Counter-Terrorism: Conflict Zones

George Howarth Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

To take the latter point first, the shadow Home Secretary made that point and I am happy to do that again, as I have on many occasions in the past and as I did at the weekend. The men and women working for our security services do an excellent job for us. It is challenging work that they are doing unseen and unknown and without general praise precisely because they have to be unseen and unknown. They do an excellent job for us. As for the comments made by Cage, I must say to my hon. Friend in this House that there can be no excuse for the barbarism shown by those operating in the name of ISIL. I condemn anybody who attempts to excuse that barbarism away in the way that has been done by Cage.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

May I ask the Home Secretary not to set her face completely against the potential the control orders might still offer? Will she give further thought to helping families to be more resilient, particularly when young members are susceptible to violent extremism? Will she give more support and encouragement to projects such as the JAN Trust, which are very helpful to people in that situation and certainly need to be encouraged?

[Mrs May]

The comment that has consistently been made about control orders concerns the power of relocation, but as the shadow Home Secretary said yesterday, TPIMs are effectively the same as control orders if we bring the relocation powers back, which we have done. The right hon. Gentleman is right that many good groups up and down the country are providing support for families. I launched a project by Families Against Stress and Trauma—FAST—last summer, which works with those families whose sons and daughters might have tried or might want to travel to Syria. I also commend the work of Inspire and Sara Khan, standing up with Muslim women throughout the UK against the radicalisation of young people.

Terrorist Attacks (Paris)

George Howarth Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for pointing out that a significant number of people who are in positions where they are aware of the impact of communications data have made the necessity of communications data well known and public. As I indicated earlier, I hope that everybody in the House understands and appreciates the importance of ensuring that, as far as is possible, there are no safe spaces for terrorists to communicate.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

The Home Secretary will be aware that in the cases of the London bombings, the brutal murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby and, according to early reports, what happened in Paris last week, those involved were on the periphery of investigations that had already been undertaken. Will she give a commitment that she will have urgent talks with the Security Service and the leadership of counter-terrorism police about how we can get smarter in reviewing the previous investigations and cases in which those individuals and networks, who clearly pose a threat, have appeared on the periphery?

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Pete Wishart]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Unfortunately I missed the beginning of this debate on temporary exclusion orders. I apologise to the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), because I wanted to welcome the Labour party out of the anti-civil liberties wilderness. These are actually worthy amendments. I do not think I have congratulated the Labour party on any measure it has taken on civil liberties and security in the course of the past 15 years. This is the Labour party of 90 days’ detention, of ID cards, of control orders, of national databases—

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

I have listened with great interest to the hon. Gentleman’s contributions throughout the passage of this Bill. While he is on the subject of the Labour party, will he tell us whether he is likely to support the amendments tabled in the names of my right hon. Friend the Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) and others?

[Pete Wishart]

That is what I am doing. I am congratulating the Labour party. This evening, for probably the first time in 15 years, I will be rushing through the Lobby to support the Labour party. Come on board! Re-establish the Labour party with its civil liberties—

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the Home Secretary, and I accept that she is technically correct, but I am describing a situation in which, because a person has not been able to follow the process that she described, they cannot find a way back and feel as though they were in exile.

If the primary purpose of counter-terrorism policy is to make us safer, it is surely sensible to ensure that individuals who definitely pose a threat are somewhere where it is easier to keep an eye on them, investigate them, arrest them, charge them and prosecute them, should the evidence warrant it. Surely we want suspected terrorists close at hand so that we can take targeted action against them rather than allow them to roam who knows where doing who knows what. As the old adage goes, “Keep your friends close and your enemies even closer”. Moreover, if someone is intent on carrying out a terrorist attack on British soil, does the Home Secretary really believe that having to apply for a permit and attend an interview will act as any kind of deterrent or obstacle?

The Government’s scheme does have one element to recommend it, which is the steps taken to ensure that agencies and the police know of an individual’s location should they need to place him or her under surveillance. That comes from the stipulation that someone return on a specific flight to a specific airport. However, I argue that the same outcomes could be secured by placing a simple notification requirement on carriers, as set out in new clauses 4 to 6. Crucially, as the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras described, that approach would not automatically alert a terror suspect to the fact that they had come to the notice of the authorities and that their return was being monitored. I argue that it would instead facilitate a targeted and intelligence-led response, and that the ability to undertake close surveillance of suspects would be maximised, with a view to arrest and prosecution. The option under existing counter-terrorism powers of interviewing a suspect on their arrival back in the UK would also be retained, and there would be further options as appropriate.

I have some concerns about the human rights aspects of the proposals on TEOs, but I also believe that they could end up being counter-productive from a security perspective. They will not provide the robust level of security that people in Britain have a right to expect.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), my right hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson), the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and now the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) have all argued, from slightly different standpoints, that the ideal situation is to have some sort of judicial process. I do not think anybody could argue against that from a democratic and human rights perspective. In cases in which there is the possibility of a prosecution or other judicial process to bring about the type of outcome that we desire, that is clearly the preferred option.

As I see it, the choice is between the measures in the Bill—temporary exclusion orders with a managed return—or a form of judicial process that might be even worse than that. Perhaps the Home Secretary will correct me if I am wrong, but in almost every case I can envisage that would be affected by this process, the information that will determine the trigger of a temporary exclusion order would be based on intelligence—she is not shaking her head in disagreement, so I will assume assent on that point. If that is the case, any form of judicial process to verify or authorise that process would inevitably involve wholly or partly closed proceedings. It would be impossible to give evidence from intelligence in open court for all the reasons that we have repeatedly debated. Although that is the ideal situation, given the presumption that in most, if not all, of these cases the evidence will be intelligence based, it will be difficult to rely solely on a court proceeding, no matter how it was constructed or held, other than on the basis that it would be either closed, or at very least semi-closed.

[Mr David Davis]

The right hon. Gentleman is a thoughtful and long-standing expert in this area, and he is right to say that it will be a Special Immigration Appeals Commission style process. In the past, however, SIAC-style processes with control orders and TPIMs have prevented quite egregious errors—he will remember the case of MI5 presenting the same passport two weeks running against two different suspects, and that being caught and stopped by the SIAC. My concern is not just about the increase in power; it is also the error rate and the fact that someone can be denied serious rights without a proper review. The right hon. Gentleman is right that a SIAC-style process would be necessary. He knows I am not fond of that, but it is better than nothing.

[Mr Howarth]

I think I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but none of that changes the fact that, regardless of the quality of the submission to the SIAC court, some intelligence material would be required. Even from a justice point of view that is not an ideal situation, and that is a problem.

[Julian Smith]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that as well as the intelligence issue, the British people want the state to act in a nimble and dynamic way, as long as measures are proportionate, against one of the biggest threats to our security in decades? I suspect he acknowledges that broader point given his role on the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Mr Howarth]

I was coming on to talk about the sorts of cases that we might be confronted with. If my remarks answer the hon. Gentleman’s point, so be it. If not, I am sure he will intervene again.

