that there is a problem here. There is an asymmetry of perspectives.
Q
Thomas Simpson: There are two problems. One is that existing statutory duties have very weak means of enforcement, so my view is that those gaps should be plugged. Two of the controversies in Cambridge in 2019 were around the dismissal of Noah Carl and its rescinding of the visiting fellowship invitation to Professor Jordan Peterson. Regardless of the merits of either case—I do not know the details of them—the astonishing thing about that was the lack of due process. The university in one case, and the college in the other case, made the decision, and there was nothing that the people involved could do, or very little that they could do: there were not ready legal means. There needs to be legal remedy.
Actually, one of the really surprising things about this discussion is that it is not an argument against taking measures, specifically in the human rights case, to guard against human rights being breached. You do not need to show that there are lots of patterns of human rights being breached.
Q
Thomas Simpson: Exactly the same charges were made against the original passage of anti-discrimination legislation.
Q
The issue I have with this is that, with a Conservative Government, shouldn’t we be upholding the freedoms of universities to decide what they want to do within the legal framework that is there, rather than what this is? It is going to put the director in a position whereby they will be able to dictate terms. Now, that might be okay when you have a Conservative Government, but what happens if you have a radical Government of a different persuasion that then starts saying to universities, “You will do x, y and z”? That is why I find it very difficult to understand the reasons why Conservatives are backing this piece of legislation, because interventions on that level are not what it says on the tin of conservatism.
Thomas Simpson: The legislation does define it. It says that one of the objectives is
“securing that, where a person applies”
for a given job,
“the person is not adversely affected in relation to the application because they have exercised their freedom within the law”,
referring to an earlier clause.
Q
Thomas Simpson: The current situation is one in which universities mark their own homework about whether they have complied with the duty.
Q
Thomas Simpson: What this creates is an ecosystem of accountability, both within the sector and external to it.
Q
Thomas Simpson: I can give my personal experience. I am cautious about drawing too strong conclusions from that. My personal experience was that as an undergraduate from 1999 to 2002, I felt free to argue a position in my final year dissertation that I knew my markers would reject, but would recognise the quality of the work on its own merits. I had the confidence to do that. The topic was whether God existed, broadly speaking. Cambridge was a very secular faculty at that time; I was examining a recent contribution to that debate.
I had a moment about three years ago where an undergraduate student in a different department from where I work was talking to me about their political philosophy paper. They had written all the ethics of migration, which is a sensitive subject. The philosophical debate is whether countries have the right to control who crosses the borders into their country. The two positions are what is called open and closed borders. The philosophical debate is already right on the edge of the Overton window for public discourse on that topic. It became clear in the conversation that the student’s personal views were in favour of closed borders, so I said, “What did you argue for in the essay?” The student replied, “Oh, I argued for open borders. It would be silly not to do that, because that is where the lecturers were coming from.”
That to me had a sense of tragedy: here was an individual who believes something different and thought they had arguments for that, but felt that the grade they would receive on the exam would be different because of the content of what they argued for. That sense of danger about particular viewpoints is something I have sensed grow within the university over the last five or six years. I think it roughly tracks some of the turmoil we have had in the public space more generally in that time. It is mitigating somewhat now, but the patterns are in place and we need to take steps to counter that.
Q
Thomas Simpson: I have been really inspired by the observation that Scalia and RBG, the two SCOTUS justices, used to go to the opera together. They were ideological opposites and I am sure that they even viewed the other person’s views as reprehensible at times, but there was a collegiality about their ability to do their work together. That collegiality exists in very many places, but it is under pressure, and that is the challenge that we are facing.
Perhaps a way of resolving the difference of view between the right hon. Member for North Durham and the witness is for the witness to cite some of that evidence in writing as a follow up? I would like to know about courses that have been cancelled, stopped or never delivered, speakers who have not been invited or where invitations have been withdrawn, and funding that has not been granted on the basis of all of those things being “unacceptable”. It would be very useful if you could provide some kind of note with that as a follow up, which will hopefully allow us to move on.
It seems to me that what you are describing the difference between mob rule and the rule of law.
You have had your say, thank you very much.
Thomas Simpson: I am very cautious about the language I would use to describe that situation, but I want the rule of law rather than the rule of politics. That is the frank truth.
Q
Dr Harris: You are right that—at least following the 1988 Act—many universities have in their statutes clauses protecting academic freedom, and that tends to be in the same wording. In terms of why we need law, again, I think we come back to the question of whether we regard and respect freedom of speech as a fundamental right. I think most people here—and, I hope, most lawmakers in a liberal democracy—would agree that it is a fundamental right and that it is fundamental to the flourishing of the individual and the running of civil society. Universities certainly pay lip service—if I can say that—and when challenged, they will always say, “Freedom of speech is our lifeblood.”
