Extradition Arrangements: European Union Member States

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what reciprocal extradition arrangements are in place for the surrender of nationals between the United Kingdom and the European Union member states where the surrender of such nationals to a third country is forbidden or restricted by law.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, some EU member states operate on the fundamental principle that they cannot extradite their citizens outside the EU. We have ensured in our new arrangements that there is a path to justice in each case—for example, by requiring a member state that refuses to refer the case to its own prosecuting authorities.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

I thank the Minister for her Answer. We all know about the difficulties with the United States in the tragic Harry Dunn case; despite the pleas of the Foreign Secretary, it refuses to extradite an American lady for serious offences committed on British soil. Is it now the same with Europe? What differences are there between our arrangements today with the 27 EU states in our new status as a third country, so far as they are concerned, and our long-time arrangements with the USA?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The fundamental difference between then and now is the additional safeguards built into the proceedings, which in my view make them a more effective set of arrangements. There is also the notion of proportionality, which is crucial for both accused and victim.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the Home Secretary claims that Brexit makes us safer. Is the sharp decrease in extradition cases at Westminster Magistrates’ Court, from about 10 cases a day to about one, a direct result of losing fast access to the European crime DNA databases? Does this reflect the position nationally?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

We are on day 14 of the new arrangements so it is probably a bit difficult to give reliable data at this point. The agreement allows UK law enforcement to continue to share DNA and fingerprints so I am slightly confused by the premise of the noble and learned Lord’s question.

[Lord Walney (Non-Afl)]

Will the Minister set out what the extra safeguards are to which she referred and how she envisages they will work in practice?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The additional safeguards, beyond those in the European arrest warrant framework decision, make clear that a person cannot be surrendered if their fundamental rights are at risk—which might include things such as political views, sexual orientation, race and religion—if extradition would be disproportionate or if they are likely to face long periods of pre-trial detention.

[Lord Robathan (Con)]

My Lords, the late, lamented European arrest warrant certainly brought benefits in cross-border justice, but there is a presumption that the rule of law is the same in all EU states, which it is not. Could my noble friend look at political interference and corruption in any extradition or asylum case, particularly in the case of Alexander Adamescu, a German national fighting extradition to Romania under some very dubious circumstances?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My noble friend outlines the answer to the previous question about extradition for political reasons. That is not allowed under our arrangements.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, what assessment have the Government made of the additional cost of trials of those wanted in the UK having to take place in the accused’s home country, and to what extent will that be a consideration in deciding whether to pursue a prosecution?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

As I said to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, it is probably quite early to say what those additional costs would be, but the decision on whether to pursue a trial would be based not on costs but on the likelihood of that trial being successful, either for the accused or indeed for the victim.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, many people felt that the European arrest warrant offered insufficient safeguards for the rights of those accused of crimes overseas. Can the Minister assure us that the replacement arrangements for the European arrest warrant offer solid and reciprocal protection, as far as possible, for the rights of the accused?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I can certainly assure my noble friend that the principle of proportionality is implemented in UK law through Sections 2, 12A and 21A of the Extradition Act 2003. It enshrines the principle of proportionality, which allows the UK to reject warrants where extradition would not be proportionate to the alleged conduct or where other, less intrusive measures could be used to progress an investigation. This is a much-needed improvement on the previous arrangements.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, what steps have been taken to identify and appoint those persons who are to serve as our representatives on the very important specialised committee to which Article 83 of the “Surrender” part of the trade and co-operation agreement refers?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I will have to get back to the noble and learned Lord because I do not know where that is up to.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

As the Minister said, our trade and co-operation agreement with the EU makes clear that extradition can be refused where a person’s fundamental rights are at risk or where

“they are likely to face long delays of pretrial detention”.

What are the Government going to do to ensure that delays, particularly in the current situation, and an overreliance on detention do not prevent extradition or the pursuit of justice?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The pursuit of justice is paramount but so are the issues of fundamental rights. There is no reason why the new system should not be as swift but, as my noble friends have outlined, it is very important that some of those fundamental rights are upheld.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD) [V]]

My Lords, what are we to rely on in these matters, the Panglossian statements of the Home Secretary or the experience of a former National Security Adviser, the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, who has said publicly that our position now in these matters is one of damage limitation?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

By chance, I heard the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, outlining some of his concerns on the radio. I bow to his expertise but there is probably some difference in our interpretation of what he outlined, particularly on access to databases and the sharing of information.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

My Lords, together with our departure from the Schengen Information System, there appears to be no replacement for the respective instruments on joint investigative teams, the enforcement of fines, the enforcement of non-custodial measures and prisoner transfer. Please will the Minister tell the House how these gaps will be filled?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord will know that the EU maintained that it was legally impossible to offer SIS II to a non-Schengen third country so we have reverted to Interpol, which is a tried and tested mechanism of co-operation. Regarding the joint investigative teams, the UK will be able to continue running and participating in those with EU member states and third countries on a non-EU legal basis. Prisoner transfers are a Ministry of Justice lead. The EU did not want to include arrangements on them in the agreement but we will continue to transfer foreign offenders back to their home states using the existing Council of Europe convention, as well as accepting the repatriation of any British citizen imprisoned by an EU member state who is eligible and wants to return to the UK to serve their sentence.

[Baroness Wheatcroft (CB) [V]]

My Lords, on the day when the United States has executed a woman for the first time in 67 years, it is fitting that we should be addressing the subject of extradition. Even without the death penalty, the plea-bargaining system produces unjust results. Would the Minister feel confident about UK citizens being extradited for a vengeful trial in the US legal system?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Baroness will know that we are against the death penalty in all cases. I have talked about some of the fundamental rights and that may or may not be included in them, but we are against the death penalty. The noble Baroness is talking about the EU; it is important that people are brought to justice but it is also important that their fundamental rights are upheld.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord Fowler)]

My Lords, all supplementary questions have been asked on this Question, which shows that it can be done with sensible discipline.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

I am with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson: the gift horse needs a bit more to chomp on. We support there being clear provision in the Bill to deal with the problem of “lawful for all purposes”.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which I think has gone on now for over two and a half hours, signalling the importance of this subject and this Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, started off by really pressing the importance of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. She was, of course, supported in that endeavour by the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, Lady Bryan of Partick, Lady Blower, and my noble friend Lord Cormack. I agree absolutely wholeheartedly with those sentiments of democracy and the rule of law.

However, it also led me to reflect, thinking about events the other day on Capitol Hill, on some of the events that have taken place close to our Parliament in the last few years. The noble Baroness will recall her erstwhile colleague John McDonnell, saying:

“Parliamentary democracy doesn’t work for us … we used to call it insurrection. Now we are polite and say, ‘direct action’. Let’s get back to calling it what it is. It is insurrection. We want to bring this Government down by whatever mechanism we have.”


I stand by the principles of democracy and the rule of law, and that there can be no departure from them. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, whom I do consider my noble friend, posits some of the points that noble Lords have made about whether we are dodging the rule of law. We are not. We are putting covert human intelligence sources engaging in criminal conduct beyond statutory doubt in the Bill.

I will begin with Amendments 1 and 2. The question of whether properly authorised conduct should be rendered lawful or left open to prosecution was discussed at great length in Committee. I have listened very carefully to the points made by noble Lords on this issue, and to the views of operational partners, and the Government’s view is that the approach in the Bill as drafted is the right one. It seems unfair and unreasonable for different approaches to be taken here from those for other investigatory powers, such as interception and equipment interference, where otherwise criminal conduct is rendered lawful by properly granted authorisation.

In response to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, regarding the assertion of my noble and learned friend the Advocate-General for Scotland—and I thank the noble Lord for giving me notice that he would be making this point—that all noble Lords agree with this position, clearly, if he does not, then it is not the case. However, I hope that most noble Lords can see the merit of the Government’s position on this issue. Covert human intelligence sources operate in the background and take great personal risks to keep the wider public safe from harm. It seems a disservice to them to expect them to carry out this activity and not provide them with the appropriate protection for doing what they were asked to do.

Noble Lords are all aware, and I think appreciate, that we are limited in what we can say publicly about this tactic, so I am afraid that I cannot go any further. What I can say is that we risk damaging the future operation of this tactic if we take the approach suggested in these amendments. At the end of the day, CHISs are humans. Each CHIS is one of us and not a machine that can be switched on and off. We must do what we can in this Bill to protect them in exchange for the work that they do on our behalf to protect us.

Amendment 3 seeks to remove the exemption from civil liability for CHIS criminal conduct. Let me start by setting out the legal position in RIPA. The effect of a valid authorisation under Part 2 of RIPA is that authorised conduct is rendered

“lawful for all purposes”

by Section 27. Section 27 sets out a requirement for the conduct to be in accordance with an authorisation in order for it to be made lawful for all purposes. Where a court finds that the authorisation under the Bill does not meet the requirements of the new Section 29B, or where the conduct goes beyond what is permitted by the authorisation, it will not be rendered lawful. I will make this point again, as it is very important: an authorisation will have been granted because the authorised conduct was deemed to be both necessary and proportionate to tackle threats such as crime, terrorism or hostile state activity—and, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, says, it is laid out in the code of practice. Where that authorisation has been validly and lawfully granted, it is right that those criminals or terrorists cannot then sue the CHIS or the state for that same vital activity.

Let me be clear that it is not the intention of the Bill to close off routes of redress where an authorisation has not been lawfully granted, or where a person has been the victim of conduct by a CHIS that was not covered by the tightly bound authorisation. It is right that in these cases appropriate routes of redress remain open to those affected. For example, where the person is a victim of conduct not covered by the tightly drawn criminal conduct authorisation, the authorisation would not offer protection from criminal liability. This would mean that the conduct was not rendered lawful, the person could report the crime in the normal way to the police and the normal routes of redress would be available. The approach that we have taken in the Bill does not leave open the possibility of criminals and terrorists suing public authorities for legitimate and lawful activity, but it will still be possible for innocent people to seek redress where appropriate. That is why the Government cannot accept Amendment 3.

Amendment 32, from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to ensure that conduct authorised under the Bill is within the remit of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. I absolutely assure him that this will already be the case. Section 65 of RIPA sets out that conduct to which Part 2 of RIPA applies falls within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The Bill creates a new Section 29B which will be inserted into Part 2 of RIPA. Any person or organisation will be able to make a complaint to the tribunal regarding CHIS criminal conduct. The tribunal also has the same remedies available to it as other courts, including the ability to grant compensation. This amendment is therefore not necessary.

Responding to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, I should first highlight that CHISs are authorised in essence for the purpose of acquiring information. A CHIS will be authorised to participate in criminal conduct only where it is truly necessary in connection with that overall aim. The proposal to carve out certain activity from the Bill is inconsistent with the approach of the Bill, which is to render properly authorised conduct lawful for all purposes. I assure the noble Baroness that a CHIS could not be authorised for the purpose of legalising an otherwise unlawful profit-making exercise, as it would not be necessary for a statutory purpose.

In Amendment 21, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, seeks reassurance that the Bill will not provide a blanket immunity that results in improper conduct being excluded from prosecution. I can be very clear on this point. I would expect any improper conduct on behalf of an authorising officer to be picked up by the stringent safeguards that are in place, thereby preventing such an authorisation being granted in the first place. However, if an authorisation did not meet all the requirements of new Section 29B, a court could find that authorisation to be invalid. The conduct would not then be rendered lawful and prosecutions could be brought.

In practice, if the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office felt that an authorisation was improperly granted, it would flag up any concerns that it had to the authorising authority. This could include recommending that it refers the conduct to the appropriate authorities. While the primary responsibility for reporting crime rests with the authorising public authority, IPCO could refer a case directly to the appropriate authorities, subject to the process set out in the Investigatory Powers Act. The courts could then decide whether the authorisation was improperly granted and therefore whether it was unlawful.

As a matter of public law, a decision made subject to a discretionary power, such as the decision to issue a criminal conduct authorisation, must be “reasonable”. The decision must be rationally open to a reasonable decision-maker in possession of the facts of the case, or it will be unlawful. In terms of the additional reassurance that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, sought, it is clear that authorising officers must be acting lawfully when properly granting a CCA. That does not prevent a prosecution of that officer for having improperly granted a CCA, including for misconduct in a public office if the authorisation was corruptly granted—but we would expect a court to consider the validity of that CCA as a preliminary issue.

I can also confirm that judicial commissioners have the ability to report conduct directly to prosecutors, subject to the process set out in the Investigatory Powers Act, and that anyone who has been impacted by a criminal conduct authorisation can make a complaint before the IPT. Where that complaint is upheld the IPT can provide redress, including compensation.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, with regard to the criminal injuries compensation scheme, the Minister said that the Bill does not “in practice”—I stress those words—interfere with its operation. Can she confirm that it does not interfere with the scheme either in law, as distinct from practice, or as the scheme is currently drawn; in other words, should we regard the term “in practice” as limiting the scope for application to it, which noble Lords have made clear is something that concerns us?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I noticed that the noble Baroness mentioned that point in her speech. The practical application of this will not interfere with the operation of the scheme. She is shaking her head—I do not think she is very satisfied.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has spoken in this debate and was quite humbled by so many of the speeches—both those I agreed with and many with which I disagreed—not just by the kind remarks about me and my intentions with these amendments, but by the sheer eloquence and experience which so many noble Lords displayed on all sides of your Lordships’ House. Please forgive me if I do not pay appropriate tribute to everyone individually, as I am sure your Lordships would not thank me for the amount of time that that exercise would take.

We have been dealing with some difficult realities on this legislation, but also some important principles. That has come across in the nature of this important debate. The noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Naseby, and others, talked about difficult realities from both sides of the argument. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave a speech rooted in being, as far as I noticed, the only former police officer who has spoken on the Bill. His picture of handing out banknotes to undercover agents is not a difficult reality, designed to undermine the importance of using undercover agents in the community. It is not designed to undermine the difficult reality of some of those people being current or former criminals—or, indeed, having turned terrorist, for that matter. But it is important to demonstrate that not everyone involved in this kind of activity—in the past, present or future—has been or will be of the character or ability of the finest trained officers and agents. There will necessarily be a variation; that is a difficult reality.

I do not say this to criticise the need to have undercover operatives. It just makes the checks and balances in a democracy founded on the rule of law even more important. I say that to those who are flabbergasted at the idea that I should not just take the Government’s case studies without looking at any other experience, including that of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I think it was the Minister who said, rightly, that undercover agents—or CHIS—are human. They cannot be turned off and on. I absolutely agree; they are human, as we all are, and therefore flawed. They are not robots; they cannot be pre-programmed to cover every situation in the moment. We therefore need to create ethical incentives, not just blanket immunity. We have been dealing with the difficult realities of having to go undercover and keep cover. That will mean engaging in criminal activity, perhaps quite serious criminal activity such as being a member of a terrorist group or dealing drugs, for example.

There are also important principles such as the rule of law, as rightly pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, even if he did not agree with my emphasis or my argument. He is right, and so is the Minister, in saying that the clarity and accessibility of the law are important rule-of-law principles. With that in mind, there is great value in putting these matters on a clear statutory footing. This is so that the public at large understand, in a clear statute for all to see, if they look it up, that sometimes undercover agents of the state will be authorised to engage in crime for the purposes of keeping their cover. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the Minister are quite right to say that that is one attempt towards the rule of law.

However, another foundational principle of the rule of law in any jurisdiction anywhere in the world is equality before the law—as expounded by my noble friends Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, Lady Bryan, Lady Blower, Lord Hendy, Lord Judd, and many others. Equality before the law means that there is one law of the land for Prime Ministers, police officers—uniformed or undercover—and undercover agents or CHIS. That creates a conundrum for us: how can we respect equality before the law but also authorise criminal activity in certain situations in order to keep us safe? That is a genuine conundrum that I accept we are having to engage with here.

