Shrewsbury 24 (Release of Papers)

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Thursday 23rd January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. A large number of Members want to participate in the debate so I am imposing a time limit of six minutes for each Back-Bench speech, starting immediately. We will see how we go through the afternoon, but it may be necessary for that limit to be reduced further if we do not have enough time to fit everybody in.

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[Mr Dennis Skinner (Bolsover) (Lab)]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

I call Dennis Skinner. [Interruption.] I am sorry. I will call the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell) next.

[Mr Dennis Skinner (Bolsover) (Lab)]

Well, that has put the Lib Dems in their place, hasn’t it? I have always wanted to do it. I know Clegg’s got a sour face—[Interruption.]

Anyway, we live in the age of transparency, don’t we? We have transparency coming out of every pore. Every day I turn up in the House of Commons, from all sides I am assailed by people saying, “We need transparency.” At the beginning, I was unsure what it meant; I am sure now. It is a class thing. It applies only to the things that affect us, but it does not give us an inch when we are asking for something from the other side. We can have transparency about hospitals, care homes, schools, and everything else, but not about this. Isn’t it strange that we are being told again today, by this tin-pot coalition, that we cannot have it? [Laughter.] It really is tin-pot, although I know the last Labour Government did not pull their weight either. It has to be put on the record.

But this is a debate about class, and we do not get many of those in here. Every so often, it erupts, and we talk about class. That is what this is. It was the same with Hillsborough, when my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Steve Rotheram) got that debate, and it was the same with Thatcher and the funeral and all the rest of it. I do not want to go into that, but the truth is that it is very rare. Here are a few people who were on the picket line, they ordered a bus from a bus company, and they talk about conspiracies—all the records are there! I know it was not the age of social media, Twitter and God knows what else—if it had been, they would have won, because they would all have had a mobile phone, with a camera, and they could have took some pictures. Yes, it’s about class, and that is why we are here today, thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon (Mr Anderson) and other colleagues.

I was here in the 1970s, and I could not believe it the moment I got to London: we were on picket lines, and winning—winning! It does not happen very often, so we have to treasure every moment. My father worked for 50 years in the pits, and when we won the 1972 strike, he said, “It’s the first time in my life.” Yet there is all this talk, somehow or other, about workers having power. It is not true, and this is another example where they do not have it, or otherwise the papers would have been released and, what’s more, this whole episode would not have begun. It began because of the climate of 1970 onwards. The establishment, the Heath Government, were defeated by the miners in 1972, after a seven-week strike. It is true there was a bit of pushing and shoving, but by and large it was a relatively peaceful affair. The police were wearing long stockings underneath their trousers. I told Tom Swain, and he said, “I’m getting a pair.” That’s what it was like, by and large.

What happened then? The Upper Clyde shipbuilders had a sit-in and won. Then there was Vic Turner and Bernie Steer saying, “We’re going to put some pickets on down at the docks”—at what is now Covent Garden—and they got put in Pentonville jail. The Industrial Relations Act had just got Royal Assent, but what happened? After Vic Turner was put in jail with his mates, the Official Solicitor had to turn up, representing all the echelons of the establishment, saying, “They won’t purge their own contempt. We’ve got to do it for them.” We said, “Yes, but at a price”, and so they had to kick the Act into the long grass.

In the middle of all this, some people, such as those I should not speak about in the Gallery, decided also to battle for better wages. They had never had great wages, but UCATT and the building workers had had a lot of injuries, so they decided in that climate to take a chance and fight for better wages and conditions. That is all it was. The evidence was there, as we have heard, but the establishment decided that somebody needed a lesson: “We’ll take these on. We lost to the miners. We lost to Upper Clyde. We lost the Industrial Relations Act. We’ve got to have a victory.” That was what this was all about, and let no one kid themselves: when the echelons of the state decide to take action, the judiciary join them, and I do not care what their names are. It has been apparent for so many years, and it is still apparent today.

My time is running out. I compliment all those who have taken part, but I want to pay my final compliment to that face I saw in Lincoln prison, Des Warren, fighting the establishment, and when I call for transparency, it is the face of Des Warren—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order.

[Sir Bob Russell]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Sir Bob Russell, I apologise about earlier. As the House will know, we alternate between sides. Follow that, in six minutes.

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[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. Before I call the next speaker, I inform the House that I am reducing the time limit further to five minutes. I am doing my best to fit in all those who want to speak. I ask Members to pay attention and to assist colleagues to make their points; it is not necessary to take five minutes, but five minutes is the maximum from now on.

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[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. I am now reducing the speaking time limit to four minutes. Everyone who wishes to speak will be able to do so if all Members stick to that limit.

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[Katy Clark]

I am intervening on my hon. Friend because I think that he may need some more time. Does he think that this quotation from Construction News, published on 17 December 1970—a very long time ago—gives some indication of the power and influence of the construction industry? The paper said of a private Christmas dinner organised by McAlpine in 1977:

“Anyone who can hold a private party and make it virtually impossible to get a Cabinet quorum cannot be without influence of friends.”

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman may need more time, but it will come out of the hon. Lady’s time, because the winding-up speeches must start at 2.40 pm.

[John Mann]

The fact is that McAlpine was based in that part of the world, and it is no coincidence that this was picked on.

We know what these people do. They did the same during the miners’ strike. What they do is randomly pick out people and claim conspiracy, which is exactly what they tried to do to my right hon. Friend the Member for Neath and others in the anti-apartheid movement. That is the mindset of some of these people. They believe that they have some sort of supreme knowledge, and then they claim to defend freedom.

These people are not the friends of freedom; these people are the enemies of freedom. That is why those Johannesburg principles were written, and that is why they apply not just to South Africa under apartheid, not just to North Korea and the lunatic running it, not just to China and the repression of working people there, but to this country and to western democracies. Freedom is about the right to go about your business. It is about the right to engage in protest, including industrial protest. It is about the right to hold your Government to account, and to ensure that if there are documents out there, they are brought to light. Such documents are already slowly emerging. We have seen the documents about Hillsborough, and in future we will see documents about Orgreave and the miners’ strike, and many, many more. There is an information revolution going on in this country, because people are fed up with the secrecy of the state and those misfits around it who set up organisations claiming conspiracies when there is no conspiracy because it suits their political ends—and some of them clearly even participate in events like this but are still elected to this Parliament.

If this is a coalition Government, this Liberal Minister needs to demonstrate that he is part of the coalition. The Liberals have always told us they stand for individual freedoms. Well, prove it; release these documents. These people who have had to fight against this for years deserve it, but there is a bigger cause, too: the rest of us. This is about defining freedom in this country. That is what this debate is about, and why this Liberal Minister has to act.

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[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. I am taking the time limit down to three minutes to get three more speakers in before the wind-ups start.

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That this House is seriously concerned at the decision of the Government to refuse to release papers related to the building dispute in 1972 and subsequent prosecutions of the workers known as the Shrewsbury 24 and calls on it to reverse this position as a matter of urgency.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

I ask Members to leave the Chamber quietly and quickly so that we can start the next important Back-Bench debate.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [Lords]

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Monday 11th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Corbyn]

We are all in favour of young people having a decent chance in life. If the hon. Gentleman had listened to what I said, he would have heard me suggest that we need to invest much more in young people in school and college and beforehand, so that they gain a wider range of life experiences, greater self-reliance and a greater sense of community involvement. I am concerned that he seemed to base his whole argument on the operations of the military, rather than on a much better form of community service and development.

I support the reasoned amendment and am pleased that it has been selected. I draw attention in particular to the last part, which points out that

“the Ministry of Justice’s own internal risk register warns that the Government’s proposals could result in a high risk of an unacceptable drop in operational performance”.

We on the Justice Committee will start taking evidence on this tomorrow. Despite the Secretary of State’s refusal—and, indeed, that of previous Governments—I think it is high time that Governments start, as a matter of routine, to publish the risk registers of any service for which they propose major change. It is a simple act of transparency on the way in which the Government operate.

The speed with which this Bill is being pursued is extraordinary. The Justice Committee will take evidence and I hope that we will come up with some conclusions, but that is for the Committee to decide, not me. I hope that any conclusions will be taken on board, but the Bill is going through the House today and has to be out of Committee in three weeks’ time, so there is hardly any time for any considered public discussion or debate or for Members of the Commons to take a proper look at it.

The fundamental issue is that this is about the Secretary of State’s obsession with the privatisation of services. I cannot forget the day when the Justice Committee visited the Ministry of Justice. When we met the Secretary of State, he had hardly sat down at his desk before he said that he was a complete convert to the idea of franchising out and privatising various MOJ services. There clearly is an obsessive attitude that only the private sector can produce results.

I am sure that when the hon. Member for South Dorset meets members of the probation service in Dorset, he tells them what a fine job they are doing and what wonderful people they are. That is because they are wonderful people who are doing a fine job, but how are we rewarding them? We are giving them more work to do with fewer resources and putting them in competition, in a race to the bottom, with the private sector, knowing full well that the financial argument will win out at the end of the day and that the private sector will win, with its profits, low wages and inadequately trained or qualified staff, and the public probation service, which all of us are proud of, will be the loser. This Bill is going down a very dangerous road.

The statistics helpfully provided today by the Library show that the total case load of the probation service in 2003 was 199,000, of which 120,000 cases came from court orders and 80,000 came from pre and post-release supervision. By 2012, the number from court orders had declined to 114,000, while the number from pre and post-release supervision had gone up to 111,000. There is already a significant change in what is going on.

The reoffending statistics quoted are from Doncaster and Peterborough. I welcome anything that brings about a better prison service, better education and less reoffending. That has to be a good thing. The Justice Committee visited Doncaster, and it was an extremely interesting experience, but the statistics show that its reoffending rate of over 40% is still way above the national average of about 30%. It is a privately run prison and many of the regime’s liberal aspects are interesting, but it is perfectly reasonable to ask questions of the company that runs it about the treatment of its inmates.

I will make one last point because I want to leave enough time for the Front Benchers. Both unions that are involved in the probation service—Unison, which has fewer members from the probation service, and the National Association of Probation Officers, which has more—made a number of strong points in the evidence that most Members have no doubt received from them. The Unison paper makes the point that

“probation operates as a seamless whole. Splitting the service in two will allow dangerous offenders to fall down the gap between the two parts.”

Other colleagues have supported that position. NAPO has the same view. I attended its meeting and will conclude with a quotation from it:

“Napo believes that the proposed…agenda will undermine pubic protection procedures and place communities at risk of harm from poorly managed offenders. It will have a detrimental impact on staff who will have limited senior management support and who will be based many miles away and will have little local knowledge of the area they are responsible for. This will place unnecessary pressures on middle managers and front line staff.”

This privatising will not save money, but will cost more through higher rates of reoffending, greater danger to the public and, ultimately, more people in prison, not fewer. We should support the reasoned amendment tonight and give—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. I tried not to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but that was a very long quotation. We need to get on to the closing speeches.

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The House proceeded to a Division.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the No Lobby.

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[Mr Peter Bone (Wellingborough) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. On page 20 of today’s Order Paper, it states that tomorrow’s debate is on the “Abolition of the bedroom tax.” As there is no such thing as a bedroom tax—and I pray in aid page 390 of “Erskine May”, which states:

“A notice which is wholly out of order may be withheld from publication on the Notice Paper”—

does that mean that the Opposition day will not now take place?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Mr Bone, I suggest that you read tomorrow’s Order Paper tomorrow. You will then be able to see the title of the debate, which, I am informed, is in order.