Temporary exclusion orders and the managed return process, as the Home Secretary described it, is seen as the alternative to a judicial process that for various practical reasons would either be not very just, or at least closed or partly closed. It would therefore be impractical and difficult to judge whether proceedings were fair or otherwise for anyone who was not involved, and even for some of those who were. In principle the provisions in clause 2(1) are probably acceptable, but I have a couple of issues—this goes directly to the point made by the hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith)—about how they will work in practice. Perhaps one way of looking at it would be to give examples of the kinds of cases that we are likely to see with people returning from Syria or Iraq. For convenience, I have bracketed them under three headings. They are not mutually exclusive and it is possible that in some cases all three will apply, and in others just one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Howarth]

I think I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention, although I rather suspect it was aimed more at the Home Secretary than at me. Some fighters out there are involved in ISIS or another group and they went out to fight for a completely different cause from the one they have ended up fighting for. It is literally that complicated.

On the disillusionment front, we will talk about the Prevent strategy tomorrow. I suspect there are some means by which Prevent, or a revised form of Prevent, would be appropriate for those who have come back disillusioned and want to reintegrate back into society.

I am sure nobody will disagree that the most difficult group are those who were radicalised in the UK, adopted a particular kind of Salafist view and went out specifically in pursuit of jihad. They think still that they are out there creating a caliphate, which is the whole meaning behind what ISIS are doing. Some will return not because they have stopped believing in that particular ideology, but because they want to resume their activities in the UK. That is the most difficult group.

To conclude, I would be grateful if the Home Secretary answered a couple of questions. I realise it is difficult in an open forum such as this, but will she indicate what assessment will be carried out of the individuals concerned to determine which of those three categories—it might be all three—they fit into? Will the conditions applied to a managed return relate to that assessment? If she could say a bit more about that, it might give people greater confidence that the process she is proposing is preferable to a judicial process that, because it is based on intelligence, might at worst be completely closed and at best partly closed.

[John McDonnell]

I seek some clarity on clause 9 on pages 5 and 6.

We know of two young men who have left my constituency to fight—we believe—in Syria, and we worked with one of the families, with the assistance of the Government, to enable them to go to Turkey to try and convince the young man to return. When I read his letters to his parents, I found them to be extremely sincere. He thought he was going to Syria to fight against the Assad regime—he called it “jihad”—to protect people being bombarded by the regime and to prevent what he considered to be war crimes. I also found him sincere in his hope that his parents would not be distressed. It was a rather sad leaving letter. At one point, he explained to his parents that there was still a few bob left on his Oyster card for them to use. It was a short, extremely moving letter from a young man in his late teens, early 20s, explaining his intentions. I believe that many young men, and possibly women, have gone out with what they and others would consider to be the best of intentions: to engage in a military action to protect people from the abuse of human rights by a dictatorial regime that, as we now know, was using gas and other weapons against its own people.

I am trying to find a mechanism to encourage people to come back and be reintegrated into our society because I think that a lot of people who went out realise they made a mistake; they might have thought their intentions virtuous in the first instance, but I think many of them would now acknowledge that they made a mistake and it has gone wrong. Clause 9, however, introduces significant offences. It states:

“An individual subject to a temporary exclusion order is guilty of an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the individual returns to the United Kingdom in contravention of the restriction on return specified in the order.”

It would be extremely helpful if the Home Secretary gave us greater clarity, either now or later, about what a reasonable excuse would be. I would not want practicalities—for example, a person not knowing they had an exclusion order against them—to be an issue. Clause 9(4) states:

“In a case where a relevant notice has not actually been given to an individual, the fact that the relevant notice is deemed to have been given to the individual under regulations under section 10 does not…prevent the individual from showing that lack of knowledge of the temporary exclusion order, or of the obligation imposed under section 8, was a reasonable excuse for the purposes of this section.”

We need to be clear about what a reasonable excuse would be in this instance.

Many of these individuals already led chaotic lives, but they are now in a zone of operations that in itself is chaotic, and I think that many will want to return. However, the fact that there is uncertainty about what would be a reasonable excuse for returning—of getting on that plane and coming back—and the risk of up to five years in prison or a summary conviction of up to 12 months could act as a disincentive.

I think we should be easing the path as best we can to as many as possible of those who want to come back to be de-radicalised or rehabilitated. In some instances, unless we are absolutely clear about the nature of these offences and, in particular, about what would be construed as a reasonable excuse for return when the person does not know whether a temporary exclusion order is in place, it could provide a disincentive to carrying out the purpose that the Government, the Opposition and others want to happen—the process of managed return.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr George Howarth]

My hon. Friend has already answered the question that I was going to ask, but I will make my point anyway. I am sure he agrees that there is no comparison between the barbaric acts that are being committed by members of ISIS and what was done by the freedom fighters in South Africa.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Of course that is true. I have no truck with those who commit those barbaric acts, and nor does any other Member.

Our job is to scrutinise legislation, and that is exactly what we are doing tonight. We can vote to change some of the amendments tonight, or we can return to the issues on Report. However, I hope the Home Secretary understands that a great many of us are deeply concerned about the principle of dealing with British nationals in this way, as we would be in relation to any other country. We are concerned about the long-term consequences: about what such treatment does to those people, and about the increased radicalisation of others. My hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) talked about that.

I have encountered young people who have been attracted to what ISIS is doing. They say that what the west did in Iraq and Afghanistan was appalling, and was questionably legal in the case of Afghanistan and definitely illegal in the case of Iraq. We are living with the consequences of the war on terror of 2001, and if we continue to try to create legal obstacles and make value judgments about people without considering the overall policy we are following, we will return to legislation such as this again and again, year after year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs May]

This has been a constructive and well-informed debate. Some Members have raised practical questions and others have raised questions of principle, but it was the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson) who brought home to us why we must look at the issue of our terrorism legislation when he explained that his own constituency had been affected by not the theory but the actuality of terrorism, and that people had lost their lives as a result. So this is not an academic discussion; we are talking about a real threat to this country, and we need to do everything we can to combat that.

The hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) talked about the balance between civil liberties and national security. I have always taken the view that without our security we cannot enjoy our civil liberties, but I would simply point out that this Government reviewed counter-terrorism legislation when we came in and took a number of steps such as reducing the period of pre-charge detention from 28 to 14 days, so we have been very conscious throughout of the need always to be aware of the freedoms we hold dear and the desire to ensure we can maintain them.

I am grateful for the constructive tone adopted by most of those who spoke in the debate. There will of course be discussion of the details and consideration of how best to achieve our desired objective, but many of those who spoke recognised the legitimate aim of what the Government are doing. It is perfectly legitimate to try to ensure we can manage the return to this country of those who may pose a threat to the people of the UK.

The right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) talked about the complexity of the situation we are dealing with, particularly in relation to Syria and Iraq. People going out there, sometimes with the best of intentions, may find themselves being radicalised. People may go out to fight or work with one particular group but get caught up in fighting with other, more extreme terrorist organisations. So it is a very complex picture; I understand that.

The right hon. Gentleman raised the question of whether people would be looked at in categories, and described a number of categories. As I have said, individuals will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Whether they meet the criteria set out in the Bill will be considered, and that will include looking at them in much the way he described, and putting in place the appropriate measures in relation to particular individuals. Of course, such considerations will be made in consultation with operational partners, notably the security services and the police, but that this will be done on a case-by-case basis is a very important element that people should remember.

