Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Third sitting)
(1 day, 7 hours ago)
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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 1 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Good morning, everyone. Will you please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? This morning, we begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection and grouping list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website; it shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate.
I remind Members that the Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called to speak first. In the case of a stand part debate, the Minister will be called to speak first. Other Members will then be free to indicate they wish to speak by bobbing or catching my eye. At the end of a debate on a group of amendments or new clauses, I shall again call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press to a vote any other amendments in a group, they need to let me know. That includes grouped new clauses.
The order of decisions will follow the order in which amendments appear on the amendment paper. Any decisions on new clauses will be taken at the end of proceedings on the Bill, after decisions have been taken on all amendments and clauses of the Bill. I shall use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following debate on the relevant amendments. I hope that that is helpful.
There is one more point that is not in my script: there are three members of the Committee who have hearing impairments, so it would be helpful if hon. Members could articulate as clearly as possible.
Are there any declarations of interest?
Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)
I declare an interest: my father-in-law is a professor of cyber-security at City St George’s, University of London. Also, Kao Data has a large data centre in my constituency.
The Chair
Thank you.
Clause 1
Meaning of “the NIS Regulations”
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Stringer. The Bill will make crucial updates that build on the NIS regulations, which are the UK’s only cross-sector cyber-security regulations. As clause 1 sets out, “NIS regulations” refers to the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (S.I., 2018, No. 506).
Clause 2 gives an overview of the Bill’s parts and what they include. It sets out that part 2 amends the NIS regulations by expanding the scope of the regulations to cover data centres, large load controllers and managed service providers. It also introduces powers for regulators to designate suppliers as being critical for their sector. Part 2 also updates the existing incident-reporting regime and includes provisions relating to the recovery of regulators’ costs, information-gathering and sharing powers, and enforcement powers. Part 3 gives new powers to the Secretary of State to specify other sectors as in scope of the regulations in future, to create new regulations relating to the security and resilience of regulated services, and to issue a code of practice and a statement of strategic priorities. It also requires the Secretary of State to report on this legislation and its implementation. Finally, part 4 gives new national security powers for the Secretary of State to issue directions. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I thank all hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for taking part, and the officials for their work on the Committee stage of this important Bill.
The Bill will significantly update and expand the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 by bringing new services within scope of regulation, giving sector regulators the power to designate critical suppliers, updating and expanding the reporting regime for cyber-security incidents and making significant changes to the regulatory funding model and regulators’ information-gathering and sharing powers. The Bill will also grant extensive powers to the Secretary of State to respond to emerging cyber-threats, including the power to bring further sectors within the scope of regulation, giving directions to regulated entities and issuing a code of practice that sets out measures for compliance with duties under the NIS regulations. Recognising the increasing role of malicious cyber-activity as a threat to our national security, part 4 will give the Secretary of State far-reaching powers to issue directions to regulated entities for reasons of national security.
Covid turbocharged the digitalisation of all aspects of the economy and our daily lives, bringing new opportunities but at the same time heightening the exposure of digital systems to exploitation by malicious actors. The previous Government recognised that in their post-implementation reviews of the NIS regulations and in a subsequent series of consultations on proposals to improve the cyber-resilience of the entities that are most important to the UK economy. Those consultations included a review of information security risks relating to outsourced IT provision, data centres and organisations controlling large amounts of electrical load. The last Government’s work assessing those threats has informed this Government’s decision to bring data centres, managed service providers and large load controllers within the scope of the NIS regulations.
Industry stakeholders have welcomed the Bill as essential for bringing the cyber rules governing critical infrastructure in line with modern threats, economic realities and technological developments, and for moving our cyber-security regulatory framework into closer alignment with international partners to ease cross-border operations for businesses that provide services overseas.
In some respects, at least, the Bill identifies the right problems, but, crucially, it falls short of providing workable solutions. In embarking on our scrutiny of the Bill, the Committee should be acutely aware of the raft of digital legislation with which businesses and regulators have been asked to grapple in recent years. Many of those new regulations are necessary, but as lawmakers we should be conscious of the burden that we are placing on industries and particularly on small and medium-sized enterprises, which are the lifeblood of the UK economy and which have fewer resources to navigate complex layers of regulation. It is therefore incumbent on all of us to enact laws that are clear and capable of practical implementation.
Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that, although we support the intent behind the Bill, clause 2 does a lot of framing work but does not necessarily consider the extensive perimeter that is coming through and how proportionality will be applied in practice? I suggest that the Committee keep that in mind as we move through the detail.
Dr Spencer
I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I am reminded of the Committee’s evidence session earlier this week, in which expert after expert lined up to raise concerns around the scope of the definition. Although they acknowledged the importance of and appreciated the reasons for leaving some things to secondary legislation in a climate as fast-moving as the IT and digital sector’s, they raised concerns about the uncertainty that is coming for business and the need for extensive consultation so that businesses can feed into and have some degree of influence over the regulations that they will have to abide by.
Chris Vince
The hon. Gentleman is making an interesting speech. I recognise his desire to be constructive on the issue. Will he recognise that this is about finding a balance? We want to include some flexibility in the legislation, because of the ever-changing threat that he mentioned. Equally, we recognise the challenge that SMEs may face in complying with the legislation on data sharing, but it is important that they do so, because not complying will have an impact on their business.
Dr Spencer
I thank the hon. Member for his point about balance. I am confident that this is an area to which the Committee will return quite a few times in our line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, particularly clause 12, which relates to the designation of critical suppliers. Clearly the regulations need to be proportionate, but to make that judgment we will need to know exactly what the regulations are. A lot of the detail is not in the Bill and has instead been left to secondary legislation. As we heard from the experts, it is very difficult to scrutinise legislation that is mostly being left to future regulations rather than being set out in the Bill.
These definitions will be critical if businesses are to have clarity as to whether they will fall within scope. I do not want to go too deeply into clause 12 now, but I see it as an exemplar. How are businesses that could fall within the critical supplier designation to know what they need to do? How is the operator of an essential service to know what information it needs to pass to the regulator on businesses that it may end up regulating? It would be very helpful if the Minister could comment, even at this introductory stage, on how he envisages that balance playing out in the Bill, particularly given that so much of the detail has been left to secondary legislation. Anyway, I digress—I will get back on topic.
Businesses are struggling with legal uncertainty and the increased costs of regulatory burden. Regulators in the sector lack the resources, the teeth and sometimes even the will to carry out effective oversight and enforcement of existing cyber regulation. Uncertainty about which incidents should be reported will dramatically increase the burden on regulated entities and on regulators. All the while, institutional barriers to effective oversight and enforcement remain.
The Bill fails to give the legal certainty and the proportionate framework that businesses need if we are to achieve widespread adoption and hardened cyber-resilience across the sectors that are most critical to the economy and our society. Perhaps most critically, there is little point in granting the Secretary of State extensive powers to make directions to regulated entities for national security purposes if the Government remain wilfully blind to the greatest threats to our national security. In the past few weeks, reports have circulated that a Chinese state-affiliated group hacked the communications of top Downing Street officials between 2021 and 2024, yet the vital organs of our state, central Government Departments and agencies carrying out the most critical functions, are left unprotected and unaccountable for their cyber-resilience under the Bill.
If we do not address these problems, we risk the Bill becoming yet another missed opportunity for the Government. These are opportunities that we can ill afford to miss if we are to safeguard our economy and our national security.
Kanishka Narayan
I welcome some of the Opposition spokesperson’s comments. Let me briefly address his questions about definitions and public sector inclusion. It is customary for the Opposition to oppose for the sake of opposition, at times, and I am afraid that this is one of those times; I have so far set out only two clauses, which are effectively an index to the Bill. Notwithstanding that, I will address his two particular points.
I was delighted that in our evidence sessions we heard from witness after witness who appreciated the flexibility of the Bill. For the Government to prescribe activities or incident thresholds in the finest detail in primary legislation is not how businesses, Government and regulators ought to engage. I hope that the Opposition will come to appreciate that in due course.
On critical suppliers, which no doubt we will come on to, I thought that in response to Opposition comments at our second sitting, I set out a very clear, precise set of tests. I found no opposition to that claim, but I look forward to hearing any original thoughts on that question.
On incident reporting, I was delighted that there was a witness who noticed that the extension of the definition of incident reporting, to include incidents capable of having an impact, was appropriate and exactly in the right place.
On the question about the public sector’s inclusion, we are here not to prescribe and wait for a law to tell us what we ought to do in the public sector, but instead to move fast and fix things. In that spirit, the Bill focuses on essential services.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Identification of Operators of Essential Services
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Kanishka Narayan
Clause 3 makes important distinctions as to which organisations can and cannot be considered operators of essential services for the purposes of the NIS regulations. It clarifies that a person—in practice, an organisation or business—can be an operator of an essential service regardless of whether that person is established in the UK, as long as they are providing essential services in the UK. That means that organisations established outside the UK can be regulated under the NIS regulations.
Clause 3 also makes it clear that the NIS regulations do not apply to public electronic communications networks or to public electronic communications services. Those are telecoms operators, which are regulated separately under the Communications Act 2003. The amendments in clause 3 will prevent telecoms companies from being subject to duplicate regulations; they will also ensure that all essential services in the UK are protected, even if the company operating them is based outside the UK. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dr Spencer
Clause 3 will amend the relevant provisions of the NIS regulations, stipulating that operators of essential services are within scope of the regulations whether or not they are operating an essential service in the UK, and regardless of jurisdiction in which they are established. Providers of public electronic communications networks and public electronic communications services are excluded from characterisation as operators of essential services, as the Minister says, to avoid duplication with their sector-specific cyber-security regime.
The clause is an important provision to ensure that entities providing essential services in the UK are compliant with domestic standards. Perhaps the most important aspect of the change is ensuring that serious cyber-security risks that appear within the systems of those entities are reported to the UK authorities for action. That is vital for the National Cyber Security Centre to keep abreast of emerging risks and be able to respond to them.
Nevertheless, the complex maze of compliance and regulatory standards across jurisdictions is a growing challenge for businesses of all sizes and particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. This is also a complicating factor facing UK companies when providing services abroad, particularly in the digital domain. Will the Minister lay out what discussions he has had with industry representatives about easing the complexity of cross-border digital service provision to ensure that the UK is a competitive and attractive place to do business?
Kanishka Narayan
On the question about cross-border compliance and making sure that we have a proportionate and effective regime, we have had a series of engagements at ministerial and official level with representatives of techUK, the industry body. The NCSC has convened a series of organisations—not least managed service providers, but others as well—and there has been a pretty extensive period of consultation on that and every other matter in the Bill.
I feel satisfied that the Bill strikes a good balance in ensuring proportionality in what businesses experience. Critically, as supply chains in this context become increasingly cross-border, it is vital that bodies that may not be resident in the UK but which provide essential services here are included in the scope of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Data centres to be regulated as essential services
Kanishka Narayan
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 4, page 3, line 5, column 3, leave out from beginning to “the” in line 6.
This amendment and Amendment 12 would remove the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology as a joint regulator for the data infrastructure subsector, leaving the Office of Communications acting as the sole regulator for that subsector.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 12.
Clause stand part.
Clauses 5 and 6 stand part.
Kanishka Narayan
Clause 4 of the Bill amends the NIS regulations by creating a new regulated sector, data infrastructure, and designating the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology and Ofcom as joint regulators. We have received clear feedback from the data infrastructure sector expressing concerns that a dual regulator model could create unnecessary complexity and limit accountability. Amendments 11 and 12 will remove the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology as a regulator, leaving Ofcom as the sole regulator, which will streamline the regulatory model for data infrastructure and resolve the concerns raised by stakeholders.
Ofcom already has proven regulatory expertise and is well placed to oversee the new data infrastructure sector effectively. By adopting a single regulator for data infrastructure, the amendments will reduce administrative burden, simplify engagement, and strengthen accountability. This will ensure a clearer, more effective regulatory framework for this rapidly growing sector.
Clause 4 brings qualifying data centre services into the scope of the NIS regulations, recognising both their vital role in underpinning our economy and public services, and that disruption to them can significantly impact productivity, service delivery, and revenue.
Alison Griffiths
Clause 4 relies heavily on capacity as the trigger for regulation. I understand why that is attractive: it is measurable. But capacity is not the same as criticality, and a high-capacity facility used for redundancy can present less systemic risk than a smaller, highly concentrated one. I simply put on record that the way this threshold is applied in practice will matter more than the number itself.
Kanishka Narayan
I thank the hon. Member for that thoughtful point. One assurance I will offer her is that the direct definition of data centres in scope here rely on capacity as a proxy for their essential independent nature, but when data centres below the capacity threshold but high on the criticality threshold are suppliers to essential services, they would be covered in part by the critical suppliers framework in the Bill. I take her point into account.
Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)
What consideration has been given to the potential conflict between data centres’ contractual obligation regarding customer confidentiality and mandatory rapid reporting? What assurance can the Minister give us that data centres will ensure that the conflict does not impact their future business?
Kanishka Narayan
In the course of engaging with firms we have considered what the timeline for reporting ought to be. It is critical that the initial notification requirement, which is a much lower requirement than the full notification requirement, at least gives the NCSC and other enforcement authorities the ability to counter national security and wider-impact risks. I believe that specification to be proportionate in the Bill, but it is of course a matter for implementation that we will keep a close eye on.
An attack on a data centre can have significant impacts beyond the facility itself. As data centres underpin digital services across multiple sectors, disruption or compromise can cascade through essential services, businesses and public services. Incidents may also pose national security and economic risks, given the concentration of sensitive and critical data. Bringing qualifying data centre services into scope of the NIS framework helps ensure these risks are managed proportionately and incidents are reported promptly.
As per Government amendments 11 and 12, we propose that Ofcom is the regulator. Medium and large third party data centres and very large enterprise centres will be required to manage risks and report to Ofcom. Their thresholds have been carefully calibrated to capture data centres whose disruption could have the greatest impact, while avoiding unnecessary burdens on smaller operators. This will strengthen the cyber-security and resilience of data centres, align with international regulations, and introduce structured oversight, notification, and incident reporting to strengthen national security and economic stability.
Dr Spencer
Clause 4 amends the NIS regulations to bring data centres that meet certain thresholds within scope of the regs as operators of essential services. As drafted, these data centres will be regulated by DSIT and Ofcom, but the amendments moved by the Minister propose that Ofcom will be the sole regulator for the subsector. I thank him for his explanation of why he has tabled these amendments.
Given the oral evidence from Ofcom and other sector regulators earlier this week regarding the challenges of recruiting skilled cyber-security staff to regulate effectively, what assessment has the Minister made of the additional regulatory burden on Ofcom of this decision and its capacity to secure adequate resources to meet it? Clause 5 extends the scope of the regulations to data centres operated by the Government, with the exception of services provided by or on behalf of intelligence services handling classified information.
Data centre infrastructure is increasingly vital to the UK’s society, economy and security. Data centres underpin nearly all aspects of our digital lives, from sending emails to booking GP appointments or ordering shopping online. Businesses of all sizes routinely process their workloads in the cloud, supported by data centres. For those reasons, data centres were designated as critical national infrastructure—CNI—in 2024.
The UK digital sector, which is heavily reliant on data centres, contributed more than 7% of the UK’s total gross value added in mid-2024, growing almost three times faster than the rest of the economy. Data centres are also critical to the UK’s ambition to become an AI superpower. Training artificial intelligence models relies on access to an abundance of processing capacity, or compute, located in secure data centres.
In October last year, Amazon Web Services experienced a glitch in one of its US data centres, which set off a chain reaction that took down online services across the globe.
Bradley Thomas
On the growth of this industry, and with 78% of UK enterprises relying on cloud-based services, 96% of companies expected to use public cloud services, 35% of UK businesses outsourcing IT support and, as of last year, 63% of organisations planning to continue or increase their IT outsourcing over the next 12 months, does my hon. Friend the shadow Minister agree that greater consideration—or at least elaboration—must be given to the vulnerability of the supply chain of large load data centres?
Dr Spencer
My hon. Friend will be aware that the issue regarding the bottleneck in the supply of cloud computing, in which I put data centres, compute more generally and access to large language models, in our country is very much on my mind, and we have been raising it with the Government. At the moment, I understand that around 70% of cloud services directly procured by the Government are coming from the three big US providers. I hear from UK SMEs—not just cloud providers, but SMEs of all types—all the time about the challenge that they face with Government procurement contracts to procure domestic UK-company services, whether that is central Government or otherwise.
We are getting ourselves into a very difficult situation from a resilience perspective: not only are we currently heavily reliant on US big tech, but we are not doing the work we need to do right now to support a burgeoning UK tech industry. In the UK, we have fantastic universities and businesses. We really are a centre of innovation, but the problem is that companies can really struggle to take the next step forwards.
Of course, Government procurement is not the be-all and end-all—although, depending what sort of sector the company is operating in, it might be—but we are certainly not focusing enough on supporting our SME sector. The sector is really good and strong, and it has the potential to be great, but we still have not had a hyperscaler. We have not seen the expansion in the UK digital and tech sector that, all things considered, given our background and where we stand in terms of our academic and business resources, we really should have seen.
Dave Robertson (Lichfield) (Lab)
I am taken by the hon. Member saying that every regulation is a harm; I cannot hear that and not intervene. Regulations do place burdens on businesses—that is absolutely a thing, and we all understand that—but we cannot afford to look at regulation as only negative.
The hon. Member is making a very good point about SMEs and their access to markets and funding but, if SMEs want to grow and thrive in the UK, they need access to data centres whose security they can have confidence in. Part of what we talked about in introducing this Bill was ensuring that SMEs can be confident about the regulatory environment that we have in the UK and providing such reassurance to them. Later on, we talked about large load carriers. SMEs rely on electricity and power supply, and making sure that we have the correct regulations in place to give them the security and confidence in the knowledge that the supply will always be there comes back to the regulatory framework.
I am not in any way trying to step away from the hon. Member—he also spoke about the balance of regulation, and I think he is right on that—but to use a sentence such as “regulation is a harm” steps too far from that balance. We need to make sure that we also see the good side to this regulation, in creating the business confidence to allow SMEs to operate in an environment where they can have confidence in their access to data and energy.
The Chair
Order. Interventions should be short and to the point. If any hon. Member wishes to catch my eye, they should not have any difficulty in doing that, but it is important to keep a distinction between interventions and contributions to the debate.
Dr Spencer
The hon. Member for Lichfield may be aware that my background is in medicine; I used to be a doctor before I came to this place. One of the skills and challenges in medicine is that any medical intervention—apart from a small handful—always has a risk of harm or side effects to the patient. It is always a balancing act between the harm and the benefit. My bread and butter before I came to this place was balancing harms and risks in the best interests of the person in front of me.
Although I have never been a businessperson, and I have certainly never owned or run a data centre, my approach to business burdens is to see the extra things that the Government make businesses do—which are not necessarily what businesses would normally do or see as in their direct interests—as a prima facie harm. I will expand my words a bit if that helps in explaining the logic. The starting point is that it is an extra burden and a harm, but then benefits from other angles can outweigh that harm. It is getting businesses to do something more; if they were doing it anyway, we would not need regulations. It is an additional thing that business is being asked to do. It might be that we have decided that overall it is in the best interests of the sector. Individual businesses cannot regulate and change the sector themselves, so we have decided, “For the good of society, we think businesses should do this.”
I am always a little careful when we politicians say that we know what is better for business in terms of what they are doing. I take the point about how regulatory certainty can be helpful in itself. I also take the point about the overall benefit to society and the business network of having confidence that there are secure and working data centres and that the large load controllers—which we will talk about presently—have control. This Bill is a full-fat compendium of cross-regulations and links. I feel for any business looking through the later chapters and finding themselves subject to those requirements. We have to keep that in mind: all of us in this Committee want our businesses to succeed and do well, and we also want stable and flourishing infrastructure.
Going back to my medical roots, the starting point should be, “Primum non nocere”. That is often misinterpreted as, “First, do no harm”; actually, not doing harm is the main thing that we should do. As a legislator, you should have quite a high threshold before you start saying, “The solution is putting in another law. Let’s create another regulation,” or, “Let’s put another burden on business.”
One of the challenges I had when looking at the Bill when it was first published was understanding why we need it in the first place. What is its starting point? That is something that I have been exploring and thinking about as we have been preparing for this Committee stage. Why is our industry not doing it itself and sorting this out? Why is the Minister here today bringing forward these regulations on business and why is that necessary in the first place as opposed to business sorting it out?
I am sure that this is something that the Committee are going to come back to and explore in more detail when we discuss some of the more high-profile cyber-security impacts, particularly on Jaguar Land Rover and M&S. The hon. Member for Lichfield makes a very good point, and I do not think that this debate is settled in some ways—and I am sure we are going to come back to it quite a few times during the passing of this Bill.
Dr Spencer
I am certainly going to come back to it a few times—if not other Members—and I will invite the Minister to come back to it a few times.
Returning to the point about the dependency on particular sectors, I mentioned the impact that Amazon Web Services had on our society and systems; interestingly, the AWS outage was caused not by a cyber-attack, but it demonstrates the disruption to our lives and businesses that could occur in the event of such an attack. The last Government recognised the vital and growing importance of data centres to the UK economy and people’s lives, as well as the risks of serious interruption to these services. That led to a public consultation on enhancing the security and resilience of UK data infrastructure.
The Conservatives therefore welcome that this vital element of our national infrastructure will be subject to cyber-security regulation. However, for regulation to be robust for cyber-resilience and regulator data centres it is essential that there are high rates of industry compliance. The Government stated in their impact assessment for this Bill that there is an ongoing engagement with the data centre sector. Could the Minister lay out what feedback he has received on the sector’s preparedness to meet the cyber-resilience standards set by the NIS regulations?
Likewise, in terms of ensuring effective regulation, Ofcom will have a dramatically increased role in terms of cyber-security regulation when these provisions come into effect. In view of Ofcom’s current regulatory workload and the challenges with recruitment, which I mentioned earlier and highlighted in the evidence session this week, what ongoing engagement is the Minister having with Ofcom more broadly to make sure that it is sufficiently resourced to play its role?
Before I move on to clause 6, on large load controllers, I feel I need to go back to the discussion about proportionality and the purpose and need for these regulations in the Bill. One of the biggest criticisms of the NIS regulations is that they have not really been enforced. I am not saying that a certain rate of enforcement is a marker of efficacy or compliance, but it is curious, and it has been raised to me, that the level of enforcement indicates that the NIS regulations have not really had teeth or changed anything.
In one bad world, we have regulations that are completely disproportionate and place a huge and unnecessary burden on industry. But in some ways the worst of all worlds, or rather another problem that we would need to deal with, would be for us to legislate, produce this wonderful cyber-security Act, and go away happy as legislators—“Hey-ho, it’s all sorted and finished; we can sleep well in our beds about the cyber-security of the UK.” But if the companies cannot follow the legislation, will not follow it or do not have the resources to do so, then all we will have done is waste our time. Worse, we will have given ourselves a false sense of security, rather than delving into some of the real challenges and problems in the sector, which include overall education, encouraging businesses to take the issue more seriously and encouraging people to do Cyber Essentials.
Alison Griffiths
My hon. Friend is making a very good point, which also applies to improving board awareness and ensuring that the enforcement of the regulations incentivises boards to take the issue seriously and make sure that they are equipped to understand the commercial reality of cyber-security for their businesses. Enforcement is an important part of that.
Dr Spencer
That is something that I know will come up in debate as we go through the Bill. It is curious that we are receiving consistent feedback that some boards are not taking the issue of cyber-security seriously, in terms of allocating resource to it, especially in the light of the very high-profile cyber-attacks on businesses. Obviously, I am all over this issue, given my role as shadow Minister, but I think it is completely insane, certainly for larger companies, not to focus on the challenge of cyber-security. It is a challenge for businesses of all sizes, but I am mindful that implementation is particularly problematic for very small businesses.
Bradley Thomas
Does the shadow Minister agree that the Government should heed the message of Chris Dimitriadis, the chief global strategy officer at the Information Systems Audit and Control Association? He said:
“The era when cyber regulation could focus solely on critical national infrastructure is over. Today, every major employer is part of the digital economy—and therefore part of the threat landscape.”
Surely the Government should heed that message.
Dr Spencer
That is a stark message. Going back to my previous point, I struggle to think how many small businesses can really put in the necessary resource to take these sorts of steps on cyber-security.
There is a broader point here, which goes back to my opening remarks. A chunk of this involves hostile state actors that are attacking our companies, Parliament and the Government, whether directly or through their intermediaries. I find it quite ironic that it was announced earlier this week that our security services are going to work with China’s security services to deal with cyber-security threats. I thought, “Well, hang on a sec. What are they going to say, given that the Chinese Communist party is one of the main drivers of cyber-security threats in the UK?”
Legislating in this area and deciding how to approach it as a society is a particular challenge, given that it is not merely criminals or hacktivists doing this stuff to our companies and institutions; there is also full-fat hostile state inference from Russia, Iran or the Chinese Communist party.
Bradley Thomas
The risk and the threat from hostile states is plain to see. Does my hon. Friend have any sympathy for the ten-minute rule Bill that I introduced a few months ago on the Floor of the House? We need to strike a balance between the risk that bureaucratic administration poses to small businesses and the very real risk that cyber-attacks pose to the economy in general. The Government should have the private sector in scope and look at setting a threshold that does not become burdensome on smaller businesses. My proposal was for any company that turns over £25 million or more to be scope, in order to not bear down too heavily on small companies that would otherwise find the process, the risk and the burden of reporting too onerous.
Dr Spencer
I thank my hon. Friend for his interesting proposal, which attempts to crack the nut of one of the problems subsumed in the Bill.
The Bill cherry-picks certain sectors that need to be regulated entities, and there is a whole host of definitions. Then the Secretary of State can allocate some of the bits that they want to tag on through secondary legislation or the designation of a critical supplier. Then we have the MSP component. But there is something the Bill does not deal with. If I were to ask to the man in the street to identify the biggest cyber-security attack they have heard of in the past year or so, their answer would probably depend on where they live. If they live in the west midlands, they would talk about JLR, which has had a catastrophic effect on the local economy. In other parts of the country, the focus might be on Marks & Spencer or the Co-op. The Bill does not fix that, so what needs to be done? Should there be a threshold based on turnover, so that the process is not so onerous on certain companies, or something to support the insurance industry?
The Bill is silent on this issue, and the Government need to come up with some answers. I totally understand what they are trying to do with the Bill and how it is taking us forward—of course the NIS regulations need updating—but it does not fix the big stuff that has had a huge impact on people’s lives and required a massive bail-out of several billions of pounds-worth of taxpayers’ money. How many more JLRs can the Government afford to bail out until they have to do something to resolve the issue? I suspect we will come back to that, but I am glad that my hon. Friend introduced his ten-minute rule Bill.
We need to have a solution, but at the same time, we should not put onerous burdens on companies that are already struggling because of the Government’s anti-growth agenda and the punitive taxes being imposed on them to pay for profligate spending. This goes back to the discussion about prima facie harms. Taxation is the best example of a prima facie harm.
Dave Robertson
I fear I am about to repeat what I said a moment ago. I am aware that nobody gets up in the morning and is excited to pay tax, but tax pays for our roads, for our infrastructure, for our hospitals, which keep our workforce in good health, for the education of the next round of employees, for our security services, and for the police, who help to prevent crime. It pays for a whole variety of things that are essential for business to succeed, so taking an evangelical view that tax is bad is just not—
The Chair
Order. I want to take this opportunity to again remind the hon. Gentleman and the shadow Minister that this Bill is not about tax. It is relatively narrowly drawn, so I would be grateful if hon. Members can come back to what is on the face of the Bill.
Dr Spencer
As I risk getting into trouble with Mr Stringer, I will not respond to the hon. Member for Lichfield. I look forward to the opportunity to debate this issue again, perhaps in the emergency Budget in the next couple of weeks.
Clause 6 brings large load controllers, which provide the flow of electricity in and out of smart appliances, within scope of the NIS regulations if the load is above 300 MW. I understand that the threshold has been decided through consultation, given that that pressure could have a substantial impact on the grid. There is a challenge in managing peak demand and supply in the grid and big changes in it, so I entirely understand why the Government are introducing this provision. Smart EV devices—I have a smart charging electric vehicle device myself—used system-wide could cause big grid disruptions, particularly as we integrate infrastructure into our homes such as solar panels, batteries and other energy-related smart devices.
In fact, we need the grid to become more smart device-integrated over the next 10, 15 or 20 years. When we look at projections of energy consumption, we see that we will need to enable people to use the grid by expanding technology such as vehicle-to-grid energy supply, so that we can manage peak load. That is part of expanding our energy, reducing energy costs and supporting renewable energy and the transition to net zero. If anything, this issue will become more important and expansive over the years.
On that basis, I have some questions for the Minister about the clause. Why are data centres and large load controllers the two sectors that he has decided to put on the face of the Bill? I say that with particular reference to the NIS2 regulations, which are expanded a bit more. How does he envisage this area expanding in the future? Is he confident that the scope of the clause is sufficient to cover future technologies that are coming down the track? I am thinking of EV charging apps. The list is prescriptive, but does it have sufficient flexibility? Is the Minister able to come back with secondary legislation if he needs to expand the list in the future, given that it is in the Bill in that form? Would it not be better to put that on the face of the Bill and to use secondary legislation to lay it out, in order to have flexibility? The Minister has been trying to ensure flexibility elsewhere, and understandably so—let us not go back into those debates. I just want to understand his reasoning behind that a bit better. That is certainly not a criticism, but I want to know why those particular sectors have been pulled out, and why it has not been left for secondary legislation.
Kanishka Narayan
With your permission, Mr Stringer, I will restrict my comments to clauses in question—in particular, clauses 5 and 6—and the relevant Government amendments. The shadow Minister has auditioned for roles at the Department for Business and Trade in talking about the philosophy of regulation, at the Department of Health and Social Care in talking about his medical background, and at the Treasury in talking about taxation. I will try to restrict myself to none of those and simply speak to the clauses and address three points in response to his comments.