Deferred Divisions

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 41A(3)),

That, at this day’s sitting, Standing Order No. 41A (Deferred divisions) shall not apply to the Motion on a Reasoned Opinion relating to the regulation of new psychoactive substances. —(Mark Lancaster.)

Question agreed to.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [Lords] (MOney)

Queen’s recommendation signified.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Offender Rehabilitation Bill [Lords], it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided.—(Mark Lancaster.)

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Steve Reed (Croydon North) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 6—Dog number control notice—

(1) This section applies where more than one dog is being kept in a domestic property in England or Wales.

(2) Where an authorised officer has reasonable cause to believe that the number of dogs being kept in a domestic property gives rise to a risk that any one or more of the dogs may become dangerously out of control while in or partly in the domestic property (“the risk”), he or she may serve on the person in charge a written control notice which—

(a) states that the authorised officer is of that belief;

(b) specifies the maximum number of dogs which, in the opinion of the authorised officer, are capable of being kept in the domestic property such as to sufficiently reduce the risk;

(c) requires the person in charge to reduce the number of dogs kept in the domestic property to no more than the number specified under paragraph (b) and;

(d) specifies the date by which the terms of the control notice must be complied with.

(3) A control notice may be served on more than one person in respect of one domestic property.

(4) It is an offence for a person without reasonable excuse to fail to comply with a requirement under subsection (2).

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

(6) An authorised officer may make a complaint to a Magistrates’ Court if a person in charge fails, to the satisfaction of the authorised officer, to comply with the steps required in a control notice within the time period specified.

(7) A Magistrates’ Court receiving a complaint under subsection (6) shall, if it finds that the person in charge has failed to comply with the steps required in a control notice, make an order in a summary way directing any of the dogs kept in the domestic property to be destroyed.

(8) In this section—

“authorised officer” means a person appointed by a local authority within whose area the domestic property is situated for the purposes of this section;

“domestic property” means a building, or part of a building, that is a dwelling or is forces accommodation (or both);

“person in charge” means the owner or owners, and if different, person or persons for the time being in charge of the dogs.

New clause 17—Community protection notices (dogs)—

(1) An authorised person may issue a community protection notice (dogs) to the owner or person for the time being in control of the dog if they have reasonable cause to believe that—

(a) the dog is not under sufficient control, and

(b) preventative measures are required to protect the public, the dog itself, or another protected animal.

(2) An “authorised person” means a police officer, local authority dog warden, or other authorised person.

(3) A community protection notice (dogs) is a notice that imposes any of the following requirements on the owner or person for the time being in control of the dog—

(a) a requirement to have the dog microchipped;

(b) a requirement to obtain third party liability insurance;

(c) a requirement for the dog to be kept on a leash in public;

(d) a requirement for the dog to be muzzled in public;

(e) a requirement for the transferring or relinquishing of ownership of the dog without notifying the enforcing authority.

(4) A community protection notice may be issued—

(a) without notice, and

(b) with immediate effect.

(5) A person issued with a community protection notice (dogs) who fails to comply with it commits an offence.

(6) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (5) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.

New clause 18—Requirement to fit a post box guard where a dog is present—

(1) The Secretary of State shall bring forward regulations to require householders to fit a guard to their letterbox if—

(a) the householder owns a dog,

(b) the dog is kept in residential premises to which the letterbox is fitted,

(c) the letterbox opens directly into those premises, and

(d) a person may reasonably conclude that there is the possibility of the dog causing harm to someone using the letterbox.

(2) Regulations made under subsection (1) shall include provision in respect of—

(a) the size and style of the guard to be fitted, and

(b) the householder to be liable to a civil penalty for any harm caused as a result of failing to comply with this requirement.

(3) Regulations under this section—

(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and

(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

New clause 19—Written control notice—

(1) Where an authorised officer has reasonable cause to believe that a dog is not under sufficient control and requires greater control in any place, as a preventative measure to protect the public, the dog itself, or another protected animal, he or she may serve on the owner, and, if different, person for the time being in charge of the dog a written control notice which—

(a) states that he or she is of that belief;

(b) specifies the respects in which he or she believes the owner, and if different, the person for the time being in charge of the dog is failing to keep the dog under sufficient control;

(c) specifies the steps he or she requires the owner, and if different, the person for the time being in charge of the dog to take in order to comply with the notice.

(d) specifies the date by which the terms of the notice must be complied with; and

(e) specifies the date that the notice expires which will not be for a period which exceeds six months.

(2) In a control notice pursuant to subsection (1)(c) an authorised officer must require a dog to be microchipped (if not already done) and the owner, and if different, the person for the time being in charge of the dog, register the dog with a microchip database, and may require the following steps, where appropriate, but not limited to—

(a) keeping the dog muzzled as directed;

(b) keeping the dog on a lead when in public or under control as directed;

(c) requiring the owner, and if different, the person for the time being in charge of the dog, to seek and implement expert advice about training and behaviour for the dog;

(d) having the dog neutered where appropriate; and

(e) keeping the dog away from particular places or persons.

(3) Failure to comply with the steps required in a control notice within the time period specified, to the satisfaction of the authorised officer may lead to a complaint to a magistrates’ court under section 2 of the Dogs Act 1871.

(4) The provisions of section 2 of the Dogs Act 1871 shall have effect if the owner, and if different, the person for the time being in charge of a dog fails to comply with the steps required in a control notice within the time period specified in accordance with subsection (3) above as they would apply if a dog was dangerous and not kept under proper control.

(5) An “authorised officer” is a person that has been appointed by the local authority or police for the purposes of this Act.

(6) A “protected animal” is one that is commonly domesticated in the British Islands, is under the control of man whether on a permanent or temporary basis, or is not living in wild state.

(7) A person served with a dog control notice may appeal against the notice to a magistrates’ court within the period of 14 days beginning with the date on which that person was served with the notice.

(8) The grounds on which a person served such a notice may appeal are one or more of the following—

(a) that the notice contains required steps which are unreasonable in character, or extent, or are unnecessary; or

(b) that there has been some defect or error in, or in connection with, the notice.

(9) On hearing of the appeal the court may—

(a) quash the dog control notice to which the appeal relates; or

(b) vary the notice in such a manner as it thinks fit; or

(c) dismiss the appeal.

New clause 29—Improving the welfare of seized dogs—

(1) Where an expert examination is required for a dog that is alleged to be one to which section 1 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 applies that examination must be carried out and completed by both the defence and prosecution within 28 days of seizure of the dog and a written report produced within one week of the examination.

(2) If the prosecution or defence fail to carry out the examination as described in subsection 1 within the requisite period the prosecution or defence, as the case may be, may not rely in evidence on any expert report involving an examination of that dog after the 28 day period unless the Court extends this period.

(3) In considering any application to extend the examination period the Court must take into account the welfare of the dog, the costs of kennelling the dog and any other relevant matters.

New clause 30—Rehoming of prohibited types of dog—

(1) The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 4B(1)(b) (Destruction orders otherwise than on a conviction) after the first “owner” there is inserted “or prospective owner”, and after the second “owner” there is inserted “or prospective owner”.

Amendment 143, in clause 98, page 69, line 43, leave out subsection 2(a).

Amendment 140, page 70, leave out line 3 and insert—

(ii) for “injures any person” there is substituted “injures or kills any person or assistance dog”.’.

Amendment 144, page 70, line 6, after ‘householder’, add ‘or business’.

Amendment 145, page 70, line 7, after ‘householder’, add ‘or business’.

Amendment 146, page 70, line 11, after ‘(or is both)’, add

‘or in premises used partially or wholly for business purposes’.

Amendment 147, page 70, line 17, at end insert—

(iii) D (if not present at any time) could have reasonably believed V to be in, or entering the building or part as a trespasser if they had been present.’.

Amendment 134, page 70, line 23, at end insert—

‘(1C) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) in a case where they, or an associated person, are being attacked by another person or another dog at the relevant time.

(1D) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) if they are a vet or someone working in a veterinary practice at the relevant time.

(1E) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) if they themselves are the victim of any incident involving their dog.

(1F) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) if they are in charge of a dog they are removing in connection with their work.

(1G) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) if they are in charge of a dog they are required to maintain in any police or court proceedings or if they are assisting the courts as a witness (expert or otherwise).

(1H) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) if they are in charge of a dog that they are authorised or required to look after in connection with their work.

(1I) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) if they are in charge of a dog they are looking after by virtue of the dog being in their kennels.

(1J) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) if the dog is a police dog or a dog being used in an official capacity to assist with their work.

(1K) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) if the dog is an assistance dog.

(1L) A person (“D”) is not guilty of an offence under subsection (1) if they are registered blind.

(1M) A person (“D”) is not guilty of the aggravated offence under subsection (1) if, as a result of any disability, they were not able to physically prevent the offence.

(1N) A person (“D”) is not guilty of the aggravated offence under subsection (1) unless they encouraged the dog in its actions.’.

Amendment 133, page 70, line 28, at end insert—

‘(2A) If an owner of a dog, and if different the person for the time being in charge of a dog unreasonably omits to keep the dog under proper control, or if he causes, or encourages the dog to attack a protected animal, and any of those things lead to the injury or death of a protected animal he shall be guilty of an offence.

(2B) A “protected animal” has the same meaning as in section 2 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006.’.

Amendment 141, page 70, line 28, at end insert—

(iii) for “two years” there is substituted “fourteen years”.’.

Amendment 142, page 70, line 28, at end insert—

‘(1C) In proceedings for an offence under section 3(1) it shall be a defence for the accused to prove that he took reasonable steps to prevent the dog being dangerously out of control.’.

Amendment 135, page 70, line 41, at end insert—

‘(1B) Anyone authorised to seize a dog under subsection 1A is exempted from the provisions of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.’.

Amendment 98, page 70, leave out lines 45 and 46 and insert

‘for the purposes of this Act, “assistance dog” means a dog which has been accredited to assist a disabled person by a prescribed charity or other organisation.’.

Amendment 97, page 70, line 46, at end insert

‘“dwelling”, for the purposes of section 3, includes enclosed buildings within the curtilage of the dwelling and associated with it, where a person might reasonably expect to find a dog, such as garages, sheds and other outbuildings;’.

Amendment 132, page 70, line 47, leave out subsection (6)(b).

Amendment 99, in clause 99, page 71, line 33, at end add—.

‘(5) After section 7 there is inserted—

“7A Fit and proper person code of practice

(1) The Secretary of State must prepare a draft code of practice giving guidance about the matters to be considered when determining whether someone is a fit and proper person for the purposes of sections 1, 4 and 4B.

(2) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—

(a) any draft code of practice prepared under this section; and

(b) an order to be made by statutory instrument providing for the code to come into force, subject to subsection (4).

(3) Before preparing such a draft code, the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.

(4) Where a draft is laid before Parliament under subsection (2)(a), if neither House passes a resolution disapproving the draft within 40 days—

(a) the Secretary of State may issue the code in the form of the draft; and

(b) it shall come into force in accordance with provision made under subsection (2)(b).”.’.

[Mr Reed]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate and to move this new clause, which stands in the names of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Luciana Berger) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Oxford East (Mr Smith).

Dangerous dogs, or, perhaps more accurately, irresponsible dog owners, are a serious public threat. Not only do we have a duty to act, but there is widespread agreement on what form that action should take. I regret to say that the Government are the only ones standing meekly on the sidelines, refusing to take the necessary action. Having failed to lead from the start with this Bill, the Government refused to act in Committee, despite the support of their own Back Benchers for such action, but I hope, with a new Minister in place, there will be a fresh approach and a chance to move forward and tackle this menace.

