Finance (No. 2) Bill (First sitting)
(1 day, 8 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Good morning, everyone. We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed in the room. Members may remove their jackets if they wish to do so.
We will now consider the programme motion and the motion to enable reporting of written evidence for publication. In view of the time available, we will take these matters formally, without debate.
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 27 January) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 27 January;
(b) at 11:30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 29 January;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 3 February;
(d) at 11:30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 5 February;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 10 February;
(f) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 24 February;
(g) at 11:30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 26 February;
2. the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 11 to 43; Schedule 3; Clauses 44 to 45; Schedule 4; Clause 46; Schedule 5; Clause 47; Schedule 6; Clauses 48 and 49; Schedule 7; Clause 50; Schedule 8; Clauses 51 to 54; Schedule 9; Clause 55; Schedule 10; Clause 56; Schedule 11; Clauses 57 to 61; Clauses 70 to 82; Clauses 87 to 100; Schedule 23; Clauses 101 to 136; Schedule 14; Clauses 137 to 140; Schedule 15; Clauses 141 to 148; Schedule 16; Clause 149; Schedule 17; Clause 150; Schedule 18; Clauses 151 to 220; Schedule 19; Clauses 221 to 241; Schedule 20; Clauses 242 to 247; Schedule 21; Clauses 248 to 252; Schedule 22; Clauses 253 to 279; any new Clauses or new Schedules relating to the subject matter of those Clauses or those Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill.
3. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 26 February. —(Lucy Rigby.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Lucy Rigby.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee has received will be made available in the Committee Room.
We will now begin the line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses and schedules have been selected, and amendments have been grouped together for debate. Let us be clear about this, because I suspect that there may be Members present who have not been on a Public Bill Committee before, or any Committee before. The lead amendment is the first amendment in the group. That is the only one that, at the start of that debate, will be moved. All the others will be debated but moved later, if necessary. In clause stand part debates, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate if they wish to speak in the debate by bobbing. It would help if Members bobbed when they want to speak; we are all quite good at this but we do not have second sight.
The decision on clause stand part is usually taken at the end of the debate on each clause. You can either have a stand part debate at the end or during the debate on the amendments, but you cannot have both. I am fairly relaxed about this; other Chairs may take a different view. Sometimes it is more convenient to have a fairly wide debate on the clause at the start of the debate about amendments to the clause. That is perfectly in order as far as I am concerned, but you cannot do it twice. The Chair—in this case, me—will judge whether or not the clause then warrants a stand part debate. That is my decision, not yours, and it is final. Basically, that ball is in your court.
At the end of the debate on amendments and new clauses, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment—the one at the start of the group—or new clause. Before they sit down, it would be helpful if they could indicate whether they wish to move the amendment or withdraw it. It would also be helpful to whoever is in the Chair for there to be an indication if anybody wishes to force a Division on other amendments in the group.
The amendments are grouped by the Clerks, who are very expert in this, but in some cases they may relate to matters that come much further on in the Bill. People may say, “Hang on a minute! Why haven’t we voted on that?”—the answer is, we will when we get to it, if you want to. If any Member—the Minister, shadow Minister or anybody else—is speaking to an amendment that they want to move, it would be very helpful for the Chair to have an indication early on, so that when we get to that point we have a marker down that you want to force a Division. Within reason, we shall allow that.
If there are any queries at any time during the process—which is fairly arcane—do not be shy. None of us has a monopoly of wisdom, so just ask. I probably won’t know the answer either, but the Clerks will.
Clause 11
Charge and main rate for financial year 2027
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Lucy Rigby)
I am very pleased to be opening the first debate in this Finance Bill Committee. Clause 11 sets the charge for corporation tax for the financial year commencing in April 2027 and sets the main rate at 25%. Clause 12 sets the small profits rate at 19% for the same period.
The Government are committed to a stable and predictable tax system for businesses, and we are supporting businesses by creating the economic stability and fiscal sustainability needed for future growth. That is why we are delivering on our commitment, set out in the 2024 corporate tax road map, to cap corporation tax at 25% for the duration of this Parliament. The changes made by clauses 11 and 12 will establish the right of the Government to charge corporation tax for the financial year beginning in April 2027.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
Thank you for your guidance, Sir Roger. I am very grateful that you are in the Chair, because although I have been doing this for 15 years, as you know, and this is about my fifth Finance Bill, I do not have a clue how any of it works.
Mark Garnier
It is of course standard practice—as with income tax—for the Government to legislate the charge for corporation tax every year. These rate levels have remained unchanged since Labour came into office. As my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Bourne (Gareth Davies) pointed out last year, Labour promised to cap the corporation tax rate at 25% for the whole of this Parliament. That has not been done in legislation, although we have had an indication from the Minister that that is still the Government’s intention.
I will make just one small political point. The Government did promise that they would not increase taxes on working people, but we have seen national insurance contributions increase—that was obviously in a different Bill. None the less, the more the Minister can say about capping corporation tax at 25%, the more confident businesses and our economy will be that something will not be slipped in during the next three and a half years before the general election. We have no other objection to this measure.
Lucy Rigby
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for his comments and for highlighting the fact that we have kept our manifesto commitment on tax. This is part of that: we are capping corporation tax at 25% in line with our corporate tax road map.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Enterprise management incentives: thresholds and period for exercise
Lucy Rigby
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 13, page 7, line 37, at end insert—
“( ) In section 169I(7D)(b) of TCGA 1992 (material disposal of business assets)—
(a) for ‘tenth ’ substitute ‘specified’;
(b) at the end insert ‘(with “specified anniversary” having the meaning given in section 529(2A) of that Act)’.”
This amendment to TCGA 1992 would reflect the changes made to section 529 of ITEPA 2003 by clause 13 of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 38.
Clause stand part.
New clause 24—Report on impact of section 13 (Enterprise management incentives: thresholds and period for exercise)—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within two years of the coming into force of section 13, lay before the House of Commons a report on the impact of that section.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must, in particular, assess the impact on—
(a) the recruitment and retention of skilled employees in qualifying companies,
(b) high-growth and innovative companies, and
(c) the Exchequer finances.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to report to the House of Commons on the impact of section 13 on recruitment and retention in qualifying companies, on high-growth and innovative businesses, and on the Exchequer finances.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 13 significantly expands the enterprise management incentives scheme eligibility to allow greater access for scaling companies. Specifically, the changes made by the clause will expand the EMI company eligibility limits to maintain the world-leading nature of the scheme.
Government amendments 37 and 38 are consequential to the business asset disposal relief legislation, updating it to align with the EMI maximum holding period expansion provided by the clause. The change will significantly expand the EMI limits and expand access for scale-up companies.
New clause 24 would require reports to the House of Commons on the impact of the clause on recruitment and retention in qualifying companies, on high-growth and innovative businesses and on the Exchequer finances. The Government have published a tax information and impact note setting out the impact of the EMI expansion. That showed that the measure will cost £585 million in 2029-30. The expansion is expected to support an extra 1,800 of the highest growth scale-up companies over the next five years, allowing them to reward an estimated 70,000 more employees.
The Government keep all taxes under review, and monitor and evaluate tax policy changes on an ongoing basis. We have also launched a call for evidence to gather views from founders, entrepreneurs, scaling companies and investors on tax policy support for investment in high-growth UK companies.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger, and on the Committee considering this 536-page doorstop of a Bill. We are grateful for the written contributions and evidence provided to the Committee, but I think the usual channels should consider having oral evidence sessions for future Finance Bills, so that people can make important representations on significant pieces of legislation.
I will turn to clause 13 and new clause 24 tabled in my name. We need to have an enterprise economy that incentivises investment. The tax regime clearly has an important role to play in helping to achieve that, and in doing so, backing much needed growth in the economy. Clause 13 amends the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 to expand the enterprise management incentives scheme. That scheme helps attract, keep and motivate staff by allowing employees to buy shares in the company with tax advantages. That includes no income tax or national insurance contributions at the time of grant and exercise, with gains eventually being taxed under the more favourable capital gains regime, rather than as income tax.
The changes in the clause should make it easier for start-ups and growing companies to use the enterprise management incentives scheme, helping them reward staff and link employees’ success to the company’s growth. That is something that we support and the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association has also welcomed the change. The clause increases the company options limit from £3 million to £6 million, raises the gross asset limit from £30 million to £120 million, and doubles the employee limit from 250 to 500. It also extends the exercise period to 15 years. These are all welcome changes.
However, one important element that is not due to change under these provisions is that the scheme allows qualifying companies to grant employee share options up to a maximum value of £250,000 per individual. Has the Minister considered going further and raising the cap beyond £250,000 to attract the brightest and best to grow businesses?
In its report on competitiveness, published yesterday, TheCityUK states that,
“the UK’s tax schemes such as…Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI) offer lower relief thresholds and tighter eligibility than international equivalents such as the Qualified Small Business Stock regime in the US, weakening incentives to scale and retain activity domestically.”
I have tabled new clause 24, which would require the Government to assess and report to Parliament on the impact that the changes have on the recruitment and retention of skilled employees in qualifying companies, on high-growth and innovative companies and on the Exchequer.
The Minister referred to the tax information and impact note, but clearly that is a forecast of what the Government hope will happen, not a review of what has actually happened. I think that will be a debate that we have many times as we consider the Bill: a TIIN is not a review of what has actually happened. The numbers that the Minister gave may be higher or lower, but we need to have a post-implementation review.
According to the Budget 2025 policy costings, the objective is to increase eligibility to allow scale-ups, as well as start-ups, to access the scheme. That is, of course, something we support. Will the Minister commit to keeping the scheme under review to ensure it is delivering on its aims to support high-growth firms and to consider whether further action, such as on the individual threshold, is needed?
Given the substantial investment, can the Minister clarify what behavioural assumptions underpin these projections? How many companies just above the existing threshold are expected to utilise these expanded limits? The BVCA has said that the enterprise management incentives scheme is
“long overdue for reform: high growth companies are often unable to grant EMI options due to the constraints of the £30m gross assets and 250 employee limits.”
Does the Minister have figures showing how much these limits have actually restricted growth?
Mr Joshua Reynolds (Maidenhead) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger, on what is not only my first Finance Bill Committee, but my first Bill Committee—a nice, simple one to start me off. The Liberal Democrats welcome the changes made by clause 13. We need to support our British start-ups and British start-up culture to grow and develop.
We would of course like the Government to go further than clause 13 in what they promise. We need to ensure that we have a British start-up culture where start-ups do not, after five or 10 years, head off to the United States, taking that capital and leaving the UK with a brain drain. I have only one question to the Minister: how can we go further to ensure that once we have implemented the Bill, we will be in a position to say that fantastic UK companies will not head overseas, taking that capital and culture with them?
Lucy Rigby
The hon. Member for North West Norfolk made a series of important points. I come back to the fact that the Government have opened a call for evidence on tax in this area. The Committee will come to the enterprise investment scheme and venture capital trusts scheme, which the call for evidence also covers. Importantly, the call for evidence covers the changes we have made to the enterprise management incentives scheme. All of those changes, as well as the clauses we are about to discuss, are important to the Government’s objective of making sure that the UK is the best place in the world to start and grow a business, and I encourage any views to be fed into that call for evidence.
The hon. Member referred to an important report from TheCityUK and PwC; I attended its launch yesterday. I am pleased to tell him that the Government’s objectives on the growth of financial services very much align with that report. Our objectives and the report have much in common, but most importantly, we share the sense of urgency and ambition that it outlines.
The hon. Member for Maidenhead referred to his desire to see more companies remain in the UK. That is imperative, and it is behind the Government’s reforms to a series of tax incentives in this area. We believe that the UK is already the best place in the world to start a company, and we have to make sure that it continues to be, but it must also be the best place to scale and to list a company. That is why the reforms are so important—so that companies stay.
Amendment 37 agreed to.
Amendment made: 38, in clause 13, page 7, line 38, for “(7)” substitute “(8)”.—(Lucy Rigby.)
This amendment is consequential on the addition of a new subsection by Amendment 37.
Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Enterprise investment scheme: increase in amounts and asset requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 29, in clause 15, page 10, line 23, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment would maintain the rate of income tax relief for investments into venture capital trusts at 30 per cent.
Government amendments 3 and 4.
Clause 15 stand part.
New clause 1—Report on the impact of section 15—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within six months of this Act being passed, lay before the House of Commons a report on the impact of implementation of the provisions of section 15 on—
(a) early-stage investment volume,
(b) investor participation, and
(c) international competitiveness.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to report to the House on the impact of section 15 on early-stage investment volumes, investor participation and the UK’s international competitiveness.
Lucy Rigby
Clauses 14 and 15 double the maximum amount that a company can raise through the enterprise investment scheme and venture capital trusts scheme, as well as the gross assets limit for companies using the scheme. The VCT income tax relief will also be reduced from 30% to 20%.
The changes made by clause 14 will mean that, from April 2026, the EIS annual company investment limits will increase to £10 million, or £20 million for knowledge-intensive companies. The lifetime company investment limits will increase to £24 million, or £40 million for knowledge-intensive companies. The gross assets test will increase to £30 million before share issue, and £35 million after. Likewise, clause 15 will mean that from April 2026, the VCT company investment limits and gross assets test will increase to the same levels. Alongside that, as I said, the VCT up front income tax relief will decrease from 30% to 20% from April 2026.
Government amendments 3 and 4 fix wording in clause 15 so that the annual and lifetime investment limits consistently apply to “the relevant company”, removing any ambiguity in how the VCT limits should be interpreted.
James Wild
Clauses 14 and 15 are a story of two halves. As the Chartered Institute of Taxation rather adeptly put it—we are grateful for its support in scrutinising the Bill—these changes give with one hand and take with the other. We support clause 14, but we have doubts about clause 15.
Both clauses deal with our risk capital schemes—the enterprise investment scheme and venture capital trusts. EIS was introduced in the UK in 1994 to stimulate economic growth and, along with VCTs, these Government-backed schemes encourage individuals to invest in smaller high-risk trading companies by offering tax reliefs on their investment. As a former adviser in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, I helped to develop these schemes, as well as the seed enterprise investment scheme. I recognise their importance.
As the venture capital industry has noted, these are essential tools in unlocking private capital for early-stage, high-growth UK businesses, which we all support, particularly in the knowledge-intensive sectors such as life sciences, clean energy and deep tech; however, companies now routinely require £20 million to £30 million in funding before they start to sell their products. The previous limits had prevented UK investors from following their initial investment with more capital, forcing businesses to turn to overseas capital too early. That is a problem I think we all want to fix.
The main difference between the schemes is that with EIS an investor buys shares directly in an eligible company, whereas with VCTs the investor buys shares in a listed fund-like vehicle, which then spreads their money across a portfolio of qualifying companies. These clauses increase the annual and lifetime investment limits for the EIS and VCTs in Great Britain and raise the gross asset thresholds for qualifying companies.
Clause 14 increases the annual and lifetime investment limits for the EIS and VCTs, and raises gross asset thresholds. These limits have not been uprated since 2018 for knowledge-intensive companies and 2015 for other companies. Now, all limits are being doubled, which is welcome. As we have heard, for both schemes, the limit will rise from £10 million to £20 million. The total amount that can be raised over time will increase to £40 million for those knowledge-intensive firms. The gross assets yield for qualifying companies will go up to £30 million before a share issue and £35 million thereafter. TheCityUK has said that schemes such as EIS remain vital for crowding in early-stage finance and these changes are welcomed by the industry.
Clause 15 heads somewhat in the opposite direction. This clause reduces the rate of income tax relief for investment in VCTs from 30% to 20%. This is where our doubts begin to grow. The 2025 Budget policy costings reveal a calculated trade-off. The increased limits in clause 14 will cost the Exchequer £60 million in 2027-28. Meanwhile, the reduction in VCT income tax relief will raise £125 million in the same year, delivering a net yield of approximately £65 million. The policy costings state that this rate reduction is intended to
“better balance the amount of upfront tax relief…and ensure funds are targeting the highest growth companies”,
but the costings’ own assumption that
“investors alter or reduce the way they invest into VCT”
is an acknowledgment that the relief cut will dampen investor appetite.
I am concerned by how much that tax increase will reduce investment in these high-growth companies that we all support. The British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association has been explicit about its concerns, warning that this reduction
“could lead to a decline in fundraising that would impact the high growth and high-risk investments that the Government is looking to encourage”.
VCTs are a key part of the UK’s capital mix, providing one of the few consistent sources of long-term equity for early-stage and scaling companies. Any reduction in their ability to raise funds would directly affect the pipeline of innovative businesses that the UK needs to grow.
The reduction in VCT relief to 20% creates a fundamental risk to venture capital funding, precisely when scale-ups face capital constraints. For early-stage companies dependent on VCT funding, the reduced relief translates directly into a higher cost of capital and reduced funding availability. The Budget relies heavily on revenue raising from less visible and more complex parts of the tax system. This VCT change exemplifies that approach, shifting costs to venture investors rather than implementing transparent broad-based taxation.
New clause 1 would require the Chancellor to report on the impact of the cuts to VCT allowance on early-stage investment volume, investor participation and international competitiveness. Given the Government’s own admission that this will alter investment behaviour, such reporting is essential, and I reiterate that a TIIN does not review what actually happens in practice. Amendment 29 would simply remove the provision in clause 15(2) that reduces the rate relief from 30% to 20%, keeping the relief at its current level to support investment in high-growth firms. I believe both amendments would be supported by industry and, subject to what the Minister says, I intend to press amendment 29 to a vote.
The Government are expanding VCT investment limits while simultaneously cutting the relief to 20%. How would the Minister address the concerns of the investment sector that the combined changes will dampen investor appetite for venture capital trusts at the very moment we need to encourage them?
Lucy Rigby
I welcome the shadow Minister’s welcoming of the majority of the changes that we are making. To address his criticism of what we are doing in relation to the venture capital trust income tax relief, I come back to the impetus behind this package of reforms as a whole on EMI, EIS and VCT, which is to make sure that the UK is the best to start, scale, list a company and to ensure that companies stay.
The specific change to VCT to reduce the income tax relief from 30% to 20% is to help rebalance the up-front tax reliefs offered across the schemes, where the VCT scheme offers tax relief on dividend income, which the EIS scheme investors do not get. VCTs tend to invest in larger, less risky, scaling companies compared with EIS scheme investors. The reduction in income tax relief therefore reflects the overall reduction in investment risk that comes with investing in later-stage companies.
It is important to bear in mind that the VCT scheme remains very generous with, as I said, 100% tax relief on dividend payments and 100% capital gains tax relief on the sale of shares, alongside that 20% income tax relief. I know that the shadow Minister does not like TIINs in general—he has made that point in the Chamber—but they do contain the full details of the assumptions and impacts, and indeed the policy rationale. I therefore commend clauses 14 and 15 and Government amendments 3 and 4 to the Committee, and ask that amendment 29 and new clause 1 be rejected.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Venture capital trusts: rate of relief and amounts and asset requirements
Amendment proposed: 29, in clause 15, page 10, line 23, leave out subsection (2).—(James Wild.)
This amendment would maintain the rate of income tax relief for investments into venture capital trusts at 30 per cent.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 16 will enable the existing enterprise management incentives scheme and company share option plan contracts agreed before 6 April 2028 to be amended to include a sale on the private intermittent securities and capital exchange system—known by its much more catchy acronym of PISCES—as an exercisable event, without losing the tax advantages. The legislation will have retrospective effect from 15 May 2025. In the interim, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs will be able to use its collection and management powers to not collect tax on exercise.
That means that this change will benefit PISCES trading events that happen before the Finance Bill receives Royal Assent. The change will therefore support more employees of growing UK companies to access the tax advantages of EMIs, and ensures that the tax system keeps pace with innovation in the wider economy. It also, of course, supports the launch of PISCES, which will provide a key stepping stone for public markets, supporting our world-leading capital markets. I commend clause 16 to the Committee.
James Wild
As the Minister says, clause 16 addresses a specific but important matter by permitting employers to amend existing company share option plan and enterprise management incentives option agreements, to allow PISCES trading events to serve as exercisable events without sacrificing the valuable tax advantages. Employers frequently offer share options to employees in recognition of their service and commitment, and to grow their businesses, and when employees exercise such options, they naturally face income tax and national insurance consequences. To encourage this form of employee ownership, successive Governments have introduced tax-advantaged schemes, including CSOP and EMIs, that provide relief from those taxes when certain conditions are satisfied.
Lucy Rigby
The Government delivered the regulatory framework for PISCES in May 2025, and the shadow Minister has, fairly, asked for an update. I am pleased to tell him that the Financial Conduct Authority has since approved, as he may know, two PISCES market operators: JP Jenkins and the London Stock Exchange. We are hopeful that the first trading events on PISCES will take place soon.
I understand the impetus behind the shadow Minister’s other points. PISCES can, of course, be written into new contracts when they are agreed, meaning that those contracts should not need to be amended to include PISCES, because it can be there ab initio. However, it is fair to say that companies might not yet be aware of PISCES, as it was only recently introduced. That is exactly why we have the April 2028 extension, to allow PISCES to become more embedded and therefore more standard in EMI and company share option plan contracts. As I said, I understand the impetus behind the suggested change; I just do not think it is necessary.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Employee car and van ownership schemes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clauses 17 and 18 will bring employee car ownership schemes into the benefit-in-kind regime from 2030, with transitional arrangements until 2032. Clause 19 will ensure that the introduction of new emissions standards does not lead to a sharp increase in benefit-in-kind tax for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles.
On clauses 17 and 18, the costing, published alongside the Budget, accounts for a behavioural response whereby a significant number of taxpayers switch towards alternative vehicles or move away from using company cars altogether. That has been updated since the 2024 autumn Budget, taking into account further evidence on the impacts of the measure provided by the sector.
Private use of a company car is a valuable benefit, and it is right that the appropriate tax be paid on it. This measure will ensure fairness to other taxpayers, reduce distortions in the tax system and reinforce the emissions-based company car tax regime, which incentivises the take-up of zero emission vehicles. To support the automotive industry and provide employers with more time to adjust to the changes, the Government have delayed implementation of the measure to 6 April 2030 and have introduced transitional rules.
On clause 19, new emissions standards being introduced in the UK reflect the higher real-world emissions of PHEVs. It is important that a car’s official emissions figures reflect real-world emissions, but that can lead to tax increases where tax is linked to emissions levels. The Government recognise that although it is right that higher-emitting vehicles pay more tax, lower-emission company cars such as plug-in hybrid vehicles continue to play an important role in supporting our transition towards zero emission vehicles and the decarbonisation of transport. The changes made by the clause will introduce a temporary benefit-in-kind tax easement for employers providing, and employees being provided with, PHEVs as company cars. I commend clauses 17 to 19 to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
I thank the Minister for her comments, but we are concerned about the unintended consequences of the three clauses.
We are concerned about how clause 17 will affect automotive industry jobs and vehicle sales. Approximately 76,000 workers use ECOS, across 1,900 medium-sized and large businesses. Those workers have utilised ECOS for essential, affordable and reliable personal transport. We believe that the clause risks making ECOS vehicles unaffordable for the workers who currently use them. In fact, using the scheme arrangements and paying tax from 2030 to 2032 onwards means that such workers face, in effect, a pay cut. That is especially unfair because those people who most use the schemes rely on a vehicle for their job much more than those in most other industries. There is a risk of further knock-on effects on the automotive industry if workers abandon ECOS completely.
The chief executive of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, Mike Hawes, who is one of the leading voices in the automotive industry, has expressed strong disapproval of the Government proposal to change ECOS. That is because 100,000 cars are provided through the schemes each and every year, which alone amounts to 5% of the new-car market in the UK. The SMMT predicts that changing the schemes will endanger 5,000 manufacturing jobs in the UK; it claims that that will bring about a loss of half a billion pounds a year due to fewer sales, lost VAT and lost vehicle excise duty receipts. That more than outweighs the £275 million in revenue that the Treasury predicts it will take within the first year of the tax changes taking effect.
We do not feel that clause 18 adequately protects the automotive industry and its workers. Under current ECOS arrangements, employers can sell a vehicle to an employee below market value, at a discounted price. For many employers, that has acted as an additional benefit to form a competitive employee recruitment package and has helped to improve staff retention. These criteria effectively stipulate that vehicles must be sold on the same terms as in the open market. Although exempt employers will not pay benefit-in-kind tax, they will inevitably have to pay a higher price for the vehicle itself. The SMMT estimates that that could become unaffordable for its members’ staff and automotive workers. The knock-on effects outlined in the discussion of clause 17 will remain. Fewer employees will be attracted to purchasing a vehicle. That will lead to fewer employers purchasing vehicles from car manufacturers, and the risk to manufacturing jobs and lost revenue will therefore still apply.
Clause 19 aims temporarily to ease the benefit-in-kind tax treatment for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. We understand the intention behind this legislative change. We want people to take up low-emission electric vehicles, and the taxation system is an effective tool to encourage that. We are also conscious that stricter emission tests will be implemented over time. That could push plug-in hybrid emission vehicles into higher emission bands, and more tax will therefore be paid on them in the future. The knock-on effects on electric car manufacturers and the environment could be stark.
Clause 19 is part of the same package that endangers jobs in the automotive manufacturing industry, which will lead to a loss of about £500 million in VAT and vehicle excise duty receipts. Automotive News has reported on the progress of electrified vehicle registrations: it says that in October 2025 PHEV registrations rose by 27.2%, and that electrified vehicles represented the majority of new car registrations, at 50.8%. The SMMT says that in 2025 the new car market reached 2 million units for the first time since 2019. It predicts that the removal of ECOS could undo the progress that electrified vehicles, including PHEVs, have achieved by denying workers affordable access to new and increasingly zero emission vehicles.
CBVC Vehicle Management has said that these measures continue to make PHEVs look attractive in the short term, but the chief executive, Mike Manners, has advised people considering a PHEV to look at the benefit-in-kind tax implications and avoid their lease running into the tax year 2028-29. The benefit-in-kind easement is temporary until 6 April 2028.
Anthony Cox of RSM UK says that manufacturers do not expect that the reforms will push people into using electric cars. He states that employees of manufacturers and retailers could instead seek out older or less clean cars to purchase, outside any employer or employee management arrangements.
The point is that there are unintended consequences to the clauses. Although we will not oppose them, we want the Minister to take into account the fact that the Government may not get what they want out of them.
Mr Reynolds
The Liberal Democrats share the concerns of the SMMT. Given that the sector is struggling with severe uncompetitiveness across the country, anything that undoes the progress that the Government are seeking to make would not be welcome. Nissan tells us that its plant in Sunderland is the most expensive for electricity of any of its plants worldwide. That is not good for British business or for British car manufacturers. The SMMT worries that these proposals will not be good for British car manufacturers either.
On clause 18, we would like some draft guidance on proposed new section 116A to be published this year and consulted on. A number of the definitions could be clarified to give the industry some certainty about what will and will not be included.
Lucy Rigby
On the points made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, we have listened very carefully indeed to the sector’s concerns and have responded. That is exactly why we are delaying the proposed changes to employee car ownership schemes until 2030. That is the reasoning behind the delay.
The Government are firmly committed to our modern industrial strategy, and specifically to the automotive sector. That is why in the past year we have committed £2.5 billion to automotive investment and research and development, increased flexibilities in the ZEV mandate, funded the roll-out of more charge points and announced plans to cut electricity costs for energy-intensive manufacturers. Various points have been made about the tax incentives, but underpinning all of them is our commitment to support the automotive industry in a challenging fiscal environment.
We will publish in due course the guidance that the hon. Member for Maidenhead requests.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 18 and 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Employment income: miscellaneous exemptions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clauses 20 to 23 relate to other employment income. Clause 20 will simplify the rules on common workplace health and equipment costs, reducing administrative burdens for employers and giving greater clarity to the tax treatment of these costs. It will exempt reimbursements for accommodations, supplies or services used in performing employment duties, such as homeworking equipment; it will extend the existing exemptions for eye tests and corrective appliances to cover reimbursements; and it will introduce a new exemption for both the direct provision and the reimbursement of flu vaccinations. Uptake will depend on employer practice, but these changes will make the rules simpler and fairer for those affected. The Exchequer impact is negligible, but this change will allow employers to support staff without having to handle the sourcing and provision of minor items themselves. This will reduce time and resource costs.