The first relates to the skills and resourcing of our regulators. On that, I welcome the shadow Minister’s prior engagement with me directly and his questions now. The last Government completely gutted our regulators. Having done so, they achieved neither growth nor regulatory quality, which Opposition Members now talk about. As a consequence, it falls to us to make sure that our regulators are fit for purpose and resourced in the way they need to be. This Bill gives them the powers to secure initial and full notifications in a timely way, the powers to share information in an appropriate way and, fundamentally, the ability of cost recovery, to resource themselves in an appropriate way. Alongside that, our wider initiatives on skills in the cyber-sector and technology more broadly are fundamental to achieving our aspirations, not least through the CyberFirst programme, which I mentioned in a witness session.
Kanishka Narayan
I might just make a slight bit of progress. As I mentioned in a previous session, the programme reached 415,000 students, and it has now been evolved into the wider TechFirst scheme as well.
The shadow Minister, as well as the hon. Member for Bromsgrove, made a very important point about resilience in particular and sovereign capability. Particularly for those reasons, I am really proud of two things. One is that the Bill includes suppliers that may not be resident in the UK but provide essential services in the UK. This is a critical means through which we can secure our capabilities here. The second, which is close to my particular interests in the data centre and compute world, is that, through our initiatives on sovereign AI, and having launched a very innovative advance market commitment in the chips part of the stack, which ends up crowding in wider demand—not least through companies such as Nscale, a fundamental part of our AI growth zone in the north-east—this Government are finally rectifying the errors and omissions of the last Government, in making sure that Britain does not do what it did in the last commercial cloud context, but instead, in this AI compute world, has some actual chips on the table.
Thirdly, I will not try to settle the thrilling debate between the shadow Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield on the philosophy of regulation. I will simply make the humble suggestion that in this context we have arrived at, not a full-fat compendium, as the shadow Minister described it, but a very targeted Bill, which has been the result of extensive industry engagement—indeed, some of it was carried out by the prior Government—that aligned on the sectors in question and the inclusion of critical suppliers in scope.
On the shadow Minister’s question about the thresholds and definitional specificity of large load controllers in the Bill, I will of course remain very open to ensuring that the secondary powers, which are intended precisely to enable us to move flexibly as the clean power industry moves, give us the flexibility to move with it. At the same time, the threshold of 300 MW reflected the point at which a large load controller could pose an unacceptable risk to the electricity system and our CNI. This threshold was set very clearly in partnership with technical experts, including the National Energy System Operator. Of course, as the market grows, the potential for cyber-incidents will grow, and we will keep that under close review.
Chris Vince
On the point about flexibility, I think we would recognise that the legislative process in this House does not always move as quickly as we might want it to, but there are reasons for that, because scrutiny is really important. Does the Minister agree that the changing nature of the cyber-threats we face and the changing nature of technology, which he understands far more than me, are the reasons why it is so important to have flexibility in the Bill?
Kanishka Narayan
I thank my hon. Friend for that point. The reality is that neither he nor I am placed to judge exactly where the thresholds should be set on a permanent basis. That is exactly why we have secured the flexibilities that we have in the Bill.
Clause 5 brings Crown-operated data centres into scope of the NIS regulations, ensuring that Government data centres meet robust standards comparable to those in the private sector. Bringing Crown data centres within scope closes a critical gap and guarantees that public sector infrastructure is protected against evolving threats. Exemptions will apply only in defined cases in which a data centre service is provided by an intelligence agency or a facility handling highly classified—“Secret” or “Top Secret”—information. These data centre services are already governed separately, and applying the NIS regime could cause conflict. I urge that clause 5 stand part of the Bill.
Finally, clause 6, on large load controllers, introduces the essential new service of load control under the energy subsector of the NIS regulations. This will capture organisations—
The Chair
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but can he speak a little more loudly and slowly for the benefit of all Members?
Kanishka Narayan
Loudly and slowly: this will capture organisations remotely managing significant amounts of electrical load via energy-smart appliances, both in a domestic and non-domestic setting. These organisations play an increasingly important role in the management of the electricity system, but are not currently regulated for cyber-security. A cyber-attack could therefore create major disruptions to the national grid, shutting down public services and critical national infrastructure. Capturing load control as an essential service will safeguard the public from these disruptions. It will also reflect the need to bring in new safeguards to manage a more digitalised and dynamic energy landscape in the transition towards net zero.
Dr Spencer
Before the Minister moves on—I was a bit nervous that he was going to finish—I have an additional question about the Crown data centre. What happens if a data centre is providing services commercially to both the public and the Crown? How is that operated within the scope of the Bill?
Kanishka Narayan
I am happy to write to the shadow Minister on that point. My understanding is that a Crown data centre will be in scope if it is providing, as in that particular example, to both the public and the private sector, but I am happy to write to him to clarify that point.
The load control market is growing exponentially and we need to make it cyber-secure. For that reason, I propose that clause 6 stands part of the Bill.
Amendment 11 agreed to.
Amendment made: 12, in clause 4, page 3, line 7, leave out “(acting jointly)”.—(Kanishka Narayan.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.
Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 5 and 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Digital services
Kanishka Narayan
I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 7, page 7, line 7, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) a pool of computing resources is ‘scalable’ if the resources are flexibly allocated by the provider of the service, irrespective of the geographical location of the resources, in order to handle fluctuations in demand;
(c) a pool of computing resources is ‘elastic’ if the resources are provided and released according to demand, in order to rapidly increase and decrease available resources depending on workload;
(d) computing resources are ‘shareable’ if—
(i) multiple users share a common access to the service, which is provided from the same electronic equipment, and
(ii) processing is carried out separately for each user.”
This amendment would refine and make further provision about certain aspects of the definition of “cloud computing service”.
Kanishka Narayan
Clause 7 amends the definitions of “relevant digital service provider” and “cloud computing service” in the existing NIS regulations. As in the original NIS regulations, an RDSP is a cloud computing service, online search engine or online marketplace. To be in scope, they must provide a service in the UK and not be a small or microbusiness. That prevents disproportionate business burden, focusing on those larger businesses whose compromise could have a significant impact on the UK’s economy or society. The changes to the definition in the clause clarify that to be in scope, providers cannot be designated as a critical supplier or be subject to public authority oversight, as defined by clause 11. That maintains consistency with the approach to managed services, and minimises dual regulation and unnecessary burden.
Government amendment 13 strengthens the definition of a cloud computing service in clause 7. It introduces precise, clarified and separate definitions of the three core characteristics of cloud computing resources, which is that they are scalable, elastic and shareable.
Alison Griffiths
Clause 7 is definition-heavy, and rightly so; these terms decide who is regulated and who is not. My only observation is that cloud models are, as the Minister knows, evolving quickly because of the AI revolution. Definitions that track architecture too closely will age fast, so the Committee should be alert to whether these terms will still make sense in five years’ time and not just today.
Kanishka Narayan
I very much welcome that point. In talking about broad architecture characteristics—being able to scale compute and to be elastic to multi-tenants by being shareable—rather than setting out the specific nature of resources, we capture both commercial cloud and AI deployments. However, I am keen to ensure that we keep this under review and, where possible, use the flexibilities provided by the Bill to adapt it to changes in technology.
Although the policy intention behind the definition has not changed, amendment 13 will provide certainty for industry, support effective regulatory oversight and ensure that services whose disruption could significantly impact the UK economy and society are properly captured. In addition, the drafting is more aligned with that of our international partners, which will improve efficiency for providers operating across borders.
This targeted, technical improvement will bring greater clarity, consistency and fairness to the NIS regulations. I urge Members to support both the clause and this important amendment.
Dr Spencer
Clause 7 amends the definition of cloud services, which have been within the scope of regulation since the NIS regulations came into force. The expanded definition emphasises remote accessibility and the “on demand” nature of cloud services, and that services may be delivered from multiple locations. It also excludes managed services from the scope of cloud services to avoid duplication of regulatory requirements and oversight.
The Minister proposes changes to this provision in Government amendment 13, which sets out further details regarding the features of in-scope cloud service provision, including common access by multiple users, with each having access to separate processing functions. My question to the Minister builds on the one raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton. It is obviously difficult—if it is possible at all—to predict how the tech sector will evolve, but what powers will the Government have to adjust these provisions as the cloud ecosystem changes, and what consultation has the Minister done on that within the scope of the Bill?
Kanishka Narayan
On that important point, which the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton also raised, the changes to the definition came about in part through extensive engagement, and in particular by ensuring that the attributes of “elastic” and “scalable” were treated individually rather than jointly and that “shareable”—the ability to have multi-tenants and therefore be a genuine cloud computing service for multiple clients—was considered in scope. As I mentioned to the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, it is important that we keep this under review, and part of the reason for the secondary powers in the Bill is to make sure it remains both specific, giving clarity and certainty, and flexible at the same time.
David Chadwick (Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe) (LD)
Currently, the law requires regulated persons to manage risks to the security of their systems. Amendment 28, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, explicitly inserts “risks arising from fraud” into that duty. It would make it clear that a system cannot be considered secure if it is easily exploited by scammers.
Fraud should be considered a national security issue, and there is clearly a relationship between fraud and cyber-security. Scammers across the world are targeting British citizens. Elderly fraud victims in Dyfed-Powys lose £7,900 a day to a tidal wave of scams perpetrated by scammers from many countries across the world, notably Nigeria. UK-wide, in the first half of 2025 alone, criminals stole over £600 million through scams. Surely, we cannot pass a cyber-security and resilience Bill—
The Chair
Order. I think the hon. Member is discussing the next group of amendments, to clause 8. At the moment, we are discussing amendment 13 to clause 7.
Dr Spencer
If I might just help a colleague, I think the grouping and selection of amendments has changed, so the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe may have the previous iteration.
The Chair
That is very helpful. Thank you.
Amendment 13 agreed to.
Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Duties of relevant digital service providers
David Chadwick
I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 8, page 7, line 31, at the end insert—
“(1A) In paragraph (1), after ‘risks’ insert ‘, including risks arising from fraud,’”.
This amendment would explicitly include fraud as one of the risks to the security of network and information systems relevant digital service providers must identify and manage.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 28, in clause 8, page 8, line 4, at end insert—
“(4) After paragraph (2) insert—
‘(2A) When taking measures to manage risks under paragraph (1), a RDSP must, in the design of the relevant digital service—
(a) eliminate unnecessary functions from system requirements;
(b) where risks cannot be managed by the elimination of functions, replace or substitute features in the architecture of the system;
(c) where risks cannot be managed by the replacement or substitution of features, implement active functional controls;
(d) where risks cannot be managed by the implementation of active functional controls, instruct and implement operational and procedural controls;
(e) as a matter of last resort, apply requirements, conditions of use or instructions to service users.
(2B) For the purposes of paragraph (1), “risks” include those relating to the availability, reliability, safety, integrity, maintainability and confidentiality of the relevant services or systems.’”
Clause stand part.
David Chadwick
Surely, we cannot pass a cyber-security and resilience Bill that ignores a crime that affects thousands of people. We know that cyber-security criminals across the world attack individuals to enable themselves to get into systems. Families are losing life savings, and small businesses are shutting down because of this epidemic.
The Government often treat fraud as a policing issue, but the amendment would establish that it should be regarded as a cyber-security issue that needs action at the national security level. By amending regulation 12(1) of the NIS regulations, we place a legal duty on digital providers to identify these vulnerabilities proactively. If we mandate that providers manage fraud risks before an incident occurs, we will reduce the number of victims and the devastation caused to livelihoods. We cannot claim to protect our digital economy while ignoring the billions of pounds lost to scams.
Dr Spencer
Clause 8 provides a new definition of “relevant digital service” and makes it clear that this category includes online marketplaces, online search engines and cloud computing services. The definition of “relevant digital service provider” is updated to encompass all entities providing a relevant digital service in the UK, regardless of whether they are established here. Entities designated as critical suppliers are excluded from the definition to avoid duplication of duties and regulatory oversight from sector-specific competent authorities.
However, the definition excludes from scope of regulation relevant digital service providers subject to public authority oversight, unless they derive over half their income from commercial activities. The exclusion of organisations overseen by public authorities also applies in relation to relevant managed service providers.
In many respects, clauses 7 and 8 provide necessary updates to reflect the changing nature and use of vital digital services. Once again, including within the scope of regulation companies that deliver services to the UK but are established or headquartered elsewhere helps to ensure that those companies report cyber-security incidents to UK authorities, rather than just authorities in their home states. That means that UK regulators and law enforcement are equipped with the most comprehensive knowledge of emerging threats.
Bradley Thomas
Given the blurring of boundary lines between cyber-attacks and financial crime, I can see the compelling reasons why the amendment has been tabled, but does the shadow Minister agree and acknowledge that fraud detection often requires a different skillset from standard network security, so it is important to strike the right balance?
Dr Spencer
I broadly agree. This is one of those difficult areas where there can be overlap. I have sympathy with the argument that it is important to use any opportunity, and in particular this Bill, to raise fraud.
We focus on financial fraud, but this area is not limited to that, especially when we think about other malicious operators, and about ransomware and hacktivism, where the boundaries are particularly blurred. In a situation where a fraudulent operator, service, provider or organisation has material, whether on social media or subject to search engines, and the police or other competent authorities have flagged it to the provider as fraudulent—as illegal criminal activity—what duties does that provider have to remove it or take it down? Is that something that the Minister is aware of? Has he looked into it, and what is the Government’s plan to crack down on that activity?
Kanishka Narayan
I thank the hon. Member for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe for tabling amendment 25, which would amend the duties for RDSPs in the NIS regulations. I empathise with the source of his concern about fraud; I think many of us in the House know and feel that concern, through either our personal experience or that of our constituents.
That said, the security duties within NIS require RDSPs to identify and take steps to manage the full spectrum of risks posed to the security of their systems. They must prevent and mitigate relevant incidents, regardless of what the threats are or where they emanate from. That includes taking an all-hazards risk-based approach. Entities must manage risks to cyber-security, physical security and broader operational resilience. “Security” includes the ability to resist any action that may compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of those systems, including risks that may arise from fraud. I caution against highlighting only one particular vector of risk in the clause; that is unnecessary and would not reflect the full range of risks each RDSP faces.
Further, while the Bill clarifies the high-level duty to manage risks, secondary legislation will give further detail on the security and resilience requirements. Guidance and the code of practice will give further detail still on the types of risks to consider. For that reason, I kindly ask the hon. Gentleman to consider withdrawing the amendment.
The shadow Minister asked about the Government’s treatment of fraud, particularly when it has been found on a platform and the authorities have asked that platform to take it down. The Government made a clear commitment in our manifesto to introduce a new fraud strategy, and the Home Office, as the lead Department, has been working at pace to engage deeply in making that an effective reality.
Alongside that, in my wider role in online safety, I am conscious that fraud is a fundamental area of content in which platforms have to look at where it crosses the border into illegality, as it may well do in the instance the shadow Minister described. That has been a central focus since the illegal content duties came into play last year. I believe that such instances are well covered by the pieces of legislation that I have just mentioned. The Bill is clearly more focused on critical national infrastructure and its exposure to network and information systems.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
Members on both sides of the Committee have referred frequently to the fact that the incident that took Jaguar Land Rover down would not have been covered by the Bill. JLR employs a digital service provider, in the form of Tata Consultancy Services. Would that provider not be covered, meaning that JLR is in scope?
Kanishka Narayan
Although I will not rule a particular provider in or out of scope, if the provider in question met the threshold for RDSP coverage, it would be covered, but the locus of that coverage would be limited to the provider rather than to the end-customer entity. I hope that clarifies that sufficiently.
Let me explain how clause 8 was designed to tackle the risks that Committee members have set out. The clause updates the existing duties for RDSPs in the NIS regulations to ensure that they remain resilient against evolving cyber-threats. It clarifies the requirement for those services, making it clearer that they must secure themselves not just to keep the services they provide running and available but to contribute to wider systems security as a whole.
Lincoln Jopp
Given the scenario we just discussed, it is possible that a digital service provider would have an obligation to report under the Bill, but the parent company employing its services would not. Given the requirements for confidentiality that a client company may put upon a digital managed service provider, how can that conflict be managed?
Kanishka Narayan
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s question, and I have two comments to make on that front. First, the relevant digital service provider will have a range of different customers, and my expectation would be that the regulators and the NCSC would seek a deep understanding of the risk exposure across the full breadth of that portfolio, rather than for each particular customer. Of course, that would form part of some analysis.
Secondly—the shadow Minister asked a related question —I am happy to write about the interaction between prompt notification responsibilities and commercial confidentiality duties, on the basis of the engagement we have conducted so far. Especially when questions of major risk exposure are concerned, I would hope there are provisions that allow the relevant digital service provider to notify the NCSC, but I am happy to write to the hon. Member for Spelthorne and the shadow Minister to clarify that point.
Clause 8 also removes a reference to the RDSP’s own network and information system to clarify that the duty is intended to cover all network and information systems that the relevant digital service relies on.
The cyber-risk landscape is diffuse and multifaceted. Hostile actors can use a range of routes and techniques to attempt to take services offline, as well as to extort, steal and surveil. These changes to the NIS regulations support a holistic approach to tackling cyber-risk. They ensure that important dependencies are covered and that facets of security such as the confidentiality of data and integrity of systems are not set aside.
The clause also requires RDSPs to have regard to any relevant guidance issued by the Information Commission when carrying out its duties. Finally, it removes a requirement for relevant digital service providers to consider specific duties referenced in EU regulations. I urge the Committee to support the clause unamended.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill (Fourth sitting)
(1 day, 7 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Chair
I remind Members to speak loudly and clearly so that everyone is able to hear.
Clause 9
Managed Service Providers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 10, in clause 10, page 9, line 29, at end insert—
“(2A) The measures taken by an RMSP under paragraph (1) must ensure that the number of customers to whom the RMSP provides services does not exceed the critical risk threshold.
(2B) In paragraph (2A), the ‘critical risk threshold’ is the number of customers within a sector or subsector where an incident affecting the provision of services to those customers by the RMSP would result in disruption that is likely to have a significant impact on the economy or the day-to-day functioning of society in the whole or any part of the United Kingdom.
(2C) Paragraph (2D) applies where the number of customers to whom an RMSP provides services exceeds the critical risk threshold by virtue of contracts entered into before the coming into force of section 10 of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Act 2026.
(2D) The RMSP must take steps to reduce the number of customers to below the critical risk threshold, including exercising any right to terminate a contract or vary the terms of a contract.”
This amendment would place a duty on relevant managed service providers (“RMSPs”) to ensure that they do not provide services to manage the technology systems for a number of customers that exceeds a critical risk threshold, such that an incident affecting those services would be likely to result in significant disruption in the United Kingdom. This would prevent an RMSP managing the technology systems for a whole sector or subsector. Provision is also made for a situation where an RMSP is in breach of the critical risk threshold because of contracts entered into before the enactment of the Bill.
Clauses 10 and 11 stand part.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)
I welcome you, Ms McVey, to the most exciting event in Parliament this week.
Kanishka Narayan
What a pleasure it is to serve with you in the Chair. Clause 9 brings large and medium-sized managed service providers—MSPs—into the scope of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018. MSPs are organisations that provide an ongoing IT function, such as an IT help desk or cyber-security support, to an outside client. In doing so, MSPs often have widespread and trusted access to clients’ networks and systems. A single targeted attack can ripple outward, disrupting thousands of other systems. That makes MSPs attractive targets for cyber-attacks. Last year an attack on Collins Aerospace halted check-in and boarding systems at major European airports, causing international disruption. Such attacks highlight what can happen if a single point of failure is compromised, and the importance of managed service providers implementing robust cyber-protections. Despite that, MSPs are not currently regulated for their cyber-security in the UK. As organisations rely more and more on outsourced technology, we must close that gap. The clause provides essential definitions of a “managed service” and of a “relevant managed service provider” to clearly set out which organisations are in scope of the regulations.
Clause 10 imposes new duties on MSPs that have been brought into scope by clause 9. For the first time, such businesses must identify and manage risks posed to the network and information systems that they rely on to provide their managed services. As part of that duty, MSPs must have
“regard to the start of the art”,
meaning that they must consider new tools, technologies, techniques and methods that threat actors may employ. That includes artificial intelligence, and means that providers must deploy the right tools to mitigate the risks and take action to minimise the impact of incidents if they occur. By bringing MSPs into scope of the regulations and imposing such security duties on them, we will strengthen cyber-security and resilience across supply chains, reduce vulnerabilities in outsourced IT services and better protect businesses and services across the UK.
Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)
Bringing MSPs into scope is the right direction of travel, and MSPs sit at points of concentrated risk, but they are not all the same and the real risk is not size alone but the level of privileged access and cross-customer dependency. Proportionality will be critical under these provisions if we want better security, not just box-ticking.
Kanishka Narayan
I agree very much with the hon. Member’s point, and a similar sentiment is expressed elsewhere in the Bill, in that it ensures that the focus is primarily on large and medium-sized MSPs, and that small businesses and microbusinesses are dealt with in a deeply proportionate way. That is an important point to take into account.
Clause 11 defines what it means for a digital or managed service provider to be
“subject to public authority oversight”
under the NIS regulations. Public authority oversight is defined as “management or control” by “UK public authorities” or by a board where the majority of members are appointed by those authorities. Such MSPs are already subject to requirements in the Government cyber-security strategy, which is mandatory for Government organisations. That ensures that cyber-resilience standards remain strong for services linked to public functions, while preventing disproportionate burdens on providers already subject to public authority governance.
In response to points raised by hon. Members in prior Committee sittings, I flag the engagement that we have conducted in coming to the definition of MSPs in question. In particular, beyond the provisions of the 2022 consultation, prior to the introduction of the Bill, we conducted a range of bilateral meetings. We have had multiple conversations with the industry body techUK, roundtables with digital firms, and we engaged through the National Cyber Security Centre-led MSP information exchange with 40 providers in this context, and undertook market research mapping the MSP market. As a consequence, adjustments to the definitions at the heart of this provision have been agreed with incredibly deep and broad engagement across the industry to arrive at a widely-welcomed definition.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms McVey. Small and medium-sized enterprises are defined by the headcount of full-time employees, yet in the world of IT, particularly for managed service providers, data centres and digital service providers, that is not a helpful metric to understand size and scale. Did the Department consider reevaluating the size of digital and managed service providers based on the through-flow of transactions or data rather than headcount? When I worked in the world of tech, there was a ratio for headcount that was totally different from other sorts of businesses.
Kanishka Narayan
The hon. Member raises an important point about the operating leverage of technology businesses. The Bill directly focuses on size as one proxy for risk, but it is not a complete or perfect proxy. That is why, through the critical supplier provisions, it ensures that any smaller providers can be caught in scope as essential services.
Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey.
Clause 9 brings within scope of the NIS regulations a new category of technology service providers, known as relevant managed service providers. MSPs play a critical role in the UK economy. Research conducted by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology under the last Government suggests that 11,000 MSPs were active in the UK in 2023, of which 1,500 to 1,700 were medium or large organisations that would be in scope of the Bill. Micro and small enterprises that offer managed services are excluded from the scope of regulation but have the potential to be designated as critical suppliers under other provisions, which we will come to shortly.
MSPs are critical to the functioning of the multiple businesses that they serve, offering contracted IT services such as helpdesk and technical support, server and network maintenance, and data back-up. In many cases, they also provide managed cyber-security solutions to their customer bases. Consequently, these businesses often have significant access to their clients’ IT networks, infrastructure and data, which makes them attractive and valuable targets.
Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)
I seek some clarification on the shadow Minister’s statistics about the number of MSPs that are in scope, and what they are as a proportion of the MSPs in the country. Could he clarify that he is talking about individual organisations rather than what they do? For example, if there is one large organisation and nine small ones, but the large one takes up 80% of the market, the proportions are slightly different.
Dr Spencer
The scope and breadth of the organisations regulated by these provisions is one of the most important parts of the debate. If the hon. Member can wait a moment, that point will form the bulk of my speech. It was also mentioned by my constituency neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne.
The previous Government consulted on bringing MSPs within scope of regulation. Feedback on that consultation indicated strong support, with 86% of respondents in favour. As such, there is a sound policy rationale for imposing cyber-security and instant reporting regulations on MSPs over a certain threshold. Those MSPs will need to take appropriate and proportionate measures to manage risks to the security of the networks and information systems on which they rely to provide managed services in the UK.
However, as I said at the outset and as many people said during evidence, the devil really is in the detail as to whether the Bill is effective in protecting the sectors it seeks to regulate. Several industry stakeholders, including officers of MSPs and industry representation bodies, have raised concerns about the broad definition of MSPs in clause 9. As drafted, that definition has the potential to cause confusion among businesses as to whether they are in scope or not. These relevant provisions will be brought into force with secondary legislation before Royal Assent, allowing time for consultation with industry and specific duties. Could the Minister clarify whether his Department will respond to concerns by consulting on a refined definition of what constitutes an MSP, to provide much-needed certainty to businesses operating in the sector?
I will also take this opportunity to speak to amendment 10, which was tabled in the names of many Members, including the right hon. Member for Stone, Great Wyrley and Penkridge (Sir Gavin Williamson), who I know has a keen interest in this area. He represents an area in the west midlands, which, like many parts of the country, has suffered massively from the impact of the problems with Jaguar Land Rover. The amendment relates to legitimate concerns about the compound risk that could occur when MSP systems are accessed by malicious actors, and those MSPs are providing services to a large number of entities within a regulated sector. Clearly, there are many reservations about the desirability of this particular amendment, including its potential to interfere with customer choice and the inconsistency with the approach to freedom of enterprise in other regulated sectors in the Bill.
It is noteworthy that several witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee pointed out the lack of skilled cyber-security professionals available in the UK employment market to help regulated entities with the effective implementation of the Bill. It is conceivable that many regulated businesses, particularly smaller ones, will be forced to look for external expertise to comply with their obligations, and we would not want to artificially restrict access to expertise, even when done with the best of intentions. The point is rightly made that large MSPs and those providing services to the most critical sectors should observe the highest cyber-security standards. A relevant MSP must have regard to any relevant guidance issued by the Information Commissioner when carrying out the duties imposed on it, so will the Minister confirm whether and to what extent the important issues raised by the amendment will be covered in consultation and industry guidance?
The amendment, and some of the debate that we have had, goes to the heart of some of the thresholds and metrics that are being used as gatekeepers in the Bill when an entity is or is not being regulated. As I mentioned this morning, at least 70% of Government cloud procurement goes to the three big US tech actors. Those are clearly huge operators, but when it comes to the criticality of an MSP, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne mentioned, size does not in itself necessarily indicate its essentialness in the system.
One can imagine that if a particular unique type of service was being offered, such as a cyber-security service, by a big company—Cloudflare and Salesforce, for example, had a substantial impact on the sector—not merely the size of an organisation, but what they provide, could be relevant in terms of producing systemic risks to our economy as a whole.
Lincoln Jopp
Having read the Bill, does my hon. Friend understand that if a managed service provider provides services to, say, a hospital—so it would be covered by the regulations—and a reportable event happens to the managed service provider, there is any obligation for the hospital trust to report it as well, or is it just the managed service provider that has the responsibility? If he is not clear on that, would he ask the Minister?
Dr Spencer
I thank my hon. Friend for the “get out of jail free” card that he gave me at the end of his question; indeed, I pass that question on to the Minister. The point is well made in terms of trying to dissect the interacting and relevant duties in the Bill. The Bill tries to chop up different actors in the digital ecosystem, as well as public an non-public organisations, although a commercial threshold is being used. The Bill also introduces confusion: it rightly tries to make a carve-out for Crown data centres, but what exactly is a Crown data centre? One could argue that a Crown service is something provided by the state. Is a data centre serving a hospital therefore a Crown data centre?
There are so many different components within the Bill. Not only are there 14 regulators, or however many are operating—earlier this week, Amazon told us in evidence that it is regulated by four regulators—there is also confidential information going through, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne pointed out. It gets even worse in the clause on critical supply networks. It is just incredibly confusing. The Committee—and, dare I say, the Government—should not ignore the evidence we have received from managed service providers time and again saying that although MSPs should be in scope and these regulations help, we need clarity on what exactly that means.
Alison Griffiths
I think my hon. Friend is about to reference the commercial impacts on MSPs. We have already referenced the fact that they are of many different sizes. One of the concerns the Committee will need to consider is whether new contracts will need to be written. The level of uncertainty being created may render the existing frameworks within which they operate redundant.
Dr Spencer
I thank my hon. Friend for that pertinent intervention. The burden she talks about is not just financial; companies could also find themselves in legal jeopardy should they become subject to overlapping and competing duties without realising when the Bill becomes an Act. More than anything else—perhaps even more than a low taxation regime—businesses want certainty about the regulatory environment they operate in. This is made even more complicated by the fact that many organisations operate in different jurisdictions and have to contend with different, competing regulatory frameworks. My understanding is that the majority try to take an approach in one jurisdiction that will also cover them in the other so that they have an overlap, but those are the big companies. They have more capacity and resource to do that. The problem will be for the companies on the margins that are struggling.
Chris Vince
The shadow Minister is always very generous with his time. This is not meant to be a controversial intervention, but does he recognise that micro and small enterprises have been omitted from this legislation because we recognise the challenges they have with the guidance? I appreciate that small can mean mighty when it comes to businesses. The hon. Member for Spelthorne made the point that businesses may have only a small headcount, but a very important role in the cyber-security make-up of this country.
Dr Spencer
Irrespective of their size, whatever definition or metric we use, businesses operate on fine margins for the majority of the time. Regulatory burdens not only impact their ability to operate; they are yet another cost, which means that the cost of services increases. That has a deleterious effect on our economy more generally. Burdens on businesses are passed on to consumers. That makes it more expensive to do business unless there are customers to receive it.
Global business competitiveness, which we have not spoken about yet, is critical. I am very concerned about UK competitiveness in the digital and tech sector. It saddens me to say that we are dwarfed by US big tech in many areas. I want our digital and IT sector to be bigger and better than that of our competitors, but we need a framework to support it. Even for bigger businesses, the regulatory burden is critical, especially as they can choose, to a certain extent, where they incorporate and focus on doing business. We want to ensure that the UK has the best regulations, but the best regulations are often the ones that are least burdensome but that still provide certainty to allow businesses to operate. This is a highly competitive market.
Lincoln Jopp
I thank the shadow Minister for his reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton. Is he as surprised as I am to read in the impact assessment that the hourly rate for a contract lawyer is to be £34 an hour rather than £300 to £500 an hour, which in my experience is the market rate?