How does our current law tend to grapple with such a conundrum? Generally, this is not done by advance blanket licence or immunity, but by defences. Whether reasonable excuse defences or public interest defences are used, these would be taken into account by an investigating officer, prosecutor or, if necessary—and it does not seem to be very often—by a court after the fact. That is the kind of regime which protects all of us, including officers and agents and people who put themselves in difficult situations in harm’s way. This includes the armed police officers who are marksmen and those who protect all of us in your Lordships’ House. Those brave uniformed officers, who have sometimes made the ultimate sacrifice to defend your Lordships’ House, have used whatever reasonable force they could. They have done this, not with advance immunity, but in the knowledge that they were doing what was right and in the public interest. They have reasonable force defences or reasonable excuse defences, and nobody would dream of prosecuting them in the public interest. If it is good enough—

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it speaks well of the House that there is such concern about safeguards to buttress criminal conduct authorisations while, on the whole, accepting their use. Noble Lords identify the need for external validation and the oversight of the activities of different agents—of course, here we are dealing only with criminal conduct authorisations, not the whole of what they do—who are not identical across all the “public authorities”, as they are called, that fall within the Bill. We need to deal with all of them.

In most amendments, noble Lords identify the importance of someone with the authority of high judicial office, who therefore commands confidence, as well as the need to be practical, putting their arguments in the context of operational demands and realities, and paying attention to the timeframe. Of course, there are different proposals. I recall a discussion in a Select Committee a while ago about how, when you are a Minister, having to sign things off brings home to you that you are accountable—you have to answer for your decisions. We have heard from colleagues who have held high political office—of course, I have not had experience of this or judicial office. We support judicial authorisation.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked who judges the judges—but there is always that question, in the same way that there is always the question of who scrutinises the scrutineers. I have had the impression that the very experience of considering something after the event equips one for considering issues in advance, and commissioners are judges as well.

My noble friend spoke to all the amendments, including our Amendment 43, which is an outlier, not because it is inconsistent with the others—it is not—but because it is about a review of the regime rather than particular grants of CCAs. We do not suggest that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is not alert to how CHIS may be used, but Amendment 43 would provide for a review of the regime—or the scheme, if you like—in the round, as distinct from tweaking legislation, which is what we are doing now, in response to court proceedings. As my noble friend said, it attempts to square the circle.

In their response to the JCHR, published this morning, the Government said on the issue of review that the current process

“provides for systemic review of all public authorities’ use of the power and allows for continuous improvement”

and so on. I think that “systemic” is probably not a typo, but I wondered whether it meant “systematic”; maybe it means both. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, would say it means “systemic”.

On Amendment 17, my noble friend stood back to consider the process as a whole; if he sets the grant of a CCA in the context of the deployment of the CHIS, it applies to agents used by the police and the intelligence services—not in exactly the same situations, of course—and provides for urgency.

We sought in Committee to answer the question of what follows with our own amendment to that of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Amendment 34, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, addresses the need for an outcome. His amendment is clear about determination, and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said he would accept it. I was interested in the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, about how the matter might evolve. We do not oppose Amendments 33 and 34, but notification is not approval, as noble Lords have noted, so they are different issues, and the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and our amendment are compatible. My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford was very persuasive on the possible fallout if there is no prior notification. The breadth of his speech has spared me, and therefore your Lordships, having to wind up on that, so I am grateful to him.

In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, spoke of

“operational practicality together with rigorous scrutiny.”—[Official Report, 24/11/20; col. 210.]

I would summarise amendments on the subject of this debate as indicating that we prize independence, objectivity and respect for the rule of law—the protection of the citizen against the state as well as by it. We particularly support, of course, Amendment 5 and our Amendment 17.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this long but worthwhile debate. First, I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. I could have just referred noble Lords to his speech then sat down, because he made his points so succinctly and brought out some case examples. My noble friend Lord King talked about the recent NCA operation that managed to yield so much thanks to undercover operatives.

I also echo for a moment the summary by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and join her in thanking some of the undercover operatives who, as she said, literally risk their lives. I do not know, as I have not met any of them, but she is an expert in this area and, if she says that, I join her in tribute to them. There are no motives ulterior to keeping the public safe. She talked pertinently about oversight combined with the expertise provided for by this Bill and made the point that, when she started, there was no law at all governing the framework of this activity. She also talked about the Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation—the two that were in our House and have contributed so much to this Bill, the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson—and made the true point that there can be no exact accusation of conflict of interest with them. She talked about the vital role of the IPC—the report he does on a regular basis and the independence of the role. She talked about the double lock and made the point that judges have changed over the years, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, said, but so have the police and MI5. Noble Lords—the noble Lord, Lord Hain, in particular—will talk about some of the things that happened that under our new legal framework would not be either necessary or proportionate and would be ruled as such.

I shall start with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner: I want to welcome his most recent annual report, which was published during the passage of this Bill. He already plays an important role in providing independent oversight of this activity. But I have always been clear that the Government are willing to listen to the concerns of noble Lords and consider amendments to strengthen the Bill, providing they do not have an adverse effect on the ability of public authorities to do their job and keep us safe.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

While I have the opportunity, I thank the noble Lord for the conversation we had the other day—it was very helpful in allowing me to know exactly what both noble Lords required. I cannot give that undertaking at the Dispatch Box but I can go back and ascertain just how often the Home Secretary receives these reports and whether the Investigatory Powers Commissioner might be thinking of making more regular reports in future if necessary, or indeed spot reports as and when required. I can certainly undertake to do that.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

I too thank the Minister for her reply and for her engagement. It is clear from the balance of the debate that there is no point in my pressing Amendment 16, and therefore when the time comes, I will not seek to divide the House on it.

However, to follow up on the question of my noble friend Lord Blunkett, will the Minister give an assurance that the Home Secretary will take a particular interest in the most politically sensitive deployment of a CHIS, which is the area that has given rise to real worry? Whether that is in the form of a quarterly report or regular interactions with the head of the Metropolitan Police, other chief constables and the head of the security services is a matter for consideration, but there should be some hands-on authority by the Home Secretary and regular interest in deployments in politically sensitive areas.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

It was very good for us to have a chat the other day because we could discuss things that clearly we cannot discuss on the Floor of the House. I completely understood the sensitivity between some very nuanced situations and the purely operational role of the deployment of CHIS for criminal conduct. I will most certainly go back and put those points. Again, I thank the noble Lord for the time he took to discuss his concerns with me.

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[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Before I comment on these amendments, I am told that there was a tweet earlier today from the Commons Minister on this Bill, James Brokenshire, saying that he has had a recurrence of a tumour in part of his lung and that he is taking leave for curative surgery. I am sure that I am not alone in wanting to extend best wishes to him for a full recovery.

I will be brief, because everything that needs to be said on Amendment 6 has already been said. It requires a person authorising a criminal conduct authorisation to reasonably believe that the tests for authorisation are met and are necessary and proportionate. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, referred to what the Solicitor-General had said at Second Reading in the Commons, to the effect that the code of practice sets out that there does need to be a reasonable belief that an authorisation is necessary and proportionate. As we have heard, there is wording in part of the code of practice that is not—let us say—quite as strong as the words of the Solicitor-General in the Commons.

Crucially, once again, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said in Committee, the notion of reasonableness is completely absent from the Bill, which the courts would treat as the authoritative source. Like others, I see no reason why the Government are not prepared to put the word “reasonable” in the Bill. We certainly support Amendment 6.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I heard earlier today that my right honourable friend James Brokenshire had to go in for some more surgery; I pay tribute to him. He is one of the most decent people in politics and an extraordinarily capable Minister. He has never been far from my mind this afternoon, as not only has he mentored me but we discussed and worked closely on every aspect of the Bill. I wish him a very speedy recovery.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to add an explicit requirement for an authorising officer’s belief that the conduct is both necessary and proportionate to be a reasonable one. I have already explained why the Government cannot support this proposal. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, almost spelled out the reasons I was going to give, which are a bit of a repetition and with which I am not sure he will be entirely satisfied. However, since Committee I have updated the CHIS code of practice to make it clearer that it is expected that the belief should be a reasonable one.

I caution against an amendment seeking to include this wording in the Bill, as it would cast doubt on the test that is expected to apply to other authorisations. In particular, it could have unintended consequences for a Section 29 use and conduct authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. Including the need for a reasonable belief here, creating an inconsistency in the legislation, would create uncertainty over whether the same requirement exists for the underlying Section 29 authorisation. As I mentioned earlier, as a matter of public law, a decision made subject to a discretionary power must be reasonable; that is, the decision must be rationally open to a reasonable decision-maker in possession of the facts in the case.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has also called for the length of authorisations to be reduced from 12 months to four months, with a formal requirement for a monthly review of the authorisation. As I have said, the current authorisation period of 12 months is consistent with the authorisation for the use and conduct of CHIS, which will need to be in place before criminal conduct can be authorised. Keeping the Bill consistent with the powers laid out in Section 29 will ensure that this power remains operationally workable for the public authorities using it.

While the code of practice is clear that an authorisation must be relied on for as short a duration as possible, and in many cases an authorisation will not last longer than four months, reducing the maximum length risks unintended consequences; for example, a shorter duration could mean that activity is rushed through in a shorter period of time, to avoid renewal or to demonstrate the value of a deployment to support a renewal. This clearly may not be the most effective or safest way of carrying out that conduct. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness is sufficiently reassured to withdraw her amendment.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

My Lords, I gather that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, would like to speak after the Minister.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

Does the Minister wish to reply?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I will use the opportunity because the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, talked about the codes of practice, as he has done consistently; I would just like to raise those again.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

--- Later in debate ---

This is the first time I have spoken on this Bill on Report. I am very grateful to and want to offer my sincere thanks to all the police officers, MI5 and MI6 officers and others who undertake very dangerous work to keep us safe. We need safeguards and protections in place and clear codes of practice. People must be held accountable to those, so that agents are clear what they can and cannot do and how they must behave when they are deployed. It is important we get that right with the necessary protections. Sometimes people are authorised to commit crimes in limited circumstances, but they are doing that to prevent much more serious crime taking place. In doing this dangerous work, they get some very dangerous people off our streets—be they terrorists, drug dealers, gun-runners, paedophiles, murderers or other dangerous criminals. I will not support any amendments in this group on which we are dividing today.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords in this group who have paid their respects and tributes to my right honourable friend James Brokenshire. I will ensure that he gets all the comments in the form of a consolidated Hansard, so that he can see what kind things people have been saying about him.

I reassure noble Lords that the decisions taken when drafting this Bill have been informed by the input of operational partners. This includes the circumstances where it is necessary to authorise a CHIS to participate in criminal conduct to ultimately ensure that we can prevent terrorism, crime and harm to the public.

However, we have been robust in ensuring the power is only as broad as it is truly necessary to be. For that reason, we have restricted the public authorities able to authorise a CCA from those able to authorise a CHIS more broadly. It is also for that reason that we have reduced the statutory purposes for which a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted from the six that are available for a Section 29 CHIS use and conduct authorisation under RIPA. The remaining purposes have been included because there is operational evidence that they are required to keep us safe. I gave examples for each purpose in Committee and I am not going to repeat them all here, but I will highlight the impact this might have of the daily lives of the public.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has given two examples. Another example, which the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, alluded to is food crime—such as the extension of meat durability dates leading to out-of-date food being consumed. It is damaging and, as he said, it can be dangerous to public health, but it might not meet the serious crime threshold. I again offer reassurance, particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that the necessity and proportionality requirements apply for all authorisations. Activity could not be authorised if it was more serious than the activity it seeks to prevent and that is the test.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked me about other forms of legitimate activity. Normal trade union activity would of course be perfectly outwith the test that I have just outlined.

I understand that the intention behind Amendment 11 is to prevent CHIS being authorised to act as agents provocateurs. However, the amendment as drafted goes much broader than that. It seeks to prohibit any CHIS from being authorised to encourage or assist in the commission of any offence. That would impose broad and clearly unintended constraints on criminal conduct authorisations.

I sought to provide reassurance on the issue of agents provocateurs in Committee, where I stressed the requirement for all CHIS authorisations to be given in line with the Human Rights Act. But perhaps I can be even clearer: CHIS cannot be used to entrap people in crimes in the manner suggested. Article 6 of the ECHR, which protects the right to a fair trial, prevents this happening. I also point noble Lords to the publicly available Undercover Policing: Authorised Professional Practice, which states in very clear terms that an undercover officer must not act as an agent provocateur. I understand that noble Lords may wish to test the opinion of the House, but I hope I have provided the necessary reassurance on this point.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)]

I have received two requests to ask short questions, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern.

Okay—there is no Lord Mackay, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

Antique Firearms Regulations 2020

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Wednesday 6th January 2021 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Antique Firearms Regulations 2020.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the regulations were laid before this House on 9 November. This country has some of the toughest gun controls in the world and we keep them under review to safeguard against abuse by criminals and terrorists. The Offensive Weapons Act 2019 banned certain rapid-firing rifles and devices known as bump stocks and, in December, we began a three-month surrender and compensation scheme to take these and a range of offensive weapons out of civilian possession. In November, we launched a public consultation on a range of firearms safety issues, including security requirements for high-powered rifles.

The regulations will prevent criminals exploiting a lack of clarity in the current law to gain possession of antique firearms for use in crime. Under the Firearms Act 1968, antique firearms that are possessed, purchased, sold or acquired as “a curiosity or ornament” are exempt from most of our firearms laws, including licensing control. Unfortunately, the Act does not define “antique firearm”. The Home Office has published guidance on which firearms can safely be regarded as antique, but criminals have been taking advantage of the lack of a legal definition to obtain old but functioning firearms for use in crime.

The number of antique firearms recovered per year in criminal circumstances increased from four in 2007 to 96 in 2016. The number of recoveries has since decreased but remains at an unacceptably high level. In more than half these recoveries, ammunition capable of being used with a firearm was also present. Sadly, there have been six fatalities since 2007 linked to the use of antique firearms. The problem was highlighted by the Law Commission in 2015. It recommended that there be a statutory definition of “antique firearm”. The Government accepted this recommendation and included a power in the Policing and Crime Act 2017 to define “antique firearm” in regulations. The Home Office held a public consultation to seek views on the detail of the definition. After careful consideration of the feedback, and following discussions with expert stakeholders on the technical aspects, I am pleased that we are now able to bring forward these important regulations.

The regulations will define in law which firearms can safely be regarded as antique and therefore exempt from control, and which should be subject to licensing. They are based closely on the existing Home Office guidance, so will be familiar to law enforcement, collectors and dealers alike. They specify a cut-off date of manufacture, after which a firearm cannot qualify as an antique. They also specify a range of propulsion systems and obsolete cartridges which are safe to be regarded as antique.

When read with the relevant provisions in the Firearms Act 1968, the regulations will mean that, to be regarded as an antique, a firearm must be held as a curiosity or ornament, have been manufactured before 1 September 1939, and either have a propulsion system specified in the regulations or be chambered for one of the obsolete cartridges specified in the regulations. Following concerns raised by law enforcement, the list of obsolete cartridges does not include seven types that, together with their associated firearms, feature most often in crimes involving antique firearms. This means that those firearms will no longer be regarded as antique.

I realise that omitting these seven cartridges will be disappointing for collectors, who will see a drop in the value of their associated firearms. However, public safety is paramount, and it is the Government’s duty to protect communities from gun crime. We are being balanced in our response to this problem. Existing owners of firearms will be able to retain them on a firearms certificate and we will make commencement regulations to allow a transition period of three months for them to do so.

We have also added 23 obsolete cartridges to the list following advice from law enforcement that they will not present a threat to public safety. This brings additional firearms into the definition of “antique”.

The Government want to ensure that these regulations remain relevant and effective. There will be annual reviews to consider the latest developments in criminal use of antique firearms. We will also carry out a full review of the regulations every three years. Law enforcement and representatives of collectors and dealers will be involved in these reviews.

Public safety is the Government’s top priority and these draft regulations will help to prevent criminal use of antique firearms. I commend them to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.

Turning first to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, he nobly assists me in so much these days. Yesterday, he and the noble Lord, Lord Young, gave an absolutely fantastic lesson in how, by not doing things, we will come to regret them years later. Far from feeling as if I have been stalked, I have been greatly assisted by him, particularly when we can improve on what went before. The noble Lord stated his support for the regulations and I agree with his words: there is no real inconvenience in registering what people have and, if it helps to improve safety, all the better.