[Mr George Howarth]

My point in illustrating those categories is that the hope is that the conditions attached to the return would point individuals in the direction of prevention or some form of surveillance, as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) accepted might be necessary. I was interested in those two things coming together.

[Mrs May]

I understand the point the right hon. Gentleman was making, and the intention is indeed that that will be done on a case-by-case basis—both the question whether there should be a TEO, and how that individual would be managed on their return to the United Kingdom. For some, it would be appropriate to look at further action when they return to the UK—for example, it could be right to put someone on a TPIM—or it might be appropriate for them to be put in the direction of some form of programme that helps to de-radicalise them. The right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras raised the issue of potential prosecution, too, and it may be that there is evidence and it is appropriate to prosecute somebody when they return. So we are talking about this being done on a case-by-case basis. I know that is a well-used phrase, but that is genuinely intended to operate in this instance.

I hope that answers the point the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) made in referring to her two constituents who had died in Syria. Of course we think of the father she quoted, who has seen his sons die in those circumstances. Again, I assure her that we would decide whether to impose a TEO on a case-by-case basis. As I have said, people will go out to Syria for a whole variety of reasons, some of them believing they are going for humanitarian purposes.

The Government have given a clear message to everyone: if you are thinking of going out to Syria for humanitarian purposes, don’t go. There are better ways of helping the people of Syria than going out there and potentially getting caught up in the fighting and losing your life.

I welcome the constructive approach adopted by the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), who led for the official Opposition, and by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). I want to respond to some of the points that they and others have raised. A number of Members spoke as though the Opposition’s notification and managed return proposals were an alternative to the Government’s proposals, but I think the right hon. Member for Delyn made it clear that they were in addition to our proposals. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) asked what would constitute a reasonable excuse. In fact, that would ultimately be for the courts to decide. A reasonable excuse could involve circumstances in which an individual had inadvertently breached the terms of their permit to return to the UK for practical reasons—for example, when their plane had been diverted.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Pete Wishart]

I see by his response that he is not. I hope the amendments are rejected and that in future we do something that will make our country safe without having to resort to measures such as TPIMs.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

I wish to take slight issue with the hon. Members for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). The hon. Gentleman’s speech seemed to play to a particular event that will take place over the next few months in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, and it was more about distancing the Scottish National party from the position taken by Labour. That is fair enough; he is entitled to do that but he seemed to be putting rather more heat than light into the debate. To be slightly more serious—as I am sure he intended to be—the problem with the approach taken by him and the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion is that they describe a black and white world where either we have the evidence, in which case we go through the court system, prosecute someone and if that is successful they receive an appropriate sentence, or else there is not enough evidence to bring forward a court case so someone is not controlled at all. The difficulty is that the world is not black and white in that way.

Suppose one of our intelligence agencies has information from a liaison partner—the United States, for example—about somebody’s connections, or plans that they may be involved in with a third party elsewhere in the world to commit an act of terrorism in this country. There is a problem with taking such a case through the courts because the information it is based on is governed by the control principle—namely that that information is the property of the other agency, which in this case is in the United States. To allow that information to appear in a court case as evidence would undermine the relationship between the UK and that liaison partner.

[Caroline Lucas]

rose—

[Mr Howarth]

There is an argument against that, which I suspect the hon. Lady is about to make, but an inescapable choice has to be made.

[Caroline Lucas]

No one is suggesting that the issue is black and white. There are shades of grey and balances of judgment, but the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and I are saying that with TPIMs and control orders, that balance of judgment is wrong. If we look at things such as intercept evidence, we can see that there will be other ways of bringing evidence to bear to help us reach a solution, rather than the draconian and counterproductive measures suggested by those on both Front Benches.

[Mr Howarth]

I am interested in the hon. Lady’s intervention. Later in the proceedings we will discuss intercept evidence, although I suspect that she will take an entirely different view on that from me, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) and the Minister. I hope to comment on the limitations of intercept evidence because it is not always feasible to rely wholly on evidence that in some cases may not exist. Some people may operate in a world where they are not connected online, and do not make telephone calls or give any indication of their intentions. The obvious example is Roshonara Choudhry who was convicted and is now serving a prison sentence for trying to kill a Member of this House. It would have been impossible to find out through intercept evidence what she was intending to do, so there is not always the possibility of relying on that entirely.

My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North asked the Minister a series of questions and I hope he will respond positively. For some people the court system is not appropriate although they are known to be a threat for various reasons, and there must be some way of dealing with that.

[James Brokenshire]

The contribution by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, encapsulates some of the challenges and difficulties surrounding the principles of this debate. It is notable that contributions over the past hour have been about some of the principal issues concerning the types of measures that should be available to deal with the threat of terrorism, as well as—obviously and rightly—more detailed examination of the Bill.

We have had this debate on previous occasions, and I respect the view of the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), whose approach has been entirely consistent. In some cases, however, there will be an inability either to prosecute or deport an individual, yet a significant risk will be attached to them—the point made by the right hon. Member for Knowsley. The Government have a responsibility to deal with that risk.

My strong preference would be for prosecutions—absolutely, there are no two ways about it—but that is not always possible for a range of reasons. That is the challenge the Government face in terms of seeing the threat and the risk, and being able to assure national security, as the public and the House would expect. Therefore, reluctantly, a measure is required, and we judge that TPIMs are the appropriate way to meet that risk and challenge. I would prefer that that were not the case—in that I agree with the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion and for Perth and North Perthshire—but from the intelligence picture that I have seen and the advice I have been given, sadly and regrettably I believe that TPIMs are necessary to be able to guard national security in that way.

Since April 2010 more than 750 people have been arrested for terrorism-related offences. More than 210 have been charged and more than 140 successfully prosecuted. I say to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) that the introduction of TPIMs was part of a careful and considered counter-terrorism review. She will recall the debates. Consideration was not rushed, but made on the basis of careful analysis of all counter-terrorism legislation to examine the risk and the threat, and what was appropriate and proportionate. That led to a number of changes under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the point that the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire was underlining. An assessment was made of which powers were no longer necessary because they no longer added to the protection of the public. That is why we made a number of changes and I was proud to be the Minister leading that Bill through the House. It was part of the process of constantly evaluating and assessing the measures in place in order to consider what is proportionate, appropriate and necessary to guard our national security. In our judgment it is appropriate to make further changes, which is why we seek to bring these measures before the Committee today.

TPIMs have always been part of a package of legislative measures and investment provided to the police and security services to undertake further investigations. That investment will have led to other prosecutions. People who not have gone on to a TPIM have been brought before the courts as a consequence of that investment in capabilities. That is a positive result and something I think right hon. and hon. Members wish to see.

The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 provides a powerful range of measures to manage the threat from terrorists who cannot be prosecuted or deported. TPIM notices are imposed only in cases that require stringent measures, but where they are used, they provide a valuable capability. The Government are committed to ensuring that the appropriate tools are available to our security services and the police for the protection of national security. That is why clause 12 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to compel a TPIM subject to reside anywhere in the UK, subject to the restrictions we have talked about in the debate thus far. It is important to recognise the benefits that accrue and that there are safeguards in place. The Secretary of State has to make an assessment to determine whether a TPIM should be granted, why we judge it is human rights compliant and how that view has been upheld by the courts.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr George Howarth]

I wish to begin by providing some context. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s report in February 2013 referred to the Home Office’s assessment that there was a

“25% shortfall in the communications data that public authorities would wish to access and what they are currently able to access.”