Q
Dr Harris: On the definition question, I heard your questions to Professor Simpson. All rights are difficult to define, but that does not mean therefore that we are at a loss. I think the court in Strasbourg, and certainly the US courts, would disagree that freedom of speech is something that is impossible to define. I do not think the idea that we will sort of give up or backslide because it is difficult to define a fundamental right is a serious position. Yes, it is much more difficult to define than pregnancy, which is famously binary—you are either pregnant or you are not—but nevertheless, courts and legislatures are able to define more closely what a right should be.
Q
Dr Harris: To go back to the point about the intervention by the state, I think it is important that we are clear what we mean by “the state”. There is obviously a role for the OfS—an administrative form of adjudication—and perhaps we can come back to that, as I think it is a very relevant issue. It is entirely in keeping with any right that it is enforced by law and that there is a remedy when there is infringement of that right. That is simply what a right is. There are a number of people who are saying, “I believe in free speech as a right,” and then they baulk when we say that it must be enforced by the courts and there must be a remedy. That suggests to me that they do not take free speech seriously as a right, which as I say, is not a credible position in a liberal democracy.
Q
Dr Harris: To a degree, I agree, but the director must enforce free speech within the law, and the director will have no power to say what the law is. If the director misdirects him or herself as to what the law says on free speech, it can be challenged in the courts—it would be an error of law.
On the question, I think that, ultimately, what will happen is that there will be definition and enforcement by the courts of those duties and rights created by the Bill. It is correct to say that there is a role for an administrative body, the OfS. That is a trade-off that it is often necessary to make. It is worth while to have a cheap, informal and quick form of adjudication. The idea that every dispute—especially for students—should be taken to court, is simply impractical. Even though there can be drawbacks with administrative adjudication, it is essentially a stopgap so not everything has to go to the courts. Ultimately, the free speech that we are talking about here is defined and enforced by the courts. It is free speech within the law. We should all be happy with the idea that free speech is a right enforced by the courts.
Q
Dr Harris: Every MP must decide for themselves how happy they are to turn a blind eye to infringement of a fundamental right and how happy you are to pay that political price.
No, it’s conscious bias—[Laughter.]
Dr Harris: Yes, absolutely. For instance, in the determination of curriculum content, that is something where there absolutely must not be imposition of bureaucratic standards. The example that I cited in the written submission was that of the University of Oxford’s music faculty, which decided to decolonise its curriculum. I should say that that is a legitimate exercise of academic freedom, but it then said, “Members of the faculty must not disparage the curriculum.” Obviously, curriculums are changed by disparaging them—that is how they came to be decolonised in the first place—so we cannot stop the process.
There needs to be, and I think the Bill could include, a right of consultation. It is academic good practice anyway, and it slightly demeans universities that they need to be told that, because it should be part of academic ethics. There is also the right to criticise one’s institution. That is part of the international law standard of academic freedom. It is embedded in a number of university statutes. Whatever happens, the standard adopted by the Bill should be at least what is already best practice in the sector. I do not think it should go beyond that.
Q
Dr Harris: Yes—
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNo, but we all tend to speak from personal experience because it is more direct and authentic. Do you not find, when institutions could improve, it is actually about some changes within, and that perhaps you do not need legislation to force it through? It is thought very widely that this is a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
Professor Stock: The problem is that unfortunately we do need legislation, because universities have not got on top of this. With the people I am talking to, and the stuff that I refer to in my written evidence, we are not talking just about deplatforming. I know there is a focus on public events and public speaking. There is a range of areas where speech is being suppressed or controlled, where junior academics are being put on vexatious complaints for expressing their perfectly legitimate academic views, and where people are being very cautious about what they teach because they want to avoid controversy.
If universities had been able to get on top of all of that, they would have done, I assume, but they have not. In some cases, they just deny the problem. This legislation says that there should be a positive duty to promote academic culture. That could be a very positive, forward-looking initiative; it does not have to be heavy-handed, although obviously it has the capacity to be punitive. But there is also the dimension of encouraging universities to examine what the value is of academic freedom, which is not a discussion that I see happening.
Q There is legislation already, in the Education Act. What you are saying is that that is not working. If I follow your argument, universities are not following that because what they want to do is to ensure that they have not got individuals like you or perhaps other academics who are going to put off students from being attracted to those universities, because of their views. To follow it to a logical conclusion, is not the ultimate thing that is going to happen this? If the only motivation behind it is that somehow they feel that if they allow you and others to express your different views—which I fully support, personally—that will put off students from going there, are they not going to just not employ people like you?