Clause 21 relates to homeworking expenses. It will remove the process by which employees can claim an income tax deduction from HMRC if they have incurred additional household costs when required to work from home. The changes introduced by the clause aim to address concerns around non-compliance and to ensure fairness across the tax system.
Clause 22 will introduce changes that confirm the income tax treatment of payments made by zero-hour or similar limited-hour workers for a cancelled, moved or curtailed shift. This measure will put the tax treatment of such a shift beyond doubt. These tax changes will have an impact only on a small subset of workers, as the vast majority of such payments are taxable under existing legislation. The measure confirms that payments received in the event that a shift is altered at short notice are taxable in all scenarios, including in relation to agency workers and workers employed under umbrella companies.
Clause 23 puts beyond doubt the answer to whether earnings for duties not performed should be treated as UK earnings or overseas earnings for non-UK residents. The clause will establish a general principle to determine the tax treatment of earnings that relate to duties that have not been performed. It will also make a consequential amendment to foreign employment relief, commonly known as overseas workday relief, to ensure that this clarification also applies to UK residents who claim it. I commend clauses 20 to 23 to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
Clause 20 will introduce specific exemptions for minor expenses incurred by an employee on behalf of their employer. The Opposition particularly welcome subsections (3) to (6). As the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales says, it is a positive step that focuses on prevention rather than cures. It is also about the trade-off between tax relief and reduced future healthcare spending.
As the Association of Taxation Technicians has asked, will the Minister consider whether the covid-19 vaccination could be included in this provision? The Government’s explanatory notes state that corresponding changes to NICs for influenza vaccines and homeworking equipment will be made through separate regulations. Will the Minister provide more detail on when we can expect those regulations to be introduced?
On clause 21, the Government’s policy paper suggests that there will be no direct impact on business. However, there may be an indirect impact, as employers feel pressured to change their policies on reimbursement. As the Chartered Institute of Taxation points out:
“This creates an uneven situation in which two employees with identical working arrangements and costs are treated differently for tax purposes solely on the basis of their employer’s reimbursement policy.”
It also seems to follow our party’s scepticism about solely remote working. During the passage of the Employment Rights Act 2025, the Government said repeatedly that the right to work from home boosts productivity. Clause 21 seems to go against that by making it more difficult to work from home. It also seems to be a further attack on private sector employees, despite the fact that in 2024 HMRC spent £82 million on remote working devices for its workers, while the Home Office spent £53 million. Is this another example of the Government hitting the private sector while protecting the public sector?
Clauses 22 and 23 confirm that payments received in Great Britain for cancelled, moved or curtailed shifts are subject to income tax. In the explanatory notes, the Government state that this would also allow for
“the introduction of regulations to ensure that payments are also subject to National Insurance contributions”.
We think it would help to provide fairness in the tax system to support the clarity that the clause provides, so can the Minister confirm when the Government will seek to introduce those specific changes?
More generally, I want to make a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire (Greg Smith) made on the Employment Rights Bill Committee. While the clause provides fairness in the system between employees, the Government are still providing little support for businesses if they have to cancel, move or curtail shifts in circumstances that are unexpected or out of their control. Will the Minister commit to working with her colleagues in the Department for Business and Trade to assess how they can better support businesses when such situations arise?
Oliver Ryan (Burnley) (Lab/Co-op)
As ever, Sir Roger, it is a pleasure to make a short contribution while you are in the Chair. On clause 20, I will not echo the point that has just been made, but the Minister will have seen the written evidence submitted by the Association of Taxation Technicians, which discussed potentially widening the new initiative of including flu vaccinations in expenditure deductible from employment income, so that it also includes covid vaccinations. Has the Minister given that any thought?
On clause 22, it is a pleasure to see the Employment Rights Act being enacted and to address shifts being missed by people on zero-hours contracts, such as those in my constituency. It probably takes us into a wider debate that the Opposition have raised about having oral evidence sessions. It is clear from the evidence pack that the Chartered Institute of Taxation, the Association of Taxation Technicians and other taxation professionals have quite a lot of comments to make. If submissions on the clause were opened to my constituents, I am sure that there would be mass evidence from the public saying how much of a good thing it is. Does the Minister have any comments on that?
Mr Reynolds
Clause 21 will increase unfairness. Those required to work from home are currently divided into two groups: one group who receive reimbursement for costs without incurring income tax but are not reimbursed by their employer, and another group who take that via a taxation route. This measure will exacerbate that split and create a greater divide between the two. Where two employees hold exactly the same position or role, but in different companies, one may receive the payment and the other may not. The figures suggest that about 300,000 people will be affected by this measure. Can the Minister comment on how we can be in a position whereby two employees in the same job, but with different employers, are treated differently for tax purposes?
Lucy Rigby
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, and my hon. Friend the Member for Burnley referred to vaccinations and asked about the extent to which covid vaccinations might be part of the scheme. We are limiting relief to flu vaccinations because employers have consistently highlighted them as a common relief in relation to which reimbursement would be helpful. Flu vaccinations are low in cost, seasonal and widely offered by employers as part of routine health support to employees. By contrast, other vaccinations vary significantly in cost and frequency. Importantly, however, many of them can be accessed free through the NHS.
As you might expect, Sir Roger, I completely reject the shadow Minister’s assertion that any of these measures is an attack on private sector workers. Not at all—far from it.
It is important to be clear that clause 21 will not impact employers’ existing ability to reimburse employees for costs relating to home working, where eligible, without deducting income tax and national insurance contributions.
The question of national insurance was raised in relation to clause 22 on payments for cancelled shifts. These payments will be subject to national insurance. My hon. Friend the Member for Burnley was entirely right to refer to the Employment Rights Act and its significance. I think I am right in saying that a question was also raised about the taxable nature of payments for cancelled shifts. I can confirm that payments received for short-notice shift cancellations or changes are regarded as earnings. They are paid in lieu of the payment that workers would have received had they completed the shift, and as such they are taxable in all relevant scenarios, irrespective of the arrangement or the employment structure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 21 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Umbrella companies
Lucy Rigby
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 24, page 28, line 25, at end insert—
“61Z2 Disclosures to liable persons
(1) Subsection (2) applies where an officer of Revenue and Customs considers that a person is, or may be, jointly and severally liable to pay an amount as a result of this Chapter.
(2) The officer may at any time disclose to the person such information as the officer considers appropriate (whether or not such a disclosure would otherwise be permitted under section 18(2)(a) of CRCA 2005 or any other enactment) for the purposes of informing the person about that liability (‘the joint liability’) including—
(a) the identity of any person who is an umbrella company, a purported umbrella company or the worker in relation to the arrangements to which the joint liability relates, and
(b) information about the nature and extent of the liability of an umbrella company or a purported umbrella company that (by virtue of this Chapter) results, or may result, in the joint liability.
(3) Information disclosed in reliance on subsection (2) may not be further disclosed without the consent of the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (which may be general or specific).
(4) Where a person contravenes subsection (3) by disclosing information relating to a person whose identity—
(a) is specified in the disclosure, or
(b) can be deduced from it,
section 19 of CRCA 2005 (offence of wrongful disclosure) applies in relation to the disclosure as it applies in relation to a disclosure in contravention of section 20(9) of that Act.
(5) In this section ‘CRCA 2005’ means the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005.”
This amendment permits disclosures (whether or not permitted as a result of provision elsewhere) to persons who may be jointly and severally liable as a result of new Chapter 11 of Part 2 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 6 to 8.
Clause stand part.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 24 will make changes to ensure that recruitment agencies are responsible for accounting for pay-as-you-earn on payments made to workers that are supplied via umbrella companies. Many umbrella companies operate diligently and support their employees, but a significant number are used to facilitate non-compliance, including tax avoidance and fraud. Clause 24 is intended to encourage increased due diligence among businesses that choose to use umbrella companies to engage workers. It will do so by introducing joint and several liability for the PAYE taxes that umbrella companies are required to remit to HMRC.
Government amendments 5 to 8 will ensure that the legislation works as intended by making a small technical change. This will ensure that HMRC is able to recover underpayments of tax from businesses that are within scope of the new rules because they purport to be umbrella companies, in the same manner that underpayments will be recovered from the other businesses that are within scope of the new rules. Amendment 5 will ensure that HMRC is able to keep taxpayers informed about its investigations concerning sums to which they are jointly and severally liable. That will help taxpayers to take action to mitigate their exposure to unpaid liabilities.
I commend clause 24, together with Government amendments 5 to 8, to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
Back in 2023, the Conservative Government opened a consultation on how to tackle non-compliance in the umbrella company market, because there was evidence of widespread non-compliance that deprived workers of their employment rights, distorted competition in the labour market and led to a significant tax loss to the Exchequer. In the 2024 autumn Budget, the Chancellor announced that she would follow up the consultation, hence this clause.
The Government state in their explanatory notes that the clause seeks
“to drive behavioural change among businesses that use umbrella companies in the supply of workers by giving them a financial stake in the compliance of the umbrella companies that they use.”
I think there is broad agreement about the need for this measure in tackling tax non-compliance in the umbrella company market. However, the Chartered Institute of Taxation has raised two particular issues, and I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on them.
First, there seems to be an absence of safeguards. Currently, HMRC can transfer liability to the agency regardless of its circumstances. When an agency has done all it can to ensure the integrity of the supply chain, but has been the victim of fraud by the umbrella company, we think there should be safeguards in place to prevent the transfer of debts.
Secondly, there is some concern that the definition of “purported umbrella company” is too wide. The clause defines such a company so as to include any entity supplying an individual with services where that individual has a material interest in the entity. That means that, for instance, personal service company arrangements could fall within the definition. Is it the Government’s intention to include personal service company arrangements within the definition of a purported umbrella company? I should declare an interest: I have a personal service company. Can the Minister expand on what discussions on the clause have taken place with industry organisations such as the Freelancer and Contractor Services Association, which provides accreditation for many umbrella companies?
Lucy Rigby
On the shadow Minister’s final question, I am afraid that I do not know what discussions have taken place with the organisation he referred to, but I can write to him and let him know. Ultimately, whether to use an umbrella company when supplying a worker to a client is a commercial decision for agencies. That commercial decision has been incentivised not just by the ability to outsource administration to umbrella companies, but by the shielding from exposure to tax risk that that model provides. It is good to hear the shadow Minister welcome the impetus behind the changes in that regard.
The current legal framework provides few incentives for agencies to ensure that the umbrella companies they use are compliant. We think it—and it sounds like the shadow Minister agrees—that that has contributed to the proliferation of non-compliance in the umbrella company market. It is important that agencies take steps to ensure that their labour supply chains are compliant, and some agencies already do. HMRC has published guidance on how to undertake checks.
The shadow Minister asked about which agencies may be treated as umbrella companies, given the breadth, or otherwise, of the definition. We are, of course, aware that some agencies engage workers as employees, and where that is the case, and they meet the other conditions of the legislation, they will be treated in the same way as umbrella companies and this measure will apply. Employment is a fundamental characteristic of how most umbrella company workers are engaged and is the key aspect in determining when this legislation will apply. I think that will be the key legal test.
Amendment 5 agreed to.
Amendments made: 6, in clause 24, page 29, line 31, leave out
“a ‘relevant party’ for the purposes”
and insert
“jointly and severally liable to pay an amount as a result”.
This amendment makes sure that HMRC can use their power to make determinations about PAYE income in relation to persons who are jointly and severally liable to amounts of PAYE income under new section 61Z1 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003.
Amendment 7, in clause 24, page 29, line 32, leave out from “ITEPA” to end of line 33 and insert “(umbrella companies)—”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 6.
Amendment 8, in clause 24, page 29, line 34, leave out from first “to” to “as” in line 35 and insert “that amount”.—(Lucy Rigby.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 6.
Clause 24, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Loan charge settlement scheme
Lucy Rigby
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 25, page 30, line 21, at end insert “, or
(ii) a director or shadow director of such a person.”
This amendment expands the persons to whom the Commissioners are not required to make a loan charge settlement offer so as to include directors and shadow directors of a promoter or introducer.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 10.
Clause stand part.
Clause 26 stand part.
Government amendment 11.
Clause 27 stand part.
New clause 25—Report on fairness and scope of the loan charge settlement opportunity—
“(1) HM Revenue and Customs must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before the House of Commons a report on the operation and impact of any loan charge settlement opportunity established under section 25 of this Act.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must in particular consider—
(a) whether the terms of the settlement opportunity are available to individuals who have previously settled or fully paid liabilities arising from disguised remuneration loan arrangements,
(b) whether the terms of the settlement opportunity are available to individuals with disguised remuneration loan arrangements falling outside the loan charge years specified in Part 7A of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003,
(c) the extent to which any differences in treatment between these groups and those eligible for the settlement opportunity affect perceptions of fairness, and
(d) the potential impact of such perceptions on future tax compliance and trust in the tax system.
(3) The report must include—
(a) an assessment of whether extending more favourable settlement terms to the groups described in subsection (2)(a) and (b) would improve fairness and consistency, and
(b) any recommendations HMRC consider appropriate in light of that assessment.”
This new clause would require HMRC to report on the operation and fairness of the new loan charge settlement opportunity. It would consider whether more favourable terms are, or should be, available to those who have already settled or fully paid liabilities, and to those with arrangements outside the loan charge years.
New clause 26—Report on the treatment of disguised remuneration arrangements outside the loan charge years—
“(1) HM Revenue and Customs must lay before the House of Commons a report on the treatment, under any loan charge settlement opportunity established under section 25 of this Act, of disguised remuneration arrangements falling outside the 2010/11 to 2018/19 tax years.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must in particular consider—
(a) the extent to which disguised remuneration income from tax years outside the loan charge period is excluded from the settlement terms,
(b) the number of taxpayers with disguised remuneration arrangements which HMRC consider to fall outside the loan charge but within Part 7A of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003,
(c) the interaction between settlements pursued in respect of such arrangements and those relating to the loan charge, and
(d) whether excluding factually linked arrangements from the settlement opportunity may prevent taxpayers achieving a full and final resolution of their tax affairs.
(3) The report must include—
(a) an assessment of whether including disguised remuneration arrangements that are factually linked to the loan charge period (whether arising before, during or after that period) would improve the effectiveness, fairness and finality of the settlement process, and
(b) any recommendations HMRC considers appropriate.”
This new clause would require HMRC to report on the exclusion from the new loan charge settlement opportunity of disguised remuneration arrangements outside the loan charge years, including arrangements which HMRC considers to fall outside the loan charge but within the disguised remuneration rules.
Lucy Rigby
Clauses 25 to 27 provide for the Government to create a settlement opportunity in line with their response to the independent review of the loan charge, and to encourage those who have not yet settled with HMRC to come forward and do so.
Clause 25 sets out some of the main features of the scheme, including how the new settlement amount will be calculated. Clause 26 will ensure that inheritance tax is not charged as part of any settlement where it relates to disguised remuneration arrangements in scope of the loan charge. Clause 27 makes supplementary provision for the settlement scheme to ensure that it can operate as intended.
In some places, the Government have gone further than the review recommended. In addition to removing late payment interest and inheritance tax, and allowing for generous tax deductions to represent amounts assumed to have been paid to promoters, the Government will also write off the first £5,000 of each individual’s liability. Because of these changes, around 30% of people within scope of the review could see their liabilities removed entirely, while most other individuals will see their liabilities reduced by at least half.
Turning to Government amendments 9 to 11, HMRC is aware of a number of promoters who have made use of their own disguised remuneration schemes and would be within scope of the settlement opportunity. I am very clear that it would be wrong for those individuals to be able to access the generous settlement terms on offer rather than paying every penny that they owe. Clause 25 makes provision for the exclusion of tax avoidance promoters from the settlement opportunity. Amendments 9 and 10 tighten those provisions to ensure that HMRC is able to prevent the controlling minds behind promoter companies from inappropriately accessing the settlement opportunity, in line with the Government’s announcements at the Budget. Amendments 9 to 11 also clarify that where an employer still exists, it can enter into a settlement on behalf of its employees who used disguised remuneration schemes.
New clauses 25 and 26, which would require HMRC to publish a report on the operation and scope of the loan charge settlement opportunity and a report on the treatment of disguised remuneration arrangements falling outside the scope of the loan charge, are unnecessary. The Government published a comprehensive response to the review, setting out our position, at the Budget. That outlined the decisions the Government made to help draw this matter to a close for those impacted, and explained why the scope of the review had been set as it had. It explained that the settlement opportunity will apply to disguised remuneration use between December 2010 and April 2019, because that is the period to which the loan charge applies. While people who used tax avoidance schemes outside that period will not be able to access the scheme, HMRC will work sensitively and pragmatically to help people to resolve their cases, including by taking account of people’s means and offering generous payment terms where appropriate.
I am sure that everyone will be aware that the loan charge is already subject to significant parliamentary scrutiny. HMRC officials and Treasury Ministers routinely provide updates on their work to the Treasury Committee and the Public Accounts Committee, and the Treasury Committee asked the HMRC permanent secretary about this topic just last month. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Maidenhead not to move his new clauses, and commend clauses 25 to 27, and Government amendments 9 to 11, to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
The Conservatives welcome the independent review and the thrust of clause 25. If we were to have a criticism, it would be to do with fairness, on which we had concerns shared with us by the Low Incomes Tax Reform Group. A key objective of the McCann review, which the Minister referred to and which was set up by the Government, was to ensure fairness for all taxpayers. However, by not extending the more generous settlement opportunity to those who have already fully settled and/or paid the loan charge, the provision arguably does not achieve fairness for all taxpayers. It will effectively put those who chose not to comply with their tax obligations in a better position than those who did. That could create perverse incentives, harm future tax compliance and damage trust in the tax system. Could the Minister provide a little more detail as to why the Government have excluded those who have already settled their claims?
Mr Reynolds
New clause 25, which I hope to press to a Division, would require the Government to undertake a report to consider a number of issues pertinent to the loan charge settlement scheme outlined in the Bill. The Liberal Democrats are clear that the settlement opportunity should be fair to everybody affected, including those who have already paid or settled, so as to ensure that people outside the loan charge years are not treated differently without clear reason. Unequal treatment can create the perception of unfairness, even if the policy is technically and soundly legal. It seems to us that if perceived unfairness in the system could be reduced, we should strive to do so, in order to protect the public’s trust in HMRC and the wider tax system. Is it right that someone who has already settled should be ineligible for the loan charge settlement? Surely, that tells people that in future they should just hold off and not settle or come to agreement, because that will leave them in a better position.
James Wild
We will look sympathetically on the hon. Gentleman’s new clauses if he chooses to press them to a vote. I have constituents who were heavily pressured by HMRC and ended up settling, which left them at a considerable financial loss, so I share his concern that those people, who were effectively bullied by HMRC, will now not get the same support as people who held out.
Mr Reynolds
The hon. Gentleman is completely correct. The place we are in now is that someone who settled and came to an agreement with HMRC is excluded from the opportunity laid out in the Bill. That means that when something like this happens again—and we all know that it will—those individuals will not want to come to an agreement with HMRC. They will know that if they hold off, a better solution and a better agreement will come through.
The report required by new clause 25 would outline a range of things, including whether the loan charge settlement opportunity is available to individuals who have settled, which is really important and something that we need to ensure; whether the settlement opportunity applies to individuals with disguised remuneration outside the loan charge years; and the extent of the impact of differential treatment between those two groups and those who are eligible. The extent of the impact is the most important thing, because for those individuals it will be severe. The report would also include an assessment of whether extending more favourable settlement terms to excluded groups would improve fairness and consistency with HMRC overall.
Lucy Rigby
The purpose of the review, as I think is well known, was to bring the matter to a close for those who had not yet settled and paid their loan charge liability to HMRC. That by its very nature meant focusing on open cases and outstanding liabilities. The Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Maidenhead, referred to something like this happening again. I think we would all agree that we hope it does not. However, we would probably also agree that it is crucial that any resolution to this issue is fair to the wider tax-paying population that has never avoided tax.
The Government believe that this settlement opportunity is the most pragmatic solution to draw a line under the issue for as many individuals with outstanding liabilities as possible. The settlement opportunity being provided is substantially more generous than any opportunity HMRC has previously offered and will substantially reduce the outstanding liabilities of people who have yet to settle with HMRC, particularly those with the lowest liabilities. Most individuals, as I said, could see reductions of at least 50% in their outstanding loan charge liabilities. We estimate that 30% of individuals could have their liabilities written off entirely.
James Wild
In her opening remarks, the Minister referred to promoters of disguised remuneration schemes not being eligible for this settlement scheme, which I welcome. Perhaps she could update the Committee on whether HMRC is proactively pursuing such individuals, who caused such distress to my constituents and, of course, to people across the country who were sold schemes, advised that they were legitimate and had been agreed with HMRC, and then discovered they were not and have lost their homes and their life savings as a result.
Lucy Rigby
I managed to give way just before the end of my speech. The shadow Minister raises a good question and a fair point. Through the new measures and existing rules, HMRC will have powers that can result in criminal prosecution of promoters of tax avoidance, including the new universal stop regulation proposal, which will ban the promotion of the most fanciful schemes outright and allow the HMRC commissioners to ban by regulation the promotion of other arrangements that HMRC thinks will not work. We will consult on further measures to target promoters in early 2026—indeed, it is 2026 already, so the shadow Minister may assume that that will happen soon.
Amendment 9 agreed to.
Amendment made: 10, in clause 25, page 32, line 12, at end insert—
“‘shadow director’ has the meaning given by section 251 of the Companies Act 2006.”—(Lucy Rigby.)
This amendment inserts a definition for the purpose of Amendment 9.
Clause 25, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Loan charge settlement scheme: supplementary
Amendment made: 11, in clause 27, page 33, line 15, at end insert—
“(da) adapting provision made under section 25(6), in cases where a settlement offer is made to a person who is not an individual, about the calculation of settlement amounts (including provision for the calculation to be different to what is required by section 25(6));”.—(Lucy Rigby.)
This amendment clarifies that the loan charge settlement scheme can provide for the calculation of the settlement amount to be adapted where a settlement offer is made to a person who is not an individual.
Clause 27, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
Mr Reynolds, I heard you say you wanted to press your new clauses to a vote. New clauses, for general consumption, are always taken at the end of the Bill, so many weeks from now you will get your chance to have your vote.
Clause 28
Main rate of writing-down allowances for expenditure on plant or machinery
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 29 stand part.
New clause 2—Report on the impact of section 28—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within six months of this Act being passed, lay before the House of Commons a report on the impact of implementation of the provisions of section 28 on—
(a) business investment levels,
(b) capital-intensive sector employment,
(c) the manufacturing sector,
(d) small and medium-sized enterprises, and
(e) the public finances.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to report to the House on the impact of section 28 on business investment, employment in capital-intensive sectors, the manufacturing sector, small and medium-sized enterprises and the public finances.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 28 will reduce the main rate writing-down allowance for corporation tax and income tax, and clause 29 introduces a new first-year allowance available for expenditure on plant and machinery. As I am sure all hon. Members are aware, capital allowances allow businesses to write off the costs of capital assets, such as plant or machinery, against their taxable income. The UK continues to offer one of the most generous capital allowances systems globally and ranks top among OECD countries for plant and machinery capital allowances.
Clause 28 will reduce the main rate writing-down allowance from 18% to 14%, starting on 1 April 2026 for corporation tax and 6 April 2026 for income tax. That allows the Government to fund a new first-year allowance while also fairly raising revenue to protect the public finances. Clause 29 will introduce the new 40% first-year allowance, which will support future investment. The new allowance is available for expenditure on plant and machinery, including assets bought for leasing and assets bought by unincorporated businesses, from 1 January 2026.
The changes made by clauses 28 and 29 will raise approximately £1.5 billion per year by the end of the scorecard. The changes are UK-wide and will impact businesses with pools of historic main rate expenditure, which predate the introduction of the super-deduction or full expensing regimes for companies, as well as historic expenditure or future main rate expenditure that does not qualify for first-year allowances, or where first-year allowances were not claimed. We have heard the calls to expand full expensing to more assets and businesses. Although the fiscal climate limits what we can do now, the new first-year allowance moves us closer to that goal in a responsible way.
New clause 2 seeks to mandate reporting the impacts of clause 28 to the House. The Government have published documents much loved by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk—tax information and impact notes—setting out the impact of the reduction to main rate writing-down allowances, alongside the introduction of the new 40% first-year allowance. I therefore reject new clause 2 and commend clauses 28 and 29 to the Committee.
James Wild
I want to get on the record that I do not have a problem with TIINs, but they serve a different purpose from reviewing legislation after the event. I would not want any Treasury officials to feel that the Opposition do not value TIINs.
I will speak to clauses 28 and 29 as well as new clause 2, which is tabled in my name. Capital allowances are one of the primary mechanisms through which our tax system supports business investment. They enable firms to deduct the cost of purchasing plant and machinery from taxable profits, thereby reducing their tax liability and helping them to invest and grow, which we all support. The annual investment allowance is perhaps the most straightforward example. It allows businesses to deduct the full cost of most plant and machinery up to £1 million annually, in the same the year that the expenditure occurs.
Beyond that, there are the first-year allowances with no annual cap. The most generous of those is full expensing, which the Minister referred to, which provides a 100% deduction for qualifying main rate assets and a 50% allowance for certain special rate assets. Those measures were introduced by the previous Conservative Government in order to stimulate faster investment and drive up what have been, I think it is fair to say, historically low levels of business investment throughout all parties’ periods in government. I think that we are all committed to try and address that.
Where businesses cannot or choose not to utilise those more generous allowances, they rely on writing-down allowances. They spread tax relief over several years by permitting a set percentage of the remaining pool balance to be written off annually, with assets allocated to either a main rate or special rate pool, depending on their classification.
Clause 28 reduces the main rate from 18% to 14% a year, while the special rate remains at 6%. The relevant date is 1 April 2026 for corporation tax purposes, and 6 April 2026 for income tax. For periods straddling that change, a hybrid rate will apply. New clause 2 would require the Chancellor to produce a report that examines the impact of those reductions on business investment levels, capital investment sector employment, the manufacturing sector, small and medium-sized enterprises and public finances.
The 2025 Budget policy costing document presents that as a part of capital allowance reform, but the reduction in the main writing-down rate will alter the cash flow position of capital-intensive businesses, slowing the rate at which they can recover investment costs through tax relief. Businesses with substantial brought-forward main pool balances will see their tax relief decelerate, with corresponding impacts on cash flow and the overall tax benefit. For companies planning significant investment, timing has now become more important. This is yet another structural tax increase on businesses with large asset bases, which will now recover their investments more slowly.
Make UK has described this Budget as
“a case of two steps forward one step back for manufacturers.”
The 4% in reduction in the writing-down allowance is undeniably bad news for business. It is little wonder that polling by the Institute of Directors reveals that four in five business leaders view this Budget negatively, and I think that those findings were replicated across the Federation of Small Businesses, the CBI and many other business organisations. The delayed recovery of capital costs will constrain reinvestment in modernisation and automation, precisely when UK manufacturers are already facing strong headwinds, not least from the very high energy costs that they face in this country. The reduction from 18% to 14% will diminish the speed at which businesses can recover these costs. Has the Treasury assessed the impact on business investment intentions, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises in manufacturing and logistics? If not, I am sure that the Minister looks forward to supporting new clause 2.
Clause 29 is an attempt to balance the changes made in clause 28. It introduces a new 40% first-year allowance from 1 January 2026 for new, unused main rate plant and machinery. The new allowance expands relief to unincorporated businesses and firms that buy assets to lease out, which do not qualify for full expensing or the 50% special rate allowance once they go over the £1 million annual investment allowance. The explanatory notes highlight that this new allowance represents an expansion to include leasing, which we welcome—those activities that have traditionally been excluded from such reliefs. The allowance is not available for special rate expenditure, second-hand or used machinery, expenditure under disqualifying regimes or general exclusions.
We support the expansion set out in this clause. While these measures may have good aims, introducing an additional rate adds some complexity to the system. There is also the length of the Finance Bill that we are considering—536 pages of dense text—and that we expect businesses and individuals across the country to comply with, else HMRC will come after them. I urge the Government to monitor closely the impact on business investment and to look at options for a more streamlined or neutral capital allowances structure in future. What steps are being taken to tell businesses about these new allowances and freedoms they have to invest in leased assets—for example, by working with business organisations to get the word out? Opposition Members will certainly do that with businesses in our constituencies.