I want to start by speaking to amendment 141, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller). I have strong sympathy with the case he is making, and which he made in Committee, for a much stronger punishment for irresponsible dog owners who allow their dogs to maim and kill. We were deeply disappointed, however, that the Government failed to meet their own promise, made in an open Committee, to publish the findings of a consultation on what level of sentencing would be appropriate in such cases before the Bill returned to the Chamber.

As it was, the Minister wrote to members of the Committee last Friday, after the tabling deadline. An e-mail was sent at 5.50 in the evening, stating that the Government had not had time to review the consultation responses, and that therefore no Government amendment would be put before the House. It was in good faith that the Opposition did not table an amendment, as we believed his predecessor’s word that the consultation would result in a Government amendment. Announcing that he would not do anything after the tabling deadline was not a welcome start to the Minister’s tenure in the Home Office. I hope that we will not see a repeat of those tactics.

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[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. There are two Members left to speak. Given that the debate will end at 5.30 pm, I hope that they will agree to share the remaining time, and that each will speak for seven or eight minutes.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Monday 14th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice (Damian Green)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 14—Sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders, etc.

Government new clause 15—Saving and transitional provision.

New clause 5—Child sexual abuse prevention orders—

‘(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) For sections 123 (Risk of sexual harm orders: applications, grounds and effect) to 129 (Effect of conviction etc. of an offence under section 128) substitute—

“123 Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Orders: Applications and grounds

(1) On the application of a qualifying person, or on conviction of a qualifying offence, a magistrates’ court may make a ‘child sexual abuse prevention order’ if it is satisfied that it is necessary to make such an order for the purposes of protecting children generally or any particular child from serious sexual harm from the defendant.

(2) A qualifying person under subsection (1) shall be a chief officer of police or an officer, of superintendant rank or above, in the NCA or other relevant agency to be decided by the Home Secretary.

(3) In subsection (1) a defendant shall be considered to be convicted of a qualifying offence who—

(a) is convicted of an offence listed in schedules 3 and 5;

(b) is found not guilty of such an offence by reason of insanity;

(c) is found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged against him in respect of such an offence;

(d) is cautioned in respect of such an offence;

“(1) A chief officer of police may apply for an order under this section in respect of a person who resides in his police area or who the chief officer believes is in, or is intending to come to, his police area.

(2) An application under subsection (1) may be made to a magistrates’ court whose commission area includes—

(a) any part of the police area, or

(b) any place where it is alleged that the defendant committed one or more offences listed in schedules 3 and 5.

Section 123: supplemental

‘(1) In this Part, ‘Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Order’ means an order under section 123.

(2) Subsections (3) and (4) apply for the purposes of Section 1.

(3) ‘Protecting children generally or any particular child from serious sexual harm from the defendant’ means protecting persons under 18 or any person under 18, in or outside the United Kingdom, from serious physical or psychological harm caused by the defendant committing one or more offences listed in Schedule 3.

(4) Acts, behaviour, convictions, and findings include those occurring before the commencement of this Part.

(5) In subsection (1)(1), a person shall also be considered to have been convicted of a qualifying offence if, under law in force in a country outside the United Kingdom and whether before or after the commencement of this Part—

(a) he has been convicted of a relevant offence (whether or not he has been punished for it),

(b) a court exercising jurisdiction under that law has made in respect of a relevant offence a finding equivalent to a finding that he is not guilty by reason of insanity,

(c) such a court has made in respect of a relevant offence a finding equivalent to a finding that he is under a disability and did the act charged against him in respect of the offence, or

(d) he has cautioned in respect of a relevant offence.

(6) In subsection (5), a ‘relevant offence’ means an act which—

(a) constituted an offence under the law in force in the country concerned, and

(b) would have consituted an offence within schedules 3 and 5 if it had been done in any part of the United Kingdom.

(7) An act punishable under the law in force in a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law for the purposes of subsection (6), however it is described in that law.

(8) Subject to subsection (9), on an applicatioin under section 1 the condition in subsection (6)(b) above (where relevant) is to be taken as met unless, not later than rules of the court may provide, the defendant serves on the applicant a notice—

(a) stating that, on the facts as alleged with respect to the act concerned, the condition is not in his opinion met,

(b) showing his grounds for that opinion, and

(c) requiring the applicant to prove that the condition is met.

(9) The court, if it thinks fit, may permit the defendant to require the applicant to prove that the condition is met without the service of a notice under subsection (8).

Child-SAPOs: effect

‘(1) A Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Order—

(a) prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order, and

(b) has effect for a fixed period (not less than five years) specified in the order or until further order.

(2) The only prohibitions that may be included in the order are those necessary for the purpose of protecting children generally or any particular child from serious sexual harm from the defendant.

(3) Where a court makes a child sexual abuse prevention order in relation to a person already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.

(4) Section 3(3) applies for the purposes of this section and section 5.

Child-SAPOs: variations, renewals and discharges

‘(1) A person within subsections (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a child sexual abuse prevention order.

(2) The persons are—

(a) the defendant;

(b) the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides;

(c) a chief officer of police who believes that the defendant is in, or is intending to come on to, his police area;

(d) where an order was made on an application under section 1(1), the chief officer or other qualifying person who made the application.

(3) An application under subsection (1) may be made—

(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with rules of the court;

(b) in any other case, by complaint.

(4) Subject to subsections (5) and (6), on the application of the court, after hearing the person making the application and (if they wish to be heard) the other persons mentioned in subsection (2), may make any order, varying, renewing or discharging the child sexual abuse prevention order, that the court considers appropriate.

(5) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions on or to lift prohibitions from the defendant, only if it is necessary to do so for the purposes of protecting children generally or any particular child from serious sexual harm from the defendant (and any renewed or varied order may contain only such prohibitions as are necessary for this purpose).

(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of five years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and—

(a) where the application is made by a chief officer of police, that chief officer, or other qualifying person or

(b) in any other case, the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides.

(7) In this section ‘the appropriate court’ means—

(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the child sexual abuse prevention order, the Crown Court;

(b) where a magistrates’ court made the order, that court, a magistrates’ court for the area in which the defendant resides, or where the application is made by a chief officer of police, any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes any part of the chief officers’ police area or any area where the alleged offences occurred.

(c) where a youth court made the order, that court, the youth court for the area in which the defendant resides or, where the application is made, any youth court whose commission area includes any part of a chief officer’s police area or any place where the alleged offences occurred.

(8) This section applies to orders under—

(a) Section 5A of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 (c.51) (restraining orders),

(b) Section 2 or 20 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) (sex offender orders made in England and Wales and Scotland),

(c) Article 6 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I., 1998/2839 (N.I. 20)) (sex offender orders made in Northern Ireland), and

(d) as it applies to child sexual abuse prevention orders.

Interim Child-SAPOs

‘(1) This section applies where an application under section 123(1) (‘the main application’) has not been determined.

(2) An application for an order under this section (‘an interim child sexual abuse prevention order’)—

(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or

(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.

(3) The Court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim child sexual abuse prevention order, prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order.

(4) Such an order—

(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;

(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.

(5) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim child sexual abuse prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.

(6) Subsection (5) applies to orders under—

(a) Sections 2A or 20(4)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) (interim orders made in England and Wales Scotland), and

(b) Article 6A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I., 1998/2839 (N.I. 20)) (interim orders made in Northern Ireland),

as it applies to interim child sexual abuse prevention orders.

Child-SAPO and interim Child-SAPO appeals

‘(1) A defendant may appeal to the Crown Court against the making of a child sexual abuse prevention order under section 123(1).

(2) A defendant may appeal to the Crown Court aginst the making of an interim child sexual abuse prevention order under section 127(3).

(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under section 127(3), or the refusal to make such an order—

(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;

(b) in any other case, to the Crown Court.

(4) On an appeal under section (1), (2) or subsection (3)(b), the Crown Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.

(5) Any order made by the Crown Court on an appeal under sections (1) or (2) (other than an order directing that an application be re-heard by a magistrates’ court) is for the purpose of subsecitons 126(7) and 127(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought (and not an order of the Crown Court).

Offence: breach of a Child-SAPO or interim Child-SAPO

‘(1) A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, he does anything which he is prohibited from doing by—

(a) a child sexual abuse prevention order;

(b) an interim child sexual abuse prevention order,

(c) an order under section 5A of the Sex Offenders Act 1997 (c.51) (restraining orders);

(d) an offender under sections 2, 2A or 20 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c.37) (sex offenders orders and interim orders made in England and Wales and in Scotland);

(e) an order under Article 6 or 6A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I., 1998/2839 (N.I. 20)) (sex offender orders and interim orders made in Northern Ireland).

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for at term not exceeding five years.

(c) where a person is convicted of an offence under this section, it is not open to the court by or before which he is convicted to make, in respect of the offence, an order for conditional disharge or, in Scotland, a probation order.

(3) The Home Secretary shall issue guidance on the use of child sexual abuse prevention orders and interim child sexual abuse prevention orders within six months of this section coming into force.”.’.

New clause 7—Possession of prohibited written material about children—

‘(1) Section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (offence of possession of prohibited images of children) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), after “prohibited image of a child” insert “or prohibited written material about a child”.

(3) After subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) Prohibited written material about a child is written material which—

(a) is pornographic,

(b) falls within subsection (6), and

(c) is grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character.”

(4) In subsection (3), after “image” insert “or written material”.

(5) After subsection (5) insert—

“(5A) Where (as found in the person’s possession) written material forms part of a series of written material, the question whether the written material is of such a nature as is mentioned in subsection (2A) is to be determined by reference to—

(a) the written material itself, and

(b) (if the series of written material is such as to be capable of providing a context for the written material) the context in which it occurs in the series of written material.

(5B) So, for example, where—

(a) written material forms an integral part of a narrative constituted by a series of written material, and

(b) having regard to those written materials as a whole, they are not of such a nature that they must reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal,

the written material may, by virtue of being part of that narrative, be found not to be pornographic, even though it might have been found to be pornographic if taken by itself.”

(6) In subsection (6), insert “or written material” after the word “image” each time it appears.’.

Government new schedule 1—Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

Government amendments 63 and 92 to 94.

[Damian Green]

The Government proposals are in my name and that of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. New clauses 14 and 15, and new schedule 1, will simplify and strengthen the existing civil order regime under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The inspiration for the reforms is the Childhood Lost campaign of my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood), who has attracted more than 100,000 signatures to her online petition and the support of 67 right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House, who have added their names to my hon. Friend’s new clause 5. I pay tribute to her and those on both sides of the House who have campaigned so effectively on this important issue.

The Government essentially agree with the campaign and we are determined to do everything we can to protect the public from predatory sexual offenders. The UK has some of the toughest powers in the world to manage the risks posed by sex offenders, but in recognition of the important points highlighted by my hon. Friend’s campaign we are bringing forward amendments to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to make our powers even more effective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Paul Beresford]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

No, you do not get another opportunity to speak, Sir Paul, but I assume that you do not wish to press new clause 7.

[Sir Paul Beresford]

A reasonable assumption.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Thank you. Maybe next time it would be helpful to make a point of order.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 8 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders, etc

‘(1) Schedule [Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003] (amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003) has effect.

(2) In section 142 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (extent etc)—

(a) in subsection (2) (provisions that extend to Northern Ireland, as well as England and Wales), for paragraph (c) there is substituted—

“(c) sections 80 to 88, 89 to 91, 92 to 96, 96B to 103, 122F and 130 to 136ZB;

(ca) Part 2A;”;

(b) after that subsection there is inserted—

“(2A) Sections 110, 117A, 119 and 123 to 129 extend only to Northern Ireland.”

