Drugs: Prohibition and Criminalisation

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 11th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

To ask His Majesty’s Government, in light of the rise in deaths linked to cocaine, ketamine and synthetic cannabinoid use, what plans they have to review their policy on drug prohibition and the criminalisation of people who use drugs.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, drug misuse deaths in 2025 were down on those registered in the previous year. Every drug-related death, however, remains a tragedy. Drug deaths are best prevented by a combination of actions, including tackling drug supply, effective treatment and recovery support, clear societal messaging about the harms that drugs do, and a robust legislative framework to deter possession and supply.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his Answer, but I did not hear anything new in there. Until the Government do have better drug policies, knowing the number of deaths from illegal drugs is incredibly important. To do that, you need to triangulate with health data, and you need to establish whether serious violence or suicide has taken place, especially for women. What measures might the Government take to make sure that their recording of deaths is actually accurate?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness raises an important point, and I hope I can assure her that the Government take that seriously. We have asked the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs to look at writing four reports for us, particularly focused on women and girls. That will include the role of drugs in domestic abuse and in wider violence against women and girls. We have also set up a working group to review matters concerning the very issue she raises, which is the recording of drug-related deaths and how they are defined across all parts of the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)]

My Lords, drug poisoning accounts for 37% of deaths among prison leavers in Wales. Will the Government review whether current drug criminalisation policies are helping or hindering efforts to reduce post-release overdose deaths?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will obviously reflect on what the noble Baroness has said, and we are always looking at what we need to do on drugs generally. This year, in fact, we have introduced a number of orders in this House which have put controls on certain drugs. Along with colleagues in the Ministry of Justice, we will look at the impact of drugs in prison, but overall, as I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, drug deaths are down. That is a trend we want to continue to encourage, and one I will be working towards as Minister.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, the director-general of the National Crime Agency has described how criminals are chemically bonding cocaine in everyday materials such as plastic and glue to evade detection. Given that the Government’s number one priority is to reduce the harm that drug does, does the Minister feel we have the right balance in the use of resources between pursuing people who have drugs for their own personal use and dismantling the ever-more sophisticated drug networks that are actually supplying the drugs?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We have to take on the organised criminals who are supplying the drugs. In 2025-26, the National Crime Agency seized 189 tonnes of class A drugs. The quantity of illicit drugs seized at the border in 2024-25 was the largest, at 148 tonnes, recorded since 1973. So there are efforts to stop organised crime, but obviously, drug barons are looking at a whole range of methods, and the areas the noble Baroness has mentioned are extremely important. We need to keep on top of that, and that is why we have also put in some £3.4 billion over the next three years on drug and alcohol treatment as a whole, to ensure that we look at who the users of drugs are and how we can help support them.

[Lord Pickles (Con)]

My Lords, so far nobody has mentioned those who die as a result of drug use, particularly in road traffic accidents, but who themselves have never taken drugs in their lives. One of the great successes of the last 30 years has been the reduction in the number of people who die on the roads as a result of alcohol use. By the end of this decade, the number who die on the roads because of illicit drug use is likely to exceed the number who die because of alcohol use. There is variation from force to force in terms of the equipment used and the practices, so will the noble Lord consider getting police authorities together and getting best practice established, so that we can start to push down on drug use on the roads, as we have pushed down on drink?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises an extremely important point. He will know that some seven or eight years ago, we passed legislation in both Houses—I was then the shadow Minister in the House of Commons—on drug testing for driving, particularly for cocaine. He raises the issues of enforcement and good practice; I will take them back and reflect on them and, if I have any further information, I can reply to him. He needs to know that legislation on a cross-party basis has been passed, it will be enforced, and it is extremely important that we stop people who are under the influence of drugs driving vehicles.

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

Will my noble friend the Minister please update the House on something we worked together on many years ago: specialist drug courts and the role they may have in reducing reoffending, particularly for people whose offending is related to their drug misuse?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for my noble friend’s question. The use of drug courts, and judges having ownership of individuals who go through those courts and of the treatment those individuals get, is extremely important. That is a matter for the Ministry of Justice, but it is certainly something we are encouraging. We have put in place, as we did during previous Labour Governments up to 2010, significant numbers of drug treatment orders, which focus on helping people get off drugs in the first place.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, when cannabis was reclassified from class C to class B, there was no noticeable reduction in cannabis use. But when excessive use of genetically modified cannabis was publicised as being linked to schizophrenia, the use of cannabis then reduced. Does that not say to the Government that they should be spending more on drugs education?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is extremely important that we send messages out throughout the whole of the age range that using drugs has potential difficulties and can cause death. It is important that we do that in schools and raise education for those involved in drug use. Going back to the noble Baroness’s question earlier, it is important that we do that when people are in prison as well, to help them leave prison in a way which improves their behaviour and gives them a better chance in life outside. Those are important issues and not ones the Government will shirk.

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

My Lords, given that street-level drug dealing is one of the greatest harms perpetrated on communities across this country, what extra work could the police be doing to stop this activity, which is often dealt with as low-level crime but has a real ripple effect on the community suffering from it?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have to say that I agree with the noble Lord that it is not low-level crime. The front-end of drugs being dealt on the street has an upstream effect on criminal gangs who are importing drugs and doing things which cause death and harm and lack of social cohesion. One of the things we are doing is ensuring that we have better enforcement. We are putting some 10,000 extra police officers on the beat during the course of this Parliament to look at neighbourhood policing. Neighbourhood policing leads to local policing and intelligence, and I would hope it will lead to better community involvement in reducing drug use on the streets.

[Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the Government’s whole system, but I urge the Minister to ensure that we use more resources to stem the amount of drugs now being sold online, particularly ketamine, which is being sold so cheaply. This needs to be looked at very seriously, and we need to cut back on the availability of drugs online.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is an important point and again, there is a whole range of mechanisms, via Ofcom, through which we can take down adverts and businesses that are involved in crime and antisocial behaviour online. My noble friend mentions ketamine, and I have to say to the House that the level of ketamine-related deaths is increasing significantly. There are always challenges, and my noble friend points to one on which we need to take sophisticated action online and offline to reduce usage and therefore help reduce the number of deaths.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that, while some people seem preoccupied with talking about reparations for historic slavery, the drugs trade causes untold human misery and is one of the premier causes of slavery at all levels in the world today?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The drugs trade is an evil trade; that is why the Government are committed to investing to ensure that we can reduce it. The 148 tonnes of illicit drugs seized at the border is the largest quantity seized since 1973. The drug barons need to know that the criminal justice agencies, the National Crime Agency and all local police forces will be after them to ensure that we hold them to account for this evil trade. I welcome the noble Lord’s support in doing that.

Rebuilding Forensic Science for Criminal Justice (Science and Technology Committee Report)

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 11th November 2026 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mair, for bringing forward this important debate today, for the contribution of the Science and Technology Committee to the detailed report and for the blunt, strong and effective way in which the noble Lord put the committee’s case to the Government today.