Professor Stock: I am not a lawyer, but I assume that there should be some discussion of how recruitment happens and—
Q That is not covered by the Bill. If the logic of your argument is that the reasons why universities are not—
Professor Stock: I think that is already happening, for what it is worth, so I am not sure you are going to be able to change that in any way. I think that people are coming to interview on the basis of their views.
Q Is not the logical conclusion to what you are saying, your argument, this? You are saying that institutions are not using the existing law, which is there to protect academic freedoms; you have said, in the evidence that you have just given, that it is because they are afraid of not attracting students because of people like you or others having views that might be hostile to them. Is that not linked to the fact that what universities will do is just not employ people like you?
Professor Stock: I understand the question; I just do not really see how this—you have not pointed to a particular aspect of the Bill that would encourage that situation. I think that situation may already be in place. Arguably, if we change the culture of universities so that people—administrators as well as academics and students—come to understand why it is a good thing to have viewpoint diversity and a good thing to have civil disagreement, that might be less likely to happen. This should not just be a bureaucratic, box-ticking exercise. Done right, it should change the culture of the university sector, and that will have ramifications for far more than the university sector, I think; it will have good, positive implications for civil discourse generally. However, I do not see how this is going to somehow increase the chances of people being excluded on the basis of their views at the recruitment stage. We are still at HR—
Q But your main argument was the fact that somehow this legislation was needed because universities were not going to employ, not wanting to get, people like you, because it was turning off students from going to those universities. There is a system in legislation, in the Education Act, to protect those academic freedoms. All I am saying is that if you do this, if you are saying that your main argument is that they are doing it—
Professor Stock: It is one of my arguments.
Q Well, your main argument is that their argument is that they are doing this because they are afraid of putting off potential recruits to their universities. The ultimate conclusion to that is that they will just not employ people like you, which I do not agree with, but—
Professor Stock: I have answered that to the best of my ability. I have understood the question each time you have asked it and I have answered to the best of my ability.
Dr Ahmed: My understanding—maybe I have got it wrong—is that new provision A1(9) does mention the case where someone is applying to be an employee of one of these institutions, and they will not be adversely affected by virtue of their free speech expression in those circumstances. It is my understanding that the Bill does say something about that.
The second thing that I would say is that independent of the issue about universities employing or not employing people in order to attract students, the Bill would have the effect, I believe, of discouraging students from thinking that they could put pressure on universities to fire or discipline people by virtue of their views, so it would prevent mobs from forming, mobs that have formed against people I know at Cambridge and other people in the country, because they would know that it would not have an effect.
Q In a previous life, I was a trade union official, and can I just say to you that employers will find very clear ways of not employing people, to get round any type of legislation? It will not be on the basis of your views; it will be for some other reason, so this does not give a great deal of protection for those individuals anyway.
Dr Ahmed: I do not think that the employer—that is, the management of the university—gets up in the morning and thinks, “How am I going to stop free speech? How am I going to fire these people?” They are responding to pressure from what I think is quite a small group of activists within universities. If this legislation has the effect of creating some kind of countervailing pressure, then you are right. Of course it is not going to solve the problem; I have been a trade union official myself and I know something about what these issues are. Of course it is not going to solve the problem, but it will help, because I think it will create pressure in the opposite direction.
Q Dr Ahmed, you have previously discussed a soft censorship approach. Can you explain what that is and the impact that you think it will have or that it is having on universities?
Dr Ahmed: You can distinguish between hard censorship and soft censorship. Hard censorship, in my understanding —the distinction is evident in the written evidence that I submitted—means universities actively suppressing certain kinds of speech by enacting certain kinds of regulation. I think we have seen different examples of that, which I am happy to discuss.
Soft censorship is where there is not any regulation, but people know—people sense it themselves, because they know that if they say this, or they say that, or if they present these views, they will be regarded adversely. If they are a student, they might be ostracised
. It might make difficulties for their academic career. That is the result. Because, as it happens, we have an academy, which, at least in some parts, is predominantly in one part of the political spectrum, the result is that certain kinds of research do not get done and certain kinds of views do not get defended by people who, in their hearts, perhaps, believe in them.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNo, but we all tend to speak from personal experience because it is more direct and authentic. Do you not find, when institutions could improve, it is actually about some changes within, and that perhaps you do not need legislation to force it through? It is thought very widely that this is a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
Professor Stock: The problem is that unfortunately we do need legislation, because universities have not got on top of this. With the people I am talking to, and the stuff that I refer to in my written evidence, we are not talking just about deplatforming. I know there is a focus on public events and public speaking. There is a range of areas where speech is being suppressed or controlled, where junior academics are being put on vexatious complaints for expressing their perfectly legitimate academic views, and where people are being very cautious about what they teach because they want to avoid controversy.