(c) In subsection (3) (provisions that extend to Scotland, as well as England and Wales) for paragraph (a) there is substituted—after that subsection there is inserted—

“(a) sections 80 to 88, 89 to 91, 92, 94 to 96, 97 to 103, 122F, 130 to 132 and 133 to 136ZB;”;

“(3A) Sections 88A to 88I, 96A, 111A, 117B, 120 and 121 extend only to Scotland.

(3B) Sections 104 to 109, 111, 112 to 117, 118 and 122 extend to Northern Ireland and Scotland but not to England and Wales.”’.—(Damian Green.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 15

Saving and transitional provision

‘(1) In this section—

“the 2003 Act” means the Sexual Offences Act 2003;

“existing order” means—

(a) a sexual offences prevention order under section 104 of the 2003 Act;

(b) a foreign travel order under section 114 of that Act;

(c) a risk of sexual harm order under section 123 of that Act;

“new order” means—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order (made under section 103A of the 2003 Act, inserted by Schedule [Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003]);

(b) a sexual risk order (made under section 122A of that Act, inserted by that Schedule);

“old order” means—

(a) a restraining order under section 5A of the Sex Offenders Act 1997;

(b) a sex offender order under section 2 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

(2) The repeal or amendment by this Act of sections 104 to 122 or sections 123 to 129 of the 2003 Act does not apply in relation to—

(a) an application made before the commencement day for an existing order;

(b) an existing order (whether made before or after that day) applied for before that day;

(c) anything done in connection with such an application or order.

(3) The following sections of the 2003 Act inserted by Schedule [Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003] apply (as appropriate) to an old order as they apply to a new order—

(a) section 103E (variation, renewal and discharge of sexual harm prevention order);

(b) section 103I (offence of breach of sexual harm prevention order);

(c) section 122E (variation, renewal and discharge of sexual risk order);

(d) section 122H (offence of breach of sexual risk order).

(4) As from the commencement day there may be no variation of an existing order or an old order that extends the period of the order or of any of its provisions.

(5) At the end of the period of 5 years beginning with the commencement day—

(a) in relation to any existing order or old order that is still in force, sections 103E and 103I of the 2003 Act or sections 122E and 122H of that Act (as appropriate) have effect, with any necessary modifications (and with any modifications specified in an order under section 152(6) of this Act), as if the provisions of the order were provisions of a new order;

(b) subsections (2) and (3) cease to have effect.

(6) In this section “commencement day” means the day on which this section comes into force.’.—(Damian Green.)

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 1

‘SCHEDULE

Amendments of Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003

Introduction

1 Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (notification and orders) is amended as set out in this Schedule.

Sexual harm prevention orders

2 After section 103 there is inserted—

“Sexual harm prevention orders (England and Wales)

103A Sexual harm prevention orders: applications and grounds

(1) A court may make an order under this section (a “sexual harm prevention order”) in respect of a person (“the defendant”) where subsection (2) or (3) applies to the defendant.

(2) This subsection applies to the defendant where—

(a) the court deals with the defendant in respect of—

(i) an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5, or

(ii) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5 by reason of insanity, or

(iii) a finding that the defendant is under a disability and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5,

and

(b) the court is satisfied that it is necessary to make a sexual harm prevention order, for the purpose of—

(i) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or

(ii) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(3) This subsection applies to the defendant where—

(a) an application under subsection (4) has been made in respect of the defendant and it is proved on the application that the defendant is a qualifying offender, and

(b) the court is satisfied that the defendant’s behaviour since the appropriate date makes it necessary to make a sexual harm prevention order, for the purpose of—

(i) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or

(ii) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(4) A chief officer of police or the Director General of the National Crime Agency (“the Director General”) may by complaint to a magistrates’ court apply for a sexual harm prevention order in respect of a person if it appears to the chief officer or the Director General that—

(a) the person is a qualifying offender, and

(b) the person has since the appropriate date acted in such a way as to give reasonable cause to believe that it is necessary for such an order to be made.

(5) A chief officer of police may make an application under subsection (4) only in respect of a person—

(a) who resides in the chief officer’s police area, or

(b) who the chief officer believes is in that area or is intending to come to it.

(6) An application under subsection (4) may be made to any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes—

(a) any part of a relevant police area, or

(b) any place where it is alleged that the person acted in a way mentioned in subsection (4)(b).

(7) The Director General must as soon as practicable notify the chief officer of police for a relevant police area of any application that the Director has made under subsection (4).

(8) In this section “relevant police area” means—

(a) where the applicant is a chief officer of police, the officer’s police area;

(b) where the applicant is the Director General—

(i) the police area where the person in question resides, or

(ii) a police area which the Director General believes the person is in or is intending to come to.

103B Section 103A: supplemental

(1) In section 103A—

“appropriate date”, in relation to a qualifying offender, means the date or (as the case may be) the first date on which the offender was convicted, found or cautioned as mentioned in subsection (2) or (3) below;

“child” means a person under 18;

“the public” means the public in the United Kingdom;

“sexual harm” from a person means physical or psychological harm caused—

(a) by the person committing one or more offences listed in Schedule 3, or

(b) (in the context of harm outside the United Kingdom) by the person doing, outside the United Kingdom, anything which would constitute an offence listed in Schedule 3 if done in any part of the United Kingdom;

“qualifying offender” means a person within subsection (2) or (3) below;

“vulnerable adult” means a person aged 18 or over whose ability to protect himself or herself from physical or psychological harm is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, through old age or otherwise.

(2) A person is within this subsection if, whether before or after the commencement of this Part, the person—

(a) has been convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 3 (other than at paragraph 60) or in Schedule 5,

(b) has been found not guilty of such an offence by reason of insanity,

(c) has been found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged against him in respect of such an offence, or

(d) has been cautioned in respect of such an offence.

(3) A person is within this subsection if, under the law in force in a country outside the United Kingdom and whether before or after the commencement of this Part—

(a) the person has been convicted of a relevant offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),

(b) a court exercising jurisdiction under that law has made in respect of a relevant offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,

(c) such a court has made in respect of a relevant offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is under a disability and did the act charged against the person in respect of the offence, or

(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a relevant offence.

(4) In subsection (3), “relevant offence” means an act which—

(a) constituted an offence under the law in force in the country concerned, and

(b) would have constituted an offence listed in Schedule 3 (other than at paragraph 60) or in Schedule 5 if it had been done in any part of the United Kingdom.

For this purpose an act punishable under the law in force in a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.

(5) For the purposes of section 103A, acts, behaviour, convictions and findings include those occurring before the commencement of this Part.

(6) Subject to subsection (7), on an application under section 103A(4) the condition in subsection (4)(b) above (where relevant) is to be taken as met unless, not later than rules of court may provide, the defendant serves on the applicant a notice—

(a) stating that, on the facts as alleged with respect to the act concerned, the condition is not in the defendant’s opinion met,

(b) showing the grounds for that opinion, and

(c) requiring the applicant to prove that the condition is met.

(7) The court, if it thinks fit, may permit the defendant to require the applicant to prove that the condition is met without service of a notice under subsection (6).

(8) Subsection (9) applies for the purposes of section 103A and this section.

(9) In construing any reference to an offence listed in Schedule 3, any condition subject to which an offence is so listed that relates—

(a) to the way in which the defendant is dealt with in respect of an offence so listed or a relevant finding (as defined by section 132(9)), or

(b) to the age of any person,

is to be disregarded.

103C SHPOs: effect

(1) A sexual harm prevention order prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order.

(2) Subject to section 103D(1), a prohibition contained in a sexual harm prevention order has effect—

(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or

(b) until further order.

(3) A sexual harm prevention order—

(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;

(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions.

(4) The only prohibitions that may be included in a sexual harm prevention order are those necessary for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(5) In subsection (4) “the public”, “sexual harm”, “child” and “vulnerable adult” each has the meaning given in section 103B(1).

(6) Where a court makes a sexual harm prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.

103D SHPOs: prohibitions on foreign travel

(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a sexual harm prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.

(2) A “prohibition on foreign travel” means—

(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,

(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or

(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.

(3) Subsection (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under section 103E.

(4) A sexual harm prevention order that contains a prohibition within subsection (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—

(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or

(b) within a period specified in the order.

(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a sexual harm prevention order containing a prohibition within subsection (2)(c) (unless the person is subject to an equivalent prohibition under another order).

(6) Subsection (5) does not apply in relation to—

(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.

(7) In this section “passport” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.

103E SHPOs: variations, renewals and discharges

(1) A person within subsection (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a sexual harm prevention order.

(2) The persons are—

(a) the defendant;

(b) the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides;

(c) a chief officer of police who believes that the defendant is in, or is intending to come to, that officer’s police area;

(d) where the order was made on an application by a chief officer of police under section103A(4), that officer.

(3) An application under subsection (1) may be made—

(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with rules of court;

(b) in any other case, by complaint.

(4) Subject to subsections (5) and (6), on the application the court, after hearing the person making the application and (if they wish to be heard) the other persons mentioned in subsection (2), may make any order, varying, renewing or discharging the sexual harm prevention order, that the court considers appropriate.

(5) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions on the defendant, only if it is necessary to do so for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from sexual harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from sexual harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

Any renewed or varied order may contain only such prohibitions as are necessary for this purpose.

(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and—

(a) where the application is made by a chief officer of police, that chief officer, or

(b) in any other case, the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides.

(7) Subsection (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.

(8) In this section “the appropriate court” means—

(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the sexual harm prevention order, the Crown Court;

(b) where a magistrates’ court made the order, that court, a magistrates’ court for the area in which the defendant resides or, where the application is made by a chief officer of police, any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes any part of the chief officer’s police area;

(c) where a youth court made the order, that court, a youth court for the area in which the defendant resides or, where the application is made by a chief officer of police, any youth court whose commission area includes any part of the chief officer’s police area.

103F Interim SHPOs

(1) This section applies where an application under section 103A(4) (“the main application”) has not been determined.

(2) An application for an order under this section (“an interim sexual harm prevention order”)—

(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or

(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.

(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim sexual harm prevention order, prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order.

(4) Such an order—

(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;

(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.

(5) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim sexual harm prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.

103G SHPOs and interim SHPOs: notification requirements

(1) Where—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order is made in respect of a defendant who was a relevant offender immediately before the making of the order, and

(b) the defendant would (apart from this subsection) cease to be subject to the notification requirements of this Part while the order (as renewed from time to time) has effect,

the defendant remains subject to the notification requirements.

(2) Where a sexual harm prevention order is made in respect of a defendant who was not a relevant offender immediately before the making of the order—

(a) the order causes the defendant to become subject to the notification requirements of this Part from the making of the order until the order (as renewed from time to time) ceases to have effect, and

(b) this Part applies to the defendant, subject to the modification set out in subsection (3).

(3) The “relevant date” is the date of service of the order.

(4) Subsections (1) to (3) apply to an interim sexual harm prevention order as if references to a sexual harm prevention order were references to an interim sexual harm prevention order, and with the omission of “(as renewed from time to time)” in both places.

(5) Where—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order is in effect in relation to a relevant sex offender (within the meaning of section 88A), and

(b) by virtue of section 88F or 88G the relevant sex offender ceases to be subject to the notification requirements of this Part,

the sexual harm prevention order ceases to have effect.

(6) On an application for a sexual harm prevention order made by a chief officer of police, the court must make a notification order in respect of the defendant (either in addition to or instead of a sexual harm prevention order) if—

(a) the applicant invites the court to do so, and

(b) it is proved that the conditions in section 97(2) to (4) are met.

(7) On an application for an interim sexual harm prevention order made by a chief officer of police, the court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim notification order (either in addition to or instead of an interim sexual harm prevention order).