The new allowance will provide some up-front support for qualifying new investment, partly offsetting the impact of reducing the main writing-down rate to 14%. Once again, the Government are giving with one hand and taking with the other. The uplift will be of use for unincorporated and leasing businesses, but for most other businesses with historical or non-qualifying assets, there is no uplift at all. They simply face a slower rate of relief, going down to 14%, stretching allowances over a longer period and affecting their cash flow.
The Minister referred to Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts that suggest these combined measures will cost businesses more than £1 billion in 2026–27, rising to around £1.5 billion a year thereafter. That is a significant burden at a time when companies are grappling with weak investment and, to put it bluntly, the higher costs imposed in the first Budget. The £20 billion jobs tax has had a big impact, as we saw in the data earlier this week and as we see in the number of graduates who are struggling to find jobs.
As I say, the inclusion of leasing is welcome, but we do think there is benefit in reviewing those measures after the event and coming back to Parliament to explain what has happened.
Lucy Rigby
The shadow Minister referred to the new 40% first-year allowance, which is bringing forward relief for the leasing sector and unincorporated businesses, which have historically been carved out of the first-year allowance. In doing so, it allows for immediate relief on a significant amount of their investment from their corporation tax or income tax bill in the year in which they make that investment.
As the Chancellor has repeatedly made clear, the fiscal environment is challenging. We cannot make unfunded commitments on tax. The shadow Minister referred earlier to being an adviser to the previous Government, which is not, I suspect, to suggest that he had a role in creating the fiscal environment that we unfortunately inherited from the previous Government. We have heard the calls to expand full expensing to more assets and businesses. When the fiscal climate allows us to do so, we will look into that.
Oliver Ryan
The Minister makes a very good point about the expansion of exemptions and the fact that the Government are minded to look at this in future Budgets. I welcome clause 29, which talks about the leasing of plants and machinery and affects many businesses in my constituency. I think it will have a genuine impact and, much as the Opposition might say, “This is a very good thing,” and welcome it, I hope they will vote with us today. However, the question has to be asked why, after 14 years in government, they did not bring this in. For various businesses in my constituency that lease large equipment, this would have made a massive difference. Unfortunately, it is being brought in by us later in the day because it was not done by the Conservatives.
Lucy Rigby
My hon. Friend makes a very good point.
The shadow Minister asked about working with businesses to get the word out. We have been working closely with industry on the expansion to leasing and we are consulting businesses on guidance to ensure that understanding of the new rules is as full as possible. The TIINs beloved of the shadow Minister, we now hear, make it clear that the OBR’s “Economic and fiscal outlook” sets out that the measure is not expected to have significant macroeconomic impacts, and for future investment the present value and cost of capital for businesses that claim the new first-year allowance remains broadly the same following these changes. For all those reasons, I maintain the view that new clause 2 should be rejected.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
As an old hand, Mr Wild will know that a decision on new clause 2 will come at the end, if he wishes to press it to a Division.
Clause 30
Expenditure on zero-emission cars and electric vehicle charging points
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 3—Review of the impact of section 30—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within six months of this Act being passed, lay before the House of Commons a report on the impact of the expiry in 2027 of the 100% allowance made under section 30.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must assess the case for long-term capital allowance support for zero-emission cars and electric vehicle charging points to maintain UK competitiveness in green technology.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review and report on the impact of the expiry in 2027 of the 100% allowance made under section 30, including the case for ongoing capital allowance support for zero-emission cars and electric vehicle charging points.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 30 will extend the 100% first-year allowance for qualifying expenditure on zero emission cars and plant or machinery for electric vehicle charge points by a further year to April 2027. More specifically, it will extend the availability of these capital allowances to 31 March 2027 for CT purposes and 5 April 2027 for income tax purposes, ensuring that investments in zero emission cars and charge point infrastructure continue to receive the most generous capital allowance treatment.
New clause 3 would require the Chancellor to review and report on the impact of the expiry in 2027 of the 100% first-year allowances made under clause 30, including the case for ongoing capital allowance support for zero emission cars and electric vehicle charging points. Alongside the 2025 Budget, in which the extension was announced, a policy costings document and a TIIN were published that set out the expected economic, business and other impacts of the changes, including impacts on incentivising businesses to purchase zero emission vehicles. Those documents are of course available online.
The Government annually review the rates and thresholds of taxes and reliefs to ensure that they are appropriate and reflect the current state of the economy. For that reason, new clause 3 is unnecessary. I commend clause 30 to the Committee, and ask that new clause 3 be rejected.
James Wild
As we have heard, clause 30 will extend the 100% first-year allowance for expenditure on zero emission cars, including EVs, and EV charging points. As the Minister said, the extension runs for a year to March 2027 for corporation tax and April 2027 for income tax purposes. Our new clause, consistent with other amendments that we have tabled, would simply ask the Chancellor to come back and report to Parliament, and to the public, on the impact of her measures. I do not really understand this reluctance to understand the actual impact of the measures. As part of the Government’s broader regulatory reform approach, they seem keen on post-implementation reviews, but the Treasury holds out alone against its homework being scored, it would seem. We want to consider whether long-term support should continue to be provided to maintain UK competitiveness in green technology. It is, in essence, a call for evidence that could make a difference to business confidence and investment.
The allowance was first introduced in 2002 for low emission cars, and the threshold was tightened over time, reaching zero emissions from April 2021. The extension continues that policy, but only for a year, and the Government’s own costings suggest that the extension will cost £145 million. Businesses planning multi-year fleet transitions and charging infrastructure investments face repeated cliff edges. Each year, a one-year window does not help a company planning to electrify its fleet in two years’ time; it simply rewards those who are able to accelerate the investment within the next 12 months.
Does the Minister recognise that it creates a stop-start approach that could discourage investment, undermine industry confidence and, ultimately, slow the UK’s transition to clean, green technology? That is odd when, in many ways, the Government are accelerating full throttle towards 2030 electrification across the grid. Members may have pylons and other pieces of grid infrastructure being dumped in their constituencies, with no public recourse, in the name of the Energy Secretary’s net zero goals. It is worth asking whether their policy is joined up if it includes these incremental extensions.
In that spirit, I have tabled new clause 3 so that hon. Members can judge whether the Government have a coherent approach. It would require the Chancellor to assess, transparently and on the record, whether a long-term support system is justified to keep Britain competitive in the global race for green manufacturing. A formal assessment would give Parliament and businesses the information they need to plan ahead.
In the debate on clause 11, the Minister referred to the long-term certainty provided by committing to a 25% corporation tax rate for this Parliament. Of course, that is not actually in the legislation, but we welcome that commitment and the greater certainty, and similar certainty could be given in this area. A formal assessment could also ensure that public money is being used wisely and that policy provides the certainty to unlock the investment we all want to see.
Given their 2030 obsession, why have the Government again chosen a one-year extension that provides limited certainty for fleet operators or for the charging infrastructure sector? I see that the hon. Member for Banbury is getting ready to dive into the debate. Will the Minister support new clause 3 and commit to a proper assessment of the lasting framework that is needed to secure Britain’s place in the green technology economy of the future?
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
The shadow Minister talks about a stop-start approach from this Government. I find that a bit brass neck, to be frank, considering the record of the previous Government, who shifted the dates and forced all sorts of investment with regard to EVs.
I welcome the measure. As part of the just transition, it is important to encourage the roll-out of EV infrastructure and charging points, particularly in rural constituencies such as mine where that is a significant challenge. Members will not be surprised to hear that I do not support the official Opposition’s new clause, but there is an important debate about how we ensure that investment is rolled out more equitably into constituencies such as mine. I ask the Minister to comment on how the Government see the roll-out of EV infrastructure in areas where there are issues with the electricity grid and network, so that the just transition can happen in those areas as well.
Mr Reynolds
The Liberal Democrats wholeheartedly support electrifying our vehicle fleet. It is a shame that some other political parties and politicians have stopped at a red traffic light when it comes to electrification. [Hon. Members: “More!”] I will not make any more traffic jokes—apologies.
That is why it is quite concerning to see the 2027 expiry date for the capital allowance. When potential EV owners are surveyed, their biggest concern is charging their vehicles, and it is the same for big employers. We all know that businesses need long-term security and a long-term commitment. That is why businesses were not doing well under the last Government, and why they retreated when the 2024 Budget brought in so many changes for businesses.
Long-term security is clearly what businesses need to invest. One-year extensions on top of one-year extensions do not give the certainty that businesses need to invest in the electrification of fleets—they need to do it this year or not at all. Once we take away that capital bid, it is very difficult to get back, so I would like to see that changed.
James Wild
The hon. Member and I agree about the importance of long-term certainty. People who are watching the proceedings may wonder why we did not just table an amendment to extend the scope to 2030, but due to the narrowness of the measures passed by the House, we are unable to do so. As I weigh up whether to push my new clause to a vote in a few weeks’ time, will the hon. Member consider supporting it?
Mr Reynolds
We can look into whether to support new clause 3 in a few weeks’ time. There seems to be very little in the new clause that we as Liberal Democrats would not support. Let us face it: we need to review the impact of the 2027 expiry date. We do not believe that the allowance should expire in 2027; it needs to be extended significantly further, so we would certainly consider supporting a review of whether 2027 is the right place.
That is my question for the Minister, really: why are we saying that the expiry date will be in 2027? Will we all be sitting here excitedly after the next Budget, looking at a 2028 expiry date, and so on for 2029 and 2030?
Lucy Rigby
On new clause 3, I think I have been as full as I can. The Government annually review the rates and thresholds of taxes and reliefs to ensure that they are appropriate and reflect the current state of the economy. We therefore do not need the review that is suggested in new clause 3.
On the broader points made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk, we are, as I say, fully committed to supporting our automotive sector. On the suggestion that we might look further ahead, the Chancellor makes decisions on tax policy at fiscal events in the context of the public finances. My hon. Friend the Member for Banbury is right that support for infrastructure in this area is critical; indeed, that is the wider policy of the Government. On the suggestion from the hon. Member for Maidenhead that we might go beyond one year, we need to balance support for the industry with the impact on the public finances.
In our debate on clause 30, we have had “stop-start”, “accelerate”, “full throttle” and “red light”. I now encourage the Committee to greenlight the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
As we are nearing the end of the sitting, let me make three brief housekeeping announcements.
First, for operational reasons, the central door has been locked during the sitting. It will be opened very shortly before we adjourn so that Members may leave through it if they so wish.
Secondly, it has been drawn to my attention that, since the start of the sitting, the temperature has dropped dramatically, presumably because of the weather. Whether we can do anything about it during the lunch hour I do not know, but we will try.
Thirdly, the doors will be locked between now and the afternoon sitting. Given the weight of papers that everybody has been given, those Members who wish to leave them in the room may do so.
Clause 31
Payments for surrender of expenditure credits
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 31 will make changes to clarify the tax treatment of payments made by companies in return for receiving expenditure credits. The changes made by the clause will set out a treatment for companies to follow. Payments made in return for credit must be ignored for corporation tax purposes, both by the surrendering company and by the recipient company.
Clauses 32 and 33 will introduce technical amendments to the legislation on video games expenditure credit and audiovisual expenditure credit. The changes made by clause 32 will add a new transitional rule to modify the video games expenditure credit calculation so that it accounts for both European and UK expenditure. The changes made by clause 33 will prevent incorrect amounts from having an impact on the intended generosity of special credit. They will do so by preventing some incorrect amounts from occurring and by setting out how to resolve others when they arise. Noting that clause 32 will close a loophole, I commend clauses 31 to 33 to the Committee.
James Wild
As the Minister said, these clauses are mainly technical, tidying-up measures, but they are worthy of debate none the less.
Clause 31 clarifies the corporation tax treatment of payments made in return for the surrender of research and development expenditure credit, audiovisual expenditure credit or video games expenditure credit for payments made on or after November 2025. This technical clarification ensures that, when companies sell or surrender tax credits, the accounting treatment is consistent and correct.
R&D expenditure credit has been in place since 2013 to support companies carrying out R&D, and these creative industry expenditure credits will fully replace the old film, high-end TV, animation, children’s TV and video games tax reliefs from April 2027. At the moment, there is no agreed approach between tax authorities and companies on how to treat payments received when these credits are surrendered for corporation tax purposes, which has created uncertainty.
Clause 31 will hopefully put that beyond doubt by setting out a clear tax treatment in law, and HMRC will update its guidance manuals to reflect the new rules. Does the Minister have any figures—I do not have the TIINs to hand on this one—on whether that uncertainty has cost companies, or cost the Government, in lost revenue?
Clause 32 corrects transitional rules between the video games tax relief and the video games expenditure credit to ensure that the new expenditure credit works fairly for games that are moving over from the old relief. It corrects how the expenditure credit is calculated for transitional games—those that already have tax relief claims and then opt into the new scheme—so that companies do not get too much or too little relief, simply because the old regime used European expenditure while the new one uses UK expenditure.
In effect, clause 32 ensures that companies switching schemes do not get double relief or under-relief. Can the Minister provide an estimate of how many video games development companies will be affected by this transitional correction, and whether any have suffered financial detriment under the previous rules?
Clause 33 makes changes to the special credit for visual effects, which is part of the audiovisual expenditure credit, as the Committee will be aware. It prevents the calculation for additional credit from producing incorrect results, correcting anomalies in the visual effects credit calculation. The explanatory notes explain that, without this fix, certain combinations of expenditure could generate incorrect credit amounts or negative values, so clause 33 ensures that the scheme operates as intended and that the special credit scheme is neither more nor less generous than intended. Does the Minister have any figures on how many production companies have experienced calculation errors as a result of the previous rules?
Matt Turmaine (Watford) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I will speak briefly on clause 32, as a member of the all-party parliamentary group for video games and esports, to say to the Minister that I welcome the closing of this loophole. Does she agree that the change will support the British video games industry, which is industry-leading across the world, and deliver the best for our economy?
Lucy Rigby
I wholeheartedly agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Watford about the impact of these measures.
In relation to clause 31, if only the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk, had the TIIN to hand; if he did, he might have been aware that we estimate that the payments for the surrender of expenditure credits will have an impact on roughly 12,000 claimants of R&D expenditure credit, audiovisual expenditure credit and video games expenditure credit.
The shadow Minister asked about the impact on video games companies: I think it is fair to say that if a company has a game that switches from the video games tax relief to the video games expenditure credit, it simply needs to make sure that it uses the modified version of step 2 when calculating how much credit it is entitled to. This will affect only games that are already in development and need to switch reliefs. There are no figures available to show the impact on companies; it is normally in the tax line, so it is not treated as taxable by most companies. I think that answers all of his questions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 32 and 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
R&D undertaken abroad: Chapter 2 relief only
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 34 makes a minor legislative amendment to the R&D tax relief rules to put beyond doubt that the overseas restrictions apply to R&D expenditure credit claimants with a registered office in Northern Ireland. The Government are making this amendment to provide clarity to businesses and ensure that the legislation aligns with the original policy intent of the Finance Act 2025. I commend clause 34 to the Committee.
James Wild
Clause 34 will amend the Corporation Tax Act 2009 to clarify restrictions on relief for overseas R&D applied to companies across the entire United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland and Great Britain. It applies retrospectively on claims made on or after October 2024. It puts beyond doubt that the geographical restriction on R&D expenditure credit relief applies uniformly across all jurisdictions. Can the Minister confirm that, notwithstanding this clarification, exemptions under the enhanced R&D intensive support scheme still apply to firms based in Northern Ireland?
Lucy Rigby
I thank the shadow Minister for his question. The Government are committed to supporting R&D investment across the UK through R&D tax reliefs; they of course play a vital role in supporting the mission to boost economic growth, which he will know is this Government’s No. 1 priority.
The legislation clarifies that the rules are the same for all R&D expenditure credit companies across the UK. The overseas restriction was introduced in regulations in 2024 before being included in the Finance Act 2025. It was always intended to apply to R&D expenditure credit claimants across the UK, so the change is purely to clarify the Finance Act 2025 to put that position beyond all doubt.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Restriction of relief on disposals to employee-ownership trusts
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 28—Implementation of section 35 (Restriction of relief on disposals to employee-ownership trusts—
“(1) HM Revenue and Customs must, as part of the implementation of the provisions of section 35, make an assessment of the potential benefits of establishing a digital application process for taxpayers seeking to pay capital gains tax by instalments under section 280 of TCGA 1992 in respect of disposals to employee ownership trusts.
(2) The assessment made under subsection (1) must consider potential guidance on eligibility criteria and processing timescales.”
This new clause would require HMRC to assess the potential benefits of establishing a digital application process for taxpayers to pay capital gains tax by instalments in respect of disposal to employee ownership trusts as part of the implementation of section 35.
New clause 29—Report on the impact of section 35—
“The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within 12 months of this section coming into force, lay before the House of Commons a report assessing the impact of the changes made under section 35 on small and medium-sized enterprises, including—
(a) the number of EOT transactions completed compared to the previous three-year average,
(b) any administrative costs and burdens reported by businesses and tax advisers,
(c) the incidence and value of dry tax charges arising, and
(d) recommendations for any modifications to the instalment payment regime under Section 280 of TCGA 1992.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to lay a report before the House of Commons on the impact of section 35 on small and medium-sized enterprises.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 35 reduces the amount of capital gains tax relief available on disposal of company shares to the trustees of an employee ownership trust. The Government are committed to building on the success of the existing scheme so that the UK remains a leader in the field of employee ownership. However, the Government have to consider the public finances and the important issue of fairness in our tax system.
The current regime allows business owners to dispose of valuable shareholdings for significant capital gains without paying any tax at all. The cost of the CGT relief alone reached £600 million in 2021-2022, and forecasts suggest that it could rise to more than 20 times the original costing to £2 billion by 2028-29, if action is not taken. The changes made by clause 35 will restrict the amount of CGT relief available to company owners who dispose of shares to the trustees of an EOT. For disposals on or after 26 November 2025, half of the gain on disposal to the trustees of an EOT will be treated as the disposer’s chargeable gain for CGT purposes, and charged to tax according to the usual applicable rules. The remaining half of the gain will be not charged to tax at the time of disposal.
Overall, this means that disposals to an EOT will benefit from a rate of tax that is broadly equivalent to half of the usual rate, which will still constitute an effective incentive to encourage company owners towards employee ownership.
Finance (No. 2) Bill (Second sitting)
(1 day, 8 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 28—Implementation of section 35 (Restriction of relief on disposals to employee-ownership trusts—
“(1) HM Revenue and Customs must, as part of the implementation of the provisions of section 35, make an assessment of the potential benefits of establishing a digital application process for taxpayers seeking to pay capital gains tax by instalments under section 280 of TCGA 1992 in respect of disposals to employee ownership trusts.
(2) The assessment made under subsection (1) must consider potential guidance on eligibility criteria and processing timescales.”
This new clause would require HMRC to assess the potential benefits of establishing a digital application process for taxpayers to pay capital gains tax by instalments in respect of disposal to employee ownership trusts as part of the implementation of section 35.
New clause 29—Report on the impact of section 35—
“The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within 12 months of this section coming into force, lay before the House of Commons a report assessing the impact of the changes made under section 35 on small and medium-sized enterprises, including—
(a) the number of EOT transactions completed compared to the previous three-year average,
(b) any administrative costs and burdens reported by businesses and tax advisers,
(c) the incidence and value of dry tax charges arising, and
(d) recommendations for any modifications to the instalment payment regime under Section 280 of TCGA 1992.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to lay a report before the House of Commons on the impact of section 35 on small and medium-sized enterprises.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Lucy Rigby)
Turning to the non-Government amendments, new clause 28 asks His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to assess the potential benefits of establishing a digital application process for taxpayers seeking to pay capital gains tax by instalments following disposals to employee ownership trusts. The facility to pay CGT in instalments is a long-standing feature of the tax code and is well understood by both taxpayers and HMRC. The process for applying to pay by instalments is clearly set out within HMRC guidance and applications are dealt with swiftly once they have been received by HMRC. My officials have met representatives from the employee ownership sector to provide bespoke guidance on how these instalment payment provisions apply to disposals to EOTs. That engagement continues. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Maidenhead to withdraw new clause 28. In any event, it should be rejected.
New clause 29 asks the Chancellor to lay a report before the House within the next 12 months assessing the impact on small and medium-sized enterprises of the changes made under clause 35. The Government monitor the impact of all changes made to existing tax reliefs. However, publishing a report on the change introduced by clause 35 within the next 12 months would not be reasonable as the first full tax year of these changes is the tax year 2026-27, so HMRC will not have complete information to assess their impact. New clause 29 should therefore be rejected.
In addition to rejecting new clauses 28 and 29, I commend clause 35 to the Committee.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
Clause 35 introduces a 50% chargeable gain on shares sold by a company to an EOT. That will have a direct effect on trustees’ ability to benefit company employees. The 2014 Conservative Government introduced 100% capital gains tax relief to incentivise companies to transition to EOT models. EOTs have benefited employees by rewarding and motivating them—for example, by distributing annual tax-free bonuses of up to £3,600 a year to each employee. These tax changes would hurt employees most of all.
The Office for Budget Responsibility’s “Economic and fiscal outlook” from November 2025 forecasted that this will raise just £900 million a year on average from 2027 to 2028. However, the OBR also gave this measure a “very high” uncertainty ranking. The OBR highlighted the fact that these tax changes could have a behavioural effect: company owners would instead hold on to their shares for longer before realising gains. That means that company owners will slow the flow of shares they sell to trustees, so trustees will receive far fewer shares and, as a result, less value will be passed on to employees.
It is worth mentioning the commentary from other organisations. The Financial Times reported that tax advisers have warned against this measure and are concerned that entrepreneurs would have to cover the tax bill before they receive the proceeds of the sale. Chris Etherington of RSM UK is concerned that these changes will slow the pace of change to EOTs. The Centre for the Analysis of Taxation stated that this was a “good reform” and supports withdrawing relief entirely. This is not very popular, and there is a high uncertainty of it even raising any revenue.
Mr Joshua Reynolds (Maidenhead) (LD)
New clause 28 in my name would require HMRC to assess the potential benefits of establishing a digital application process for taxpayers to pay capital gains tax by instalments in respect of disposal to employee ownership trusts. The digital application process would make it far easier for taxpayers to apply to pay capital gains tax by instalments, reducing delays and administrative burden. The Government aim to make tax digital—this digital application process would be a small way to help to get there. It would help to ensure that the new relief works in practice, not just in theory, smoothing the implementation process and ensuring that taxpayers know where they stand. The digital process could help improve speed, accuracy and the consistent handling of instalment applications. Including this requirement in the Bill would promote modernisation and better taxpayer services and would signal that HMRC should consider practical delivery as well as policy. I hope the Minister will support it.
New clause 29, also tabled in my name, would require the Chancellor to lay a report before the House on the impact of clause 35 on small and medium-sized enterprises. It is fairly simple. It would explain whether clause 35 is achieving the policy goal by tracking the number of employee-ownership trust transactions compared to previous years. Not until we are in the process will we actually know what the impact will be. By tracking the numbers, we can see whether the policy the Government are undertaking has been a success. I hope the Minister will support it.
Lucy Rigby
To the comments from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, it is important to bear in mind that on the changes we are making to EOTs, even post these changes, the relief that will be on offer remains more generous than for many other options and deeds, such as business asset disposal relief. Of course, the fiscal climate is relevant to the changes we are making. He referred to the point at which the last Government introduced this relief, but as I said, the cost of the relief as a whole is projected to rise to £2 billion by 2029-30 without the action that we are taking. As I said, the fiscal climate is extremely relevant when looking at £2 billion of relief.
Importantly, the Employee Ownership Association has stated that the changes we are making are not such as to alter the fundamental strength and purpose of the employee ownership trust model, while also recognising that the previous level of relief, or the level of relief as it stands, was hard to sustain when set against the rapidly escalating fiscal cost. On the comments made by the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Maidenhead, I set out the reasons why we reject new clauses 28 and 29. I maintain the position of rejecting those and maintaining clause 35 as it stands.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Anti-avoidance: collective investment scheme reconstructions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clauses 36 to 38 make changes to the CGT anti-avoidance provisions that apply to company share exchanges and reconstructions, or the reconstruction rules, as they are known. Clause 36 revises the collective investment scheme reconstruction anti-avoidance rule to align with modern provisions with a similar purpose. Clause 37 revises the share exchanges and company reconstruction anti-avoidance rule to align with modern provisions with a similar purpose, too. Clause 38 does exactly the same. The changes made by these clauses, which take effect from Budget day, modernise the anti-avoidance rule so that it focuses directly on arrangements where the purpose, or one of the purposes, is the avoidance of tax.
The amendments introduced by the clauses will allow HMRC to address situations where arrangements have been added to otherwise commercial transactions that reduce or eliminate, rather than just defer, a tax charge, allowing them to be more effectively challenged. The rule has been updated so that it affects only the shareholders who benefit directly from the avoidance. Where HMRC agrees that there is no avoidance and the reorganisation is carried out within 60 days of the Budget announcement or if HMRC’s decision is later, the current legislation will apply. For those reasons I commend clauses 36 to 38 to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
On clause 36, we support tougher measures to tackle tax avoidance and close the tax gap. Under the previous Government, the tax gap of the total theoretical tax liabilities fell from 7.5% in 2005-06 to 5.3% in 2023-24. But it is crucial that legislation is not so broad to the extent that people entering into arrangements for legitimate commercial reasons face the brunt of HMRC’s enforcement powers. The scale of genuine tax avoidance as a proportion of the total tax gap is important to note.
According to HMRC, in 2023-24, avoidance behaviour as a share of the tax gap was just 1%. It was also 1% in the 2022-23 tax year and was 2% in 2021-22, 2020-21 and in 2019-20. Avoidance ranked lowest among the behaviours that contributed to the tax gap. Contrast that with 31% due to failure to take reasonable care, 15% due to error and 12% due to legal interpretation. What those behaviours have in common is they involve genuine mistakes being made, so pursuing the route set out in clauses 36 and 37 risks hurting those who enter arrangements for solely commercial purposes who may have simply made honest mistakes.
With regard to clause 37, we support tougher measures to tackle tax avoidance to close the tax gap. The methods of deferring tax for general company reconstructions and share exchanges are identical to each other’s and to that for collective investment schemes. The key difference between clauses 36 and 37 is the business practice to which the anti-avoidance measures apply when arrangements are made to avoid tax liability. Clause 36 applies to CISs, and clause 37 applies to share exchanges and company reconstructions, so the argument pertaining to the general principle and practicality of the Government’s new anti-avoidance measures also applies to those clauses.
With regard to clause 38, we support tougher measures to tackle tax avoidance to close the tax gap. The clause seeks to change the no gain/no loss rules if HMRC suspects that a transfer of business has taken place to secure a tax advantage. Those rules have been instrumental in the process of transferring a business. They are especially useful for arrangements between complex structures. No gain/no loss rules can ensure fluidity throughout the transfer process, and they stave off cash-flow issues during the process itself.
While we support tackling tax avoidance, we must also recognise the role that no gain/no loss rules play during delicate business practice. We understand that there are already safeguards in place from HMRC, such as the general anti-abuse rule. Nevertheless, we must also ensure that no business that utilises no gain/no loss for legitimate commercial purposes is penalised or hung out to dry through denied relief claims.
Lucy Rigby
I welcome the support that was expressed, on the whole, by the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury. I suspect that that support is born from a recognition that we really do need to make the changes. Recent court decisions have shown that the rules as they stand, which date back to the ’70s, do not work as intended, especially when the avoidance carried out is a smaller part of a larger commercial reconstruction.
The main effect of the rules will be to discourage the minority—and it is very much a minority—who would otherwise seek to avoid tax. It is about protecting our tax base from abuse for the benefit of the majority of taxpayers who apply the rules correctly. For those reasons, I truly believe that the clauses strengthen the protection against avoidance and will catch tax avoiders.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 37 and 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Incorporation relief: requirement to claim
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 39 makes a change to incorporation relief for CGT, requiring taxpayers to make a claim for relief and, as a result, improving the data available to HMRC to undertake analysis and compliance activity. Specifically, the change will mean that taxpayers need to make a claim for incorporation relief on their self-assessment return. That will apply to transfers of a business on or after 6 April 2026, and it will allow HMRC to monitor the relief and tackle avoidance more effectively, protecting revenue and helping to close the tax gap, with an additional £225 million expected to be collected over the scorecard period.