Dr Spencer
I thank my hon. Friend for pointing out that discrepancy in the costings. It goes back to the key principle that business and business modelling are best left to businesspeople, not to Government. The Government have a facilitatory role, but fundamentally their role is to get out of the way of business so that it can succeed and our economy can thrive. We need to ensure, for the good of our economy as a whole, that the critical elements of it are regulated in that way.
Given the interconnected operation of MSPs in our digital sector, any burden that we put on business will limit the growth that we all need and will limit competitiveness. In this footloose market especially, that could result in organisations and companies operating in other sectors, notwithstanding the fact that they will have to comply with UK jurisdictional rules. As a general point, regulations will cause footloose industries to move and operate in different sectors, which will mean less taxation revenue and more costs for clients, making it more difficult to do business.
We need to make sure that our economy is as nimble and free as possible, both for those trading as an MSP and more generally. I cannot labour the point enough: the costs that we impose on businesses under the Bill, in particular in the cyber-security and tech sector, will be felt by our economy as a whole. We will have to pay for that through increased inflation in food, energy or anything else that our critical suppliers provide. Even our NHS provision costs will increase as a consequence of the regulatory burden on businesses as disparate and distant from the NHS as those that we see in the Bill.
David Chadwick (Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe) (LD)
The hon. Member is quite right to say that American companies have captured most of the market that he is talking about, particularly the cloud providers. What does he think is stopping British cloud providers from getting a larger share of the market?
Dr Spencer
The cloud providers I have spoken to talk about several things. They talk about the crippling cost of energy in the UK, something that we need to drive down—
The Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury (Taiwo Owatemi)
I am sorry, but this is not in scope.
The Chair
Order. You are telling me that you do not think it is in scope, but we consider that it is.
Dr Spencer
The cloud providers tell me that the energy costs are crippling, which is highly problematic, and that is why we need to drive those costs down. They talk about the challenges of getting data centres built and about planning considerations, which are a concern across the country. They talk about the taxation environment and costs on businesses more generally, particularly when they are footloose, and they talk about the regulatory framework. Pretty much all of those things are not specifically in the Bill, with the exception of the regulatory framework, so there is a lot that is suppressing the opportunities for cloud providers and others in the sector and hindering them from doing business and succeeding.
There is a broader point to make about the Bill and the philosophy behind it, because there is something that we have to avoid. There is a sense in the UK that we are getting gummed up by regulation and obsessing more and more about limitations and restrictions to businesses. In that environment, people and organisations that do well financially, succeed and grow are seen as either targets or cheats—as something that we can go for, tax and punish. We have lost or diminished our can-do attitude when it comes to supporting the risk takers and the entrepreneurs, who are the people and organisations building the MSPs and data centres on which our economy relies.
Over and above that, there is a cultural issue that is impacting our IT and tech sector. As legislators we should ensure that the thing we have direct control over, which is the legislation in front of us, imposes as small a regulatory burden as possible while still ensuring that it is sufficient to meet our aims. We must listen to businesses and hear their concerns. We hear time and again that the lack of clarity, particularly in this part of the Bill, is putting them at financial and legal risk. That is a very substantial concern.
Alison Griffiths
On my hon. Friend’s point about the lack of clarity in the Bill, there is a real possibility that firms will find that an MSP has one view of an issue while their client has another. Unless there is sufficient clarity in the wording of the Bill, we will have issues.
Dr Spencer
I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. Legal clarity is important. I have absolutely no issue with lawyers, but we do not want to make a load of money for lawyers as a consequence of the definitional challenges around the Bill’s implementation. That is not good for businesses, which need certainty as to how to apply the regulatory framework under which they operate. Regulatory uncertainty will not help a business to make decisions. My assumption is that the default position will be for businesses to assume that they are not regulated entities, which means that they will not take actions that we would like them to take as a result of the Bill. Again, we will be making laws under which everybody loses out.
My final point is about the carve-out in respect of public authority oversight. It is all well and good for the Government to say, “We have an action plan and we’re going to sort out Government IT and the cyber-security risk for Government services,” but it is not playing out that way. Our biggest risks, and the most vulnerable components of our digital IT infrastructure, are those that are linked to Government services. Change is needed. My sense is that when a company interacts and shares data with Government and public sector services, the biggest-cyber security risk is likely to be in the aspects that are provided by Government services. We are making legislation that puts a host of burdens on the private sector, yet we are largely silent about what is happening in the public sector. Putting people at risk in that way is really not good enough. We need to support our overall cyber-security.
Kanishka Narayan
Once again, the shadow Minister is auditioning for roles in the Treasury, by talking about general taxation, and in the Department for Business and Trade, by talking about general philosophies of regulatory reform. I will focus on matters within the scope of our debate, and on four aspects in particular.
First, Opposition Members have raised questions about definition. They have been answered frequently, but I am happy to repeat the answer. The scope of MSP coverage, which focuses on large and medium-sized MSPs, means that something in the order of 11% of MSPs are covered, by number, but 97.6% of the UK’s MSP revenue is covered. I hope that that gives sufficient assurance as to the coverage of the Bill. Of course, the critical supplier provisions cover any others.
Kanishka Narayan
I am happy to proceed and to focus on Crown ownership of data centre provision to others. For those reasons, I continue to commend clauses 9 to 11 to the Committee.
Lincoln Jopp
Will the Minister please clarify whether he thinks that, as page 102 of the impact assessment states, the hourly rate for a lawyer changing a contract is £34?
Kanishka Narayan
I simply point out to the hon. Member that the pricing for law varies materially. I hope that, with the benefit of technology, it continues to be very accessible to all relevant providers.
Lincoln Jopp
I am sorry, but that is nonsense. The footnote on the page that cites £34 an hour for a contract lawyer directs us back to the Office for National Statistics. I hope that the Minister lives in the real world—he has clearly worked in the business world—so he knows that that is nonsense. Does he agree that that pretty well undermines that section of the impact assessment?
Kanishka Narayan
Having closed the debate, I am happy to conclude.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Dr Spencer
On a point of order, Ms McVey. What mechanism is available to Members who are concerned that there is a factual error in the impact assessment? How can that be corrected?
The Chair
The point has been made clearly on the record. We can take it beyond this room, and perhaps you can write to the Minister afterwards for clarification.
Clauses 10 and 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Critical suppliers
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Kanishka Narayan
Clause 12 will introduce a new power for regulators to designate critical suppliers to organisations as in scope of the NIS regulations. These are suppliers that are so pivotal to the provision of essential digital or managed services that a compromise or outage in their systems can cause a disruption that would have serious cascading impacts for our society and economy; I am thinking in particular of the Synnovis incident in 2024, when 11,000 medical appointments were cancelled across London hospitals as a result of an attack on a pathology service provider.
The clause will ensure that the power to designate can be exercised only where suppliers pose a credible risk of systemic disruption and when the regulator has considered whether the risks to the supplier cannot be managed via other means. In other words, it is a very high bar indeed.
The clause provides safeguards for suppliers, which must be consulted and notified during the designation process. It also requires regulators to consult other relevant NIS regulators when they are considering whether to designate, or decide to do so, ensuring that they have an accurate understanding of how suppliers are already regulated.
Finally, the clause provides for designations to be revoked when risks no longer apply or when a supplier has met the thresholds for regulation as a relevant digital service provider or relevant managed service provider. It should be noted that the clause does not set out the security duties on critical suppliers; these will be defined in secondary legislation following an appropriate period of consultation.
By addressing supply chain vulnerabilities, this measure will strengthen the resilience of the UK’s essential and digital services on which the public rely every day. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Alison Griffiths
The clause merits close scrutiny, because it is the point in the Bill where risk is supposed to be addressed beyond the individual operator and into the supply chain. In plain terms, clause 12 will allow the regulator to designate a supplier as critical where disruption to that supplier would have a significant impact on the delivery of an essential or digital service. The trigger is impact, not size or sector. That approach is sensible, but I want to stress-test how it works in the context of operational technology.
Across power, telecoms, transport, water and industry, many essential services rely on the same family of industrial control equipment. Substations, signalling systems and industrial plants may look different, but they often run on identical controlled devices and firmware supplied by a very small number of manufacturers.
The risk is not hypothetical. A single vulnerability in widely deployed OT equipment can create a common mode failure across multiple sectors at the same time, even where each operator is individually compliant with its duties. At the moment, the Bill places obligations squarely on operators of essential services, but in OT environments, operators do not control the design of equipment, the firmware, the vulnerability disclosure process or the remote access arrangements that vendors often require as a condition of support.
As Rik Ferguson highlighted in written evidence to this Committee, uncertainty about how and when suppliers might be brought into scope can lead to defensive behaviour and late engagement. The risk is amplified in OT, where suppliers may discover vulnerabilities before operators do, and where one operator may report an issue, while others in different sectors, using identical equipment, remain unaware.
There is also a traceability problem. OT equipment is frequently sold through integrators and distributors. Manufacturers may not have a clear picture of where the equipment is ultimately deployed. Without that visibility, national-scale vulnerability notification and co-ordinated response become very difficult.
UK Finance has also drawn attention to the complexity of multi-tier supply chains and the need for clear accountability when regulatory reach extends upstream. The clause recognises that reality, but its effectiveness will depend on how consistently and predictably designation decisions are made across sectors.
My concern is not about the existence of the power. It is about whether, in practice, the power will be used early enough and clearly enough to address shared OT risks before they become cross-sector incidents. Operational resilience today depends less on individual sites and more on the security practices of a relatively small— I would say very small—number of OT suppliers that sit behind them. The clause has the potential to address that, but only if its application is focused on genuine systemic risk and supported by clear signals to suppliers and operators alike. For those reasons, the clause warrants careful consideration as the Bill progresses.
Lincoln Jopp
To understand the impact of what we are discussing, we obviously look at the impact assessment. We in this place are often accused of simply making rules and passing laws with no real sense of the impact downstream, particularly on small businesses. Having worked in the tech sector for 10 years, with data centres and managed service providers, and worked to try to grow many small and medium-sized enterprises, I am acutely conscious of the need not to overburden them. It is clearly hugely important that the Government take account of the impact of the measures they are taking and the burdens they are imposing on small and medium-sized enterprises.
To understand the impact of this measure, it is important to know two things: first, how many companies will be impacted and, secondly, how much it is going to cost. While I am sure that the Minister will say that this provision on critical suppliers is great, and all very clear, it cannot really be that clear. Page 110 of the impact assessment states:
“DSIT is not able to estimate at this stage the number of SMEs or SME DSPs that will be designated as critical suppliers”;
so we cannot tell how many there are. The same page also states:
“Specific duties will be set through secondary legislation so the exact cost of security measures is not possible to estimate.”
We do not know how many there are or how much the measure is going to cost, but Government Members will be whipped to say, “That’s okay—that can be done by someone else at another time.” We do not really have a strong sense of the impact on real-world businesses of what we are doing here. We also talked about the legal costs in an earlier sitting. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reassuring words about how very clear the clause is and how it is not just a blank cheque, even though we do not know how many people it will affect or how much it will cost them.
Dr Spencer
This clause is one of the provisions that has given rise to widespread industry concern regarding its scope and implications. Business supply chains, particularly for large operators of essential services and multinational companies, are becoming ever more complex. The increased digitisation of service provision across the board means that the delivery of essential services can be vulnerable to severe disruption when the systems of critical supply chain entities are interrupted by cyber-attacks.
The Government have pointed to the 2024 cyber-attack on Synnovis, a pathology lab provider serving several London hospitals, as an example of the severe consequences that can flow from a cyber-attack on a key supply chain provider. In that case, the suspension of Synnovis services caused disruption to more than 11,000 appointments and operations. The attack caused at least two cases of serious harm to patients and, tragically, one patient’s death was attributed to the long wait for blood test results. Estimated financial losses from the attack exceeded £30 million.
The previous Government were conscious of intensifying supply chain risk, and consulted on measures to enable regulators to designate individual suppliers as critical if they provided an IT service on which an OES or RDSP was dependent for the provision of its essential service. The response to that consultation showed overwhelming support for the proposal, but stakeholders argued that the designation process would need to be transparent and based on engagement with industry. It is those vital elements of transparency and engagement, or rather the current lack of them, that are causing high levels of concern among supply chain entities that stand to be brought within scope of regulation when these provisions come into effect.
To break that down, preserving agility for the Secretary of State and regulators to respond to emerging risks has been recognised as both a strength and a weakness of the Bill. However, lack of certainty is a particular concern in a context of critical supplier designation, especially as this part of the Bill has the potential to bring in large numbers of small and even microbusinesses within the scope of regulation, potentially by multiple regulators. That is a daunting prospect for smaller companies, even taking into account the caveated duty on competent authorities to co-ordinate in the approach to regulation of critical suppliers in the proposed new paragraph 14L of the NIS regulations.
Several witnesses in oral evidence, including techUK and ISC2, made strong arguments that SMEs often lack the financial and human resources to develop cyber-security expertise and comply with regulation. Those organisations will need additional time to prepare, and a better indication of the criteria that might be used by regulators to determine which supply chain providers are critical. Industry bodies have called on the Government to ensure meaningful consultation on secondary legislation and guidance, to ensure that the measures are fit for purpose and capable of practical implementation. As part of the planned consultation, will the Minister commit to considering whether there are alternative approaches to regulation for increasing cyber-resilience in companies below a certain size?
Alison Griffiths
The clause is drafted broadly, which is understandable, but in practice many of the supply chains, as my hon. Friend has ably demonstrated, involve several layers of providers and sub-providers. I would welcome clarity on how regulators are expected to approach designation in these cases, so that responsibility is clear and preparation can happen upstream, rather than only after an incident.
Dr Spencer
My hon. Friend has figured out what I am going to say in a moment, when it comes to the scoping of the regulator and that communication process. Such is the depth of the rabbit hole that the provision creates that, even though my hon. Friend’s intervention did not go where I thought she was going, another problem has just come to mind.
What happens in the circumstance where a critical supplier that acts as a proxy for multiple critical suppliers? How does designation operate in that fashion? There are suppliers that essentially operate as a marketplace to a certain provision of services. Is it the marketplace that is regulated, or is it each supplier within the marketplace? A locum agency could hypothetically be an umbrella company for multiple different smaller locum agencies, each of which would share the corporate risk as part of that.
Going back to my first point, the idea that access to the IT network or system will somehow be discriminatory, or dichotomise between people who are in scope of this measure and people who are not, seems to me complete nonsense. It is difficult to see what organisations, if they provide a service to a modern OES, will be in scope of it.
Secondly, there is systemic or significant disruption. I often say that, if someone wanted to cripple a hospital, the best way to do that would be to stop the cleaners cleaning rooms, and to stop the porters pushing people around the hospital to get them to their appointments and moving beds. There is often a focus on doctors and on the rest of the core medical and nursing staff— I myself often focus perhaps a bit too much on doctors—but it really is a whole-team effort. In fact, the most critical people are often the people who might not be the subject of the most focus, such as the cleaners and porters.
If the cleaners stop work or do not turn up to work, the hospital grinds to a halt. If taxis are not taking people to and from hospital out of hours, or if the patient transport is not taking people to hospital, out-patient departments grind to a halt. If the locum companies that fill gaps in staff rotas are not available to do that, and there are substantial rota gaps that make the provision of services unsafe, the hospital also grinds to a halt. If it is not possible to get access to critical medicines, if staff cannot maintain the blood gas machine or the blood pressure machine, or if the boiler breaks down, the hospital grinds to a halt.
It is not just something as obvious as the tragic situation with blood and pathology testing that causes a hospital to grind to a halt. Indeed, I cannot think of many private sector provisions that would not have a substantial impact on a hospital if they were to be removed; if any other Member can, I will be very happy to stand corrected. However, just skimming through them, I can see that the removal of most of them would cause the hospital to grind to a halt. The idea that the significant impact definition will be a discriminatory factor regarding suppliers just does not work. Someone might say: “Ben, you’re completely wrong. We found some providers.”, but, if that situation arises, how will the arbitration occur in terms of the threshold?
Chris Vince
I am not going to tell the hon. Gentleman that he is completely wrong—he should not worry about that. I will make another point. I wonder whether the distinction might be how time-sensitive losing a particular service would be. That is just a suggestion.
Dr Spencer
I thank the hon. Member so much for that intervention about the time it would take to find an alternative supplier, because it will bring me on nicely to my point about alternative suppliers.
However, before I move on to that point, the hon. Gentleman made a very good point in his intervention, which I will address. To be subject to these provisions will create a regulatory burden, and therefore a cost burden, for an organisation that is designated to be a national critical supplier. If I was a supplier of services, I would want to have the best provision possible. I would want to be cyber-secure; I would want to have a gold-standard service. However, I might also be nervous of being designated as a critical supplier because of the regulatory burden that would impose on me, which would make me potentially less competitive in getting contracts because of the costs that would ensue. There would need to be an arbitration system where a company that is under threat of being designated a critical supplier could have a discussion or debate about whether that designation was relevant or not.
I will now move on to the point that the hon. Gentleman made about alternative services. I really have no idea at all how we can expect a regulator to delve into the complexities and the minutiae of what is available in a local economy to provide these services that the OES is receiving. Do we expect the relevant regulator to check what taxi services are available—actually available, rather than some sort of fantasy availability where they are available on paper, but not in reality—in the local ecosystem that could supply to that hospital, which is the operator of essential services? What is the scope of research that the regulator would have to do? What considerations would they need to take regarding how much the taxis cost and how effective they are? What about the procurement decisions and processes that have already been gone through?
Most public sector organisations have complex procurement rules when setting up their contracts—and that is before we even begin to consider health and safety concerns that are subject to regulatory provisions. For example, if the regulator decided that taxi services are under threat of becoming a critical supplier, then does the taxi service have the ability to deal with someone who has a cardiac arrest, needs oxygen or has a behavioural disturbance? Can it manage people with physical or mental disabilities? What is the scope of that particular service provision? The experts will be the people who commissioned it in the first place; yet on the face of the Bill there is no objective requirement for the regulator to speak to the OES in the first place about how this provision and service was procured.
In terms of the service being available—as per the point made by the hon. Member for Harlow about the time to shift through—how will that be evidenced and investigated? What resource is going into this? That is just for a taxi company. What about when we expand it—and this is just for the NHS—to cleaners, porters, locum agencies or medicines provision? Is the provision of services geographically circumscribed or will this be across the country? I am sure that one can find alternative services to provide taxis to St Thomas’ in Birkenhead, but that does not necessarily mean that it is available in a reasonable timeframe or sense, in terms of the designation of supplier.
Lincoln Jopp
I do not want to add spurious hypotheticals, so I will talk about the real world. I visited the Maypole special school in my constituency the other day. It has 20 members of staff and 18 pupils. It has people coming from as far away as Wandsworth. It books the transport, and the transport is paid for by the local education authority in which the pupil lives. It is clearly critical that children get to the school—just as it would be for a hospital. Would it be up to members of staff at the Maypole school to find out whether Addison Lee used a managed service provider or a data centre? That seems quite a tricky thing to know about and then to fulfil.
Dr Spencer
I really appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention. It goes incisively to the heart of the concern about how these provisions are currently drafted. I really struggle to see how an OES that is providing a service to another OES could effectively argue that it is not within the full scope of these regulations. We have a lot of OESs in this country. It may be the Minister’s and the Government’s intention to essentially have a proxy regulatory framework for suppliers to OESs going forward—it is being kept very loose, because there is some flexibility in that, but that in itself will be a problem.
I worry that a lot of providers are going to think to themselves, “Why should we provide to an OES when we might be at risk of being designated as a national critical supplier?” Surely that is a concern that will have a chilling effect on organisations supplying to OESs, because of the risk of being found within the scope of this additional regulatory burden.
Don’t get me wrong; as I have said, companies should be taking cyber-security seriously, as should everyone. However, not everyone should be subject to the various regulations and data-sharing requirements that this Bill provides for. I suspect that many organisations will be very concerned. If there is a risk of designation as a critical supplier, companies will already be instructing lawyers and other organisations to manage that corporate risk.
If an organisation starts supplying to a hospital trust, or to whoever it may be, it might think, “Actually, we’re likely at risk of being designated, so we need to start doing some work and investment, either to challenge that designation or begin doing the preparatory work.” Maybe that is the intention: to effectively regulate the entire sector providing to OESs without actually lifting a finger in terms of regulation through this Bill. If that is the case, I am sort of sad, because I think it is better to be clear-cut about it. I would be grateful if the Minister answered that point directly.
Finally, in terms of OESs, we have already mentioned the fact that Government and local authority IT infrastructure and services are among the biggest risks in our system. I was really struck by the evidence from the NHS on Tuesday, in which our witnesses described data-sharing operations with adult social care, which is of course provided by local authorities.
It seems quite perverse, if I may say so, that a GP surgery, which is a private organisation, could be deemed a critical supplier to a hospital in terms of patient information sharing. Quite frankly, I would like the Minister to answer the question specifically: does he envisage primary care GPs being in scope because of data sharing of hospital records with NHS trusts? GPs could fall within scope as critical suppliers, while social care records, which are provided by local authorities, would not. There are all these weird situations that could emerge because of the scope and the looseness of these provisions, with all the consequent harms and problems. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s responses to my points.
Kanishka Narayan
First, I will respond to the apt and thoughtful points from the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton on operational technology. I can confirm to her that both vendors and providers of operational technologies will be covered by the provision of the five-step test for critical supplier designation. That is an important aspect when thinking about supply chains and the presence of operational technology where it is of critical interest.
The hon. Member for Spelthorne raised a very accurate point about proportionality in the provisions of the Bill, and in particular the impact assessments, statements, or limited statements on critical supplier impacts. As he will know very well, the Bill takes a very nuanced position on proportionality. When a sector is designated, there will be total clarity on the number of suppliers affected and on the ultimate impact. We will have sight of that.
The provision on critical suppliers was asked for by industry. The reason why the Bill does not specify critical suppliers is that it is simply not for the Government to specify how a business can or cannot continue. It is for businesses and regulators to work that through by understanding the depth of expertise that businesses have. We have started to do that, but that is precisely why the critical suppliers provisions have been delegated to secondary legislation and subsequent guidance.
Kanishka Narayan
I commit to giving way to the hon. Gentleman at the end of my speech. He asked about schools. I am happy to confirm that schools are not in the scope of the Bill.
In response to the shadow Minister, I highlight that the five-step test is cumulative: a business must meet all the conditions to be designated as critical, not just one. I think that answers the series of logical puzzles that he tied himself up in.
I am very happy to confirm to the Committee that it is expected that regulators will use information gathered from their oversight of operators of essential services, relevant managed service providers and relevant digital service providers to identify potential critical suppliers for designation. They can also ask organisations for more information to support their assessments. Future supply chain duties will also require organisations to share supply chain risk assessments with regulators. A supplier can be designated only after the regulator has completed an investigation process, including serving notices and holding a consultation, and confirmed that the criteria are met. Designated suppliers will also have the right to challenge decisions through an independent appeals process.
Kanishka Narayan
I commit to giving way at the end of my speech to the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Spelthorne.
On the question of consultation, I am happy to confirm that the team in question has set up an implementation-focused effort. We have started to engage with regulators already, and there will be an extensive process of engagement on the Bill with business, as has been conducted historically.
The shadow Minister highlighted a number of logical puzzles. I have worked in a range of businesses and public sector organisations, and most have business continuity services. His hypothetical idea that businesses do not understand alternative provision, and whether they are or are not in a position of exposure, is well solved in the real world. I would give more credit to our expert witnesses from NHS Scotland than he did in recognising that they said that they frequently deal with the question of critical suppliers in co-ordination with competent authorities.
Lincoln Jopp
The Minister came back with an answer on proportionality, saying that it is not for Government to decide what is essential. He missed out the next bit, which is, “We’re just going to regulate critical suppliers and pass laws about them, but we don’t know how many there are, and we don’t know how much the policy is going to cost.” Would he accept that characterisation as the logical conclusion of what he said?
The Minister also said that schools were not covered by the Bill. As far as I am aware, patient data and children’s data are two of the most precious things that we have, so I would like to know why schools are not covered by the Bill.
Kanishka Narayan
On the first point, I am afraid that I do not think that was an appropriate characterisation, because where the sectoral scope is clear and where there is a clear risk of critical national infrastructure and essential services being directly exposed, we have specified that in the Bill. We have looked at the impacts set out in the impact assessment. For the critical suppliers in those sectors—I would expect them to be very limited in number—we have made sure that regulators and businesses have the flexibility to set the requirements directly, rather than them being set here in Parliament.
Chris Vince
I was going to intervene on the hon. and gallant Member for Spelthorne, but he is bigger than me. I recognise the points he made about the number of critical suppliers, but I come at the question from the other angle: doing nothing may leave critical suppliers at risk. Although we might not know the exact number, as he correctly asserted, it is important that we do something and introduce the regulations as soon as we can to protect our critical infrastructure.
Kanishka Narayan
I thank my hon. Friend for that point. This issue has not come out of nowhere. Industry and a number of organisations asked that we introduce the measures in the clause.
Beyond the very clear five-step test for critical supplier designation, the Bill provides that the requirements on critical suppliers are proportionate. The reason why we have both the five-step test and the provisions in the Bill is that, in most cases, if the risk assessment suggests so, the security requirements set out in the Bill will be less onerous in most cases. They will be specified in secondary legislation and guidance.
On the question of schools, and more broadly the question of public sector authorities, I entirely accept that the handling of pupil data in schools is a critical aspect of our public service operations. The reason why public service authorities have largely been left out of the Bill’s scope is because we do not need to wait for the legislative process to act. We have been working, not least closely with the Government’s cyber-security strategy and the cyber action plan, to ensure that pupil data is kept securely and robustly.
Dr Spencer
The Minister is, of course, within his rights to snarkily dismiss the questions that I have raised, but I should point out that the stuff that is debated in Parliament, whether in Committee or on the Floor of the Chamber, is relevant when it comes to future legal disputes after a Bill is passed. The questions I have asked about the application of the Bill’s provisions will be important parts of the legal disputes that I expect will arise after its implementation. When people look back through the Minister’s dismissive comments, I hope they have other resources that they can go to for settling legal arguments. However, he may choose to respond fully now, or in writing if he cannot provide me with an answer.
Kanishka Narayan
I believe that where the shadow Minister laid out any specific concerns, I was able to set out answers, not least on the process for the designation of critical suppliers and the availability of an appeals process. Where his points were more in the realm of specific hypothetical puzzles, I have stayed clear for precisely the reasons that he highlights. This is serious stuff that can form the basis of how businesses and others plan, rather than specific judgments that we ought not to speculate about in this House.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Provision of information by operators of data centre services
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Kanishka Narayan
Clause 13 ensures that operators of data centres provide essential information to regulators, enabling them to properly monitor their sector and its cyber-resilience. The clause requires operators to submit key details, such as names, addresses and contact information, within three months of designation, and to update regulators within seven days if anything changes. Regulators are required to maintain a list of designated entities. By keeping regulatory records current, the clause strengthens our ability to monitor and protect essential services and respond to incidents that could affect businesses, public services and national security. The clause plays a key foundational role in the Bill’s wider framework for cyber-security and resilience.
Like clause 13, clause 14 places legal duties on digital and managed services providers to provide essential information to their regulator—in this case, the information commission. Like operators of data centre services, RDSPs and MSPs will be required to register with the information commission within three months, submitting key details, such as names and contact information, and to update regulators within seven days if anything changes. Organisations based outside the UK will be required to nominate a UK representative and provide contact details. To strengthen cross-agency support and recognise the key role that these businesses play in the UK economy and society, the information commission will be required to share its registers of relevant digital and managed service providers with GCHQ. Those proportionate steps will enable authorities to do their job and respond when it matters.
Dr Spencer
Clause 13 requires in-scope data centre operators to provide certain information to their designated competent authorities, which—subject to Government amendment 11, which we passed earlier—will now be solely Ofcom, and to keep that information up to date. The information includes the data centre operator’s address and the names of directors. It must be provided within three months of the data centre operator’s designation. For data centres that meet the threshold criteria, that would be three months after clause 4 comes into force. Other OESs are not subject to an equivalent requirement to provide information to their sector regulator. That reflects the fact that the Government currently have limited information about the data centre sector.
RDSPs are already required, under regulation 14 of the NIS regulations 2018, to provide their contact details to the information commission, as their sector regulator. Clause 14(2) amends regulation 14 to require RDSPs to provide more information, including about their directors and the digital services they provide. It would also require the information commission to share a copy of its register of RDSPs with GCHQ. Clause 14(9) requires RMSPs to register with the information commission and to submit the same contact details as RDSPs. RMSPs must nominate a UK representative if they are based outside the UK. The information commission will be required to maintain a register of RMSPs and to share it with GCHQ. Clauses 13 and 14 give Ofcom and the information commission access to more detailed information about regulated entities and facilitate regulatory oversight of the data centre RDSP and RMSP industries in the UK.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Reporting of Incidents by Regulated Persons
Dr Spencer
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 15, page 22, line 15, at end insert—
“(f) whether the incident involves failure modes not previously observed in the relevant sector materially involving autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, including where the potential impact of such failure modes was mitigated or prevented.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 2, in clause 15, page 22, line 25, at end insert—
“(ea) where the incident was associated with one or more autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, details of those systems and their involvement in the incident;”
Amendment 4, in clause 15, page 23, line 32, at end insert—
“(ea) where the incident involved one or more autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, details of those systems and their involvement in the incident;”
Amendment 5, in clause 15, page 26, line 37, at end insert—
“(h) whether the incident involves failure modes not previously observed in the relevant sector materially involving autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, including where the potential impact of such failure modes was mitigated or prevented.”
Amendment 6, in clause 15, page 27, line 7, at end insert—
“(ea) where the incident was associated with one or more autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, details of those systems and their involvement in the incident;”
Amendment 7, in clause 15, page 30, line 8, at end insert—
“(fa) whether the incident involves failure modes not previously observed in the relevant sector materially involving autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, including where the potential impact of such failure modes was mitigated or prevented;”
Amendment 8, in clause 15, page 30, line 21, at end insert—
“(ea) where the incident was associated with one or more autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, details of those systems and their involvement in the incident;”
Amendment 9, in clause 18, page 40, line 10, at end insert—
“(8A) Where the CSIRT receives notification of an incident under regulation 11, 11A, 12A, or 14E that materially involves autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, the CSIRT must share relevant technical information with the relevant body within 72 hours.