103H SHPOs and interim SHPOs: appeals

(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a sexual harm prevention order—

(a) where the order was made by virtue of section103A(2)(a)(i), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;

(b) where the order was made by virtue of section103A(2)(a)(ii) or (iii), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;

(c) where the order was made on an application under section103A(4), to the Crown Court.

(2) A defendant may appeal to the Crown Court against the making of an interim sexual harm prevention order.

(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under section 103E, or the refusal to make such an order—

(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;

(b) in any other case, to the Crown Court.

(4) On an appeal under subsection (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the Crown Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.

(5) Any order made by the Crown Court on an appeal under subsection (1)(c) or (2) (other than an order directing that an application be re-heard by a magistrates’ court) is for the purposes of section 103E(8) or 103F (5) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought (and not an order of the Crown Court).

103I Offence: breach of SHPO or interim SHPO etc

(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, does anything that the person is prohibited from doing by—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order,

(b) an interim sexual harm prevention order,

(c) a sexual offences prevention order,

(d) an interim sexual offences prevention order, or

(e) a foreign travel order,

commits an offence.

(2) A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed under section 103D(4).

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years.

(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this section, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make, in respect of the offence, an order for conditional discharge.

103J  SHPOs and interim SHPOs: guidance

(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to chief officers of police and to the Director General of the National Crime Agency in relation to the exercise by them of their powers with regard to sexual harm prevention orders and interim sexual harm prevention orders.

(2) The Secretary of State may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under subsection (1).

(3) The Secretary of State must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this section to be published in such manner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

Sexual offences prevention orders and foreign travel orders

3 (1) Sections 104 to 122 (sexual offences prevention orders and foreign travel orders) are repealed.

(2) This paragraph extends only to England and Wales.

Sexual risk orders

4 Before section 123 there is inserted—

“Sexual risk orders (England and Wales)

122A  Sexual risk orders: applications, grounds and effect

(1) A chief officer of police or the Director General of the National Crime Agency (“the Director General”) may by complaint to a magistrates’ court apply for an order under this section (a “sexual risk order”) in respect of a person (“the defendant”) if it appears to the chief officer or the Director General that the following condition is met.

(2) The condition is that the defendant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Part, done an act of a sexual nature as a result of which there is reasonable cause to believe that it is necessary for a sexual risk order to be made.

(3) A chief officer of police may make an application under subsection (1) only in respect of a person—

(a) who resides in the chief officer’s police area, or

(b) who the chief officer believes is in that area or is intending to come to it.

(4) An application under subsection (1) may be made to any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes—

(a) any part of a relevant police area, or

(b) any place where it is alleged that the person acted in a way mentioned in subsection (2).

(5) The Director General must as soon as practicable notify the chief officer of police for a relevant police area of any application that the Director has made under subsection (1).

(6) On an application under subsection (1), the court may make a sexual risk order if it is satisfied that the defendant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Part, done an act of a sexual nature as a result of which it is necessary to make such an order for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(7) Such an order—

(a) prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order;

(b) has effect for a fixed period (not less than 2 years) specified in the order or until further order.

(8) A sexual risk order may specify different periods for different prohibitions.

(9) The only prohibitions that may be imposed are those necessary for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

(10) Where a court makes a sexual risk order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.

122B  Section 122A: interpretation

(1) In section 122A—

“child” means a person under 18;

“harm” from the defendant means physical or psychological harm caused by the defendant doing an act of a sexual nature;

“the public” means the public in the United Kingdom;

“vulnerable adult” means a person aged 18 or over whose ability to protect himself or herself from physical or psychological harm is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, through old age or otherwise.

(2) In that section “relevant police area” means—

(a) where the applicant is a chief officer of police, the officer’s police area;

(b) where the applicant is the Director General of the National Crime Agency—

(i) the police area where the person in question resides, or

(ii) a police area which the Director General believes the person is in or is intending to come to.

122C  Sexual risk orders: prohibitions on foreign travel

(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a sexual risk order must not be for a period of more than 5 years.

(2) A “prohibition on foreign travel” means—

(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,

(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or

(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.

(3) Subsection (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under section 122D.

(4) A sexual risk order that contains a prohibition within subsection (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—

(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or

(b) within a period specified in the order.

(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a sexual risk order containing such a prohibition (unless the person is subject to an equivalent prohibition under another order).

(6) Subsection (5) does not apply in relation to—

(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.

(7) In this section “passport” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.

122D  Sexual risk order: variations, renewals and discharges

(1) A person within subsection (2) may by complaint to the appropriate court apply for an order varying, renewing or discharging a sexual risk order.

(2) The persons are—

(a) the defendant;

(b) the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides;

(c) a chief officer of police who believes that the defendant is in, or is intending to come to, that officer’s police area;

(a) where the order was made on an application by a chief officer of police, that officer.

(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), on the application the court, after hearing the person making the application and (if they wish to be heard) the other persons mentioned in subsection (2), may make any order, varying, renewing or discharging the sexual risk order, that the court considers appropriate.

(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions on the defendant, only if it is necessary to do so for the purpose of—

(a) protecting the public or any particular members of the public from harm from the defendant, or

(b) protecting children or vulnerable adults generally, or any particular children or vulnerable adults, from harm from the defendant outside the United Kingdom.

Any renewed or varied order may contain only such prohibitions as are necessary for this purpose.

(5) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 2 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and—

(a) where the application is made by a chief officer of police, that chief officer, or

(b) in any other case, the chief officer of police for the area in which the defendant resides.

(6) Section 122B(1) applies for the purposes of this section.

(7) In this section “the appropriate court” means—

(a) the court which made the sexual risk order;

(b) a magistrates’ court for the area in which the defendant resides;

(c) where the application is made by a chief officer of police, any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes any part of the officer’s police area.

122E  Interim sexual risk orders

(1) This section applies where an application for a sexual risk order (“the main application”) has not been determined.

(2) An application for an order under this section (“an interim sexual risk order”)—

(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or

(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.

(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim sexual risk order, prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order.

(4) Such an order—

(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;

(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.

(5) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim sexual risk order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.

122F  Sexual risk orders and interim sexual risk orders: notification requirements

(1) A person in respect of whom a court makes—

(a) a sexual risk order (other than one that replaces an interim sexual risk order), or

(b) an interim sexual risk order,

must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date of service of the order, notify to the police the information set out in subsection (2) (unless the person is subject to the notification requirements of this Part on that date).

(2) The information is—

(a) the person’s name and, where the person uses one or more other names, each of those names;

(b) the person’s home address.

(3) A person who—

(a) is subject to a sexual risk order or an interim sexual risk order (but is not subject to the notification requirements of this Part), and

(b) uses a name which has not been notified under this section (or under any other provision of this Part), or changes home address,

must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which that happens, notify to the police that name or (as the case may be) the new home address.

(4) Sections 87 (method of notification and related matters) and 91 (offences relating to notification) apply for the purposes of this section—

(a) with references to section 83(1) being read as references to subsection (1) above,

(b) with references to section 84(1) being read as references to subsection (3) above, and

(c) with the omission of section 87(2)(b).

122G  Sexual risk orders and interim sexual risk orders: appeals

(1) A defendant may appeal to the Crown Court—

(a) against the making of a sexual risk order;

(b) against the making of an interim sexual risk order; or

(c) against the making of an order under section 122D, or the refusal to make such an order.

(2) On any such appeal, the Crown Court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.

(3) Any order made by the Crown Court on an appeal under subsection (1)(a) or (b) (other than an order directing that an application be re-heard by a magistrates’ court) is for the purposes of section 122D(7) or 122E(5) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought (and not an order of the Crown Court).

122H  Offence: breach of sexual risk order or interim sexual risk order etc

(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, does anything that the person is prohibited from doing by—

(a) a sexual risk order,

(b) an interim sexual risk order,

(c) a risk of sexual harm order,

(d) an interim risk of sexual harm order,

(e) an order under section 2 of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005 (risk of sexual harm orders in Scotland), or

(f) an order under section 5 of that Act (interim risk of sexual harm orders in Scotland),

commits an offence.

(2) A person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed under section 122C(4).

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years.

(4) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this section, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make, in respect of the offence, an order for conditional discharge.

122I  Effect of conviction etc of an offence under section 122H etc

(1) This section applies to a person (“the defendant”) who—

(a) is convicted of an offence mentioned in subsection (2);

(b) is found not guilty of such an offence by reason of insanity;

(c) is found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged against him in respect of such an offence; or

(d) is cautioned in respect of such an offence.

(2) Those offences are—

(a) an offence under section 122H or 128 of this Act;

(b) an offence under section 7 of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005 (contravention of risk of sexual harm order or interim risk of sexual harm order in Scotland).

(3) Where—

(a) a defendant was a relevant offender immediately before this section applied to the defendant, and

(b) the defendant would (apart from this subsection) cease to be subject to the notification requirements of this Part while the relevant order (as renewed from time to time) has effect,

the defendant remains subject to the notification requirements.

(4) Where the defendant was not a relevant offender immediately before this section applied to the defendant—

(a) this section causes the defendant to become subject to the notification requirements of this Part from the time the section first applies to the defendant until the relevant order (as renewed from time to time) ceases to have effect, and

(b) this Part applies to the defendant, subject to the modification set out in subsection (5).

(5) The “relevant date” is the date on which this section first applies to the defendant.

(6) In this section “relevant order” means—

(a) where the conviction, finding or caution within subsection (1) is in respect of a breach of a sexual risk order or a risk of sexual harm order, that order;

(b) where the conviction, finding or caution within subsection (1) is in respect of a breach of an interim sexual risk order or an interim risk of sexual harm order, any sexual risk order or risk of sexual harm order made on the hearing of the application to which the interim order relates or, if no such order is made, the interim order.

(7) In subsection (6) “risk of sexual harm order” and “interim risk of sexual harm order” include orders under sections 2 and 5 (respectively) of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005.

122J Sexual risk orders and interim sexual risk orders: guidance

(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to chief officers of police and to the Director General of the National Crime Agency in relation to the exercise by them of their powers with regard to sexual risk orders and interim sexual risk orders.

(2) The Secretary of State may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under subsection (1).

(3) The Secretary of State must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this section to be published in such manner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”

Risk of sexual harm orders

5 (1) Sections 123 to 129 (risk of sexual harm orders) are repealed.

(2) This paragraph extends only to England and Wales.

Application etc of orders

6 After section 136 there is inserted—

“136ZA   Application of orders throughout the United Kingdom

(1) In this section “relevant order” means—

(a) a sexual harm prevention order;

(b) an interim sexual harm prevention order;

(c) a sexual offences prevention order;

(d) an interim sexual offences prevention order;

(e) a foreign travel order;

(f) a sexual risk order;

(g) an interim sexual risk order;

(h) a risk of sexual harm order;

(i) an interim risk of sexual harm order;

(j) an order under section 2 of the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005 (risk of sexual harm orders in Scotland);

(k) an order under section 5 of that Act (interim risk of sexual harm orders in Scotland).

(2) For the purposes of sections 103I, 113, 122, 122H and 128, prohibitions imposed by a relevant order made in one part of the United Kingdom apply (unless expressly confined to particular localities) throughout that and every other part of the United Kingdom.

136ZB   Order ceases to have effect when new order made

(1) Where a court in England and Wales makes an order listed in the first column of the following Table in relation to a person who is already subject to an order listed opposite it in the second column, the earlier order ceases to have effect (whichever part of the United Kingdom it was made in) unless the court orders otherwise.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 158, in clause 1, page 1, line 8, after ‘conduct’, insert ‘that might reasonably be regarded as’.