As a start, I can tell the noble Lord that I was the Minister in charge of forensic services in 2009-10, when I was Police and Counterterrorism Minister as a Member of Parliament in the Labour Government of 1997 to 2010. With my colleague Alan Campbell, the junior Minister, we undertook an examination of the restructuring required for making the forensic service a modern, effective system, and we determined to keep that service in-house.

I can also tell the noble Lord that, in 2012, when the then Government—it was the coalition Government; I say this for the benefit of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover—restructured the Forensic Science Service and effectively privatised it, my colleague Alan Campbell and I opposed that. When I was not in that shadow position anymore in 2018, and served on the Justice Select Committee in the other place, we produced a report that raised many of the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Mair, put to this Committee today.

So I say to the noble Lord that, if I winced at some of his punches, it is because I recognised those concerns because I have raised them before. When I say to the noble Lord and his committee that I would not have started from here, I hope he understands that that is because I would not have started from here. But here we are.

The question of high-quality, timely and impartial forensic science is, as the noble Lord and colleagues have said, indispensable to the criminal justice system. It helps police to identify offenders, to eliminate innocent people—the point that my noble friend Lord Stansgate mentioned—to inform charging decisions, to enable the defence to test the evidence and to support courts in delivering justice firmly. The Government take the committee’s report seriously.

I cannot answer for the situation before 4 July 2024, because we were not in government then, and I have outlined to the noble Lord our views at the time. I want to put on record the excellent work undertaken by the forensic community in England and Wales and the dedicated professionals who still work in that area today, but I cannot ignore the long-standing weaknesses that have been highlighted by every Member of this House who has spoken.

The areas of concern have been put into about seven or eight categories, and I will try to address some of them, at least in part. They are around national leadership; independence; the commercial market, which is very fragile, as has been said; evidence retention; AI; the policing White Paper; and the potential for a national centre. If I may, I will start with the Government’s proposals for the policing White Paper, because it is the golden seam that runs through all of this.

When it was produced in January this year, we described a fragmented, inconsistent and inefficient system, and we have set out our intention to enable a new national police service to lead a more stable and consistent model for law enforcement in England and Wales. Ahead of the police reform Bill, we have initiated a number of reforms, including a national reform programme of policing and private sector forensic capabilities. As has been mentioned, central to the reform is the policing White Paper. The new Prime Minister has come in but the general tenets of that White Paper are still in place: a reduced number of forces and a centralised service looking at training, procurement and forensics, as well as many other areas of national security.

It may not help Members who have spoken, but the Bill will be produced at some point in the near future. I cannot talk about the Bill until such time as it is produced, but the direction of travel has been clear from the Government in 2026, and it is clear from the Government now. There are obviously some aspects that we want to look at in relation to the size of the force. We have received the report from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, on the size of forces; we want to look through it and we will do so. I cannot give comfort on those points today, but there will be governance of forensics in a stronger national service, stronger national leadership and safeguards to independence and impartiality, and the national police service will have clear responsibilities backed by statutory powers. That is the direction. It is not published yet but when it is, as with every piece of legislation, it will go to the House of Commons and it will come to this House. It will go through enormous amounts of scrutiny, and I will have to answer for it to Members of this House in due course.

Let me look at the other points that have been raised. The first question was about national leadership in government. One of the key arguments in the committee’s report, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, and the noble Lord, Davies of Gower, is that responsibility for forensic sciences has been too fragmented. I agree. There is too much variation in how forensic science is organised. There is too much about its assurance and how it is overseen, and strategic change, although extremely difficult, needs to be undertaken. Our aim is to move beyond the diagnosis of the same problems and establish some national structures and capabilities to address them. That includes the appointment of the director of forensic services, working in partnership with the National Police Chiefs’ Council and local bodies to deliver national forensic reforms and programmes. There is an understanding of that, and that leadership will need to be looked at.

The question of independence and impartiality has rightly been raised in terms of the forensic science service. It has to be developed and delivered impartially with scientific rigour. The committee itself has highlighted the Scottish “sterile corridor” model as one way to safeguard impartiality. That has some merits, but it is not the only model and currently the Scottish model does not include digital forensic services. We are looking to make sure that practitioners are free to exercise impartial scientific judgment using validated methods, professional standards and robust quality assurance.

The Government are now working with the police, the Forensic Science Regulator and our colleagues in the Ministry of Justice and the Attorney General’s Office to look at designing robust checks and balances that preserve that independence while ensuring high-quality and fair science. There are real challenges and problems, but they are ones that we wish to examine.

The regulator’s statutory code of practice expressly requires impartiality and provides external scrutiny and enforcement. Independence also depends on organisational safeguards of professional leadership, transparent decision-making and effective challenge. We are detailing now, through design with stakeholders across the criminal justice system, those safeguards that can be built into the new model.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Northover and Lady Neville-Jones, among others, mentioned the commercial forensic market. As I have said, there are real and legitimate concerns about the resilience of the commercial forensic market. I would not have started from here, but here is where we are and we recognise that challenge. Work is under way at the moment: the Home Office director of forensic services has prioritised a delivery project as part of the reform programme to look at engaging with suppliers and working with the police to address those immediate vulnerable specialist services while developing a more sustainable market for the future. I would argue—again, we can refer to this in due course—that national governance will provide a clear review of market resilience and improve our understanding of demand for specialist and low-volume disciplines. I accept that that it is work in progress, but I hope the Committee can reflect on the fact that we are trying to address this particular challenge.

The question of research, innovation and a national institute was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, among others. The committee has made a strong case for better national co-ordination of research, innovation, specialist skills and training. I agree with that need. I cannot necessarily agree, on behalf of the Government, with the solution proposed, but I agree with that need. We do not believe that a separate national institute is necessary, but we do intend to strengthen co-ordination through the national police service and a national annual plan developed with partners across the criminal justice system to look at shared priorities, support collective delivery, give special expertise, be proactive for future requirements, co-ordinate funding and commissioning, and form stronger partnerships with academia, universities, industry and others. We want to make sure that the tests do what I think your Lordships’ excellent report does, which is to try to improve the outcomes, with better co-ordination of research and faster adoption of effective science and systems to anticipate future forensic needs.

The question of digital forensics and artificial intelligence was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Ranger of Northwood and Lord Davies of Gower. Digital material is integral to modern investigations. I confess that I love catching up on the Monday night television programmes where the three great transformations of criminal justice—DNA, automatic number plate recognition and forensic science—nail people doing bad things. It is a great pleasure to watch that. I understand, and I know, that we absolutely need to be on top of that game. Synthetic media and deepfakes are creating new challenges, and AI is exponentially sweeping across. That is why we need to look at modernising digital forensics and at new technology. We are looking now at how we can support areas including CCTV analysis and disclosure on translation and transcription. Work is under way across the board to make sure that we modernise what we do in digital forensics accordingly. That is a real challenge, because we can use AI to do this, but AI is equally an enemy that the Government need to be aware of in many areas.