The noble Lord, Lord Addington, asked about the cut-off date of 1939 and thought that 1914—or maybe 1918—would be a rather lovely date. Law enforcement and some other respondents to the Home Office’s consultation preferred a 1900 cut-off date. Although moving the date from 1939 to 1900 would reduce the risk from firearms of that period by requiring them all to be licensed, the majority of firearms manufactured during that period do not in fact feature in crime. They are held safely and responsibly by museums and collectors, with no danger to the public. Licensing them all would therefore add extra burdens on the museums referred to by the noble Lord, Lord German—along with collectors, dealers and the police—without significantly increasing public safety.

The noble Lord, Lord Addington, asked me about the criteria, as did my noble friend the Duke of Montrose. I will go through those criteria again: to be antique, a firearm must be held as a curiosity or ornament, have been manufactured before 1 September 1939 and either have a propulsion system specified in the regulations or be chambered for one of the obsolete cartridges specified in them. He also asked a sensible question: how do we define “deemed to be dangerous”? There is no actual legal definition but the judgment on what is deemed dangerous is, I guess, the evidence of criminal use.

My noble friend Lord Shrewsbury questioned the reliability of NABIS data. I will take his points back. I concur that there were some inconsistencies in the NABIS data in its 2017 and 2018 annual reports in respect of recoveries of antique firearms. The head of NABIS subsequently had the data examined and found administrative errors in the figures used in the 2017 report. She has removed that inaccurate data from the NABIS website and put in place measures to ensure that there is no recurrence. The review of the list will be done every three years.

Moving on to my noble friend Lord Robathan, I just love listening to the stories from him and my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. Honestly, what went on in their schooldays? We did not have such fun at all, but I thank my noble friend for his support for these regulations.

My noble friend the Duke of Montrose asked about disabling guns in Scotland before they can be antiques. That is not part of the current arrangement or the new regulations, so it will not be required.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, is pleased with the regulations but he asked about knives and swords. They are subject to different controls.

My noble friend Lord Lucas asked—no, he was delighted with the regulations. He was pleased about the clarity of it being pre-1939 firearms, as opposed to post-1939 ones.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked how firearms were obtained. The answer is: through a variety of methods. There is evidence that criminals are taking advantage of the lack of legal clarity to obtain old but still-functioning firearms for use in crime. In recent years, there have been several notable convictions involving antique firearms, with substantial sentences handed down by the courts. For example, in 2017, a former firearms dealer was convicted and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for firearms offences including supplying antique firearms to criminal gangs. In 2018, a firearms certificate holder was convicted and sentenced to 23 years’ imprisonment for firearms offences including making ammunition for antique firearms and supplying it to organised crime groups.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how the regulations would help. Basically, as I said, the problems of the current law on antique firearms were highlighted by the Law Commission in its 2015 report Firearms Law: Reforms to Address Pressing Problems. It recommended defining “antique firearm” in law, essentially following the model used in Home Office guidance.

The noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Rosser, lamented the delay in laying the regulations. As I understand it, it was necessary to take some time to consult widely on the detail of the regulations, some aspects of which are quite technical, and consider them carefully with expert stakeholders. However, I am pleased that we can now bring the regulations forward, which will strengthen the controls on antique firearms to prevent them falling into criminal hands.

Finally, I understand and empathise with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord German, about museums. I will take it back and see whether I can get a response for him.

Motion agreed.

Law Enforcement: Brexit Impacts

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Wednesday 6th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I draw attention to my interest in the register and beg leave to ask the Question in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the safety and security of our citizens is the Government’s top priority. That is why we have secured an agreement delivering a comprehensive package of capabilities that will ensure that we can work with counterparts across Europe to tackle serious crime and terrorism, protecting the public and bringing criminals to justice. Importantly, this agreement includes arrangements facilitating streamlined extradition and the fast and effective exchange of data.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, on Christmas Day, the Home Secretary issued a statement saying that the new agreement with the EU was “historic” and would

“make the UK safer and more secure”.

Will the Minister tell us precisely in what ways the deal makes us safer and more secure? How will the loss of direct, real-time data-sharing access, and the loss of access to the Schengen database of alerts about wanted or missing people, stolen firearms and vehicles, conceivably help our law enforcement agencies?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My right honourable friend the Home Secretary is absolutely right. This deal is historic and it will keep us safe. In terms of SIS II, to which the noble Lord refers, as he knows, the EU took the position that it was legally impossible for any non-Schengen country to be included. We obviously are using Interpol and bilateral channels to facilitate that. It is important that we get SIS II into perspective, because every time that a UK law enforcement officer checked policing or border systems, it counted as a check against SIS II. That is why there were 572 million checks in 2019. Less than 0.5 per cent of those SIS II records related to persons of law enforcement interest.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I first pay tribute to the Minister, who led a very fine debate last night on domestic abuse and domestic violence. I wish to pick up on that in relation to the questions of my noble friend. When protection orders are made on domestic abuse to protect someone who is being victimised and has survived domestic abuse, the order could, until now, be enforced in other parts of Europe. What will happen if, for example, a woman goes with her children to visit family members in Europe but is pursued by her abuser, who assumes that the order will no longer operate beyond our borders? Are we going to create new mutual recognition mechanisms to make sure that any order to protect her will be enforced in other parts of Europe?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

As the noble Baroness will know, we will not be seeking membership of Europol but the arrangements that we have in place will allow for the UK’s continued effective co-operation with Europol, including rapid exchange of operational information and data for mutual benefit—in particular, in the type of case that the noble Baroness outlined.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the agreed surrender arrangements that replaced the European arrest warrant include a significant number of grounds for withholding surrender and an overall principle of proportionality. All issues raised by a requested person will have to be litigated in the executing state before a surrender decision can be made. Will the Government undertake an audit of the delays and costs involved in the new system arising from our withdrawing from the clear procedures for European arrest warrants?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord will be pleased to know that some safeguards regarding human rights would be right for the carrying out of justice. However, in terms of speed, we fully anticipate that the arrangements will be as fast and effective as those under the EAW.

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I declare my interest as deputy chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation. Without seamless access to shared intelligence or co-operation both domestically and within Europe, human trafficking here will, I fear, inevitably increase. I heard what my noble friend said earlier, so will she now confirm that the UK will still have access to Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System and passenger name record data?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I can confirm that the arrangements will allow for the UK’s continued co-operation with Europol. In terms of Eurojust, they ensure that UK and EU investigators can continue to share information and evidence, agree strategies and co-ordinate activity to tackle cross-border criminality.

[Lord Woolf (CB) [V]]

Could the Minister tell me how she will ensure that the new arrangements, which are obviously welcome, are working efficiently and not leading to delays that will hamper the workings of the criminal justice system in this country?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

There will be continued scrutiny of the effectiveness of the new arrangements. The noble and learned Lord is right that these things need to be swift and efficient but, as I said in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, they also need safeguards built into them. I have every confidence that the new arrangements will work well.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

If there has been no weakening of our security arrangements as a result of the new agreement with the EU, why, in the negotiations with the EU, did the Government seek to retain access to all the existing direct real-time data-sharing arrangements, including the Schengen database, that we had as EU members—not all of which we have retained?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord is right that we have not retained everything. We have not got everything we wanted, which was always going to happen in a negotiation. But we believe that we have a set of agreements that protect our citizens and keep people safe.

[Lord McNally (LD) [V]]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that the longest-serving Home Secretary of recent times, Theresa May, gave only qualified support for these arrangements, when she spoke in the House of Commons on 30 December? She expressed particular concern about the timeliness of access to databases of European criminal records, modern slavery and child abduction. Is it not time for the Government to come clean and say that we are weaker now with these protections and to come up with specific policies to plug the knowledge gaps identified by Mrs May?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My right honourable friend Theresa May was probably right to give it qualified support. We have not seen how it will work yet. I am confident it will work well and I am sure that this House will scrutinise any deficiencies in the new arrangements. We have a very good package for the safety and security of the citizens of this country.

[Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, real-time access to intelligence is crucial in the fight against serious organised crime and terrorism. Can the Minister assure the House that any reduced capability to access such information in a timely manner will not increase the risk level in the United Kingdom, thereby endangering UK citizens from January 2021?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, timely access and cross-border co-operation benefits not only the UK but the EU. The noble Lord talks about serious and organised crime, which knows no borders and is global. It is incumbent on all of us to work together to stem its flow.

[Lord Caine (Con)]

My Lords, as my noble friend is aware, the closest co-operation between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and An Garda Síochána is absolutely crucial in the fight against both terrorism and organised crime. In this context, the European arrest warrant has aided the smooth extradition of suspects between our two jurisdictions. Could my noble friend assure the House that arrangements are in place to ensure that this continues and that there is no going back to the extradition problems that beset us in the past, which so soured UK-Irish relations?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My noble friend is absolutely right to point that out, and I think it will have been foremost in the minds of negotiators, both here and in Ireland. We do not want to go back to those days, and it is very important that arrangements are in place that allow for criminals and terrorists to be dealt with swiftly and efficiently.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord Fowler)]

My Lords, the time allowed for this Question has elapsed, which brings us to the end of Question Time.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 5th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Relevant documents: 21st and 28th Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to be moving the Bill for two reasons: first, it is at last here in your Lordships’ House and, secondly, from my point of view it is not often that I bring Bills to this House that are universally welcomed. For those reasons, it is a particular pleasure to be introducing this Second Reading.

I want to dedicate everything that we will achieve through the Bill to all victims and survivors of domestic abuse; to all those courageous people who have spoken out about their experiences, whether in Parliament or outside it; and to those who do not lack courage but are still too traumatised to speak about their experience, maybe even decades after it first happened. We should be their voice. It is important that we see the Bill as a start. Other Bills will follow, but the Bill today is a great start in dealing with this most awful of crimes. I say to noble Lords, and I know they understand, that we should not let the best be the enemy of the good.

A person’s home should be a place of safety and security, and a person’s relationship with their partner or other family member should be based on love, mutual respect and understanding, but for some 2.3 million people a year that is not the case. Many such people have to face physical or psychological abuse on a daily basis, which can make their lives insufferable. Some pay the ultimate price: on average, two people are killed each week at the hands of their current or former partner. It is only fitting that I pay tribute to Claire Throssell, who received an MBE in the New Year’s honours list for her tireless work campaigning for children experiencing domestic abuse. She lost her own two sons, Jack and Paul, who were killed by her ex-partner.

We have seen that the Covid-19 pandemic has served to exacerbate the problem as victims have been trapped in their home with their abuser. Police-recorded crime data shows that incidents of domestic abuse increased 7% in the period of April to June last year compared with the same period in 2019. These are horrendous statistics and they mask many individual personal tragedies, lives ruined and children traumatised, many of them for life. If there was ever an issue deserving of our attention and needing decisive action, this is it.

Of course, legislation alone cannot solve society’s ills, but it can play an important role in driving change and empowering those who need help, and I firmly believe that is the case with this Bill. I welcome the fact that the Bill comes before your Lordships’ House having already been the subject of extensive scrutiny, a point well made by the Constitution Committee in its report on the Bill. A draft Bill, published in January 2019, underwent pre-legislative scrutiny by a Joint Committee of both Houses, and I pay tribute to the significant contributions to that process by my noble friends Lady Bertin, Lord Farmer, Lady Sanderson and Lady Chisholm—they are all sitting behind me, which is great—the noble Baronesses, Lady Armstrong and Lady Burt, and the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Blair. As a result of that invaluable pre-legislative scrutiny and the consideration given to the Bill in the House of Commons, I hope that I present to your Lordships’ House today a much-strengthened Bill.

Let me turn to the detail of the Bill. The measures in it are best described around four objectives. They are: to promote awareness, putting domestic abuse at the top of everyone’s agenda; to better protect and support victims of domestic abuse and their children; to transform the response of the criminal, civil and family justice systems to domestic abuse; and to improve performance across local and national agencies.

We cannot tackle domestic abuse effectively without first having a shared understanding of the nature of domestic abuse and its impact on victims. The new, all-purpose statutory definition of domestic abuse in Part 1 is directed to this end. Historically, domestic abuse has been associated with physical or sexual violence only, but such a narrow view is to misunderstand the very nature of this type of abuse. Domestic abuse can take many forms, including threatening, controlling or coercive behaviour, economic abuse and psychological or emotional abuse.

The statutory guidance provided for in Clause 73 will, among other things, expand further on the different types of abuse and the forms they can take. This will include types of abuse which are experienced by specific communities or groups, such as migrant victims or ethnic minorities. The guidance, which we have already printed in draft, will also recognise the disproportionate impact of domestic abuse on women.

The statutory definition of domestic abuse includes a minimum age of 16 years so that we do not confuse domestic abuse and child abuse. We fully recognise, however, that children growing up in a household where one adult is abusive towards another are as much victims of domestic abuse as the person being directly abused. Children affected by domestic abuse can live with those consequences for the rest of their lives; Clause 3 expressly recognises this and will help to ensure that such children receive the support they need.

The second aim of the Bill is to better protect and support victims of domestic abuse and their children. In affording protection, civil orders can play an important role. There is already a variety of such orders, principally domestic violence protection notices and orders, occupation orders, non-molestation orders and restraining orders. The fact that there are so many of these orders can be confusing to victims, and none of them is arguably fully up to the task.

In providing for a new domestic abuse protection notice and domestic abuse protection order in Part 3, we have adopted and built upon the strongest elements of the existing orders. The domestic abuse protection notice will provide immediate protection following a domestic abuse incident, while the domestic abuse protection order—or DAPO—will provide flexible, long-term protection for victims. The DAPO is designed to provide more comprehensive protection to victims than the existing civil orders. It will be available in the criminal, civil and family courts, and will give courts the flexibility to determine which prohibitions and positive requirements are required in each case. This might include, for example, prohibiting the perpetrator from going within a specified distance of the victim’s home, or conditions compelling the perpetrator to attend a perpetrator programme or requiring them to wear an electronic tag.

Breach of a DAPO will be a criminal offence subject to a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both. We want to ensure that we get these new domestic abuse protection orders right so that they work for victims, the police, the courts and others who will have to operate them. We will therefore pilot DAPOs in a small number of areas before rolling them out nationally.

It is far preferable if we can prevent abuse happening in the first place rather than having to respond after the event. One important preventive tool which already exists is the domestic violence disclosure scheme, also known as Clare’s law. There are two elements to the scheme: one is the “right to ask” and the other is the “right to know”. Under the right to ask, someone can ask the police to check whether a current or ex-partner has a violent or abusive past. If records show that an individual may be at risk of domestic abuse from a partner or ex-partner, the police will consider disclosing the information. The right to know enables the police proactively to make that disclosure if they receive information about the violent or abusive behaviour of a person that might impact on the safety of that person’s current or ex-partner. We know that Clare’s law has not always operated as effectively and consistently as it should across the country, so the Bill puts on to a statutory footing the guidance to the police underpinning the scheme to help improve its operation and thereby better protect potential victims of abuse.

Victims of domestic abuse and their children also need the right support at the right time. For those in refuges or other safe accommodation, this means having access to, for example, counselling services and advocacy support to help them access NHS services, schooling or welfare benefits. This also includes tailored support for victims with disabilities, those with more complex needs, LGBTQ+ or black and minority ethnic victims. Part 4 introduces a new duty on tier 1 local authorities in England to ensure that such support is available in their area for victims of domestic abuse and their children within safe accommodation. Noble Lords will have seen that following the spending review, the Government have committed £125 million to fund this new duty in 2021 and 2022.

Those who are forced to flee their own home as a result of domestic abuse will also benefit from Clause 71, which will require local authorities to give priority need status to all victims who are homeless and eligible for assistance. Victims will therefore no longer need to prove they are vulnerable as a result of their abuse in order to access accommodation secured by the local authority.

Where victims of domestic abuse look to the justice system for protection, including for their children, to seek civil redress or to secure justice for criminal wrongdoing, we need to ensure that the criminal, civil and family courts deliver for them. All too often, victims have found the experience of giving evidence in court traumatising and an occasion for their abuser to perpetuate the abuse all over again. To help to address this, Part 5 includes two important reforms.