Mark Garnier
Clause 39 requires taxpayers to claim incorporation relief or pay CGT up front. It is key that sole traders and other eligible people understand the changes the clause makes. What concerns us is whether enough awareness has been made to affected people, and that is crucial as claiming incorporation relief has always been a passive process because it happens automatically. Soon, people who have been accustomed to this passiveness must acutely manage their relief claims. We do not want anybody who has been conducting legitimate business to suddenly be hit with an unexpected tax bill. Landlords, for example, are a common entity who claim incorporation relief. They do so by transferring their rental property portfolio into a limited company. Should a landlord undertake that process and then find themselves receiving an unexpected tax bill, that could add significant pressure on their investments, which in this case involve houses occupied by tenants.
Mr Reynolds
This is a small administrative change but a significant one. I share concerns about awareness on this topic and how the public will know that this has changed. For individuals who have been doing this for a significant period of time, the change will be quite significant for them. I would like to know how the Government will communicate that change to the public—what advice will be put forward, and how people will be made aware of it—rather than them being expected to know that the Government have made changes. I am pretty sure the public have not read all the pages of the Bill and understood them precisely—even though I know we all have. We would all like to how the public will be made aware of this.
Lucy Rigby
While it is important to be clear about the fact that the additional data is being collected, the details required from taxpayers are brief, and that goes to the question of the additional burden or, indeed, lack thereof. They are brief details of the type of business, the tax calculations for the assets disposed of, and the value of the shares received for the business. The information HMRC requests will be used in analysis and compliance activity, which will tackle abuse of this relief for the benefit of the majority of taxpayers who apply the rules correctly.
The point on awareness was fairly raised. I can confirm that new guidance will be provided alongside the self-assessment return.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40
Non-residents: cell companies
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clauses 40 and 41 make various changes to the capital gains rules that apply to disposals of UK land and property by non-UK resident persons.
Turning first to clause 40, the changes that are being made have been in effect since Budget day and ensure that, for the purposes of the non-resident capital gains legislation, each cell in a cell company is looked at individually for the purposes of the property richness rules. That will prevent the use and ongoing exploitation of such entities to avoid the non-resident capital gains rules and will protect the tax base.
Clause 41 makes changes to the rules for non-resident capital gains in respect of double taxation treaties and the requirement to claim double taxation relief, and it also clarifies some unclear terminology. The effect of the changes made by clause 41 is that investors are not required to make or deliver a return in order to claim relief in respect of a particular disposal. In fact, the clause reduces administrative burdens by clarifying when non-resident companies and individuals have to notify HMRC of a disposal. I therefore commend these clauses to the Committee.
Mark Garnier
Clause 40 tackles the use by UK non-residents of protected cell companies to avoid paying non-resident capital gains tax. We agree that corporate structures should not be exploited to shelter people from paying their fair share of tax. However, we must consider the practicalities of how an audit of one cell may affect other cells and the PCC itself.
PCCs have their benefits. For example, the ringfencing of assets and liabilities can ensure that any issue with one cell does not spread to others. In that sense, PCCs can be more robust and durable. Audits, of course, are absolutely necessary to ensure compliance and legality. However, they can also prove costly and stressful for a company owner who is simultaneously running a business. Cells do not have full autonomy; much of that resides in the core of the PCC.
Different cells may behave differently from each other or have differing risk appetites—therein lies the risk. A situation where one cell is investigated by HMRC, and the audit process proves frustrating because that cell’s conduct is aggressive or inappropriate, risks tarnishing the entire PCC in the assumption that the other cells behave similarly. Subsequent audits could then become more aggressive and difficult. As I said, we support measures that tackle any exploitation of the corporate structure to avoid paying tax. The Government must ensure that the implementation of clause 40 protects innocent parties that may be affected.
Clause 41 focuses on non-UK residents, individuals and companies in collective investment vehicles who sell UK land or property connected to CIVs under double taxation treaties. Under the clause, non-UK residents in CIVs will no longer be required to register for corporation tax or claim capital gains tax relief if the double taxation treaties fully cover the gains they have made. The Government’s rationale for that is to streamline paperwork and reduce redundant filing—hurrah! I cannot begin to explain my happiness about trying to reduce red tape. It is fantastic to get rid of it where we can. Our tax code is 22,000 pages long and has 10 million words. Anything that makes that easier is hugely welcome.
Lucy Rigby
I welcome the “hurrah” from the shadow Minister. On his latter point about double taxation treaties, as he will know, many of the agreements were negotiated before the introduction of the non-resident capital gains regime. As treaties come up for renegotiation, as they do, or as we negotiate new treaties, we will seek to include a provision in the capital gains article to allow the UK to exercise our domestic taxing provisions in full.
On the shadow Minister’s point about cell companies and the extent to which they are used to avoid tax, there is anecdotal evidence that such structures have been created to help individuals avoid paying tax on gains made through the disposal of UK land and property, and the changes to the rules seek to cure that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 42
Abolition of notional tax credit on distributions received by non-UK residents
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 42 abolishes the notional tax credit available to non-UK residents on UK company dividends. That credit no longer serves a purpose, under the modern dividend taxation system, and the change brings non-UK residents in line with UK residents, who do not receive the notional tax credit. It will impact fewer than 1,000 non-UK resident individuals who have UK dividend income and other UK income, such as property or partnership income, a year. The clause removes the outdated notional tax credit for non-UK residents receiving UK dividends, aligning their position with that of UK residents. I commend the clause to the Committee.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
As the Minister says, clause 42 abolishes the notional tax credit that non-residents have historically been able to claim on their UK dividend income. Under the current system, non-domiciled individuals can offset that notional credit against other UK income streams, such as rented income or partnership profits. However, from April, that arrangement will no longer apply. Non-residents will no longer be treated as having already paid UK tax on dividends received from UK companies, meaning that they will lose the ability to reduce their overall UK tax liability from using the credit.
It is worth noting that UK residents lost access to the notional dividend tax credit back in April 2016, so in one sense the clause simply removes what is perceived as a potential unfair advantage enjoyed by non-UK residents. The disregarded income regime will continue to operate, providing some limitation on the tax paid by non-residents in specific circumstances.
We need to look at the clause, and the ones coming up, in the broader context. It represents a shift in how UK tax dividends flow to foreign investors and, in practice, it will effectively increase the tax rate burden on dividend recipients who are non-UK residents. At a time when the UK needs to attract international capital, we need to look at the measures in the Budget as a whole and whether they strengthen or undermine our competitive position. Attracting capital to be invested was a topic that we discussed this morning. International investors might be forgiven for concluding that the Chancellor is creating a tax and regulatory environment that feels increasingly unpredictable compared with some of our international competitors. Stability and certainty matter enormously in investment decisions. [Interruption.]
The Chartered Institute of Taxation has also raised concerns about the figures underlying this policy. The Treasury estimates in the famous tax information and impact note, which was referred to by the Minister, that fewer than 1,000 resident individuals will be affected. The institute has questioned whether that can be accurate, given what its professional members are seeing on the ground. There is particular uncertainty about whether non-resident trust taxpayers have been properly included within those calculations. I welcome a response and assurance from the Minister either way on that. That said, even the institute agrees that those impacted will represent a small minority of the overall non-resident taxpayer population. We concur that this charge brings a welcome simplification to tax calculations.
Lucy Rigby
Again, I welcome the shadow Minister’s support for these measures. However, he is absolutely wrong to suggest that these measures and the broader package will discourage foreign investment in UK companies. He will have heard the titter of laughter when he talked about the importance of stability—that not being something that was provided by his party at all when it was in government. The removal of the notional tax credit will not discourage foreign investment in UK companies, as it will not impact the overwhelming majority of overseas investors who remain outside the scope of UK tax.
In order to be affected by the measure, overseas investors will also need to have other taxable UK income, typically rental income or partnership income. If they do not have that, their dividends will not be taxable in the UK while they remain overseas. The shadow Minister is right to refer to my earlier figure that fewer than 1,000 non-resident individuals have taxable UK income in addition to their UK dividends, and that remains the figure that we are working with.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Non-resident, and previously non-domiciled individuals
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 2, in schedule 3, page 268, line 14, at end insert—
“Part 1A
Amendment of transfer of assets abroad provisions
7A In section 737 of ITA 2007 (exemption: all relevant post-4 December 2005 transactions), after subsection (4) insert—
‘(4A) In relation to income falling within subsection (4B) which arises to a person abroad on or after 6 April 2025, in determining whether Condition A or Condition B is satisfied, no regard is to be had to any purpose of avoiding liability to taxation for which the relevant transactions or any of them were effected if and to the extent the relevant transfer and any associated operation were effected before 6 April 2025 in a qualifying tax year.
(4B) This subsection applies to income which would be relevant foreign income if it were the individual’s or in relation to earlier tax years was income with a non-UK source in respect of which a non-UK domiciled individual would have been taxable only on a remittance basis (assuming any required claim and other steps had been made) if it had been the individual’s.
(4C) For the purposes of subsection (4A) a qualifying tax year is one for which the individual was not resident in the UK or (for tax years earlier than 2013/14) not ordinarily resident in the UK or, if resident or, as the case may be, ordinarily resident in the UK for that year, the individual was entitled to be taxed on the remittance basis for that year.’”
This amendment modifies the "motive defence" in section 737 of ITA 2007. It ensures that when determining if a transaction had a tax avoidance purpose, no regard is given to avoidance motives for transactions effected before 6 April 2025 if the individual was non-resident or entitled to the remittance basis at that time.
Amendment 33, in schedule 3, page 268, line 19, at end insert—
“TRF available to non-residents
8A Omit sub-paragraph 1(7).”
This amendment provides that the Temporary Repatriation Facility is also available to non-residents.
Amendment 34, in schedule 3, page 268, line 19, at end insert—
“Removal of requirement that individual must have been subject to the remittance basis for a past year
8A Omit sub-paragraph 1(5).”
This amendment would enable offshore trust beneficiaries who have not themselves used the remittance basis to use the TRF.
Amendment 35, in schedule 3, page 268, line 19, at end insert—
“Trustee designation
8A After paragraph 1 insert—
‘Trust cleansing facility charge
1A (1) The Trustees of a settlement may in the tax year 2025/26 or 2026/27 make a claim in relation to any or all of the following (“trust income or gains”)—
(a) a section 1(3) amount of the settlement for any tax year before 2025/26,
(b) an OIG amount of the settlement for any tax year before 2025/26,
(c) a section 1(3) amount in a schedule 4C pool of the settlement for any tax year before 2025/26,
(d) protected foreign source income or transitional trust income of the settlement for the purposes of section 643A of ITTOIA 2005,
(e) any relevant foreign income of the settlement for any tax year before 2025/26 that would, if remitted, be treated under section 648(3) of ITTOIA 2005 as arising only if and when remitted, and
(f) foreign relevant income of the settlement for the purposes of chapter 2 of part 13 of ITA 2007 (transfer of assets abroad) for any tax year before 2025/26.
(2) On the making of such a claim the Trustees shall be subject to the TRF charge and paragraph 1(8) shall apply to the Trustees as it applies to an individual.
(3) The amount of trust income or gains of the settlement for the category or categories in respect of which a claim is made shall be reduced accordingly.’”
This amendment enables trustees to pay a TRF charge on the trust’s past FIG while retaining the funds within the trust.
Amendment 30, in schedule 3, page 271, line 26, leave out from “amount” to end and insert—
“is the lower of—
(a) the value of the amount when it first arose to the individual, or
(b) its value on 6 April 2025.”
This amendment provides that where an investment derived from foreign income has fallen in value, the temporary repatriation facility (TRF) charge is paid on the reduced value of the investment at the point the TRF opened.
Amendment 1, in schedule 3, page 275, line 20, at end insert—
“Disregard of payments or transfers connected with designated qualifying overseas capital
15A After paragraph 13B (as inserted by paragraph 15 of this Schedule) insert—
‘Disregard of payments or transfers made in connection with the remittance of designated qualifying overseas capital
13C (1) This paragraph applies where an amount is remitted to the United Kingdom in a qualifying year in respect of the deemed income of an individual and—
(a) the income is treated as income of the individual under section 721 or 728 of ITA 2007 by reference to income arising to a person abroad in the tax year 2024-25 or an earlier tax year,
(b) the deemed income falls within section 721(1)(a) or section 728(1)(a) and is qualifying overseas capital by virtue of paragraph 2, and
(c) the qualifying overseas capital is designated by the individual.
(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (3), no payment or transfer of assets made in a qualifying year for the purpose of, or in connection with, the remittance of that designated qualifying overseas capital to the individual (whether by the person abroad, or any company or settlement), to the extent that the amount or value of such payments or transfers in that qualifying year does not exceed the aggregate amount of remittances within sub-paragraph (1) for that year, is capable of—
(a) being or giving rise to income which is treated as income of the individual under section 721 or 728 of ITA 2007 or any provision of Chapter 5 of Part 5 of ITTOIA 2005;
(b) satisfying the capital sum conditions in section 729 of ITA 2007;
(c) being or giving rise to income which is taken into account for the purpose of increasing the total relevant income under section 733 of ITA 2007 in relation to that individual or any other individual; or
(d) being or giving rise to income arising under a settlement for the purposes of section 648(1) of ITTOIA 2005.
(3) When making a designation as qualifying overseas capital in relation to deemed income within sub-paragraph (1) for a qualifying year, the individual must specify the amount, the nature and the parties to the payments or transfers of assets within sub-paragraph (2) which have been or will be made during the qualifying year for the purpose of, or in connection with, the remittance of such deemed income.
(4) Where a sequence of two or more payments or transfers is made in a qualifying year for the purpose of, or in connection with, the remittance of the same amount of deemed income in that qualifying year, then for the purpose of determining whether the amount or value of such payments or transfers exceeds the amount of the remittance of such deemed income, that sequence is to be treated as a single payment or transfer with an amount or value equal to the payment or transfer within the sequence with the highest amount or value.
(5) In this paragraph “qualifying year” means any of the tax years 2025-26, 2026-27 or 2027-28.
Disregard of payments or transfers made in connection with the provision of certain benefits
13D (1) This paragraph applies where—
(a) an amount of deemed income is qualifying overseas capital in relation to an individual by virtue of paragraph 6(1)(c), and
(b) the individual designates that income as qualifying overseas capital.
(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (3), no payment or transfer of assets made in a qualifying year for the purpose of, or in connection with, the provision of any benefit to the individual which gave rise to the deemed income within paragraph 6(1)(c) (whether by the person abroad, or any company or settlement), to the extent that the amount or value of such payments or transfers in that qualifying year does not exceed the aggregate amount or value of the benefits provided in that qualifying year, is capable of—
(a) being or giving rise to income which is treated as income of the individual under section 721 or 728 of ITA 2007 or any provision of Chapter 5 of Part 5 of ITTOIA 2005;
(b) satisfying the capital sum conditions in section 729 of ITA 2007;
(c) being or giving rise to income which is taken into account for the purpose of increasing the total relevant income under section 733 of ITA 2007 in relation to that individual or any other individual; or
(d) being or giving rise to income arising under a settlement for the purposes of section 648(1) of ITTOIA 2005.
(3) When making a designation as qualifying overseas capital in relation to deemed income within sub-paragraph (1) for a qualifying year, the individual must specify the amount, the nature and the parties to the payments or transfers of assets within sub-paragraph (2) which have been or will be made during the qualifying year for the purpose of, or in connection with, the provision of the benefits within sub-paragraph (2).
(4) Where a sequence of two or more payments or transfers is made in a qualifying year for the purpose of, or in connection with, the provision of the same amount or value of benefits falling within sub-paragraph (2) in that qualifying year, then for the purpose of determining whether the amount or value of such payments or transfers exceeds the amount or value of such benefits, that sequence is to be treated as a single payment or transfer with an amount or value equal to the payment or transfer within the sequence with the highest amount or value.
(5) In this paragraph “qualifying year” means any of the tax years 2025-26, 2026-27 or 2027-28.’”
This amendment prevents “double counting” and knock-on tax charges when designated qualifying overseas capital is remitted (or where related benefits are provided) during the Temporary Repatriation Facility years, by disregarding connected payments/transfers up to the value of the remittances or benefits in that year.
Amendment 31, in schedule 3, page 275, line 38, leave out “paragraphs 9 to 16” and insert—
“paragraphs 9 to 12 and 14 to 16”.
Amendment 32, in schedule 3, page 276, line 3, at end insert—
“(3) The amendments made by paragraph 13 of this Schedule have effect where the matched capital payment referred to in sub-paragraph 8(2C)(b) Finance Act 2025 (as inserted by paragraph 13 of this Schedule) is made on or after 26 November 2025.”
These amendments provide that a double tax charge created by paragraph 13 of Schedule 3 shall not apply retrospectively.
Schedule 3.
Clause 44 stand part.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 43 makes amendments to the residence-based tax regime that was introduced in the Finance Act 2025. These changes reflect feedback from the Government’s continued engagement with stakeholders to make sure that the regime works as well as possible. Clause 43 and schedule 3 consist of three parts. Part 1 of the schedule makes minor corrections to the foreign income and gains regime and to legislation connected with the ending of the remittance basis. Part 2 of the schedule makes technical amendments to the legislation for the temporary repatriation facility. Part 3 of the schedule amends the temporary non-residence rules by removing the concept of post-departure trade profits from legislation.
Clause 44 makes minor amendments to the residence-based tax regime, as introduced in the Finance Act 2025, to ensure that tax-free or exempt income is taken into account correctly under the settlements and transfer of assets abroad matching rules. The clause ensures that the internationally competitive residence-based tax regime operates as intended in relation to foreign income and gains from non-resident trusts and similar structures.
James Wild
The Minister has skirted over quite a few detailed issues rather briefly. It will reassure the Committee to know that I intend to take a bit more time to go through what are detailed and important principles, and to reflect on questions raised in an earlier clause—how competitive we are, what we want to do, and whether we want to attract wealthy people to the country.
I will initially speak to clause 43, schedule 3 and amendments 30 to 35, which were tabled in my name. Clause 43 introduces schedule 3 of the Bill, and members of the Committee will see that the schedule runs to 14 pages of complex detail, so it is important that we properly scrutinise it. Those pages make various changes to the foreign income and gains regime brought into effect by the Finance Act 2025. On the surface, this may look like a simple tidying-up exercise, but on closer inspection it raises some important questions about the coherence of the Government’s overall approach to taxing globally mobile individuals.
While we support fair taxation, this Government have once again produced needlessly complex legislation that contains retrospective elements and leaves ordinary people potentially facing unexpected tax bills.
Oliver Ryan (Burnley) (Lab/Co-op)
Could the shadow Minister reflect on the fact that this clause has more amendments tabled to it than any we have dealt with so far? It deals with non-resident non-dom individuals who have previously tried to get away with paying certain levels of tax in this country. I know that he will take us through some of the details of that, but I would like to go back to the macro of his party position. If he talks about ordinary people, surely he should agree with the benefits of these changes. They would not only simplify the system but bring in much-needed tax revenue from those previously non-dom individuals who did a good deed for so long under the previous Conservative Government.
James Wild
Well, indeed. I will come on to the detail. On the broader point, we support the initiative behind these measures—to encourage people to bring more of their money to the UK, precisely so it can help fund our public services. Our concern is about the implementation, and I will come on to some of the comments that representatives of the Chartered Institute of Taxation, who are widely acknowledged as experts in this area, have raised about the complexity and the retrospective elements.
As I said, schedule 3 is in three parts. Part 1 relates to relief for new residents on foreign income and gains—FIG. Under the new FIG regime, when someone moves to the UK, they do not pay UK tax on their foreign income for the first four years here. That is very sensible, but the Government have made claiming that relief so complicated that honest taxpayers risk falling into traps simply through lack of awareness.
I hope the Government will take account of the following sensible steps suggested by the Chartered Institute of Taxation: first, to remove the requirement to report every possible element of FIG as part of the claim, and instead making relief from UK tax on FIG the default position; similarly, extending the relief to the personal representatives of a deceased individual who themselves qualified; and finally, simplifying the legislation by aligning the income tax position on trust distributions with the capital gains position. I would be grateful for the Minister’s response on those points when she winds up.
Part 2 relates to the temporary repatriation facility, clarifies how remittances to the UK under that temporary facility should be matched to their original source. For years, non-domiciled individuals could keep foreign money offshore, paying UK tax only if they brought it here. The TRF offers a window until 2028, precisely to encourage people to bring money to the UK at reduced rates of 12% in the next two years or 15% in ’27-28. That is, as I said to the hon. Member for Burnley, a good idea in principle, but the devil, as ever, is in the detail.
Our friends at the Chartered Institute of Taxation pointed out some serious concerns that there are several paragraphs within the schedule—which I see the hon. Member turning to—that do not appear to work as intended or that produce unintended consequences. First, they believe that, as drafted, the new offshore income gains paragraph introduced here leads to an anomaly in the way that trust distributions are matched where a trust has generated offshore income gains. That results in trusts with surplus pre-6 April 2025 capital gains tax being treated differently from those without. We do not believe that to be the Government’s intention; perhaps the Minister can clarify.
Secondly, investments clearly fall in value, but under this legislation, if someone invested foreign income overseas and it is now worth less, they will still pay the temporary repatriation facility charge on the original higher amount. That could mean paying 12% tax on £100,000 even though the investment is worth only £60,000. Do Committee members think that is fair? Do they think it will encourage or discourage the repatriation of funds that this facility is designed to encourage, to help support our economy and public services?
I would contend that the incentive, as a result, is to keep the money out of the UK, which is not what we on the Opposition side—or, I believe, on the Government side—of the Committee want to see. We therefore tabled amendment 30 to remedy this issue, and I encourage Members to support us on it when the moment comes.
Thirdly, the Bill contains retrospective taxation. Let us be clear: retrospective taxation should be reserved for the most egregious tax avoidance, but here, trustees who made payments to beneficiaries in good faith after April, relying on existing law, may now face double taxation because of rules that look backwards. That is not about closing a loophole; it is about changing the rules after people have already acted. Our amendments 31 and 32 would ensure that double taxation does not apply retrospectively.
Fourthly, in this clause and schedule the Government have created arbitrary restrictions so that the TRF is available only to UK residents. Why should someone temporarily living abroad not be able to use this facility? The temporary non-residence rule means that they will be paying UK tax when they return anyway, so why not let them use the TRF? The rules create a situation where someone who wants to pay tax voluntarily is not able to do so. Our amendment 33 would ensure that the TRF is available to both UK residents and non-residents.
Similar concerns have also been raised regarding offshore trusts. The temporary repatriation facility applies a 12% or 15% rate to the personal FIG of individuals who have previously used the remittance basis as well as certain capital payments from offshore trusts. This was to encourage the winding-up of foreign trust structures. Right now, though, the trusts part works only if the beneficiary getting the capital could have used the remittance basis in their own right. That creates an unfair outcome in families where one beneficiary has used the remittance basis but another has always paid full UK tax on worldwide income, because only the former can benefit from the lower temporary repatriation rate if the trust is wound up.
Perhaps I could give the Committee an example to illustrate this point further: a family has an offshore trust for two adult children and one child previously used special tax rules while the other has always paid full UK tax. Under this Bill, only the first child could benefit from the TRF when the trust is wound up. That does not encourage bringing money to the UK but, I would contend, actively discourages it. Amendment 34 would therefore enable offshore trust beneficiaries who have not themselves used the remittance basis to use the TRF. Amendment 35 would enable trustees to pay a temporary repatriation facility charge on the trust’s past FIG while retaining the funds within the trust, without having to make capital payments to the beneficiary.
Amendments 1 and 2, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Jack Rankin), relate to this issue. The Government refer to the temporary repatriation facility as encouraging wealthy people to stay and invest here, and the Treasury is counting on these measures to raise a significant sum for public services, although I note that the OBR suggests there is considerable uncertainty about that. However, we know that the wealthiest people—the wealthiest investors, the people who are supporting our entrepreneurs and the high-growth businesses that we want to see—are leaving the UK as a result of steps that the Chancellor has taken. By some estimates, 10,000 people have already got on a plane and left—those are figures from Oxford Economics. We can debate whether the number is 10,000 or 5,000, but some figures suggest that the equivalent of 750,000 basic rate taxpayers have left the country. So this is not about ideology; it is about giving certainty and addressing the points that the Bill as drafted does not.
The TRF could become unusable for some because of the risks it exposes them to. There is the double taxation, which I have talked about, as well as the retrospective elements, but in addition, accusations of tax avoidance could arise from using a scheme that Parliament has itself created and lead to potentially lengthy investigations. People are leaving, and the Chartered Institute of Taxation has said that tax rules under the measure make the UK a less attractive destination for people. It should be easier to understand and apply measures aimed at getting people to bring money back to the UK. There is a risk that, as drafted, these measures drive against the Government’s intention.
Amendments 1 and 2 are tabled in a constructive spirit. Amendment 1 would stop the double counting, and amendment 2 is about the retrospective and unfair action. They would provide the certainty that, according to some experts in this field, is currently missing. Without the TRF being attractive, we will not be able to get the money coming into the country. I urge the Minister to respond more fully than she did in her opening remarks and to consider whether, on Report or at a later stage, amendments could be tabled to deliver the clarity that my amendments and those tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor offer.
Without clear guidance, ordinary commercial transactions could inadvertently be caught. The Government must publish comprehensive examples, or businesses and individuals will be left guessing. When Ministers replaced the long-standing non-dom regime last year, they promised a clean, modern and transparent framework, yet within a year we have a schedule of corrective provisions to make the legislation operate “as intended”. That rather suggests that the original drafting was not as watertight as claimed, and that further tweaks along the lines we have suggested might still be needed before the system settles.
Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)
I will speak to amendments 1 and 2 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor. The Government and those of us supporting the amendments are trying to achieve the same outcome. The aim of the amendments is simple: to enable the Government to achieve their goal of raising billions in tax revenues from former non-doms—money that is needed to pay for public services, as the hon. Member for Burnley said earlier.
The Government set out the policy intention to replace non-dom status with a UK residency tax to raise more tax from those with the greatest capacity to pay, while simplifying the system. They introduced the temporary repatriation facility—or, given that we like three-letter acronyms, the TRF—as the central part of that strategy. It is designed to encourage people to remain in the UK, to come to the UK and invest in the UK, and to bring historically offshore capital into the UK tax net. The TRF offers a reduced rate of taxation of 12% on all non-UK assets brought into the country as an incentive to do just that. We all want the same thing: we want the TRF to work, because if it does not, the money does not come here and the Exchequer and the public lose.
The Government are relying on the reforms to raise very substantial sums—about £34 billion overall. The concern I express is not ideological or about the tax rate; it is about legal certainty and deliverability. The problem is that a number of the wealthiest people have left the country, and many more are doing so as we debate these amendments. Why? Odd as it may seem, it is not because they are unwilling to pay more tax; it is because of the legal uncertainty in the Bill as drafted.
Using the TRF as set out in the Bill exposes people to serious legal uncertainty. First, they are subject to double taxation through double counting of the same economic value. Secondly, they are vulnerable to retrospective taxation. Thirdly, they face allegations of tax avoidance simply for using a scheme that Parliament itself has created. Fourthly, they expose themselves and their families to potentially decade-long investigations into arrangements that were entirely lawful at the time they were entered into. That is why they are watching this Bill proceed with their bags packed, waiting to see if it will fix the problems.
The advisers of such people are warning them to leave, but I know that the Government’s intention is not to drive them away. We need their taxes, fairly paid, to fund the renewal of our public services. That is why amendments 1 and 2 were tabled, in a constructive spirit of co-operation, as my hon. Friend the shadow Minister mentioned. Amendment 1 would stop double counting; and amendment 2 would ensure that retrospective and unfair action does not continue. Had amendment 49, which goes further, been selected for debate, I would have spoken to it as well, but I will resist doing so because it has not been selected.