If universities had been able to get on top of all of that, they would have done, I assume, but they have not. In some cases, they just deny the problem. This legislation says that there should be a positive duty to promote academic culture. That could be a very positive, forward-looking initiative; it does not have to be heavy-handed, although obviously it has the capacity to be punitive. But there is also the dimension of encouraging universities to examine what the value is of academic freedom, which is not a discussion that I see happening.
Q
Professor Stock: I am not a lawyer, but I assume that there should be some discussion of how recruitment happens and—
Q
Professor Stock: I think that is already happening, for what it is worth, so I am not sure you are going to be able to change that in any way. I think that people are coming to interview on the basis of their views.
Q
Professor Stock: I understand the question; I just do not really see how this—you have not pointed to a particular aspect of the Bill that would encourage that situation. I think that situation may already be in place. Arguably, if we change the culture of universities so that people—administrators as well as academics and students—come to understand why it is a good thing to have viewpoint diversity and a good thing to have civil disagreement, that might be less likely to happen. This should not just be a bureaucratic, box-ticking exercise. Done right, it should change the culture of the university sector, and that will have ramifications for far more than the university sector, I think; it will have good, positive implications for civil discourse generally. However, I do not see how this is going to somehow increase the chances of people being excluded on the basis of their views at the recruitment stage. We are still at HR—
Q
Professor Stock: It is one of my arguments.
Q
Professor Stock: I have answered that to the best of my ability. I have understood the question each time you have asked it and I have answered to the best of my ability.
Dr Ahmed: My understanding—maybe I have got it wrong—is that new provision A1(9) does mention the case where someone is applying to be an employee of one of these institutions, and they will not be adversely affected by virtue of their free speech expression in those circumstances. It is my understanding that the Bill does say something about that.
The second thing that I would say is that independent of the issue about universities employing or not employing people in order to attract students, the Bill would have the effect, I believe, of discouraging students from thinking that they could put pressure on universities to fire or discipline people by virtue of their views, so it would prevent mobs from forming, mobs that have formed against people I know at Cambridge and other people in the country, because they would know that it would not have an effect.
Q
Dr Ahmed: I do not think that the employer—that is, the management of the university—gets up in the morning and thinks, “How am I going to stop free speech? How am I going to fire these people?” They are responding to pressure from what I think is quite a small group of activists within universities. If this legislation has the effect of creating some kind of countervailing pressure, then you are right. Of course it is not going to solve the problem; I have been a trade union official myself and I know something about what these issues are. Of course it is not going to solve the problem, but it will help, because I think it will create pressure in the opposite direction.
Q
Dr Ahmed: You can distinguish between hard censorship and soft censorship. Hard censorship, in my understanding —the distinction is evident in the written evidence that I submitted—means universities actively suppressing certain kinds of speech by enacting certain kinds of regulation. I think we have seen different examples of that, which I am happy to discuss.
Soft censorship is where there is not any regulation, but people know—people sense it themselves, because they know that if they say this, or they say that, or if they present these views, they will be regarded adversely. If they are a student, they might be ostracised
. It might make difficulties for their academic career. That is the result. Because, as it happens, we have an academy, which, at least in some parts, is predominantly in one part of the political spectrum, the result is that certain kinds of research do not get done and certain kinds of views do not get defended by people who, in their hearts, perhaps, believe in them.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesUnder the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, I declare that my wife works at a university. I am not sure if it is necessary to declare that, but I want to put it on the record for this session.
Chair, this morning it was said that hon. Members have to declare their interests every time they speak. My understanding, and that of the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), was that as long as the interest is declared at the beginning of the session that should be enough. Have the rules changed or are the right hon. Member and I just being old fuddy-duddies?
I thank you for that plea for clarification. I am happy for any Member to make a declaration at the beginning of each session, as making a declaration every time they speak seems excessive.
Q Thank you for joining us today, Ms Jamdar. One of the areas I want to explore with you is around the tort. There seem to be widespread concerns about what this will mean and the implications it will have for universities and student unions. In an article published in Times Higher Education in May 2021, you wrote that the
“introduction of the statutory tort will almost certainly involve universities in more legal action”.
Could you briefly expand on the consequences, both intended and unintended?
Smita Jamdar: As I understand it, the tort is designed to enable people who feel that their right to freedom of speech, as defined in the legislation, has been infringed to go to court and argue their cases. The reason why I fear that could have a number of consequences, not all of them intended, is that in order to issue a case before court you simply have to pay an issue fee, in most cases, write the particulars of claim and set it out, so you set out your case. It then locks both parties into a set of proceedings. Ultimately, you can cut those proceedings short, so you can apply to the court to have a case struck out, but that nevertheless involves a certain amount of time, expense and resource in dealing with the litigation.