First is the prohibition on cross-examination in person, which already applies in the criminal courts. This will be extended to the family and civil courts. In cases where this prohibition applies the courts will, where necessary, be able to appoint a publicly funded advocate to conduct the prohibited cross-examination. Secondly, Part 5 streamlines the rules governing eligibility for special measures for domestic abuse victims giving evidence in the criminal, civil and family courts. Victims of domestic abuse will no longer have to demonstrate that they are vulnerable. This will give victims the option of giving their evidence, for example, from behind a screen or via a video live-link. As now, it will be for the court to determine whether to make a special measures direction in any particular case, taking into account whether such a direction would improve the quality of the victim’s evidence.

In criminal proceedings relating to domestic abuse it is imperative that justice is done, with perpetrators being appropriately convicted and punished for their crimes. As this Bill was going through the House of Commons the Government listened to concerns, voiced by Harriet Harman and Mark Garnier among others, that in too many cases domestic abuse perpetrators were arguing that their victim’s death was the result of consensual “rough sex gone wrong”. In the case of R v Brown, the former Appellate Committee of this House established in 1993 the principle that consent to serious harm for sexual gratification is not a defence and that, by extension, nor would consent apply where such sexual activity resulted in the victim’s death. The Bill clarifies the law by enshrining this principle in statute.

Finally, Part 2 of the Bill, providing for the office of a domestic abuse commissioner in law, will help to level up the response to domestic abuse across local and national agencies. The designate commissioner, Nicole Jacobs, is already providing very strong leadership on domestic abuse issues and acting as a powerful voice for victims. The commissioner will play a key role in overseeing and monitoring the provision of domestic abuse services in England and Wales. To facilitate this work, the Bill will arm the commissioner with appropriate powers; in particular, they will have the power to publish reports and lay them before Parliament. These reports will hold local commissioners of domestic abuse services, statutory agencies and government departments to account and make recommendations on how they can improve their responses. Specified public bodies will be under a duty to co-operate with the commissioner. They and government Ministers will be required to respond to each recommendation made to them within 56 days.

Domestic abuse gives rise to some of the gravest and most challenging crimes, including coercive control, serious assaults, rape and murder. We owe it to victims and survivors to treat domestic abuse with the seriousness it deserves and to help these people rebuild their lives. Protecting and supporting victims and their children and bringing perpetrators to justice lies at the heart of our approach. The measures in the Bill are directed to these ends and I commend it to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for what I think has been one of the most thoughtful debates I have ever heard in your Lordships’ House. No age group has been left out of the debate, including the unborn child and the foetus.

From the young to the old, the disabled, LGBTQ+ people and BME people—all strata of society are affected by this horrific crime. Of course, it does not respect social niceties either. Just because you are middle class does not mean that you will escape it. The problems of poverty exacerbate it, but nobody is safe from its clutches where the perpetrator wishes to strike.

I begin by welcoming the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, to the Labour Front Bench. I thought that was a storming first Front-Bench effort.

At this early stage in my remarks, I also want to refer to my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham. His talents, experience and expertise know no bounds. It seems that he can speak with great authority on so many things. I have in my mind a picture of him and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, in 1975, not knowing that what they had started then would be advanced all these years later, moving from the comment of “I’m not sure there’s anything the committee can do about it”—from a Home Office Minister, of all people—to the statutory duty on local authorities now being fulfilled 50 years later. I do not know whether I am proud or downright ashamed of that, but thank goodness we are at the point that we are now.

I also join other noble Lords in paying tribute to my right honourable friend Theresa May for her efforts to begin to get this Bill going. I also thank the PM for particularly noting in his remarks yesterday that people who need to flee abuse are absolutely not subject to some of the lockdown restrictions that others are.

I welcome the overwhelming cross-party support for the provisions in the Bill. Noble Lords supported the introduction of the statutory definition of domestic abuse, including the express recognition that children are victims in their own right. There was support, too, for enshrining in law the office of the domestic abuse commissioner; for the new domestic abuse protection notice and the domestic abuse protection order; for the new duty on tier 1 local authorities in England to provide support to victims and their children within safe accommodation; for the prohibition on cross-examination in person in the civil and family courts; for automatic eligibility for special measures; and for the clarification of the law in respect of the so-called “rough sex” defence.

This is not to say that all noble Lords regard every one of the provisions in the Bill as perfect. A number of noble Lords raised points of detail and substance, and I will respond to some of those in a moment. I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I do not name-check everyone who spoke, else I will lose my entire 20 minutes in doing so.

Before responding, I acknowledge that the general welcome for the provisions in the Bill was accompanied by calls for it to be extended into new areas. There were three in particular, but the first two raised were the provision of community-based support for all victims and access to safe accommodation by migrant victims who have no recourse to public funds. A number of noble Lords, including my noble friends Lady Chisholm and Lady Bertin, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Polak, the noble Baronesses, Lady Burt, Lady Armstrong, Lady Lister, Lady Hussein-Ece and Lady Wilcox of Newport, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, talked about this, as did other noble Lords. In fact, almost every noble Lord talked about it, and we recognise that more needs to be done to ensure adequate provision of community-based support, but it would not be right to impose new duties on public authorities in this Bill without first understanding the gaps in existing provision and consulting with local authorities, police and crime commissioners and others who would be subject to any new duty.

To this end, the domestic abuse commissioner is undertaking an in-depth exploration of the current community-based support landscape. The commissioner is due to complete this work towards the end of the year. Alongside this, we are also developing a victim funding strategy to deliver sustainable provision to all victims. I understand the point that my noble friend Lady Sanderson made, but we do not think the duty on first-tier local authorities for community-based service in some way overrides that provision. That is the point that she was trying to make. On completion of the projects, the Government will work with the commissioner to understand the needs identified and develop options for how best to support victims, wherever they reside.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Wilcox, Lady Burt, Lady Lister, Lady Gale, Lady Crawley and Lady Meacher, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Woolley, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and my noble friend Lady Helic—practically the whole House—talked about the needs of migrant victims. We are clear, first and foremost, that all victims of domestic abuse must be treated as victims first. Noble Lords will have heard me say that before and I say it again. We committed in our response to the pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill to review the Government’s response to migrant victims of domestic abuse, and we published our findings last July. This highlighted that, although we have received some evidence, there is currently a lack of robust data to demonstrate which cohorts of migrant victims are likely to be in most need of support.

To address the evidence gap, on 15 December we launched a £1.5 million support for migrant victims pilot scheme, which will start next month and run to March 2022. This will enable us to take well-grounded and evidence-based decisions on how best to protect these victims in the long term. Both the noble Lord, Lord Woolley, and my noble friend Lady Helic talked about engagement with Southall Black Sisters. I have engaged with them previously in a round table, and my honourable friends Vicky Atkins and Alex Chalk have also engaged with them extensively. We have engaged with many groups across the sector and certainly with them.

The noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, talked about co-operation across borders. It is absolutely essential, both to fulfil the provision and to make sure that people do not abscond from their obligations of facing justice.

I will address some of the points raised in the debate. We have heard from more than 90 speakers; I cannot respond to all the points, but I will attempt to. If I do not address all the points, I will certainly write to noble Lords.

The point I will mention first is GPs charging for letters, because it was one of the last points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. I know that, as she said, it has been troubling him for some time. While GPs can levy a fee for this service, due to it being classified as private work that sits outside the core GP contract, the BMA has now advised GPs not to charge for such letters. Back in January 2018 we made changes to legislation that aimed to make it easier for victims or those at risk of domestic abuse to obtain and provide the evidence required to access legal aid. We continue to work with the GPs committee to improve the process for GPs and victims in relation to evidence of domestic abuse.

Another issue that came up a lot was the crime survey upper age limit. My noble friend Lord Davies of Gower took the wind out of my sails by answering the question for me, but I shall answer it again. I first got the answer from my noble friend Lady Sanderson. Last month the Office for National Statistics announced that it would remove the upper age limit from the Crime Survey for England and Wales. I know this announcement will be welcomed by noble Lords and organisations such as Age UK that have campaigned for this change.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, among others, argued for the introduction of a data-sharing firewall so that migrant victims can approach the police safe in the knowledge that their details will not be passed to Immigration Enforcement. I understand the national policing lead on domestic abuse is clear that there will be circumstances in which information sharing between police and immigration authorities is in the interests of safeguarding the victim of abuse. We are committed to considering existing data-sharing procedures in the light of the policing inspectorate’s findings of a police super-complaint that relates to current police practice in this area.

Probably the biggest issue of the day was non-fatal strangulation. Many plaudits were paid to my noble friend Lady Newlove; I will join with them. She was supported by practically every Member who spoke, arguing for the new offence of non-fatal strangulation. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made the interesting point that we should take time to interrogate whether a generic offence would be better. I will not answer yes or no to that, but there are several existing offences that relate to non-fatal strangulation. They cover a range of seriousness, from attempted murder to common assault and battery. In addition, non-fatal strangulation could be part of a course of action under the controlling or coercive behaviour offence or be covered by the specific offence under Section 21 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.

Even though we are currently of the view that this range of offences already covers the diverse circumstances and levels of seriousness that may be involved in non-fatal strangulation, we are certainly willing to listen, and this debate has had quite a lot of evidence given to it on what might be needed. The Government will keep this matter under review and assess any evidence that emerges. Noble Lords have talked about New Zealand; the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, talked about Brazil. We will look at other practices around the world and consider whether a new specific offence is required. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, wisely said that we need to reflect on this and make sure that we come up with good law in this area.

The other big issue raised by noble Lords was revenge porn and, specifically, threats to disclose. My noble friend Lady Morgan asked about the steps that the Government are taking to protect victims from threats to disclose private sexual images without consent—known as “revenge porn”. Threats to disclose, regardless of the connection between the offender and the victim, are in many circumstances already captured by a range of existing offences. However, we acknowledge that there are concerns about the effectiveness of the current criminal law in this area. That is why the Law Commission is conducting a review of the law relating to the non-consensual taking and sharing of intimate images, including, but not limited to, the “revenge porn” offence in Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. I understand that the Law Commission will launch a consultation shortly. I encourage noble Lords and others to contribute their views.

The controlling or coercive behaviour offence—the post-separation abuse that goes on—was widely mentioned as well. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the noble Baronesses, Lady Burt, Lady Lister, Lady Andrews and Lady Hayman, my noble friends Lady Sanderson and Lord Goschen, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, argued for the controlling or coercive behaviour offence to be extended to cover post-separation abuse issues. This offence was created in 2015 to fill a gap in existing legislation around patterns of controlling or coercive behaviour occurring during a relationship. Cases of controlling or coercive behaviour that occur outside the parameters of the offence are captured by the separate stalking and harassment offences. That said, we are finalising a review into the effectiveness of the controlling or coercive behaviour offence to ensure that it is fit for purpose and adequately protects victims from abuse. The review has unfortunately been delayed by the pandemic—one noble Lord mentioned that—but we aim to publish the outcome in time for Report stage.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester called for the Government to introduce a statutory defence for victims whose offending is driven by their experience of domestic abuse. We recognise the harm suffered by victims of domestic abuse, which is why a number of defences are potentially available in law to those who commit offences in circumstances connected with their involvement in an abusive relationship. These include the full defences of duress and self-defence as well as, in homicide cases, the partial defences of loss of control or diminished responsibility. In light of these existing defences, we are not persuaded in this case that a statutory defence is necessary, but we will continue to monitor the position.

My noble friends Lady Bertin and Lord Farmer, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe and Lord Strasburger, the noble Baronesses, Lady Watkins and Lady Royall, and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, called for a perpetrator strategy, the expansion of perpetrator programmes and the better management of perpetrators. We continue to work with local areas to support effective commissioning of domestic abuse services, including high-quality, safe perpetrator programmes. Indeed, in this financial year, we are investing more than £7 million into direct perpetrator-focused interventions through police and crime commissioners to prevent abuse. Our forthcoming domestic abuse strategy provides an opportunity for us to build on the foundations of the Bill in order to transform the response to domestic abuse. The strategy will include specific work to tackle perpetrators and to prevent offending.

The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, called for the creation of a new Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements category for serial domestic abuse and stalking perpetrators. At this point, I pay tribute to her work and that of John Clough on this. She knows that we do not have plans to introduce a new MAPPA category, but I certainly commend her for raising it. Our focus is on ensuring that we make better use of the existing MAPPA framework and related police systems, such as VISOR, rather than creating new categories.

Noble Lords, particularly the noble Baronesses, Lady Wilcox, Lady Burt and Lady Jones, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friends Lady Gardner of Parkes, Lady Altmann and Lady Helic, expressed concerns about the handling of child contact cases in the family courts and the issue of parental alienation. My noble friend Lord Moylan also stressed something really important: the importance of ensuring that justice is upheld. We must never lose sight of that.

Last June we published the findings of the expert panel established to examine how effectively the family courts respond to allegations of domestic abuse and other serious offences in private law proceedings. While the current law is clear that the welfare of the child is paramount in making decisions about contact, the panel concluded that in some cases involving domestic abuse the courts are not striking the right balance between the child’s right to a relationship with both parents and the well-being of both the child and the parent victim.

That is why we have committed to undertake a review of the presumption of parental involvement as it currently stands. The review will consider how the presumption is currently applied by the courts, as well as reviewing the existing body of research in this area. However, while we fully recognise the need for swift action in the light of the panel’s findings, we also need to ensure that the full spectrum of issues and potential impacts can be considered in the round. The presumption of parental involvement is wide-ranging and we must be certain that any changes are fully considered.

Most noble Lords talked about support for children through the Bill. My noble friends Lady Chisholm, Lord Polak, Lady Stroud, Lady Verma and Lady Jenkin, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Benjamin and Lady Watkins, rightly drew attention to the devastating impact that domestic abuse can have on children and young people. I talked about the foetus earlier—those adverse impacts start when that child is in the womb.

Growing up in a household of fear and intimidation can impact children’s health, well-being and development, with lasting effects into adulthood—in fact, all their lives. That is why we amended the Bill in the Commons expressly to recognise that children who see, hear or experience domestic abuse are victims in their own right. The Bill includes a number of other measures to better protect and support child victims of domestic abuse. One of the domestic abuse commissioner’s key functions will be to encourage good practice in the identification of children affected by domestic abuse and the provision of protection and support to people, including children, affected by domestic abuse.

Another issue raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Warwick and Lady Donaghy, and my noble friend Lady Eaton was accommodation-based support, and how we had costed the new duty on tier 1 local authorities provided for in Part 4. MHCLG engaged with local authorities and service providers in estimating the cost of the new duty to ensure that it is funded appropriately.

The funding covers the estimated cost of providing unmet need for support in safe accommodation for victims and their children, as well as needs previously supported through MHCLG short-term challenge funds. The Women’s Aid estimate included costs of all services, including those with existing funding. On the basis of evidence, MHCLG estimated the cost at £125 million for 2021-22. It will undertake a post-implementation review, two years following the commencement of the duty, to assess its delivery, including the level of funding and the allocation method.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Burt and Lady Donaghy, and my noble friend Lord Bourne all raised the role of employers. We all expect employers to be particularly sensitive when dealing with a colleague who is experiencing domestic abuse. On 9 June 2020, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy announced a review of support in the workplace for victims of domestic abuse, including a call for written evidence, which closed on 9 September and received 126 responses. BEIS is currently considering the evidence gathered and the appropriate next steps, and will publish a response and action plan shortly.

I wonder whether I have more time. I usually go well over time, but not on this occasion. The noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Marks, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Royall, raised the issue of legal aid. We are currently conducting a review of the means test, as part of which we are specifically considering the experience of victims of domestic abuse. As part of this, we have made a public commitment to look at the capital thresholds for victims of domestic abuse, where these apply. At the moment, the legal aid agency can apply an eligibility waiver for victims of domestic abuse applying for an injunction or other orders for protection, which means that an applicant for a protective injunction may be eligible for legal aid, even if they have income or capital above the thresholds in the means test, although they may have to make a financial contribution towards their legal costs.