That is, of course, an estimate, as it is not possible to be precise about what is unknowable, but the existence of a shortfall is a legitimate cause for concern. The report goes on to suggest that

“left unchecked, this gap will increase.”

Perhaps the Minister will be able to say whether it has increased and, if so, whether by an appreciable amount. It would be interesting to know that, and I suspect it has increased.

It is worth spending a little more time examining what we know about both the scale and the sources of interceptions that take place. In his annual report for 2013, the interception of communications commissioner, Sir Anthony May, noted that the total number of authorisations for interception of communications data under part 1 of RIPA stood at 514,608, down from 570,135 in 2012. He pointed out that these figures do not represent sole individuals, because

“public authorities often make multiple requests for communications data in the course of a single investigation but also make multiple requests for communications data in relation to the same individual.”

The figures give some indication of the scale of this, rather than the number of individuals who are covered. Under the same process, Sir Anthony notes that 87.7% of authorisations were at the request of the police and law enforcement agencies, 11.5% were from the intelligence agencies, and the rest were from local and other public bodies.

Worldwide, the scale of online communications is daunting. About 3 billion people have access to the internet, and during the time I have been speaking more than 200 million e-mails will have been sent, 2 million Google searches will have been made and there will have been 6 million Facebook views. So why is it considered important that the police, intelligence agencies and other bodies have access to some of the data records of these online communications? Overwhelmingly, internet traffic is benign; it is people using the various platforms for perfectly legitimate and legal purposes. However, a small proportion—I estimate it to be no more than a tiny fraction of 1%—is used for illegal purposes, and my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) referred to some other purposes that are cause for concern.

My hon. Friend’s new clause 2 would, if agreed, require the Home Secretary to review the time taken by communications service providers to disclose information linking an individual to an internet protocol address. That is important for two reasons. The first is that, as we tragically discovered with Fusilier Lee Rigby’s murder, CSPs will, on occasion, receive information that in some cases could crucially be the catalyst for a warrant to enable greater surveillance measures on an individual to take place. In turn that can, in some cases, prevent a terrorist attack.

IP addresses are the key to unlocking who is contacting whom, and that can be critical. But they are not straightforward. Typically, a communications service provider with, say, 10 million to 15 million customers would have allocated to it 100,000 IP addresses. For the larger commercial bodies or public bodies, a series of static IP addresses will be allocated. But for the vast majority of users, IP addresses are dynamic. In practice, a range of numbers is allocated randomly to customers, which is why the former head of GCHQ used the analogy of finding a needle in a haystack.

Secondly, the range of platforms is constantly changing, with new ones entering the market all the time. A good example of that is WhatsApp, which was recently acquired by Facebook for $22 billion. On 1 April, that platform, which is adaptable and easy to use, handled, over a 24-hour period, 64 billion messages, 20 billion of which were sent and 44 billion of which were received. In such a dynamic sphere of activity, it is vital that procedures are in place and properly monitored to ensure that, when the security and intelligence services need to locate a needle in a haystack, the haystack is still in place, and that is what this section of the Bill seeks to ensure. It means that urgent inquiries of either a historical or planned terrorist or criminal activity can be located.

[Julian Smith]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a powerful case for us to go further. What would he do now? He has made it clear that there are many technologies that need much more scrutiny and oversight. What would he do if he were in charge?

[Mr Howarth]

Had the hon. Gentleman waited a while longer, I was about to say what more could be done. It is right that we have a statutory provision, and, subject to the concerns that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North highlighted being satisfied, the provisions contained in the Bill are appropriate. However, there is a problem that we cannot resolve within the context of our own domestic legislation. Many of the communications service providers are not based in the UK; they are based mostly in the United States. Increasingly, the Republic of Ireland is seen as a location of choice for some companies. Google and perhaps one other CSP have already relocated there. It is increasingly clear that whatever legislation we put in place, it will not, of itself, be enough to resolve the problem.

[Mark Field]

Does the right hon. Gentleman also accept that the increased knowledge of the general public and—dare I say it—of individuals who would do us harm about the techniques adopted by the security services and others have also helped to ensure that there is now much more sophisticated encryption in place, which also plays an important part in further reducing our capacity to know precisely what is happening on the internet?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Howarth]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right and he, like me, is a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. We have good reason to believe that there are any number of encryption packages that can be bought quite openly on the internet. It is a matter not just of the communications service providers encrypting communications that take place but of individuals buying packages that enable them to do that themselves, which makes the situation even more difficult.

What more can we do? It is no use pretending that this problem is unique to the UK; it is a very difficult international problem. I know that the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and others are in constant dialogue with their opposite numbers in the United States, but there needs to be a growing understanding between ourselves and the places where CSPs are located that there cannot be this ungoverned space within which criminal activity can take place unchecked on the basis that it is in another jurisdiction from where it is being perpetrated. That issue can only be properly resolved by states, either bilaterally or multilaterally, agreeing protocols and ways of dealing with these issues. Obviously, it is much more easy to do that with friendly states—states with which we share common values—than it is in some other areas where internet providers might decide to locate because there will not be many controls on them. Clearly, that is another matter that needs to be seriously avoided.

We need to have order in this ungoverned space. I am talking about legal compliance and there not being this free space in which crime, terrorism and other activities can illegally take place. It is also important that the CSPs take a more responsible view of what they are being used for. Like the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field), I have seen some CSPs washing their hands of such responsibilities, saying, “That is a matter of jurisdiction. We are not in that jurisdiction so we will comply with the laws where we are.” That might be good for their reputations with their customers, but it is a fairly cynical way of operating. I hope that, through the intervention of our own Government and Governments elsewhere, CSPs can be brought to the view that they should behave responsibly and in such a way that upholds the law right across the world—except in cases where the rule of law does not operate.

[Mark Field]

Is the right hon. Gentleman happy for me to put it on the record that it is also the case that many CSPs do a very good job of co-operating with the police and law enforcement agencies? Part of the difficulty has been that the revelations of the past 14 or 15 months have exposed what some would call an over-cosy relationship between those service providers and the state. I am talking about not so much here in the UK, but in mainland Europe and the United States of America, and it has been commercially damaging to many of those providers.

[Mr Howarth]

As always, the hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Sometimes the difficulty is that the amount of data and communications that providers store means that they are unable to know what is there. Very often, controls are triggered electronically, and so human eyes might not necessarily see the communication that relates to a terrorist plot, organised crime or even, in a hidden corner of it all, some kind of child abuse. Quite often, no human eyes see it, and it may be that only after an event—as in the case of Fusilier Lee Rigby—do people become aware that there was a communication that indicated that someone was about to or was likely to do something, and that knowing about it could have made a difference, as we concluded in our report the other week. Perhaps I have presented too cynical a picture of communications service providers. I know that, on occasion, they do co-operate constructively, but I believe that increasingly we need the space in which they operate to be better regulated, and that requires international controls agreed between responsible allies and CSPs themselves.