In relation to the statutory tort, there is not any threshold level of harm that anyone has to show. Ultimately, for a remedy, any tort requires some form of damages, but that would not necessarily stop people from bringing claims simply to make the point. Especially where the threshold of harm is very small, it could be brought in the small claims court, where no costs are recoverable by either party. On one analysis, you would say that is at least a level playing field, but again it could mean that a few thousand pounds in every case could be spent getting rid of claims that are either very trivial or unmeritorious generally. That is the concern.
Q You cover the issues of frivolous and vexatious, and even they will cost some money, but if you get individuals who are well financed this could lead to a lot of expense for the universities.
This morning, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) raised the issue of Chinese students. We all—or I do and at least one other person in Committee does—know about the United Front activities of the Communist party on campuses throughout the UK. Sometimes they are intimidating students, and they are pushing an agenda—for example, on the Uyghurs in China—that is pro the Chinese regime. Under the Bill, I fear that that could be opened up, as my right hon. Friend raised this morning.
A group of students could on the face of it just be students, but they might have financing behind them that we and other people do not know about so that they could pursue a freedom of speech claim to push an agenda that might, for example, be in the interests of the Chinese Government. That would not only involve a lot of cost, but would clearly be financed by some very deep pockets, so it could lead not only to that agenda being pushed but to a lot of expense for the universities. Do you agree with that?
Smita Jamdar: The legislation obviously covers freedom of speech within the law, so as long as what these people were purporting to want to speak about was within the law—or at least arguably within the law, because obviously one of the things that you might wish to have the court adjudicate on is whether the speech was within the law—I cannot see anything that would stop that kind of funded litigation. Ultimately, you can try to seek clarification about where money has come from to fund litigation, but there are always ways of passing money through so that it comes from the pockets of the claimants in the first instance. So, yes, we would not necessarily know who was funding the litigation, or to what end. Ultimately, the question for the court to decide would be: was it an infringement of freedom of speech within the law?
Q To pursue this a little further, you and others have been talking about getting into a compensation culture—we might have the equivalent of ambulance chasers going around chasing, whether through social media or on campus. You are obviously very familiar with the legislation and I think you are the first lawyer we have had so far as a witness. Is it clear to you how this would work with the tort and how, when a complainant wishes to pursue some damages, that will work through the complex relationships between the three bodies involved? We will have the Office for Students, the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education and the Charity Commission. That looks like a minefield and super-complex—a lawyer’s goldmine. What do you think?
Smita Jamdar: There is definitely a lot of complexity here about the different roles that these bodies will play and the different routes that somebody could go through to get compensation. The Charity Commission, for example, would not normally be involved in making decisions about compensation for individual complainants; it would be looking more at whether the body in question had complied with the charity law obligations. But the other three, under the model that we have seen in the Bill, could all be involved.
Without a great deal of clarity about the relative responsibilities or indeed the pecking order—there is a rule that you cannot go to the OIA, and I think under the Bill you could not use the OfS free speech complaints process without first exhausting the internal processes of the university to challenge the decision that you are unhappy about. However, there is no such restriction when you go to court. You are free to go to court when you feel that your rights have been infringed, rather than having to go through another internal process. That said, the courts tend to encourage people to utilise internal processes first, because it is a good way of managing court resources. Does that answer the question?
Four more Members have indicated that they want to ask a question. I call Kevan Jones.
Q I am very clear that where we need legislation to protect people, I will support it. That is the way we should operate. I struggle with the Bill and understanding what the problem is. You used the phrase “chilling effect”. We heard this morning about people self-censoring, which is a very difficult concept to understand. You seem to be saying that the legislation will be a bit like equal rights legislation, but may I respectfully say that it will not? With equal rights legislation, at least you can define things—for example, you can define whether a woman is pregnant and whether she has been discriminated against. Defining notions of free speech will be very difficult.
Perhaps I am old-fashioned, because I do not believe that the state should intervene where it is not necessary. That is why I find the Bill, which comes from the Conservative party, very interesting. I am someone who believes that, with guidance—I am not suggesting that the existing guidance should not be used—academic institutions should be allowed to police themselves. Apart from Policy Exchange wanting to do a paper, and the examples that you have picked up, what is the extent of the problem? No one has been able to explain it to me. The Minister did not explain it on Second Reading, and you have not done so either. What is it?
Thomas Simpson: One of the things that really strikes me is often overlooked in this debate is the structural similarity between discussions around free speech and discussions around other forms of discrimination. We have rightly been thinking very seriously about racial discrimination in the past year and a half in particular, and one of the features of that debate is that people who may not themselves be subject to discrimination on those grounds are often cautious or outright sceptical that there is a problem here, whereas those who are subject to it, or at risk of being subject to it, are often very clear that there is a problem here. There is an asymmetry of perspectives.