(8B) For the purposes of this regulation, a “relevant body” means the AI Security Institute or any successor or replacement body designated by the Secretary of State.”
Dr Spencer
I will speak to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Dewsbury and Batley (Iqbal Mohamed), but wait for the next group to speak to clauses 15 and 16 and the amendments to them in the name of the official Opposition.
From the outset, it is important for me to say that while I have spoken to the hon. Member more generally and responded to a debate he secured on AI, I have not spoken to him specifically regarding these amendments and their precise purpose. However, given his concerns about the AI sector and his background, we can see where he is going with them. Broadly speaking, the amendments would ensure that as part of the reporting requirements under these clauses, there is an ability to measure whether adaptive AI or large language models have been responsible for a cyber-security breach or an incident within the systems themselves.
That derives from what we see happening more generally in the cyber-security sector. We heard evidence that, online, people can essentially purchase a cyber-security hack suite of software. It is possible to pay for people to do hacking and one can get training in it. A lot of hacking and cyber-security breaches are now expanding because of large language models and the use of AI to probe systems. I do not know if we have a sense of scope regarding how much this is a problem specifically in the UK, whether for the individual businesses or organisations that will be regulated under the Bill. I understand, as I interpret them, that the point of the amendments is to get a dataset on where AI or automated decision making has been used to pose a particular cyber-security risk.
The amendments also speak to a more general point. There has been a lot of debate in this place over the years about what we as a country, and equivalent democracies, are doing on the regulation of AI and large language models, building on the Bletchley conferences, innovative work and what guardrails we need to think about in terms of imposing LLMs and AI in the UK, and how we approach AI being used by hostile state actors, such as through bot accounts. I understand that the use of deepfakes, bots and so on is an emerging risk as a method of cyber-attack. There are broader issues with regard to transparency when bots on the internet and social media networks can get into various IT systems and accounts, and effectively pretend to be somebody else to get around the cyber-security system. As with all things, we do not know what we do not know. I understand that the amendments were tabled to increase reporting requirements and give us more evidence of the scope of the problem and the threat posed.
I will be grateful if the Minister gives his sense of how much of a problem this is, particularly with regard to whether reporting requirements are necessary. I believe that the Government’s original plan was to introduce an AI Bill. That would have pros and cons, and I remain agnostic on that, but, speaking for His Majesty’s Opposition, I would like to know the Minister’s plans for the AI landscape and whether, in the upcoming King’s Speech, there is an idea of revisiting an AI Bill, which might make such amendments obsolete.
Kanishka Narayan
I appreciate the intent behind the amendments and the shadow Minister’s position of understanding but not supporting them, which I share. I share his concerns about the potential for emerging risks posed by AI systems, not least in the realm of cyber-security. At the same time, I am conscious that we have not specified any risk factors in the Bill from a reporting point of view for the National Cyber Security Centre or the regulators. To do so in this context would place an undue priority on one category or source of risk.
For those reasons, although I understand the motivation behind the amendments and I am conscious of the risks posed by AI systems, I urge the hon. Member not to press them. The Bill is technology-agnostic rather than focused on particular areas of risk. The Government continue to work on mitigating AI risks, primarily at the point of use, but also through extensive Government capability, not least in the AI Security Institute.
Dr Spencer
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Taiwo Owatemi.)
Railways Bill (Eleventh sitting)
(1 day, 7 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. I remind Members to switch any electronic devices off or to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during the sittings. The selection and grouping document shows the way in which the amendments and new clauses have been arranged for debate. Any Divisions on amendments or new clauses take place in the order in which they appear in the amendment paper.
Clause 59
Access and use policy
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 79, in clause 59, page 33, line 19, at end insert
“in addition to a subsequent right to appeal to the ORR”.
This amendment would enable a subsequent right of appeal to the ORR after going through the dispute resolution process.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 217, in clause 59, page 33, line 30, at end insert—
“(3A) Great British Railways’ policy about, and procedures for, access to and the use of GBR infrastructure for the operation of trains, must be best calculated—
(a) to promote improvements in railway service performance;
(b) otherwise to protect the interests of users of railway services;
(c) to promote the use of the railway network in Great Britain for the carriage of passengers and goods, and the development of that railway network, to the greatest extent that it considers economically practicable;
(d) to contribute to the development of an integrated system of transport of passengers and goods;
(e) to contribute to the achievement of sustainable development;
(f) to promote efficiency and economy on the part of persons providing railway services;
(g) to promote competition in the provision of railway services for the benefit of users of railway services;
(h) to promote measures designed to facilitate the making by passengers of journeys which involve use of the services of more than one passenger service operator;
(i) to impose on the operators of railway services the minimum restrictions which are consistent with the performance of its functions under this Part; or the Railways Act 2005 that are not safety functions;
(j) to enable persons providing railway services to plan the future of their businesses with a reasonable degree of assurance.
(3B) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (3A) above, Great British Railways shall have a duty, in particular, to exercise the functions assigned or transferred to it under or by virtue of this Part, or the Railways Act 2005 that are not safety functions in the manner which it considers is best calculated to protect—
(a) the interests of users and potential users of services for the carriage of passengers by railway provided by a private sector operator otherwise than under a franchise agreement, in respect of—
(i) the prices charged for travel by means of those services, and
(ii) the quality of the service provided; and
(b) the interests of persons providing services for the carriage of passengers or goods by railway in their use of any railway facilities which are for the time being vested in a private sector operator, in respect of—
(i) the prices charged for such use; and
(ii) the quality of the service provided.
(3C) Great British Railways shall be under a duty in exercising the functions assigned or transferred to it under or by virtue of this Part or the Railways Act 2005 that are not safety functions—
(a) to take into account the need to protect all persons from dangers arising from the operation of railways, and
(b) to have regard to the effect on the environment of activities connected with the provision of railway services.”
This amendment places requirements on Great British Railways to use the access and use policy to promote high quality service and competition.
Amendment 77, in clause 59, page 33, line 37, at end insert—
“(7) Neither the Secretary of State, nor Great British Railways, may take any action to implement any part of the access and use policy until a copy of the policy has been laid before Parliament for a period of three months.”
This amendment would provide that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways, could take any step to implement any part of the access and use policy until it has been laid before Parliament for three months.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 87, in clause 66, page 37, line 32, after “ORR,” insert “open access operators,”.
This amendment would require GBR to consult open access operators on its access and use policy.
Clause 66 stand part.
Rebecca Smith
It is a privilege to work under your chairmanship, Mr Western. I start by conveying the apologies of my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham, who is not able to be present today. Instead, I am standing in on his behalf.
The clause sets out that Great British Railways must issue documents explaining the policies and procedures for access to and use of GBR infrastructure. Policy must cover procedures for applying for access, the criteria that GBR will apply to its decision making, and a procedure for resolving disputes. Subsection (3) permits GBR to set out the terms—that is, the rights and obligations —that a train operator can expect to receive where it has been granted access to GBR infrastructure. Subsection (6) allows a person aggrieved by a provision in the document to appeal to the Office of Rail and Road.
That is crucial information for all open access operators, and yet the Bill has no detail at all. It just makes reference to a future “document or documents”. In our view, that is a totally unacceptable approach, and it leaves the industry in the dark on mission-critical issues. Furthermore, no draft has been published, no direction of travel set out and no assurance given to the sector. We feel that to be a slightly arrogant approach from the Government and not a good sign of the approach that GBR itself will take to the independent sector.
Under the Bill as drafted, GBR can make the application process as one-sided as it likes, favouring its own services over those of other competing operators—in the interests not of passengers, but of GBR. The key issue is that the Government’s approach to the legislation is an assumption that the interests of GBR are synonymous with those of passengers, but we do not believe that that is always the case. Every organisation seeks to remove competition, which is uncomfortable—it exposes failures and weaknesses, and ultimately will show GBR up—but competition is crucial to improve service to customers, because organisations are forced to respond. That is why we believe that it needs to exist.
The Bill gives GBR the power to design out competition to itself, with no checks or balances save what we consider to be a pathetic appeals process, where the Government’s position is that the appellate body should not second-guess the decision of GBR, only errors of law. That is a core problem with the Bill and something that we feel is akin only to what a judicial review can do in other areas.
The clause gives GBR sweeping control over access rules, with very few safeguards. GBR sets both the access criteria and the timetable dispute procedure, so the body compiling the timetable also controls challenges to its own decisions. Subsection (3) makes the publication of access terms optional, allowing for opaque or preferential conditions. Subsection (4) lets GBR change the rules at any time, with no duty to consult. Overall, the clause lacks the transparency and checks promised in the consultation and risks embedding clear conflicts of interest to the disadvantage of non-GBR operators.
Lumo and Hull Trains, in their written evidence to the Select Committee on Transport, stated:
“Maintaining a fair, evidence-based, and independent process for access to the network is fundamental to ensuring continued growth and innovation.”
Under clause 59, however, the access and use policy will be developed and revised by GBR, setting the framework by which new services are assessed and defining the terms under which the ORR will judge appeals. Giving GBR exclusive control over that framework risks creating real or perceived conflicts of interest.
For more than two decades, the independence of access decisions has underpinned rail market growth. The continued involvement of the ORR in assessing applications objectively, balancing passenger, freight and performance needs, is essential to preserving that success. To ensure a transparent and fair access framework that the ORR can meaningfully enforce, it is important that private operators are involved in the development of the access and use policy and that appropriate statutory protections for open access are in place.
Without consultation or clear safeguards, the access and use policy risks becoming a document shaped solely by GBR’s priorities, which would potentially exclude private operators and leave them with no effective mechanism to challenge decisions that affect their ability to operate. A robust and independent access framework will also help to unlock further private sector investment in new services and rolling stock. By maintaining confidence in fair treatment and predictable regulation, the Government can encourage additional capital into the network, supporting the expansion of rail connectivity and the delivery of GBR’s passenger growth targets.
Freight operators currently benefit from statutory protections that recognise their environmental and national importance. Open access services deliver comparable benefits by driving modal shift, reducing emissions and supporting regional economies, and should therefore receive equivalent recommendation. They recommend that the Bill provide statutory protection for open access services, equivalent to that afforded to freight, and ensure that the ORR retains full authority to make access determinations independent of GBR. That would support the Government’s ambition for a network that is accountable, transparent and responsive to passenger demand.
I think that they are right. A core criticism of GBR is that it is a player and, now, the referee at the same time. Everyone must surely see that glaring conflict of interest. If His Majesty’s Government insist on changing the access and use policy to create a non-level playing field through the very tight capacity duty in clause 63, it should, at the very least, have an independent body responsible for applying the access and use policy. That is basic fairness in organisational structure.
We tabled amendment 76, which was not selected. We are not sure why, because it would ensure that the access and use policy would remain with the ORR by removing clause 59. That would mean sticking with the status quo and the existing access and use policy, avoiding the profound conflict of interest that clause 59 creates. If the Government decide to keep clause 59, which I assume they will, amendment 79 would enable a subsequent right of appeal to the ORR after going through the dispute resolution process. That would give open access operators a mechanism by which they could go to an independent regulator where necessary, giving them more assurance that they could survive in a new GBR world. That is a different point to the right of appeal under clause 59(6), which refers to the right to appeal the contents of a document. Amendment 79 requires a right of appeal to be included in the document itself.
Amendment 217 would place requirements on Great British Railways to use the access and use policy to promote high quality service or competition. At the very least, legislation needs to point GBR in the right direction so that other users can hold their decisions to account. The amendment gives such guidance. Without it, all that is left is clause 18, the general duties for GBR, and a bold reference to the public interest. It is inevitable that GBR will consider the public interest and the interests of GBR to be the same thing. The Government must think again on this, because the long-term damage to the wider rail sector will be profound.
Amendment 77 ensures that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways could take any step to implement any part of the access and use policy until it has been laid before Parliament for three months. That ensures that we are not blindly creating law when we have not even seen important documents relating to how that law will work in practice.
Clause 66 lists the bodies that GBR will be required to consult before issuing its access and use documents: the ORR and Scottish and Welsh Ministers. That is it; they are the only ones that have that opportunity by right. There is no requirement to consult freight or other operators that might be affected. We think that that is an extraordinary approach. Amendment 87 addresses the shocking lack of consultation envisaged when GBR creates its crucial access and use policy documents by adding open access operators to the mandatory list.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)
Good morning, Mr Western. It is once again a pleasure to serve under your chairship. I thank the hon. Member for South West Devon for these amendments, which all seek to make changes to GBR’s access and use policy.
First, I will provide a brief explanation of what the access and use policy sets out to do. It will set out a clear and consistent process for any operator seeking to run services on GBR’s network. It will therefore provide transparency and certainty for non-GBR operators—such as freight and open access—on the new policy and procedures they will need to engage with when seeking access to GBR’s infrastructure. It will be very similar in concept to the way the ORR publishes access processes and policies today. It will therefore follow a well-known path by which industry can engage with the access process, and like today, this engagement will be underpinned by legislation.
I can reassure hon. Members that the access and use policy is being developed in collaboration with industry. A discussion paper on the initial contents of the policy has already been published. It can be reviewed by hon. Members of this Committee and anyone else who wishes to contribute to its development.
I will turn to amendment 79, which seeks to add an appeals route to the working timetable after the dispute resolution process. I am delighted to start in a place of agreement with the hon. Member for South West Devon because the addition to clause 59 is, in fact, already in the Bill. The Bill provides, first, a mechanism for resolving disputes relating to the working timetable and, secondly, an appeals route to the ORR.
GBR will be required to set a dispute resolution procedure within its access and use policy for applications to be included in the timetable. That will allow parties to resolve disagreements collaboratively before escalation to the ORR, as detailed in clause 61(5). To be clear, the Bill already provides a subsequent route of appeal to the ORR for operators who have disputes over the working timetable. The amendment is therefore duplicative of that existing appeals route, and risks creating additional bureaucracy and confusion within the process. It would not improve the dispute resolution framework and, in our view, is redundant, but I am pleased that we have found at least one thing in these clauses on which the official Opposition and the Government can agree.
Amendment 217 would add requirements that GBR should use the access and use policy to promote high-quality service and competition. I cannot agree with this amendment. GBR’s duties under clause 18 cover the range of points that the hon. Member for South West Devon has suggested GBR must consider for its access and use policy. For example, I agree that GBR must promote a high-quality service, and this is already reflected in GBR’s duty to ‘‘promote high standards” of performance. We must remember that the clause 18 duties are the key decision-making criteria that GBR must apply at every stage—including when making its access and use policy—and so the requirement to drive towards a quality service is already embedded.
On competition, however, I must clarify that the Government support competition on the railways where it can add real value to passengers and farepayers. As the directing mind, GBR will be required to determine the best use of the network for all operators under a new and simpler legislative framework that ensures passengers and taxpayers are at the heart of decisions that are taken on the railways.
Where competition can support GBR in fulfilling its statutory duties—for example, to grow the economy and to provide improved choice and benefits to passengers —without undermining the vast investment made by taxpayers, we are supportive of the benefits of competition, and GBR must take those benefits into account. However, what the Government will not support is competition for competition’s sake. It is ideological and does not help us achieve the goal of making the railway work better.
The hon. Member for South West Devon seems to be equating promoting competition with fairness, but they are not one and the same. GBR must be fair to all third-party operators at all times. To ensure fairness for all parties, GBR will be bound by the Competition Act 1998, under which rules it cannot discriminate or abuse its dominant market position, and the ORR will continue to enforce this as the competition regulator. GBR does not need to actively promote competition to achieve that aim.
Amendment 77 would require GBR’s access and use policy to be laid before Parliament for three months before it can be implemented. GBR would be unable to implement any part of the access and use policy for a period of three months after it had been laid in Parliament. This would only result in delays for operators seeking to access the GBR network—a concept that is unlikely to be considered favourably by either open access or the freight industry.
The hon. Member for South West Devon should note that the access and use policy is a technical railway document. The purpose of this document is to provide a fair and transparent process for operators to apply for access. It sets out, for instance, the timings for applications, so that operators can prepare for the application window in advance. It also sets out what information applicants will need to supply and how applications will be assessed by GBR in accordance with its statutory duties. It is therefore right for GBR to develop it in consultation with industry and other railway bodies such as the ORR. This document should rightly be industry and expert-led. To reassure hon. Members about the content of the access and use policy, Network Rail has published a discussion document that sets out emerging thinking on a future access and use policy, with input from industry stakeholders. If Members of Parliament are keen to scrutinise the document, they are welcome to do so now, and I encourage them to engage with Network Rail’s external engagement process, or the usual processes in Parliament.
The industry has responded positively to the transparent and collaborative approach that has been taken in the development of the access and use policy. The freight sector has commented on how the discussion document acknowledges the key role of private investment. Network Rail’s engagement with industry will continue as the policy is developed, and there will be a further full consultation on the access and use policy with the ORR as a statutory consultee, which Members of Parliament are again welcome to contribute to.
Rebecca Smith
Something that the Minister said reflects back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham said on Tuesday. Not putting private operators, open access and freight on this mandatory list is making us nervous that it is not the Government’s intention to keep involving them in the future. I appreciate what the Minister is saying about them being consulted at the moment, but this amendment is important because it would keep them as a fixture of the future of GBR, rather than as an optional extra, where they can be useful, but if they are not considered to add any value to the railway, they will not be there any more.
As we have already alluded to, industry certainty and assuredness needs to be there for private investment to come forward, some of which I know the Government will welcome. It is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation: if we do not have them in the framework at the beginning, they are not being encouraged to stay involved and have that confidence. Does the Minister agree?
Keir Mather
The hon. Member is of course right to be wary about the involvement of open access in the railway, because although such provision forms a comparatively small proportion of railway journeys, we have discussed at length how certain access operator services provide great inter-city connections. There is of course a role for open access in the system being created by the Bill.
With GBR having regard to its duties when creating its access and use policy, it will have to factor in how users of the railway, both current and future, are able to make best use of services, whether they are provided by GBR or anybody else. Being bound by competition law, and the transparency and fairness inherent in it, will ensure that those that already provide services on the railway, and those that seek to provide services in the future, will have the opportunity to do so. I understand the hon. Member’s point about making sure that something is prescriptively listed in the Bill so that it is given due regard, but I would say that, whether through existing open access entitlements or the two rail freight targets that exist, there are sufficient assurances that there is scope for the inclusion of those services in the future of the railway, and that the access and use policy has to reflect that. I will turn to that in more detail soon.
All of the work on the access and use policy so far has happened without the need for a long and ever-expanding list of operators in the legislation, which would be the likely result of the amendment. If we name open access operators, we should presumably also list others, such as freight operators and devolved operators. Clause 66 currently requires that GBR must consult
“such other persons as it considers appropriate”,
and that formulation is deliberate; it ensures that consultation can be targeted, relevant and proportionate. Network Rail’s actions so far clearly demonstrate that open access operators are considered to be other appropriate persons in the reading of the clause, so both the reality and the future can be accounted for.
I reassure the hon. Member that there is no world in which GBR will create an access and use policy without consulting the relevant industry bodies that are affected. The amendment would add complexity, without delivering additional practical benefit. Although I thank the hon. Member for the amendments, for those reasons, I urge that she does not press them to a vote.
Clause 59 requires Great British Railways to publish an access and use policy. That key document will provide transparency and certainty for non-GBR operators, such as freight and open access, on the new policy and procedures they will need to engage with. For example, the policy will set out how operators should apply to access and use GBR tracks and infrastructure. It must set out the criteria Great British Railways intends to apply, in accordance with its statutory duties, when making access decisions, as well as its procedures for resolving competing demands and disputes. That will include, for instance, details on the economic and performance assessments GBR will undertake to determine best use. The policy must also include an explanation of how GBR will carry out maintenance and improvements to GBR infrastructure, and other necessary provisions, to ensure that the network works effectively. That exists in today’s system, within the industry network code, and we would expect GBR to draw on that when developing its policy on these key points.
The access and use policy is being developed in collaboration with industry. A discussion paper on initial content has already been published, and can be reviewed by the Committee or anyone else who wishes to input into its development. We hope that the extensive engagement being undertaken will ensure that a robust and effective document is produced that industry will be content with. However, as a backstop, any person aggrieved by a provision in this policy may appeal to the ORR.
Clause 66 will make it a legislative requirement that GBR must consult the ORR, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and such other persons as it considers appropriate before issuing, revising or replacing its access and use policy, which is dealt with in clause 59. That is in addition to GBR being a public body bound by public law principles. GBR must behave in a fair and transparent way, and therefore must consult interested parties, including rail freight and open access. The clause also ensures that GBR consults such persons as it considers appropriate before issuing, revising or replacing its infrastructure capacity plan, before issuing a working timetable and before making, revising or replacing a charging or performance scheme. Those issues are dealt with in clauses 60, 61 and 62.
Clause 66 is essential to provide reassurance to industry and our Scottish and Welsh counterparts that key parts of the new framework—GBR’s policies and processes—will not be designed in isolation, but will be underpinned by a transparent and consultative process. The clause provides the essential framework for collaborative and strategic planning by GBR across the rail network. I therefore commend clauses 59 and 66 to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
I think I have said everything I want to say, but we would like to press amendment 79 and then amendment 217 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move amendment 78, in clause 60, page 34, line 14, at end insert—
“(4A) When preparing, revising or replacing the document or documents Great British Railways must consult and have regard to the views of other railway passenger services and services for the carriage of goods by railway.”
This amendment would ensure that GBR had to consult and have regard to the views of open access and freight providers when preparing, revising or replacing the capacity plan.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Amendment 81, in clause 63, page 35, line 34, leave out from “to” to the end of line 37 and insert
“be satisfied that it retains sufficient capacity across GBR infrastructure to allow for—
(a) the operation of GBR passenger services, passenger services not operated by GBR and services for the carriage of goods by railway, and”.
This amendment aims to reduce the ability of GBR to prioritise its own operations where there are network capacity constraints and create a level playing field.
Amendment 80, in clause 63, page 35, line 34, leave out from “ensure” to the end of line 39 and insert
“be satisfied that it will meet its key performance indicators set out in section [Great British Railways: key performance indicators].”
This amendment would ensure that GBR made decisions about allocating capacity having regard to the need to meet its key performance indicators.
Amendment 253, in clause 63, page 35, line 37, at end insert—
“(aa) the achievement of the Rail freight target set out in Section 17, and”.
This amendment requires GBR to retain sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure to allow for the achievement of the rail freight target.
Amendment 211, in clause 63, page 35, line 39, at end insert—
“(3) Where Great British Railways decides not to grant access to persons to a specific part of the network to reserve capacity, Great British Railways must—
(a) publish a statement (a ‘capacity reservation statement’) setting out the evidence relating to the decision;
(b) consult—
(i) the Office for Rail and Road, and
(ii) any other persons who have sought access to that part of the network.
(4) A capacity reservation statement must explain how the decision taken by Great British Railways under subsection (3) reflects the best use of GBR infrastructure for the operation of trains as set out in the infrastructure capacity plan.
(5) The ORR must review a capacity reservation statement.
(6) The ORR may direct Great British Railways to reconsider its assessment if it considers that the exclusion of other operators is not necessary for Great British Railways to retain sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure.”
This amendment requires Great British Railways to publish a statement explaining any decision not to grant access to a specific part of the network on the basis of network capacity.
Amendment 229, in clause 63, page 35, line 39, at end insert—
“(3) In exercising its capacity duty, Great British Railways must take account of the Infrastructure Capacity Plan and give due regard to achieving the Rail Freight Target set out in section 17.
(4) Great British Railways must identify and publish a list of strategic freight corridors on the railway network.
(5) In exercising its capacity allocation functions, Great British Railways must ensure that the availability of network capacity on a strategic freight corridor is not materially reduced unless—
(a) the Office of Rail and Road has approved the reduction, and
(b) suitable alternative provision has been made to enable the carriage of goods by rail to continue to be facilitated.
(6) Before revising the list of strategic freight corridors, Great British Railways must consult—
(a) freight operating companies;
(b) owners and operators of rail-connected terminals;
(c) such other persons as it considers appropriate.”
This amendment ensures that capacity allocation decisions reflect both planning priorities and freight-increase ambitions. This amendment requires GBR to publish and maintain a list of strategic freight corridors and ensures that any material reduction in capacity must be approved by the ORR.
Clause 63 stand part.
New clause 56—Centralised train planning and auctioning—
“(1) Great British Railways must publish a report on the potential benefits to passenger railways services of the centralised train planning and auctioning scheme (‘the scheme’) set out under subsection (2).
(2) The scheme must require Great British Railways to—
(a) create a centrally designed passenger rail services timetable, and
(b) auction to alternative operators of passenger rail services train paths that—
(i) are long-distance intercity routes;
(ii) have a high revenue yield.
(3) The report under subsection (1) must consider the potential impact of the scheme on customer service and choice.
(4) The report must be laid before each House of Parliament within six months of this Act being passed.”
This new clause requires GBR to explore and consider the potential benefits of centralised train planning and auctioning.
Rebecca Smith
The Government Whip referred to this as the “meaty” group, so we may be here for a while. That is fine; we have plenty of time.
Clause 60 requires GBR to set out how, in its view, best use can be made of its infrastructure over a specified period. Subsection (3) allows GBR to replace or amend the document or documents that set that out at any time, and subsection (5) requires any plan or revisions to be published. Subsection (4) requires GBR to have
“regard to the need to accommodate”
its own passenger services, other passenger services—including open access services—freight services, and the maintenance and improvement of its infrastructure when preparing the document or documents.
Subsection (6) gives a right to appeal to the ORR, but only on limited judicial review grounds, in line with clause 68; there is no right of appeal on the decision of GBR. The Bill contains a duty to consult the ORR and Scottish and Welsh Ministers, but no express duty to consult other rail operators, despite their activities being two of the four considerations for GBR under subsection (4). The Opposition believe that that is an extraordinary omission; only the ability for GBR to consult
“such other persons as it considers appropriate”
is included, in clause 66(1).
Clause 60 gives GBR broad freedom to set and change the capacity plan at will, with no explicit duty to consult operators or freight interests when doing so. Subsection (3) allows revisions “at any time”, and the “have regard” duty in subsection (4) is weak and does not stop GBR prioritising its own services. In fact, the capacity duty in clause 63 actively requires GBR to prioritise its own services, irrespective of passengers’ interest. Clause 60 lacks the transparency and safeguards signalled in the consultation. Our amendment 78 would ensure that GBR must consult and have regard to the views of other railway passenger services and freight when preparing, revising or replacing the capacity plan. That is the very least GBR should be required to do.
Clause 63 provides for GBR to retain sufficient network capacity for the passenger services it is required to operate, and for engineering access. When granting access under the clause—that is, when issuing any capacity commitment or access contract—and when preparing, issuing and revising the timetable under clause 62, GBR must ensure that it retains sufficient capacity on its infrastructure to operate its own passenger services and to carry out works to maintain and improve its structures. It is required to retain sufficient capacity for services it already operates and for those it expects to operate in the future—for example, as set out in a business plan or public service obligations in transport specification not yet awarded. GBR will continue to follow general and wider legislative duties when taking access decisions, and the explanatory notes to the Bill assure us that
“it must take decisions fairly on the genuine best use of the network.”
The infrastructure capacity plan at clause 60 will indicate the capacity available to different market sectors—that is, how much capacity is best used for freight, for open access and for GBR passenger services. Clause 63 ensures that where GBR has decided what constitutes best use, and where the Secretary of State or Scottish or Welsh Ministers have funded it to operate passenger services, consistent with their allocated section of the infrastructure capacity plan issued under clause 60, GBR must ensure that sufficient network capacity is available for those services to operate, while ensuring sufficient capacity for engineering works. The explanatory notes assert:
“The duty does not enable GBR to secure more capacity for its own services than it thinks would equate to best use.”
However, clause 63 is not designed to achieve a level playing field; it does not even try to. The clause is not interested in maximising passenger choice or services, or in allowing competition to maximise use of capacity for the benefit of passengers. The express obligation in the clause is that GBR prioritise its own planned growth, because it must ensure capacity for all current and expected GBR services. That obligation sits ahead of any consideration of open access bids, or whether the service provided by open access would be better for passengers and therefore in the public interest.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
This question is possibly better directed at the Minister, but does my hon. Friend think that the clause might be so restrictive because, in truth, the Government do not really want open access, despite what they say?
Rebecca Smith
I agree with my hon. Friend. I alluded to that issue earlier in my comments, and my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham raised it on Tuesday. That is why we are concerned on behalf of not only open access, but first of all passengers, who are not going to get the best possible service because of the inbuilt assertion that open access can ultimately be discarded if the Government do not see it as palatable.
The written evidence from Lumo and Hull Trains also says:
“As the Government and GBR seek to deliver a thriving, growing railway, it is vital that the Railways Bill recognises and protects the contribution that Open Access makes to these shared goals. This will ensure that it will continue to deliver these benefits to the millions of passengers who rely on them, now and into the future…As the Government looks to modernise and centralise rail through GBR, it will be important that competition remains an embedded principle within this framework. Open Access provides a proven model of innovation and efficiency, which can help GBR achieve its statutory objectives. Recognising the role of competition as a driver of value and growth will ensure that passengers, the network, and the public purse all continue to benefit.”
FirstGroup’s written submission to the Transport Committee tells a similar story, saying that open access operators
“receive no government funding, take on full risk, and generate their own revenue— giving them very strong incentives to deliver a service which is endorsed by passengers…The way in which GBR structures its timetable will be critical. It should be obliged to carry out its functions fairly and without discrimination, so that if an open access train service can provide passenger benefit monopoly interests do not prevent that train from running.”
FirstGroup also says:
“Clause 63 must ensure that un-funded services which GBR ‘expects’ are not given train paths in advance of funded open access services, which will provide passenger benefit sooner.”