Amendments 1 and 2 would provide the needed certainty and make the TRF usable in practice, not just in theory. I hope that the Minister can give me some assurance that the Government recognise some of the technical problems highlighted by the amendments and intend to resolve them. I noted earlier that the Minister rejected amendments 1 and 2, giving a brief reason why, but given the representations, certainly by the Opposition, a more detailed response as to why the amendments have been rejected by the Government would be worthwhile.
Much careful work has gone into the construction of amendments 1 and 2. Again in the spirit of co-operation, I am sure that Conservative Members would be happy to provide input to the Minister and officials as they consider how best to address the issues. With that, I commend the amendments to the Committee.
Lucy Rigby
A criticism of complexity has been made. The aim of these reforms is, of course, simplicity. I think it is recognised across the House that in matters of taxation, simplicity is better. We are ensuring that the legislation works as it is intended to do. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk, referred to the Chartered Institute of Taxation. It is important to note this quote from the institute:
“Moving from domicile to residence as the basis for taxing people who are internationally mobile makes sense.”
As well as being a major simplification, it is a fairer and more transparent basis for determining UK tax. Residence is determined by criteria far more objective and certain than the subjective concept of domicile. Replacing the outdated remittance basis is sensible, and the temporary repatriation facility offers a helpful transition.
Another criticism is retrospection. In this instance, the Government feel that a retrospective change is a proportionate response to protect revenue, which, as the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire said, is essential for public services. This change will prevent taxpayers from benefiting from unintended windfalls and promotes consistency in the application of rules, bringing the capital gains position into line with the income tax provision. In most cases, trusts will not yet have made capital distributions, meaning that beneficiaries and trustees will have advance notice and can plan their affairs.
A further topic that that came up is the reporting of every element of FIG. I have a note on that somewhere, so I will come back to it. I will deal first with the suggestion that restrictions on the TRF are arbitrary. The position of someone who is temporarily abroad arose. The TRF is designed to encourage people to be UK-resident and bring funds into the UK economy. Allowing non-residents to use the TRF would let individuals benefit from the reduced charge without living here or contributing to the UK economy, which would reduce the incentive to become or remain UK-resident.
As I said, I reject amendment 1 because there are already measures in place that prevent double counting. I have dealt with amendment 2. I want to deal with the reporting of every element of FIG, which I have a note on, as I said. [Interruption.] That is the wrong note. I will have to come back to that.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
We have heard from Opposition Members that there are families watching this Finance Bill Committee with their bags packed in case their amendment does not pass. Does the Minister share my scepticism that people who hung around through a botched Brexit, Liz Truss and 11% inflation will leave the country on the basis of whether an amendment passes or not?
Lucy Rigby
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. I think it is right to say that the reporting of every element of FIG will not be necessary. I am afraid I shall have to confirm in writing exactly why that is the case.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Non-resident, and previously non-domiciled individuals
Amendment proposed: 30, in schedule 3, page 271, line 26, leave out from “amount” to end and insert
“is the lower of—
(a) the value of the amount when it first arose to the individual, or
(b) its value on 6 April 2025.”—(James Wild.)
This amendment provides that where an investment derived from foreign income has fallen in value, the temporary repatriation facility (TRF) charge is paid on the reduced value of the investment at the point the TRF opened.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 45 and schedule 4 will make changes to the pay-as-you-earn notification process that enables employers to give provisional in-year tax relief to globally mobile employees, including those eligible to claim overseas workday relief.
The majority of changes made by the clause and schedule are minor, technical changes that will help the legislation relating to the PAYE notification process to operate as originally intended, but a few are more substantial. For example, treaty non-resident employees—that is to say, UK residents who are covered by a double taxation agreement between the UK and another country—have been permitted to benefit from provisional in-year tax relief by concession, so they are now being added to the legislation to formalise that treatment. We will also specify that if the employer’s best estimate of qualifying employment income for an employee eligible for overseas workday relief is more than 30%, it must be limited to 30%. That should ensure that in most cases the provisional overseas workday relief received in-year does not exceed the relief that the employee can claim when they file their tax return.
These changes will place the treatment of treaty non-residents on a statutory basis, prevent excessive in-year provisional overseas workday relief and ensure that the PAYE legislation operates as intended. I commend clause 45 and schedule 4 to the Committee.
James Wild
Clause 45 will extend the PAYE notification process to include treaty non-residents and introduce the 30% cap, to which the Minister referred, on overseas workday relief that can be claimed through PAYE. In simple terms, clause 45 and schedule 4 will change how employers operate PAYE for people who move to the UK but are treated as resident in another country under a tax treaty. The clause will let employers agree with HMRC that the part of the employee’s salary that is expected to be exempt overseas be left out of PAYE during the year, and it will formally limit how much foreign employment relief can be given to 30%.
The changes under the clause will require employers to send further notification to HMRC whenever there is a change in the employee’s circumstances that affects the proportion of earnings subject to PAYE. That sounds reasonable in practice, but I want an assurance from the Minister about the potential administrative burden that it will place on employers. It could mean that employers will now be expected to monitor the day-to-day working practices of globally mobile working employees. They will need to track whether individuals are working from home or from a hotel room in Boston, which is not necessarily a simple task. For multinational companies with hundreds of employees, this represents a potentially significant compliance burden at a time when we want to reduce the burdens on business. For smaller businesses venturing into international markets for the first time, it could be a disincentive—indeed, a barrier—to their trying to do so.
The Government must provide clear, comprehensive guidance on exactly what level of review and monitoring employers are expected to undertake not to fall foul of the rules. Without that clarity and guidance, we risk creating a compliance minefield in which well-meaning employers inadvertently break rules that they could not reasonably be expected to follow. Guidance can help employers to comply with the law, as we all want them to do.
The Government like to talk about making Britain the best place to do business and to champion our competitive advantage in attracting global talent—we have just discussed one area in which that may or may not be the reality—but we should seek to avoid introducing measures that potentially add to the compliance burden without giving guidance to employers. I hope that the Minister can assure the Committee that she will look at the case for publishing clear guidance to ensure that businesses are not adversely impacted.
Lucy Rigby
I can confirm that guidance will be forthcoming, and I am absolutely sure that it will be clear. I am also pleased to confirm that there will be no additional administrative burden on employers, because employers already have to enter a percentage figure on the PAYE notification form; as I say, this change will just require them to limit the in-year relief provided to no more than 30%. The guidance will be given to employers in April when the changes go live.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Clause 46
Unassessed transfer pricing profits
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 46 will introduce a new corporation tax assessing provision for unassessed transfer pricing profits. It will replace the diverted profits tax, a stand-alone tax that will be repealed in its entirety, providing a significant simplification.
The changes made by the clause will make the rules clearer and more straightforward for businesses to implement, and will support access to treaty benefits, including relief from double taxation under the mutual agreement procedure. The removal of the diverted profits tax as a stand-alone tax is a very significant simplification, and bringing the rules into the corporation tax framework will clarify the interaction with transfer pricing and access to treaty benefits. I therefore commend clause 46 and schedule 5 to the Committee.
James Wild
The clause introduces schedule 5, which will repeal the diverted profits tax and replace it with new rules to tax unassessed transfer pricing profits within the corporation tax regime, coming into effect for periods beginning on or after 1 January. The diverted profits tax will continue to apply for prior accounting periods. In effect, the clause creates a higher tax charge on profits that should have been taxed here, but were shifted out of the UK by using non-market prices between groups.
Like the DPT, the new transfer pricing profits rules are intended to target structured arrangements that are designed to erode the UK tax base by omitting profits that are subject to transfer pricing. These unassessed transfer pricing profits will be taxed at a rate that is six percentage points higher than corporation tax. In simple terms, if a global business structures its arrangements to shift profits from the UK in a pricing manipulation, HMRC will be able to bring those diverted profits into UK tax at a higher, penalty-style rate.
In principle, we support that approach. Moving away from the stand-alone tax and bringing diverted profits under corporation tax provides better treaty access and clarity, and clearly the six percentage point charge works as a deterrent, as countries that play games with their transfer policies will risk paying more tax than if they had priced their UK dealings properly in the first place. However, I would welcome the Minister’s response to the concerns that the Chartered Institute of Taxation has raised about the drafting of the clause.
First, the new tax design condition is very broad: it captures transactions designed to reduce, eliminate or delay UK tax liability. There is a question as to whether legitimate commercial decisions made for regulatory compliance or capital requirements could be caught by the condition simply because they are deliberate and happen to reduce tax liability, even when tax planning is not the primary motive. I know that is not the intention behind the drafting, but that point has been raised, so I hope that the Minister will respond in order to avoid any uncertainty as to whether businesses that think they are operating within the law, without seeking to reduce, eliminate or delay tax liability, may be captured.
Will the existing arrangements be grandfathered? Can HMRC revisit settled positions under these broader rules? As the Chartered Institute of Taxation rightly says, it is unsatisfactory to pass legislation with a wide definition and simply hope that HMRC guidance and rules will narrow it down later. That is not how we in Parliament should legislate. We discussed the loan charge during this morning’s sitting; HMRC applied rules in a way that most MPs did not consider reasonable, and we have now had to make changes through this Bill to address that historical issue. The law should be made clear in the Bill, not left to administrative interpretation.
I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed how many multinational companies HMRC estimates are using pricing manipulation to avoid tax. Can she guarantee that legitimate business structures that have previously been accepted by HMRC under the DPT will not suddenly fall foul of the scope of the new rules? Will she also comment on the main purpose test, to provide clarity and certainty for businesses?
Lucy Rigby
I hope that what I am about to say will provide a good deal of reassurance to the shadow Minister. The purpose of the reform was to simplify the legislation and bring the regime into the corporation tax framework. There is no intention at all to change the scope of the regime.
I appreciate that the question as to when the reforms will come into effect is of some importance. I can confirm that they will take effect for chargeable periods beginning on or after 1 January 2026. For prior periods, the diverted profits tax will continue to apply.
The shadow Minister asked how many companies would be affected. I am afraid that I do not have the statistics to hand, but I can investigate and confirm them to him in writing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 47
Transfer pricing reform
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 20.
Schedule 6.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 47 will simplify the UK’s transfer pricing rules, which protect our tax base by ensuring that transactions between UK companies and related parties are priced appropriately. The changes made by the clause include the general repeal of UK-to-UK transfer pricing where there is no risk of tax loss. This will provide a meaningful simplification for businesses. Alongside it, amendments have been made to the participation condition, intangibles, commissioners’ sanctions, interpretation in accordance with OECD principles, and financial transactions.
Government amendment 20 will ensure the consistent use of terminology with respect to financial transactions throughout the legislation.
The changes made by the clause will update UK law in line with international standards, will reduce compliance obligations and will address areas of potential legislative weakness. I commend clause 47, schedule 6 and Government amendment 20 to the Committee.
James Wild
Clause 47 and schedule 6 mark an evolution in the UK’s transfer pricing regime. The Opposition recognise the importance of getting this right: it goes to the heart of how multinational profits are attributed and taxed, and therefore how we ensure that companies pay the correct amount of tax in this country. The principle behind transfer pricing is simple, even if it is rarely simple in practice. I believe that these measures flow from a consultation process launched by the last Conservative Government, so they have a good origin. I hope that they will lead to greater certainty and reduce the burden that some companies may face.
Lucy Rigby
I confirm that the shadow Minister is right about the origin of the proposals and the date of the consultation. It is entirely right that we are bringing UK transfer pricing legislation up to date; it was last materially updated in 2004, so it is high time that these rules were updated.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6
Transfer pricing
Amendment made: 20, in schedule 6, page 318, line 41, at end insert—
“(ba) in subsection (4)(b), for ‘issuing company’, in both places it occurs, substitute ‘borrower’,”.—(Lucy Rigby.)
The amendment deals with a missing consequential change to section 154 of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 (transfer pricing).
Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 4—Report on the impact of section 48 (international controlled transactions)—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within 6 months of this Act being passed, lay before the House of Commons a report on the impact of implementation of the provisions of section 48 on—
(a) cross-border trade, and
(b) administrative burdens on businesses.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must in particular set out the steps the Government intends to take to consult affected businesses and stakeholders on the operation of section 48.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to report to the House on the impact of section 48 on cross-border trade and business administrative burdens, and to set out how affected businesses and stakeholders will be consulted.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 48 will create a power for the commissioners of HMRC to issue regulations requiring certain taxpayers to file an international controlled transactions schedule. This measure is expected to have an impact on approximately 75,000 businesses within the scope of the UK’s transfer pricing and related rules. Most of these businesses are part of large multinational groups.
New clause 4 would include a requirement for the Chancellor to lay a report before the House of Commons, within six months of the Act being passed, on the impact of the implementation of clause 48 on cross-border trade and administrative burdens on business. It asks that the report focus on Government steps to consult affected businesses.
Most major economies have similar requirements, and we do not expect the international controlled transactions schedule to have a significant impact on cross-border trade. Rather, this measure is expected to improve fairness, ensuring that multinational enterprises pay tax on profits generated from economic activity in the UK. It is also expected to increase efficiency, meaning that HMRC compliance activity can be more effectively targeted, benefiting compliant taxpayers. I urge the Committee to reject new clause 4.
James Wild
New clause 4 stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest. As the Minister says, clause 48 introduces a power for HMRC to implement a new reporting obligation: the ICTS, which will come into force in 2027.
This new power would require businesses engaged in significant cross-border transactions to disclose specified information about their dealings. Rightly, the intention is to give HMRC better tools to identify transfer pricing and international tax risks that could affect the tax take, and to allow it to conduct more efficient and better-targeted compliance activity. I recognise that objective and support it in principle. I agree that the ICTS could help HMRC to identify risk earlier and to avoid wasting the time of the Department and businesses. Chasing down questions and embarking on inquiries can often lead nowhere and can cost businesses time that could be spent on growing their business.
However, it is also important that the Government explain how the system will work in practice and how it will be seen to work. Our new clause 4 would therefore require a report on the impact of these changes on cross-border trade and the administrative burden on businesses.
During the consultation last year, the Treasury acknowledged that more needed to be said about how the data collected through the ICTS system would be used and how it would fit alongside existing obligations such as master and local files. That remains a crucial point of detail that the industry and advisers will be looking for as this measure is implemented. Can the Minister shed some light on those concerns today?
As the Minister rightly says, most major economies already have some equivalent form of reporting, but it should be pointed out that the differences between them are significant. Australia, for example, operates a single transaction-driven disclosure process through its international dealings schedule; the United States of America relies on a more fragmented, relationship-based approach spread across multiple forms. Each system clearly has its benefits and disadvantages. What matters is that each country has a clear, consistent model to which businesses can understand and readily adapt.
What the Government seem to be proposing is a hybrid. That might mean that we have the best of both worlds—let us all hope so—but it might also lead to an approach that is inconsistent with the systems that some multinationals already have.
The Treasury has said that it will consult on detailed regulations in the spring of this year. We welcome that commitment. Can the Minister give an assurance that she will make sure that businesses and representative bodies will be closely involved in shaping how the system is put into practice? With the planned 2027 start date, there is not a lot of time to get the rules in place or for companies to build or modify systems to provide the new data. Can that be done without causing undue cost and disruption to businesses?
Finally, I want to make a slighter broader point on the clause. We clearly understand the importance of robust compliance and the need to protect the UK tax base on behalf of our constituents so that we can deliver public services. However, each new requirement—whether it is the ICTS, pillar two returns or transfer pricing documentation—adds to the cumulative impact on businesses.
We need to see these obligations in the round, not as each one being reasonable on its own terms. What is the overall picture of what we are imposing on companies? If that load becomes too great, the UK will be seen as a less attractive place to invest, which is certainly not what we want. Although we support the principle of better risk assessment, we continue to press Ministers to ensure that we have proportionate and workable solutions that add value for HMRC, businesses and our constituents. New clause 4 would simply require a report setting out those impacts.
I would add that, according to the Budget costings, the reporting duty would raise around £25 million in 2026-27, growing to £350 million a year, helping HMRC to tackle artificial profit shifting. That is welcome, but we should also consider the one-off and ongoing costs for businesses that have to re-engineer their systems. I would be grateful for the Minister’s response to my points about implementation and whether the hybrid model will actually be the best of both worlds.
Lucy Rigby
The ICTS will help HMRC to focus compliance resources, as has been discussed, on the most meaningful transfer pricing risks. We think that it will also lead to greater efficiencies by encouraging up-front compliance and reducing the length of transfer pricing inquiries. Those outcomes will benefit the compliance of taxpayers and HMRC.
Clause 48 gives the commissioners of HMRC the power to issue regulations that will determine the detailed design of the ICTS, including the information to be provided, the format of the schedule and the commencement date of the filing obligation. A consultation was held in 2025, and we will carry out a technical consultation on the draft regulations in spring 2026. The obligation is expected to take effect for accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2027, which is designed to allow time for businesses to adapt to what they need to do.
The shadow Minister suggested that the proposal will lead to an administrative burden; actually, it is intended to mitigate additional administrative burdens by requiring the reporting of readily available objective information. We will continue to be guided by these principles as we move into the detailed design phase, working—as one would expect—with affected businesses.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Permanent establishments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 49 modernises and simplifies the UK’s law on permanent establishments, which governs how the UK taxes non-residents who are carrying out business here. Specifically, the changes made by clause 49 reduce uncertainty over how profit should be attributed to permanent establishments under UK law. The greater clarity provided by these changes, in the same way as the previous clause, will assist taxpayers and HMRC by offering greater clarity. I commend clause 49 and schedule 7 to the Committee.
James Wild
Clause 49 and schedule 7 make changes to the rules that decide, where a company has a permanent establishment in the UK, how its profits are then taxed and when they apply. The Minister talked about modernising and simplifying the rules to bring them into line with international best practice.
To clarify, in November 2025 the OECD published new guidance on the definition of a “permanent establishment”. Can the Minister confirm whether the UK’s current approach reflects that updated guidance, as I have been advised that it does not? Some expert bodies have pointed out that the OECD changes are generally helpful and would bring more consistency across countries, so does the Minister agree that it would make sense for the UK to broadly adopt them? Is that the Government’s approach, or have they deliberately decided to have a set of UK rules? If so, what is the purpose of that, considering that we might be dealing with multinational companies operating in multiple jurisdictions that would have to follow separate rules when the OECD has brought together a coherent package?
Lucy Rigby
It important to recognise that, as I perhaps should have explained at the outset, the legislation in this area is 20 years old. The purpose of making the changes that we are making is to update it and to account for the fact that there have been considerable developments in the international tax landscape since it was first drafted, most notably in relation to the attribution of profits to permanent establishments.
The shadow Minister mentioned the OECD. This legislation is interpreted in accordance with the OECD model tax convention and commentary, so it will always be interpreted using the most recently available model and commentary. The OECD council approved a 2025 update in November 2025, which can be found online. The full update will be published in 2026, if it has not been already. I hope that gives the shadow Minister some assurance.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Clause 50
Pillar two
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 21 to 24.
Schedule 8.
New clause 5—Pillar Two competitive safeguards and review—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, every six months beginning from the day on which this Act is passed, review the implementation of the provisions of section 50 and Schedule 8.
(2) Any review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) whether other major economies are implementing Pillar Two on comparable timelines and with comparable scope,
(b) any competitive disadvantage to UK-based multinationals from implementation of section 50,
(c) any impact arising from differentiated treatment for the US, and
(d) proposals for remedial measures to address any competitive disadvantage to the UK that has been identified.
(3) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must lay before the House of Commons a copy of any review undertaken under subsection (1).”
This new clause would require regular reviews of the implementation of section 50 and Schedule 8, including consideration of international implementation of Pillar Two, any competitive disadvantage for UK-based multinationals and possible remedial measures.
Lucy Rigby
Just to warn anyone who is not aware, clause 50 and schedule 8 are not the shortest. The changes they make are technical, but very important. Paragraphs 20 to 22 of schedule 8 prevent multinationals from trying to reduce their pillar two liability by entering into favourable tax arrangements to create pre-regime deferred tax assets or liabilities. Paragraphs 24, 25 and 34 ensure that the profits and losses relating to a UK real estate investment trust are excluded from the charge to domestic top-up tax to avoid double taxation. Paragraph 32 allows the UK to recognise the qualifying undertaxed profit rules of other jurisdictions before the OECD inclusive framework has completed a formal peer review.
Paragraphs 36 and 37 provide for a payment for group relief to be treated as a covered tax amount for domestic top-up tax purposes. Paragraph 39 reduces compliance burdens for smaller or non-material entities within a multinational group. Finally, paragraphs 2, 3, 6 to 12 and 16 to 19 update the rules on flow-through entities, permanent establishments, intragroup amounts and cross-border allocations of deferred tax so that the regime operates more smoothly in practice.
Taxpayers can elect for most amendments to apply retrospectively from the introduction of pillar two on 31 December 2023. However, taxpayers cannot select individual amendments to apply retrospectively; one election covers the whole package to prevent cherry-picking of favourable amendments. I should remind Members that, in line with the written ministerial statement of 7 January 2026, the clause does not include any amendments connected with the publication of the side-by-side agreement by the OECD/G20 inclusive framework earlier this month. The Government will introduce legislation to do that in the next Finance Bill following a technical consultation.
Government amendment 23 ensures that the legislation works as intended by making a small correction to legislative references used. Government amendments 21, 22 and 24 temporarily extend the deadline for making elections to give taxpayers more time to bed in the new IT systems needed to meet their filing obligations.
New clause 5 would require the Chancellor to review those technical amendments to the pillar two rules every six months and report on the international implementation of pillar two, among other things. We have already committed to the implementation of pillar two, which, as hon. Members will know, aims to ensure that large multinationals pay their fair share of tax. As a matter of course, the Government keep all areas of tax policy under review, so I reject the new clause.
Taken together, these changes implement internationally agreed changes, respond to taxpayer consultation, and ensure that the pillar two rules continue to be effective and administrable in the UK. I therefore commend clause 50 and schedule 8, together with Government amendments 21 to 24, to the Committee.
James Wild
I rise to speak to clause 50 and to new clause 5, which is in my name. Clause 50 will amend parts of the Finance (No. 2) Act 2023 and implement the multinational top-up tax and domestic top-up tax. As I set out in the last Finance Bill Committee, in October 2021 more than 135 countries signed up to the G20/OECD agreement on reforming international transactions and taxation, which the clause refers to—a major achievement that aims to ensure that multinational groups pay a fair share of tax where they generate profits. Pillar two delivers a minimum global effective tax rate of 15% for large multinational groups in every country they operate in, and the UK has been one of the first jurisdictions to legislate for the changes.
New clause 5 would require the Chancellor to review the changes on a six-monthly basis and lay before Parliament a report assessing three key issues: whether other major economies are implementing pillar two on comparable timelines and with comparable scope, whether any competitive disadvantage is arising for UK-based multinationals, and the impact of differentiated treatment for the United States. Crucially, if that review identified a material competitive disadvantage to the UK and UK businesses, the Treasury would be obliged to provide remedial measures within three months.
In rejecting new clause 5—another new clause that asks for a review—the Minister says that the Treasury is always conducting regular reviews of measures. If it is conducting this work anyway, why not share it with Parliament, and accept that it is a proportionate step to ensure ongoing parliamentary scrutiny in a very important area—a level playing field for British firms? The Minister referred to the length of the schedule. The sheer volume of amendments, coming less than two years after pillar two was first introduced, highlights the extreme technical complexity of the global minimum tax and the challenges for businesses that have to comply with it to keep up to date.
The Government’s aim is to ensure that UK rules remain consistent with the OECD model legislation, and schedule 8 is therefore aligned with the guidance and technical fixes. Those are sensible to maintain international consistency, but throughout last year there was growing international uncertainty about pillar two, the subject of the clause, as political divergence emerged over how it should operate, particularly regarding the treatment of US-parented companies.
The Minister referred to the side-by-side agreement made between G7 Governments last summer—and formalised, I think, this month—allowing certain UK and US multinationals to be exempt from parts of the rules while retaining access to the newly defined safe harbours. The agreement might bring some short-term stability, but it raises questions, and clearly we will be scrutinising it when, as the Minister said, it comes forward in future legislation. The US Treasury Secretary has described the side-by-side deal as
“a historic victory in preserving US sovereignty and protecting American workers and businesses from extraterritorial overreach.”
Will the Minister comment on what pillar two means in that context and on the UK’s position?
The impacts that might flow from that are precisely why new clause 5 is needed. The Government say that the UK is aligned with international developments, but the international landscape is shifting. Other major economies have delayed implementation or have adopted narrower regimes; meanwhile, the US has its own agreement and has not legislated for this framework at all. Without scrutiny, the risk is that UK-headquartered multinationals will find themselves complying with complex and burdensome rules, while their competitors operating elsewhere face a lighter regime. I simply note that the Chartered Institute of Taxation pointed out that it thinks the burdens of pillar two
“continue to appear disproportionate to the amount of tax that will be raised”.
If the Government truly believe that the regime provides a balanced and proportionate approach to a level playing field and that we can be assured that the competitive advantage does not go to other countries, let us have that report, see it set out to Parliament and have the matter resolved. To conclude, international co-operation on tax is essential, but we need to ensure not only that the UK is honouring its commitments, but that other countries are meeting theirs, so that UK companies are not losing out as a result.
Lucy Rigby
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his comments. International co-operation on such matters, as he said, is extremely important. The side-by-side agreement, as I have made clear, will be the subject of future legislation, which will be the opportunity for scrutiny. However, as I also made clear, that agreement ensures that all large multinationals will pay their fair share of tax through the application of pillar two and pre-existing minimum tax rules, while offering welcome simplification and stability to UK businesses.
We have to be clear that US multinationals, like every other multinational company, are still subject to the UK’s 25% corporation tax on the profits that they make in the UK. They are also still subject to the UK’s domestic minimum tax rate of 15%. We recognise that a degree of complexity is inherent in pillar two, but we must not forget that it applies only to large multinational businesses and that it is needed to stop businesses shifting their profits to low-tax jurisdictions and not paying their fair share of tax in the UK. I think the shadow Minister acknowledges that that is exactly why we need it.
That being said, in relation to the complexity, the UK continues to be a strong proponent of work to develop simplification of the system, including the recently agreed permanent safe harbour. As stated in our “Corporate Tax Roadmap”, the Government will also consider
“opportunities for simplification or rationalisation of the UK’s rules for taxing cross-border activities”
following the introduction of pillar two.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8
Pillar Two
Amendments made: 21, in schedule 8, page 358, line 9, leave out “50” and insert “50A”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
Amendment 22, in schedule 8, page 379, line 26, at end insert—
“50A In Schedule 16 (multinational top-up tax: transitional provision), after paragraph 2 insert—
‘Transitional extension to deadline for elections
2A (1) Schedule 15 (multinational top-up tax: elections) has effect in its application to a pre-2026 election as if in paragraphs 1(2)(b) and 2(2)(b) of that Schedule for “no later than” there were substituted “before the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day after”.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1), a “pre-2026 election” means an election which specifies an accounting period ending before 31 December 2025 as—
(a) in the case of an election to which paragraph 1 of Schedule 15 applies, the first accounting period for which the election is to have effect, or
(b) in the case of an election to which paragraph 2 of Schedule 15 applies, the accounting period for which the election is to have effect.’”
This amendment extends the deadline for making an election to which Schedule 15 of the Finance (No. 2) Act 2023 applies in cases where the election specifies an accounting period ending before 31 December 2025.
Amendment 23, in schedule 8, page 379, line 27, leave out paragraph 51 and insert—
“51 (1) In FA 1989, in section 178 (setting of rates of interest), subsection (2) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph (x)—
(a) for ‘51’ substitute ‘33A’;
(b) after ‘Finance’ insert ‘(No.2)’;
(3) In paragraph (y), for ‘51’ substitute ‘33A’.”
This amendment deals with a consequential amendment that was missed when paragraph 33A was inserted in Schedule 14 to the Finance (No.2) Act 2023 by the Finance Act 2024.
Amendment 24, in schedule 8, page 379, line 38, at end insert—
“(3A) The amendment made by paragraph 50A has effect in relation to accounting periods beginning on or after 31 December 2023.”—(Lucy Rigby.)
This amendment provides for the amendment inserted by Amendment 22 to have effect in relation to accounting periods beginning on or after 31 December 2023.
Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 51
Controlled foreign companies: interest on reversal of state aid recovery
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Rigby
The clause makes changes to ensure sufficient repayment interest is paid to affected companies following a successful challenge of a European Commission decision. It provides that interest is also paid on the amounts of late-payment interest that were recovered and are now repayable. It will affect a small number of UK companies that had amounts collected and later repaid following the successful challenge of the Commission decision. The changes are expected to have a negligible impact on the Exchequer.
James Wild
As the Minister said, this is a fairly straightforward measure allowing HMRC to pay interest to companies that have had to hand over money under a now overturned EU state aid ruling relating to the controlled foreign company rules. The 2019 ruling was subsequently annulled. My only question for the Minister is: does the clause mark the final chapter in the UK’s compliance with the EU state aid rules relating to the controlled foreign companies regime, or could other outstanding matters give rise to further issues or payments?
Lucy Rigby
The shadow Minister will appreciate that it is a requirement of UK domestic legislation to put companies in the position that they would have been in had the recovery legislation not been introduced, and it is that principle on which the clause is based.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52
Legacies to charities to be within scope of tax
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 6—Report on legacies to charities—
“The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within six months of this Act being passed, lay before the House of Commons a report on the impact of implementation of the provisions of section 52 on—
(a) charitable giving through estates, and
(b) charity sector income.”
Lucy Rigby
Clause 52, in combination with the other clauses in the Bill, will support the Government’s aims of closing the tax gap by strengthening compliance powers to challenge abusive arrangements by which donors or trustees of charities can enrich themselves. The clauses also simplify the tax rules by equalising the tax treatment of investment types and tax reliefs used by charities. The changes made in clause 52 will bring legacies into the definition of “attributable income”.
New clause 6 would require the Government to report on the impact of clause 52 on charitable giving through estates and on the income of the charity sector. The changes are aimed at those charities and donors who seek to make a financial gain. They will not penalise charities when legitimate donations are received and investments are made. The Government have published a tax information and impact note that sets out the impact of the changes, and it showed that the measures will have a negligible impact on businesses and civil society organisations such as charities. Once the measures have been implemented, HMRC will assess the impact by monitoring tax reliefs claimed by UK charities, so a formal evaluation is not required. I therefore propose that clause 52 should stand part of the Bill, and that new clause 6 should be rejected.
James Wild
Charities are a very important topic. We need to ensure that we give it appropriate scrutiny, given the importance of charities in our society and communities. Clause 52 and new clause 6—which I will speak to—relate to extending the definition of attributable income to include legacies left to charities. In practice, that means that when a charity receives a gift left in a person’s will, it could face a tax charge if that money is not spent on its charitable activities.
How charities use their funds is a topical subject in the context of the Church of England, which is planning to spend £100 million on its fund for healing, repair and justice—effectively a reparation fund for slavery, which many consider not to be an appropriate use of the funds, or what people gave funds to the Church for.
I now turn to the clause. The change will apply to gifts made on or after 6 April this year. New clause 6, in my name—it bears repetition—would require the Chancellor, within six months of the Act becoming law, to publish a report on the impact of the measure on charitable giving through estates and on the wider impact on the charity sector.
Concerns have been raised that expanding rules to cover legacies could have unwelcome implications if charities do not apply inherited funds quickly enough to their charitable purposes, leading to them being taxed. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales warns that that uncertainty, particularly around the timing, may discourage potential donors from including charities in their wills. Clearly, none of us would wish to see that.
HMRC has said that it will not set a deadline for how soon money must be used, although that ambiguity creates issues in itself. If the rules are unclear, HMRC could later decide that a gift has not been applied appropriately and withdraw the tax relief, undermining confidence that legacy gifts to charities will remain tax-free. Perhaps the Minister could give the Committee some clarity on that point, and on how HMRC will determine what counts as timely or appropriate application of funds.
There is also a concern about the administrative burden it may place, particularly on smaller charities, which will have to prove that each legacy received has been properly applied to charitable purposes, even when the money is placed in long-term endowments or reserves. The Charity Finance Group warns that the changes could mean more record keeping, compliance checks and bureaucracy, taking money away from frontline charitable activities and towards administration. I do not think that anyone would wish to see that. I do not know whether the Minister has anything more to add on that complexity.
Adding complexity could also make life harder for executors and delay the administration of estates, which could affect the timing of cash flows to charities at a time when finances in the sector are under considerable pressure, and income is critical for them to do their job. There is also a risk that wealthier donors might think twice about leaving legacies to smaller charities, if they think that the charity might struggle to comply with HMRC rules.
I am really asking for the Minister’s assurance that HMRC will take a sensible and proportionate approach, particularly with smaller charities that are seeking to do the right thing in applying these rules. We all want to avoid the potential risk that this measure could deter charitable giving, when that is clearly not the intention. It is important that the concerns raised by the sector are aired in the Committee, and it is our role to do so.
Lucy Rigby
I will start with the principle that, because legacies have received tax relief, it is important that they are spent on charitable purposes, otherwise they will be subject to a tax charge. More broadly, the Government are very much committed to supporting charities and their donors through tax relief, which was worth over £6.7 billion in 2024.
The changes in the clause are aimed at those charities and donors that seek to make financial gain. They will not penalise charities where legitimate donations are received and investments are made. The measures are intended to protect the integrity of the charitable sector by ensuring that donations, investments and charity expenditure are deployed for charitable purposes, not the avoidance of tax.
The shadow Minister fairly referred to any burden that may fall on smaller charities. The Government of course recognise that many small charities are run by unpaid volunteers, and for that reason we have sought to design the new rules in a fair and proportionate way. HMRC will help the sector to understand and prepare for the changes by providing clear communications and guidance.
I also want to be clear, in response to the shadow Minister, that the changes to the attributable income rules mean that legacies received by a charity will become chargeable to tax if they are not spent charitably. The changes reflect the fact that this income may have already received considerable tax relief. We have no plans to stop charities accumulating donations, so there will be no deadline for the spending of legacy funds.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 53
Approved charitable investments: purpose test
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 7—Report on charitable investments purpose test—
“The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within six months of this Act being passed, lay before the House of Commons a report on the impact of implementation of the provisions of section 53 on charity investment strategies.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to report on the impact of section 53 on charity investment strategies.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 53 changes the definition of “approved charitable investments”. The Government recognise 12 types of investments for charitable tax relief, but presently only one type of investment is required to be for the benefit of the charity and not the avoidance of tax. The Government are extending this rule to all 12 types of investment, making the rules both simpler and tighter.
New clause 7 would once again require the Government to report on the impact of clause 53 on charity investment strategies. As with clause 52, these changes are aimed at those charities and donors that seek to make financial gain. They will not penalise charities where legitimate donations are received and investments are made. As the shadow Minister may expect, we have published a TIIN setting out the impact of these changes, which showed that these measures will have a negligible impact on businesses and civil society organisations such as charities. I commend clause 53 to the Committee, and I ask that new clause 7 be rejected.
James Wild
I rise to speak clause 53 and new clause 7, which was tabled in my name. My comments will reflect submissions from people involved in the charitable sector and my discussions with them. The clause extends the allowable purpose to all categories of recognisable charitable investment—at present, it applies to only one, but it will cover all 12. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales has raised a suggestion that the test be reframed from
“for the sole purpose of”
to “wholly or mainly” to the benefit of the charity. The concern is that there could be increased obligations for compliance on trustees who have to demonstrate that their every investment in, for example, their portfolio was made for the benefit of the charity rather than an ancillary purpose therein. Was that more flexible approach something that the Government have considered, and if so why did they chose to reject it?
Mr Reynolds
As the Minister has outlined, clause 53 extends the purpose test from one category to all 12 categories. What guidance will HMRC provide for charity trustees to determine where the line is to be drawn between a legitimate investment strategy and those that are seen as having an ulterior purpose, because anti-avoidance should not penalise prudent charitable investment strategies?
Can the Minister also confirm exactly which charity sector bodies were consulted on these provisions and how they responded to that consultation, because many charity trustees are volunteers and this seems to place a significantly larger burden on those charity trustee volunteers to determine where to draw the line? It would be interesting to see what the consultation came back with as to where they would see that line and how they would attribute it.
Lucy Rigby
In answer to the comments of the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Maidenhead, as in relation to the previous clauses, I can confirm that HMRC will be coming forward with guidance that will make clear the exact scope of the changes and what needs to happen on behalf of charities in order to ensure compliance. The compliance changes apply equally to all charities regardless of size.
I come back to the statement that I recognise I have made repeatedly: these changes, along with those in the previous clause, are designed to protect the integrity of charitable tax reliefs. Although some smaller charities may need to review processes, the measures are proportionate and targeted at preventing abuse—not burdening charities, which in the main do incredibly good work.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk, questioned whether some specific wording had been considered as part of the Bill. I am afraid I cannot confirm that now, and will have to get back to him in writing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Tainted charity donations: replacement of purpose test with outcome test
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 9.
New clause 8—Report on tainted charity donations—
“The Chancellor of the Exchequer must, within six months of this Act being passed, lay before the House of Commons a report on the impact of implementation of the provisions of section 54 and Schedule 9 on—
(a) legitimate charitable giving, and
(b) prevention of tax avoidance.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to report on the impact of section 54 and Schedule 9 on legitimate charitable giving and the prevention of tax avoidance.
New clause 9—Review of outcome test—
“(1) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must within two years of the passing of this Act, review implementation of the outcome test under section 54.
(2) The review must assess whether the outcome test is clearer and more effective than the purpose test.”
This new clause would require the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review the implementation of the outcome test in section 54 and to assess whether it is clearer and more effective than the existing purpose test.
Lucy Rigby
Clause 54 and schedule 9 will support the Government’s aims of closing the tax gap by strengthening compliance powers to challenge abusive arrangements by which donors or trustees of charities can enrich themselves. The changes made in clause 54 tighten the rules on tainted donations.
New clauses 8 and 9 would require the Government to report on the impact of clause 54 and schedule 9 on legitimate charitable giving and the prevention of tax avoidance, to review the implementation of the outcome test in clause 54, and to assess whether it is clearer and more effective that the existing purpose test.
I come back to the same justification as for the previous clauses: these changes are aimed at those charities and donors who seek to make financial gain; they will not penalise charities when legitimate donations are received and investments are made. The TIIN, which was published alongside these changes, showed that these measures would have a negligible impact on businesses and civil society organisations. I therefore commend clause 54 and schedule 9 to the Committee, and urge it to reject new clauses 8 and 9.
James Wild
I rise to speak to clause 54 and to new clauses 8 and 9 tabled in my name. The clause makes significant changes to how tainted donations are treated. At present the donation is considered tainted only if it was made with an improper purpose. This clause replaces the motive-based test with an outcome test. If someone connected to the donor under the new regime receives financial assistance from a charity, such as a grant, guarantee or loan, the donation will be deemed tainted regardless of the donor’s intent. I have tabled new clause 8 to require the Government to publish a report on how the change affects legitimate charitable giving, or genuinely tackles tax abuse.
New clause 9 would require a review of the implementation of the new outcome test after two years and would assess whether it proves to be clearer than the existing purpose test. The Minister and the Government said that this measure is about tightening anti-avoidance rules and the challenge of proving intent. But I have been approached by the Charity Finance Group, which represents over 1,400 organisations and manages one third of the sector’s £20 billion annual income, and it has raised concerns around the change. It warned that the outcome test could unfairly penalise both donors and charities for results outwith their control.
For example, a donor could make a genuine good faith contribution only for a charity months later to make a routine investment or financial arrangement that inadvertently benefits a linked person. That donor could then find themselves caught by the anti-avoidance rules without ever having done anything wrong. That could cause uncertainty and raise concerns about people leaving legacy gifts that the charity sector relies on.
It is not just the charity and that one body. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales has warned that donors may have limited influence over the outcome once the donation has been made. It, too, questions the fairness and practicality of shifting from a motive to an outcome test. Indeed, it proposes that the existing rules are not altered for that precise reason. We tabled the two new clauses to introduce proper scrutiny of the measures and ensure Parliament understands the effect on the charitable sector and whether donations continue to be given.
Does the Minister consider there is a risk that shifting to such an approach could have the effect that the charitable sector has set out? If so, will she commit to perhaps providing some practical guidance, with examples that charities and their compliance teams could look at so that they can see that charitable giving is not undermined? None of us on this Committee would want to do anything that would undermine the ability of charities to raise money and disincentivise anyone from giving money for fear that they might be caught inadvertently by rules when they have done nothing wrong.
Lucy Rigby
It is important to recognise that the tainted donations rules ensure that the usual tax reliefs are not available where someone gives money to a charity with the intention to benefit financially from it. Previously, HMRC was only permitted to consider the intention of a donation and whether a donor had received a financial advantage from a donation, but now, with these changes, it will also be able to consider the outcome of the donation and whether a donor had received financial assistance. In that respect, considering the outcome of a tainted donation is a positive step towards challenging abusive arrangements. As I have said in relation to previous clauses, HMRC will come forward with clear guidance on the application of the clauses, and, to the shadow Minister’s point, that guidance might well contain examples.
We are taking a range of steps to ensure that the charity sector and the wider public are aware of the changes, which I hope reassures the shadow Minister. A detailed summary of consultation responses has been published. As I said, HMRC will provide clear and practical guidance in advance of implementation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 54 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Mark Ferguson.)
Railways Bill (Fifth sitting)
(1 day, 8 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. The selection and grouping list shows the way in which amendments and new clauses have been arranged for debate. Any Divisions on amendments or new clauses will take place in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper—I remind Members, after Thursday afternoon’s confusion, that new clauses will be voted on at the end of proceedings.
Clause 7
Directions by Secretary of State
Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 7, page 4, line 30, after “functions” insert—
“where the Office for Rail and Road, in carrying out its functions under section 69A of the Railways Act 1993 (as inserted by section 74 of this Act), has deemed Great British Railways to be in breach of its statutory functions.”
This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to give directions to Great British Railways to circumstances where the Office for Rail and Road has deemed Great British Railways in breach of its statutory functions.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 11, in clause 7, page 4, line 30, at end insert—
“(1A) A direction under this section may only be given as a last resort, and only if the executive head of Great British Railways has had to be removed because Great British Railways is failing to comply with its key performance indicators as set out in section [Great British Railways: Key Performance Indicators].”
This amendment limits the Secretary of State’s power to give directions to Great British Railways to a last resort.
Amendment 13, in clause 7, page 4, line 31, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment would remove the Secretary of State’s ability to say that Great British Railways can only exercise unspecified functions after consulting the Secretary of State or with the Secretary of State’s consent.
Amendment 14, in clause 7, page 5, line 9, after “publish” insert “and lay before Parliament”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay any directions given to Great British Railways before Parliament.
Amendment 16, in clause 7, page 5, line 11, at end insert—
“(5A) If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give a direction to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any direction.”
This amendment puts a duty on the Secretary of State to publish the assumptions, criteria and objectives used when giving any direction about the level or structure of fares, so decisions can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability.
Amendment 15, in clause 7, page 5, line 12, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State enforcing failure to comply with a direction through civil proceedings.
Amendment 17, in clause 8, page 5, line 35, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment would remove Scottish Ministers’ ability to say that Great British Railways can only exercise unspecified functions after consulting them or with their consent.
Amendment 18, in clause 8, page 6, line 4, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment would prevent Scottish Ministers enforcing failure to comply with a direction through civil proceedings.
Amendment 24, in clause 15, page 8, line 21, at end insert—
“(1A) The document set out in subsection (1) must ensure that Great British Railways is focussed on meeting the key performance indicators set out in section [Great British Railways: Key Performance Indicators].”
This amendment would require the rail strategy to be geared to enabling Great British Railways to meet its key performance indicators.
New clause 4—Secretary of State: power to dismiss the executive head of Great British Railways—
“(1) The Secretary of State may dismiss the executive head of Great British Railways.
(2) The Secretary of State shall only exercise the power in subsection (1) if—
(a) Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator set out in this Act,
(b) Great British Railways has failed to act on guidance given by the Secretary of State under section 9 of this Act.”
This new clause gives the Secretary of State the power to dismiss the executive head of Great British Railways if the organisation is failing to perform against its statutory duties.
Jerome Mayhew
It is just as pleasurable to have you in the Chair today as it was last week, Sir Alec.
I remind hon. Members that clause 7 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue and publish directions to Great British Railways relating to its railway activities. It also outlines how the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Welsh and Scottish Ministers before giving directions relating to their devolved services, except where powers are used in relation to the access regime. The clause further outlines how GBR will be required to comply with directions, which are mandatory and binding, and intended to be used as a so-called
“responsive tool for necessary course correction, rather than as a proactive tool to set requirements on GBR,”
or, as further clarified in the explanatory notes, as “a last resort”.
Interestingly, although the explanatory notes state that a direction by the Secretary of State is a mechanism of last resort, the clause itself gives no indication to substantiate that. Instead, it suggests that the Secretary of State can act independently of their Welsh and Scottish counterparts’ views, especially as there is a reliance on non-legislative measures. My first question to the Minister is, therefore: why is this supposed last-resort requirement not on the face of the Bill?
When dealing with matters relating in particular to the interpretation of devolution, the risk is that any decision taken by the Secretary of State may be disputed by the devolved nations and end up as a political football, which only increases lawyers’ profits. Would it not therefore be prudent to set out in the legislation exactly what is meant? Without a clear breakdown of the procedures and directions, surely we run the risk of granting the Secretary of State a large degree of power with very limited oversight.
The clause gives the Secretary of State unrestricted power, other than for operations in Scotland and Wales, to intervene in the running of GBR. That is a step too far. While it is justifiable for the democratically elected Government of the day to set and agree GBR’s strategic objectives, key performance indicators and business plans, after those are set out, the Government’s role should be to hold GBR to account for the delivery of the targets, objectives and strategies, and not to tell it how to do so on a day-to-day basis.
A question arises on clause 8(4), and I would be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on the oversight system outlined in clauses 7 and 8. Subsection (4) states:
“Before giving, varying or revoking a direction under this section the Scottish Ministers must consult the Secretary of State.”
Presently, GBR must decide whether a decision directly affects devolved services, but the Bill provides no statutory test, which leaves a delivery body making politically sensitive judgments, further increasing the risk of challenge by devolved nations. Clarity for Members, especially those from the devolved nations, will be extremely helpful, so I would be grateful if the Minister would address that directly.
Under subsection (5) of both clauses 7 and 8, directions must be published, but there is no requirement for them to be laid before and scrutinised by Parliament—the old trap of creating transparency without consequence. A reporting or laying requirement, perhaps through the Select Committee, would turn publication into genuine accountability. However, I am interested to hear what rationale the Minister has not to allow greater scrutiny of GBR in Parliament. Again, perhaps he will address that directly in his response. That is the rationale behind our suggested amendments to require the Secretary of State to lay directions before Parliament, in order to allow us to scrutinise the decisions in greater detail.
There is a fundamental question about leadership and who is the key decision maker. We are told repeatedly by the Minister and others that GBR is the directing mind, but will that really be the case if the clause goes through unamended? If GBR really is the directing mind, what is the necessity for the clause? It is a recipe for decision paralysis, with GBR, given the decision-making structures, undermined by guidance—we will come on to that when we discuss clause 9—and by directions from the Department for Transport in the name of the Secretary of State.
Clause 7 really does risk creating the worst of both worlds. We will have the cost of GBR and its oversight structures—we are told in the recently published job application for the part-time chair that GBR will have more than 100,000 employees; it will be an enormous organisation, with its own senior management team—and then we will have the same again, with an overactive Department for Transport second-guessing GBR’s day-to-day working and being able to give guidance and directions as a result of clauses 7 and 8.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
As my hon. Friend describes the growing size of the Department for Transport and Great British Railways, I am slightly reminded of the Department of Health and Social Care, and NHS England. The Government talk of doubling up and so are winding back by abolishing NHS England, but here they are doubling up in the Department for Transport over Great British Railways. I wonder whether he has any reflections on that analogy.
Jerome Mayhew
It is not a perfect analogy, because GBR is at least intended to be more akin to a business—a nationalised business—but my hon. Friend is entirely right that where we have two organisations in competition, each one thinking that it runs the railways, that is a recipe for confusion at the least, and disaster at the worst.
This is not an idle concern, because it has happened before. We all remember the Virgin West Coast franchise debacle in 2012, when the slightly arm’s length process of franchising did not go well, causing a communal panic in the Department for Transport. The phrase, “Something must be done to prevent this from ever happening again,” was no doubt repeated many times. The result was that more and more micromanaging took place by the Department for Transport in the setting of franchises. The Department no longer talked only about outcomes that needed to be achieved, leaving how companies went about that entirely up to them, which is the appropriate way to draft a franchise agreement. Instead, that devolved into mechanisms of how a franchise should be operated.
We had that mission creep, and I fear that under the Bill we might get exactly the same approach with GBR. It will be set up with the best of intentions, and perhaps in the first two or three years all will run smoothly and the directing mind in practice might well be GBR, but then something will happen, because something always does happen in the real world, with lots of people doing their best but sometimes making mistakes, and there will be a collective gasp from the Department of Transport, because it will feel like it is on the hook, so “Something must be done to ensure that this doesn’t happen again.” We have designed into this mechanism a structure that allows the removal of GBR’s operational independence, and it does so without any reference to actions of last resort by the Government—the Bill is silent on that.
We talk about the Secretary of State, but we all know that officials in the Department for Transport will be advising the Secretary of State on what he or she should be doing in a particular circumstance, and there will be a power grab. Without amendment, the clause will absolutely allow for that. We should be alive to the real-world experience that we all have and take this opportunity to strengthen its wording in order to design out that issue and ensure that there is proper accountability—with GBR accountable to the Secretary of State and, through the Secretary of State, to Parliament—and that operational independence stays with what will be a nationalised business, rather than creating a railway version of NHS England, as my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East mentioned a moment ago.
I have tabled two amendments to address this issue. Amendment 12 would limit directions to circumstances in which the Office of Rail and Road assesses GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions. It could be argued that the Secretary of State should have an emergency lever; that is fair enough, because bad things happen. One of our great complaints before the election, although I am beginning to hear it from Labour Ministers as well, was, “We pull the levers but they’re not attached to anything—we have no power.” When we form the Government after the next election, we will want to have levers that are attached to something, and I accept that it is necessary to have an emergency lever to pull should a significant unforeseen event occur—another pandemic, perhaps—and an intervention be required.
However, amendment 12 would still allow the Secretary of State to intervene in emergency scenarios, as the ORR would deem that such events make it impossible for GBR to conform to its business plan targets. Clause 74 sets out the ORR’s power to monitor GBR’s performance. Elsewhere in the Bill, we shall argue that the ORR needs more teeth to hold GBR to account, and this provision limiting the potential for the Secretary of State to intervene until such time that an independent regulatory body has recognised that GBR has not been able to fulfil its functions will be an important safeguard.
Amendment 11 would put the words “last resort” on the face of the Bill, and would provide that a direction may be made only after the removal of GBR’s chief executive officer. The intention behind the amendment is to treat GBR as a business, which I think we all agree is what it is intended to be—albeit a nationalised one. Where there is a board of non-executive directors, they can question the executive team, and they can challenge decisions and require the chief executive to explain and defend the direction of the company. However, when push comes to shove, and the decision is made that the organisation is moving in the wrong direction, the weapon available to the chairman is the removal of the chief executive officer.
If GBR is operating on a day-to-day basis with oversight from the Department for Transport—the Secretary of State—and concerns arise as to its direction or performance, the sequence of severity of the response should not start with guidance from the Secretary of State and then mandatory directions. They might be the final requirement, because we all need those levers, but surely they should come only after the chief executive has been challenged and then removed, just as in the private sector with an arm’s length majority investment.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
I certainly see what the hon. Member is trying to do with these amendments, and the Liberal Democrats share some of his concerns about the balance between holding GBR to account and GBR’s autonomy. However, does he not feel that amendment 11 may go a little too far? Laudable though the KPIs that he has set out are, I am not sure that any railway in this country has ever achieved them all at once, and if the amendment were made we may very well go through a revolving door of chief executives before the Secretary of State can give any direction.
Jerome Mayhew
That is a perfectly fair challenge, but amendment 11 would not require the CEO’s removal by the Secretary of State if those KPIs are not met; it would be a necessary first step to demonstrate that the KPIs are not being met, and then there would be a discretion. I suppose the hon. Member is really arguing that my safeguard is not quite as strong as it could be. Nevertheless, it would be a step in the right direction, and it would not require the removal of the chief executive.
New clause 4 would give the Secretary of State the power to dismiss the CEO of GBR on the grounds that a KPI has not been met and—this is an important bit, which the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage might recognise gives the new clause some weight—GBR has failed to act on guidance that has been issued by the Secretary of State under clause 9. It is sequential. First, the chief executive is given guidance from the Secretary of State. Most chief executives worth their salt would take notice of official guidance given by their 100% shareholder, but if for some reason they fail to act on the guidance and they are still missing their KPI, then the power to dismiss would be exercisable. In my submission, that is a good approach.
Clause 7(2)—the “interference clause”—anticipates minor direction changes, which is exactly the kind of direction that should not be issued and is contrary to the explanatory notes. We are told that the powers in the clause will be used only as a last resort, but subsection (2) states:
“A direction under this section may provide, in particular, that a function is only to be exercised—
(a) after consulting the Secretary of State, or
(b) with the Secretary of State’s consent.”
The clause is not an emergency lever. It is quite clear from the drafting that the circumstances in subsection (2) cannot apply to a last-resort emergency lever. It is saying, “You can carry on doing things, but we need to have oversight in the nitty-gritty.” It is truly an interference clause.
Is it the Government’s intention that directions issued under clause 7 will be, as described in the explanatory notes, used as a “last resort” emergency brake, or do they intend—this is the case as the Bill is drafted—that the Secretary of State will give himself or herself the power to intervene in day-to-day management, even down to the level that individual decisions will not be taken until there has been consultation with the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State has consented to them?
Clause 7(5) needs improvement. It requires publication by the Secretary of State, but anticipates no role for Parliament in that oversight. The organisation Rail Forum said:
“We agree that this is desirable to ensure GBR remains arm’s length and is allowed to manage its own affairs.”
That is important. The industry itself is saying that GBR needs to be operationally independent and to manage its own affairs. Amendment 14 would correct that issue. It would require the Secretary of State to lay any decision before Parliament—the right place for primary scrutiny. Rail Forum supports the amendment. It says:
“This is essential to ensure that normal Parliamentary process is not bypassed.”
Amendment 16 would mean that decisions on fares imposed on GBR by the Secretary of State can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability. Such a direction would have a huge impact on the financial position of GBR, because decisions on fares and passenger growth and affordability are central to revenue. It is crucial that decisions are made on proper evidence and in line with the objects of GBR.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
I do not want to stop my hon. Friend’s flow, as I believe he is probably coming to the end of his remarks. On listening to his eloquent speech, it strikes me that these amendments point directly to the fact that if Parliament had more of a role under the Bill, we would not even get to such places. Ultimately, if there is scrutiny throughout the process and an ability for Parliament, once GBR exists, to hold the Secretary of State and GBR to account, we should avoid the need for a civil proceeding, because a lot of the issues could be nipped in the bud before getting to that stage.
Jerome Mayhew
My hon. Friend is entirely right. That will be a theme of our comments on and challenges to the Bill throughout the progress of our scrutiny: accountability without responsibility is no accountability at all. Time and again, we see an unwillingness from those who drafted the Bill to trust the role of parliamentarians as scrutineers.
As a former businessman, I know—I have not made this one up; it is not unique thinking—that, in any organisation, you get what you measure. That will have been the case in any organisation that hon. and right hon. Members may have worked in in the private or public sector: the NHS has targets because it gets what it measures. At the moment, the Bill measures very little on GBR’s performance, and where it does, that disappears off to the Department for Transport and is reported to other civil servants.
As parliamentarians, we know our value in holding not only GBR to account but the Government of the day, which will not always be a Labour one. That is our important role, which is done through the Select Committee process and more widely. As parliamentarians, we should seek to improve the Bill. I recognise that we will have a number of Divisions during this process and I am unlikely to win a single one, but I urge the Government to listen—perhaps to the private comments of its own Committee members; they do not have to tell me about it—because these are genuine areas of improvement that we as parliamentarians should be encouraging the Government to add to the Bill. On that note, I will stop.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)
It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Sir Alec. I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, for this group of amendments, which are primarily about the direction powers in the Bill.