Q With respect, Mr Simpson, that is nonsense. If someone is black and they are discriminated against, whether in delivering a service or in a job, you can define that. What we have here—what I am trying to get to—is that you have used this phrase, “chilling effects”, which might get nice headlines, but does not actually define what the issue is. In terms of existing legislation, given that most universities have charters that protect freedom of speech, what is it that is not there at the moment? I have to say, I do not agree at all with the analogy with equality legislation, because it is not the same at all.
Thomas Simpson: There are two problems. One is that existing statutory duties have very weak means of enforcement, so my view is that those gaps should be plugged. Two of the controversies in Cambridge in 2019 were around the dismissal of Noah Carl and its rescinding of the visiting fellowship invitation to Professor Jordan Peterson. Regardless of the merits of either case—I do not know the details of them—the astonishing thing about that was the lack of due process. The university in one case, and the college in the other case, made the decision, and there was nothing that the people involved could do, or very little that they could do: there were not ready legal means. There needs to be legal remedy.
Actually, one of the really surprising things about this discussion is that it is not an argument against taking measures, specifically in the human rights case, to guard against human rights being breached. You do not need to show that there are lots of patterns of human rights being breached.
Q But, with respect, those are covered already by the equality legislation and the Human Rights Act. You do not need another piece of legislation. You said earlier on that you would get a situation where, for example, somebody was not appointed because of their views, and you came up with this issue around right-left academics. My experience is that the reason people are appointed is usually old boys’ networks—and it is usually boys—within universities, not because of their political views, but this legislation is not going to stop someone not being appointed. You are not going to get someone at an interview saying, “I wouldn’t appoint you because I disagree with you on x, y and z and what you have said.” They will find some other reason, so can you explain where the Bill is going to actually do that? I cannot see it. It will not happen.
Thomas Simpson: Exactly the same charges were made against the original passage of anti-discrimination legislation.
Q No, it is different. In those cases, you can actually define it: if, for example, a woman is pregnant and there is evidence that the individual did not get the job or was not promoted because of their sex, their gender or because they were pregnant, for example, you can define that. You can’t in here, and the problem with this Bill is the same problem that we had—with great respect to Policy Exchange—with the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill, which set out to solve a problem that was not there and ended up in a situation where we took rights away from veterans and made things worse.
The issue I have with this is that, with a Conservative Government, shouldn’t we be upholding the freedoms of universities to decide what they want to do within the legal framework that is there, rather than what this is? It is going to put the director in a position whereby they will be able to dictate terms. Now, that might be okay when you have a Conservative Government, but what happens if you have a radical Government of a different persuasion that then starts saying to universities, “You will do x, y and z”? That is why I find it very difficult to understand the reasons why Conservatives are backing this piece of legislation, because interventions on that level are not what it says on the tin of conservatism.
Thomas Simpson: The legislation does define it. It says that one of the objectives is
“securing that, where a person applies”
for a given job,
“the person is not adversely affected in relation to the application because they have exercised their freedom within the law”,
referring to an earlier clause.
Q How do you prove that? You cannot. In future, let’s say you get a Government of a different persuasion who puts a director in there who says, “Right, the new guidance is X, Y and Z. You will not be able to teach certain right-wing views on economics or various things.” The state is intervening in an area that I find remarkable that the Conservatives should be supporting.
Thomas Simpson: The current situation is one in which universities mark their own homework about whether they have complied with the duty.
Q That is not true, because there are boards of universities. There is the advice put out in present legislation—I accept it might need updating, but you do not need legislation to do that. There is an idea that university boards just sit there and nod through things with academics—they do not. They challenge; that is their job. But it is not the job of the state to run universities. That is the thin end of the wedge with this legislation.
Thomas Simpson: What this creates is an ecosystem of accountability, both within the sector and external to it.
Q I am grateful to Emma for drawing attention to my views of the relationship between consciousness and unconsciousness. That is a philosophical debate we could have. I am interested to talk about your views on trust and truth, and whether you think trust is found through synthesis or, as Hegel said, truth was—but let us talk about that on another occasion and in a different place. Dealing with truth and trust, how far has the culture in universities changed? Has this concern about free speech and openness altered in recent years, in your view?
Thomas Simpson: I can give my personal experience. I am cautious about drawing too strong conclusions from that. My personal experience was that as an undergraduate from 1999 to 2002, I felt free to argue a position in my final year dissertation that I knew my markers would reject, but would recognise the quality of the work on its own merits. I had the confidence to do that. The topic was whether God existed, broadly speaking. Cambridge was a very secular faculty at that time; I was examining a recent contribution to that debate.