--- Later in debate ---

[John McDonnell]

indicated dissent.

[Mr Howarth]

I look forward to hearing what my hon. Friend has to say. I acknowledge that he and his supporters have a valid point to make. I just think it is a tricky area in which to legislate and there might be a better way of doing it that we have not thought of yet.

[John McDonnell]

Everyone else who has spoken so far seems to have explained my amendments, and I am grateful to them. I tabled new clause 1 and amendment 11 because there is now a sense of urgency about dealing with this matter. I speak as the secretary of the National Union of Journalists group in Parliament—a group of MPs drawn from various political parties in the House. Throughout proceedings on RIPA and DRIPA and now this Bill, we have been discussing this issue. To put it simply, this House has always recognised in legislation the need to protect journalists, because we see journalism as one of the bulwarks of democracy in this country. Although we may not be enamoured of journalists or individual newspapers at times, we believe they play a vital democratic role in exposing what happens, particularly in regard to the behaviour of public authorities, Governments, corporations and others. That is why over the years we have written into legislation protection for journalists, as well as for other professions where there are issues of confidentiality, and the House has accepted that in all the debates so far.

--- Later in debate ---

The hon. Lady will be well aware of the review that David Anderson is conducting, which is due to report next May. She will also know that, as per the discussions we had on DRIPA, the Bill is time-limited to December 2016. Indeed, she will note that the provisions in clause 17 are time-limited to December 2016, for the very reason that the House will need to return to these matters in the next Parliament. I think that is right and proper, so that the issue can be considered in the round and in the light of the different reports, including the ISC report, David Anderson’s report and the Home Affairs Committee’s report, which was published in the past few days, in order to inform a measured, proper debate in the next Parliament on these issues, recognising the speed at which DRIPA was brought before the House and, equally, to ensure that the legislation remains in the right place.

[Mr George Howarth]

I have a suggestion. Where a situation is changing rapidly, such issues are sometimes dealt with in legislation by adding a schedule that can then be updated by order. It is not necessarily the best way, but it is one way of dealing with that type of situation.

[James Brokenshire]

I recognise that in certain circumstances that might be appropriate, but the challenge in this case is the fast-paced nature of technology, which means we would always be playing catch-up. The original RIPA legislation was therefore intended to be technology-neutral so that, if the technology moved on, it was still able to capture that, just as our criminal law is intended to cover all forms of communications. I think that might be a better way of seeking to achieve that. However, that is part and parcel of David Anderson’s review of RIPA, and therefore the existing legislation and a number of the themes that have been touched on by right hon. and hon. Members in this debate, and also the continuing utility of these provisions.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

Before coming on to specific provisions in the Bill, I want to say a few words on the context. Taken together, the provisions need to be subjected to a number of tests, some of which have already been debated, to see whether they are a coherent and effective way of tackling the problems we have already experienced with home-grown terrorism, and the problems of fighters in Syria and Iraq coming home, which has already started to happen.

The first and most important test, which has been discussed but needs to be reiterated, is whether proposed restrictive or intrusive measures strike the right balance between personal liberty and the right to privacy, and the degree of monitoring and restrictions placed on those who are considered to be posing a threat.

The second test is in some ways more problematic. It relates to the practical and legal framework in which any of the measures must operate to be effective in practice. The exchange between the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) brought out perfectly how legal principles and practical considerations sometimes do not quite work out in the way set out in a Bill.

My final introductory point is not so much a test, but, rather, relates to having a better understanding of the paths to radicalisation, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) talked about. If we ignore those paths and do not understand them, there will always be a danger that proposed measures will be ill-suited to the problem we are trying to challenge.

Before saying a few words on the process of radicalisation in the UK, I want to thank, like my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King’s college London, and in particular its director Peter Neumann. Its work has shaped my own thinking on this subject.

Researchers who have studied the phenomenon of radicalisation have identified certain key ingredients. These include “root causes” or “grievances”, including poverty, political marginalisation and exposure to a specific ideology—we have talked about how violent jihadism seems to offer an answer, or at least an explanation, for that sense of grievance—and what my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East called “peer group pressure” and what social scientists call “social and group dynamics”. However, this area is problematic, because there are different types of group and different types of individual; some act alone, operate differently and are influenced by different means.

I shall give two examples. First, Mohammad Sidique Khan, the leader of the London bombers, whom my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles mentioned, became disillusioned with his family and the local mosque over the teaching on arranged marriages. He wanted to make other life choices, as is modern and understandable in a young person, but the initial rejection escalated to the point where he became a violent jihadist and bought completely into the Salafist violent ideology, which was then reinforced by group loyalty. The ISC in its report studied that issue in great detail.

Secondly, by way of contrast, there is the case of Roshonara Choudhry, who tried—thankfully unsuccessfully —to murder my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms). She was a lone wolf, as the media put it, unconnected to any group; her radicalisation took place entirely on the internet. She had a grievance over foreign policy, bolstered by a growing sense of a particular version of Islamic identity, which took on a violent and ideological character. Those are some of the things that researchers have come up with and which we need to take into account.

The hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) talked about counter-narrative in the context of the Prevent strategy and was asked about comparisons with Nazism in Germany and Marxist-Leninism. I understand the point, but there is a difference: the ideology we are talking about is intertwined with a particular view of Islam, which makes it a different kind of belief. Nazism and Marxist-Leninism offer particular world views, but this offers a world view that extends beyond the realms of the world—if he follows my meaning.

We ought to acknowledge that perhaps the state is entirely the wrong organ to propose a counter-narrative. If I were a Muslim in this country, I would resent the state’s telling me what Islam was and what I could believe, as I would were I a member of a Christian faith, a Hindu or any other religious believer. It is not the job of the state to tell people what views to hold. I agree that there is a need for a counter-narrative, but I do not believe it is the role of the state to come up with it—and certainly not to promote it.

Part of the Bill deals with the problem of communications data, and here I think there is one area where a certain part of the private sector could help. I refer to internet providers. Our ISC report last week referred to an unnamed internet provider that had some information about one of the people who killed Fusilier Lee Rigby that was not passed on to the agencies.

A paper that came out earlier today from the Quilliam Foundation made what I think was a sensible suggestion. It said:

“Private sector companies, particularly social media companies and ISPs, can also work to facilitate”

what it calls “counterspeech”,

“in a way that provides deliverables to counter-extremism. These private companies benefit from supporting counterspeech content as a means of countering online extremism since it creates a healthier realm of ideas within their platforms and naturally develops a more hostile environment for individuals wanting to use online platforms for extremist and/or terrorist-related purposes.”

I think that is a good idea, so I hope Ministers and others will think carefully about how those companies can be used if not exactly to promote a counter-narrative, at least to provide space where a counter-narrative can exist, and perhaps in some cases even a side bar where the opposite point of view can be put.

The final issue I want to cover is TPIMs. The ISC, on which I and other right hon. and hon. Members sit, raised its concerns about them in two of our annual reports. In 2012-13, we said:

“The Committee shares the concerns of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation over what happens when individual Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures…come to the end of their two-year limit. The Government must take steps now to ensure that they have sufficient policies in place when TPIMs have reached their limit and cannot be extended.”