Amendment 163, page 1, line 10, leave out ‘and’ and insert ‘,’.

Amendment 164, page 1, line 10, after ‘convenient’, insert ‘and proportionate’.

Amendment 159, page 2, line 1, leave out ‘doing anything’ and insert ‘specified actions’.

Amendment 160, page 2, line 2, after ‘injunction’, insert

‘which relate to the anti-social behaviour which the respondent has engaged or threatened to engage in’.

Amendment 161, page 2, line 3, leave out ‘anything’ and insert ‘specified actions’.

Amendment 162, page 2, line 3, after ‘injunction’, insert

‘which relate to the anti-social behaviour which the respondent has engaged or threatened to engaged in’.

Amendment 165, page 2, leave out line 6.

Government amendments 1 to 12.

Amendment 166, in clause 12, page 6, line 29, after ‘court’, insert

‘is satisfied that the exclusion is necessary and proportionate, and’.

Government amendments 13 to 15.

Amendment 167, in clause 21, page 11, line 24, after ‘satisfied’, insert

‘, according to the criminal standard of proof.’.

Government amendment 16.

Amendment 168, page 11, line 27, leave out ‘help in preventing’ and insert ‘prevent’.

Amendment 169, page 11, line 31, leave out ‘doing anything’ and insert ‘specified actions’.

Amendment 170, page 11, line 31, after ‘order’, insert

‘which relate to the anti-social behaviour which the respondent has engaged in’.

Amendment 171, page 11, line 32, leave out ‘anything’ and insert ‘specified actions’.

Amendment 172, page 11, line 32, after ‘order’, insert

‘which relate to the anti-social behaviour which the respondent has engaged in’.

Amendment 173, page 12, leave out line 3.

Government amendment 17.

Amendment 174, in clause 22, page 12, line 44, at end insert—

‘(9) The courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration when determining reporting of a child’s case.’.

Amendment 175, in clause 29, page 16, line 40, at end insert—

‘(7) The courts must taken into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration when determining reporting a child’s case.’.

Government amendment 18.

Amendment 176, in clause 34, page 20, line 17, at end add—

‘(c) any other form of peaceful assembly.’.

Government amendments 19 to 44.

Amendment 177, page 61, line 22, leave out Clause 91.

Government amendments 45 to 48.

Amendment 96, in schedule 8, page 155, line 32, leave out paragraphs 24 to 27.

Government amendment 82.

[Simon Hughes]

I wish to speak to the new clause and amendments that I and the hon. Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis) tabled, and I will also say a word about the Government amendments and Labour’s amendment 96.

Our amendments all arise from the deliberations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which has just completed its report on the Bill. I welcome the Minister of State, Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewes (Norman Baker)—if I can have his attention for a second—to his new responsibilities. I hope it will help him and the House if I say that we do not intend to seek to divide the House on the new clause or the amendments, but I hope that he will be able to give me a positive and constructive response. On many occasions we have been on the same side, trying to get positive and constructive responses from previous Conservative and Labour Governments. We have not always succeeded, but I hope that the new form of double act will allow me to ask for some reasonable changes and him to agree, either today or very shortly, to the changes that we seek.

I will put on record the relevant parts of the summary of the Joint Committee’s report, which we published on 9 October. It was the Committee’s fourth report of this Session. It states:

“The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 9 May 2013…It is a substantial Bill containing many provisions with significant human rights implications”.

The new clause relates to one of those implications. All the amendments in this group have human rights implications, which is why Mr Speaker has grouped them

We should like Ministers to pay attention to the issue of antisocial behaviour, which I shall come to expressly; to that of forced marriage; and, probably most politically controversially, to those of powers to stop, question, search and detain at ports, and compensation for miscarriages of justice. We shall come to those matters later in our deliberations.

We are grateful for the way the Bill team facilitated the Committee’s scrutiny of those issues, but we have three qualifications, as set out in our unanimous report. It states:

“First, we doubt whether the mechanisms for ensuring that a systematic analysis of the impact of laws and policies on children’s rights is carried out are yet embedded across Whitehall. We repeat our call for the Government to reassure Parliament that in future it will conduct a thorough assessment of the impact of legislation on the rights of children under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child before the legislation is introduced. We propose to raise with the Children’s Commissioner the question of what can be done, in practical terms, to accelerate the Government’s progress towards implementing its undertaking to Parliament of nearly three years ago.

Second, the number of significant Government amendments to the Bill with potentially significant human rights implications has made our scrutiny—”

any Committee’s scrutiny, but ours in particular—

“of the Bill’s human rights compatibility more difficult”.

We take up that issue with the Leader of the House on a regular basis, because the more amendments are tabled late in the day, the more difficult Committees such as ours find it to report to the House and advise colleagues on how to respond. The summary continues:

“Third, the Government has not always provided us with information it has promised in sufficient time to enable us to scrutinise it adequately. We call on the Government, once again, to ensure in future that we are provided with the information we request in time to inform our scrutiny of Government Bills.”

Let me address the new clause and amendments to the antisocial behaviour proposals collectively, and then I will consider them individually although I do not anticipate detaining the House for too long. Parts 1 to 6 of the Bill reform current measures on antisocial behaviour, and the Committee’s view is that preventive measures against antisocial behaviour are, in principle, a welcome fulfilment of the state’s positive obligation to protect people against having their rights interfered with by others—that is the important context in which we consider all human rights implications of the Bill’s antisocial behaviour provisions.

New clause 33 would add to the Bill the requirement that

“The courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration”

when imposing an injunction. It is a common principle of criminal and welfare law that the best interests of children be taken into account, and we would like that written into the Bill. The new clause simply states that the best interests of the child should be taken into account in four situations, namely when the courts are deciding to impose

“an injunction;

the terms of any prohibition or requirement;

sanctions for breach of an injunction; and

when determining reporting of a child’s case.”.

The Committee considered the human rights compatibility of the new civil injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance—an IPNA. The Bill states that an IPNA may be imposed if the court considers it “just and convenient” to prevent antisocial behaviour—a lower test than the test of necessity required by human rights law. We also considered that the new IPNA definition of antisocial behaviour is too broad and not clear enough. I hope Ministers will consider positively the idea that the Bill should be as clear as possible and compatible with other legislation; we should not start introducing concepts not found in other legislation, which would mean that people would not know how the law would be interpreted.

In the Committee’s view, the Bill’s current provisions on the prohibitions and requirements that can be attached to an injunction are far too broad. Furthermore, we have not been persuaded that it is necessary to state expressly that prohibitions and requirements in an IPNA must “so far as practicable” avoid any conflict with religious beliefs. The Committee is clear—the House has been clear about this on many occasions—that the freedom to hold religious beliefs, or any beliefs that may not be from a religious perspective, is not a relative right but an absolute right that cannot be interfered with. The power to exclude a person from his or her home through the use of an IPNA is a severe measure, and the Committee believes further provision is required to ensure that such a power is used only when necessary.

As the new sanctions can be imposed on children as young as 10, the Committee also scrutinised the provisions and considered their impact on the rights of children. To reduce the potential negative impact of IPNA measures on children, we recommend that the courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in any IPNA legal proceedings. That explains the Committee’s position, and I will now consider quickly other amendments in the group.

Child Protection

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Thursday 12th September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. Before the hon. Gentleman replies to the intervention, may I gently remind him that the recommendation is that the mover of the motion speaks for 10 to 15 minutes? He has been on his feet for 18 minutes or more. He has been generous in taking interventions, but that time is supposed to include interventions. It means that there will be a time limit on the rest of the speeches. Therefore, I hope that he will be less generous and draw his remarks to a conclusion. This is not coming out of your time, Mr Loughton.

[Tim Loughton]

I am gently reminded, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am happy to give up some time—I think I have a right to reply at the end of the debate—so that as many Members as possible can get in. Perhaps if I do not take any more interventions and speak very quickly, it will help. In response to the hon. Member for Wigan (Lisa Nandy), I will gently come on to that point in the few minutes remaining to me, but I think that the answer is that I could not possibly comment.

I fear that in the UK the public have become increasingly confused and sceptical about what progress has been made over recent years to ensure that our children are safe. That is not surprising given the tsunami of media reports that I have already listed and the tangled tidal wave of reviews announced by Ministers, the BBC, the NHS, the Church and everyone else. Therefore, the public are confused and parents are understandably worried. They need high-profile, high-octane, high-impact leadership from central Government, working with all the relevant agencies, to convince a sceptical public that we are on top of the situation.

I know that much is going on. Indeed, I instigated quite a lot of what is going on. I know what a champion the Minister from the Home Office is on the issue and welcome his leadership of the National Group on Sexual Violence against Children and Vulnerable People instituted in April. However, to take on the point made by the hon. Member for Wigan, I am concerned about the move to the Home Office, because child abuse is not just about detection and prosecution. It is first and foremost about education, awareness, early intervention and prevention, and I think that that is best co-ordinated in the Department for Education, which retains the lead for children’s social care and for Ofsted inspection, I think. It is particularly concerning, therefore, that, at a time when child abuse has never been more in our consciousness, the assurances and leadership from the DFE have been rather muted over the past year.

I do not understand why, because we have much to be proud of. The Munro reforms provided a fundamental overhaul of child protection and the way in which that is done in this country. They are widely respected and starting to be instituted. Hopefully, the appointment of the chief social worker is raising the profession’s morale and the launch of the Frontline scheme is raising its confidence. The full publication of serious case reviews has cast light on the problems that are going on. There has been a proliferation of multi-agency safeguarding hubs, progress on child sexual exploitation and the action plan. The Children’s Society toolkit was launched just this week and it has also launched its “Say something if you see something” campaign. The Lord Chancellor’s Department has made important announcements about the way in which we treat the 23,000 child witnesses in deeply traumatic cases in our courts. There are sermons in mosques about the exploitation of children. In July 2012, children started to be placed far away in residential homes. There will be a report on that later this year. There is also the national action plan to tackle child abuse linked to faith or belief.

A lot has happened in the past few years to make our children safer. I think the Government need to shout out much more loudly about it. I hope that the Prime Minister, who has rejected calls for an overarching inquiry, will think again in the light of the tsunami of cases in the past year.

Therefore, in conclusion, child abuse takes many different forms: the harm, neglect and ultimately killing of a vulnerable child by family members; child sexual exploitation and systematic abuse by gangs; internet abuse; opportunistic grooming over the web; cyber-bullying and trolling, on which a campaign was launched in Parliament just this morning. All these things are part of the same problem and we need to show the public how we are protecting our children better. As such, it is a child protection and education and prevention issue, which should be, as it always was, led by the DFE, notwithstanding the talents and dedication of the Minister in his role in the Home Office. Without doing that, we risk giving rise to a new generation of Jimmy Saviles, perhaps without the shell suits and bling but armed with much more powerful—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Mr Loughton, you said “In conclusion”. I would like you to conclude your remarks. Even allowing for my 30-second intervention, you are way over the 15 minutes. Please conclude your remarks.

[Tim Loughton]

My final sentence is that this is the challenge that faces us all in the post-Savile world: child protection has potentially never been so important to so many, and all of us have a duty to be vigilant.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. A large number of Members wish to speak in the debate. I ask Members to take no more than 10 minutes, including interventions. The clock will not be on, but it will be a sharp time limit if that is not complied with.