Amendments 11 and 12 would each limit the use of the Secretary of State’s direction power, requiring that the power can be used only as a last resort, after dismissing the head of GBR and if GBR has breached its functions. I understand the intention here, which is to ensure that these direction powers are used proportionately. I assure the hon. Member that the Government agree with that aim—we absolutely must empower GBR to be the directing mind of the railway—and I agree that the railway will not work if Ministers are forced to keep meddling in it in the way that they do today. That said, this power is not the problem that he thinks it is.
The new direction power is common in relationships between the Secretary of State and arm’s length bodies. Other examples in the transport sector that are not limited to last resort use include the power in the Infrastructure Act 2015 for the Transport Secretary to direct National Highways. Hon. Members will note that these types of powers are not frequently used. These amendments would create restrictions that undermine the principle that the Secretary of State should retain the ability to respond to persistent, urgent or unforeseen issues where rapid intervention is required.
Jerome Mayhew
Where is the reference to persistent, urgent and unforeseen incidents in the Bill?
Keir Mather
The Government have made it clear what the provisions within these clauses are designed to implement. I ask the shadow Minister to look at legislation passed under his own Government that contain direction powers that are remarkably consistent with those found in the Bill, and at the directions provided in other pieces of legislation. Does he feel that they represent mission creep when it comes to Secretary of State responsibilities? He will note that these type of powers are not used frequently. We believe that these amendments would create restrictions that undermine the principle that the Secretary of State should retain the ability to respond as required.
Critically, a direction should come before there has been a serious impact. The removal of an executive or the ORR deeming GBR to be in breach of its statutory functions would suggest that a serious failure has already occurred. In the latter case, it is unclear in what situation the hon. Member would consider a breach of a statutory function to have occurred, which would introduce ambiguity into the system.
Restricting the direction powers by limiting their use to only the most serious of instances would mean that any directions were more likely to be more prescriptive and severe. I am sure that the shadow Minister would not wish to see the public or industry seriously impacted before the Secretary of State acted. The new powers also recognise the GBR board as the railway’s directing mind while enabling Ministers to intervene to support GBR to deliver or correct course.
Amendments 13 and 17 would remove the ability for the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, respectively, to say that GBR can exercise unspecified functions only after consultation or with their consent. I do not think that these amendments are helpful. They would effectively remove the clarity on the directions power, but would not restrict the legal scope of it. They would simply lessen the legal transparency around the use of the direction.
There are circumstances where requiring GBR to consult the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers before taking a specific action would be entirely reasonable, and maybe even desirable for GBR. For example, where GBR needs to address a specific risk or situation as part of a wider national co-ordination or cross-industry response, the Secretary of State may need to ensure that actions are in line with national responses. The ability to revoke a direction allows Ministers to ensure that they operate in a proportionate and rational way in response to time-sensitive issues.
Amendments 15 and 18 would prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers, respectively, from enforcing GBR’s failure to comply with a direction through the civil courts. The Government need to retain the right to independent enforcement with fixed remedies that compel GBR to act across a range of mechanisms, to ensure a pathway to protecting taxpayers’ money and the delivery of the Government’s objectives. I hope the hon. Member would agree that it is completely undesirable to remove any ability for Ministers to hold the executive to account.
I also politely say that the hon. Member cannot have it both ways: either GBR is an organisation that could exercise mission creep and is too independent of scrutiny, whether from Parliament or anywhere else, or the powers in the Bill place too many strictures on it from the perspective of Government. That point of clarity is required in the Opposition’s overall perspective on the Bill.
Jerome Mayhew
As I have set out in my series of amendments, the appropriate oversight and control is to remove the chief executive. The Minister must accept that, if the Secretary of State thinks that the organisation is going in the wrong direction, is not listening to guidance or has gone rogue in some way, they have the unfettered power to remove the chief executive officer at any stage. If he does not think that is the case, he should say so now, because if the Secretary of State has the power to remove the chief executive officer and put in place someone who will do his bidding, then none of this is needed, is it?
Keir Mather
I will turn in a moment to the specific points that the shadow Minister raises around the chief executive, but I think I share his views on the importance of GBR’s compliance with its fundamental functions and with the law. That is why amendments 15 and 18 are peculiar—they do not recognise GBR needing to be able to have enforcement through that particular route.
Amendments 14 and 16 both relate to the transparency of directions. Amendment 14 would require directions to be laid before Parliament, but we believe that is unnecessary as provisions in the Bill already require directions issued under this power to be published, and Parliament has the power to call the Secretary of State to account should it take the view that more information is required.
Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Alec. The Minister is quite eloquently setting out why some of these amendments are not needed. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, set out earlier why they were needed, but also referred to problems that may happen in the future. It is difficult to write a Bill while trying to tackle problems that may or may not happen in the future.
The fact remains that rail reform failed to happen during 14 years of Conservative Government. The previous Rail Minister admitted that the Government failed to bring in the necessary reform. We had 10 Rail Ministers, I think—correct me if I am wrong—in 14 years. That was not just a failure to bring in a Bill; it failed passengers, railways and our workers who support the railways. Is it not time that we crack on, pass the Bill and deliver the improvements that this industry so greatly needs?
The Chair
Order. I remind Members that interventions should be short and punchy. If Members would like to make a longer intervention they have the opportunity to catch my eye.
Keir Mather
I agree with my hon. Friend’s sentiment that it is unwise to hypothesise about what potential eventualities could befall GBR in specific instances, as the shadow Minister encourages me to do. What is important—my hon. Friend made an important point around consistency, both in our legislative work and the work of the Government more broadly—is to ensure that the bedrock upon which GBR sits is legally sound, and that all eventualities that may arise are catered for through provisions within the legislation that offer sufficient breadth. That is why amendments 15 and 18 do not serve the legal accountability purposes that the shadow Minister seems to want to stress.
Keir Mather
I will give way one final time and then I want to make some progress.
Jerome Mayhew
I am grateful that the Minister is being very generous. In my opening remarks, I asked him to give me some real-world examples of when injunctive relief might be required. Could he not forget to provide those?
Keir Mather
I had not forgotten the shadow Minister’s request for me to provide specific examples. In a sense, though, I do not believe that it would be wise to do so. I do not think that the purpose of this Committee is to speculate about what GBR may or may not do in future; it is important that we develop a suite of measures that create the accountability that is required.
Keir Mather
I will give way one final time, and then I really do want to make some progress.
Laurence Turner
I will not test the wisdom of speculating about future legal circumstances, but is it not the case that when Railtrack was in a state of advanced collapse, that particular case did end up in court?
Keir Mather
I defer to my hon. Friend’s expertise on that particular matter, but my overall point is that, rather than create events in our heads about when this enforcement power may be required, it is important that we give GBR, and the Secretary of State in exercising accountability in relation to it, a full suite of measures to ensure that it remains compliant with the law. Actually, specific duties outlined in the Bill encourage GBR not only to be compliant with the law but to deliver for passengers, including those with disabilities, and to make sure that we have a long-term infrastructure strategy for the railway and unify it in a way that serves the interests of passengers.
Amendment 16 would require the publication of the assumptions, criteria and objectives used when giving directions about fares. The Government have been clear that GBR will have a greater level of autonomy and flexibility over fare setting than train operating companies do today; however, given the need to balance passenger and taxpayer contributions to funding the railway, that freedom will be within strategic parameters and guardrails set by the Secretary of State.
While it is possible that the directions power could be used to set strategic parameters and guardrails for fares, there are alternative routes, most notably the ability for public service contracts awarded to GBR to contain fare parameters and guardrails. Nevertheless, it is crucial that the Secretary of State retains the powers to direct and give guidance to GBR on fares. It is necessary that the Government and GBR alike can respond to exceptional circumstances. Beyond that, the Government are committed to interacting with GBR clearly and transparently, and the refreshed role of the Secretary of State on fares is no exception.
Finally, I turn to two additional amendments, which relate not to directions but generally to the accountability of GBR. Amendment 24 would require the long-term rail strategy to be geared towards enabling GBR to meet the key performance indicators set out in new clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham. New clause 4 would allow the Secretary of State to dismiss the head of GBR were it not meeting the key performance indicators proposed in new clause 2. We have already discussed new clause 2, so I will not repeat my arguments, but in relation to amendment 24, the long-term rail strategy is clearly meant to be just that—long term. The amendment would make the strategy a document focused on short to medium-term performance indicators, which could change much more frequently.
Rebecca Smith
I would argue that my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham has tabled a key amendment, which relates to something that came up in the scrutiny of the Bill in the Transport Committee; indeed, I asked a question of the noble Lord Hendy about it when I quizzed him on how we as MPs are supposed to hold the Government to account for the delivery of the long-term rail strategy. I appreciate that it is long term, but we have to get from the short term to the long term, and if nothing is set out in the Bill about what delivery is supposed to look like on the route to the long-term delivery, we effectively cannot do our job. The Minister in the other place rightly said, “It’s going to be an amazing railway system. It’s going to be perfect,” but he could not answer me on how we hold people to account on getting from A to B. I would be interested in the Minister’s response to that if he is not prepared to accept amendment 24.
Keir Mather
It puzzles me that with all the other transport bodies that have been set up—National Highways is an interesting example—I do not recall a series of concerns having been outlined that one of the most robust systems of parliamentary democracy in the world was in some way, shape or form incapable of—
Jerome Mayhew
I am grateful to the Minister, though I remind him that we do have 14 sessions; we are not cantering to the last fence. He prays in aid National Highways. We are all constituency MPs. We all know how frustrating it is trying to deal with National Highways. I do not want to make a headline unnecessarily, but my personal view, as a constituency MP, is that trying to deal with National Highways in the interests of my constituents is almost impossible. Why would he choose that as the example to follow when designing accountability for GBR?
Keir Mather
In a spirit of cross-party contrition, I agree with the shadow Minister’s point; it is a fair one, and perhaps that was a poor example.
In the setting out of the long-term rail strategy, through the Secretary of State, there are myriad means of Parliamentary accountability to ensure that process is done in a way that reflects the long-term interests of the railway and of passengers. There are robust means of scrutiny through this House and other means of which Parliamentarians can avail themselves of, and of which the hon. Member for South West Devon has availed herself multiple times through the passage of this Bill.
I would like to conclude on this grouping and so I want to speak to new clause 4. As the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will be aware, with bodies of this nature the Government’s long-standing policy is that the Secretary of State of the sponsoring Department has responsibility for appointing the non-executive chair of the board. The executive team is then accountable in the first instance to the organisation’s non-executive board, and it is right that trust is given to the expertise and experience of the executive and that there is appropriate distance between the Secretary of States and those tasked with the day-to-day operational management of the organisation. That is one of the benefits of the GBR model.
Legislating to dictate a process whereby the chief executive is dismissed directly by the Secretary of State for failure to meet a single KPI is not appropriate and it cuts across all guidance and understanding of effective partnership between Government Departments and their arm’s length bodies. For those reasons, I cannot accept these amendments and urge the hon. Members to withdraw them.
Jerome Mayhew
I am wholly unconvinced by the explanation the Minister has given. On many of the clauses and amendments I have put forward, and those put forward in the names of other Members, one can see both sides of the argument; on this one, I think the Government are entirely wrong. They are setting up a structure using another arm’s length non-governmental body, National Highways, that is a byword among us constituency MPs for a lack of accountability and for being a frustrating body to deal with. That is not the right direction for the Government to be going in and I will push the amendments to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Keir Mather
I beg to move amendment 166, in clause 7, page 5, line 4, leave out
“operation of a GBR-provided Scottish service”
and insert
“exercise by Great British Railways of functions—
(i) on behalf of the Scottish Ministers in accordance with arrangements made under section 4, or
(ii) under a contract awarded under section 31(3)(b)”.
This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the Scottish Ministers, where giving directions to GBR.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 167 and 168.
Clause stand part.
Clause 8 stand part.
Keir Mather
The amendments will improve clarity and ensure that the Railways Bill works as intended. Clauses 7 and 9, as drafted, set out that the Secretary of State must obtain consent from Scottish or Welsh Ministers when issuing a direction and guidance to GBR
“in a manner that directly affects the operation of”
a GBR-provided Scottish or Welsh service. That definition could unintentionally exclude scenarios where Great British Railways is exercising functions delegated by Scottish or Welsh Ministers that do not directly affect operation of railway passenger service functions, such as in relation to branding. The amendments provide a clearer and more precise approach. Consent will now be required whenever GBR is acting on behalf of Scottish or Welsh Ministers under formal arrangements enabled by clause 4, or contracts awarded under clause 31. That is a better way of defining where consent is needed as it reflects the responsibilities devolved to Scottish and Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
The amendments remove ambiguity from the Bill without changing its core purpose. They ensure that devolved Governments have a clear and consistent role in decisions affecting services devolved to them, while maintaining the Secretary of State’s ability to protect the network as a whole. That approach has the support of both Scottish and Welsh Ministers because it provides certainty and transparency. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendments.
Clause 7, to which the amendments apply, provides the Secretary of State with the power to issue legally binding directions to Great British Railways. Clause 8 replicates that power for Scottish Ministers when GBR is exercising functions relating to Scottish railway services in Scotland. Such powers are common in relationships between Government and arm’s length bodies and used only when absolutely justified and in a proportionate way. For example, the Oil and Gas Authority has received only one ministerial direction in its 10-year history.
Clause 7 is a normal, standard accountability provision that follows established precedent. It is a type of power that is always used sparingly. It is not a new and extraordinary means of interfering with the railway that the Government are trying to decentralise to GBR. The powers are necessary to reflect the overall democratic accountability of the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers for the performance of GBR within the areas of the country that they are responsible for and fund.
To protect GBR’s day-to-day operational independence as the directing mind, the powers will be used only where there is strong justification, in consultation with the ORR and after agreed processes have been followed. For Scotland, those processes include following a series of procedures and controls that will be set out in the memorandum of understanding between the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers that is required under clause 23 of the Bill. They also include consulting the Secretary of State before using the power.
To ensure appropriate transparency, the clauses require that the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers must publish any issued directions, including when they are amended or revoked. As GBR may also provide services on behalf of Scottish or Welsh Ministers, clause 7 requires the Secretary of State to secure the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers to issue directions to GBR relating to areas that fall under the devolved responsibilities of Scotland or Wales.
Finally, to avoid a scenario where GBR receives contradictory directions from Ministers or where directions issued by Scottish Ministers appear to go beyond their responsibilities, clause 8 provides the power for the Secretary of State to revoke Scottish Ministers’ directions. We have agreed with Scottish Ministers that that provision is necessary to protect the overall network as a whole.
The clauses are essential to provide a clear and proportionate route for intervention while still enabling GBR to deliver as the directing mind in the interests of its customers, taxpayers and the public. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Jerome Mayhew
The Committee will be pleased to hear that I am not going to reheat my arguments on clause 7, but we have not yet discussed clause 8. The arguments inevitably mirror each other to a degree, because clause 8 in the main seeks to extend the provisions of clause 7 to Scottish Ministers.
Clause 8 will grant Ministers in Scotland the power to issue and publish directions to GBR—so far, so similar—and GBR will be required to comply with those directions. However, the Secretary of State has ensured that they will have the ability to remove a direction of Scottish Ministers where it is inconsistent with her directions. The clause requires the Secretary of State to consult Ministers in Scotland before revoking and must publish any revocations.
The clause suffers from the same issues as clause 7, as I have already intimated: granting the Secretary of State, and then by extension Scottish Ministers, the ability to direct GBR, which is meant to be operationally independent. That is the first confusion. I will not rehash the arguments, but hon. Members should take it as read that I repeat them here.
As the Minister just mentioned, clause 8(7) will allow the Secretary of State to revoke a direction given by Scottish Ministers under that clause. That is confusion No. 2. We anticipate circumstances in which GBR has a direction of travel—that is not meant to be a rail pun—with which the Scottish Minister disagrees; the Scottish Minister issues a direction for GBR to go in a different direction, and then the Secretary of State disagrees with that direction and issues a revocation. What a recipe for confusion, delay and poor governance that creates!
Who is really in charge of the railways in Britain? It is certainly does not sound as though it is GBR, which is being second-guessed on the one hand by the Scottish Ministers and on the other by the Secretary of State. It does not sound as though Scottish Ministers are in charge even in Scotland, because they can suffer a revocation from the Secretary of State. Yet the consultation document tells us, as the Government have told us time and again, that
“GBR will be operationally independent, staffed by experts and professionals from the rail sector…who will be empowered to deliver for passengers and freight customers without government interference in day-to-day decision-making.”
When did that change? Perhaps the Minister can let us in to the secret. Clause 8 not only prevents GBR from being independent—as clause 7 does—but prevents devolved Ministers from acting within their own devolved settlements without being second-guessed by the Secretary of State.
I accept that the Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Transport, Fiona Hyslop MSP, when speaking about clause 8 during the Transport Committee evidence session, seemed not to oppose that oversight, as she recognised that certain aspects, such as access and freight, remain reserved. It seems that Scottish Ministers are content to accept the clause as drafted because a further memorandum of understanding will create firebreaks between non-devolved powers, in which the Secretary of State may intervene, and devolved powers. That could be okay, but we as a Committee do not know, because we have not seen the memorandum of understanding, even in draft.
We are going to come back to this issue again and again. There are a plethora of documents designed to support the operation of GBR—to support this skeleton Bill—and yet we have not seen them. How can this Committee do our job of scrutinising this Bill line by line, seeking to improve it and to ensure that it achieves the objectives that the Government say it does, when 19 documents and counting—documents that are crucial to the actual running of the railway both in Scotland and in the United Kingdom as a whole—are absent, even in draft?
Bill Reeve, the director of rail reform for Transport Scotland, when invited to add further to the remarks from the Cabinet Secretary, said:
“An awful lot will rely on the memorandum of understanding to flesh that out and give examples.”
There is a question for the Minister surrounding this memorandum of understanding for Scottish and Welsh Ministers. A lot of the powers in the Bill seemingly rely on a document that is not part of the Bill. Will the Minister provide details of the memorandum of understanding prior to the passage of this Bill? If not, why does he refuse to let us know what the memorandum of understanding is likely to stay? Why does he believe that Parliament should approve a working arrangement between the devolved Governments on which no consultation has been undertaken?
I will speak further in detail on the memorandum of understanding when we reach clauses 23 and 24, but it is important that Ministers note that the current framework of the Bill relies on a document that has little oversight or clearly defined objectives, and which we have not seen.
Keir Mather
On memorandums of understanding, I point the shadow Minister to the fact that the heads of terms for the memorandum of understanding with the Welsh Government have already been published. On the overall principle on the development of memorandums of understanding, the stakeholders who gave evidence to the Committee were very clear that the process is being carried out in close consultation with devolved Governments and that it is very common for such operational documents to be developed in consultation in this way.
We are creating an operational framework by which GBR can function as an organisation. It is very important that that platform exists before the devolved settlements that will dictate the operational reality of how the railway works are layered on top.
On the shadow Minister’s point about direction powers, these are the same direction powers that exist, almost like for like, with Great British Energy, Great British Nuclear and the North Sea Transition Authority. They are there to respond to urgent and pressing matters. His points on overreach should have applied to the creation of those organisations as much as to the creation of GBR.
The factual reality of how the direction power has been used in the case of oil is that only one direction has been issued in 10 years. It is the Government’s intent—we have been very clear in saying so—that this direction power must operate in a similar way and only respond to urgent, pressing and persistent matters.
On the issue of direction from Scottish Ministers, the Secretary of State cannot revoke a direction if it pertains purely to a devolved matter, but Scottish Ministers did agree that revocation powers are necessary when there are conflicts in directions. Speaking from my perspective on how this Bill puts the devolved settlement at the centre of how the railway functions, there are sufficient methods to create accountability, mutual working and shared recognition of priorities and ambitions across devolved Governments, the UK Government and GBR, so that I do not envisage a revocation of a direction being used regularly. It is only there to ensure the smooth function of the railway.
Amendment 166 agreed to.
Amendment made: 167, in clause 7, page 5, line 8, leave out
“operation of a GBR-provided Welsh service”
and insert—
“exercise by Great British Railways of functions—
(i) on behalf of the Welsh Ministers in accordance with arrangements made under section 4, or
(ii) under a contract awarded under section 31(4)(b).”.—(Keir Mather.)
This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the Welsh Ministers, where giving directions to GBR.
Amendment proposed: 14, in clause 7, page 5, line 9, after “publish” insert “and lay before Parliament”.—(Jerome Mayhew.)
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay any directions given to Great British Railways before Parliament.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Olly Glover
I beg to move amendment 143, in clause 9, page 6, line 30, after “statutory functions” insert
“, but only in respect of strategic or financial matters where such guidance is necessary and does not interfere with the operational exercise of those functions.”
This amendment limits the guidance that the Secretary of State can give to Great British Railways.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 19, in clause 9, page 6, line 30, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may only give guidance under this section if—
(a) the Secretary of State has drawn to Great British Railway’s attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator set out in section [Great British Railways: Key Performance Indicators], and
(b) Great British Railways has not, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.”
This amendment would restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to issue guidance to GBR to circumstances where GBR was failing to meet a key performance indicator as specified in NC2.
Amendment 20, in clause 9, page 6, line 37, at end insert—
“(5A) If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give guidance to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any guidance.”
This amendment puts a duty on the Secretary of State to publish the assumptions, criteria and objectives used when giving any guidance about the level or structure of fares, so decisions can be assessed against passenger growth and affordability.
Amendment 21, in clause 10, page 7, line 4, at end insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may only give guidance under this section if—
(a) Scottish Ministers have drawn to Great British Railways’ attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator set out in section [Great British Railways: Key Performance Indicators], and
(b) Great British Railways has not taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.”
This amendment would restrict Scottish Ministers’ ability to issue guidance to Great British Railways to circumstances where Great British Railways was failing to meet a key performance indicator as specified in NC2.
Olly Glover
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Alec. This amendment relates to some of the clauses in the Bill that will enable the Secretary of State to give guidance, as opposed to direction, to GBR. Amendment 143 is, in my humble opinion, a very modest and reasonable attempt to simply clarify some of the clear intentions that the Minister has expressed for the Bill. Our amendment would mean that the Secretary of State could only provide guidance to GBR on its statutory functions in respect of strategic or financial matters, where such guidance is necessary and does not interfere with the operational exercise of those functions.
The reason for tabling this amendment alludes to things I have said previously in this Committee room, and in other locations—there have been many examples in the past of the Secretary of State as proxy for the Department for Transport, getting involved in far too much of the fine detail of the running of our railways, whether that is the intricacies of timetable specification, whether certain types of rolling stock are upgraded or not, and whether they are equipped with wi-fi and tables, or not. There are many other examples that I could give and I have given before. The amendment is intended to strengthen the Government’s clear intent that the direction and guidance given by the Secretary of State should be strategic and high level. The guidance should be about providing a clear overview of what the Government of the day wishes the railway to achieve and deliver, and about empowering GBR—with appropriate regulation to hold it to account, as we have been debating—to get on with it.
I hope the Minister will view the amendment rather more favourably than he has others, although my powers of clairvoyance feel particularly strong this morning, and I suspect that will not be the case, in which case we will wish to press it to a vote.
Jerome Mayhew
I will deal briefly with amendment 143 and develop some arguments on the other amendments. I congratulate the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage on tabling amendment 143, which pushes in exactly the same direction that I have been pushing today, and also last Thursday, in developing the concern about increasing micromanagement by Department for Transport officials in the name of the Secretary of State, which will undermine the independence of GBR as a tactical organisation.
The culture is already there: the Department has been micromanaging the railways to an increasing extent since 2012 at the latest. This Bill needs to change culture. It is not a steady-state Bill; it is a once in a generation opportunity to change the culture not just of GBR, moving it away from Network Rail, but of the Department for Transport, which is as necessary as the other cultural change. If this Bill is to achieve what it is meant to, the Department’s relationship with the railways should properly be changing. Amendment 143 is a modest but important proposal that would go some way to facilitating that.
Dealing with the group as a whole, and continuing the theme of the exercise of functions and guidance by the Department, the Opposition once again note the contrast between the supposed independence of GBR and the various mechanisms that the Department and the Secretary of State have managed to wheedle into the Bill to grant themselves extra powers, whether as a last resort or, as I fear, to create a micromanaging charter, and where that last resort, as it has been described, has no qualifying criteria—although as we have heard from the Minister, that is seemingly of little consequence.
The clause enables the Secretary of State to “issue and publish guidance”, with notable devolved exceptions, which will allow the Secretary of State to
“clarify policy intentions to GBR.”
The explanatory notes acknowledge that
“in most cases requiring course correction, guidance would be used before directions,”
although I note that it is not required. The Government anticipate that they could move straight to directions if they wish to. However, subsections (1) and (2) are very clear:
“The Secretary of State may give guidance…or revoke guidance”
without any qualifying criteria at all.
What is guidance? It is a steer short of direction, and an application for an injunction against GBR—which we have just voted in favour of—destroys the myth of GBR operational independence. It will be taking orders from the Department for Transport, because that is the status quo ante. Without strengthening this clause and some others, we will confine the relationship between the Department for Transport and the newly created GBR to “more of the same”. That is the fear that we should collectively be fighting against.
The guidance will be not just on the strategic direction or the business case, but on delivery decisions, at the whim of the Department. We can say, “Well, it’s the Secretary of State. This will be done under advisement,” but we all know that in practice it will mean officials micromanaging GBR in the name of the Secretary of State, who will provide the rubber stamp. I fully expect the Minister to reassure me that that would never happen, and that the provision is only for course corrections. Now, if I was in the passenger seat of a vehicle and kept telling someone how to drive, I suppose I would call that a course correction, but they might call it backseat driving. That is the problem: the Bill is designed for backseat driving by the Department for Transport. Will the Minister explain how the clause is nothing short of backseat driving?
I obviously wish GBR the best of luck, and I hope the Minister’s enthusiasm and optimism is fully justified, but I fear that the disastrous consequence of forcing it to walk on eggshells will be constant second-guessing. I have been involved in an organisation in which there was second-guessing—no one was sure who had the decision-making power—and it was a disaster. If there is second-guessing, the organisation as a whole does not know when a decision has been taken. Does the power lie with the board? Does the board have to get clearance from a second board in a wholly different organisation, which might have a different view? Should people in GBR wait for the nod from the Department for Transport before taking action within the organisation, particularly if it is a decision with which its sub-department may not agree?
Rebecca Smith
My hon. Friend’s argument highlights the challenge that a lot of the independent retailers, open access users and, potentially, freight users will face if the Bill remains as drafted. Ultimately, they are the people outside the walls of the castle who will struggle to understand who is making what decision and which decision is final. It is a bit like a child going to one parent, getting an answer they do not like, and going to the other parent to get a different answer. Should there be more clarity in the Bill specifically for that reason?
Jerome Mayhew
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. When one’s children come and ask for something, the wise answer is always to ask first, “What did your mother say?” If we were able to apply that common sense to this situation, I would not be so concerned. What we have instead is stakeholder management culture seeping into the core aspects of GBR functions.
Laurence Turner
Will the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that progress has been made on the cultural issues and the micro-management that he describes? I note in passing that he dates that culture from 2012 onwards, which was, of course, entirely under the Government of which he was part. In the Transport Committee, we heard that until the election, Network Rail had to seek Treasury permission to do as much as put up a passenger footbridge. Is it not welcome that that has now come to an end?
Jerome Mayhew
It is certainly welcome, but we are still in the position in which an improvement to a line—something as small as the Haughley junction improvement, which costs roughly £15 million to £20 million—still needs ministerial sign-off from the Treasury before it can be authorised. The Government have some way to go to improve the situation.
This will leave us with a stakeholder management culture. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon is entirely right that many organisations in the 60% of the railway that is not being nationalised as part of GBR will be intimately and hugely impacted by GBR’s decisions—or will they? Will they, too, have to wait for the all clear from the Department for Transport? If GBR gets on the wrong side of Ministers or the Department, its course is going to be corrected to all manner of different ports.