The Rail Freight Group is also concerned by the clause, telling the Transport Committee:
“We understand that the basis of the new approach will be via Infrastructure Capacity Plans (Clause 61) and, for GBR’s own trains, via the Capacity Duty (Clause 63). It is very difficult from these clauses to have a clear understanding of how the new process will operate, and how rail freight and rail freight growth will be facilitated, including in contractual rights for operators…For example, we understand from our discussions that there could be numerous infrastructure capacity plans across the network which a new freight service will have to navigate. We also understand that when an infrastructure capacity plan is reviewed, existing freight services could be stopped from operating if other services are considered to be higher value, as contractual commitments are expected to expire in line with the capacity plans.”
Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL told the Transport Committee:
“I think we would look for clarification, regarding clause 63, that GBR cannot reserve capacity for hypothetical future GBR long-distance services at the expense of privately funded open-access proposals or existing services that provide immediate benefits—and extra infrastructure income, of course, because open-access operators are paying track access fees too. For that, I think you need to prioritise funded open access over speculative GBR services ‘someday in the future.’”
It is very clear what the sector thinks: clause 63 needs substantial clarification. That is why, along with the Lib Dems, we have tabled a number of amendments, which I will briefly speak to. Amendment 81 would make it clear that capacity allocation should be based on a level playing field, without priority given to any particular operator. That would allow the best outcome for the passenger, and allows the public interest bit in clause 18 to take the lead. Proceeding on any other basis will leave us with a monopoly that is allowed to abuse its position.
Amendment 80 puts forward an alternative approach, based on key performance indicators, but it is clear the Government are not interested, so in the interests of time I will not pursue that further today—that will be one fewer Division, the Government will be pleased to hear.
Amendment 253, in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, requires GBR “to retain sufficient capacity” to ensure that the rail freight target is met. To progress, there would need to be a mechanism to reach a decision if that conflicted with any planned GBR service.
Amendment 211 would require GBR
“to publish a statement explaining any decision not to grant access to a specific part of the network on the basis of network capacity.”
For an appeals process to have any meaning at all, that would need to be a pre-requisite.
Amendment 229 would ensure that
“capacity allocation decisions reflect both planning priorities and freight-increase ambitions”
and would require
“GBR to publish and maintain a list of strategic freight corridors and ensures that any material reduction in capacity must be approved by the ORR.”
The amendment would give a better balance to capacity considerations than the current wholly one-sided drafting. That is incredibly important because, ultimately, the Government are seeking to reduce climate change and achieve net zero. Freight plays a huge part in that, and if we do not have strategic freight corridors to ensure that we can make use of the freight system, we will fall short of what could be achieved.
Finally, new clause 56, in the name of the Libs Dems,
“requires GBR to explore and consider the potential benefits of centralised train planning and auctioning.”
That is an interesting concept and could have significant benefits for passengers and taxpayers by driving competitive pricing for certain routes, while avoiding the abstraction arguments in relation to competing open access applications.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again on the Committee, Mr Western. I will no doubt be told off for getting her title wrong, but I agree with the Conservative spokesperson, the hon. Member for—
Olly Glover
I knew the hon. Lady’s seat; it is just that I got told off the other day by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, for calling him the spokesperson instead.
Carrying on, I agree with the hon. Lady’s comments on the Opposition’s amendments. I think most of them are sound and reflect the intention to strike a better balance in the Bill between GBR wanting to protect its interests and objectives, and recognising that there are valid and competing objectives elsewhere in the industry, particularly on the freight side, as well as on the open access passenger side.
Let me speak briefly to our new clause 56. The hon. Lady accurately summarised our intention. The new clause does not require GBR to adopt the idea of auctioning train paths, but it does require it to examine the potential of the idea, which is used to good effect on the Italian and Spanish high-speed rail networks. This idea, basically, retains the guiding mind approach to timetable development and construction but would recognise that for routes with a high-revenue yield and limited competition, such as London to Manchester, it may well be best, in the interests of both revenue and getting more people on to trains, to auction off one of the paths—London to Manchester has three an hour—to another operator. That would help GBR to provide some competitive tension to improve its own delivery.
I appreciate that the Government would probably say that Avanti West Coast is terrible and when it becomes GBR everything will be a land of milk, sweetness and honey; however, the real structural problem is that at the moment there is no realistic competition between London and Manchester. That is why—certainly from the figures that I have seen most recently—passenger numbers have recovered far less than they have on the east coast main line, where there is competition and a real spirit of customer choice. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on that.
Keir Mather
It is my pleasure to speak to this long-awaited group of amendment to what are arguably some of the most critical aspects of the legislation. Clause 60 will require GBR to set out its proposal for the best use of its infrastructure, while clause 63 will require GBR to retain sufficient capacity to run its own passenger services and carry out engineering work.
First, I will explain how the Government have reached that conclusion. We are here because the current system for allocating capacity is clearly not working; it is designed so that each part of the railway acts and takes decisions in isolation. There was a four-year delay to the implementation of the new east coast main line timetable that was finally achieved in December 2025. Meanwhile, there is no single body with a clear vision for the best use of the network, and therefore no clear statement of the capacity that can be made available for different users of the railway. As a result, open access operators have expended considerable effort and resources in developing proposals for access to the network, many of which have ultimately been rejected by the ORR.
Both freight and open access operators would benefit from a single body empowered to provide that clarity about future opportunities for them to grow their presence on the railway. The only possible answer to fixing that is GBR, which can take decisions strategically, making the very best use of the limited capacity that we have. Only GBR can review the network holistically with a view to creating more space, which will benefit open access operators where they can show that their new services constitute best use of the network. That will benefit every hon. Member’s constituents, because there will be more opportunity for connectivity and more co-ordination to avoid disruption and delays.
In our new system, the process of allocating capacity starts with clause 60. The infrastructure capacity plan will set out GBR’s view of the best use of the network, showing how capacity can best be allocated between GBR’s own services, freight services and open access services. In creating that plan, GBR must have regard to the need to accommodate all types of services. The clause is one of the most crucial in the Bill, because it is where GBR—having consulted carefully with existing and prospective operators and other interested parties, and taken account of its statutory duties—will set out its view of the best use of the network. Once established, the plan will provide much-needed certainty for operators contemplating investment in new services.
I will be crystal clear for the benefit of the Committee: the capacity duty mentioned in clause 63 does not apply to the creation of the infrastructure capacity plan. Under clause 60, GBR will make its best-use assessment on the basis of the duties in clause 18 and other general duties in the Bill only. At this stage, it will not have any basis to refer to the duty as described in clause 63. It will take the decision fairly and transparently, in line with its duties, with the need to allocate paths for freight, open access and itself in mind.
There is absolutely no intention for other operators to be unfairly pushed out or disadvantaged by GBR. We want the best service for passengers, freight users and the public on every part of the route, to enable the best possible connectivity, quality of service and overall economic benefit. That is the goal, regardless of who provides those services. Were GBR to mistakenly apply the capacity duty at the capacity plan stage as part of its determination of best use, that would be grounds for appeal to the ORR.
Joe Robertson
I note the Minister’s assertion that there is no intention to squeeze out other operators, but given the way in which the Bill and the clause are drafted, that surely is an inevitability regardless of whether he intends for that to happen. It is the outcome that matters. If it will not enable open access and competition, that is in itself a problem, notwithstanding he might not intend that to be the case.
Keir Mather
I take fully on board the hon. Member’s point that we need to ensure services are not squeezed out. The process I am outlining is specifically to ensure that that does not happen. Where GBR has regard to its duties under clause 60 when deciding best use, it has to have regard to the freight target and the need to grow freight, but also the need to accommodate a range of services on the railway. That best use policy is locked in. It is under clause 63 that the capacity duty comes into effect, and GBR can make practical operational decisions about how to effectively actualise those proportions being allocated on the railway.
GBR will have to have regard to open access and freight under its duties in clause 60 when making the macro decision about what constitutes best use, which at the end of the day is not a binary yes or no question. The capacity duty in clause 63 merely ensures that it can provide the services it has been allocated. I will come to that in a bit more detail and set it out further. The hon. Member is welcome to intervene again if he feels my subsequent detail is insufficient.
On the capacity duty more broadly, the Government have been nothing but consistent. Put simply, the services that offer the genuine best value proposition for passengers, freight customers and the taxpayer, consistent with GBR’s duties, should be allocated capacity. Clause 63, meanwhile, creates a legal duty for Great British Railways to ensure there is enough space in the timetable to run the services funded by the Government and taxpayers. To reiterate, clause 63 is a requirement for space in the timetable. It is not a requirement for space in the capacity plan. It does not apply to the capacity plan and it therefore does not and cannot undermine the best use decisions taken at the capacity planning stage. That is because the Government are paying for certain GBR services and must not waste public funds. The clause 63 duty is about managing taxpayers’ money after best use has been determined. It is not about keeping anyone out.
Amendment 78 would require GBR to consult open access and freight operators in preparing the infrastructure capacity plan. Amendment 80 would require GBR to have regard to its key performance indicators when preparing the plan, and amendment 81 would amend clause 63 to require GBR to retain capacity for open access and freight operators. Amendments 253 and 229 would both give freight operators more weight in the capacity process.
Adding a further consultation requirement to clause 60 is unnecessary as there is already a separate requirement in clause 66 for GBR to consult affected operators when developing or amending the capacity plan. Were GBR to publish or amend a capacity plan at any point without consultation, that would constitute a breach of its duties under the Bill and present strong grounds for appeal to the ORR. Amendment 78 is therefore duplicative of the provisions already in the Bill.
As for amendments 80, 81, 253 and 229, the intended effect of clause 63 is to create a statutory duty for GBR to ensure that there is enough space in the timetable to run its own passenger services, which are funded directly by taxpayers. That is because taxpayers spend many billions of pounds subsidising the railway. Any responsible Government would be obligated to protect that investment and ensure that taxpayers get full value from it. The clause is therefore needed to ensure that where GBR considers its services constitute the best use of the network, and where it then allocates capacity to itself, it will actually run the trains that it is proposing to run and which it will be funded for. I do not believe anyone on this Committee would be delighted to find that, following GBR being paid several billion pounds to run services, it was unable to do so. Clause 63 is therefore an essential legal safeguard to prevent that from happening.
The interests of freight and open access operators are protected by GBR’s general duties under clause 18, and freight operators are further protected by the duty on GBR to have regard to the rail freight target set by the Secretary of State under clause 17. Those duties will apply when GBR establishes best use at the capacity planning stage for all operators, including freight. The existence of not just one but two statutory duties is a clear signal of this Government’s view that freight must be front and centre of GBR’s decision making. This will give freight much greater prominence in capacity planning and allocation decisions than the current system, in which capacity is too often allocated on a first come, first served basis without reference to any coherent view of the best overall use of available capacity. The clause 63 duty exists only to protect the Secretary of State’s investment in the railway; it is not intended to influence GBR’s capacity planning or to keep anyone out of the network. The amendments are therefore not compatible with the intended purpose of the clause.
Amendment 80 draws a link to the concept of key performance indicators. As I have set out in previous debates, the Government do not accept the need to make statutory provision about KPIs and so cannot support the proposed reference. As I have consistently said throughout these debates, KPIs should be in GBR’s business plan and not in legislation.
Amendment 211 would require GBR to publish a statement on any decision not to provide access on the basis of capacity. As a public body, GBR is bound by public law principles to behave in a transparent and non-discriminatory way. That means that GBR must set out its decisions transparently, including when granting access, with robust evidence that shows how it has acted in accordance with its duties, access and use policy and any guidance issued by the Secretary of State. If GBR failed to do that, it would be grounds for appeal to the ORR. The amendment is unnecessary because GBR is already required to transparently account for its access decisions, whatever the reason for them.
Finally, new clause 56 would require GBR to report on the merits of a centralised train planning and auctioning scheme, with high-yielding services being operated by private sector operators rather than GBR. This Government were elected with a clear mandate to return franchised passenger services to public ownership. Public ownership, with responsibility for passenger services and infrastructure brought together in a single organisation, is the only way to make the railway run better. It enables everybody to focus on a single set of objectives centred around the needs of railway users and the interests of the taxpayers who fund it, rather than shareholders and private profit. Public ownership of passenger services will save the taxpayer up to £150 million a year in fees to private operators alone. Therefore, GBR, rather than private operators, must be responsible for operating the services that taxpayers will fund it to deliver. Making GBR responsible for essential services also avoids the costs of maintaining a public sector operator of last resort function ready to step in if a private operator suffers financial failure or chooses to withdraw from operating the services.
While I fully support the provision of services by open access operators on the network where they add value and where there is capacity on the network, the model set out by the new clause is not compatible with the mandate that this Government were elected on: to bring franchised passenger services back into public ownership. It is not compatible with the regime set out in the Bill, which already provides clarity about the role of private sector operators and the opportunities for them to run services.
Given what I have set out, I hope that the hon. Member for South West Devon feels able to withdraw the amendments. I commend clauses 60 and 63 to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
I have listened to the Minister’s comments. As I said earlier, we will not press amendment 80 to a vote, but I wish to press the others to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
The rest of the amendments that we have just debated will be decided at the appropriate point.
Clause 61
The working timetable
Keir Mather
I beg to move amendment 174, in clause 61, page 34, line 38, at end insert—
“(4A) Agreement under subsection (4) may be general or specific, and the ways in which it may be given include it being given—
(a) in accordance with the terms set out as mentioned in section 59(3);
(b) by means of, or in accordance with, provision contained in an agreement or other document to which Great British Railways and the operator are parties.”
This amendment ensures that changes to the working timetable can be agreed in advance and in general terms, and sets out various of the ways in which agreement can be given.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 62 stand part.
New clause 52—Train frequency duty—
(1) The Secretary of State must undertake a public consultation on the frequency of Great British Rail services.
(2) The consultation under subsection (1) must consider the appropriate frequency of train services to ensure services meet local need.
(3) The Secretary of State must publish a report on the outcome of the consultation under subsection (1) within one year beginning on the day on which this Act is passed.
(4) The report under subsection (3) must—
(a) propose a frequency of rail services that will meet local need;
(b) include proposals for continuous engagement with local communities about the frequency of rail services for those communities.
(5) Before the end of the period of six months beginning on the day on which a report under subsection (3) is published, the Secretary of State must by regulations provide for a duty on Great British Railways to provide the frequency of train services as set out in that report (‘the duty’).
(6) Within one year following the making of regulations under subsection (5), and once per year thereafter, the Secretary of State must publish a report on—
(a) the extent to which Great British Rail has met the duty under such regulations;
(b) where the duty is not being met, any proposed changes to Great British Rail services to better allow the duty to be met.
(7) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake a public consultation and the regular reporting and monitoring of train frequency to ensure timetabling reflects the needs of local communities.
Keir Mather
Amendment 174 will provide greater clarity for all parties that the agreement GBR is obliged to have under clause 61(4) can be made in advance in a contract or other document between GBR and the operator in line with the terms set out in GBR’s access and use policy under clause 59(3). The amendment broadly replicates the current industry practice of making changes to the working timetable through contractual arrangements, so it is familiar to industry and was always the intended approach. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendment, tabled by the Government in my name.
I thank the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) for tabling new clause 52, which would require the Secretary of State to publicly consult on and publish a report that recommends an appropriate train frequency that would meet local need and which GBR would then be obliged to deliver. Although this Government support the principle of designing a train service that meets passengers’ needs and local needs, the new clause would embed that responsibility in Government, and not with GBR. That would serve only to continue Government’s micro-management of the railways, under-mining GBR’s intended role as an empowered, directing mind that is enabled to take decisions on the best use of the network.
To take access decisions and plan its passenger services —which GBR will do in accordance with its duties, which are clearly defined in the Bill—GBR, and not the Department, must be able to design its own passenger train services. GBR will also be legally required to consult devolved Governments and mayoral strategic authorities before making certain decisions, such as service frequency decisions that will significant affect their local areas. The Government and GBR will also have to consult the new passenger watchdog when developing their policies, strategies and priorities for the railway, including when GBR is developing its business plan and passenger offer. The Secretary of State will set the long-term strategic objectives of the railway through the long-term rail strategy, which GBR will need to consider when taking decisions about service frequencies. The Secretary of State will also have to approve GBR’s integrated business plan, which will cover both track and train activity.
That framework represents the right balance between an empowered directing mind that can independently weigh up its duties in a considered and rational way when delivering its statutory functions, including developing the timetable, with appropriate consultation requirements and proportionate Government oversight. We do not want to continue the current system, under which stifling Government interference hampers the efficient running of the railways. I therefore urge members of the Committee not to move new clause 52.
Clause 61 requires GBR to issue a timetable that defines
“all planned train movements which will take place on GBR infrastructure during the period for which it is in force”.
Enabling GBR to establish a working timetable is fundamental to running trains safely and reliably at their published times. The current system cannot deliver significant timetable changes, even where there is a strong public interest case for doing so with significant taxpayer investment. That is because the process for revising the timetable is dependent on different organisations taking, at different points, different decisions that affect the timetable’s production. That creates complexity and challenges that can result in significant delays to the implementation of a new timetable being implemented and passengers and taxpayers losing out.
Despite the significant efforts made by Network Rail and the ORR, the new east coast main line timetable was delayed for over four years, which resulted in delayed benefits to passengers. Ultimately, until the current Rail Minister was appointed no one was willing to make a final timetabling decision. That cannot happen again: GBR must be empowered to take decisions or passengers and taxpayers will not see improvements.
Under clause 61, as the directing mind GBR will be responsible for taking decisions on timetabling in a process overseen by the ORR. A person whose application to be included in the timetable is rejected or who disagrees with the terms and conditions of their inclusion may appeal to the ORR. The clause ensures that GBR will deliver an achievable, reliable timetable that the network is able to deliver. Better co-ordination of the timetable and engineering works will reduce delays, improve reliability and reduce cost. GBR’s holistic review of the whole network can also improve connectivity for passengers. Without the clause, the current unacceptable system of timetable delays, disagreements and ministerial intervention will continue, which serves no one.
Clause 62 sets out the steps that GBR must follow before issuing a working timetable, as previously described in clause 61. It is a critical provision as a timetable is the backbone of a safe and efficient railway operation. Without a clear and structured timetable, trains cannot run reliably at their published times. GBR must invite applications for inclusion in the timetable from operators other than GBR’s own passenger services. The invitation must specify the period within which applications must be made and the information that must accompany an application. GBR must prepare and send a draft of the working timetable to those applicants. A person who has had an application rejected by GBR may appeal that decision to the ORR. The clause ensures that the process for developing the timetable is fair and transparent. I commend clauses 61 and 62 to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 61(1) sets out that GBR must issue one or more timetables covering all train movements on GBR infrastructure for the period that GBR intends the timetable to cover, to be known as a working timetable. Subsection (3) allows GBR to alter a working timetable, for example to add new train movements, change a planned train movement, allow for maintenance works, deal with disruption, or change the duration of the timetable. Subsection (4) allows GBR to alter a planned train movement of an operator other than GBR only with that operator’s permission. Subsection (5) provides a right of appeal to the ORR for an operator who applied for a train movement to be included in the working timetable by GBR but was refused, or where the inclusion was made subject to conditions. The duty to consult and appeals provisions in clauses 66 to 68 also apply to the working timetable, but not to alterations of the working timetable.
Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)
It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Mr Western. I wanted to speak briefly in support of new clause 52, which, as the hon. Member for South West Devon indicated, was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell. It would introduce a duty on train frequency, which is something my constituents—and I am sure those of other Members—write about continuously. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to consult the public on how often GBR services should run, taking account of local need. It would then require the publication of a report, ongoing engagement with communities, and a binding duty on GBR to deliver the agreed frequency, with regular monitoring.
The new clause is designed to ensure that rural and less well-served areas are properly heard, and that timetables reflect how people actually use the railway and not just what is easiest to operate. If I were the shadow Minister, I would probably describe this as a probing new clause designed to draw out some secret piece of information. I heard what Minister said about it. All the other Liberal Democrat amendments have been designed to restrain the power of the Secretary of State and ensure that GBR is not micromanaged, and I think the new clause probably flies in the face of that. We will leave it there.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Members for South West Devon and for West Dorset for their contributions. I remain of the view that a unified system under GBR will plan and deliver an achievable, reliable timetable and ensure that the network is actually able to deliver it, so that the services promised to passengers are delivered. Better co-ordination of the timetable and engineering works will reduce delays, improve reliability and reduce costs, and through its role in issuing the timetable, GBR will be able to ensure that all services represent the best use of the network, with a strong appeals role for the ORR to ensure that fairness is embedded in the system. I therefore retain the view that the hon. Members should not move their amendments.
Amendment 174 agreed to.
Clause 61, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 63
Capacity duty
Amendment proposed: 81, in clause 63, page 35, line 34, leave out from “to” to the end of line 37 and insert—
“be satisfied that it retains sufficient capacity across GBR infrastructure to allow for—
(a) the operation of GBR passenger services, passenger services not operated by GBR and services for the carriage of goods by railway, and”.—(Rebecca Smith.)
This amendment aims to reduce the ability of GBR to prioritise its own operations where there are network capacity constraints and create a level playing field.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Olly Glover
Apologies, Mr Western; the confusion has arisen because the selection and grouping paper lists it as an Opposition amendment. I do not wish to move it.
Rebecca Smith
Amendment is 211 is mine, and we would like to press it to a vote. [Interruption.] Oh, no, that is also a Liberal Democrat amendment—that says “Opp” as well.
Olly Glover
Yes, Mr Western. Thank you.
Amendment proposed: 211, in clause 63, page 35, line 39, at end insert—
“(3) Where Great British Railways decides not to grant access to persons to a specific part of the network to reserve capacity, Great British Railways must—
(a) publish a statement (a ‘capacity reservation statement’) setting out the evidence relating to the decision;
(b) consult—
(i) the Office for Rail and Road, and
(ii) any other persons who have sought access to that part of the network.
(4) A capacity reservation statement must explain how the decision taken by Great British Railways under subsection (3) reflects the best use of GBR infrastructure for the operation of trains as set out in the infrastructure capacity plan.
(5) The ORR must review a capacity reservation statement.
(6) The ORR may direct Great British Railways to reconsider its assessment if it considers that the exclusion of other operators is not necessary for Great British Railways to retain sufficient capacity over GBR infrastructure.”—(Olly Glover.)
This amendment requires Great British Railways to publish a statement explaining any decision not to grant access to a specific part of the network on the basis of network capacity.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)
On a point of order, Mr Western. We have just dealt with a couple of amendments that the selection list described as tabled by the Opposition but were actually been tabled by the Liberal Democrats, which I suspect is where some of the confusion came from. Will it be possible during the lunch break for the Clerks to check the list and update it if necessary, or confirm that there is no further mislabelling, just for clarity?
The Chair
Absolutely. We will make sure there is absolute clarity for this afternoon’s session.
Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64
Charging scheme
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move amendment 242, in clause 64, page 36, line 6, leave out subsection (1)(b).
This amendment would remove the requirement for GBR to charge in relation to trains which are planned to use GBR infrastructure but do not operate, or do not operate in full.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 230, in clause 64, page 36, line 7, at end insert
“, except where the services cannot operate due to a failure of the GBR infrastructure or the need for GBR to take capacity for work on the network.”
This amendment would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions.
Amendment 83, in clause 64, page 36, line 11, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment would prevent GBR charging any sum it likes, rather than what is reasonable.
Amendment 82, in clause 64, page 36, line 28, leave out “at any time” and insert
“by giving no less than 12 months’ notice”.
This amendment imposes a duty on GBR to give other operators a minimum 12-month advance notice of changes to the charging scheme.
Amendment 84, in clause 64, page 36, line 34, at end insert—
“(9) Neither the Secretary of State, nor Great British Railways, may take any action to implement any part of the charging scheme until a copy of the scheme has been laid before Parliament for a period of three months.”
This amendment would provide that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways, could take any step to implement any part of the charging scheme until it has been laid before Parliament for three months.
Clause stand part.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 64(1) requires GBR to develop a charging scheme setting out the charges to be paid for access to and use of GBR’s infrastructure, and the extent to which charges may by payable in relation to trains that do not operate, or do not operate in full, despite their use being planned in.
The base assumption is that charges will be set at the costs directly incurred—for example, the wear and tear caused by the service—but subsection (3) provides for a higher charge to be demanded in particular circumstances,
“provided that it does not exceed the amount that Great British Railways considers is the amount that an efficient operator would be able to pay in those circumstances.”
Subsection (4) confirms that GBR can also set a lower charge where it considers that appropriate, for various purposes, including but not limited to encouraging the use of spare capacity and promoting new services. The Subsidy Control Act 2022 would apply to any decision to lower charges under that provision.
GBR will not charge itself for use of infrastructure, despite being an operator as well as the infrastructure manager, but must include in its charging scheme sufficient information on the charges for its passenger services’ access to and use of its infrastructure to explain how charges in the scheme have been calculated. GBR will be able to make changes to its charging framework at any time.
The Opposition believe that the clause is simply terrible. It confirms the worst fears of other rail users, and gives no certainty for business planning. Subsection (3) allows for a higher amount than the actual cost to GBR to be charged in particular circumstances, but those are not defined or explained. If GBR thinks that the operator has the money to pay it, then it is expected to pay—no rationale for the increase is given. The clause allows GBR to set charges above direct cost based on what it considers an efficient operator could afford, which remains a subjective judgment made by a body that is itself a major operator.
Even with the ORR able to substitute its own decision on appeal, the initial charging decision sits entirely with GBR. That creates scope for charges that disadvantage open access operators, unless and until challenged, which is not the level of neutrality expected for an industry-wide charging regime.
Subsection (4)(a) is an oxymoron. Charges could not be assessed unless there were sufficient capacity to run a service, which by definition would mean that there is assessed to be spare capacity. Subsection (5) does not provide open access operators sufficient information to properly assess the fairness of the proposed charges. Subsection (6) allows for a change at any time, and without notice.
It is clearly impossible to run a service without confidence of track-access charges. A devolved, concession, freight, open access or heritage and tour operator could, at the stroke of GBR’s pen, suddenly find its cost base increase significantly. That is not conducive to long-term business planning, and must harm private sector investment in rail services.
Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)
I am thinking about the hon. Member’s arguments about clause 64(3). Does she not think that there may be circumstances where higher charges actually help to get private investment into the railways? For example, GBR could agree to fund infrastructure improvements in exchange for an operator paying higher access charges over an agreed period and, through that mechanism, recoup at least some of the costs of that welcome upgrade to the network.
Rebecca Smith
I can appreciate where the hon. Member is coming from. It sounds like a good idea; however, it could still be in the legislation directly, and the illustration he gave still leaves a huge number of questions about what happens if there is more than one user of that bit of infrastructure. Why should the private operator be the one that has to pay for the infrastructure? If anything, there is an issue, which I may come to, about the impact on fares, because ultimately, by the sound of it, GBR is going to have far fewer costs than other operators. In principle, I can see why the hon. Member made that point, but I think it is not clear enough at this stage.
Clause 64(8) allows a right of appeal, but only under judicial review-type provisions, which is no right at all. Any of us who has worked with anyone who ever wanted to get a judicial review knows that it is incredibly difficult. It is also incredibly expensive, so it is certainly not a level playing field.
The industry has rightly been outspoken on clause 64. In evidence to the Transport Committee, the Rail Freight Group stated:
“The Bill sets out the future framework for access charges for freight. In headline terms the charges will be calculated in a similar way to today (costs directly incurred by running the train) which we welcome. However, the Bill provides for extra costs to be levied on freight services
a. Through a mandatory reservation charge for capacity which is booked and then not used (for example, if a customer cancels a train due to poor weather) (Clause 64)
b. Through a general clause 64(3) which allows GBR discretion to charge more if ‘an efficient operator can pay it’. This is a very broad test and far wider than the test in current law ‘if the market can bear it’. This raises the prospect of far higher, and potentially uncapped charges being levied.
Increasing the costs of rail freight will simply make using rail too expensive for customers when compared to road freight, and will reverse modal shift and undermine growth. It is essential that the powers to charge more than the standard charge are strictly limited for GBR.”
The key point there is about reversing modal shift. On the one hand, the Government want to promote modal shift. Indeed, there is a scheme coming in— I mentioned it on Tuesday, but now I cannot remember its name—that will look at different types of transport, and one of the plans is to ensure modal shift. Anything that undermines that is potentially contradictory and a backwards step.
The Transport Committee also heard evidence from Nick Brooks of ALLRAIL, who said:
“I was just going to say something about privately owned investors and privately owned operators, specifically privately owned investors that want to invest in our sector rather than in other sectors—aviation, the road sector, or even completely different sectors. There is a certain risk. There is a commercial risk, of course, and ultimately they are looking for lower fixed costs and higher variable costs. The worry with GBR is this: who determines what the market can bear? Is GBR an independent entity, or not? I think the Bill says it should be GBR itself that determines that, if I am not mistaken.
It is a little bit like another conflict, or potential problem, with track access fees. Who decides the size of the track access fees? If you are a privately owned operator, is it your competitor—GBR—that decides your track access fees? That is a potential cause of worry.”
Lumo and Hull Trains also had similar concerns, which they raised in their written evidence to the Transport Committee:
“A transparent and proportionate charging regime will be critical to ensuring the financial sustainability and competitiveness of the railway. If GBR were able to set and revise access charges without independent oversight (as suggested by clause 64), it could create uncertainty and deter private investment. Independent regulation of charging is therefore vital to maintain investor confidence and ensure fairness between different operators. Open Access operators already make a substantial contribution to the upkeep of the network while receiving no public subsidy. The charges paid by Open Access are calculated independently by ORR to encourage investment, sweat the railway asset and deliver connectivity and the associated economic benefits. It also acts as an additional income stream to Network Rail. These arrangements demonstrate the sector’s willingness to invest and its commitment to supporting the network’s long-term health.
Ensuring that access charges remain proportionate and independently regulated will help reinforce the Government’s objective of crowding in private capital to support network growth. Confidence in a fair charging regime is essential for the continued profitability of private operators. Reinforcing a transparent and proportionate charging system will also help deliver the Government’s wider fiscal priorities by attracting and retaining private investment. By giving investors certainty that network costs are predictable and fairly allocated, the Bill can ensure that private operators continue to play a central role in funding innovation and expanding passenger capacity across the UK.”
Lumo and Hull Trains recommend:
“The updated charging regime must be developed in consultation with private stakeholders, appropriate for the markets being served and regulated with independent oversight from the ORR. This will sustain confidence in a fair and transparent access regime and ensure that private investment continues to play a central role in delivering a successful railway.”