Legal Aid Reform

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Thursday 27th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. [Interruption.] Mr Lammy, it is not a good idea to be on the move in the Chamber when one wishes to be called to speak. It is not a good way to try to catch the Speaker’s eye.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bellingham]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am sorry, but the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) is on the move again. Surely right hon. and hon. Members should always stay in their seat and listen to the speech immediately after their contribution.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

The courtesies of the House are that a speaker should remain for the next two speakers, having contributed to the debate. It is regrettable. I did not see him move again, but I am sure that someone from the Opposition Benches will ensure that he returns quickly to hear the debate. Sorry for the interruption, Mr Djanogly.

[Mr Djanogly]

To retain the two-fee structure sends the wrong message either that the outdated current system can adapt to contracting or that it will soon be reversed and be back to inefficient business as usual. In the longer term both are unsustainable.

The legal profession, from mediaeval times, has always been against change. Most significant legal reforms emanate from Parliament. Our job is to create a marketplace for the future, not for the past. I support the Government’s proposals, but I recommend that we look again at bringing in a single-fee structure. Yes, that will force significant changes to criminal legal practice, but in the longer term it will provide a more flexible, efficient and sustainable platform for criminal legal aid provision.

I end by noting that it was not just the Labour Government’s inability to reform that constituted their failure but their shocking inability effectively to process legal aid payments and to monitor fraud and auditing systems. In all seriousness, when I started at the Ministry of Justice, the previous Minister had hardly been on speaking terms with the Legal Services Commission, and the delays and inefficiencies of the processing of claims, including criminal claims, were very serious indeed. Much of the processing has now been dramatically improved. The accounts published only this week are the first not to have been qualified in five years, and I congratulate the MOJ on that achievement. Significant savings have since been made by abolishing the LSC and reintegrating legal aid into the MOJ.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. A large number of Members still wish to speak, and there are only 30 minutes left before the debate will conclude. I hope that Members will try to make their comments succinctly so that as many as possible can speak, and that those who are tempted to make interventions will avoid doing so if at all possible, and save them for the Minister and the shadow Minister, so that Back Benchers get their comments on the record.

[Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East and Saddleworth) (Lab)]

I will try to remember your advice, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Although I am not a lawyer, I should mention that my eldest daughter is a lawyer working in prison law, so I have drawn much of what I will say from her experience.

On the proposals being an attack on access to justice for all regardless of means, we must ensure that such access is protected. Even the Government’s Treasury counsel has roundly condemned the proposals. What concerns me particularly is the fact that they will not require primary legislation, but will be pushed through in secondary legislation. That is an insult to Parliament.

A system that would restrict access to criminal legal aid to people with assets of less than £35,000 would be very different from the current system. The Government say that they do not want to pay for the defence of wealthy criminals, but people who are charged are not criminals. Indeed, that is the point of charging them. The proposed restriction breaches the fundamental principle in our legal system that those who are charged are presumed innocent until proved guilty. Article 6 of the European convention on human rights requires that they have the right to a fair trial and to professional legal representation. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy): this is akin to what might happen in a country run by a despot. It is entirely unacceptable. Our proud tradition of the right to access to the law dates back to Magna Carta, and we should not threaten that tradition.

I was also concerned to learn that in the autumn there is to be consultation on a proposal to restrict access to legal aid for recipients of benefits. The restriction of access to the law for the poor and vulnerable would take us back to the dark ages, and we must not let it happen.

Some Members have referred to the introduction of price competitive tendering, which many believe will lead to a race to the bottom and a dramatic reduction in the quality of services.

The importance of the right to choose one’s lawyer has also been mentioned. One of my constituents, who is a solicitor, told me of a vulnerable young woman who had been abused. She had been charged on three occasions, but because she had built up a relationship with her lawyer and trusted him, he was able to provide a high quality of representation, and she was acquitted. That would not happen under the proposed new system. Again, we should not jeopardise access to the law for the most vulnerable members of society. According to my daughter, it can take weeks for a trusting relationship to develop; in the early stages, one-word sentences may be the only form of communication.

There are also proposals to restrict access to legal advice in prisons. As I have said, my daughter works in prison law. I have been told that a very vulnerable client who was sentenced at the age of 15 and had served three times her sentence tariff was recently released following a judicial review. That would not happen under the new system—and she is not unique. As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), many prisoners are extremely vulnerable, and may have mental health problems or learning difficulties. It should be recognised that punishment is not the only purpose of prison. Opportunities for rehabilitation should be offered, and prisoners should have access to the law when that does not happen. It should also be ensured that facilities are appropriate for those with learning difficulties or other disabilities.

It is a myth that restricting access to civil legal aid will save money. It has been suggested that the changes relating to prison law will save £4 million, but, as we know, there will be a cost of £10.3 million.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. The hon. Lady’s time is up.

Protecting Children Online

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Wednesday 12th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. The wind-ups are due to start at 4.10 pm, so I am establishing a time limit on all Back-Bench speakers of six minutes. If there are lots of interventions and speeches run for longer than six minutes, the last few speakers will have their time cut again. Please remember that interventions are supposed to brief and relevant to the point being made at the time. I call Diane Abbott.

--- Later in debate ---

16:30

Division 27

Ayes: 227

---

Labour: 213
Scottish National Party: 6
Democratic Unionist Party: 4
Plaid Cymru: 3
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 2

Noes: 280

---

Conservative: 239
Liberal Democrat: 40
Independent: 1

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

I now have to announce the result of the deferred Division on the question relating to the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013. The Ayes were 272 and the Noes were 209, so the Question was agreed to.

[The Division list is published at the end of today’s debates.]

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr McKenzie]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. The hon. Members for Inverclyde (Mr McKenzie) and for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Sandra Osborne) are making valid points, but they are Third Reading points and not relevant to the new clauses on recognising humanism, which we need to deal with before we get to Third Reading. I would be grateful if the hon. Gentleman did not get teased down the route the hon. Lady wants him to go down and instead referred specifically to the new clauses.

[Mr McKenzie]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will take your direction and end by simply saying that respecting faith and belief and equality are essential and must be extended to humanist marriages.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

I do not think that the Secretary of State quite addressed the question put by the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt), which was whether in principle—if there was a way that did not involve the Bill, did not have ECHR problems and did not cause any other problems—she and the Government would support the concept of humanist weddings.

I am really rising because I am so shocked at the concerns about the extra amendments, which again were inserted at the suggestion of Government officials. The BHA has changed this to suit the Government, and the Government then complain about the changes.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Mr. Huppert, it is not necessary to restate at length a previous question. I remind you that interventions should be brief, not a series of questions. It would help enormously if we stuck to those conventions.

[Maria Miller]

I can be very clear. It is not coalition policy to undertake the actions that the hon. Gentleman outlines. I have already dealt with the comments made about the work of my officials. Most individuals who have been dealing with my officials have found their work incredibly diligent and helpful. I am sorry that he does not feel that that has been the case in this instance.

New clause 14 would create a new status of civil union and repeal the Marriage Act 1949. That would prevent the creation of any new marriages: put simply, England and Wales would no longer recognise marriage within the law. It seems that the intention here is that civil unions would replace marriages—a change that would affect everyone who wants to marry in England and Wales in the future. That is simply not a position that the Government can support.

Conversely, the Bill is about strengthening marriage, and the Government strongly oppose any measure that would undermine marriage. New clause 14 would damage the important institution of marriage beyond repair. It would to all intents and purposes abolish it. I therefore note and welcome the intention of the hon. Member for Leeds North West (Greg Mulholland) not to press the new clause to a vote. It is not something that we could support if he were to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huppert]

I beg to move amendment 15, page 10, line 24, at end add—

‘(9) Where a civil partnership formed under part 1, section 96 of the Civil Partnership Act (Civil Partnership with former spouse) is converted into a marriage under this section—

(a) the civil partnership ends on the conversion, and

(b) if both partners so elect, the resulting marriage is to be treated as having subsisted since the marriage dissolved under Schedule 2 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 was formed.’.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 25 to 39.

Amendment 49, in schedule 4, page 33, leave out from line 42 to line 4 on page 34 and insert—

‘(2) Omit sub-paragraph (1).’.

Government amendments 40 to 47.

Amendment 13, in schedule 5, page 36, leave out lines 10 to 37 and insert—

‘Section 4 (successful applications): for subsections (2) and (3) substitute—

“(2) The certificate is to be a full gender recognition certificate if—

(a) the applicant is not a civil partner and does not request an interim gender recognition certificate,

(b) or the applicant is a civil partner who does not request an interim gender recognition certificate and the Panel has deceided to issue a full gender recognition certificate to the other party to the civil partnership.

(3) The certificate is to be an interim gender recognition certificate if either—

(a) the applicant is a party to a protected civil partnership and the other party to the civil partnership has not made an application under section 1(1).

(b) the applicant is a party to a protected civil partnership and the Panel had decided not to issue a full gender recognition certificate to the other party to the civil partnership,

(c) or the applicants is party to a protected marriage, requests an interim gender recognition certificate and the application includes a statutory declaration of consent from the applicant’s spouse.

(3A) If a gender recognition panel issues a full gender recognition certificate under this section to an applicant who is a party to a marriage or civil partnership, the panel must give the applicant’s spouse notice of the issue of the certificate.”.’.

Amendment 14, schedule 5, page 39, line 39, leave out

‘(by virtue of section 4(2)(b) or (4A)’.

Amendment 18, in schedule 5, page 40, line 18, at end insert—

‘One-off compensation payment to couples whose marriages were annulled to permit a person to obtain a gender recognition certificate

9A Schedule 4 (Effect on Marriage): at beginning insert—

“(1) This section applies to a formerly married couple whose marriage was annulled in order to permit one or both partners to that marriage to obtain a full gender recognition certificate, provided that—

(a) the marriage was annulled following the coming into force of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, and

(b) the formerly married couple either—

(a) (i) formed a civil partnership with each other within six months of the annulment of their marriage, and continue to maintain their civil partnership, or

(ii) have continued to live together as a couple in the same household since the annulment of their marriage.

(2) The couple shall be compensated from public funds to the amount of £1,000 by way of apology for the distress and costs incurred as a result of the annulment of their marriage.”.’.

Amendment 22, in schedule 5, page 40, line 18, at end insert—

‘Reinstatement of marriages annulled to permit a person to obtain a gender recognition certificate

9A Schedule 4 (Effect on Marriage): at beginning insert—

“(1) This section applies to a formerly married couple whose marriage was annulled in order to permit one or both partners to that marriage to obtain a full gender recognition certificate, provided that—

(a) the couple have continued to live together in the same household since the annulment of their marriage, and

(b) both partners to the former marriage give notice to a registrar that they wish their marriage to be reinstated.

(2) When notice is given under (1)(b), the marriage shall be reinstated with effect from the date the couple give notice to have it reinstated.”.’.

Amendment 16, in schedule 5, page 40, leave out lines 30 and 31 and insert—

‘(a) the registration of qualifying marriages,

(b) the registration of qualifying civil partnerships,

(c) the issue of replacement marriage certificates displaying the new details of the parties to the marriage but maintaining the original date,

(d) the issue of replacement birth certificates where the application is shown on the certificate, with the consent of the other parent named and—

(i) where the child has reached 16 years of age, the consent of the child to whom the birth certificate relates,

(ii) where the child has not yet reached the age of 16 years, the consent of the other parent named on the birth certificate, where present.’.

Government amendment 48.

Amendment 12, schedule 7, page 50, line 37, at end insert—

‘24A Section 12 (grounds on which a marriage is voidable): omit paragraph (h).’.

[Dr Huppert]

We now move on to a rather different subject, but it is still an important one that affects a number of people greatly. A range of issues apply specifically to people who change their gender, who transition between genders or who are transgender. There may not be a huge number of people in that category and they may be a small minority, but they have been subject to some of the worst discrimination over many years and decades. Indeed, that has happened partly because there are not as many people in that group as in other groups.