I have been asked the question about financing from the noble Lords, Lord Ranger and Lord Davies. I cannot give an answer today, but I will look at that, dissect the funding and the budgets and come back to the noble Lords in due course.

There was also a question about evidence retention and the forensic archive from my noble friend Lord Stansgate and the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger. The committee is right to emphasise storage and retention. The director of forensic services has started to work with policing and the forensic archive to strengthen retention and storage arrangements. It may not help the Committee, and I know there will still be challenges back to us, but we now have two police forces working with the Home Office to develop a more consistent and qualitative approach to storing forensic evidence and to look at what we can do to roll out a better, clearer, consistent and auditable approach to long-term management of forensic evidence.

A number of noble Lords mentioned defence experts and equality of arms. That is an important area. The Ministry of Justice has a particularly important role in that. A number of noble Lords mentioned the fact that we need a fair forensic system. If it cannot provide good evidence for the prosecution, the defence must also be able to understand it. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has great experience in that area. We recognise those concerns and the need to have extra resilience for the defence expert community.

I am speaking for the Home Office, but the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Aid Agency are now looking at monitoring the availability of defence forensic expertise. Over the summer, they have engaged with defence firms and forensic experts, including on the payment process, which has been raised today. The Legal Aid Agency has published consolidated guidance for experts and, as indicated in the Government’s response to the committee in April, although immediate changes to expert rates will have to be done on a cost-neutral basis, the MoJ is considering the findings of the engagement in the context of the spending review. That goes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned. Where higher expert rates are justified in individual cases, there are mechanisms to ensure that they can request enhanced rates where possible. An independent cost assessor can determine appeals against the Legal Aid Agency’s refusal of funding.

Finally, we had streamlining forensic reporting. The committee raised concerns about how forensic evidence is communicated and tested in court. I recognise that forensic evidence must be presented in a way that allows prosecutors, the defence and courts to understand its meaning and limitations. The Forensic Capability Network is examining potential improvements at the moment, and the Ministry of Justice is looking at engaging with the defence community as a whole.

I am answering for the department today. One of the criticisms the noble Lord, Lord Mair, made early in his contribution was that a single Minister is not responsible. My colleague Sarah Jones, the Minister for Policing, has responsibility for this. I am answering today for our department, but I will make sure that she and I reflect on the points that have been made today. We cannot revisit the government response, but the areas of concern are ones that we raised when we were not in government. We need to examine how we can do that. In the two years and three months that the Government have been in office—it might seem a lifetime to colleagues—we have been trying to assess and flush out some of those difficulties and challenges. We agree wholeheartedly that the status quo is not sufficient. That is why we have an ambitious national reform programme, why we are tackling the underlying causes and why scientific quality will remain non-negotiable.

While I cannot say yes or no to everything in the report, if I look, as I did today, at the list of the committee’s recommendations, there are a lot of yeses to them. There are quite a few maybes and a few noes, but they are in the minority compared to the yeses and maybes in relation to the list.

The objective for our reform is to have a more effective system at the national level, regulated robustly and focused on timely, high-quality, innovative and impartial advice. I thank the committee. To be honest, I felt that I was against the ropes on this. Every speaker punched hard on areas of concern. It is important that we recognise those areas. We are trying to work through them. I thank the committee for its report. I hope that in the response I have given some comfort on some areas for the noble Lord, Lord Mair, to share with the members present, past and even future.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2026

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 11th November 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the draft Order laid before the House on 14 September be approved.

Relevant document: 13th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 10 November.

Motion agreed.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2026

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2026.

Relevant document: 13th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, this Order was laid before the House on 14 September 2026 and provides for the continuation of the Secretary of State’s powers under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, also known as the TPIM powers. The continuation is for a further five years.

I think all noble Lords accept that it is the first duty of government to protect the public, and central to that mission is to counter the threat we face from terrorism—a threat which, sadly, is enduring and evolving. In response, there is a range of tools, including the powers conferred on the Secretary of State by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which I well recall, having dealt with it at the time as shadow Minister for these issues.

The measures ensure that, where prosecution or deportation is not possible, the Secretary of State can impose specified restrictions and requirements on an individual involved in terrorism-related activity, to protect the public from a risk of terrorism. Section 21 of the Act states that the Secretary of State’s TPIM powers will expire at the end of five years from the date the Act was passed. The orders were renewed twice, in 2016 and 2021, and these powers are due to expire at the end of 13 December 2026. As TPIMs remain an important part of the UK’s counter-terrorism toolkit, we seek to renew them today. This position is supported by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the director-general of the Security Service.

As noble Lords will know, the Secretary of State can impose a TPIM notice on an individual if the conditions set out in Section 3 of the Act are assessed by the Secretary of State to have been met. These conditions include that the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity, and reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to impose such measures on the individual. In addition, the Secretary of State has powers to extend and vary a TPIM notice that is in force, and to revive a TPIM notice that has been revoked.

It may help noble Lords to know that, since the introduction of the Act in 2011, 33 TPIMs have been imposed. As of the last published set of figures, from June to August 2026, there are four TPIMs currently in force.

These are undoubtedly restrictive measures, which is why it is right that they are used sparingly and only in exceptional cases involving individuals assessed to present the highest levels of terrorism-related risk, where prosecution, deportation or other disruptive measures would be insufficient to protect the public.

There are, however, stringent safeguards. The Secretary of State must be satisfied that all conditions are met and apply to the court for permission to impose the TPIM notice, except in cases of urgency. A TPIM notice is subject to a review hearing at which the court reviews the Secretary of State’s decisions and the conditions were and continue to be met. The Act also provides a right of appeal in relation to specified decisions taken after its imposition.

Having consulted as required by the Act, the Home Secretary has decided to make this statutory instrument to provide for the continuation of TPIM powers for a further five years, the maximum period allowable in the legislation. We take this step because, sadly, we still face significant terrorist threats, and it is necessary to continue upholding the first duty of government: securing the nation and keeping our citizens safe.

The House of Commons has considered this order, and I hope that noble Lords will also support it today. I beg to move.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, the Official Opposition support this order. The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 gives the Home Secretary powers that are needed in the small number of cases where the threat is real, but prosecution is not possible. Without this order, those powers would lapse on 13 December this year. Continuing them until December 2031 is the responsible course of action and we will certainly not stand in the way of this.

However, I have a few questions for the Minister. First, he stated that four TPIM notices are currently in force. How has that figure changed since the last renewal of the powers in 2021? I appreciate he may not have those figures to hand. More broadly, is the Minister satisfied that the powers are being used in proportion to the threat rather than falling into disuse?