I had a moment about three years ago where an undergraduate student in a different department from where I work was talking to me about their political philosophy paper. They had written all the ethics of migration, which is a sensitive subject. The philosophical debate is whether countries have the right to control who crosses the borders into their country. The two positions are what is called open and closed borders. The philosophical debate is already right on the edge of the Overton window for public discourse on that topic. It became clear in the conversation that the student’s personal views were in favour of closed borders, so I said, “What did you argue for in the essay?” The student replied, “Oh, I argued for open borders. It would be silly not to do that, because that is where the lecturers were coming from.”
That to me had a sense of tragedy: here was an individual who believes something different and thought they had arguments for that, but felt that the grade they would receive on the exam would be different because of the content of what they argued for. That sense of danger about particular viewpoints is something I have sensed grow within the university over the last five or six years. I think it roughly tracks some of the turmoil we have had in the public space more generally in that time. It is mitigating somewhat now, but the patterns are in place and we need to take steps to counter that.
Q The implication from earlier witnesses, Arif Ahmed, Nigel Biggar and others, is that there is what amounts to a culture of fear. You are setting out the very reason why the Bill is pertinent now there has been a change. Is it that what is acceptable has been redefined, and what is unacceptable is now no longer permissible? It will always be true that there will be differences of opinion, and some people would find certain views agreeable, but is the change that ideas have gone from being disagreeable to, in effect, prohibited?
Thomas Simpson: I have been really inspired by the observation that Scalia and RBG, the two SCOTUS justices, used to go to the opera together. They were ideological opposites and I am sure that they even viewed the other person’s views as reprehensible at times, but there was a collegiality about their ability to do their work together. That collegiality exists in very many places, but it is under pressure, and that is the challenge that we are facing.
Perhaps a way of resolving the difference of view between the right hon. Member for North Durham and the witness is for the witness to cite some of that evidence in writing as a follow up? I would like to know about courses that have been cancelled, stopped or never delivered, speakers who have not been invited or where invitations have been withdrawn, and funding that has not been granted on the basis of all of those things being “unacceptable”. It would be very useful if you could provide some kind of note with that as a follow up, which will hopefully allow us to move on.
It seems to me that what you are describing the difference between mob rule and the rule of law.
You have had your say, thank you very much.
Thomas Simpson: I am very cautious about the language I would use to describe that situation, but I want the rule of law rather than the rule of politics. That is the frank truth.
Q I understand that you have commented elsewhere that you believe that the normative power of changes to the law can shift social values. Do you not recognise that the Bill could have the inverse effect and shift social values towards being less willing to hear a diversity of views, for fear of being sued?
Dr Harris: I am not sure I said that, but it is still a good question. It is hard to see in that situation where the danger of being sued arises. My understanding is that this is likely to make it much easier to secure diversity of opinion in the higher education section, because it will be difficult to punish students who say things that are distasteful to some and it will be difficult to rescind invitations to speaking events, and there will also be this enhanced freedom—the academic freedom—for members of staff. That creates a framework, but no more than a framework. I am trying to answer your question; if I have not, I am sure you will tell me.
Nothing in the Bill will make people value freedom of speech. The law cannot make anyone ethically say that freedom of speech is a good idea. It will not, of itself, create a culture of free speech, which is what we really need, and it will not, of itself, make academics start disagreeing with one another, but it will create the conditions by which that can happen. It will allow those who seek to restrain such diversity—those who believe there should be a degree of uniformity—to now be restrained. It creates the conditions by which those changes can happen, but I very much believe that it is for the autonomous institutions themselves to change those cultures. All the law can do is set the ball rolling and create the framework.
Q Why do we need legislation to do that for those institutions? Most university charters have such points in them. The 1987 Act has it in there as well. Why do you need legislation to do that? Surely it is about upgrading the guidance and so on.
Dr Harris: You are right that—at least following the 1988 Act—many universities have in their statutes clauses protecting academic freedom, and that tends to be in the same wording. In terms of why we need law, again, I think we come back to the question of whether we regard and respect freedom of speech as a fundamental right. I think most people here—and, I hope, most lawmakers in a liberal democracy—would agree that it is a fundamental right and that it is fundamental to the flourishing of the individual and the running of civil society. Universities certainly pay lip service—if I can say that—and when challenged, they will always say, “Freedom of speech is our lifeblood.”
Q It depends how you define it. What the Bill is doing is letting the state determine what freedom of speech is going to be. I accept that everyone agrees what its broad definition should be, but as I said to the last witness, there is a danger here that you will actually have the state, whatever its political persuasion, intervening in academic institutions. Surely that is bad?