We have already—in April 2020—widened the evidence requirements for domestic abuse victims, making it easier for them to obtain and provide the evidence they need to access legal aid. It will also reduce the risk of genuine victims being unable to obtain the required evidence.

There are a few issues that I have not addressed, including the commencement of Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act. I may have to refer to other government departments, but I will write to noble Lords whose points I have not addressed.

I think we have made an excellent start to a Bill that I hope will become an excellent Act.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Immigration Rules: Supported Accommodation

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Thursday 17th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

In their Statement, the Government said that they will bring forward a Bill

“to fix the immigration and asylum system once and for all.”

What will an immigration and asylum system that has been fixed “once and for all” by this Government look like, and how will it differ fundamentally from the present system? Secondly, are there at least minimum standards that must be, and are, met at all times for the accommodation in which a total of 60,000 asylum seekers—some three-quarters of the size of our prison population—are housed? If so, do those minimum standards include at all times for all those housed the provision of electricity, heating, hot water and mains running water?

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question, which pertinently asked what a firm but fair asylum system would look like. The whole premise of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary’s ambition for the future immigration system is to give refuge to those who need it—some of the most vulnerable people in the world—and to seriously clamp down on some of the criminals who facilitate some of the dangerous crossings across our waters. The accommodation will meet minimum standards: there is no question of a diminution in standards for anybody who finds themselves in our accommodation.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the Home Office relies on the UNHCR in connection with its resettlement programme. The Minister will know that the UNHCR is concerned about asylum seekers being left in limbo, so why did the Home Office not consult the UNHCR and others about the changes and issues such as exactly how people will be assisted to access support?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The changes to the Immigration Rules are small and technical, and some of them are clearly almost an extension of Dublin in terms of the safe country rules. On asylum seekers being left “in limbo”, if by “limbo” the noble Baroness means destitute or in any way left to fend for themselves, I say that no one will be left destitute: everyone will be treated with dignity and respect.

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)]

My Lords, surely one way of reducing the need for supported accommodation is to enable asylum seekers to support themselves? Can my noble friend give any indication of when the review into the potential reduction of time before paid work is allowed will report?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I am afraid that I cannot give my noble friend an answer to that at this point in time—I do not think there is an update on that, but I will go back and see if there is one, and, if there is, I will send him the response.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I usually associate Red Cross food parcels with our prisoners of war in World War II; however, I once witnessed them being handed out to destitute asylum seekers in Manchester. Can the Minister please assure the House that no asylum seeker supported under the changed rules faces similar destitution?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I can categorically assure the noble Lord that no asylum seeker will be left to face destitution.

[The Lord Bishop of Southwark [V]]

My Lords, in the light of the recent ruling by the High Court of Justice in London against the Secretary of State, what steps have Her Majesty’s Government taken to review the way in which the Home Office houses asylum seekers with disabilities in order to comply with the judgment of the High Court? The delays in providing accommodation in the cases before the court range from 45 days to nine months.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I know that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary will take note of, and reflect on, the judgment before making a decision, and I am sure that I will update the House in due course.

[Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the Minister will be aware that, under the Dublin III regulations, which come to an end at the end of this month, no child can be returned to the country they came from because that would not be in their best interests. What is to be the position from 1 January?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, any cases which are live—as we term them—before 31 December will be dealt with in the ensuing period. As I have said to the noble Lord before, there will be a statement on my right honourable friend the Home Secretary’s ambition for a firm and fair immigration system for the future within three months of Royal Assent to the immigration Bill.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP) [V]]

My Lords, in preparation for this question, I contacted the Refugee Council to hear its concerns about the changes. It sent a few questions and I will ask the Minister two of them. First, why was this major and fundamental change announced with zero consultation with stakeholders, including local authorities and the asylum sector? Secondly, the change is due to come in on 1 January, but the accompanying guidance on its implementation has still not been published. Given that this is just over two weeks away, and happening over Christmas, when will the guidance be published?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Baroness described the changes as “major and fundamental”. They are neither major nor fundamental; they are technical changes. I made a commitment to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, during the passage of the immigration Bill, that published guidance would necessarily be updated to ensure that it was clear and transparent by 31 December. The guidance will be published by the end of the year but, given the timescales involved, it has not been possible to consult on this ahead of publication.

[Lord Marlesford (Con) [V]]

Does the Minister recognise the challenging fact that the flow of economic migrants will continue until the standard of living of the country they are trying to reach is no longer sufficiently above that of the country they have left to make the risks and costs of the journey worthwhile? Does she further agree that the prospects of such a potential dilution of quality of life in the UK would not be tolerated by the electorate, whatever Government was in office?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My noble friend’s question is a global one: why would people make these dangerous journeys, facilitated by criminals and risking their own lives, if they were not fleeing such substandard, and in many cases frightening, conditions back home? It is a terribly sad state that so many migrants are willing to make that journey. It is only in helping people, both upstream and in the reception that we give to genuine asylum seekers, that we can hope to address in some way the terrible things that people are facing.

[Lord Singh of Wimbledon (CB) [V]]

My Lords, why are we being so hard on asylum seekers in this season of good will? Does the Minister agree that we and other great powers, partly responsible for destroying the homes and livelihoods of innocents fleeing conflict in the Middle East, have a moral responsibility to provide shelter and a livelihood for those we have helped to displace?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I cannot say that I agree with the noble Lord that we are acting so harshly. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary is trying to give refuge to those who genuinely need our asylum, but to crack down on some of the huge level of criminal activity that leads people to risk unsafe journeys, and thus their lives.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Barker) (LD)]

My Lords, the time allowed for this Question has elapsed.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 (Consequential, Saving, Transitional and Transitory Provisions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Thursday 10th December 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That the Regulations laid before the House on 18 November be approved.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I will refer to this instrument as the consequential amendments SI. Parliament has approved the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020, which will end free movement on 31 December, at the end of the transition period. The Act gives the Government full control of UK borders for the first time in decades, delivering on our promise to the British people. It represents an important milestone in paving the way for the new UK points-based immigration system, to operate from 1 January 2021.

The consequential amendments SI is the next step in ending free movement, and completes the legislative changes necessary for this historic act. It is made under the regulation-making power in Section 5 of the Act, the scope of which we and the other place debated extensively during the passage of the legislation. I was pleased to share with noble Lords an illustrative text of the SI in early September.

The SI amends primary and secondary UK legislation as a consequence of, or in connection with, the provisions in Part 1 of the Act, which end free movement and make provisions for the new status for Irish citizens. It amends legislation relating to immigration, nationality, benefits and services. It amends devolved matters where changes are required for an immigration purpose, to reflect the end of free movement.

As noble Lords will have noted, the SI is lengthy, given the breadth of amendments to domestic legislation required. The effect of the legislative changes is to align the immigration treatment of EEA citizens and their family members who are not protected by the withdrawal agreements and the UK’s implementation of these agreements, with that of non-EEA citizens under the UK’s immigration system. Once free movement has ended, newly arriving EEA citizens and their family members will be subject to the same UK immigration law as non-EEA citizens. They will need to meet the requirements of the new points-based immigration system set out in the immigration rules made under the Immigration Act 1971.

The SI provides clear protection for Irish citizens and EEA citizens and their family members who have been granted status under the EU settlement scheme. It also removes references in domestic legislation to the UK’s membership of the European Union and EU-derived law that has been retained by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as amended by the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, at the end of the transition period.

Most of the changes will come into force at 11 pm on 31 December, at the end of the transition period. There are some exceptions, which include the provision to bring EEA citizens within scope of the immigration skills charge, which came into force on 1 December to coincide with the opening of the new skilled worker route. It means that the charge will apply to EEA citizens who arrive in the UK from 1 January 2021 under this route.

Another exception consists of the various provisions that bring EEA citizens within the scope of the sham marriage and civil partnership referral and investigation scheme. They will come into force on 1 July 2021, after the deadline for applications to the EU settlement scheme, at which point it will be easier for the Anglican Church to differentiate between EEA citizens who have status under the EU settlement scheme and those who do not.

The consequential amendments SI reflects the repeal of free movement at the end of the transition period, as enacted by Parliament’s approval of the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act. It makes the statute book coherent, and terminates arrangements relevant to the operation of free movement law in UK legislation, which will no longer be appropriate, while implementing our obligations under the withdrawal agreements. It is an essential step in fulfilling our promise to end free movement. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords for their questions. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will forgive me—he asked so many questions that I am not sure I can get through all of them this afternoon.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, talked about the complexity of the SI—a point reiterated by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The changes are required to fully implement the end of free movement by removing references to retained EU law and preferential arrangements for EEA citizens and their family members. Domestic legislation includes these references as a result of decades of membership of the EU. So the SI contains these consequential provisions; it is not a self-contained new policy, and it needs to operate on the statute book as it is now. As a result, yes, the SI is lengthy and includes amendments to a wide range of primary and secondary legislation. However, the overarching effect is simple: the SI aligns EEA citizens and their family members, except Irish citizens and those protected under the withdrawal agreement, with non-EEA citizens. This will pave the way for the points-based immigration system that will treat people on the basis of their skills and their contribution, not their nationality.

The noble Baroness talked also about the examples raised in the House of Commons. I actually did look at the Hansard of the questions raised there. I would not have wanted to reply to those questions because obviously, every single case is different and there may be elements in people’s circumstances that do not elicit a one-size-fits-all response. That also goes to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—if there will be a chart setting out the rights in all sorts of eventualities. I would have thought that that would be the wrong thing to do because, as I say, everyone’s case is slightly different. We have the Settlement Resolution Centre and GOV.UK, which assist people, and we have also launched a further awareness campaign so that people know their rights.

The noble Baroness also brought up the issue of over 4 million people now applying. The EU settlement scheme is clearly a system that works, given the number of people who have already applied. Yes, some have pre-settled status—that is absolutely to be expected—and there are some with full settled status as well. She asked whether the SI is compatible with Article 18(3), and I can confirm that it is. She asked about the EEA, Turkish citizens and the Civil Service, as did the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. As he said, the SI makes changes to the Aliens’ Employment Act 1955, which will lead to changes in the Civil Service nationality rules concerning who is eligible to work in the Civil Service.

The effect is that newly arriving EEA citizens from 1 January next year will no longer be eligible to work in the Civil Service on the basis of exercising free movement rights, since we are ending free movement. But the instrument protects those EEA citizens and their family members with status under the very successful EU settlement scheme, those who would have been eligible for status at the end of the transition period but have other leave to remain granted before the end of the transition period, and Turkish nationals in specified circumstances in relation to the EC Association Agreement with Turkey. Separate provision has been made in the grace period SI, of course, to protect existing rights to work in the Civil Service during the grace period.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, questioned not only the affirmative SI process but the illustrative draft SI process. It was requested and made available ahead of Committee stage of the immigration Bill to facilitate scrutiny of the legislation, so if there is any doubt about parliamentary scrutiny, that was an opportunity for Parliament—both Houses—to scrutinise this SI.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether some of the provisions are unrelated to the end of free movement, and about the compatibility with Section 5. The power to make regulation is provided by Section 5 of the immigration Act, as he said, and that provision is to make changes appropriate as a

“consequence of, or in connection with”

the ending of free movement and provisions in the Act relating to the rights of Irish citizens, so all the provisions in the SI are made accordingly.

The noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe asked about the cap. It is a very pertinent point. We have ended free movement and introduced the new points-based immigration system. It is absolutely right and fair that in the coming months and years, we look at how that all pans out. My noble friend made a point about the data, which is so important here. It will be kept under review. The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, asked for a debate on the points-based system—obviously, over to noble Lords on that. These things are allowed for in your Lordships’ House, and I look forward to having a debate, perhaps in the first quarter, on how that new system is working. The resident labour market and the key sectors will be kept under very close scrutiny, and we will of course retain the ability to make any changes necessary.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, also asked about the impact assessment on health and social care. Noble Lords will recall that back in the debates on the immigration Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked if we could publish an independent review on the impact on the sector of ending free movement, and I undertook to do that.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe asked about monitoring. She asked me not to talk about the MAC all the time, but I think it will monitor the impact of the new system. She asked for a breakdown by country and sector of who was applying to the EU settlement scheme. I do not have that at the moment, but I can look into it for her and see if we have any information to date.

I hope I have answered all noble Lords’ questions. I will have to write to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on some of his points because I could not write them down quickly enough. On that note, I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 3rd December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, Amendment 22, moved by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti with the support of my noble friends Lord Hain and Lord Hendy, seeks to limit the use of criminal conduct authorisations to serious crime—and by that they mean indictable offences that must be tried in Crown Court before a judge and jury.

The amendment seeks to remove subsection (5)(c) in respect of economic well-being in the United Kingdom. It would be helpful if, in her response, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, were to set out examples of what this provision is seeking to do and what it is not seeking to do. There are concerns about this, as I am sure the noble Baroness has heard, from around the House, during discussion of this group.

Can the Minister also explain why the list of necessary grounds given in this Bill—as listed in subsection (5)(5)—is slightly different from those listed in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act? In that Act, the reasons listed are that the activity threatens national security, threatens the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in a way relevant to the interests of national security, or is an act of serious crime. Why not use the same words? Not to do so is surely a recipe for confusion when you are dealing with such serious matters. We want to see clarity from the Government; clarity about what they intend to bring into law is very important. Why is a form of words that was acceptable to the Government two years ago, when they put the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act on the statute book, changed in this Bill? Surely there is a risk of some overlap between these two pieces of legislation. Will the noble Baroness clarify this when she responds to the debate?

Amendments 23 and 26, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, add the word “serious” in order to limit a criminal conduct authorisation to issues of serious crime. I have listened carefully to the arguments from the noble Lord and have some sympathy with them, so I will be interested to hear from the Minister the case for why these amendments are not necessary. The noble Lord referred to the number of times we have talked about serious crime over the years, and the various definitions of “serious”. That is a fair point and it needs to be answered.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, raised the question as to why preventing and detecting crime would not be enough, on their own, as reasons for the powers in the Bill to be deployed. We also need reassurance about what will not happen when powers are given by Parliament, so it is important for the Minister to set out what will not be impacted.

Noble Lords may not like it, but the right to withhold one’s labour and to strike is a hard-won right that we should all defend. We need guarantees that the powers in the Bill would never be used to undermine lawful, legal trade union activity in respect of strike action or campaigning activity. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti raised the important point regarding trade unions, as did my noble friend Lady Bryan of Partick and many others. We have to get the balance right; lawful activity must not be undermined by the state with the use of undercover activities.

We have heard about the policing inquiry. Some terrible things have happened that I am sure we all regret, which have undermined legitimate activity. It must never happen again. Those are the questions the noble Baroness needs to reassure the House on: how will this Bill ensure that never ever happens again?

I am a proud trade unionist. I was a member of USDAW for 12 years when I first left school and I have been a member of the GMB for the last 30 years. I never rose very high in the GMB ranks; I got as fair as the chair of the Labour Party senior staff sub-branch for a couple of years. I spent probably more time arguing with the rest of the staff in the Labour Party about where we wanted to get to. But I certainly think that the unions are very important. For example, USDAW—a union I am very close to—is a great trade union with great campaigns that I always support. It is important that we support the work that unions such as USDAW do.

At this point, I pay tribute to my old friend John Spellar. John was first elected to public office 50 years ago today, in a St Mary Cray by-election on 3 December 1970. John has served as a councillor, trade unionist, trade union official, MP and Minister. John would have nothing to do with any extremism of any sense whatever; anyone who knows him would know that. He has also run a news service for many in the Labour Party called “Spellar News”. We get it two or three times a day: early bird, evening round-up and news flashes. John is actually retiring the news service today, which I am very sad about. He has done great work as a trade unionist and is a great example to many of us in the Labour Party.

I was also sorry to learn that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has been arrested on demonstrations. I have been on a few demonstrations in my time as well. I have avoided being arrested, but I must admit that I have also been demonstrated against. When I was a councillor, many times things that we did on the council provoked some annoyance. I remember once that I put up the fees of the traders in East Street Market and drew their wrath for a number of weeks. There were lots of unpleasant signs about me.