Secondly, what is the Government’s assessment of compliance and breaches? For instance, how often are TPIM subjects found to have absconded or breached their conditions? Does he believe that the police and security services are properly resourced to monitor them?

With those questions, I reiterate the support of the Official Opposition for this order.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for his broad support for TPIMs. They were introduced when the noble Baroness, Lady May, was Home Secretary; I shadowed her at that time, and we had some concerns, some of which were around the issues the noble Lord has mentioned. Absconds and breaches are important issues.

I can give the noble Lord some figures. Since 2017, 16 TPM subjects have been prosecuted, with breaching measures imposed on them, and 12 pleaded guilty. To date, three have been found guilty by a jury. Judges have imposed custodial sentences on individuals who have breached the terrorism prevention and investigation measures, which I hope demonstrates to the noble Lord and the Committee the seriousness with which courts take these breaches.

On conclusion of any custodial sentence, the Home Secretary has the power to revive the existing TPIM if it provides a necessary and proportionate response to any threat that the individual may still pose. It is important that I put on record that the breach of a terrorism prevention order is a criminal offence. Every suspected breach is treated seriously and investigated, and we will always work with the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to support prosecutions accordingly.

I mentioned in my opening remarks that we currently have four individuals on TPIMs. I hope the noble Lord will be reassured that we provide a quarterly update on the TPIMs figures, and we have had 33 since their instigation. Off the top of my head, I do not have the quarterly figures for before the latest quarter, but there are four existing TPIMs. We will give an update every quarter on the numbers to date.

The Secretary of State takes these powers very seriously. The number one priority is to ensure that a TPIM is proportionate. When the Secretary of State—the Home Secretary in this case—signs off that TPIM, they must have a full submission and a full examination of it, and they will challenge it to ensure it is required and necessary. The appellant can appeal in court against that TPIM, and therefore a robust case is always made. A breach or indeed an abscond is a serious matter, and TPIMs provide significant levels of control over a range of movements and locations. As the noble Lord will know, on a number of occasions we remove people to new locations, so they are broken away from other influences.

I say to the noble Lord that we can rest assured. When I was in his position as a shadow Minister in the House of Commons, I asked about and was concerned about absconds and breaches. Now, as a Minister in government working alongside the Home Secretary, I am confident that we have a regime that is minimising those breaches. As I said to him in relation to the figures, if breaches or absconds occur, we take them extremely seriously, and these cases will potentially result in a custodial sentence. With those remarks, I hope I have assured the Committee that the order is worthy of general support.

Motion agreed.

Interpol: Russia

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Monday 9th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking (1) unilaterally, and (2) in co-operation with other member states of Interpol, to prevent the abuse of Interpol red notices and diffusions by Russia.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The Government take any misuse of Interpol systems extremely seriously. We will work with the National Crime Agency and Interpol to monitor safeguards, including the Notices and Diffusions Task Force, which scrutinises red notices and diffusions. We will also work with like-minded countries through Interpol’s governance structure to strengthen safeguards and take action against abuse, including by Russia.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, nobody who practises in this area of the law—I declare that interest—will be surprised by Russia’s abuse of the system to target its political opponents abroad. Ben Keith, a barrister well known for his expertise in this area of law, has recently written in the Times:

“Russia has been the worst offender for years”,


despite Interpol claiming, since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, that it has the matter under control. Will the Minister ensure that, on our own and with our democratic allies, we take robust and effective measures to prevent Russia abusing the system, most obviously by not allowing Interpol to publish any red notices or diffusions unless they have been previously examined in detail?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his question. He will know that Interpol is responsible for its own governance and structure; we are simply a part of that. We are keen to ensure that standards are maintained. That is why we play a role in the various committees to uphold scrutiny of these issues. Indeed, there is currently a UK candidate in the election for members of the body that examines red notices. It is important that those standards are maintained. If there are breaches then Interpol will take action, not the UK Government independently.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, given that Russia has applied for 46% of the 6,370 Interpol red notices out at the moment, do the Government not think that this country should press against the slow, inefficient and not very effective appellate process, place the burden for proving such applications on the arresting state, and press for appeals founded on the merits of each individual case?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Any misuse of Interpol tools, including red notices, is taken seriously by this Government and, I would suggest, by Interpol itself. There are robust safeguards in place: 100% of red notice requests are reviewed before publication by the Interpol Notices and Diffusions Task Force and the UK is an active participant in the governance committee for data processing, which discusses all aspects of Interpol’s constitution. There are sensitive matters for discussion. The noble Lord has made suggestions. Ultimately, it is for Interpol to determine its procedures.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, earlier this year, the BBC’s extensive investigation revealed that Russia had used Interpol’s messaging system to find the whereabouts of a person, even though Interpol had already turned down a request for a red notice. Are safeguards in place to ensure that UK officials do not pass information through this system? Will those messages be given the same level of scrutiny as red notices?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There are strict rules by which Interpol deals with these matters. Obviously, we will participate in helping Interpol to scrutinise those rules but, ultimately, it is for Interpol itself to determine how it deals with requests and how they are scrutinised. There is an important mechanism in place. The UK is very keen to ensure that scrutiny takes place, and we have measures whereby all requests are scrutinised and considered. Any abuse of those requests will be considered as very serious action by both Interpol and the UK Government.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, what progress, if any, has been made in implementing any or all of the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights report on transnational repression, published in July 2025, which drew on the submissions of more than 180 experts? In particular, is the Minister revisiting the JCHR’s calls for a review to consider mechanisms for alerting individuals about politically motivated red notices, along with a mechanism to protect British nationals abroad, and the committee’s calls for enhanced police and immigration staff training? Has that report led to any changes in the handling of red notices or to greater cross-departmental and international co-operation?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord will remember that we had a debate on the report in this House in February. The Government will look at all the recommendations; we keep all the matters under review. I will certainly give him an update in writing, if I may, on progress on implementation of the recommendations that we have accepted. He will know that we did not accept all the recommendations—that is the nature of Governments and Select Committee reports—but I will give him a full response on where we are to date with their implementation.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the United States has addressed misuse of Interpol red notices by passing two related pieces of legislation—the so-called TRAP Acts. Given the deluge of threats from Russia and its ongoing campaign of transnational repression, will the Government show leadership and pass similar legislation in the United Kingdom?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We are trying to play a constructive role in scrutinising red notices and other methods by Interpol as a whole. Ultimately, the governance of Interpol, which comprises 196 countries, is a matter for Interpol. We will help support Interpol in that scrutiny but, ultimately, it is for Interpol to determine its governance and operations.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his several answers but they give the impression that the Government are being a little passive. I agree that there are a huge number of members of Interpol, but it requires leadership from a major country such as the UK to engender some sense of enthusiasm for the proper scrutiny of red notices issued by countries such as Russia, which we all know—and he, his department and the Government as a whole know—is fiddling the system and causing abuse. Could the Minister, perhaps later this afternoon, have a word with some of his colleagues in government and ask them to move this up a gear?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I never wish to give the noble and learned Lord the impression that I am not taking things as seriously as he would wish. The UK believes there are robust safeguards in place: 100% of red notice requests are reviewed before publication by the Interpol Notices and Diffusions Task Force, and the UK is an active participant in the Interpol governance committee for data processing, which discusses all aspects of Interpol’s constitution, including safeguards against misuse. We strongly support Interpol’s efforts to ensure that systems are in place and, where necessary, we will continue to press for reform on those matters. I return to the point that, ultimately, we are one part of a 196-member organisation; it is for Interpol as a whole to determine its governance and its responsibilities in those areas.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, further to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Alton—I should declare that I am sanctioned by Russia—in September the UN rapporteur at the human rights office said that the industrial-scale transnational repression by Russia, including the abuse of Interpol procedures, warranted much further UN action, including the concept of a binding UN convention on transnational repression. Transnational repression is not codified in our legislation in those specific terms, but will we support UN efforts to ensure that Russia does not get away with abusing Interpol, and support other methods to ensure that transnational repression is cut out from the UK entirely?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I share something in common with the noble Lord: I am also sanctioned by Russia, which is an interest that I declare. It is a matter for the Russians; they decided to sanction me for the Russia report that I wrote with the Intelligence and Security Committee back in 2019 when I was a Member of the other House. We will always hold Russia to account, particularly since the invasion of Ukraine, for its international transgressions. We will work with Interpol in this context to ensure that there is proper and effective scrutiny of red notices, and that they are not used for persecution or for political purposes.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister has concentrated, quite properly, on the governance of Interpol and its responsibilities. However, when a red notice is received in the UK a responsibility is placed on our Government and our police forces. It might help people to be reassured about how that process is managed to ensure that an improper red notice is not acted on to locate, arrest or attempt to extradite to another country.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As the noble Lord will know, a red notice is not an extradition agreement; it is a request for information surrounding an individual. There are lots of safeguards in the UK with regard to that information, but in the context of the Question—and this is a perfectly legitimate point that all noble Lords have made in this case—the governance and work on this issue ultimately remains a matter internationally for Interpol.