In our annual report of 2011-12, we said:

“The Committee is concerned about the potential increase in the overall risk as a result of the introduction of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) regime.”

My late friend, Paul Goggins, who was also a member of our Committee, pursued this issue doggedly both in our Committee and on the Floor of the House. I would like to cite a point he made in June 2011:

“My final point is whether the whole new TPIM system represents the same level of risk as we had with control orders or a greater level of risk. I can only assume that the Home Secretary believes there is an increased risk from the new TPIM system, otherwise why would she be committing a serious level of resource—whatever that level is—to the police and the Security Service to help them deal with the additional work and the additional pressures that will result from the new system?”—[Official Report, 7 June 2011; Vol. 529, c. 88.]

As ever, Paul showed a sensible note of caution in what he said at the time, and in view of what has happened since, he was characteristically prescient in the remarks he made.

I started with a principle or a test, saying that the loss of civil liberties on the one hand always has to be balanced against the gains in national security on the other hand. As we have heard, those judgments still cannot be fully made in respect of large sections of the Bill. I do not oppose its Second Reading and I do not think that there is any move to do so, but a number of questions remain to be asked and a number of tests remain to be passed before everyone can feel comfortable with it, and I hope that those concerns can be laid to rest during its later stages.

Oral Answers to Questions

George Howarth Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mike Penning]

I shall be in my hon. Friend’s constituency in the near future, so rather than him coming to me, I shall come to him.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

When he did not turn up for work on Friday 22 August, my late constituent Mr Joseph McIntosh’s employers alerted Merseyside police, as they were concerned about his well-being. The police called at his home and, finding him to be in need of medical attention, called an ambulance. When no ambulance had turned up after an hour, the police took Mr McIntosh to the local hospital themselves. Sadly, he later passed away. I have raised this matter with the Health Secretary, who accepts that North West Ambulance Service’s response did not meet the required standard. The chief constable of Merseyside police has referred the matter to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. As the Merseyside police and crime commissioner, Jane Kennedy, has said, the only body being held to account for Mr McIntosh’s sad death so far is Merseyside police. Will the Minister make it clear that the police are neither trained nor equipped to act as a substitute for the ambulance service?

[Mike Penning]

The police are no substitute for the ambulance service or for any other emergency service. The Health Secretary has explained exactly what the situation is, and the matter will be looked into. However, I was out on patrol in Holborn in north London recently when someone with a mental health illness was reported to the police. The police could have arrested that gentleman for a public order offence, or taken him to the hospital where he could receive the care that he needed. He went to the hospital with the police.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

Clause 3 (1) states:

“Section 5 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (power to issue necessary and proportionate interception warrants in interests of national security, to prevent or detect serious crime or to safeguard the UK’s economic well-being) is amended as set out in subsection (2).”

Subsection (2) reads:

“(economic well-being of the UK), after ‘purpose’ insert, ‘in circumstances appearing to the Secretary of State to be relevant to the interests of national security’”.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

It might be worth the Home Secretary adding subsection (4) of clause 3, which explicitly links economic well-being to national security.

[Mrs May]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. Indeed, subsections (2) and (4) define economic well-being in terms of the interests of national security.

The ECJ ruling in April was critical of the data retention directive because it said it did not contain the necessary safeguards in relation to retained data. I said that to the House last week and referred to it earlier this afternoon. Of course that ruling did not take into account the different structures, regimes and domestic laws that are in place in individual member states. Our communications data access regime, primarily governed by RIPA, has strict controls and safeguards in place. The data can only be accessed when it is necessary and proportionate for a specific investigation, and access is limited and subject to a strict authorisation regime, which was specifically endorsed by the Joint Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill. Clause 3 provides an important clarification in that it makes it clear that the statutory purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the UK can only occur when it is in the interests of national security. That is already the position, but the Bill puts that position beyond doubt.

Part 2 of the Bill deals with the question of interception. The House will know that interception can only take place when a warrant has been authorised by a Secretary of State, when he or she considers it to be necessary and proportionate and when the information sought cannot reasonably be obtained by other means.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab). I listened to him carefully, and there is a problem with what he said. His starting point was that something needs to be done, but he then listed a whole lot of reasons on why nothing can be done. Although he made a very fluent speech, I do not think that it took us any further, except in saying that he wanted more time to consider the Bill.

I will start by discussing the time we have to develop our arguments and consider the Bill. One factor to be borne in mind is whether there is enough time for this House and for concerned experts and members of the public to get their heads round what is being proposed and to have a say. That is an important question that needs to be answered.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Andrew Miller) reminded me earlier that I was responsible for a piece of legislation called the Disqualifications Act 2000, which you will remember, Madam Deputy Speaker. Although the content of that legislation has no bearing on this Bill, it is comparable because it was a five-clause Bill that went through all its stages in the House in one 26-hour sitting. The quality of the debate as we got into the 23rd, 24th and 25th hours was probably not that good. I am not convinced that we got better legislation after sitting for 26 hours than we would have done had we sat for five or six hours.

In the time left to me, I will cover two clauses of the Bill. The first is clause 3. I will not speak about it for too long, because I tabled an amendment to it, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) and other hon. Friends, that will be debated later. Amendment 1 covers the whole issue of economic well-being. The only thing I want to say at this point is that we at least need to have a debate about the scope of economic well-being. The purpose of amendment 1, which is a probing amendment, is to get the Government to give us some idea of the dimensions of economic well-being. The amendment tries to restrict it to three main areas, but there may well be other areas that should be considered. If there are, we ought to hear about them.

Clause 4 is the extraterritoriality provision. I well understand the need for it and will not speak against it, but I just fear that it might prove to be unworkable. I am looking for reassurance about how it will be carried out in practice. Let us imagine that there was a billing office for Google in Liverpool and that some relatively junior person in the organisation turned out to be the sole representative of Google in the United Kingdom. I am sure that that is not the case, but I am using it as a hypothetical example. My fear is that somebody who is well down the pay grades could, by virtue of being in an office that is owned by a parent company that is registered in Ireland or the United States, be the person on whom the notice is served to enact the warrant. That would be disproportionate. I might have misread clause 4. I will be quite happy if the Minister can ease my mind on the subject, but it does pose a bit of a worry for me.

In conclusion, when we are debating issues such as this, a couple of considerations must be borne in mind. The first is the amount of time that is available, which I have covered. The second is whether the provisions break new ground in policy terms. My reading of the Bill—I have read it carefully several times—is that it brings the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 up to date slightly to address the problem that arose as a result of the European Court of Justice decision. In so far as it breaks no new policy ground, I do not think that there is necessarily a problem with what is proposed. I am quite prepared to support the Bill on Second Reading.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

Clause 2 sets out the meaning of various terms used in clause 1 and includes provisions that underpin and support the application of the powers contained in that clause. In particular, the definition of “relevant communications data” in clause 2 limits the communications data that can be retained to those specified in the existing data retention regulations: the data that are already being retained by service providers in the UK. To be absolutely clear, the Bill does not extend in any way the types of data that we will be asking service providers to retain.