What is important here is that, if you are a trade unionist or a campaigner, nothing in the Bill must ever undermine legitimate work. It is really important for the Government, and for the noble Baroness, to reassure the House and Parliament that nothing legitimate will ever be undermined when this goes on the statute book, and that actually it will be supported. I think she can see from the comments of people around the House today that we are not convinced that is the case. She needs to reassure us now in responding to the debate.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and pay tribute to anyone who has been in politics—and indeed the trade union movement—for 50 years. I have heard of John Spellar in dispatches, but unfortunately not the person that the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan of Partick, referenced.

Turning to public authorities, they have different functions, the ultimate outcome of which is to keep the public safe from harm in a variety of ways. It is very important that they can lawfully deploy CHIS to fulfil those responsibilities. These amendments seek to restrict the statutory purposes available to public authorities under the Bill.

The structure of new Section 29B closely resembles that of Section 29, which authorises the use and conduct of CHIS, as there is a high degree of interrelationship between the two provisions. That is why a Section 29 authorisation is required to be in place before a Section 29B authorisation can be granted. The statutory purposes that will be available for a criminal conduct authorisation are linked to those available for a use and conduct authorisation. It is not operationally workable to have different grounds for authorisation between the provisions. For example, we would want to avoid a situation where a CHIS’s use and conduct has been deemed necessary for the prevention of crime, but the linked criminal conduct authorisation for the same CHIS and the same activity may be only on the basis of preventing a serious crime, as my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater pointed out.

My noble friend also pointed out the words of my right honourable friend James Brokenshire about the sheer amount of activity that has been done under covert means—it led to 3,500 arrests and the recovery of more than 400 firearms, 100 other types of weapons, 400 kilograms of class A drugs and £2.5 million-worth of cash. But first and foremost, and most importantly, is the fact that it safeguarded hundreds of victims from child sexual abuse and other heinous crimes.

To restrict the prevention of “crime” to “serious crime”, as Amendments 22, 23 and 31 propose, would mean that public authorities would be less able to investigate crime that, while not amounting at the time to serious crime, actually has a damaging impact on the lives of its victims—so the outcome is serious, to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. An example of this would be food crime: the extension of meat durability dates, leading to out-of-date food being consumed, is damaging and can be very dangerous to public health.

Of course, the necessity and proportionality requirements mean that an authorisation must be proportionate to the activity it seeks to prevent. This provides an important safeguard against authorisations of serious criminality being granted to prevent less serious, but equally important, crime. However, it is surely right that public authorities have access to the most effective tools to ensure justice for victims of these crimes and to prevent their occurrence.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to some of the examples that we have heard in this Chamber of sexual relationships between undercover police and women, and some of the actually quite devastating consequences of that. I think I have said before in this Chamber that that was not lawful, is not lawful and would never be lawful.

In response to the1 amendments seeking to remove economic well-being, this is one of the established statutory purposes for which covert investigatory powers may be deployed by public authorities. It recognises that threats to the economic well-being of the UK could be immensely damaging and fundamental in their effect. It might, for example, include the possibility of a hostile cyberattack against our critical national infrastructure, our financial institutions or, indeed, the Government. It is important that law enforcement bodies and intelligence agencies can deploy the full CHIS functionality against such threats where it is necessary and proportionate.

Similarly, preventing disorder is an important and legitimate law enforcement function. Where illegal activity takes place, public authorities listed in the Bill have a responsibility to take action as is necessary and proportionate. An example of this could be managing hostile football crowds, which does not involve lawful protest but causes harm to the public.

To be clear to noble Lords concerned that either economic well-being or preventing disorder could be used to target legitimate protest or the work of the trade unions, an authorisation can be granted only if it is proportionate to the harm or criminality that it seeks to prevent. Therefore, this would not include—to use the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—“legitimate and lawful activity”. The noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Bryan of Partick, also gave examples of activity by political groups or trade unions. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked me about the difference between the wording in this Bill and the CT Act. It goes wider, basically, and it is consistent with RIPA.

With those words, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful for what the Minister has said and appreciate that she has to stick to her script, but it gives the impression on occasion that there is no point in making contributions to debate because what I have said appears, from what she has said, to have been completely ignored. I will repeat exactly what I said. I said that of course the Government may say that in addition to being necessary the granting of a CCA must be proportionate—the issue that she mentioned—and it would not be proportionate to deploy a CHIS if the criminal activity was minor. That is almost word for word what she said. However, I went on to say that the same argument applies to the interception of communications in RIPA, where necessity is limited to serious crime, as defined in our Amendment 31. That second point seems to have been completely ignored by the Minister. I accept that that is probably because she has, understandably, just stuck to her script. It comes back to the point that I made, which is: what is the point of making speeches in debates if what noble Lords say is ignored by the Minister?

The Minister said that these amendments would limit how CHIS could lawfully be deployed and seek to restrict their deployment, and authorities would be less able to investigate crime. This Bill is about criminal conduct by CHIS, not their deployment. It is about giving authority to agents and informants to commit crime, and grant complete legal immunity to CHIS in those circumstances. There is a world of difference between deploying a CHIS and authorising them to commit crime, and then granting them immunity from prosecution. Yet the whole basis of her argument, from what I understood her to say, is that there is no difference between the two. In which case, what is the purpose of the Bill?

I say again: why is the interception of communications limited to serious crime if there is no need to limit the deployment of CHIS, who are going to be authorised to commit crime? Why should they not be limited to serious crime? That is a question that the Minister has failed to answer.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord, with whom I am actually good friends, makes a valid point: what is the point in making speeches if points are ignored? I often find that I make the same points over and again, and they are completely ignored because such is the will of people to make their opposite points. However, on this occasion, he is absolutely right. I did not address his point about RIPA and it being confined to serious crime. In the interception of communications, we are dealing with machines. In the deployment of humans, we are dealing with something else. I apologise to him for not answering his point.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for the care with which they have approached this group, which once more highlights the gravity of the development of this legislation to enable statutory criminal conduct authorisations with total immunity for the first time in our law. I will not rehearse the various arguments, most of which I agree with, but I will respond to the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, a distinguished statesman for whom I have a great deal of respect, and to the Minister. It is their opposition to these amendments and the thinking behind them that I must address, because the issue is so serious.

At various times in the debates on the Bill, some noble Lords have expressed irritation that one should hark back to past abuses including those in the Undercover Policing Inquiry, or the treatment of my noble friends Lord Hain and Lady Lawrence, as if they belong in a bygone era and would never happen again. Other examples include the treatment of the Greenpeace women and so on. One can cast those abuses aside by saying they would never happen again but, of course, we know that as legislators we have the precious duty—the sacred trust of those who have appointed us to this role—to learn from the past and legislate for the future, informed by the dangers that past activities have exposed. It is right that we take some care and employ forensic precision in refining provisions in legislation as serious as this.

With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, and the Minister, there has been an element of blurring classes of activity that should not be blurred in legislation of this kind. In particular, there has been blurring, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, highlighted, on authorising undercover operatives, which is perhaps the most serious kind of intrusive surveillance—because humans are human, not machines, to quote the Minister. Yes, they need more protection but we also need more protection from them because they will change our behaviour and not just record it.

Undercover operatives are important but dangerous, even under the present law. There is a new category of authorisation in this legislation, which is about criminal conduct by those agents and criminal conduct with total immunity after the fact. That is completely novel. It is important to understand how we got here, not just regarding the vital need for these operatives or the abuses of the past but the jurisprudential and legislative train that got us to this station.

Article 8 of the convention on human rights guarantees the right to respect for private and family life, stating that:

“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”


But of course there are exceptions. Article 8(2) is crucial in this debate. It states:

“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”


That is a necessarily broad exception. Why? It is because that exception exists in international and human rights law to cover any privacy interference at all. Any camera on a high street or requirement to fill out a tax form is an interference with privacy. It includes any interference on a prisoner’s privacy or the privacy of a schoolchild—any interference at all. Therefore, that category of exception is broad. However, it is too broad for intrusive surveillance, which is why, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, we start to introduce further restrictions for intrusive surveillance. It is not just about the duty to fill out a tax form any more; we are now talking about much greater intrusions—serious crime rather than just any crime.

Economic well-being is vital, for example, for the tax form; but it is too broad a category for authorising agents of the state to commit crimes against me, my friends or my associates. That is the Article 8 wording, which is too easily copied and pasted. Then we have the slightly tighter definitions in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, on to which today’s scheme is going to be grafted. That, serious though it is, is intrusive surveillance, but this is intrusive surveillance plus criminal activity plus total civil and criminal immunity. That is why the justifications in this Bill need to be tighter still than those in RIPA, not broader, and certainly a great deal tighter than the exceptions to Article 8 of the convention. I hope that I have made that clear, and I hope it rings true with most of your Lordships’ House.

To return to the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, I say that nobody is under any doubt that covert human intelligence sources are absolutely vital tools of public protection. Under the current law, we have no doubt that they have protected many of us and saved many lives. However, that was on the basis of a law where these people acted on the basis of guidance, but without this absolute immunity; but now we are told that they need absolute immunity—not a public interest defence and not what they have had until now. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to at least probe the possibility of, if not to insist on, much tighter regulation and safeguards than are currently provided in the Bill. Having had that discussion, however, for today at least I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, Amendment 27 is tabled in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I am not going to speak for long because we discussed some of these issues in the previous group. We have mentioned numbers in the various pieces of legislation and I have made the point about consistency. I know that when I mentioned the counter-terrorism Act, the noble Baroness was spot on and I will look at what she said in the earlier debate. However, we need to be sure that we have consistency in the various bits of legislation that we are talking about today. That is very important.

A number of colleagues have talked about the need to get the balance right here. The concerns that have been raised by Members of the House show that it is one thing when you are dealing with terrorists from another state or people who for various reasons are looking to undermine the economic well-being of the country, but on the other side of that are quite lawful campaigners. We might not like them and we might think that what they are doing is wrong or irritating, but they are acting in a perfectly lawful way. That is the area in which we need reassurance and it is what this debate comes down to. People have the right to protest, to be annoying and irritating, as long as they do it lawfully. We have to be sure that we get this right and that is what we are worried about.

Equally, I turn to the whole question of trade unionists, who have been mentioned many times. Trade unionists have the right to campaign and to know that they can do so without having agents put in to undermine their activities. You could argue that others might undermine their activities, but they do not need people in their own ranks who are sent in to do that.

As many noble Lords have mentioned, in the past undercover officers have been sleeping with campaigners. That is totally out of order. I am sure that it will be said that that will never happen again, but people need to be reassured that it is, as I say, totally out of order. While the Government are saying that this will never happen again, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has challenged a number of police commissioners—three of them are now Members of this House—and has never had an answer; that is also a concern. These things are totally wrong.

The Minister has a job here to find a way of reassuring the Committee that these things will not happen again, but how can we be sure about that? That is the issue that we have to deal with, because of course we thought that they could not have happened before, but clearly they did and we have only found out about them years afterwards. We want legislation that is right and proper so that people are protected, but, equally, legitimate campaigners have to be protected as well so that they are not abused and wrong things done to them. This, I think, is the crux of the issues we are debating today and I look forward to the response of the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I will start with the comments of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Chakrabarti, and the point about listening to what each other is saying. I have never tried to skirt around the issue of the disgusting behaviour of some 30 years ago. I do not know whether police officers were not told that it was illegal and the inquiry is clearly establishing the ins and outs of that. But it was not acceptable and it was never lawful, and it cannot be authorised under this Bill. I hope that I have made that very clear. I do not dismiss what those women went through—including, indeed, what the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, went through—and I hope that the inquiry will vindicate an awful lot of the people who suffered, complained and were simply ignored in the past. The inquiry will get to the bottom of something that was never lawful in the first place. I digress, but I must add that operational partners are very clear that that sort of behaviour could not be authorised under this Bill.

I shall move on to the substance of Amendment 27. I will not repeat the points I made in response to the last set of amendments, but I will emphasise that economic well-being is one of the established statutory purposes for which covert human investigatory powers may be deployed by public authorities. We recognise that threats to the economic well-being of the UK could be immensely damaging and fundamental in their effect. That might include, for example, the possibility of a hostile cyberattack against our critical infrastructure, as I said earlier, attacks on financial institutions or on the Government themselves. I gave examples in my previous speech of the victims of CSA, cash and drugs activity, so they may not be solely related to issues of national security.

We have agencies such as HMRC, the NCA and the Serious Fraud Office whose mandate includes mitigating broader threats to the UK’s economic well-being. These threats are real, emerging and go beyond the remit of national security. We cannot tie our hands in response to such threats by limiting the statutory purposes available to tackle these issues. Of course, there are also examples of where economic well-being is not restricted to national security, as set out in other parts of the Investigatory Powers Act and the Security Service Act.

I hope that I have given a full explanation of why Amendment 27 should be withdrawn.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

My Lords, I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, if the noble and learned Lord was referring at the beginning of his contribution to the term “economic well-being”, I hope that the references made during the earlier debate will be helpful. I certainly agree with him about the breadth of what is in the Bill and the distinction between surveillance and authorising criminal conduct.

The amendments in this group raise the issue of whether we are concerned about the activity or the actor. My noble friend Lord Paddick questioned Amendment 29 and the term “legitimate political activity”. I had in fact made a note that that quite attracted me, but he and I have not had the opportunity to thrash this out between us. We may get it on the floor of the House if the noble Baroness brings the matter back at a future point.

On Amendment 78, on the equality impact assessment, frankly, the Government would be ill advised to resist this. I am mindful of the need to avoid the identification of agents. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, was very clear about that the other day but, as the amendment is worded, I do not think that there should be such risks—although of course I am not experienced in this area.

In Amendment 56A, my noble friend has stood back to look at the purpose. Again, it is the broader point of addressing the principle rather than producing a list or a detailed prescription. I hope that the Minister will accept that we are keen to address the problems that the Bill throws up without undermining it. I am sorry that, today at any rate, I will not get the chance to speak after she has responded to my noble friend, but I believe that he has come up with a formula that is well worth pursuing.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group of amendments. I start with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about people in this House with experience. This is important, because your Lordships’ experience in such a wide variety of areas makes legislation in Parliament better.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I have just one question. She said that the scenario I suggested could not happen because police forces had dedicated source units. Can she point to where in the Bill or in the codes of practice it says that that has to be the case? If not, the Bill or the code of practice is defective.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord will appreciate that not every Bill contains every minute detail of issues such as this, but I hope that, with my having made the statement on the Floor of the House, the noble Lord is satisfied that there cannot be conflict. However, I would be very happy to speak to him about this before Report.

[Baroness Clark of Kilwinning (Lab)]

I am happy to withdraw Amendment 29.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

There are a number of amendments in this group relating to human rights. They variously provide that a criminal conduct authorisation: may not authorise activity that would be incompatible with convention rights; may not authorise murder, torture or rape, or a person under the age of 18 to engage in criminal conduct; cannot authorise causing death or grievous bodily harm, sexual violation or torture; and cannot authorise causing death or grievous bodily harm, perverting the course of justice, sexual offences, torture or depriving a person of their liberty.

There is also an amendment in my name and that of my noble friends Lord Kennedy of Southwark and Lord Judd, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that would also put explicit limits in the Bill on the types of criminal behaviour that can be authorised. These limits cover causing death or bodily harm, sexual violation, perverting the course of justice, torture, detaining an individual or damaging property where it would put a person in danger. There is an amendment to my amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, the purpose of which, as he has explained, is to explore whether the proposed regulatory regime provides adequate safeguards for operations carried out overseas.

The amendments all follow a similar theme, namely, wanting to include in the Bill clearer and tighter wording in respect of the criminal conduct that can be authorised by a CCA, so that there can be no doubt over what is a permissible criminal conduct authorisation and, more significantly, what is not. The Government’s position appears to be that criminal offences that are contrary to the Human Rights Act are already precluded, given that all public authorities are bound by the Human Rights Act, and thus authorising authorities are not permitted by the Bill to authorise conduct that would constitute or entail a breach of those rights.

Interestingly, the Bill states in new Section 29B(7) in Clause 1(5), on criminal conduct authorisations:

“Subsection (6) is without prejudice to the need to take into account other matters so far as they are relevant (for example, the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998).”