Another group that we will not talk about specifically today is that of people who are intersex and who do not associate with one gender for a range of reasons. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) has tabled some amendments to clarify the position for such people. I assume that it is clear that the Government’s intention is that marriage will be equal and will not exclude those who do not identify as male or female. I assume that there is no intention to discriminate. We therefore need to focus on the specific issues for the small group of people who are transgender.

Last Friday was IDAHO—the international day against homophobia and transphobia—and I spoke to people who have suffered such discrimination at an event in my constituency. My constituency is perhaps uniquely blessed in having not only a number of people who are out about the fact that they are transgender—many people, for understandable reasons, are cagey about admitting that they are transgender—but a number of transgender people who have been elected to the local council. Indeed, we had the first transgender mayor in the country. She was very proud of that role.

There is far too much transphobia, which many people have to face. Like other hon. Members, I have worked with Trans Media Watch, which keeps an eye on the truly disgusting articles that appear in the press about people who are transgender. I heard a number of awful stories at a recent event. To give one of the many examples, Lucy Meadows, a primary school teacher, killed herself after a very nasty article came out in the Daily Mail shortly after she transitioned. That is not acceptable in society, and we need to make a stand against it.

Sometimes, such things happen because people wish to be actively nasty. Sometimes, problems are caused for people who are transgender because of problems with the legislation that we produce. We do not always think of people who are transgender when we are writing legislation and there can be unintended consequences. I do not believe that this Government or the last Government have ever intended to discriminate against people who are transgender, but it has happened by accident.

We have had a few specialist debates—for instance, about which gender of police officer should search people who are transgender. I proposed that we should just ask people whom they wished to be search by, which would resolve the problem.

Church of England (Women Bishops)

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Wednesday 12th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. It may be helpful to hon. Members who have yet to speak in the debate if I set out the clear time constraints. The debate will end at 8.20 pm. I need to allow time for a number of speakers, so the wind-ups will start at 10 minutes to 8. There are five Members left to speak, and I intend to make sure that all of them get in. Rather than apply a time limit, I ask each Member to take less than 10 minutes—some may feel that they do not need 10 minutes—so that we can conclude the debate in an orderly fashion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

I am sorry; I am having a senior moment. I call Diana Johnson.

[Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I should like to start by congratulating my right hon. Friend the Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw) on securing this debate. I should also like to congratulate the Backbench Business Committee on allowing the debate to take place because of the importance of the subject. I want to say at the outset to the hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) that my comments this evening might not be seen as tender, and that I am very impatient. I am also on the side of the oppressed—in this case, the women in the Church who are being discriminated against.

The Times this morning carried a report on the 2011 census, which showed that Hull, my home city, had had the largest fall in Christian belief in this country over the past decade, at 16.8%. The row that is going on in the Church over women bishops will just make the established Church’s struggle for relevance even more difficult as it seeks exemptions from the realities of the modern society that it wishes to serve. We all know that women are the mainstay of the Church in communities throughout our land. As has been said many times, the theological argument over women priests—and, therefore, their position in roles of authority—was settled 20 years ago. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), I was involved in that campaign to get women ordained. The argument was won, and since 1992 more than 3,000 women have been ordained as priests, which is a huge success for the Church of England—new wine in old bottles. The next natural step, as many people have said, is to see some of those excellent ordained women priests move into positions of church leadership as bishops.

Discrimination in the wider community is wrong and prevents the talents and abilities of all from flourishing, so it is important in the established Church that the experience and skills of both men and women are used. The Church should be led by the very best, not just those who happen to be male. As I said during the urgent question to the Second Church Estates Commissioner last month, the stained glass ceiling for women in our Church must go. As a result of the House of Laity being just six votes short of a two-thirds majority on 20 November, the Church of England now stands to be left behind by the society it seeks to serve and made to look outdated, irrelevant and, frankly, eccentric. It also stands to be left behind by the Anglican community around the world.

I want to remind the House of some of the arguments that have been deployed as to why we should not have women bishops. Some hold the belief that God created man to lead and that women are there to be his obedient helper. They take the view that the Church should be run by Adam and Steve, not Adam and Eve. Those in favour of women bishops more commonly draw inspiration from the theological arguments that both men and women were created equal in God’s image. We can also rely on facts that are usually painted out in biblical history. For example, in the early Christian Church, until about 400 AD, there were female priests and it was common for congregations to be led by women.

Theology and theological debate evolve over time. My celebrated predecessor in Hull, William Wilberforce, fought a 30-year campaign against the slave trade, with theological arguments for slavery deployed against him. Theological fundamentalists tried to resist the scientific work on evolution by Charles Darwin and others. Afrikaner theologians also made a case in favour of apartheid. Those who oppose gender equality in the Church often draw on literal, if selective, interpretations of the Bible, and I have heard personally from some such opponents in recent days.

The House might like to hear just a few of the comments I have received from those whom I call the three wise men. The first said to me:

“God actually knows better than you”.

Thanks, Mr Dave Croton—I am only a woman, after all, so what would I know? The second wise man said to me:

“The language of ‘equality’ seems to me to be profoundly unhelpful in this debate.”

Thanks, Mr Ian Colson—equality is often “unhelpful” to vested interests. Finally, I was told:

“How dare you seek to go against the will of Almighty God. Almighty God will hold you to account for what you have said in the day of judgment. Ask his forgiveness and beg for mercy.”

Thanks, Mr Jonathan Buss—I will take my chances on that one.

Forward in Faith has produced a briefing that is heavy on public relations advice for how opponents of change should lobby Members of this House on today’s debate. I will quote an example of the quality of its case:

“We do not, for example, have women in Premier League football teams but this is not seen as a failure in equal opportunities.”

We are asked to believe that the physical demands of being a bishop are like premiership football—and obviously beyond what women can do. I am not really sure that that is the strongest argument for a team that is fighting relegation.

I am worried about what will happen next. The decision made by a minority in the House of Laity means that this essential modernisation of the Church of England has potentially been put back another five years, with no guarantee of progress even then. A broad Church is being held to ransom by a few narrow minds, even though the vast majority of its members want to see women bishops. Some of those who tell us that they want to see change claim that it must not be rushed. However, this issue has been debated in the General Synod since 2000, so I do not think that the Church can seriously be accused of acting in haste on gender equality.

So what needs to be done? As long as we have an established Church, Parliament has a role to play in supporting it through its time of crisis. The Church and wider faith communities often seek to inform and inspire our deliberations in politics. It is now time for the Church to pause and reflect on how wide the gap has become between it and the society that it wishes to serve and influence.

As the established Church is part of the settlement of this country, this House should consider what the decision of the 20 November vote means for the Church’s role in our law making. The Synod’s vote means the entrenchment of the discriminatory nature of the 26 places in the House of Lords that are reserved for bishops who can only be male. Such sexual discrimination would not be allowed to determine membership anywhere else in the Houses of Parliament. In light of the Government’s deferral of wider reform of the other place, we have to question the role of the 26 bishops in this Parliament, unless the Church decides to ordain women bishops.

First, I agree that there should be a moratorium on the appointment of new bishops until this gender discrimination ends. Secondly, if the bishops want to send a clear message that they are engaging seriously with women in the Church, they should end the practice of meeting and voting in private when amending primary legislation, even though their standing orders allow the press and public to be present. Thirdly, it can no longer be right for the Church of England to be allowed exemptions from equalities legislation. We are all meant to be equal before the law, and nobody is above that law.

I have a message for the many friends who have worked so patiently for so many years to see women bishops. They should take up the fight with added vigour and less willingness to compromise with those who will never accept change and who never compromise themselves. They should seek inspiration from British history. Left to itself, the Church will not restart its slow, uncertain process on women bishops until July 2013. July 2013 will mark 125 years since a group of low-paid, exploited, mainly women workers went on strike at the Bryant and May factory in Bow. They won and changed history. One movement that followed the match girls was the suffragettes. The Church of England would struggle to exist without the voluntary work and good will of women all over the country, so what if the women of the Church of England had their own strike? Perhaps it is true that well behaved women seldom make history.

In conclusion, the Archbishop of Canterbury-designate has agreed to meet Members of Parliament and I will certainly be there. I hope that the all-male group of bishops will start to work with and listen to senior women in the Church, who have so much to offer. I hope that the House will support the one-clause Bill that I intend to bring forward in the spring to introduce women bishops. I will finish with the words of a former leader of the Labour party, John Smith, who was a man of great faith. He summed up what most women in the Church of England seek:

“A chance to serve, that is all we ask.”

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Before I call the next speaker, I apologise to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), whom I have known for a very long time. I was listening and reflecting on this excellent debate and not paying enough attention to what I should be doing, which is chairing the debate. I apologise that she had to prompt me on whom to call.

Leveson Inquiry

Baroness Primarolo Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mark Reckless]

As Lord Justice Leveson says, the July 2009 review by the DPP was not assisted by the failure to examine witness statements and exhibits from the prosecution. I asked the CPS for the witness statements from prosecution and it did not provide them, so I had to submit a freedom of information request, and it still has not provided them. However, I spoke earlier to my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes), who was clear. He said that when he was one of the victims—in counts 16 to 20 of the indictment—a police key focus in interviewing and preparing his witness statement was on whether those messages had been listened to before he picked them up. He gave clear evidence to them, saying that he went into his voicemail and discovered that a number of those messages had already been listened to by someone else before he picked them up. That is partly why he felt he was picked: in order to give proof on the narrow basis of the legal advice that the CPS clearly—and, I believe, David Perry—was saying the police had to follow.

We also have the conference on 21 August 2006. The only proper, full note of that seems to have been taken by the police—Detective Chief Superintendent Williams, in charge of the investigation, is clear that the narrow interpretation was given. We also can say that, at most, the advice was nuanced. Carmen Dowd, who was from the CPS and who had throughout taken the narrow view, was actually in that meeting. David Perry was there, and although he was not contradicting the advice given by his instructing solicitor throughout, even on his own evidence he said it was tenable to take either the wide or the narrow view—despite the legislation being clear.

David Perry has another problem. He prepared a note on 14 July saying:

“We did enquire of the police at a conference whether there was any evidence that the editor of the News of the World was involved in the Goodman-Mulcaire offences. We were told that there was not (and we never saw any such evidence). We also enquired whether there was any evidence connecting Mulcaire to other News of the World journalists. Again, we were told that there was not (and we never saw any such evidence.”

The Director of Public Prosecutions said that David Perry had given him a personal assurance in a face-to-face meeting that that was the case, and that he clearly recalled saying those things. However, when Mr Perry gave evidence under oath to the Leveson inquiry, he said:

“I don’t think I would like to say that I necessarily expressed it in precisely those terms, but I was concerned to discover whether this went further than just the particular individuals with which we were concerned and I think I was conscious in my own mind that the question had to be whether it was journalists to the extent of the editor.”

That was much weaker than the assurance that had previously been given to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Leveson suggests that David Perry might have said that in July 2009 because he was advising in a rush overnight, but the fact is that the DPP showed—or it was shown on the DPP’s behalf—and that his draft letter to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee was put before David Perry on 30 July, and he again confirmed that the narrow interpretation had been made. That letter was then supplied to the CMS Committee and used again to inform the DPP’s commitment to the Home Affairs Committee in October 2010. So that was then a question of misleading Parliament. On 3 November, junior counsel repeated that same basis when looking at the DPP’s letter and going to reconfirm this to the Committee once more.

Given all these issues, Clarke in charge of this said that the uncertainty of the legal advice limited the investigation, and that we have to give credit.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order.