Dr Harris: On the definition question, I heard your questions to Professor Simpson. All rights are difficult to define, but that does not mean therefore that we are at a loss. I think the court in Strasbourg, and certainly the US courts, would disagree that freedom of speech is something that is impossible to define. I do not think the idea that we will sort of give up or backslide because it is difficult to define a fundamental right is a serious position. Yes, it is much more difficult to define than pregnancy, which is famously binary—you are either pregnant or you are not—but nevertheless, courts and legislatures are able to define more closely what a right should be.
Q I am sure if we were sat in the Russian Duma, they would argue that they have freedom of speech there. I think we would take a very different view.
Dr Harris: To go back to the point about the intervention by the state, I think it is important that we are clear what we mean by “the state”. There is obviously a role for the OfS—an administrative form of adjudication—and perhaps we can come back to that, as I think it is a very relevant issue. It is entirely in keeping with any right that it is enforced by law and that there is a remedy when there is infringement of that right. That is simply what a right is. There are a number of people who are saying, “I believe in free speech as a right,” and then they baulk when we say that it must be enforced by the courts and there must be a remedy. That suggests to me that they do not take free speech seriously as a right, which as I say, is not a credible position in a liberal democracy.
Q But its definition could be determined by who the Government appoint as director or by the advice that they are given at the time, so that is a highly political situation. It might be comfortable for the present Government who are in control at the moment, but if you had a Government at the other extreme who want to take a very different view, by being able to appoint an individual or make an intervention like that, they could define freedom of speech in a completely different way that you and I would completely disagree with.
Dr Harris: To a degree, I agree, but the director must enforce free speech within the law, and the director will have no power to say what the law is. If the director misdirects him or herself as to what the law says on free speech, it can be challenged in the courts—it would be an error of law.
On the question, I think that, ultimately, what will happen is that there will be definition and enforcement by the courts of those duties and rights created by the Bill. It is correct to say that there is a role for an administrative body, the OfS. That is a trade-off that it is often necessary to make. It is worth while to have a cheap, informal and quick form of adjudication. The idea that every dispute—especially for students—should be taken to court, is simply impractical. Even though there can be drawbacks with administrative adjudication, it is essentially a stopgap so not everything has to go to the courts. Ultimately, the free speech that we are talking about here is defined and enforced by the courts. It is free speech within the law. We should all be happy with the idea that free speech is a right enforced by the courts.
Q You say that this is a real game changer, this piece of legislation. According to the OfS, we have had fewer than five events cancelled in universities in the two years between 2018 and 2020. In your submission, something like less than one incident a month for the last five years has come to you. There is quite a mixture of cases and incidents that have been brought to your attention, including several WhatsApp messages from students on campus and so on. Are you not guilty of a bit of hyperbole to say that this is a real game changer? The universities need to work with the OfS to tighten up processes, adopt best practice and change individual legislation, as we discussed earlier today, as opposed to adopting the Bill.
Dr Harris: Every MP must decide for themselves how happy they are to turn a blind eye to infringement of a fundamental right and how happy you are to pay that political price.
Q And in that sense, it will change the balance of power between academics and university bosses, because there is a sense—and this is about governance as well, isn’t it—that in that kind of process that you have described, academics are often not involved, so they are asked to do things that they have not had a role in helping to shape. Is this not also good in the sense that it only protects academics, but really curbs the power of some of the university chiefs, who sometimes impose these policies top-down? As an addendum to that, every time Kevan speaks about this dystopian future of a militant Government, he waves his hands vaguely in John’s direction. I wanted to defend John.
No, it’s conscious bias—[Laughter.]
Dr Harris: Yes, absolutely. For instance, in the determination of curriculum content, that is something where there absolutely must not be imposition of bureaucratic standards. The example that I cited in the written submission was that of the University of Oxford’s music faculty, which decided to decolonise its curriculum. I should say that that is a legitimate exercise of academic freedom, but it then said, “Members of the faculty must not disparage the curriculum.” Obviously, curriculums are changed by disparaging them—that is how they came to be decolonised in the first place—so we cannot stop the process.
There needs to be, and I think the Bill could include, a right of consultation. It is academic good practice anyway, and it slightly demeans universities that they need to be told that, because it should be part of academic ethics. There is also the right to criticise one’s institution. That is part of the international law standard of academic freedom. It is embedded in a number of university statutes. Whatever happens, the standard adopted by the Bill should be at least what is already best practice in the sector. I do not think it should go beyond that.
Q The Bill is about trying to change cultures in universities. Surely that requires universities to train people about biases that they might have against right-wing or controversial views. Would you not agree that universities would need to implement training sessions and education programmes for their students and staff on those issues of freedom of speech?
Dr Harris: Yes—