But what are the words “to take into account” meant to mean in this context as regards adhering to the requirements of the Human Rights Act? One can, after all, take something into account and then decide that it should be ignored or minimised in whole or in part. What do the words,

“so far as they are relevant”,

mean in relation to the requirements of the Human Rights Act? In what circumstances are those requirements not relevant in relation to criminal conduct authorisations?

Turning to an issue that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, addressed, the Government have maintained that specifying in the Bill offences that cannot be authorised places at risk undercover officers and agents on the grounds that to do so would place into the hands of criminals, terrorists and hostile states a means of creating a checklist for suspected CHIS to be tested against. However, as has been said, the Canadian Security Intelligence Act authorises criminal conduct similar to that proposed in the Bill, and my amendment reflects the wording in the Canadian legislation on the type of serious criminal conduct that cannot be authorised.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has pointed out that the Bill gives the Secretary of State power to make orders prohibiting the authorisation of any specified criminal conduct and that, in line with the Government’s argument, whatever might be prohibited by such an order could presumably also be used by criminals as a checklist against which to test a covert human intelligence source. The JCHR comments in its report:

“If limits can be placed on authorised criminal conduct in publicly available secondary legislation without putting informants and undercover officers at undue risk, it is unclear why express limits cannot also be set out in primary legislation.”


The JCHR report also states:

“If a criminal gang or terrorist group was familiar enough with the relevant legislation to test a CHIS against it, they would presumably be equally able to test them against the guarantees and protections set out in the”


Human Rights Act.

Perhaps, in their response, the Government could say whether they are still committed to the Human Rights Act, since following their 2019 election manifesto commitment to ensuring that there is a proper balance between the rights of individuals, national security and effective government—which suggests that the Government do not think that is the present position—they have announced that there is to be a review into the operation of the Human Rights Act.

If the Government intend to argue that the Human Rights Act will provide protection in the years ahead against unacceptable use of the powers in this Bill, there needs at least to be a clear statement from the Government that they are committed to the Act and will not be altering its provisions.

It could be claimed with some justification, however, that the Human Rights Act has not prevented previous human rights violations connected to undercover investigations or covert human intelligence sources. I await the Government’s response to this group of amendments and to the contributions that seek more specific wording in the Bill, to put clear limits on the type of criminal behaviour that can be authorised.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their very thoughtful contributions to a discussion of the upper limit of what can be authorised by a criminal conduct authorisation.

I will first address comments—because they have been the most numerous—that propose to replicate on the face of the Bill the limits that the Canadians have set in the legislation governing their security service, and Amendment 42, from my noble friend Lord Cormack, which prohibits murder, torture or rape. I totally recognise why noble Lords want to ensure that this Bill does not provide authority for an undercover agent to commit any and all crime. It does not. I reiterate once more: there are already clear limits on the criminal activity that can be authorised and they can be found within the Human Rights Act—which, by the way, was not in place when some of the activities that noble Lords have described were carried out.

Nothing in this Bill undermines the need to comply with that Act, as is made clear by new Section 29B(7). Further limits are placed on the regime by the need for the authorising officer in all public authorities to confirm that there is a demonstrable need to authorise a CHIS by making a clear case for its necessity and proportionality. I understand questions about why we cannot place explicit limits in the Bill, as they do in other countries, notably including—as noble Lords have said—Canada, and I will explain our reasoning.

We think that placing express limits on the face of the Bill is not necessary. The Human Rights Act already provides these limits and the amendments that replicate the limits in Canadian legislation do not prohibit any criminal conduct which is not already prohibited by the ECHR and HRA, as encompassed by the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made a point about undercover police who have sexual relationships: if gangs knew that that was unlawful, would they then test against it? I would say that although that behaviour would be unlawful in that context, it is very distinct from rape. I have been trying to talk to my noble friend who is a QC and perhaps I will set my answer out in more detail in writing.

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[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 39 in the names of my noble friends Lady Massey of Darwen and Lord Dubs removes from the definition in the Bill of authorised criminal conduct the words

“by or in relation to”

the specified covert human intelligence source. It replaces those words with a more detailed definition; namely, that it is conduct by

“the covert human intelligence source”

or by a person who holds a rank, office, or position in the public authority that is granting the authorisation and is assisting in the behaviour of the covert human intelligence source. As my noble friend Lord Dubs said, this amendment was recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Under the terms of the Bill, authorised conduct is not limited to the conduct of the covert human intelligence source. The code of practice says that a criminal conduct authorisation may also authorise conduct by someone else in relation to a covert human intelligence source, with that someone else being those within a public authority involved in or affected by the authorisation.

If the Government do not accept Amendment 39, they need to set out in their response the reasons why they consider it necessary to provide for the authorisation of criminal conduct by someone other than the covert human intelligence source; the parameters of that criminal conduct by someone other than the CHIS that can be so authorised; and the safeguards in the Bill to ensure that the person authorised to commit criminal conduct—who is someone other than the covert human intelligence source—is not also involved in any way in the authorisation process to which that criminal conduct relates.

I shall listen with interest to the Government’s response to Amendment 39 and to the pertinent questions raised by my noble friend Lord Sikka in speaking to his amendment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.

Amendment 39 seeks clarification on who can be authorised under the Bill. The intention behind the Bill is to provide protection both to the CHIS themselves and to those involved in the authorisation process within the relevant public authority. There are a range of limitations on what can be authorised under the Bill, including the conduct being necessary and proportionate. This means that it would not be possible to grant an authorisation for criminal conduct unless that conduct was by a CHIS for a specific, identified purpose, or involved members of the public authority making, or giving effect to, the CHIS authorisation.

Amendment 53, from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to restrict those who can be granted a criminal conduct authorisation to employees of the public authority. The Government cannot support this amendment as it would significantly hamper our public authorities’ efforts to tackle crimes and terrorism. While CHIS are often employees of the public authority, they also can be members of the public. The real value of CHIS who are members of the public is in their connections to the criminal and terrorist groups that we are targeting. This is often the only means by which valuable intelligence can be gathered on the harmful activities which we are seeking to stop. Employees of a public authority will not have the same level of access. I reassure the noble Lord that the authorising officers within the public authority set out clearly the strict parameters of a criminal conduct authorisation. Were a CHIS to engage in criminality beyond their authorisation, that conduct could be considered for prosecution in the usual way.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether the CHIS and their handler could be prosecuted. Obviously, every situation will be different, but if the CHIS acted beyond their authorisation, they would have to answer for that. Equally, if the CHIS handler acted inappropriately or in a way that might endanger the CHIS, they could also be liable for that conduct.

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, talked about security guards being undercover operatives. The noble Lord will know that we have published the list of bodies that can run undercover operatives. In addition to this, the criminal injuries compensation scheme is not undermined by this Bill, and I understand that anyone can approach the IPT if they feel they are due civil compensation. I think that is right, but I will write to noble Lords if that is wrong.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

I have received a request to speak after the Minister, and hand signals suggest it may be the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation. I am not sure I explained myself well enough to her in terms of who is covered by legal immunity. It is not if the CHIS goes beyond the CCA, but if the CHIS remains within the CCA. So, if the CHIS operates exactly in the way the handler has told them to, and the handler tells them only what the authorising officer has authorised them to, but it is not necessary or proportionate, it is corrupt or a mistake, who is covered by the CCA? Who is covered by the immunity, even though the CHIS has not gone beyond what they were asked to do?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I say again that each situation will be different, but I understand the noble Lord’s point that if the CHIS is acting as instructed, but the handler has gone beyond where they should have gone, it would be the handler’s authorising officer who would be liable for that activity. There would be an investigation, but at that point, we are talking about a theoretical case. If it was the handler who had acted beyond their purview, the handler would be liable for that handling activity, or the authorising officer. It is late, I am tired, and I have suddenly forgotten my thread.

[Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who contributed to the debate. I have to lead with what the Minister said. I feel that her interpretation of the part of the Bill we are talking about was nearer to the spirit of the amendment than the wording of the clause itself. That is why I want to have a look at it. As for what my noble friend Lord Sikka said, I was not aware that a person in the Bill could be a corporate body. I fear he has an important point, but maybe it is not quite in the scope of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, my contribution on this amendment will be fairly short. I hear the point that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti makes and I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this issue is not mentioned in the Bill. Therefore, I am not quite clear whether the amendment is necessary. It would help us if, when the Minister responds, she could say something about the detail of the authorisations in a CCA.

Behind all the amendments today are concerns and worries about what may or may not have happened in the past. People want reassurance going forward, but they are not seeing it. I see that theme across all our discussions today. At some point, the Government will probably have to go a bit further to provide that reassurance, although I do not know how they will do that.

All these issues have been raised because of concerns that people have had in the past. As my noble friend said, we do not know whether we can stop this in the future, but I hope that the Minister can go a bit further. I cannot see any particular issue but, if I am right, the reason behind an authorisation would have to be recorded and shared with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That is the issue on which we need reassurance, as we move forward and give people new powers.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I thank noble Lords. I hope to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about why we do not need this amendment.

I have already stressed the requirement for all CHIS authorisations to be given in line with the Human Rights Act. Article 6 of the ECHR protects the right to a fair trial. The article restates a fundamental principle of English law and, I understand, Scottish law: that a court has a duty to ensure a fair trial. The use of an agent provocateur could be seen as affecting the fairness of a trial, and rightly so. A court already has the requisite power in law—under Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—to consider and exclude such evidence. The relevant entrapment principles are set out in the leading House of Lords case of Loosely from 2001, which also opines on the convergence of English law in this area with our Article 6 commitments. I hope that that provides reassurance.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

I apologise: I perhaps have not made myself clear enough. It is late and we have all been at this for a while, but I do not think that I explained myself well enough either to my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark or to the Minister.

Agent provocateurs are not limited to the trial process. In fact, the scenario that I have painted could apply where nobody is brought to trial, so Article 6 and evidential rules against entrapment are no protection. I shall try again.

The scenario is like this. Some hours ago, the noble Lord, Lord King, spoke about the possibilities—suspicions or fears perhaps—that in the future environmental or race equality movements might become involved in more militant or violent action against people or property. That is a concern that he already has, and maybe some other people do too. Given that the Bill allows economic concerns to be a justification not just for CHIS but criminal conduct, what would happen if a CHIS were authorised to enter such a protest movement and misbehave in order to discredit it when that movement had not yet, or at all, engaged in that more violent, militant or illegal activity?

In my scenario, it is possible that only the CHIS himself is committing a crime, but because he is doing so within that movement, the organisation is now discredited in the public mind or the Government might choose to prohibit the organisation in some way. It is quite possible that in that scenario nobody will have been brought to court and there will be no Article 6 fair trial issue and no entrapment/evidence issue.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Will the noble Baroness give way?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

Of course.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I apologise for intervening at an inappropriate moment. I was trying to clarify whether the noble Baroness was suggesting that a CHIS would be authorised to entrap. I do not think that authorisation would be valid.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

Forgive me, but in the scenario that I have just painted there is no entrapment because nobody is prosecuted. There is just criminal behaviour by a CHIS for the purpose of discrediting in the public imagination an otherwise peaceful protest movement, for example; it could be an environmental movement. At the moment I see nothing in the Bill that bans a criminal conduct authorisation being made with the primary purpose of discrediting an otherwise peaceful movement that perhaps poses a challenge to some people’s idea of the economic well-being of the nation.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I think that we are coming to the end of this debate, but entrapment in and of itself would have been committed.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we can disagree on that, but perhaps before Report the Minister and her colleagues might reflect on what I am trying to achieve. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, this is one of those debates where you can stand up and quite honestly say you agree with every single word that has been said from across the House. I am sure the noble Baroness understands that this presents particular problem for the Government, because I am sure that, in addition to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, who made an excellent speech, many other members of the Government’s own party will agree with all the points that have been raised here today.

This group of amendments brings the House back to an issue that was first raised by my noble friend Lord Haskel on a statutory instrument, to which the noble Baroness responded. I remember sitting in a much more packed House, and there was lots of concern around the House—“What is this?” People were quite shocked to learn that children were being used in such a way, and that shock and concern has continued, which is why we have come here today.

Everyone around the House is very worried. That is certainly why I signed Amendment 60, which was so ably spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey. Other noble Lords have spoken, and all these amendments are excellent, but I hope that we can hone this down to one. I particularly like Amendment 60, but I think we can see the concern expressed by the House, and we need to deal with this. Our Amendment 60 does not rule out child CHIS completely, but it certainly restricts them. I accept that in very limited circumstances, you might have to use a child, but it must be a very limited, rare occasion.

I am confident that the House will pass an amendment on this issue. Ideally and hopefully, it would be a government amendment, but I am confident that the House will pass an amendment by a large majority on this issue, which is about children. As you have heard, people under 18 can be quite streetwise—certainly, children think they are quite streetwise, although I do not know if they are; they are not quite as streetwise as they think they are. It is about that ability to give informed consent.

We are asking these children to take part in, be involved in and inform and report back on some very dangerous situations. This can be terrorism, drug dealing, sexual abuse or paedophilia: all sorts of really appalling, terrible things. We have to ask ourselves the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham: how is that individual child protected? What would be said if a child CHIS is authorised and that child dies? That would be appalling—what would we say then? I think we have to take note of and be concerned about that, as well as the comments of the Children’s Commissioner in respect of using child CHIS.

Of course, sometimes—we have had this before—the child CHIS can be asked to pass information back to their handler, who can be a member of their own family. There are often situations when they are involved in a crime family: it could be their own father or mother. It is not always the case that the child is in care and hanging around the streets before getting involved; sometimes, it can be members of their own family, who can be very dangerous people. We are putting people in very difficult situations, and we must be even more careful about the individual child in those situations. These children have rights, and we need to ensure that, as the state, we protect them even more. As I said, if you are under 18, you are legally still a child and deserve protection from the state.

The right reverend Prelate made the point again about children, and I fully support his comments, as I do the points about mental capacity made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, which are very important. I also support the point of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that, sometimes, you can have quite a streetwise child and, equally, an older adult who is not that streetwise, so there is an issue there as well. These are things that we need to consider.

I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to tell the House that she fully understands the situation—and I know she is concerned about this. I hope that she will work with the House and, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell, says, can see the concern and genuine desire to agree something. I hope that she will welcome noble Lords from around the House and that we will come back with an amendment that, hopefully, we can all sign up to on Report, allowing very limited circumstances where a child may need to be used—very limited. Equally, I want to see much more protection for people. I hope that, when the noble Baroness responds, she will be able to give the House that information.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I start with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and absolutely confirm that I fully understand what all noble Lords have been talking about this evening. Of course, I will continue to work with the House, as I have done to date, in discussing what is, for me, the most difficult part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked me: would I like to be a CHIS? No: I would be utterly terrified. Could I see my children being deployed in such activity? It would be incredibly difficult for me.

We need to put ourselves in the shoes of those children, who, as every noble Lord has said, are fairly vulnerable people in the sense that they might have been involved in, or their home life might be the site of, criminal activity. This is a very difficult area indeed. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Russell, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, and my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham—and any noble Lords who are behind me—who have taken the time to come and speak to me about this aspect of the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, put to me the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about sessions in private. We are thinking about the best way to ensure that people have some of the information they need, although noble Lords will understand that some of that is sensitive to the point that it cannot be given out. I hope that noble Lords will appreciate that I have taken the time to have a one-to-one session with any noble Lord who requested it, on any aspect of the Bill. That said, these issues are very difficult, and I totally understand the concerns that have been raised. Nobody likes to think of children or young people being involved in these horrible areas.

Noble Lords may recall that the issue of juvenile CHIS, including whether they should be authorised at all, was discussed extensively in Parliament in 2018. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Young, asked me why there was no child impact assessment of the Bill. As a result of concerns being raised about the use of juvenile CHIS, the IPC himself launched a review of all public authorities that have the power to authorise CHIS, to ensure that there was a comprehensive record of how often these powers were used in relation to juveniles. The conclusions of the review were reported in March 2019 to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I have discussed them before, including the numbers, on the Floor of this House.