US Diplomat: Removal

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of reports that US officials removed a US diplomat who was accused of possessing indecent images of children from UK soil in August without informing UK authorities.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The United States embassy has confirmed that it has recalled a member of staff to the United States due to an investigation in the United States. The Metropolitan Police was notified on 25 August and remains in contact with US law enforcement. It is inappropriate for me to comment further during a live investigation, but I expect all diplomats in the United Kingdom to respect our laws, and any breach is treated seriously.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his last sentence. Unfortunately, it is exactly the same as the Government said in 2019 when Anne Sacoolas killed Harry Dunn in a road collision and the US authorities spirited her out of the country, saying that she had diplomatic immunity. Can the Minister explain what the Government are doing to ensure that the USA Government abide by the rules that the USA insists other countries have to follow when crimes are committed by foreign diplomats there? Have the US authorities agreed that the Met Police can now interview the suspect and investigate any other evidence of this crime?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

With respect to the noble Baroness, I would not conflate the two cases; there are different issues at hand. As I have said, the United States has recalled the individual back to the United States, informed the Metropolitan Police, which is investigating and co-operating on whether there are issues that it needs to investigate and examine. There is a protocol between the United States and others. In relation to the Harry Dunn case, may I just say that that that was under the last Government? There was an investigation. There have been 12 recommendations made. We intend to accept all those recommendations. We are looking as to how we can update the family of Harry Dunn, which we will do by the end of this year. I assure the noble Baroness that we take these matters seriously and the Metropolitan Police is examining and discussing with the embassy what the circumstances were.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, further to what the Minister said about the review which was carried out by Dame Anne Owers, she concluded that the FCO missed multiple opportunities to influence the US Government and failed to treat that case as a priority. HMG—this HMG, not the last one—said that lessons will be learned from that review and from the Sacoolas case and applied to future cases, so with great respect to the Minister, the Sacoolas case is highly relevant.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

With due respect to the noble Lord, the details of the reasons why the individual was recalled to the United States are still under discussion. The Metropolitan Police was informed that that there was a US investigation relating to indecent images of children, but the offences are now being investigated and the individual has been recalled to the United States. The Metropolitan Police is examining and co-operating and discussing with the US authorities. I also say to the noble Lord that, on the previous case he mentioned, this Government looked at the lessons learned, have accepted all 12 recommendations, will implement all 12 recommendations and will write to the family by the end of this year on progress on that implementation.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, it has been reported that the Metropolitan Police was informed by American authorities only after they had removed the diplomat from British soil. Can the Minister tell the House exactly when the Government were made aware of the allegations, when they were informed of the diplomat’s removal and whether that sequence of events breached any protocol governing co-operation between British and American authorities on serious criminal allegations?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I have said to the House already, the Metropolitan Police was informed by the US authorities on 25 August of a US investigation relating to indecent images of children. As a result of the investigation, a member of US embassy personnel who was at that point based in London was recalled to the United States, where the investigation is focused. Senior officials, and indeed Ministers—in this case, a Minister in the Foreign Office—have discussed the case with senior diplomats in the US embassy to ensure that maximum co-operation occurs with UK law enforcement. Again, the Metropolitan Police is in contact with US law enforcement partners as investigations continue. The important point I would make to the noble Lord is that the US investigation relating to indecent images of children is ongoing in the United States, and that is the key point to this item before the House today.

Licensing Act 2003 (Mandatory Licensing Conditions) (Amendment) Order 2026

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Tuesday 8th September 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the draft Order laid before the House on 30 June be approved.

Considered in Grand Committee on 2 September.

Motion agreed.

Licensing Act 2003 (Mandatory Licensing Conditions) (Amendment) Order 2026

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd September 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Licensing Act 2003 (Mandatory Licensing Conditions) (Amendment) Order 2026

Relevant document: 9th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Licensing Act 2003 (Mandatory Licensing Conditions) (Amendment) Order 2026 was laid before the House on 30 June. This instrument makes a focused amendment to the mandatory licensing conditions for alcohol sale and supply in England and Wales. It will allow licensed premises and club premises with a certificate to accept digital proof of age through a digital verification service that has been independently assessed against the UK’s DVS trust framework and is listed on the statutory DVS register, provided the order’s safeguards and any relevant local licensing conditions are met. In doing so, it removes a legal barrier created by conditions drafted when secure digital verification was not available while leaving the wider licensing regime unchanged.