Amendment 83 would prevent GBR from charging any sum it liked without notice. Instead, it would be required to follow the standard pricing structure set out in clause 64(2), based on actual costs incurred as a result of the activity. Does the Minister agree that any serious business case for private investment in our railways will need to have the certainty of fixed costs? How does the clause achieve anything other than the opposite?
Amendment 82 would remove the right of GBR to charge its competitors costs, basically at any time and without notice, on grounds that they have access to more money that they could pay. Instead, it would impose a duty on GBR to give other operators a minimum of 12 months’ notice of changes to the charging scheme, so at least they can react to the change and seek any appeal before the event rather than after it.
Speaking to amendments 82 and 83, the Rail Forum has said:
“We strongly support these amendment, access and other charges should be reasonable and operators should have sufficient warning of changes to be able to plan accordingly.”
The amendments are not just a nice idea being suggested from the Opposition Benches, but something that the industry would like to see as well.
Amendment 84 would provide that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways can take any step to implement any part of the charging scheme until it has been laid before Parliament for three months. Once again, that would put accountability and transparency back into the system—something the Government seem hellbent on ignoring.
The second impact would be to allow affected organisations time to prepare an appeal. Judicial review requires a very short application process of just 12 weeks. This amended clause would help aggrieved parties to prepare a complex challenge in time for a JR timetable. Amendment 84 is more a probing one, so it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response. The reflection on the judicial review process is particularly important, because we do not want to crowd people out of the opportunity to appeal. Anything he can offer in response would be appreciated.
Amendment 230 would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions—a case of natural justice. Does the Minister accept that the existing wording of the clause would allow GBR to profit from a cancellation of services caused by GBR’s failure to provide infra-structure? If so, will he explain how that could be a fair result?
Amendment 242 would remove the requirement for GBR to charge in relation to trains that are planned to use GBR infrastructure, but do not operate or do not operate in full. Again, that is in effect a probing amendment, or a making-a-point amendment, as it were. With that, I shall sit down.
Olly Glover
I have a few brief thoughts on what the Conservative spokesperson has said about this clause. On the Liberal Democrat Benches, we feel that a lot of the amendments ask good questions about transparency and about accountability for how the access charging regime will work. We are definitely interested to hear the Minister’s response.
A couple of the Opposition amendments perhaps go a little too far, or at least questions could be asked about them. Amendment 242, on what I am calling phantom paths, addresses an interesting phenomenon in the railway at the moment. Many freight paths are in the timetable, but seldom used; they are reserved by freight operators for a variety of reasons in case they might be used. People in the industry say that they sometimes present problems for optimum timetable development or use of capacity. It will be interesting to hear from both the Minister and, perhaps, the Conservative spokesperson as to how they feel that those phantom paths can be dealt with, absent an ability by GBR to apply access charges to trains that do not run.
Conservative amendment 83 attempts to remove GBR’s ability to charge higher than the normal rate, the likely revenue to be obtained by running train services does not vary significantly based on the type of railway and the type of service concerned. The most extreme example of that is that the typical fare yield for Manchester to Blackburn will obviously be a lot less than for London to Manchester. The concept of GBR applying differential access charges is not necessarily one that I would be inclined to oppose, but the criteria that it uses in doing so needs to be transparent. The amendments that we tabled earlier allude to that. It will be interesting to hear from the Minister how the Government intend for GBR to make that process transparent, particularly given the high judicial review bar for challenging some of those decisions. That way, hopefully, a new system can be created in which everyone might have faith.
Keir Mather
I will briefly turn back to the debate on the previous clauses; because the Opposition spokesperson asked me to provide an example of the motion of consent in general as it relates to timetabling and I was remiss in my duty in not doing so. To give more context, the network code currently sets out the circumstances where train service timings need to be adjusted by a few minutes without requiring specific consent. GBR will follow a very similar process and that is a normal process that industry would expect us to follow.
I now turn to the amendments at hand, all of which seek to make changes to GBR’s charging scheme. I confirm to the hon. Member for South West Devon that the charging regime broadly replicates the one that is in place today. That is intentional, so that all of the charges and discounts referenced will be familiar to industry to achieve a smooth transition to the new framework.
Furthermore, given that GBR will be bound by public law duties, which require fairness, reasonableness and non-discrimination in actions and decision making, there is no reason to think that GBR will behave unreasonably. Rather, when making or amending its charging scheme, GBR will be required to balance the various duties set out in clause 18, which include promoting the interests of passengers, promoting the use of the network for carrying freight and enabling operators to plan the future of their businesses. GBR will also be required to consult with industry through the development of its charging scheme, and will be held to account via a clear route to appeal to the ORR on the scheme’s design and application.
Given that existing competition law and applicable subsidy rules will automatically apply to GBR, GBR will not be able to treat other operators unfairly or start levying excessive charges that would undermine their ability to operate successful, profit-driven services. That will be further supported by the ORR’s continued role as competition regulator for the railway. I hope that gives hon. Members some assurance to begin with.
I now turn to amendment 242, which proposes to remove the provision at clause 64(1)(b) that enables GBR to charge operators for services that do not run as planned. In today’s system, that mechanism is called a reservation charge, and the Bill replicates that for GBR. Importantly, the Bill does not mandate that a reservation charge must be issued in all instances where services do not run. Instead, GBR will have discretion regarding how and when to use it. That is particularly important for taking into consideration different industry operating models, especially freight, which is market driven and therefore has to live with less certainty over the services that it needs to run to serve its customers.
A routine and technical example of when a reservation charge is used today, and likely to be replicated in the future, is one affecting passenger services, not freight. Where a passenger service is allocated to a path that is expected to stop at eight stations but—for reasons of its own making and not GBR’s—it terminates short of its final destination and stops at only seven, it could still be charged as planned for the full service. In addition, with finite capacity on the network it is important that, when passenger operators are granted access, they provide those services they said they were going to run and are disincentivised to simply hold on to capacity.
To use a different example, if an operator consistently failed to run a service in its entirety, it would disadvantage passengers seeking to use that train and other operators that might wish to operate a passenger or freight service on an unused path. It could therefore be charged in full. As I have outlined, the purpose of the measure is to encourage operators to use the capacity that they have been allocated. Therefore, the ability to levy a reservation charge is an extremely useful tool to drive the right behaviours on the network. It ensures that best use is made of capacity and that operators remain accountable for providing the services in the timetable that they agreed to deliver.
The Chair
Just to confirm, the Clerks have checked the point of order raised by Edward Argar about the selection and grouping, and there are no further errors. They apologise for the error.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Nesil Caliskan.)
Railways Bill (Twelfth sitting)
(1 day, 7 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 10 / Noes: 3 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 3 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 3 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 230, in clause 64, page 36, line 7, at end insert
“, except where the services cannot operate due to a failure of the GBR infrastructure or the need for GBR to take capacity for work on the network.”
This amendment would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions.
Amendment 83, in clause 64, page 36, line 11, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment would prevent GBR charging any sum it likes, rather than what is reasonable.
Amendment 82, in clause 64, page 36, line 28, leave out “at any time” and insert
“by giving no less than 12 months’ notice”.
This amendment imposes a duty on GBR to give other operators a minimum 12-month advance notice of changes to the charging scheme.
Amendment 84, in clause 64, page 36, line 34, at end insert—
“(9) Neither the Secretary of State, nor Great British Railways, may take any action to implement any part of the charging scheme until a copy of the scheme has been laid before Parliament for a period of three months.”
This amendment would provide that neither the Secretary of State nor Great British Railways could take any step to implement any part of the charging scheme until it has been laid before Parliament for three months.
Clause stand part.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. There is not much to say, except that the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage raised a question about our amendments and what he called phantom paths. I think he may have been referring to ghost trains, as opposed to phantom trains—if you google “phantom trains”, all sorts of weird films come up, and they are far too scary for me to watch. He is not here to disagree with me, but I think he was alluding to the issue of trains running entirely empty through stations where people would have quite liked to get on them.
The point I think we are making with our amendments is more about where issues that it is within Great British Railways’ responsibility to fix mean that services cannot run, and about not believing that the operators, which have no responsibility for the infrastructure, should still be expected to pay a fee if they are not able to run their services. I think we would have been alluding to that, rather than where they are running empty trains. There may well be empty trains as well, but I think we were talking specifically about where GBR had the responsibility—
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)
I thank the hon. Lady for giving me an opportunity to piggyback on her response to the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. I want merely to say that, from the Government’s perspective, having one centralised body accountable for access to and use of the railway and for determining best use is a good way to avoid the phantom train scenarios she describes, such as the 7 o’clock service from Manchester Piccadilly to London. I am grateful that she has given me the opportunity to row in behind her on this point.
Rebecca Smith
I thank the Minister for that. Yes, absolutely; I believe our amendments are much more about the infrastructure that GBR has responsibility for and about operators not having to pay if they are un able to operate their services. A natural disaster is probably a bit too extreme, but if, for example, a train is running through to Dawlish and the line gets closed, I think it is fair to suggest that the operator should not have to pay the fees for that train. We will press some of these amendments to a vote for that reason, but I just wanted to clarify that point. Without further ado, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 230, in clause 64, page 36, line 7, at end insert
“, except where the services cannot operate due to a failure of the GBR infrastructure or the need for GBR to take capacity for work on the network.”—(Rebecca Smith.)
This amendment would ensure that services are not caught within the charging scheme if they cannot operate due to GBR failures or actions.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 254, in clause 64, page 36, line 14, at end insert
“and the higher amount does not hinder progress against the Rail freight target set out in section 17.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 255, in clause 64, page 36, line 34, at end insert—
“(8A) Following an appeal made under subsection (8), the ORR may, if it decides that GBR has not dealt fairly with the appellant, direct GBR to revise a scheme.”
This amendment requires that any charge levied by GBR under its charging scheme does not have a detrimental impact on the freight growth target.
Edward Morello
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. It will escape no one that, in the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage, I have been left with my hand on the wheel. I do not think trains have a wheel, but I am not entirely sure how they work—[Interruption.] They have a stick, yes. However, given that both amendments are in his name and relate to the freight target, I can only assume that they are eminently sensible and that the Government should accept them. If not, we would apparently like to press them to a Division.
Keir Mather
It is, once again, a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. Amendment 254 would require GBR, when charging above the cost directly incurred—in other words, when charging mark-ups—to consider its target to increase the use of freight. I can reassure the hon. Member for West Dorset immediately that GBR will not be able to raise charges in a way that is not compatible with its statutory duties or targets.
In practice, that means that when developing its own test of affordability, GBR is expected to establish bespoke criteria for divergent market segments operating on the railway, including freight, as Network Rail set out in its discussion document on charging. That allows GBR to design a test that can support its duties, including those under clause 18, and the targets to increase freight under clause 17.
We intend that the provision will operate in a way similar to the “market can bear” test today. GBR will develop its own test of affordability in consultation with the sector, including the Office of Rail and Road, before publishing it. However, as we move away from European law, in which the “market can bear” test is established, and to the Bill, which carries over the same principles, we must ensure that the language in the drafting is fit for purpose for UK statute. That is why the Bill stipulates that GBR will be able to levy mark-ups only if it is affordable to efficient operators. The Bill preserves that fundamental safeguard for operators, but in a form that can be applied more clearly in the UK context.
The test will be published with clear routes of appeal, as a further layer of protection for any operators, including freight, that are subject to charges when using GBR infrastructure. When hearing appeals, the ORR will consider the extent to which GBR has appropriately considered all factors before levying a mark-up. I hope I have reassured the hon. Member for West Dorset that amendment 254 is unnecessary, as the Bill already achieves its intended effect.
Amendment 255 would give the ORR an explicit power, following an appeal against the content of a charging scheme, to direct Great British Railways to revise the scheme in cases where it considers GBR has not dealt fairly with the appellant. However, the amendment is not necessary to achieve that aim. The Bill already provides clear and robust rights of appeal to the ORR in relation to the content of a charging scheme. Those rights are supported by strong and effective remedies where an appeal against GBR is successful, as set out in clause 68.
In the system set out in the Bill, where the ORR upholds an appeal on the content of a charging scheme, it has the power to remit all or part of the provision appealed against to GBR for reconsideration. That means that the ORR can require GBR to make changes to the charging scheme if it was identified during the appeal process that GBR had acted in a discriminatory manner, inconsistently with its statutory duties or in a way deemed procedurally unfair.
The ORR can also give legally binding directions to GBR, which could include setting out what it failed to take account of in the original decision and what it must do to ensure that those matters are properly assessed when reconsidering it. The amendment would therefore introduce powers that are already provided for in clause 68. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member not to press amendments 254 and 255 to a vote.
Rebecca Smith
Amendment 254 is good in so far as it goes in relation to rail freight, but other rail operators also provide public benefit and should receive a similar level of protection. The Opposition are happy to support the amendment, but we do not think it goes nearly far enough.
Amendment 255 would give the ORR the power to order GBR to revise a charging scheme if it found, on appeal, that GBR had not dealt fairly with the appellant. With the current constraint on appeals, the amendment would make no practical difference. The Government need to go much further by providing a genuine appeals process to assess appeals on their merits, with an independent body, not a direct competitor, taking the key charging decisions.
Keir Mather
I believe that hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have expressed all the points on these amendments, and I have nothing further to add at this stage.
Edward Morello
I heard what the Minister and the Opposition spokesperson said but, because of my long-standing and passionate support for freight targets in the context of charging regimes, I will divide the Committee on the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move amendment 85, in clause 65, page 37, line 15, leave out subsection (3)(b).
This amendment would enable GBR to have to pay penalties or compensation.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 223, in clause 65, page 37, line 15, after “Railways” insert
“or any operator of a train on Great British Railways infra-structure”.
This amendment clarifies that freight operators should not face penalties for service disruption caused by factors outside their control, such as infrastructure failures or planned engineering works by Great British Railways.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 86, in clause 92, page 53, line 40, at end insert—
“(1A) Section 65 does not come into force until Great British Railways has published the performance scheme and laid it before Parliament.”
This amendment would prevent section 65 from coming into force until GBR has published the performance scheme and laid it before Parliament.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 65 requires GBR to provide and publish a performance scheme that is designed to incentivise GBR, its subsidiaries or other train operators to minimise disruption or delay to other train services or the network. Train operators may be required to pay penalties if they cause disruption, may receive compensation where disruption is caused by a different operator’s operations and may receive bonuses to reward better than planned performance. So far, so good, you might say. However, it does not permit payments by GBR that relate to disruption outside its control.
Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. As in previous sessions, I draw the Committee’s attention to my membership of Unite the union. I will speak briefly on the amendments. I welcome the opportunity to talk about an area of narrowly gauged interest of long-standing, although I hesitate to call it tunnel vision: schedule 4 and schedule 8 compensation for planned and unplanned disruption on the network.
The delay attribution scheme has remained essentially unchanged since privatisation, and the clause is a welcome opportunity to look again at how it works in practice. Attention has been drawn to the fact that, under the present system, approximately 400 people are employed across the rail industry to attribute delays to either operators or Network Rail. That sometimes happens in ways that defy any common-sense interpretation of good value for money, and there have been eye-catching examples of expensive lawyers gathering in a room to argue about whether a dead pheasant or a dead peacock was a small bird or a large one, for the purpose of the scheme. Depending upon that determination, the costs may be picked up by the taxpayer or by private operators, and I think we can all agree that that is nonsense.
I am glad that the Bill, as drafted, retains some degree of compensation scheme. My attention was drawn to the need for such measures recently in my constituency, where there has been a long-standing problem with road surface conditions, including what has become known, infamously, as “Northfield’s big pothole” under the railway bridge that connects Quarry Lane and Coleys Lane. Network Rail pointed out to me that a single bridge strike from a heavy goods vehicle would incur greater compensation costs for just one hour of disruption than the entire cost of resurfacing that stretch of road. Clearly, we need some degree of accountability in the system.
However, the amounts paid out through schedule 8 compensation, which is for unplanned disruption in particular, have been enormous. In theory, these schemes should be self-financing, but for all the attention that is paid to dividend payments and profits in the current railway system, the money that leaves the public part of the railway through these compensation schemes has in some years been in excess of those payments. There is a very good case for these changes.
I am not sure that amendment 85 is entirely necessary or desirable, on the basis that there may well be circumstances in which a private operator, whether freight or open access, is responsible for delays, for example if rolling stock had not been kept in the required condition. It is sensible for there to be some attribution in the system. As subsection (7) sets out, there is a right of appeal to the ORR. This is a sensible clause, and I am not sure that the amendments are necessary.
Rebecca Smith
Does the hon. Member not think our amendments could actually improve the system for GBR? We have talked, in this Committee and in the Select Committee sessions on the Bill, about the real gap in terms of the incentives for GBR to improve its services and improve itself. There is no reason why adding GBR as a body that would have to pay penalties and compensation would not introduce an incentive, in the same way we expect for operators, to ensure that the service provided on the taxpayers’ behalf and using taxpayers’ money is improved. At the end of the day, GBR is paying itself, but our amendments would at least give it an incentive to make sure that it does not need to pay compensation in the first place.
Laurence Turner
If I have understood the hon. Member’s point correctly, the key is openness and transparency. We need some degree of understanding that, if GBR itself is responsible for delays, that information should be recorded so that improvements can be made. I am not convinced that GBR paying money to itself in a legal or quasi-legal process is the best use of public resources.
That transparency is lacking under the current system. The Delay Attribution Board does not publish any records of its proceedings. Some months ago, I made a freedom of information request for the minutes of the board, and the response was that they were too commercially confidential to disclose. Given the vast amounts of public money that are spent through this process at the moment, I think that is a severe limitation of the current system. This is a real opportunity to do things better.
Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)
I will not get into whether a peacock or a pheasant is a large or small bird—it takes me back to my days as a Health Minister, when we had a debate about whether a scotch egg is a substantial meal in the context of the regulations. However, my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon made a very valid point: even if the money is going back to GBR, there needs to be some degree of transparency so that it can be seen where the attribution is, whether it is GBR that has caused the problem, and whether it is improving or going backwards. Does the hon. Member agree that, even if actual cash is not transferred in and out, a notional payment or a schedule of payments that would have been paid should be published to give the travelling public transparency as to where the challenges lie and give GBR an incentive to improve its game?
Laurence Turner
I think I agree with at least most of what the right hon. Gentleman says. The issue is whether actual payments are made, but we questioned the noble Lord Hendy in the Transport Committee on this matter, and he agreed that there needs to be some data accountability where there are delays.
I am sorry to detain the Committee on this matter. As is sometimes said, man is born free and everywhere he is in trains—I just wanted to get that one on the record. I thank Committee members for their time.
Keir Mather
How can I top that? I am not going to try.
This group of amendments concerns performance schemes, which, as hon. Members are aware, are designed to improve the performance of the railway network by incentivising operators and infrastructure managers to enhance punctuality, reliability and overall service quality, underpinned by compensation, bonuses and penalties. For example, performance schemes can require operators to pay penalties if their services cause unplanned disruption, or can offer bonuses for better-than-planned performance.
The performance scheme provided for by clause 65 will apply to GBR itself, both in its capacity as a service operator and as the body responsible for maintaining the infrastructure. The clause supports one of the overall goals of the Bill: to dramatically improve service performance for passengers and freight operators, and to make a railway that really works.
I thank hon. Members for their amendments, which I will speak to in turn. Amendment 85 seeks to remove the provision that protects GBR for liability for performance scheme payments or penalties where the disruption is not its fault. To be clear, that provision is not designed to prevent GBR from ever paying penalties or compensation. Clause 65(2) clearly provides for GBR to pay penalties, compensation and bonuses. Where it is at fault for disruption, there is no question but that it must compensate other operators.
GBR will have the flexibility to design a bespoke performance scheme for its network. The Bill is intentionally broad, including at clause 65(3)(b), which does not define what constitutes disruption outside GBR’s control. Instead, GBR will consult the industry on its policy on the extent to which disruption after an unplanned event has occurred, and whether it is or is not outside GBR’s control. It will consider any legal requirements before publishing all agreed terms for transparency.
Edward Argar
The Minister says that GBR will be able to design a bespoke performance regime, but does that not go to the heart of what my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon highlighted, which is essentially that it will be designing a performance regime against which its own performance will be managed? It gets to set the rules, determine what the parameters are, and then decide whether it meets those criteria. Subsection (7) says:
“A person aggrieved by provision contained in a scheme…may appeal to the ORR.”
Will the ORR have binding powers to make an adjudication, and will GBR be compelled to follow it?
Keir Mather
The right hon. Gentleman pre-empts my later comments about the role of the ORR in this process.
On the principle of whether GBR should be able to design a performance scheme for its own network, that is completely in keeping with the aspiration of the Bill to create a single uniting mind for the railway. We are cognisant of the fact that GBR has a threefold obligation in this process. First, it must create a scheme that it can use to deliver the efficiencies and operational realities of the railway in a way that suits the interests of the travelling public. Secondly, operators that use the service need to be able to ensure that they can have fair service under it. That is why consulting with the industry is so important.
Thirdly, and arguably most importantly, GBR must protect taxpayers’ interests where it is reasonable to do so. A scheme is being created that directs GBR to run the railway in a purposeful way but with robust consultation and enforcement mechanisms, which I will come to in a moment, embedded within it. I believe that strikes the right balance. We are giving GBR control over the system but not allowing it to mark its own homework in every way, as the Opposition might see it. I will go into that in more detail in a moment.
Rebecca Smith
To build on the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston made, clause 65(3)(b) says that compensation may not be paid by Great British Railways
“in relation to any disruption that is outside its control.”
It strikes me that that relates to what the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield said happens already: people have to decide what constitutes significant disruption, and what is inside its control. If I were an outside operator looking at this, I would be thinking, “Hang on a minute. Where’s the definition of what is inside GBR’s control?” There is a whole long list of options that I will not even begin to bore the Committee with for what could be said to be outside its control, but where is that conversation? It strikes me that it might be like trying to claim for a bag that was stolen on holiday on insurance—you have to literally prove that you were mugged to get reimbursed. I would be interested in a bit more information on how “outside its control” will be defined.
Keir Mather
That is why the point about designing the scheme in close consultation with industry partners is so important. The hon. Member has read my mind, as I am about to turn to specific instances or potential demarcations with respect to what does or does not constitute being within or outwith GBR’s control.
It is probably important to briefly explain what happens if an unforeseen situation arises and operators believe it is GBR’s fault but GBR disagrees, and the role of the ORR in that process. That brings us back to the intervention from the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston. The Bill will include in the future scheme a clear route to appeal, to protect all parties in instances that are disputed, but the risks will be mitigated by requirements for GBR to clearly publish the details of the performance scheme, including criteria for when GBR would be liable to pay compensation. That goes back to the public law point about transparency and fairness. The ORR, as the independent appeals body, will have a legal obligation to review the situation impartially and advise on appropriate action where necessary. In addition to the ORR, to further mitigate the risk, operators will be able to seek other means of resolution though the Access Disputes Committee where matters relate to a contractual dispute.
We believe that the clause is important, as there is a need to balance rightly protecting operators whose services have been disrupted with protecting taxpayer interest where it is reasonable to do so. For example, in instances of trespassing, we would not expect the exclusion in clause 65(3)(b) to apply, as the disruption that it causes should be within GBR’s gift to mitigate through investment in defences, and GBR would have significant opportunity to influence how quickly services are restored. In such an instance, therefore, we expect that compensation would be payable. However, where disruption follows events in extremis that are clearly not within GBR’s ability to mitigate against or control—for example, an act of terror—we envisage that the exclusion in clause 65(3)(b) might apply.
I reiterate that formulating the scheme in consultation with industry will allow us to flesh out in far greater detail the demarcations, and make sure that private sector operators and rail freight have the surety they need that the scheme has been designed in the right way. The ORR will play a key role in the process in ensuring fairness, acting as the independent appeals body if GBR does not act in line with its duties.
Amendment 223 seeks to ensure that third party operators do not face penalties for disruption outside their control. The Bill stipulates that only GBR is protected from paying penalties or compensation for disruption outside its control, because GBR is the only party that bears responsibility for the operation, maintenance and renewal of its network. There is no responsibility for that placed on third party operators, including freight.
On that basis, we do not see how the concerns raised by the hon. Member for South West Devon that a freight operator could face penalties for, say, infrastructure failures or planned engineering works would arise in practice, other than in extremely unusual circumstances —perhaps where an operator’s faulty train had caused damage to the infrastructure. Such events could only be the responsibility of GBR, as today they are not the responsibility of the infrastructure manager or the operator, so it is GBR that would pay the penalties for such issues.
It is right, therefore, that the Bill pursues a policy that protects the rights of third parties to reasonable compensation when disruption occurs as a result of another party’s actions or inactions, while also mitigating the risk of unjustified costs to the taxpayer when disruption is not reasonably in GBR’s gift to avoid or resolve. I hope the hon. Member will be reassured that the amendment is therefore unnecessary, as we believe the Bill already achieves the intended effect.
Amendment 86 would prevent the performance scheme set out in clause 65 from becoming operational until it has been laid before Parliament. Such provisions for parliamentary scrutiny are a well-trodden path at this stage of the Committee’s proceedings, and we again believe that the amendment would add unnecessary layers of bureaucracy to what is effectively a technical industry process. In reality, the expertise about what specific incentives should be set for different operators on different routes is within the rail industry, and those experts are the ones who need to review and help GBR to develop the performance scheme.
That is why the Bill includes requirements for GBR to consult on its performance scheme and requirements for what GBR must include and consider as part of its design, with clear rights to appeal to the ORR in the event of disputes. The amendment would add little practical value. It would delay the new access regime and the benefits it will bring to passengers.
Clause 65 requires GBR to provide for and publish a performance scheme that is designed to incentivise it, its subsidiaries and other train operators to minimise disruption to other train services and to the network itself. The scheme may include provisions for GBR and other operators to be required to pay penalties for causing disruption, receive compensation for disruption caused and receive bonuses that reward better-than-planned performance. The scheme may not provide for penalties or compensation when one train service causes disruption to another but they are both operated by the same person. The clause also prevents GBR from having to pay penalties or compensation in relation to disruption outside its control.
The clause gives GBR the power to require operators to provide information necessary for the scheme to function and offers no right to compensation or bonuses for parties that do not comply with those rules. The clause allows any person aggrieved by a provision in the scheme or any replacement or revision to it to appeal to the ORR. The clause is vital to create an efficient and reliable railway. It equips GBR to design a scheme that safeguards operators, forces accountability across the network and promotes continuous improvement. I therefore commend it to the Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 88, in clause 68, page 38, line 11, leave out subsection (1).
This amendment removes the requirement that appeals may only be made under Judicial Review principles.
Amendment 89, in clause 68, page 38, line 11, leave out from “must” to the end of line 15 and insert—
“determine the appeal on the facts and the law.”
This amendment would enable the ORR to determine appeals on the merits.
Amendment 90, in clause 68, page 38, line 20, leave out paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) and insert—
“(a) remit all or part of the provision appealed against to Great British Railways for reconsideration, or
(b) quash all or part of the decision appealed against and substitute its own decision, as, at its discretion, it sees fit.”
This amendment would allow the ORR, when agreeing an appeal, to remit all or part of the decision appealed against to GBR for reconsideration, or quash all or part of the decision appealed against, as at its discretion it sees fit.
Amendment 91, in clause 68, page 38, line 29, leave out from “question” to end of line 32.
This amendment would allow the ORR to substitute its own decision for that of GBR when allowing appeals, without there needing to have been an error of law.
Amendment 92, in clause 68, page 39, line 8, at end insert “(f) open access operators.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult open access operators before making regulations about steps that must be taken before an appeal can be brought, to make provision about the procedure and to set time limits and fees for the appeals brought under this Chapter.
Amendment 93, in clause 68, page 39, line 18, at end insert “(f) open access operators”
This amendment would require the ORR to consult open access operators before publishing its document on the practice and procedure for appeals under this Chapter.
Clause 68 stand part.
Keir Mather
Clause 67 provides a route of appeal to the ORR for a person aggrieved by a GBR decision about access, capacity allocation and charging, including decisions made under those schemes. Clause 68 then sets out the principles for how appeals to the ORR will operate and empowers the ORR to issue a document setting out the detailed practice and procedure to be followed. Together the clauses establish the ORR’s reformed and independent appeals role, providing a clear, credible and accessible route of redress against GBR’s access and charging decisions.
Opposition Members have consistently raised the view that basing the appeals role on judicial review principles is not strong enough. However, the rationale for the ORR deciding appeals based on judicial review principles is simple: we do not want the ORR to opine on best use. That is GBR’s job and if the ORR could simply disagree with GBR because it had a different opinion, we would be leaving the system as it is today, with parallel decision makers and unclear accountability. We would not gain the benefits of a body that is truly in charge of rail. That is precisely how we ended up with mistakes like the recent 7 am Manchester service that was set to travel with no passengers on it. The ORR admitted it did not have the adequate information or resource needed to make an informed decision on the operation of that service. That is exactly why we need a consolidated directing mind for the industry that can take decisions confidently and with passengers and freight users at its heart.
Basing the appeals system on judicial review principles ensures that appeals are considered independently and on a recognised basis of fairness, legality and rationality, and without the fragmentation of decision making that plagues the current system. The appeals process will provide a robust accountability framework to ensure the railway delivers for passengers and freight customers. It is not judicial review principles that are weak; perhaps the hon. Member for South West Devon would suggest it is the powers available to the ORR to act on any wrongdoing that are flawed. I will turn to that next.
Edward Argar
Does the Minister not see the challenge that if GBR is the single directing mind, we need to ask how it is held to account for individual decisions that it makes? Where is its accountability to the public, be it through this place or others? Secondly, the Minister talks about judicial review principles. As constituency Members of Parliament, we all know just how high that judicial review bar is when people wish to challenge a planning decision, or something else. It cannot consider the individual merits of the decision, merely how it has been reached and whether due process has been followed. It is also incredibly costly. Is the Minister not concerned that in setting these principles, he is setting that bar at an unattainably high level, rather than striking the appropriate balance between being able to appeal and challenge something, but not unduly burdening the day-to-day decision making of the railways?