The capability gaps identified and discussed during scrutiny of the draft Communications Data Bill will not be addressed and will continue to grow, impacting on UK law enforcement. As important as that matter is, I am sure that the Committee will agree that fast-track legislation is not the appropriate vehicle for considering addressing such gaps. The Prime Minister has made it clear that it is important that the issue is addressed in the next Parliament.

The clause also provides that the regulations made under clause 1 must be made under the affirmative procedure. We have placed in the Library a draft of the regulations that we intend to make, which will give Parliament the maximum possible opportunity, given the urgency of the matter, to consider the detailed contents of the regime before secondary legislation is taken through.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Grounds for issuing warrants and obtaining data

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 1, page 4, line 19, at end insert—

‘(5) In section 25 (interpretation of Chapter 11), subsection (1), after “in accordance with subsection (2);”, insert— ““economic well-being of the United Kingdom” is defined as the security of critical national infrastructure, the conduct of defence contracts, the development, manufacture and design of UK defence systems, and the stability of the UK currency, banking and financial systems.”

[The Temporary Chair (Sir Roger Gale)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part; there will be no further debate on clause stand part.

[Mr Howarth]

It was said on Second Reading, but it bears repeating that clause 3 does move things on slightly on the question of economic well-being. We keep saying that the Bill is based on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, but explicitly relating economic well-being to national security is progress, because the relationship was previously implicit. I accept that clause 3, even as it stands, is progress from where we stood previously.

I constructed this amendment, which is intended as a probing amendment, because I thought it was as well to have a debate about the range and scope of the term “economic well-being”. I wanted to try to work out the range of concerns that should be taken into account when it comes to that concept. In the amendment, I have effectively highlighted three areas that I think are of concern and that ought at least to be taken into account in this context. The first is critical national infrastructure, and I shall say a little more about that in a moment. The second is the conduct of defence contracts and the development, manufacture and design of UK defence systems. The third is the stability of the UK currency, banking and financial systems.

On the question of critical national infrastructure, an organisation that has some responsibility in this regard is the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, which provides protective security advice aimed at reducing the vulnerability of critical national infrastructure to national security threats. It categorises national infrastructure into nine sectors: communications, emergency services, energy, financial services, food, government, health, transport and water. Not everything in that list is considered critical in nature, so the CPNI contends that within those nine sectors

“there are certain ‘critical’ elements of infrastructure, the loss or compromise of which would have a major detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life.”

It draws attention to broad descriptions of the types of infrastructure that would be categorised at different levels. That infrastructure can be physical, which means sites, installations or pieces of equipment, or it can be logistical, which includes information networks or systems. It is important that economic well-being takes into account critical national infrastructure, because it directly relates to the continuation of daily life that electricity, water and all the things that go with them should be available.

I do not propose to speak for long about defence, but I am aware, as I am sure others listening to the debate will be, that there have been attempts in the past by hostile nation states or individuals to compromise defence systems. There have been attempts to break into companies’ design systems and so on. Without proper controls to deal with that, there could be serious consequences for our national security. It is therefore self-evident that we should take into account defence systems and their design, manufacture and so on when we consider this matter.

The amendment also refers to

“the stability of the UK currency, banking and financial systems.”

It is interesting to look at what the Serious Organised Crime Agency has to say. It concludes by talking about cybercrime and the effects that it can have. It says:

“Financial crime can jeopardise the integrity of our financial markets and institutions.”

That is not just a question of protecting individual firms or interests. It really is related to our national security. It is interesting that the International Monetary Fund has said that

“Money laundering, terrorist financing and the related…crimes can undermine the stability of a country’s financial system or its broader economy in a number of ways and may have adverse spillover effects on global instability.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

The right hon. Gentleman serves on the Intelligence and Security Committee, and I used to serve on it. When I did, I was a little concerned that the definition of “economic well-being” was extremely broad and could refer to things that might generally promote Britain’s economic interest, rather than matters related to national security, as the Bill helpfully defines economic well-being, or things that should be dealt with under other categories such as serious crime. There are serious threats, and the right hon. Gentleman is right to identify them. They are what this should be about.

[Mr Howarth]

That intervention was helpful. I said at the outset that the wording of clause 3 took us slightly further. It relates economic well-being explicitly to national security, whereas previously it was related implicitly. The right hon. Gentleman is right to say that that is the conditional element of it all. I do not think that I am drawing the definition too broadly; the interpretation could be even broader. My purpose is to find out what other factors fall under that broad heading of economic well-being. I do not for one minute think that I have included all the considerations in the short amendment that I have put together; it is merely a vehicle to allow us to discuss matters more fully.

It was interesting when we discussed the timetable for the Bill—you may rule this comment out of order, Sir Roger—that everyone said that there would not be enough time to discuss it. As far as I am aware, nobody else is due to speak on my amendment, and I do not think any other speeches are intended on clause 3, so perhaps we do have enough time.

[Mr Tom Watson (West Bromwich East) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Howarth]

I see that I have tempted my hon. Friend into intervening.

[Mr Watson]

Does my right hon. Friend accept that perhaps most of our colleagues have not had time to read his amendment because of the timetable that has been set?

[Mr Howarth]

I am interested to hear my hon. Friend’s concern. I went to the Vote Office at half-past 8 this morning just to make sure that the amendment had been tabled. Anybody who was interested enough would have been able to see it from half-past 8, and it was tabled in accordance with the procedures of the House yesterday evening. I do not want to labour the point, but there was enough time, if anybody was interested enough, to check what amendments had been tabled. I am sure that my hon. Friend, as the author of another amendment that we will discuss later, took the trouble of checking this morning that his had been included as well. We do have a responsibility to check what we are debating.

This is my small attempt to bring further enlightenment to the proceedings, particularly as regards clause 3. I hope that the Minister will be able to allay my fears that the provision may be too widely drawn.

[Mark Field]

I fear that it was wishful thinking on the part of the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) to assume that there would be no other speakers on this matter. As he will know, because we discussed it yesterday as members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I wholeheartedly approve of this amendment.

[Mr Howarth]

The hon. Gentleman’s contribution is very welcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

I have heard several comments that clause 3 does not need to be in fast-track legislation, and it does not relate to an impending emergency, but I would not like to see it removed. It is a good, pro-civil liberties, pro-privacy clause, which just trims down what was always quite a bizarrely broad definition. It restricts the issuing of interception warrants on grounds such as national security—fair enough; serious crime—or the UK’s economic well-being, which is a broad concept, as was being discussed. The wording is taken from article 8(2) of the European convention on human rights, which is why we have that idea, but it could be interpreted broadly. There have been a number of discussions about whether, for example, it would enable lawful intercept to be used to find out what other companies are bidding against British companies. That is something that I think the House would be clear now is simply not acceptable—the Government have a stated policy on that—but it is not excluded by law. I think we would all say that it is simply not appropriate, so I am pleased that we are taking the opportunity of this legislation to trim this down; to try to make sure that it is only economic well-being as it relates to national security.

I appreciate that this is a probing amendment, but I have a number of issues with it. In particular, I am concerned that some of the language around

“the conduct of defence contracts”,

and the

“manufacture and design of UK defence systems”,

sounds worryingly as though it is saying that the House believes that it is okay to have interception to win defence contracts against a foreign bidder, or to make sure that we do well. I hope that that is not what is intended.