On the basis of these detailed reviews, the IPC was satisfied that those who grant such authorisations do so only after very careful consideration of the inherent risks, and that concerns around the safeguarding of children and the public authority’s duty of care to the child are key considerations in the authorisation process. He also noted that public authorities are reticent to authorise juveniles as CHIS unless the criminality and the risk of harm to individuals and communities that the authorisation is seeking to prevent is of a high order and cannot be resolved in less intrusive ways. The noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, put that challenge to me.

The IPC also highlighted that juvenile CHIS are not tasked to participate in criminality that they are not already involved in and that becoming a CHIS can, potentially, offer a way to extricate themselves from such harm. The decisions to authorise were only made where this is the best option for breaking the cycle of crime and the danger for the individual, much as that might sound contradictory.

As well as the IPC investigation, the High Court considered the issue of juvenile CHIS last year. Mr Justice Supperstone set out his view that it was clear that the principal focus of the framework for juvenile CHIS is to ensure that appropriate weight is given to a child’s best interests and that the practical effect of the enhanced risk assessment is that juveniles are,

“only utilised in extreme circumstances and when other potential sources of information have been exhausted.”

I hope that that goes some way to reassuring noble Lords that the decision to authorise a young person to act as a CHIS, or participate in criminality, is never taken lightly.

I will now set out the additional safeguards that apply to the authorisation of juveniles as CHIS, and which will equally apply when criminal conduct is being authorised. These include authorisation at a more senior level, a shorter duration for authorisations—four months, rather than 12 for adult CHIS—with monthly reviews, and a requirement for an enhanced risk assessment. There must also be an appropriate adult present at meetings between the public authority and the CHIS for those under 16 years of age. To answer another question, appropriate adults are always independent of the police or other investigating authorities. This must be considered on a case-by-case basis for 16 to 17 year-olds.

These safeguards are contained within the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order and the updated CHIS code of practice, where the safeguards for juveniles have been further strengthened. The revisions to the code will be subject to a full consultation before they are finalised and will have legal force.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

I thank the Minister for her very full reply. I asked whether the approach of my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich in 2016 to the scrutiny of the Investigatory Powers Act, as it went through both Houses, might not be a model to follow. In our meeting last week, the Minister discussed with myself and those of us who are sceptical about the use of child CHIS for evidence the requirement for this. To convince us, she was kind enough to indicate that the 17 cases that we know of through IPCO produced a result that was deemed, in the balance of all things, positive and justified the use of those cases. In the absence of that sort of evidence, those of us whose primary concern is the best interests of the child are understandably very cautious and a little sceptical. We are willing to be convinced but we need the evidence to be convinced, please.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I will reiterate what I said, which is that I am trying to work out a mechanism for sessions that might be helpful but not leaked, and perhaps where we can give some working examples—again, perhaps in private. We will try to do that if not before Report then during it, but before we come to this amendment.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

Actually, I have nothing to ask. The noble Baroness answered my point right at the end, after I had asked the clerk if I could speak, so I will leave it there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I will be brief. I see the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is making on the need for review, but I am not convinced that it needs to be in the Bill. I am not persuaded that it is the right thing to do, although I see the point of a review. When the noble Baroness responds, maybe she can tell us about the detail of future authorisations. Would it be built into the authorisation itself? That would seem the better place for it, but I will wait to hear what the noble Baroness says. As it is, I am not convinced by the amendment or that the issue should be in the Bill.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I hope to provide the clarity that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, seeks and persuade the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this is not necessary in the Bill. The current authorisation period of 12 months is consistent with the authorisation for the use and conduct of CHIS, which will need to be in place before criminal conduct can be authorised. Keeping the Bill consistent with the powers laid out in Section 29 will ensure that this power remains operationally workable for the public authorities listed in the Bill.

In the updated CHIS code of practice that accompanies the Bill, it is clear that a criminal conduct authorisation should be relied upon for as short a duration as possible. There is also a requirement on authorising officers to undertake regular reviews to assess whether the authorisation remains necessary and proportionate, and is justified. An authorisation must be cancelled when that is no longer the case.

Authorisations will be specifically and narrowly drafted and, in many cases, the specificity of the authorisation will mean that the criminal conduct authorised is in effect narrowly time-limited. However, there will be occasions when this conduct necessarily extends longer than a four-month period; CHIS who are members of proscribed organisations is a good example of this.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I thank the Minister for what she just said and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support. I do not quite understand the position of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. If 12 months is specified as the length of a CCA in the Bill then why, if we want to change it to four months, should it not be in the Bill? The Minister is saying it is consistent with the period for authorising CHIS, but not the period for authorising juvenile CHIS. It is a much more serious issue than simply authorising CHIS, as we have discussed. Authorising someone to commit a crime and giving them immunity from prosecution is far more serious than simply deploying CHIS.

To say that it makes it easier if the length of time is the same for one as it is for the other is to ignore the seriousness of this deployment—authorising CHIS to commit crime. If you were to follow the noble Baroness’s argument to its logical conclusion, you would not need the Bill to authorise CHIS to commit crime, as it would be just the same as deploying CHIS. No doubt we will return to this on Report but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Security Co-operation

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dubs]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the future of security cooperation across Europe from January 2021.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, we will continue to work closely with our European partners to tackle shared security threats, promoting the safety and security of all our citizens. We also continue to work closely with operational partners to ensure that we are ready for a range of possible outcomes at the end of the year. The UK will continue to be a global leader on security and one of the safest countries in the world.

[Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that we are threatened by cybercrime, other forms of serious crime, violent extremism and terrorism and that, if we leave the EU without a sensible deal on security co-operation, we will lose access to data, the European arrest warrant and Europol? On access to data, will she confirm that we use the Schengen Information System 600 million times a year? Surely our membership of the European Court of Justice, which is a government red line, is trivial compared to the need to keep our people safe and save lives in this country.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

We have always said that there would be a mutual loss of capability in the event that the UK no longer had access to SIS II. That is why we have offered to reach an agreement with the EU that delivers a similar capability. The Commission has stated its view that it is not legally possible for a non-Schengen third country to co-operate through SIS II and that a future agreement between the UK and the EU need not provide similar capabilities. We regret this and have maintained our offer to the EU.

[Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, the sharing of intelligence and the importance of close co-operation between the UK and our friends throughout Europe is well proven. I could cite several examples clearly showing that it keeps us all safe and has prevented terrorist attacks throughout the continent. What assurance can the Minister give your Lordships’ House that there will be no lessening of this close partnership after the end of the implementation period on 1 January 2021?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I assure the noble Lord that the UK will continue to work with our European partners to counter, as he said, the terrorist threats we face in Europe and beyond. We have world-leading expertise on counterterrorism and countering violent extremism, which we will continue to share with EU member states as appropriate.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, how much of our data exchange with EU member states now takes place through Europol? Does my noble friend agree that, having left the EU, we should rebuild our security and intelligence exchange arrangements on a bilateral basis with member states rather than exchanging sensitive intelligence through Europol, and that our security will be enhanced rather than diminished as a result?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, the UK is not seeking membership of Europol or Eurojust. That is not how third-country arrangements with these agencies work. We have not sought membership of either agency, but we are negotiating at what is clearly a very sensitive and late stage. In general, there is a good degree of convergence between what the UK and the EU have been seeking to negotiate.

[Baroness Coussins (CB) [V]]

My Lords, can the Minister give a clear assurance that, from 1 January, the police will continue to have unfettered access to the various EU databases which help them track and prevent transnational crime such as the trafficking of drugs, arms and people? Over 50 million requests are made of these databases every year from UK police forces. National security would clearly be at risk without access to them.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I agree with the noble Baroness about our capabilities. We are in the very late stages of negotiating an agreement on law enforcement, criminal justice and, as she says, those data exchanges that are so important. I cannot say more than that, but we have had some very useful discussions in this area and I am hopeful of a good deal.

[Baroness Quin (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, can the Minister assure us that, once we are no longer part of the EU’s common security and defence policy, UK defence companies will not be disadvantaged in participating in and supplying to European defence projects?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Baroness strays slightly into the area of defence, but I can say that the foundation of European security since 1949 has been the NATO alliance. Our intelligence services already have highly effective co-operation to build on outside those EU structures. We also have the Five Eyes group and the Counter-Terrorism Group. We are well placed going forward.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, is it not the case that, without access to EU databases and the European arrest warrant, in terms of security we are leaving the European Union on a wing and a prayer?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The European arrest warrant is used exclusively by EU members, obviously. We have proposed that an agreement with the EU should provide for fast-track extradition arrangements, based on the EU’s arrangements with Norway and Iceland but with appropriate further safeguards for individuals.

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My noble friend has rightly stated that the safety and security of our citizens is the top priority and that the UK will continue to be a global leader in security. One therefore hopes that our European friends will continue to work closely with us to ensure the safety of all our citizens. In the unlikely event that we leave without a deal, can my noble friend confirm that there are well-developed and well-rehearsed plans in place to ensure the safety and security of the British people?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I can confirm that for my noble friend. I also reiterate his point that the safety and security of our citizens is the Government’s top priority. We are negotiating an agreement on law enforcement and criminal justice with the EU to equip our operational partners on both sides with the capabilities to protect citizens and bring criminals to justice.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

The National Police Chiefs’ Council has warned that, post Brexit, with the loss of access to EU databases,

“even with contingencies in place, the fallback systems will be slower, provide less visibility of information/intelligence and make joined up working with European partners more cumbersome.”

The National Crime Agency has said that, in both a negotiated outcome and a non-negotiated scenario,

“the alternative measures are less automated and more unwieldy to use.”

Do the Government agree with the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the National Crime Agency? If so, what do they intend to do about it?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I reiterate that there will be a mutual loss of capabilities for the UK and the EU in a non-negotiated outcome. I do not think I have made any secret of that in this House. We are therefore working very hard—I know it is late in the day—to secure a negotiated outcome.

[Lord Bilimoria (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the Minister has confirmed that the security of their citizens is the number one priority of the Government. If that is the case, are we going to have access to the European Criminal Records Information System, which we make almost 200,000 requests to in a year? Are we going to have access to the Schengen Information System II, which, as noble Lords have said, has required access of up to 500 million times a year? What about Europol, which was mentioned? What about the European arrest warrant? Does the Minister agree that, deal or no deal, if we do not have these things, they represent a risk to public safety and security?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I can only admire the noble Lord’s ability to get about seven questions in his one question. Going back to SIS II, which we spoke about earlier, the Commission has stated its view that it is not legally possible for us, as a non-Schengen country, to co-operate through SIS II. As set out in the UK’s published approach to negotiations, we believe an agreement should provide for the fast and effective exchange of criminal records data between the UK and EU individual member states.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord Fowler)]

My Lords, I do not admire the noble Lord’s ability to get more than two questions in, because that is meant to be the requirement of Question Time. We now come to the fourth Oral Question.

Children: Online Grooming

Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Benjamin (LD)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper and declare an interest as a champion of the Internet Watch Foundation and a vice-president of Barnardo’s.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the rise in self-generated indecent images of children is extremely concerning. These images can have devastating impacts on young people, putting them at risk of blackmail, coercion and, of course, further abuse. Through the online harms Bill we intend to publish a new duty of care for online companies towards their users, overseen by an independent regulator. Our response during the pandemic includes amplifying messages to stakeholders to help children to stay safe online.

[Baroness Benjamin (LD)]

My Lords, professionals working in child protection, such as those at Barnardo’s and the NSPCC, have been raising concerns about the impact of the lockdown on children, which has created a perfect storm that has led to an increase in online child abuse. The Internet Watch Foundation has warned of a rise in self-generated illegal images of young children which it has had to take down, up almost 50% on last year. What steps are the Government taking to ensure that there is a renewed focus on prevention and the protection of children, who are spending more time online, to guarantee that they are properly supported with high-quality online safety advice, funding and resources?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I agree whole- heartedly with the noble Baroness: she is absolutely right that the figures she quotes are staggering and worrying. I commend the Internet Watch Foundation for the work it is doing. I know that officials are engaging very closely with the IWF to explore what more we can do to tackle this sort of online grooming. I also know that RSE in schools is another area through which we can engage with children to prevent this sort of thing happening in the first place.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the UK Safer Internet Centre recently reported that in one week alone earlier this year 700 young girls, most of them between 11 and 13 years old, were coerced into filming their own abuse and posting it online, where it is easily shared, repeating the trauma and victimisation time and again. What progress have the Government made in getting social media companies to take down all such images, including those that have been shared, as they are reported? Which companies are not complying with this process? Can the Minister also confirm that funding for the UK Safer Internet Centre has been secured as a result of the Chancellor’s Statement last week?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I cannot confirm the answer to the noble Lord’s question about the funding for the UK Safer Internet Centre, but I will confirm it to him in writing. The figure that he quoted of 700 girls in one week is just staggering in its magnitude. Of course, this is a problem of this generation: my children were certainly not subjected to this type of coercion, either by their peers or by groomers online. This is the double concern. I know that Five Eyes are working together with some of the internet providers and social media sites and that the Home Secretary has been engaged in this work, specifically with Facebook.

[Baroness Kennedy of Cradley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, in April 2017, three and a half years ago, the Digital Economy Act included measures to protect children online. In 2019, the Government decided not to commence these measures, wanting instead to wait for the online harms Bill. A year on, we are still waiting for that Bill. When will it be published, and can the Minister explain to the House how this three and a half year-delay is the Government seeking to protect children online?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I cannot disagree with the noble Baroness that the sooner the online harms Bill comes our way, the better. I certainly know that the response to the consultation will be published very shortly. The sooner we can get on with this, the absolute better for our children.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, is there any way for the authorities to monitor communications with children who are in local authority care and particularly vulnerable to the offer of a relationship, and in this way prevent the grooming altogether?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I have to say to my noble and learned friend that in local authorities, particularly when local authority systems are being used, there are firewalls to prevent some types of abuse, but if a child has a smart phone with such things as Messenger or Snapchat on it, it is incredibly difficult for local authorities to keep tabs on children who are at the end of such coercive behaviour. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, talked about the online harms Bill next year: that is going to be crucial, because it will place a duty of care on service providers and social media platforms to actually protect vulnerable people from this sort of thing.

[Baroness Walmsley (LD) [V]]

My Lords, following up on the Minister’s reply to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, she may be aware that industry compliance in taking down child abuse images fell by 89% in the first month of lockdown. What tools are the Government using, or threatening to use, to ensure that social media companies such as Facebook design and deliver platforms and services that put child protection front and centre?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I can guess at several of the factors, but one might be the ever-increasing use of encryption, so that not only can parents not see what their children are doing, but nor can the local authority or, actually, the internet providers themselves. This is at the heart of what the Home Secretary and Five Eyes partners are trying to discourage going forward.

[Baroness Warsi (Con) [V]]

My Lords, following up on the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, my noble friend may be aware that Facebook and Facebook-owned apps such as Instagram and WhatsApp account for more than 50% of online abuse. What conversations are specifically taking place with Facebook in relation to its platforms being the preferred method and platform for this kind of abuse?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

Well, Messenger, which is a Facebook app, had not to date been encrypted, but Facebook has announced its intention to encrypt Messenger from, I think, next year. This is precisely the type of discussion that the Home Secretary and Five Eyes partners are having with Facebook, because not only will law enforcement bodies and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in the US not be able to look at what is going on there, but nor will Facebook itself, and that is the crucial thing here.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, these are horrific crimes. Frankly, is it not time to give the directors of the companies that are hosting these images legal civil and criminal responsibility for the content they host? I suspect we would see much swifter action if this were the case, and nothing short of this will do to deal with this abuse.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, although I cannot give the actual details of the online harms Bill, that duty of care will push that responsibility on to those internet service providers and platforms to do just that, to protect our children.

[Lord Mann (Non-Afl)]

The question we really want answered is whether the Home Office is pressing for, and the Government are going to provide parliamentarians with, the opportunity to vote in Parliament to create criminal sanctions against the internet companies that are failing to deal with this depravity.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I certainly look forward to having those discussions with parliamentarians in your Lordships’ House, many of whom have such expertise in this area.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord Fowler)]

My Lords, the time allowed for this Question has elapsed. We now come to the third Oral Question.