Keir Mather
I thank the right hon. Member for that contribution, because he gets to the nub of the principles. GBR will be held accountable through compliance with its duties as set out in legislation, which ensures that it has to have regard to passengers, including passengers with disabilities, and regard to the need to promote rail freight. It also has public law accountability built into it, through its legal obligation to act in a manner that is transparent and fair. The right hon. Member asks a broader question about whether the JR principles threshold is too high. We would argue it is not too high, precisely because of what it unlocks if we get to the stage where an appeal is upheld.
The ORR will have strong powers to dismiss the appeal or remit the decision to GBR for reconsideration, with legally binding directions that GBR cannot ignore. It is right and it is the stated principle both of the policy and of the overall notion of nationalisation that GBR can be a directing mind for the railway and have the power to do so, but there is a strong buttress against it if it is found that it has acted incorrectly as a matter of law.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 66 sets out who GBR must consult before issuing, revising or replacing the access and use policy under clause 59. The ORR and the Scottish and Welsh Ministers must be consulted as well as other persons GBR considers appropriate. Subsection (2) requires GBR to consult the persons it considers appropriate before issuing the infrastructure capacity planning document under clause 60, including any revisions and replacements; before issuing a working timetable under clause 61; and before making, altering or replacing a charging scheme under clause 64 or a performance scheme under clause 65.
Subsection (3) provides that a requirement in this clause for consultation may be satisfied by a consultation before or after the commencement of the clause. There is currently no express requirement to consult existing open access operators.
Clause 67, on appeals against access, charging and performance decisions, provides that a person who is aggrieved may appeal to the ORR against a GBR decision as to their train operations’ access to and use of the infrastructure, or a decision under the charging scheme or performance scheme. That sounds okay, until we realise that it is on judicial review terms, so there is no actual right of appeal at all.
Clause 68, on the appeals procedure, sets out that the ORR, when determining appeals under this chapter, must apply the principles that the High Court would apply on an application for a judicial review, or the principles that the Court of Session would apply in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction for appeals in Scotland.
Subsections (2) and (3) provide for the ORR to allow an appeal or dismiss it, and, if it allows an appeal, to use the following remedies. For appeals made against the GBR policies, plans, and schemes themselves—under clause 59(6), on access and use; clause 60(6), on infra-structure capacity; clause 64(8), on charging; or clause 65(7), on the performance scheme—the ORR can only require GBR to reconsider the decision.
For appeals made against a specific decision under clause 61(5) or clause 62(7), on the working timetable, or under clause 67, on GBR’s policies, plans and schemes, the ORR can quash the decision that is appealed against. Then, however, all it can do is to send it back to GBR to reconsider, or it may substitute the decision with its own if quashing the decision is on the basis of an error of law and without the error there is only one decision that GBR could have reached.
Clause 68(1) means that because appeals must be assessed using judicial review principles, operators can challenge GBR decisions only on procedural grounds and not on the substance or commercial merits. That means that GBR will be judge and jury in its decisions affecting its direct competition, which is obviously wildly unfair.
Clause 68(3)(a) sets out that even where an appeal succeeds, the ORR can only remit the matter back to GBR for reconsideration, which means that GBR can often reach the same outcome again without revising its reasoning. That offers little to no real corrective power.
Clause 68(4)(b) says that the ORR may substitute its own decision only where there is an error of law and where only one lawful outcome was possible. That is a very high bar and as a result this remedy will be rare.
These concerns have been echoed by the industry. During one of the oral evidence sessions for the Transport Committee, Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group said:
“There are a number of problems with that appeal function. First, it will be incredibly hard to ever get to it. We are told that the appeal will have to meet the standards of a judicial review—illegality, irrationality or procedural unfairness—so there will be a very high bar to meet to even get there. On top of that, the law allows the Secretary of State by regulation to set out some steps you would have to take in advance of going to the ORR. We do not know what those are. There is also a fee, and we do not know what that is. Even getting to the ORR will be very much more difficult than it is today.
If we do get up there, in most cases, the ORR will be able to ask GBR to have another look at its decision. It has another look, and it reaches the same view—so what? Only in a minority of cases can it quash a decision and only if there was an error of law…Passengers are going to get a very powerful watchdog when, conversely, we feel that in freight, we are having those rights of access watered down.”
Steve Montgomery from FirstRail said:
“Considering other large public sector organisations—like GBR is going to be—you have to ask, ‘Why would you not have an independent regulator of it?’ Why is rail going to be different from other large public sector organisations where there are regulators looking at them?”
Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said:
“A strong independent rail regulator has two roles. The ORR, by the way, is part of the European group of independent rail regulators called IRG. Ideally, those roles are to protect passengers and other parts of the sector from monopolistic behaviour, and to ensure the best use of taxpayer money. Their role is also, in other countries, to ensure competition and non-discriminatory behaviour. We are worried that that might be watered down in this country and needs to be improved still.”
That prompts some questions that I hope the Minister can answer. Why is GBR being set up in such contradiction to its European neighbours? Is there anything that we could have learned? Will the Government reconsider any element of GBR as a result?
These concerns were also set out in the Rail Freight Group’s written evidence to the Transport Committee:
“GBR will by nature be a very powerful monopoly of track and GBR trains, and the overarching changes in the Bill reduce significantly the independent oversight of ORR, leaving the Secretary of State holding GBR to account. By comparison, the ORR currently has a duty to promote the use of the rail network and thus has a track record”—
ha, ha—
“of creating growth by approving new access applications previously rejected by Network Rail. Although we welcome the provisions for freight outlined above, there is still a significant risk that GBR could act in a way which favours its own trains, restricting growth for freight. As such, we believe it is essential that non-GBR operators have an independent appeals function that is powerful, easy to use and able to take action effectively.”
It continued:
“In essence, the provisions in the Bill mean that freight operators and customers have a very limited right of independent appeal against GBR. It is also of note that GBR may replace the current Access Disputes Committee (also independent of Network Rail) who hear lower level timetabling disputes with their own internal process, albeit we do not yet have full details of this.”
I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to that.
FirstGroup wrote in a similar vein, saying that it was concerned
“about the ORR’s responsibility for track access decisions being transferred to GBR…The Bill removes the ORR’s powers to independently adjudicate on whether applications for access best meet the needs of all railway users. Under Clause 68 the ORR is an appeals body but with no ability to uphold appeals if they are discriminatory or anticompetitive. There need to be more checks and balances to maintain confidence in fair access, independent regulatory oversight and to protect the interests of passengers…As a broader point, independent regulation is vital to all large comparable bodies—consider for example the CQC’s role in healthcare or the Civil Aviation Authority in airlines and airports.”
The pushback against this grossly unfair clause is overwhelming, and the Government can surely no longer turn a deaf ear.
Amendment 88 would remove the requirement that appeals may be made only under judicial review principles. We think that it is an obvious improvement. At the Transport Committee on 7 January, the Department for Transport’s official, Lucy Ryan, stated that the requirement is deliberate:
“The reasoning for the JR threshold is to be absolutely clear that GBR needs to remain the directing mind, able to take decisions about optimising the use of the network.”
That is an insufficient safeguard against monopolistic behaviour by GBR. Large monopolies with structural conflicts of interest need effective decision-making oversight. It cannot be done by the Secretary of State, because this is operational, so it has to be the ORR.
Amendment 89 would enable the ORR to determine appeals on the facts and the law. It builds on amendment 88, and we think it is the only way to create a fair and non-discriminatory process. Amendment 90 would allow the ORR, when agreeing an appeal, either to remit to GBR for reconsideration or to quash and/or substitute its own decision for all or part of the decision appealed against. An independent appellate body applying the rules to GBR and its decisions would not challenge the role of GBR, but make sure that it was applying its rules fairly and correctly.
Amendment 91, which I believe the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage supports, would allow the ORR to substitute its own decision for that of GBR when allowing appeals, without there needing to have been an error of law, resulting in only one possible outcome. It would remove a ridiculously closely drafted requirement, and it is obviously fair. It is a test to see if the Government actually want a fair and level playing field.
Amendment 92 would require the Secretary of State to consult open access operators before making regulations about steps that must be taken before an appeal can be brought, to make provision about the procedure and to set time limits and fees for the appeals brought under this chapter. Operators clearly have skin in the game, and should be consulted by right.
Amendment 93 would require the ORR to consult open access operators before publishing its document on the practice and procedure for appeals under this chapter. The argument for that is very similar to the one behind amendment 92, which I just set out. Will the Minister stand up for the open access and freight sector, and support our amendments to create a fair appeals process?
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. I have a short point to make. The Minister seems to be saying that it is important to restrict an appeals process to the judicial review principles, which is a more restrictive set of criteria by which a body or company can appeal. Otherwise, that might lead to “incoherent decision making”—I think those were his words.
That sentiment and assertion undermines the entire court system of the United Kingdom—save for judicial review applications—which is based on disputes being had in, for example, the county court or the High Court, or another court making a decision, and the possibility of an appeal going upwards all the way to the Supreme Court, depending on the issue. However, nobody would suggest that that leads to an incoherent society or to incoherent contracts, family law, employment law, decision making or anything else.
For some reason, Great British Railways has this special carve-out, such that it can be challenged only through judicial review, because of some notion of incoherence. It seems to me that the entire purpose of that restriction is to prop up Great British Railways and allow it to act in a way that is not really comparable to anything else in the way we deliver public transport in this country. It gives me considerable concern.
Keir Mather
I will respond first to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. The point about confusion does not pertain to confusion created through arbitration in the courts on the principles of access decisions as a matter of law. I think that that is fundamental to making sure that GBR works within the boundaries of the legislative framework we have created, as well as, via public law principles, operating in a way that is both fair and transparent. The point about confusion is having two decision-making bodies on what constitutes best use of the network and access to the network. That is where we want to avoid confusion, because that is the system we have inherited, and it does not work for passengers.
The shadow Minister raised a point about fees, and the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston mentioned costs. Any appeals will be made against JR principles and not processes. It is not that each case will be brought before the courts, with the associated costs that that would bring, so I am confident that the costs of appeal would not be a significant factor under the new system as opposed to the old one.
On the matter of European systems, the shadow Minister tests the boundaries of my knowledge of the operation of rail systems overseas. There are systems in Europe in which a body similar to the ORR has too dominant a role in having charge over access and decision making in relation to it. That is not working in the existing system, and that is what we are trying to change through the Bill.
Amendments 88 and 89 seek to remove the requirement that appeals be made on judicial review principles and replace this with a requirement that appeals are determined
“on the facts and the law.”
As I set out in my opening speech, judicial review principles will ensure that the ORR focuses on the legality and fairness of GBR’s decision making, not on retaking the decision. Replacing this with a requirement to determine appeals on the facts and the law instead would convert this to a merits-based system, which would require the ORR to rerun strategic judgments and exercises on best use of the network. That is not the role we intend for the ORR. The framework is designed to provide strong, independent oversight while preserving GBR as the single directing mind.
We have discussed repeatedly in Committee that what is wrong with the railway today is the fact that there is no one decision maker. There has to be just one, or the railway will continue to stagnate. GBR is the body with the expertise to be that decision maker, and the ORR is the body that should check that it has acted fairly and proportionately. Judicial review principles strike the right balance between accountability and effective decision making.
Amendments 90 and 91 would extend the ORR’s powers to substitute its own decision for one of GBR’s. As I have mentioned, the Bill deliberately distinguishes between types of appeals and the powers available to the ORR in each circumstance. For appeals concerning provisions within GBR’s strategic documents, such as the access and use policy, infrastructure capacity plans or its charging and performance schemes, the ORR may remit the provision appealed against to GBR for reconsideration, and may do so with binding directions, but may not substitute its own decision. That is because these are not yes or no decisions—they are not simple decisions—but rather complex and comprehensive policies that govern the railway. It is not appropriate for the ORR to rewrite strategic policy documents, and that is not what regulators are meant to do. The ORR should be checking that GBR has acted consistently with its procedures and policies, not substituting them with its own.
However, for operational decisions, for example about charges for operators or about whether someone should be included in the timetable, the ORR has stronger powers. The ORR may quash all or part of the decision and may substitute its own decision in cases where there has been an error of law and, without the error, there would have been only one decision that Great British Railways could have reached. The amendments would remove these carefully drawn distinctions, potentially allowing the ORR to step beyond its oversight role and into decision making on best use of the network. We cannot have that. The amendments would allow the ORR to make decisions on best use without decisions going back to GBR to correct, removing GBR’s ability to learn from and correct its mistakes, and adding duplication between two decision-making bodies. The Bill already provides robust remedies where an appeal is upheld, including the power to remit with binding directions, even when substitution is not available, which ensures effective redress while preserving GBR as the single directing mind.
Amendments 92 and 93 would require the Secretary of State and the ORR to consult open access operators before publishing either regulations or practice and procedures for appeals under this chapter. The Bill already sets out a clear and proportionate consultation requirement, and the current formulation is deliberate to provide flexibility for the ORR to engage industry and stakeholders, including open access operators, without creating an inflexible statutory list. It may also be helpful to emphasise that the ORR’s appeals role exists precisely to ensure fairness, transparency and lawful decision making for operators, including open access operators.
The ORR has already begun engagement on its approach to developing its appeals process and has published a discussion document setting out its emerging thinking, which is publicly available and open to comment and views from industry and other stakeholders, including open access operators. The work is intended to inform its final appeals process, and there will be a formal consultation once the Bill receives Royal Assent. Open access operators will therefore be able to provide views as part of the consultation without the need for an explicit mention in the Bill. The process already provides a clear and appropriate route for open access operators to have their views heard.
I also note that the Secretary of State regulations relate to process matters only, such as steps that must be taken before an appeal is brought, time limits, and fees. They do not determine access rights or decision making on capacity allocation or charging. It is therefore appropriate that the statutory consultation requirement focuses on bodies with system-wide responsibilities and oversight roles, rather than individual categories of operator.
As with other consultation provisions in the Bill, singling out one category of operator will create a precedent for others to request to be added to the statutory list, and we will risk making the framework overly prescriptive. The current drafting already achieves the right balance, ensuring engagement and maintaining flexibility. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for South West Devon not to press the amendments, and commend clauses 67 and 68 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 68
Appeal procedure
Amendment proposed: 88, in clause 68, page 38, line 11, leave out subsection (1).—(Rebecca Smith.)
This amendment removes the requirement that appeals may only be made under Judicial Review principles.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Edward Morello
I beg to move amendment 203, in clause 68, page 38, line 35, leave out subsections (6) and (7).
This amendment, along with Amendments 204 and 205, strengthens the role of the ORR, and reduces the role of the Secretary of State, in considering appeals against GBR access decisions.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 204, in clause 68, page 39, line 10, leave out from “Chapter” to end of line 11.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 203.
Amendment 205, in clause 68, page 39, line 15, leave out paragraphs (b) to (d).
See explanatory statement for Amendment 203.
Edward Morello
Amendments 203 to 205 were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage. The clause gives the Secretary of State extensive powers to intervene and, ultimately, overrule access decisions made by GBR. As I said in our previous sitting, we must remember that those powers are not just for the current Government, but for all future Governments. The Bill concentrates too much authority in the hands of the Secretary of State, with too little accountability and independent oversight. The amendments would reduce ministerial micromanagement and strengthen the role of the ORR in determining appeals on access decisions. The ORR should be an independent regulator whose job it is to make fair, evidence-based judgments. Access decisions should be governed by transparent regulation, not by political discretion. The amendments would strengthen the role of the ORR, protect the independence of GBR and prevent excessive control by the Secretary of State, especially without any accompanying accountability—something the Government have continued to refuse when the Opposition parties have tabled amendments. However, I hope we will have a sudden volte-face on amendments 203 to 205.
Rebecca Smith
I shall be brief. The amendments would strengthen the role of the ORR and reduce the role of the Secretary of State in considering appeals against GBR access decisions. Without further ado, I will say that we will support all three, should the Liberal Democrats press them to a vote.
Keir Mather
Amendments 203 to 205 seek to do two things: to remove the Secretary of State’s ability to make regulations relating to the appeals process; and to remove the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers as statutory consultees on the ORR’s appeals procedure. I support the ambition to ensure that the appeals framework works independently and commands confidence across the industry. However, the amendments are not necessary or appropriate to achieve that aim.
The ORR will establish its own appeals process and engage with industry on its development. In fact, it has already published a discussion document seeking views from interested parties on its policy choices. That was published on 3 December and can be found on the ORR’s website. The Secretary of State’s regulation-making powers are intended to provide a safeguard to ensure that the appeals framework operates effectively, and are not expected to play a routine role. The powers may be used only for matters of process—for example, the setting of legally binding time limits for bringing appeals and, if appropriate, providing for the charging of fees.
The powers cannot be used to interfere with the ORR’s independence in deciding and assessing individual appeals, or used to dictate the outcome of any appeal. Other procedural arrangements will be set by the ORR as it develops its appeals process. The power ensures that the framework can be set and adjusted, if required, to maintain effective operation over time while fully preserving the ORR’s independence in determining appeals. The Secretary of State will, of course, be required to consult the ORR, GBR, Scottish and Welsh Ministers and such other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making any regulations under the power.
In a similar vein, when the ORR issues, revises or replaces its appeals practice and procedure, it is important that it must consult GBR, the Secretary of State, Scottish and Welsh Ministers and such other persons it considers appropriate. That ensures coherence across the railway network, particularly where services cross borders. Removing these provisions would reduce flexibility and resilience in the appeals framework without materially strengthening the independence of the ORR’s appeals role. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for West Dorset to withdraw the amendment, and not to move amendments 204 and 205.
Edward Morello
I listened to the Minister’s points. I think that the Liberal Democrats have been adamant throughout scrutiny of the Bill that we want to establish clear lines between the ORR, GBR and the Secretary of State in order to limit meddling under any future Government and to protect what this Government are trying to achieve. The Bill needs clear red lines on where Secretary of State power should be, so I will push the amendments to Divisions.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Keir Mather
I beg to move amendment 175, in clause 69, page 39, line 25, leave out “17(1)” and insert “17”.
This amendment and amendment 176 restrict the power of the Office of Rail and Road to give directions to Great British Railways so that it will apply only to “facility to facility” access contracts.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 176 to 183.
Clause stand part.
Clause 70 stand part.
Amendment 146, in clause 71, page 40, line 30, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment prevents regulations allowing for the early termination of access agreements.
Clause 71 stand part.
Government amendment 186.
New clause 67—Abolition of open access rights—
“Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument make provision to—
(a) prevent the granting or renewal of licences for open access passenger services;
(b) where such services cease to operate as a result of paragraph (a), require Great British Railways to operate equivalent services following their cessation.”
Keir Mather
Amendments 175 to 183 and 186 will ensure that GBR can enter into connection contracts with adjacent infrastructure managers and facility owners. A connection contract is a formal agreement that focuses on the physical interface and upkeep of the connection between two rail networks. Connection contracts are important in enabling the smooth passage of trains from GBR’s network to others, such as the Core Valley Lines in Wales. They also allow GBR’s network to be connected to privately owned depots or ports, which will be of importance to freight operators. These technical amendments retain the existing arrangements, enabling GBR and other parties to enter into connection contracts. I therefore urge the Committee to support them.
Edward Morello
I wish to speak in support of amendment 146 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage. Clause 71 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations allowing for the early termination of access agreements. We believe that this creates unnecessary uncertainty for train operators and passengers. Access agreements are detailed, regulated contracts that set out service patterns, responsibilities and costs. They are overseen by the ORR and published on its public register. Amendment 146 would remove ministerial powers to terminate those agreements early, limiting the ability of the Secretary of State to micro- manage GBR.
While I risk sounding like a broken record, as I have said before, these are powers that apply to both the current Government and future one. While I understand the desire for the Secretary of State to have the power to terminate agreements, those powers sit better with the ORR and GBR. If we want stability, investment and reliable services, we need to signal to the market that there will not be political intervention that undermines long-term planning. I hope that the Government will see the sense of this amendment.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 69 amends the Railways Act 1993 to except GBR or a subsidiary of GBR from the sections outlining the ORR’s powers on access and its corresponding duties. That change would prevent the ORR from making access decisions on infrastructure operated by GBR. The clause removes GBR from the normal ORR supervised access regime, giving it a special exemption that no other operator has. Since GBR is both operator and infrastructure manager, we believe that this creates an uneven playing field and risks unfair treatment of competing operators. If the Government insist on the current drafting, they must come clean and admit that their intention is to treat competitors unfairly in comparison, and that they are not in favour of competition and reject private investment as a driver of innovation and improvement on the railway.
Given the destruction of the current independently managed fair and level playing field, it is no surprise that the industry has major concerns. Eurostar’s written evidence to the Transport Committee explains:
“The Railways Bill consolidates strategic and operational authority in Great British Railways. While centralising network management offers efficiency gains, it is essential that ORR’s independent regulatory function is preserved, especially for open access and international services. In future Government will have the overarching interest in the Infrastructure Concession (let to LSPH), the Maintainer Operator (Network Rail) and the largest operator on the route (SET). There needs to be an independent referee to balance these interests with those of open access operators.
ORR provides impartial oversight of track access, station allocation, depot facilities, charging, and timetabling. Its independence provides transparent decision-making and safeguards competition, while giving investors confidence in the long-term stability of services.
Decisions such as the allocation of depot access at Temple Mills demonstrate the importance of ORR in balancing competing demands for constrained resources. Without statutory protection, GBR could constrain competition and impede international service growth. In addition, it could reduce transparency in access allocation.
Eurostar recommends that the Bill explicitly preserves the ORR’s independent role in regulating access, charges, and depot allocation for international services. This statutory protection is essential to provide fair treatment for operators and give certainty for the future of UK international rail services.
In international rail terms, the ORR’s role is more important than ever before, given the recent ruling enabling a new entrant to the market to access Temple Mills depot. The regulator will need to perform a strong, independent and objective role in ruling on cost sharing, compatibility and rolling stock issues.
The ORR can also play a role in track access charges – costs for accessing the London-to-Calais stretch of rail are nine times higher per kilometre than the cost of accessing equivalent infrastructure in Belgium, France or the Netherlands.”
Written evidence to the Transport Committee from Lumo and Hull Trains outlines their concerns:
“The ORR plays an essential role in maintaining a fair, transparent, and competitive rail network. Its independence supports confidence among passengers, freight operators, and private investors. Lumo and Hull Trains believe the Railways Bill should preserve this role to help GBR succeed.
To maintain balance across the system, the ORR must retain meaningful regulatory powers to ensure decisions made by GBR on access and charging are fair, evidence-based, and consistent with the Government’s growth objectives. The current drafting of the Bill, however, limits the ORR’s capacity to intervene proactively, restricting its powers primarily to appeals after decisions have been made.
Enhancing the ORR’s decision-making and enforcement capability would help ensure that GBR’s commercial and operational decisions remain aligned with the wider interests of passengers and the market. This approach would reinforce the Government’s ambition for a collaborative, competitive, and accountable rail system. A strong regulator also provides stability for investors, ensuring that GBR operates within a framework that fosters long-term confidence and fair treatment for all market participants.
While the Government desires to create a ‘directing mind’ in GBR, coordinating rail with a whole network view, for private operators to have confidence in the system there must be appropriate protections guaranteeing fair access and charging. The ORR is well-positioned to perform that role as an essential backstop, but the correct framework must be built around it to enable it to operate as such.”
Finally, Angel Trains also provided written evidence to the Transport Committee:
“Angel Trains believes that the new access framework must provide equitable access to all parts of the railway, whether operators are GBR-led, Open Access, or freight. As a lessor of rolling stock to both GBR-led and Open Access operators we believe parity among operators is crucial and would welcome greater clarity from the Government on how access and charging decisions will be made and prioritised. As an independent regulator, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) should be responsible for ensuring a level playing field by intervening if concerns are raised that GBR could have taken a discriminatory decision, for example, around preferential access rights and charging for GBR operators over Open Access competitors.
Beyond access arrangements, we would welcome further detail from the Government about how GBR will be held to account. In its current form, GBR possesses a high concentration of power in its role in setting both strategy and delivery. In order to provide adequate scrutiny and accountability, there must be sufficient checks and balances to ensure that financial, economic, and safety objectives are met.
Angel Trains believes that there should be clear divisions between different parts of the rail system to ensure adequate accountability…As outlined above, it is vital that there is a fully independent regulator to hold GBR to account, for which the ORR could be best-placed. Beyond acting as an arbiter on access and charging decisions, the ORR should be empowered to report on GBR’s performance and issue performance improvements notices to GBR, in addition to other regulatory duties. The ORR must maintain a regulatory function to provide fairness and stability for the rail industry, which encourages investment and ensures financial sustainability by creating a level playing field across the sector and eliminating subjectivity from decision-making.”
We therefore seek to leave out clause 69 and will vote against it. This would keep GBR under the normal access regime supervised by the ORR and ensure a fair system. We have no objections to Government amendments 175 to 183 but, as mentioned, we are less happy with clause 69 as a whole.
Clause 70 amends the 2016 regulations to exempt GBR from the provisions of those regulations that would otherwise apply to its infrastructure. The 2016 regulations will continue to apply to other infrastructure managers. We do not object to the clause.
Keir Mather
I thank the shadow Minister and others for their contributions. It is a small point, but the shadow Minister raised international obligations and treaties, and I want to reassure her that infrastructure managed and operated by parties other than GBR, including High Speed 1, will continue to be governed by the existing access and management regulation. There will therefore be no impact on international obligations and treaties. Hopefully, that will instil confidence throughout the rail supply chain as to how seriously we take those obligations.
I will speak first to clauses 69 and 70, before turning to the amendments. Clause 69 amends the Railways Act 1993 to exempt GBR from the ORR’s powers on access and its corresponding duties. In short, the clause prevents the ORR from making access decisions on infrastructure operated by GBR. Amendment of the existing provisions is vital to allow the Government to fulfil their commitment to establish GBR as the directing mind responsible and accountable for making best use of the railway. Retaining the role of the ORR as the decision maker on access is not the answer.
Under the current ORR system, decisions on the timetable are plagued by delays and disagreements between ORR and Network Rail, and require ministerial intervention for timetables to be finalised. As the regulator, the ORR does not have the ability to review the system holistically, create more routes and optimise the overall use of the network—it can only respond to the specific applications that are submitted to it.
If we keep the current system, we will continue to see disruption and delays caused by timetabling problems, and inefficient use of the network that is no one’s best interests. We will continue to see problems, such as trains running without passengers on them, purely because of the systematic issues that govern access and timetabling decisions. Retaining the ORR as the access decision maker would not lead to better performance, and would not benefit passengers. The only way to achieve the high-performing and high-quality railway that this country needs is to put one body—GBR—in charge of the railway and of granting access to it. It is only GBR—not Ministers or the ORR—that will have the level of expertise and the detailed knowledge of the whole railway system that is needed to make the right decisions for passengers, freight users and taxpayers.
Clause 70 makes technical changes to the body of law that currently governs access, to exempt GBR and make some other consequential changes, so that the existing access and management regulations will no longer apply to GBR in relation to its infrastructure. The technical amendments in the clause are necessary to enable GBR to become the single decision maker and directing mind for its infrastructure. The existing regulations will continue to apply for adjacent infrastructure managers, such as Transport for London and Core Valley Lines in south Wales.
Clause 71 provides the Secretary of State with a time-limited power to ensure that contracts can continue to operate effectively, following the establishment of Great British Railways. The Government have made the commitment that, following its establishment, the existing access rights held by operators, known as schedule 5 rights, will be honoured, as will the charges set by the ORR for the remainder of the current control period. The clause does not change those commitments. However, the power is needed to prevent contracts from becoming inoperable because they are reliant on the previous legislative framework in the Railways Act 1993, which will not be applicable once the Bill is enacted.
In a similar way to how the ORR provides notices for contracts today, the Secretary of State will, if necessary, and only as a last resort, use the power to make technical changes to existing contracts, simply to ensure smooth transition to the new access and charging regime under GBR—for example, to account for the establishment of GBR and address the changed roles of the ORR and GBR, so that contracts still operate as they should.
Without those changes, operators with access rights would potentially not be able to provide the services that they have contracts and rights to run, because the contracts will become inoperable. However, recognising the need for reassurance, and to offer certainty for third parties, the Government have also committed publicly to ensuring that operators with existing contracts in scope of needing that power will be engaged with and consulted, to identify inoperable clauses and agree on replacement wording.
Amendment 146 would take away the ability to amend or terminate contracts. However, it is necessary for the clause to be drafted widely, including with reference to termination, in case the best way to effect the technical changes to the contract is to terminate and immediately replace the contract with one that is aligned to the new legislative framework, rather than making numerous technical amendments throughout that would otherwise render the contract unusable or unwieldy. As stated earlier, that will not affect any operators’ schedule 5 rights, nor will it impede the existing charging determination set by the ORR until its natural expiry in April 2029, which the Government have confirmed both publicly and in writing. Not including that provision would be a risk to the smooth transition to the new regime, which the Government are not prepared to risk.
Given all that I have discussed, I urge hon. Members not to press the amendment to a vote.
Amendment 175 agreed to.
Amendments made: 176, in clause 69, page 39, line 26, leave out from “after” to end of line and insert—
“subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Where the facility owner is Great British Railways, the Office of Rail and Road may give directions under subsection (1) only for the purpose specified in subsection (2)(e).”
See the explanatory statement for amendment 175.
Amendment 177, in clause 69, page 39, line 32, leave out—
“to which this section applies”
and insert—
“of the description specified in subsection (2)(e) unless one of the conditions in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) is satisfied; and any such contract is void unless one of those conditions is satisfied.”
This amendment replaces the general restriction on Great British Railways entering into access contracts with one that will apply only to “facility to facility” access contracts.
Amendment 178, in clause 69, page 40, line 1, leave out subsection (4)(c).
This amendment removes the restriction on Great British Railways as a facility owner entering into installation access contracts.
Amendment 179, in clause 69, page 40, line 4, at end insert—
“(4A) In section 21 (model clauses for access contracts), after subsection (5) insert—
‘(6) The powers of the Office of Rail and Road under subsection (5) may not be exercised in relation to an access contract where the facility owner is Great British Railways unless the access contract is of the description specified in section 18(2)(e).’”