Currently, anyone asked to prove their age when buying alcohol must produce a physical document bearing a photograph and date of birth with either a holographic mark or an ultraviolet feature, such as a passport or driving licence. I assure the Committee that physical documents remain valid: the order does not require individuals to use digital proof of age or businesses to accept it; it simply provides an additional voluntary route where equivalent safeguards are in place.

The Committee will recognise that people increasingly expect to provide and prove information securely and digitally. As many do not routinely carry valuable documents such as passports or driving licences, providing a trusted digital alternative may also reduce the inconvenience and cost caused when those documents are lost and damaged, particularly on evenings out. They can, of course, easily be lost.

Digital proof of age also supplies and supports data minimisation. A driving licence may reveal an address, when the only relevant question is whether the person meets the age threshold. A digital check can answer that question without disclosing unnecessary personal information.

I hope that noble Lords recognise that modernisation must not compromise licensing objectives. Licensing is there to prevent crime and disorder and public nuisance, promote public safety and protect children and young people from harm. Robust and reliable age verification therefore remains central to this reform.

The digital proof of age may be accepted only through a digital verification service that has been independently assessed against the UK DVS trust framework and is listed on the statutory DVS register. The framework covers security, privacy, inclusion, fraud management and governance, and the register itself provides a clear basis on which consumers and businesses can identify services that meet recognised standards rather than having to judge the reliability of different products for themselves.

I again assure the Committee that a screenshot or image on a phone will not be enough; a registered digital verification service must confirm that the individual meets the threshold in the premises’ age verification policy and that the identity information relates to the individual presenting it. That validation must take place through secure technological means. These requirements reduce the risk of copied, altered or borrowed evidence and give businesses confidence that the digital proof of age is genuine.

It may also benefit the Committee to know that the Government consulted between January and March 2024. Indeed, this Government were not even in office then. Respondents included licensing authorities, policing, trading standards, the alcohol and hospitality sectors, technology providers, delivery partners and the public. We had a very strong 72% response in support of digital proof of age for alcohol sales with strong support for requiring providers to meet government-approved standards. The final approach reflects that support, while responding to the need for dependable safeguards in the regulated environment.

The statutory instrument balances innovation and choice with safety. Licensing and certificate holders remain responsible for preventing under-age sales, the supply of alcohol following the age-verification process and meeting their wider obligations under the Licensing Act. Offences relating to under-age sale and supply are unchanged, and the consequences for businesses that fail to comply also remain the same. Digital verification services are, in essence, an additional tool for responsible age checking, not a substitute for staff training, judgment or oversight.

I also assure the Committee that the order is not a national digital identity scheme or identity card. It does not make digital identity compulsory or give the Government visibility of alcohol purchases. It only permits registered digital verification services to be used for digital age checks as an additional option to physical proof-of-age documents.

In summary, the type of reform that I have outlined, which began under a previous Government, is designed to reflect modern technology and provide consumers and businesses with greater choice while preserving physical identification and the safeguards supporting responsible alcohol sales. I think that they are sensible and important aims, and I commend the order to the Committee.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for presenting this SI and for continuing the work that the previous Government started. I declare my interests in that I was chair of the Select Committee that reviewed the Licensing Act 2003 and I currently chair the National Proof of Age Standards Scheme board. I also thank the Minister for meeting me yesterday; it was extremely helpful and I am grateful to have had that opportunity.

I welcome the regulations before us this afternoon, both personally and as chair of the Proof of Age Standards Scheme board. It is particularly appropriate, for the reasons that the Minister has set out, that physical cards will exist alongside the digital dPass. As a community interest company, PASS places the interests of young people at the heart of everything we do. We are mindful of the fact that, during Covid, there were not many options or opportunities open to young people to access cinemas, bars, restaurants or indeed any aspects of the night-time economy in general. We therefore welcome the regulations and wish to see them implemented but, as was the case with the Licensing Act 2003, the key to proper implementation will be how Section 182 guidance is drafted. In that regard, I will write giving fuller detail, but I would like to raise a number of issues this afternoon.

A particular concern is the potential weakening of PASS’s established recognition in the Section 182 guidance. I seek an assurance from the Minister and the department that cards bearing the PASS hologram will continue to be named as the preferred physical proof of age method. The Minister set out the reasons why the physical PASS card and others of that nature have been so successful. Many people use them: older people often do not drive or have passports and younger people are not necessarily old enough to have passed their driving test, so there will continue to be a market in that regard. I further ask the Minister that no change affecting recognition of the PASS hologram will be made before OfDIA has provided its supporting analysis and PASS and others have had a proper opportunity to respond.

I am delighted to say that PASS has reviewed its standards and will amend them from October this year to ensure that any PASS card capable of being used as evidence to create a digital proof of age is issued to the medium level of confidence required by the new secondary legislation before us, although I would emphasise that existing compliant cards should continue to be accepted when presented directly as physical proof of age. The revised guidance should also give appropriate recognition to dPass-enabled services once certification and registration are complete. The additional operational matters identified through subsequent review should be addressed in the statutory guidance or, if necessary, confirmed by the Government before Parliament.

There are other technical issues on which I have said I would write to the Minister, but I shall raise two now. I think I am right that Parliament was not consulted on the statutory guidance under Section 182, so I think it is appropriate that we make the point now before that guidance is drafted and adopted. There are two brief points of clarification on which I will write and give further detail. The first is to confirm that no manual visual inspection is required, so that the regulations are to be understood as requiring secure technological validation, not a member of staff simply looking at a phone screen. I can go into more detail when I write to the Minister.

The second is to clarify what the DVSP, to which the Minister referred, must deliver to the responsible person. The draft regulations require the relevant DVSP to

“deliver identification to the responsible person that reaches at least a medium level of confidence”.

It would be very helpful if that classification could be further clarified. We would welcome confirmation in the upcoming updated mandatory licensing conditions guidance and the Secretary of State’s Section 182 guidance that the meaning of the words “deliver identification” includes the delivery of a verified age result or age attribute. There are a number of other specifications that are very technical. I would like to write to the Minister on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I must begin by saying that the order seems to be a bit of a relic of history. The Government have outlined how they believe it aims to modernise alcohol sales by allowing digital identification for the purposes of age verification at the point of sale. On several occasions, I have had an argument with the Minister about what we on this side view as the folly of digital ID cards. We disagree on the merits of their policy but, given that he has so vociferously defended the introduction of digital ID and given that the new Prime Minister has scrapped the policy, where does the Minister stand now?

More importantly for this debate, what precisely is this order now standing on? The entire proposal behind it depends on functioning digital identification, yet the new Government have abandoned their own digital ID proposals, which, incidentally, I am delighted about. Parliament is being asked to approve secondary legislation built on an assumption of infrastructure that the Government themselves have just walked away from. This all begs the question: how will this now work? How will retailers use digital verification if there is no digital identification system being produced by the Government? It would be particularly useful if the Minister could answer that.