[Mr George Howarth]

indicated dissent.

[Dr Huppert]

The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, so that is clear. But I would be very worried about anything that suggested that.

[Mr Howarth]

My concern was not to empower interception for those purposes, but to empower countermeasures in cases where hostile states or hostile individuals sought to break into those systems. I think I did say that. As I said, I do not claim for one moment that it is a perfectly worded amendment, but that was my intention.

[Dr Huppert]

That is helpful. There is general agreement, but it was something that struck me when I read the amendment earlier this morning. I note that there are not many Members in the Chamber. Sadly, the House is often like that, however much time has been given for debate or however much notice.

There is a question as to whether it is helpful to define economic well-being. It may be that it is just too hard. Perhaps scholars of the future will look at this discussion and many others to try to work out what is meant. It should relate to things that would be catastrophic; where the effect of failing to stop something would be equivalent to a national security problem or a serious crime. It is that sort of level.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

I do not know the answer to the hon. Lady’s question. That would seem inappropriate if it was about a trade union problem. If it was about ensuring that there was not a catastrophic failure of national infrastructure, there might be some grounds, but I would be alarmed if it was used for what were clearly political arguments. From my perspective, the miners’ strike would seem to be an inappropriate use of anything like this. I do not think we should ever see anything like that.

[Mr Howarth]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me the opportunity to reassure my hon. Friend the Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) that it was certainly never my intention that it should be used for the purposes she described. I believe strongly in free trade unions and can think of no circumstances in which the state should intervene in that way.

[Dr Huppert]

I am always delighted to enable two Labour Members to talk to each other. Having facilitated that conversation, and as I agree with what both of them said, I will end my remarks there.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend makes his customary point about ensuring that there is such clarity. I am sure that we will return to this issue, but for the reasons I have outlined, I hope that the right hon. Member for Knowsley is minded to withdraw his amendment and that the clause will stand part of the Bill.

[Mr George Howarth]

I will be brief. I am happy to withdraw amendment 1, which I tabled as a probing amendment. The Minister’s last point is perhaps the most significant one. I do not think that we have a clear enough understanding of the scope of economic well-being, although it is reassuring to know that in this context it must be related to national security. We have had a reasonable debate. We have not reached any firm conclusions, but I am comforted by the fact that the issues will be discussed by David Anderson and others, and I hope that we can move the issue further along before there is any fresh communications data legislation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Extra-territoriality in Part 1 of RIPA

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

Perhaps I did not explain this clearly to the hon. Gentleman, but we are not intending to add additional powers to compel. I suppose he is trying to elicit whether the measure is a means of getting more data retained outside the UK—he raised that point in the previous debate on this issue, and again I may be misunderstanding him. I reassert that the Bill contains nothing that in any way extends the existing reach of section 12 of RIPA. Other than reasserting the position on extraterritoriality, it does not in essence change section 12 at all. If that does not answer his point, he may wish to write to me on the matter.

The clause provides that where a warrant has been served on a company outside the UK, the law in the country where the firm is located must be taken into account when determining whether it is reasonably practicable for that company to give effect to the warrant. The clause also makes it clear that the court should consider what steps the company has taken or could take to avoid such a conflict arising. It does not extend the powers of law enforcement or security and intelligence agencies. It simply puts beyond doubt the fact that sections 11, 12 and 22 of RIPA apply to telecommunication service providers that are based outside the UK but provide services to customers in the UK.

[Mr George Howarth]

I raised this point on Second Reading but I do not think the Minister had an opportunity to respond. In clause 4(6), proposed new subsection (3B)(a) and (b) covers the circumstances of delivering a notice to the sort of companies he has just described. Paragraph (a) states

“by delivering it to the person’s principal office within the United Kingdom or, if the person has no such office in the United Kingdom, to any place in the United Kingdom where the person carries on business or conducts activities,”

and (b) states

“if the person has specified an address in the United Kingdom as one at which the person, or someone on the person’s behalf, will accept documents of the same description as a notice, by delivering it to that address.”

I am sorry to read that out, but it provides the context.

The example I used earlier was of a relatively junior member of staff in a billing office in Liverpool for Google or one of the other communications service providers, and my concern is that they could end up having a notice served on them and be put in an invidious legal position. I hope that I am wrong about that and that the Minister will be able to reassure me. The provisions seem entirely appropriate for a senior member of staff.

[James Brokenshire]

Provisions on a person having a specified address, such as proposed new subsection (3B)(b), refer to a situation where lawyers accept service, proceedings or notification on a person’s behalf. In essence, the Bill gives effect to such clarification.

[Mr George Howarth]

The Minister has provided the reassurance I was looking for, so at this point I can say that I am perfectly happy with the clause as it now stands.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) asked an important question: what will the Government do when a company does not wish to co-operate? I would like to put on the record something that I cannot attribute to a particular individual, other than to say it was a comment made by a very senior member of one of the main communications services providers in modern media. In relation to the question of his medium being abused for serious criminal or terrorist purposes, he said:

“We don’t want to frustrate the access of law enforcement agencies; only, that they should come through the front door and ask us, not sneak in by the back door.”

The companies want something that is clearly laid out in a proper legal format, so that they can fulfil that promise not at the whim of some private or backstairs approach by some unnamed Government official, but through a proper on-the-record procedure.

Hillsborough

George Howarth Excerpts

Wednesday 12th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I thank my hon. Friend for reiterating the point of concern about the police pocket notebooks. Although the two investigations are concerned with slightly different aspects of the Hillsborough tragedy, it has been made clear that information that is relevant to both should be available to both.

As for my hon. Friend’s wider question, as I said earlier to the hon. Member for Halton (Derek Twigg), it is important for us to look at the issue of documents that are acquired by police officers in relation to investigations or to incidents that they attend and are required in the course of their duty, but which, in the cases that we are discussing, were treated as if they were personal possessions that officers could take home and deal with as they wished. That is an issue to which I shall want to return.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

I, too, thank the Home Secretary both for her statement and for the way in which she continues to handle this most important issue. Does she agree that one of the truly alarming things that we have discovered in the recent past is the extent to which there was what could almost be described as an organised stereotyping distortion of what had taken place, and the extent of the prejudice against those who attended the game at Hillsborough—both those who lost their lives and those who survived? Does she agree that one legacy that we should really want is the knowledge that, in any future situations of this kind, such prejudices will be continually challenged and rooted out? The only guarantee that we can have that something like this will not happen again is a guarantee that those attitudes will be utterly condemned, and will become a thing of the past.

[Mrs May]

The right hon. Gentleman has made a very important point. As I said earlier, when the Prime Minister made his own statement in 2012, he said that the second injustice that had taken place was the treatment that the families had received at the hands of the press. However, the injustice was wider than that: it did not just involve the press.

The press set out their particular portrait of what had happened, and of the families involved, but a collective view was then taken by society as a whole. With very few—but notable and honourable—exceptions, people had that collective belief, and felt that it was not necessary to take the matter further. Like others, I pay tribute not just to the families who continued the fight, but to the Members of Parliament and others who consistently challenged that view and said that it was not right to let the issue lie. The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: while I hope that we never see an incident of this sort again, it is important for those who try to set a public perception on such issues to be challenged.