This amendment provides for the ORR’s model clauses powers to be exercisable in relation to access contracts entered into by GBR only where the access contract is a “facility to facility” access contract.
Amendment 180, in clause 69, page 40, line 6, leave out “if” and insert “where”.
This amendment and amendment 181 provide for ORR approval to be required for amendment of “facility to facility” access contracts entered into by Great British Railways.
Amendment 181, in clause 69, page 40, line 7, at end insert—
“unless the agreement is an access contract of the description specified in section 18(2)(e)”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 180.
Amendment 182, in clause 69, page 40, leave out lines 10 to 12 and insert—
“(5A) Directions may not be given under this section in relation to an access agreement where the facility owner or installation owner is Great British Railways unless the agreement is an access contract of the description specified in section 18(2)(e).”
This amendment restricts the ORR’s power to give directions under section 22A of the Railways Act 1993 to the parties to an access agreement in line with the approach taken by the other amendments about access agreements.
Amendment 183, in clause 69, page 40, line 12, at end insert—
“(7) In section 22C (amendment: supplementary), after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) Directions may not be given under subsection (1) in relation to an access agreement where the facility owner or installation owner is Great British Railways unless the agreement is an access contract of the description specified in section 18(2)(e).’”—(Keir Mather.)
This amendment restricts the ORR’s power to give directions under section 22C of the Railways Act 1993 to the parties to an access agreement Great British Railways in line with the approach taken by the other amendments about access agreements.
The Chair
I propose that we suspend the meeting for 10 minutes so that everybody can have a comfort break.
Edward Morello
I beg to move amendment 256, in clause 72, page 41, line 38, at end insert—
“(3A) The regulations must not make provision for the Secretary of State to direct operational matters of customer and facility-owner freight sidings and terminals.”
This amendment ensures that the Secretary of State does not exercise powers over operational matters of customer and facility-owner freight sidings and terminals.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 221, in clause 72, page 42, line 2, leave out from “consult” to end of line and insert
“the Office of Rail and Road and affected facility owners”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult the ORR and affected facility owners before making regulations under this section.
Amendment 231, in clause 72, page 42, line 4, at end insert—
“(7) Infrastructure, facilities and services not managed by Great British Railways which are used exclusively for the carriage of goods by rail are excluded from the provisions of this section.”
This amendment clarifies that privately funded, freight-only facilities are excluded from regulation under this section.
Clause stand part.
Clause 73 stand part.
Edward Morello
I speak in support of amendment 256, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage. Clause 72 allows regulations that could give the Secretary of State powers over operational matters in freight sidings and terminals. Amendment 256 makes clear that those operational decisions must not be subject to ministerial direction. The amendment comes directly from the freight industry and reflects clear concerns about unnecessary political interference.
Freight sidings and terminals are operational commercial assets, and their day-to-day management should sit with operators, not with Ministers. As we said in previous sittings, the powers would apply to not just the current but future Governments. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I should say that the Bill already gives the Secretary of State too much control and too many opportunities for micromanagement with too little accountability over too many areas. Amendment 256 draws a sensible boundary, protects freight operators from meddling, and supports a stable and efficient freight network.
Rebecca Smith
I will speak to clauses 72 and 73, and the grouped amendments. Clause 72 is another controversial clause. It sets out that the Secretary of State may make regulations about the management and operation of non-GBR infrastructure, which means any network, station or track not operated by or on behalf of GBR; about the rights to operate trains that use non-GBR infrastructure; and about competition in the market for the provision and supply of such operations.
Subsection (2)(c) allows the Secretary of State to set access terms and charges for non-GBR infrastructure, overriding commercial negotiation and bypassing the ORR. That cuts directly against the stated principle that the publicly owned operator must not regulate its competitors. It is an extraordinary clause that cuts up contract law and throws it out of the window.
The Rail Freight Group is concerned. It states:
“Clause 72 enables the Secretary of State by regulation to intervene in privately owned rail freight terminals, setting conditions of access and charges amongst other matters. Again, we understand that this is not the intention of the clause (which exists to enable GBR to take over other infrastructure such as HS1, Heathrow Branch or the Core Valley Lines) but nonetheless it is an extant risk to rail freight as presently worded, and we believe freight terminals should be explicitly out of scope for this clause.”
Rebecca Smith
I think he probably would have said it, to be perfectly honest.
Clause 73 marks the end of a very significant chapter in the Bill, with many poorly drafted or simply ill thought through clauses. I am sure the drafting has been done with the greatest attention to detail; it is just the “thought-through-ness” that we are struggling with. But we end on a positive note, with no objections to clause 73.
Keir Mather
I am pleased to speak to this group of provisions, which concludes the scrutiny on the access chapters of the Bill.
Clause 72 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations to amend the Railways (Access, Management and Licensing of Railway Undertakings) Regulations 2016 via the affirmative procedure. The access and management regulations are the existing body of secondary legislation that sets out the rights and obligations of infrastructure managers, train operators and the role of the ORR in relation to access, capacity allocation, access charges and performance. At present, those regulations can be amended only using powers under the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, but those powers will expire on 23 June 2026, which means that, after that date, there will be no means other than an Act of Parliament by which those detailed and technical regulations can be amended.
Great British Railways infrastructure will not be subject to the regulations, as the Bill establishes a new access framework to enable GBR to be the directing mind, which we have discussed over the last few groups. However, alongside Great British Railways there will be a number of rail networks, such as Transport for London, London St Pancras Highspeed and the Core Valley Lines in Wales, that will continue to be subject to the access and management regulations. Those “adjacent infrastructure managers” will therefore not be part of GBR’s access regime. The purpose of the power in clause 72 is to ensure that the legislative framework governing the other infrastructure managers can be updated to address any inconsistencies between networks—to “keep pace” between the two different regulatory regimes. Without this power there may be disruption to the smooth passage of train services across different networks—which the Government have a duty to protect.
For example, the power might be used to secure alignment on the date when a new working timetable must come into effect. The access and management regulations currently stipulate a date in December, but given the risk of weather-related events, staff absences during the Christmas season and the engineering works that usually take place between Christmas and the new year, GBR will likely want to move away from that. If it did, it is not unreasonable to think that other infrastructure managers might want to follow suit to avoid being affected by the same risks and to ensure consistency in the timetable change date. To achieve that, it would be necessary to amend the regulations for the other infrastructure managers who wish to align with the date that GBR chooses in the future. The regulation-making power would enable that simple change to be made without needing an Act of Parliament.
There may also be opportunities for adjacent infrastructure managers to seek further simplifications to the current regulations in a way that meets our ambitions to reduce regulatory burden and support growth, while maintaining a sustainable and predictable framework so that businesses have confidence to plan and invest. The Government consider regulations, rather than primary legislation, as a better way in which to achieve that.
Regulations made under the clause must be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring full parliamentary scrutiny. Before exercising the power, the Secretary of State will consult all interested parties, ensuring full transparency, that industry has the chance to comment and that Parliament approves the regulations before any changes can be made. Amendments 256, 221 and 231 all seek to narrow that power in some way.
Amendment 256 would prevent the power from being used to direct operational matters of customer and facility owner freight sidings and terminals; amendment 231 would similarly exclude freight-only facilities. Those amendments are unnecessary, as the purpose of the power is to ensure alignment and remove inconsistencies in the regulatory regimes that will apply to GBR and non-GBR infrastructure and to enable simplifications where they align with the objectives of adjacent infrastructure managers.
Rebecca Smith
The Minister just said that the amendments are completely unnecessary, because the stated concerns are not real, effectively. That does not answer the very real concerns put forward time and again in the Transport Select Committee and in this Committee’s evidence session—the written and oral evidence—by businesses that are experts in the field. They are not reassured by the Bill as it stands. How can the Minister go back and say, “No, we’re right and you’re wrong,” to those experts in the industry?
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I am not arguing that stakeholders are not valid in raising concerns about the issues: they are. I am seeking to ameliorate their concerns by outlining what provisions are in the legislation to offer sufficient scrutiny and ensure that the way in which the process happens offers robust safeguards.
Constraints are built into clause 72 to ensure sufficient oversight, with the Secretary of State consulting persons considered appropriate and making changes in secondary legislation that is subject to the affirmative procedure. That means that legislation will be subject to full public consultation and subsequently debated in both Houses, which reflects the importance of the regulations in providing certainty for business.
I have already said that the Secretary of State will consult all interested parties to ensure that there is full transparency and industry comment. Amendments 256, 221 and 231 would all narrow that power in some way. Amendment 256 would prevent the power from being used to direct operational matters of customer and facility owner freight sidings, and amendment 231 would exclude freight-only facilities. I have already spoken on why some of the principles that lie behind those amendments are unnecessary.
Let us take my example of GBR changing the date when its new working timetable is to take effect. On the basis of the amendments, other infrastructure managers would forever be misaligned with that new timetable change date, even if they wished to align. The Government do not intend to use the power to direct the owners or operators of private freight facilities on operational matters.
I am happy to reassure the Committee that the power cannot be used to bring other infrastructure managers or operators of privately funded facilities into public ownership, as I know how exercised Opposition Committee members have been about that principle. In the consultation, industry broadly supported the ability to make necessary amendments, although it is of course right to raise concerns when they arise. Most sector bodies agree that it will be important to ensure that there are no regulatory barriers to passenger and freight operators crossing between different networks, and that is what the clause seeks to achieve.
Amendment 221 would make the ORR and affected facility owners statutory consultees to the power. That is unnecessary as before exercising the power to make regulations, the Secretary of State is already required to consult all persons they consider appropriate, which would include the ORR and any affected facility owners. If the Secretary of State did not consult such persons, there would be strong grounds to challenge the regulations.
Clause 73 will ensure clarity in how key terms are applied throughout the access chapter of the Bill. It defines “GBR infrastructure”, “GBR passenger service” and “working timetable”—fundamental terms to the operation of GBR. The definition of GBR infrastructure ensures that the new access arrangements developed by GBR apply only where intended. The clause also includes a power to amend the definition, which is necessary to ensure that, as GBR’s network evolves over time, it remains clear to GBR and other infrastructure managers which parts of infrastructure are GBR’s responsibility. The clause is therefore critical to provide clarity and transparency.
Given what I have set out, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments. I commend clauses 72 and 73 to the Committee.
Edward Morello
I have nothing further to add, but we would like to press amendment 256 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Rebecca Smith
I beg to move amendment 99, in clause 74, page 42, line 24, after “monitor” insert “and audit”.
This amendment would require the ORR to monitor and audit GBR’s statutory functions.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 100, in clause 74, page 42, line 29, after “monitoring” insert “and auditing”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 99.
Amendment 101, in clause 74, page 42, line 30, after “monitoring” insert “and auditing”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 99.
Amendment 97, in clause 74, page 43, line 5, at end insert—
“including, where reasonably practicable, implementation of recommendations of safety improvements and standards developed through relevant industry bodies”.
This amendment ensures that Great British Railways in furtherance of railway safety actively engages with the industry bodies such as the Rail Safety and Standards Board and implements where reasonably practicable, the cross-sector recommendations of safety improvements and standards emerging from any cross-sector work.
Amendment 222, in clause 74, page 43, line 5, at end insert—
“(d) whether, and the extent to which, Great British Railways is achieving its key performance indicators set out in section [Great British Railways: Key Performance Indicators].”
This amendment requires the Office of Rail and Road to consider Great British Railways’ performance against its KPIs, as set out in NC2. This amendment is consequential on NC2.
Clause stand part.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 74 amends the Railways Act 1993. It gives the ORR a new function to monitor GBR’s delivery of its statutory functions and carry out investigations where appropriate to fulfil that monitoring. In particular, the ORR must consider how and whether GBR is carrying out the activities listed in its approved business plan, how the cost of carrying out those activities compares with the estimates in the business plan, and whether GBR is carrying out railway activities in a way that furthers railway safety. The ORR may advise the Secretary of State in relation to that monitoring function and publish its advice.
Amendments 99 to 101
“would require the ORR to monitor and audit GBR’s statutory functions.”
The amendments address the relationship between GBR and the ORR, making it clear that the ORR remains an independent regulator with powers associated with audit, for example in relation to the release of documents. None of that applies to a woolly duty to monitor. Legally, the term “monitoring” is weak. It does not imply an ability to take action to demand improvement. That is particularly concerning when combined with clause 75, which removes the ORR’s ability to impose a financial penalty in the event of poor performance.
Amendment 97
“ensures that Great British Railways in furtherance of railway safety actively engages with the industry bodies such as the Rail Safety and Standards Board and implements where reasonably practicable, the cross-sector recommendations of safety improvements and standards emerging from any cross-sector work.”
That provides the Office of Rail and Road a clear mechanism to hold Great British Railways to account in safety matters. It also highlights an expectation of relevant industry bodies to recommend improvements to Great British Railways. We will not divide the Committee on amendment 97, but we ask the Government to think about what we are proposing in it. We all want the Bill to make the railways safer, and anything we can do to ensure that that happens will be for the good.
I think we have already debated amendment 98, but I want to put it in context we will vote on it at this point, so I want to mention why it is relevant. It
“would require the ORR to consider whether GBR procuring services from the private sector would be a more efficient use of public funds.”
That echoes previous amendments that we tabled, but we will be dividing on amendment 98 as part of this group, I believe.
Amendment 222
“requires the Office of Rail and Road to consider Great British Railways’ performance against its KPIs, as set out in”
new clause 2. As amendment 222 is consequential on new clause 2, we will not press it to a Division, given that the new clause is likely to be rejected. It is a probing amendment that we wanted on record.
We also have amendment 236, which is not part of the group, but my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham told me not to forget it because we will have a vote on it. Are we debating group 73?
Keir Mather
Me too, Mrs Hobhouse. Thank you for placing such confidence in me; we will see in due course if it is justified.
I thank the shadow Minister for speaking to amendment 222, which would require the ORR to monitor KPIs. My response will be brief, to avoid repeating myself, as the amendment is heavily linked to new clause 2, which we have already debated.
We expect GBR to have KPIs, as I have said before, but the right place for them is in GBR’s integrated business plan, alongside the detail of the activity that GBR will carry out over the five-year funding period. No sensible business would ever set its KPIs in stone, potentially for generations to come.
It is important that the ORR, in its role scrutinising GBR’s proposed business plans and monitoring its delivery of them, is able to assess whether commitments made by GBR are ambitious and realistic. As the independent expert adviser to the Secretary of State, the ORR will have a clear route to influence the formulation of GBR’s KPIs. By keeping them within the business plan, the ORR’s involvement is already ensured by legislation.
Amendment 97 would require the ORR to monitor whether GBR is implementing safety recommendations and standards set by industry bodies. I sympathise with the sentiments behind the amendment. Britain’s railways remain some of the safest in the world, which is why we are maintaining the roles of the statutory bodies in this area—the ORR and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch —and preserving the legal duty on all public bodies, including GBR, to give due regard to the investigation branch safety recommendations addressed to them.
Existing safety legislation already gives the ORR broad powers to monitor GBR’s safety management, including its implementation of investigation branch recommendations, and to take enforcement action if it finds that GBR is not managing safety effectively. The amendment risks confusing or duplicating well-understood roles and responsibilities in relation to the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of safety best practice. I hope I have reassured the hon. Member that this suggestion is already covered.
Amendments 99 to 101 would require the ORR to audit GBR’s statutory functions when undertaking its monitoring role. That is unnecessary, and would distort the clear and distinct roles set out in the Bill for both GBR and the ORR. The Bill retains the ORR’s important role as sector regulator and creates an enhanced monitoring function through which it will monitor GBR’s statutory functions and provide independent advice to the Secretary of State.
The ORR’s role as sector regulator is rightly separate to the role of an approved auditor. The annual accounts of GBR will be audited by the National Audit Office in the usual way. We do not propose to change that effective system, and cannot agree to an amendment that would layer it with unwarranted and inappropriate duplication, given that the ORR will already be monitoring GBR’s delivery of the KPIs within its business plan and GBR’s consideration of its duties when doing this.
Oversight of GBR will be proportionate, risk-based and focused on the outcomes that matter most to users of the railway, taxpayers and the wider public. The ORR will have a crucial part to play in providing this oversight, including by undertaking its enhanced monitoring role in the way it, as the independent regulator, considers appropriate. With that in mind, I urge the hon. Member not to press those amendments.
I commend clause 74 to the Committee. It will provide the ORR with enhanced monitoring powers, in line with its new role in the reformed sector. It will ensure that the ORR can effectively scrutinise GBR and provide independent expert advice for the Secretary of State for Transport and Scottish Ministers on its performance. As set out in the Bill, GBR will be required to produce an integrated business plan that demonstrates how it will deliver its priorities across the breadth of its statutory functions, including passenger services and the management of the GBR network.
Although GBR will report to the Secretary of State on the delivery of the plan, the ORR will be required to monitor the performance of GBR and independently advise the Secretary of State. The clause sets out that the ORR will monitor how GBR exercises its functions, including whether the commitments in GBR’s business plan are being met, how costs and income compare with estimates in that plan, and the extent to which GBR is ensuring safety on the railway. On an ongoing basis, the ORR will be able to escalate concerns to Ministers as it considers necessary, enabling the Secretary of State to make informed decisions in line with her responsibilities as funder of GBR. Given that the Secretary of State is democratically responsible for the billions of pounds of taxpayer subsidy invested in the railway, it is right that she has the final say on how it is used, with proper, comprehensive advice from an expert independent regulator to support her.
To fulfil its new role, the ORR must have the ability to gather information, conduct investigations, and assess whether GBR is fulfilling its statutory functions and business plan commitments. Clause 74 provides that statutory basis. It will allow the ORR, where it deems appropriate, to publish any information or advice it provides to the Secretary of State in connection with this monitoring function. That will ensure that the public can see how GBR is being held to account for its performance and how it is delivering in the interest of its customers, taxpayers and the public.
The policy rationale is clear: the Government are committed to preserving an independent expert adviser within the rail system and are providing the necessary tools for that body to operate and scrutinise GBR effectively. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
I have indicated that we want to press amendment 99 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Keir Mather
I beg to move amendment 271, in clause 75, page 43, line 23, at end insert—
“(2A) In section 55 (orders for securing compliance), after subsection (7C) insert—
‘(7D) The Office of Rail and Road may not, by a final or provisional order, require the payment of a sum by Great British Railways.’”
This amendment would ensure that the ORR may not impose a fine on GBR under an order to secure compliance with conditions etc, to align with the amendment to section 57A of the Railways Act 1993 made by clause 75(3) of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 212, in clause 75, page 43, line 24, leave out subsection (3).
This amendment removes the restriction on the ORR to impose fines on GBR for licence breaches.
Clause stand part.
Keir Mather
I will first speak to Government amendment 271 and clause 75 as drafted, which is essential to ensure that the accountability arrangements for GBR reflect its status as a publicly owned body, as well as enshrining the strategic role of Ministers.
The clause will make two changes to functions of the ORR that would otherwise apply to GBR. The first is to prevent the ORR from issuing specific directions to GBR relating to providing, improving or developing railway facilities, such as stations or depots. However, we expect that the GBR licence will include a condition relating to long-term asset management to ensure that the ORR retains oversight of infrastructure in the new system. As Members are aware, GBR’s licence will be subject to formal consultation.
The direction power was originally included to ensure that improvements were made when it is was clearly in the interests of the railway generally, but a railway operator might have no commercial incentive to make them. In the new system, GBR will be incentivised to improve its own infrastructure, and the change in legislation recognises that it is for Ministers, as funders, and GBR itself—not the regulator—to set the strategic direction for GBR.
GBR should then make decisions and improvements as part of its business planning, and the ORR should be able to monitor against the agreed business plan, supported by a licence condition that ensures that it can enforce long-term asset management in case anything goes wrong. If the ORR identifies a failing that constitutes a breach of that condition, and dialogue or early intervention have not proved effective, it will be able to escalate issues to the GBR board, require GBR to create and publish improvement plans and issue an enforcement order, which is a legal instruction that would require GBR to take action to meet its responsibilities.
The second change is to remove the ORR’s power to fine GBR. Imposing financial penalties on a public body would not align with the aims of maximising the benefits of public ownership. It would simply mean recycling public funds between two public bodies, continuing the money-go-round that is pervasive in today’s system. It would also add an administrative burden with only a limited effect on incentivising the right behaviours.
Amendment 271 is a technical amendment to ensure that when the Bill removes the ORR’s power to fine, it refers to all the correct parts of the law, including section 55 of the Railways Act 1993, to achieve that aim. The ORR will retain the ability to issue fines for breaches of licence conditions by non-GBR licence holders where that is an effective tool because those organisations will not be wholly funded by Government money. GBR can still be subject to a financial penalty if it violates health and safety or competition laws, as we are not changing the safety regime that will apply to the railways, and competition law will still apply in full to GBR. I look forward to hearing from hon. Members about amendment 212.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Mrs Hobhouse. Our amendment 212 relates to what the Minister said: it would remove the restriction on the ORR’s ability to impose fines on GBR for licence breaches. I am hoping that we can find some agreement or that the Minister can improve my understanding of the Bill. I entirely agree with him that we do not want wooden dollars—are we still allowed to say that?—sloshing around the system. We do not want fake money, fake economics or fake regulation. That has not been a strength of the rail industry under the current structure.
The Minister said that the ORR would have the powers to tell GBR to do better and to put a legally binding notice on it. Perhaps this is an extreme thought experiment, but what would happen if GBR said, “Thank you very much, ORR, for your legally binding improvement notice, but we’re not interested—we’re not doing it.”? Is the Minister saying that the ORR could then sue GBR? What would happen next? If he covers that in his summing up, I might not move my amendment—I am sure he feels very threatened given how many Divisions we have won so far.
Rebecca Smith
Clause 75 prevents the ORR from issuing directions to GBR relating to providing, improving or developing railway facilities. It also prevents the ORR from imposing a fine on GBR for licence breaches. We think those are both terrible ideas.
The Transport Committee asked Maggie Simpson of the Rail Freight Group:
“What is your view on the ORR’s downgraded power merely to ‘advise’ the Secretary of State on GBR’s performance, rather than having actual powers of enforcement?”
She said:
“I am quite worried about this.”
To the same question, Steve Montgomery from First Rail said:
“Following on from that, the independence element of it—marking your own homework—is a big concern for us. How do we ensure that we do not see a perverse behaviour where GBR looks after its own operations to the detriment of others?”
Nick Brooks from ALLRAIL said:
“I can only echo that. With GBR writing the rules, controlling capacity and being linked to the main operator in the country, there is a structural conflict of interest, unless there is a clear duty of fairness and non-discrimination. I do not know of other European countries that do not have a strong independent rail regulator, across the EU and beyond. To be the judge and the jury at the same time is somewhat worrying.”
Emma Vogelmann, the co-chief executive of Transport for All, told the Transport Committee:
“Our recommendation on the role of the ORR is to retain its independent authority. We are definitely interested to see how that transition of powers, as Ben mentioned, plays out, and how enforceability plays into that.”
For once, the Government need to stop and listen. The sector is speaking with one voice and telling them that this is the wrong approach. The clause needs to be removed in its entirety. It is common for regulators to be able to issue financial penalties to private utility companies that are in breach of their statutory duties. Why should that consumer protection not also be applied to a public body like GBR? Removing clause 75 would restore the ORR as a strong, independent economic regulator.
Government amendment 271
“would ensure that the ORR may not impose a fine on GBR under an order to secure compliance with conditions etc, to align with the amendment to section 57A of the Railways Act 1993 made by clause 75(3) of the Bill.”
The Conservatives are against the whole clause, but, to save time, we will not seek a Division specifically on this amendment—I am sure that everybody will be pleased to hear that. However, as somebody who serves on the Transport Committee and sat through a lot of those evidence sessions, one of the key things that concerned me and some other members of the Committee was the breakdown of the relationship between the ORR and GBR and the weakening of the ORR’s powers. When I heard that evidence, I certainly felt that it was a compelling argument.
Liberal Democrat amendment 212 would remove the restriction on the ORR to impose fines on GBR for licence breaches. That is okay as far as it goes, and we will support the amendment, but we think that it does not quite go far enough. As I am sure Members expect on the basis of what I have just said, we will vote against clause 75 as a whole.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for his amendment, which would retain the ORR’s power to fine GBR in the event of a licence breach. He will be pleased to hear that I do not intend to repeat the arguments that I made in my opening remarks. However, as I suspect he knows, I cannot accept his amendment, because in creating the ability for the ORR to fine GBR, it would simply lead to the recycling of public funds, which he so ably outlined as being an issue.
On the subject of licence breaches, the ORR can issue an enforcement order to direct a different outcome from GBR. There is also a point to be made about accountability for GBR’s executives. That kind of relates to the penalties for Network Rail today: the ORR already recognises its public sector status and scales penalties accordingly. The chair and board of GBR will be responsible for ensuring that the CEO has in place robust performance management for senior staff, inherent to which will be not defying the ORR when it has issued legally binding directions. There will be a clear expectation that any significant failures will have a material impact on performance-related pay, and where the failure is sufficient to demand it, an individual should be at risk of dismissal. Put simply, removing the ORR’s power to fine will not cause the executive of GBR to be remiss in their duties.
Although the hon. Member asks me to speculate on potentially extreme cases where GBR could defy the ORR, I believe that, in the round, sufficient safeguards remain in place, with the ORR retaining its existing ability to issue mandatory and legally binding enforcement orders to GBR on matters within the licence; it is only the monetary aspect that is targeted here.
Amendment 271 agreed to.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Keir Mather
Clause 76 updates the Office of Rail and Road’s information duties by inserting a new section into the Railways Act 1993 under which the ORR must proactively publish documents and information about key regulatory matters, including licences, access contracts, closures and railway administration orders, in whatever manner and form it considers appropriate. At the same time, the clause removes the ORR’s duty to maintain a formal statutory register under section 72 of the 1993 Act and repurposes that section so that it better reflects modern expectations of transparency, while retaining strong safeguards so that information that would seriously and prejudicially affect individuals, businesses or the wider public interest is not disclosed. The clause is not retrospective: it does not compel the ORR to publish historical material, but it allows it to publish information already held on the existing register where that is appropriate.
The main purpose of clause 77 is to replace the Secretary of State’s duty to keep a statutory register under section 73 of the 1993 Act with a focused duty to publish information, in keeping with the Government’s commitment to ensure appropriate levels of transparency on the railways. Clauses 78 and 79 do the same but for Scottish and Welsh Ministers.
These clauses retain strong protections for individuals, businesses and the wider public interest, making it clear that material that would seriously and prejudicially affect those interests must not be published. They allow Ministers to publish material currently held on the existing register, so that there is no gap in transparency during transition. The clauses deliver a modern, proportionate and more accessible publication regime, in keeping with the Government’s ambitions for a reformed railway.
Rebecca Smith
Clauses 76 to 79 change the current duties on the ORR, the Secretary of State and Scottish and Welsh Ministers to maintain a register, in sections 72 to 73B of the Railways Act 1993, and put them under duties to publish certain information. The ORR must publish documentation relating to licences; access agreements; access contracts, other than those using GBR infrastructure, for which GBR will be responsible; experimental passenger services; closures; and railway administration orders, except where that would affect individual public or commercial interests. The Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and Welsh Ministers must publish determinations that a closure is a minor modification, and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions. Each clause contains restrictions about publishing information that would affect individual, public or commercial interests. Each clause also allows for the publication of documentation that was previously contained in the registers.
Clause 77, which is very similar to clause 76 and, indeed, clauses 78 and 79 on the devolved Ministers, amends section 73 of the 1993 Act, on the publication of a register by the Secretary of State, so that they are under duties to publish information—in particular, determinations that a closure is a minor modification and documentation relating to the enforcement of closure restrictions. However, proposed new section 73(5) of the 1993 Act is interesting. It states:
“The Secretary of State may not publish particular information or documents under this section if it appears to the Secretary of State that publication of that information or those documents would be against the public interest or the commercial interests of any person.”
Can the Minister outline under what circumstances not being transparent is not in the public interest? What determines public interest? I would be grateful to hear the methodology in this instance. Further, the only person with commercial interests in the railway will be the guiding hand of the Secretary of State herself, as it is all public money.
I am sure that proposed new subsection (5) is standard practice in statute, but it raises an interesting point about transparency that I ask the Government to spend some time thinking about. Public trust is low—perhaps it is even lower today than it was when my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham wrote this speech—and any part of any Bill that allows the Secretary of State to get away with not publishing information under a perceived public good would look most suspicious indeed. I do think that, in the light of yesterday’s events, my hon. Friend will see the irony in the words that he wrote there.
Clause 77(2) allows publication of anything that was in the register before the Bill’s commencement. What is the timeline for publication, and will the Minister commit to publication? Those queries aside, Members will be pleased to hear that we have tabled no amendments at this time.
Clause 78, which relates to publication of information by Scottish Ministers, mirrors clause 77. As I mentioned, it amends the 1993 Act, and aside from my query about the ability that it provides to not publish information against a perceived public good, we have no objections to the clause—unless it falls outside the devolution settlement, but presumably the Minister can reassure the Committee that it does not.
Clause 79 relates to the powers of Welsh Ministers, which are similar to those enjoyed by Scottish Ministers. The rationale behind allowing Ministers to not publish information over a perceived public good remains interesting to me, but I see no need to revise the clause.
Keir Mather
The intention of these changes is not to reduce transparency, but to modernise what is published and how. The new duty focuses on determinations under the Railways Act 2005 and the exercise of key enforcement and closure powers, which are among the most significant decisions the Secretary of State takes in relation to the railway. Other publication requirements—for example, on designations, directions and guidance, and the long-term rail strategy—are dealt with in other clauses, so the transparency framework should be viewed as a whole, not just through the lens of these changes to the 1993 Act.
The shadow Minister raised an important point about how commercial and public interest protections interact with freedom of information and scrutiny. The clauses preserve a carefully balanced approach that has long existed under the 1993 Act. This is not a wholesale change in how that process works. The Secretary of State must not publish material where it would be against the public interest or commercial interests, or where it would seriously and prejudicially affect individuals or particular bodies. Those protections sit alongside and do not displace the wider legal framework, including freedom of information legislation and parliamentary scrutiny, which of course continues to apply.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 76 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 77 to 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Nesil Caliskan.)