I press the Minister on two further points. First, if a supermarket chain moves towards a QR code verification as its default, what protection exists for those, often older, customers who are unable or unwilling to use a smartphone? The impact assessment speaks confidently of time savings at self-checkouts but says little about those left behind by that convenience.

Secondly, the Government have told the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that they expect uptake to reach 100% within seven years. Will physical identification still be accepted at that point or is this order, in fact, the first step towards its effective retirement? I should welcome clarity from the Minister on how it is meant to function, from a Government who have, by their own choice, abandoned the very digital identity framework on which this order depends.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, one has to love the noble Lord. The opposition spokesman starts talking about the potential challenges in this policy, but I remind him that the consultation took place between January and March 2024, when the Government of which he was a supporter was in office. So, by all means, have a little kick-about on this point but, ultimately, the Government are trying to make a provision that makes it easier for consumers, easier for businesses, and does not do what he has alleged that we are trying to do—stop the use of physical means of identity.

I was clear in my opening comments about the existing use of physical identification. If someone wants to go out on a Saturday night with their passport in their pocket, they can do so. If it meets the criteria that we have set under the scheme that is already in operation, they can do so. Nobody is going to stop them doing that.

We would hope, self-evidently, that people might think that carrying a passport on a Saturday night might not be a good idea, as it could be lost, because it is a physical document that has great value in terms of political capital and in terms of cost of replacement. So a digital scheme could be used. Again, the noble Lord challenges me and says, “Well, isn’t it terrible that the Government have abandoned their digital ID scheme?” The changes operational here are completely separate to the proposals for a national digital ID scheme. Again, I emphasise to the noble Lord that there is no compunction on this. There is an ability to have both, if businesses and consumers wish to do so. That is based on a consultation, I remind the Committee, that was commenced not under this Government but under the previous one.

Yes, the Government have changed our view on national digital ID. That is what happens in government occasionally: Governments look at policy, determine them and decide whether to continue or not. The noble Lord will know that the job of Ministers in this House is sometimes to defend government policy as determined by a range of Governments at the time. If Ministers reflect on representations made by, among others, Opposition Members, that is reasonable. I just say to him that there is a way forward and I think it is that which is in this order today.

I welcome and thank the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for her support and acknowledgement of the contribution of the Proof of Age Standards Scheme over a number of years. She raised a number of valid points and I will try to answer them. I absolutely recognise the need for clear guidance available to businesses and consumers to support the use of digital proof of age for the supply and sale of alcohol. Updating the statutory guidance issued under Section 182 of the Licensing Act is an important part of that, as it guides licensing authorities on the discharges of their functions.

I can say to the noble Baroness that no immediate change will be made to Section 182 guidance in relation to physical ID and that we will not change anything more before further engagement with PASS. I cannot guarantee that there will not be changes in due course, but it is important that she knows that there will be engagement with PASS. We will certainly examine the points that she has made today and those we discussed outside the Committee yesterday. We have already taken into account and made some changes following suggestions from PASS, and I should be happy for the noble Baroness to write to me, as she suggested, with further suggestions that we will consider in due course.

With regard to businesses, I say to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that businesses will incur costs only if they freely choose to adopt digital proof of age. There is no requirement to do so. Training is important but, again, that is a voluntary measure for businesses to examine in relation to the potential introduction of this legislation. The legislation supports the objectives of strengthening age-verification safeguards and preventing underage alcohol sales. It allows premises secure digital methods to verify age.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, it might be something that people take up, and it might reach 100% within a certain period of time. If it does so, as I have given the Committee the assurance today, it will do so because individuals going out who want to give their proof of age find it a more useful, succinct way of doing so on a digital basis via the verification scheme than carrying a driving licence, birth certificate or passport. I think it is a positive thing. It is reported that 57% of 18 to 25 year-olds have experienced forgetting their ID on a night out. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, will know that people very rarely forget their phones on a night out, and the digital ID that will be there will be available, more secure and, I think, valuable. It will not be mandatory. The Government are taking an enabling approach ensuring that we have an additional option rather than replacing existing forms of proof of age. Ultimately, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said, it will be for retailers to maintain their responsibility to ensure that proof of age is present. It is their responsibility to do so, but they remain free to decide which age-verification methods they accept, and consumers remain free to use physical material should they so wish. I will respond to the noble Baroness’s letter in due course.

I hope I have helped the noble Lord. I understand that he is opposed to digital ID. That is a legitimate point of view. We know where we are on that. That is not progressing. This is not linked to that. With that assurance, I hope I can—

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for responding on the point about of Section 182 guidance not, at this stage, being amended for physical sales—that is greatly appreciated from the PASS point of view—but he did not address the issue that retailers in the wine and spirit trade have raised, and I am sure that convenience stores would have similar issues. When will the Section 182 guidance be amended for digital proof of age at the point of sale? We want to make it go smoothly and make sure that there are no altercations and no threats to staff at the point of sale.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I appreciate that. I cannot give the date when this will be implemented. The points the noble Baroness made around training and the need to prepare are valid. We do not have a commencement date yet. My understanding is that this order will go to the House of Commons on Monday next week. Ministers, including the direct Minister responsible, who is in the department, and not me in this case, will take a decision on that. The factors that she has mentioned are important, and I will ensure that no immediate change will be made to Section 182 guidance without further engagement with PASS. We have the ability to implement this order in an ordered way, and I will reflect on what the noble Baroness said, and if I am able to give further information post the letter, I will do so.

Motion agreed.

National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 13 July be approved.

Relevant document: 9th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument)

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the House for its consideration of this draft instrument, which will see three bodies designated: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, and the GRU Volunteer Corps. I know that there has been significant interest in the House in this matter from both Opposition and Liberal Democrat Benches. I hope that they will welcome these regulations today.

Threats from foreign powers and their proxies have grown in scale and complexity. Designation is a powerful tool for disrupting state bodies and those acting in concert with them, and it sends a strong message of the UK’s commitment to tackling foreign power threat activity globally. The Home Secretary has determined that these three bodies are involved in foreign power threat activity and, as such, we propose to designate them under this new power, as I suggested we may do when the Bill, now an Act, went through Parliament recently.

Before I give more detail of the bodies in question, it is worth setting out the legislative basis for this decision. For a body to be designated, the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is involved in foreign power threat activity, as defined in the National Security Act 2023. The definition of foreign power threat activity covers the most serious offences in the Act, including espionage, sabotage and foreign interference. It also covers broader activity that constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety when carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. If that test is met, the Home Secretary must then consider whether designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. She will take into account considerations of foreign policy and the impact on human rights as part of that decision-making process.

Once a group is designated, it will be a criminal offence within the UK’s jurisdiction to support a designated body, assist a designated body or obtain material benefits from a designated body. The penalties for these offences are imprisonment for up to 14 years and/or a fine. Where an individual commits certain espionage conduct or sabotage for a designated body, this can attract sentences of up to life imprisonment. Designation therefore enables law enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt designated bodies more effectively.

Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary will exercise this power only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence, including intelligence material and cross-government advice. A decision to designate is taken only after great care and consideration, and, as noble Lords will know, it must be approved by both Houses. It was approved by the House of Commons yesterday evening.

For the benefit of noble Lords I will give some explanation of the bodies in question. First, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a group that has been commented on significantly in this House over many months, before the gracious Speech and since. The long-standing threat posed by Iran and its proxies is no secret. We know that the Iranian intelligence services have established a pattern of targeting dissidents, Persian-language media organisations and journalists, as well as Jewish and Israeli communities globally.

The IRGC Quds Force and IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Its role extends beyond conventional military operations and includes intelligence activity, the use of proxy actors and influence operations designed to advance Iranian state objectives. Activity linked to the IRGC has included threats to life and intimidation on UK soil, including credible plots to target individuals in the United Kingdom. The IRGC supports militant actors overseas and has been associated with cyber and other state threats activity aligned with Iranian state objectives. I know that noble Lords across all parts of this House have great concerns about that body.

The Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, otherwise known as Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyah, has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and Persian-language media, including an antisemitic attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March, a well-known arson attack that Members will be aware of. Sitting behind the IMCR were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, who almost certainly directed IMCR attacks across Europe. These incidents, including acts of arson and intimidation, have caused real fear and distress and have had a profound impact on those communities. It is clear that this sustained activity directly threatens the safety and interests of the United Kingdom.

The GRU Volunteer Corps is Russia’s threat to the United Kingdom in a form that extends far beyond conventional military action to include state threats. Moreover, the Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force, nor a loose collection of volunteers; it is a proxy organisation operating under the direction and control of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service.

These formations are directed, supported and sustained by the GRU and are already operating across conflict zones, most notably in Ukraine in support of Russia’s illegal invasion. What we are seeing is a conscious attempt by the Russian state to blur the lines between military action, intelligence activity and criminality, using deniable forces to carry out sabotage, destabilisation and violence beyond its borders. This is not conjecture. It reflects a pattern of behaviour that underpins Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and that has been seen repeatedly across Europe, including here in the United Kingdom.

In 2024, two men organised an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned business in east London. They acted on behalf of the Wagner Group—another proxy body that acts on behalf of the Russian state and is proscribed as a terrorist organisation. It is notable that large parts of the Wagner Group have also been absorbed into this so-called Volunteer Corps, which demonstrates the threat posed to the United Kingdom by this group.

With noble Lords’ consent, these bodies will be designated. Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary has decided that there is sufficient evidence for her to reasonably believe that each body is involved in foreign power threat activity and that designation is necessary to protect the United Kingdom. Designation will strengthen our ability to disrupt these bodies and those who support and facilitate them. More broadly, it sends a powerful message to any foreign power or proxy that the United Kingdom will not allow harm to ourselves or our interests, and that we will do whatever it takes to prevent such activity on our soil.

In conclusion, these bodies operate in different ways but are united in their role of endangering the safety and interests of the United Kingdom through violence, intimidation and destabilisation. I know this House has called for designation. It is a proportionate and necessary response, and this Government will continue to use every available tool to confront state threats wherever they arise. I commend this instrument to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Let me first welcome the noble Baroness back to the Home Office, even if it is only a temporary glitch. Let me also, through her, pass on my thanks to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for their broad support for the Bill, which has allowed us, now that it is an Act, to effect these designations. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his broad support for the proposals before the House today.

As the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, mentioned, this proposal came out of, first, a manifesto commitment to have a review, and secondly, Jonathan Hall KC bringing forward proposals on how we deal with state threats. I am grateful to His Majesty’s Official Opposition and to the Liberal Democrats for their support in helping get the state threats Act, as it now is, through Parliament. There were some challenges, there were some amendments which we accepted from the Liberal Democrats, and there were some amendments that I tried to explain from His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, but with that Act passed only a couple of weeks ago and Royal Assent granted only in the last 10 days or so, we have got to a position which has allowed us to bring forward these regulations for the reasons that I outlined.

I think there was general consensus from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, that this measure is required for these groups, for the reasons I outlined in my opening speech. I do not intend to delay the House too long on those matters, because I think there is general consensus that we need to do this.

In discussions that we had with both Opposition Front Benches in the run-up to the state threats Bill before it became an Act, I tried to indicate that the Act was being proposed for a purpose, and today is the first use of that power for a definitive purpose. We wanted to have that Act at speed, and I pressed both Front Benches very hard to get it through speedily, because we needed, in my view and in the view of the Home Secretary, to get this legislation passed, both in the House of Commons, which rises today, and in the House of Lords, where we face another week in Parliament, as quickly as possible. That means that this designation, once I sign the order, if it is agreed by this House, can be put into effect fairly soon. For all those reasons, I welcome the support of both Front Benches, including their support for further action, as the noble Baroness asked for.

In the gracious Speech, we promised a state security Bill later in the parliamentary Session. It will cover a number of issues, which the House will not expect me to go into because the Bill has not yet been published, but we discussed issues such as passports in Committee on the state threats Bill, and I gave indications that we wanted to take action on that. On the display of a Palestinian flag but not an IRGC flag, and the illegality of that, if a person expresses support in any way, and if their reasons for doing so are prejudicial to the safety of the United Kingdom, they will commit an offence. I hope that gives the noble Baroness some reassurance. That is different from the provisions in the Terrorism Act and reflects the reality of dealing with bodies that benefit from protection under international law. Individual decisions to arrest or charge will be for the police and prosecutors, but people who glorify terrorism will potentially face action in future.

The noble Baroness asked me about not criminalising the specific offence of the display or wearing of certain articles of clothing. I said during debates on amendments to the state threats Bill that we consider that the supporting of a designated body offence is wide enough to capture the display or wearing of articles when this is done for a prohibited purpose. It was therefore, in our view, unnecessary to create a specific offence, while also avoiding potential enforceability challenges by foreign state officials who are protected by international law. Whether we like that or not, that is the situation. I gave that explanation to the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron, and I give it now to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford. I hope that she will recognise that there will be further action downstream. As a former Minister in the Home Office, she will know that I cannot say what, I cannot say when, and I cannot give detail, but, if she remembers, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, will concur with this, I could not say when or what or give detail about the regulations that I have brought forward today, but those regulations are here.

For the reasons I have mentioned and with gratitude for the support of both Opposition Front Benches, I condemn—no, not condemn; it has been a long day waiting for the debate—I commend these regulations to the House and hope Hansard will treat me kindly.

Motion agreed.

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Temporary Class Drug) Order 2026

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 15th July 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Order laid before the House on 10 June be approved.

Relevant document: 6th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 14 July.

Motion agreed.