The combination of clauses 7 and 9 removes almost any semblance of operational independence from GBR. Clause 9(5) states that GBR
“must have regard to guidance given under this section.”
That sounds soft, but in practice it creates a standing expectation of compliance and makes it impossible for GBR to make dynamic tactical decisions that are free from day-to-day second guessing by departmental and ministerial intervention.
That brings me to amendments 19 and 21, which would help defend the operational independence of GBR. If the Secretary of State is concerned about an aspect of GBR’s performance, they may instead issue guidance to inform GBR of its failure to meet the key performance indicators. Additionally, under clause 10, the Secretary of State may give guidance only if
“Scottish Ministers have drawn to Great British Railways’ attention that Great British Railways is not meeting a key performance indicator…and…Great British Railways has not taken action to remedy this failing within the period of two months.”
As a result, the amendments would apply to GBR in both England and Scotland.
Finally, amendment 20 repeats the argument made about directions or guidance given by the Secretary of State on the general level and structure of fares, and it would introduce new subsection (5A), which states:
“If the Secretary of State uses the powers in this section to give guidance to Great British Railways about the general level and structure of fares for travel on railway passengers services designated under section 25 or 26, then the Secretary of State must publish the assumptions, criteria, and objectives underpinning any guidance.”
That is self-evidently sensible, and I look forward to the Minister agreeing with me.
Keir Mather
May I begin by addressing the point about backseat driving? Following the shadow Minister’s remarks, I identified that this is something that we want to avoid not only in future but because it is the existing scenario that we inherited. Right now, under the old system, the Secretary of State is the only person who is really accountable for driving the system forward, and private operators spent more time employing people to decide who was to blame for failures on the railway than ensuring that the railway actually ran in the interest of passengers.
Interference in access and timetabling is another issue that has been raised. The reason why we have diffuse responsibility and muddled accountability in that space is because Network Rail and the ORR, which are two separate organisations, both have responsibility there but they cannot do it in a unified way, and therefore they cannot serve the interests of passengers. That is exactly what the creation of GBR as a directing mind for the railway seeks to avoid, and guidance within that system plays a very important role in removing one of the shadow Minister’s key concerns: an overbearing Secretary of State issuing direction to GBR. Guidance has been designed to create an iterative process by which GBR can enter into a dialogue with the Secretary of State to talk through and deal with common challenges.
The amendments seek to limit the ability of the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to issue guidance to GBR under clauses 9 and 10. I am clear that the new system established by the Bill does not intend to involve the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers in ongoing or individual operational decisions. That is for GBR’s board and the thousands of employees working on the railway. Instead, the guidance power provides a mechanism through which Ministers can respond to overarching issues that might emerge. For example, if the ORR identified persistent failures in GBR’s performance against its business plan, it may suggest guidance from the Secretary of State that could help to support GBR to course correct, and to clarify the desired outcome without requiring more stringent action, such as a direction.
Further, it is not all one-directional guidance. Guidance will be a flexible tool designed to support Great British Railways. For example, there may be instances where guidance is requested by GBR and is issued in a collaborative manner to provide clarity on the policy direction or shared objectives. I also remind members of the Committee that GBR must have regard to the guidance—in other words, it must consider the guidance and weigh it against its other duties and obligations. It is not required to blindly follow the guidance in all cases.
Let me turn to the specifics of each amendment. Amendment 143 would limit the issuing of guidance to solely financial or strategic matters. In seeking to establish a hard line between types of decision making, the amendment would create a false dichotomy. Strategic and financial decisions are likely to have operational implications. The amendment could therefore inadvertently prevent the Secretary of State from being able to issue guidance where there is any operational impact at all, which is clearly disproportionate, given the potentially collaborative and helpful nature of the guidance.
Similarly, amendments 19 and 21 seek to prevent the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers from issuing guidance unless GBR is not meeting a key performance indicator under the Opposition’s proposed new clause 2. I have already explained why that proposed new clause is nonsensical. I reiterate that KPIs would be better designed and included as part of GBR’s business plan.
Jerome Mayhew
You are kind to call me to speak again, Sir Alec; I realise that I did not speak to clause 10 earlier. Briefly, I recognise that clause 10 mirrors clause 9, which we have debated substantially, but it is important to note that Scottish Ministers are given a guidance function, whereas Welsh Ministers are not. That reflects the devolution settlement, whereby Scotland funds and controls its rail system in its entirety, whereas Welsh responsibilities are substantially limited to the core valley lines. I repeat our previous arguments about the express need for operational independence for GBR, without constant second-guessing by Department for Transport officials, which my amendment 21 addresses, and about fares, which I discussed in relation to amendment 20. I will press a selection of the amendments to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Keir Mather
Clause 9 provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue non-binding guidance to Great British Railways, which GBR must have regard to. Clause 10 provides Scottish Ministers, as funders of the railways, with the same power.
Guidance provides the Secretary of State with a proactive lever to hold GBR to account, while preserving its operational independence as the directing mind. Scottish Ministers will be able to issue guidance to GBR on the exercise of its statutory functions in Scotland, in so far as they relate to Scottish railway activities.
These powers will be used by the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to help to develop a better common understanding of an area or to encourage a strategic focus on a specific issue to support GBR in carrying out its functions in the interests of its customers, taxpayers and the public.
To ensure appropriate transparency, the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers will be required to publish any issued guidance, as well as any amendments or revocations. Further, where the guidance relates to functions that Scottish or Welsh Ministers have delegated to GBR or to services that they have contracted GBR to provide, the Secretary of State must secure their consent before the guidance is issued, reflecting devolved accountability for those services.
This is a sensible and proportionate provision that allows for direct and unambiguous communication between Ministers and GBR, and is intended to support the proper management of the railway.
Jerome Mayhew
We have debated these two clauses. We have made clear our concerns about the current drafting and have tried our best to improve the Bill through a number of very sensible amendments, the majority of which were supported by the Liberal Democrats. We in our turn have supported some sensible amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage. I recognise that to vote against the clauses would potentially put a difficult hole in the armoury of the Secretary of State for GBR, so it is with a heavy heart that I do not oppose these two clauses.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Licensing
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Mather
On a point of order, Sir Alec. Before turning to the clause, I would like to correct the record. My Department’s commitment has always been to publish the draft GBR licence during the Bill’s passage, rather than before the Bill leaves the Commons, as I had said in oral evidence on 20 January. Before publication in draft, my Department will undertake engagement with stakeholders to inform the draft. That engagement will start before the Bill leaves the Commons, and I will ensure that hon. Members are involved in it if they would find that beneficial.––[Official Report, Railways Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2026; c. 97, Q180.]
Keir Mather
Clause 11 introduces schedule 1, which will amend part I of the Railways Act 1993 to set out GBR’s licensing regime in a way that broadly mirrors the existing licence provisions in the 1993 Act. I will deal with schedule 1 in more detail later, but for now I commend the clause to the Committee.
Rebecca Smith
I do not think I said this earlier, because I was merely intervening, but it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alec.
I appreciate what the Minister just set out in correcting the record from last week, because a lot of what I was going to say had to do with the lack of the licence. In spite of what he said, I still think that it is a problem for us to be debating clause 11, and later schedule 1, without that detail in front of us. It is very generous of him to say that we can be part of the consultation process, but given that we are encumbered with being here for 10 hours a week, I am not quite sure when would be able to do that. With all due respect, I still want to put on record how disappointing it is that we do not yet have the licence. Ultimately, Great British Railways is entirely premised on that licence: it does not operate without it, cannot deliver its functions without it, and will not create this supposedly amazing utopia of perfection for passengers and infrastructure deliverers alike without it.
Debating the clause without that context feels like a completely wasted opportunity—indeed, I fear that this debate will be incredibly short. This is something that I have seen happen with other Bills. The Minister will say that this is what the Opposition would also have done, but we were not in the position to set up Great British Railways, which—next to the NHS—will be the biggest Government-funded and backed body in this country. Without the scrutiny of hon. Members this morning, we cannot do our job properly.
Such scrutiny is in the interest of all the stakeholders—the public, the staff who work for all the railway companies that are to be brought into Great British Railways, and all the other stakeholders that provide services through open access or freight. Whether it is the coffee shop in a station or the trolley service on the train, all these people need this information, and I am disappointed that we cannot provide that scrutiny at this stage in the debate. I would welcome the opportunity to see the draft as soon as it is out, but it is disappointing that has not come in time for debate in Committee. No doubt similar comments will be made on Report and, hopefully, in the other place.
Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification. When I asked the question and he, with alacrity, answered, I did catch the expression on one of his official’s faces; I have to say that I have, on occasion, found myself in that position in the past, so I sensed what might have been coming.
I have to say that I am deeply disappointed. Although it is important that stakeholders are engaged, this legislation has been some time in the making. The licence is at the heart of how GBR will operate, so the fact that not even a skeleton draft will be made available to hon. and right hon. Members as the Bill continues its passage through this House is deeply concerning. I will speak at greater length when we get to schedule 1, but we are effectively being asked to give the Government a blank cheque, based on assurances of intent, without actually seeing the detail of the legislation.
Joe Robertson
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Alec. My right hon. and hon. Friends have already spoken at length and I agree with them, but I will add just a couple of short points to place my disappointment on the record that not even a draft of the licence has been presented.
It is good that the Minister has clarified that it will be coming forward sooner than he suggested previously, but the reality is that it is already too late, as we heard from stakeholders last week during evidence. I urge him not to delay any further. Even an outline draft of the licence as soon as possible, rather than a more detailed one, would be clearly better than nothing. He should also bring forward the other 19 documents identified by my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon—again, in draft form as appropriate—as soon as possible. As I say, it is already too late for this Committee today, as we debate this very clause and schedule. I wish to place that on the record.
Jerome Mayhew
I echo all the comments made by my right hon. and hon. Friends. I also thank the Minister for facing up to it with a point of order. It was obvious last week that a point of order was on its way. None of us on the Opposition Benches will hold him to his initial, rather quick, response—no doubt I will do something similar during the passage of the Bill—but that does not let the Government off the hook.
This is not business as usual for a Department bringing through a Bill of this nature. My right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston, an experienced former Minister, gave two examples of primary legislation that also relied on secondary documentation. In those circumstances, the departmental teams did provide skeleton outlines for Parliament, which is what we are, to consider and do our job properly. I do not want the Minister to rush out a quick affirmative like last week, so I ask him to take time to consider, perhaps discuss with his officials, and reply later today on whether he and his officials are able to commit to some form of briefing—some skeleton outline—on the nature of the licence, at a time when we can collectively discuss and debate it, and see whether it points in the right direction.
Clause 11 simply enables GBR’s licensing to be set out in schedule 1, which we will come on to in a moment. That schedule amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 and sets out the detailed process by which the GBR licence will be issued and maintained. Both the Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will retain the ability to grant licences to railway bodies other than GBR—for example, open access operators, freight operators and other infrastructure managers such as the core valley lines in Wales. I know we will discuss the contents of schedule 1 and the detail of the licence extensively.
Keir Mather
Although we have had an opportunity to discuss some of the provisions regarding the creation of the licence—it being enforced by the ORR with powers that include giving GBR directions to escalate issues to its board, requiring GBR to create and publish improvement plans and issuing enforcement orders— I have heard Opposition Members’ points that they would like an opportunity to discuss those matters more closely and in further detail.
We believe that developing the licence in this way will ensure that what is published for statutory consultation is informed by the development of a stable legislative framework in which to scrutinise the licence—as we are doing now—and can be meaningfully refined and enhanced by a wide range of views. However, I take the point that the shadow Minister and other right hon. and hon. Members have made, and I am sure that we can have further discussions today. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Licensing of Great British Railways
Jerome Mayhew
I beg to move amendment 109, in schedule 1, page 55, line 10, leave out from “may,” to “grant” and insert—
“at the recommendation of the Office of the Rail and Road in relation to matters related to safety and standards and, after consultation with the Passengers’ Council,”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to get a formal recommendation from the Office of the Rail and Road that the GBR licence adequately ensures that licence obligations related to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined.
Schedule 1 contains the meat of what we have been talking about. It amends part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 to set out how GBR will be licensed. Paragraph 2 confirms that GBR should never be exempt from holding a licence, and paragraph 3 inserts new section 7B, which will enable the Secretary of State, following consultation, to grant GBR a written licence to operate specified railway assets. The licence must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the Secretary of State’s consent.
Paragraph 3 also sets out the process for granting licences to persons other than GBR. The Secretary of State and the Office of Rail and Road will continue to be able to grant licences to persons other than GBR to operate railway assets. The ORR may grant such licences only with the Secretary of State’s consent or under a general authority issued by the Secretary of State. Licences must be in writing and will remain in force unless revoked or surrendered. Surrendering the licence will require the ORR’s consent, much in the same way as it previously required the Secretary of State’s consent.
Proposed new section 8A sets out the requirements for the granting of licences by the Secretary of State or the ORR. It provides that a notice must be published outlining the intention to grant a licence, the reasons for doing so, and allowing at least 28 days from the date of publication for interested parties to make representations or objections. There is a duty to consider representations or objections made within the period specified in the notice.
Proposed new section 8B gives the Secretary of State the power to set rules for how licence applications must be made. Among other things, that includes the format of the application, the fee payable—different fees may apply—and the requirements for publishing the application. Before making any regulations, the Secretary of State must consult the ORR. Any fees collected by either the Secretary of State or the ORR in connection with licence applications must be paid to the consolidated fund.
Paragraph 4 clarifies that a licence granted to GBR may specify when the authorisation it provides takes effect. It allows the licence to include a start date or a mechanism for determining it. Paragraph 5 provides that the licence granted to GBR may include a condition requiring it to comply with the provisions set out in separate document that is prepared by the ORR and approved by the Secretary of State. It might be something such as a code of practice—one of these operating documents that we have been talking about so much—and it may relate to the sale of tickets by GBR or third parties, or to services that GBR provides to the rail industry to facilitate railway operations that are of particular interest to the independent retail sector. The paragraph makes it clear that an approved document may be used to regulate GBR’s behaviour in relation to the sale of tickets by parties other than GBR, in the independent retail sector.
Paragraph 6 provides that, before making modifications to a GBR licence, the Secretary of State must publish a notice explaining the proposed modifications and the reasons for them, and must allow the usual period of 28 days for interested parties to make representations. There is a duty on the Secretary of State to consider representations or objections to the notice made within the period specified.
Paragraph 7 clarifies that the ORR must consult the passengers’ council before making any amendments to passenger or station licences that relate to functions of the council. The ORR must also send a copy of the modifications to the council as soon as practicable. Paragraph 9 clarifies that any licence under section 8 of the Railways Act 1993 that was in force immediately before the changes made by the schedule come into force will remain so, per the conditions and periods set out in the licence, unless it is revoked or surrendered.
Here is the mystery of the missing licence: where is it? We have explored this at some length, and the Minister is going to go away and see what he can rustle up in the Department’s cupboard to point us in the right direction, or at least to give us the direction of travel of the missing licence. In oral evidence to the Transport Committee, Ben Plowden, chief executive officer of the Campaign for Better Transport, said:
“I think the licence will be critical. There are various references in the documents that the Government published to a ‘streamlined licence’, so I would be quite interested to see what that means relative to the current licence that applies to Network Rail. I think the Government are going to consult on the draft licence, so we will all have a chance to look at it.
The other point I would make is one I made earlier, which is that the licence will be one of many documents the Government will produce in the next year to 18 months. There is the long-term rail strategy and GBR will produce its business plan. There will be the access and use policy; the new periodic review process; and MOUs with Ministers in Scotland and Wales. There will be guidance on partnerships with mayoral combined authorities, and guidance on the right to request full rail devolution. There is a huge amount still to come.
Understanding how the licence intersects with those other documents and processes is going to be critical, because between them they will add up to the set of arrangements that determine whether GBR is successful or not for passengers. We have to see the licence in the context of all the other things that will be guiding, directing and shaping what GBR does, how it invests, and what it does operationally.”
That is the experts in the industry repeating what the Opposition have been arguing repeatedly today and last week. More accurately, it is the other way around: we have been listening to the industry in a way that the Government have not, and have been expressing the deep concerns in the sector that the current proposals are half cocked. Huge chunks of the direction, guidance and memorandums are simply missing, including the licence that the schedule is designed to address.
Rebecca Smith
The Minister spoke earlier about the consultation. It is worth restating that it is not the final draft but a consultation on the draft that is going to happen. We will have sight of the final version of the licence way down the road of the Bill’s progress, and ultimately the final licence may not be ready before scrutiny of the Bill is complete. Does my hon. Friend agree with me that that is something that we need to address? Hopefully the Minister will reassure us.
Jerome Mayhew
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have made that point as forcefully as we can. I trust the Minister when he says that he will take it away and do his best with his ministerial and departmental colleagues, but it is not just a matter of saying, “We kind of understand that licences already exist. Licences have been issued by the Office of Rail and Road. It will not be some kind of copy and paste, but taken from what already exists and we are going to get something similar here.” As Ben Plowden said, there are various references in the documents that the Government have published to something very different: a streamlined licence. That begs all sorts of questions about what is anticipated to be removed from the licence. The Department for Transport has got as far as saying it is going to be smaller, perhaps significantly smaller because it is streamlined, but this is critical.
The licence of ORR is a mission-critical document that anyone who works in the industry would acknowledge, yet we are told it is streamlined, and therefore elements of what is traditionally considered to be a licence under the current system are anticipated to be removed. Is the Minister able to tell us what parts are likely to be removed? What is it? Because the Government documents refer to a streamlined licence, he can tell the Committee what that means. The Department says it is going to be streamlined, but what does it intend to remove to justify that description? It must be somewhere within the Department; otherwise those words would not have been used in the supporting documentation. There is no excuse for the Minister not to describe the definition of a streamlined licence and what is anticipated.
My hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon made the point that the Minister has corrected the record on when the draft licence will be provided during the passage of the Bill through both Houses, but in the next breath he said there will be consultation on that document, which has not yet started. How can that consultation be anything other than a paper exercise? The Minister seems confident that he can go through a consultation process that has not yet started, that the Department can then properly consider the contributions and come to a considered view and redraft the licence, taking into account all the comments, good, bad and ugly, that the consultation came up with, and then produce the draft licence in the two or three months that the Bill has to run through both Houses. That is an extraordinary position. It suggests either that the Minister will have to come and make a second point of order in a couple of months’ time, or that the consultation to which he refers is an absolute farce, because the Government have already decided what they want to do. They are going through the performance of a consultation, but they have already made up their mind. Perhaps the Minister will tell us which one it is.
Amendment 109 would constrain the Secretary of State’s ability to modify GBR’s licence without first seeking consent from the ORR and the passengers’ council. It is part of a series of amendments including amendments 110, 112 to 116 and 233, to which I will speak later. The Government strategy is that the Bill will be the legislative shell for the creation of GBR. Crucial matters of detail, such as the licence under which GBR will operate and important long-term strategies, business plans, targets and so on are separate and, at this stage, missing. Such details matter and deserve proper scrutiny.
We know that other plans and targets are unlikely to be set until after the Bill is enacted, so it is important to include strong checks and balances. That is the purpose of amendment 109. At present, the Bill merely requires the Secretary of State to consult the Office of Rail and Road. Legally, that is weak; after consultation, the Secretary of State may simply ignore whatever the ORR comes up with. The amendment and those linked to it would require the Secretary of State to obtain the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be issued. Subsequent amendments would require the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be modified.
Modification of the licence requires consent from the new passenger watchdog. If the passenger watchdog is to be as powerful in championing the interests of passengers as the Government claim they want it to be, it requires proper powers that go beyond an invitation to be consulted. For that reason, I propose that we put amendment 109 to the vote.
The Chair
I note that debate on amendment 109 has included discussion of schedule 1 more generally. In order to use the Committee’s time more efficiently and if the Committee is content, we could debate schedule 1 more broadly now. That would mean that group 20 is not debated; there would just be a formal decision on schedule 1 and debate on group 19 would be unchanged. As that is the will of the Committee, we will take that approach.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the amendment, which is intended to prevent the Secretary of State from granting a licence to GBR unless the ORR gives a formal recommendation that licence obligations related to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined. The amendment does not specify what the ORR’s recommendations would need to contain or how it would operate in practice. The Government recognise the importance of effective regulation in the rail sector, particularly in relation to safety. The safety of our railways is a priority, and we will ensure that it is central to GBR, so that our railways continue to rank among the safest globally. The Bill makes no changes to the existing safety regime, which has proved to be exemplary.
In practice, amendment 109 would give an approval role to the ORR on matters relating to safety and standards ahead of the GBR licence being granted by the Secretary of State. It would confuse the clear accountabilities that the Bill establishes, which place responsibility for drafting, consulting on and granting the GBR licence with the Secretary of State, with the ORR then enforcing against its provisions. That aligns with the Government’s approach to regulation: Ministers set policy and strategy, and regulators provide validation and reassurance to the industry.
The Bill already requires a consultation on the contents of the GBR licence and specifies that the ORR and the passenger watchdog must be consulted as part of that. That will ensure that any concerns about safety and standards can be raised and considered appropriately ahead of the GBR licence being granted. The amendment would confuse accountabilities and add additional processes where they are not needed. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Jerome Mayhew
I am grateful for Minister’s explanation, but I am not persuaded by it and seek to put amendment 109 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Railways Bill (Sixth sitting)
(1 day, 8 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The House divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 1 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and our proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch any electronic devices off or to silent, please, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during the sittings—there should be ample water at your Benches. The selection and grouping document shows the way in which the amendments and new clauses have been arranged for debate. Any Divisions on amendments or new clauses take place in the order in which they appear in the amendment paper, of which you should all have a copy.
Schedule 1
Licensing of Great British Railways
Jerome Mayhew (Broadland and Fakenham) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 233, in schedule 1, page 55, line 10, leave out “consultation” and insert “agreement”.
This amendment limits the Secretary of State’s powers to set GBR’s licence unilaterally.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 110, in schedule 1, page 55, line 25, leave out “consultation” and insert “agreement”.
This amendment, along with Amendments 111 and 112, would limit the Secretary of State’s ability to unilaterally set GBR’s licence and require instead agreement from the ORR and the Passenger’s Council.
Amendment 111, in schedule 1, page 55, line 30, leave out “consultation” and insert “agreement”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 110.
Amendment 112, in schedule 1, page 55, line 34, leave out “consultation” and insert “agreement”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 110.
Amendment 118, in schedule 1, page 56, leave out line 6.
This amendment would strengthen the ORR’s right to grant a license to a non-GBR operator.
Amendment 113, in schedule 1, page 57, line 20, leave out “consult” and insert “obtain the agreement of”.
This amendment, along with Amendments 114 to 116, would require the Secretary of State to gain the consent of the ORR for making regulations about GBR’s licence.
Amendment 114, in schedule 1, page 58, line 20, leave out “consultation” and insert “agreement”.
Amendment 115, in schedule 1, page 58, line 21, leave out “consultation” and insert “agreement”.
Amendment 116, in schedule 1, page 58, line 23, leave out “consultation” and insert “agreement”.
Amendment 126, in schedule 2, page 62, line 17, leave out “advice” and insert “agreement”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to obtain the ORR’s agreement for GBR’s business plan instead of seeking its advice.
Jerome Mayhew
Thank you, Mr Western, and for agreeing to be in the Chair this afternoon. We are part-way through consideration of the schedule, with a degree of overlap: amendment 109 was selected in a separate group to this one, although its wording is intricately linked to that of amendments 110 to 116. I shall try to minimise the degree of repetition for all concerned.
The amendments in this group seek to constrain the Secretary of State’s ability to modify the licence of Great British Railways without first seeking consent from the Office of Rail and Road and the passengers’ council. The Government’s strategy is for the Bill to be the legislative shell for the creation of GBR. Crucial matters of detail, such as the licence under which GBR will operate, together with important long-term strategies, business plans, targets and so on, which we have mentioned more than once in our deliberations so far, are separate from the Bill.
That detail matters and deserves proper scrutiny by this Committee and elsewhere in the Houses of Parliament. When the Rail Minister and his officials appeared before the Transport Committee on 7 January, Members took several attempts to secure an assurance that the draft licence would be published before Parliament completes scrutiny of the Bill, albeit without a specific date set. It is therefore important to include in the Bill stronger checks and balances than exist now, and that is the purpose of amendments 110 to 115.
At present, the Bill merely requires the Secretary of State to consult the ORR. Legally, that is of course very weak and, after such consultation, the Secretary of State may simply ignore whatever it is that the ORR comes up with. Amendments 110 to 112 therefore require the Secretary of State to obtain the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be issued, and amendments 113 to 115 require the Office of Rail and Road’s agreement for the licence to be modified.
In addition, modification of the licence requirements would need consent from the new passenger watchdog. If the passenger watchdog is to be as powerful in championing the interests of passengers as the Government claim they want it to be, it requires proper powers that go beyond an invitation to be consulted. That leads me to amendment 118, which would leave out line 6 on page 56 of the Bill and would strengthen the right of the ORR to grant a licence to a non-GBR operator.
The schedule contains important powers for the Office of Rail and Road to issue licences to operators other than GBR to operate services on the network. However, proposed new section 8(5)(a) in paragraph 3 of the schedule gives the trump card to the Secretary of State, who must consent to the granting of such a licence. Why is that power of veto required? Perhaps the Minister will explain when he responds.
If the Government wish to reduce their involvement in the day-to-day running of the railways and the Office of Rail and Road deems that an application from a non-GBR operator meets all the requirements and conditions set out in the Bill, why do the Government think it necessary to have that overriding power? It does not appear to make sense. Amendment 118 would remove that power of veto. The group of amendments, together, would require the Secretary of State to obtain a formal recommendation from the Office of Rail and Road, and would require that the GBR licence adequately ensures that licence obligations relating to safety and standards are not compromised or undermined. The amendments would ensure that, as GBR is granted new responsibilities by the licence, it continues to be subject to safety standards obligations that are in the licence issued by the Office of Rail and Road to the current infrastructure manager, Network Rail.
Such licence obligations go beyond obligations under the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006—which are called ROGS for obvious reasons—and would require Great British Railways to participate in the industry’s collaborative structures around collective decision making, managed by the Rail Safety and Standards Board, and comply with safety and interoperability standards set collectively by the sector, including for freight and supply chain.
For those reasons, this group of amendments, taken as a whole, would provide important strengthening of the role of the ORR. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)
May I begin, Mr Western, by saying what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairship? I thank the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham for tabling this group of amendments. I shall discuss amendment 233 with amendments 110 to 112, which I believe all share the same intent. Provisions to require the agreement of the ORR and the passenger watchdog before the Secretary of State issues the GBR licence would add an additional and unnecessary level of bureaucracy. If the amendments intend to ensure that the ORR and the passenger watchdog can constructively input into the licence, I assure the hon. Member that the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult the ORR and the passenger watchdog, and to invite representations more widely, before the licence is issued. If the amendments were accepted, it would no longer be clear who had the right to determine the terms of the licence. It is only appropriate that, following full consultation, the Secretary of State, as the licensing authority, has the sole final sign-off of the licence. The ORR will then, of course, enforce that licence. That is consistent with the clear accountabilities that the Bill establishes. We therefore cannot support the amendments.
On amendments 113 to 116, GBR will not need to apply for a licence, therefore the amendments’ provisions would apply only in relation to non-GBR licences. In any case, the amendments would add unnecessary complexity to the process for making licence application regulations. The amendments also intend to give an approval role to the ORR and the passenger watchdog in relation to modifications of GBR’s licence. The Bill already requires those bodies to be consulted before the Secretary of State modifies GBR’s licence. Again, requiring approval rather than consultation would risk confusing the clear accountabilities that the Bill establishes.
Amendment 118 seeks to strengthen the ORR’s ability to grant non-GBR licences. Under the Railways Act 1993, all licences are granted by the ORR with the consent of the Secretary of State. In practice, that consent is normally given in advance through a general authority, avoiding the need for case-by-case approval. The Bill does not change that aspect of the licensing regime. Removing the provision for specific Secretary of State consent, as the amendment intends, would not meaningfully strengthen the ORR’s ability to grant non-GBR licences. Non-GBR licences could still only be granted within the scope of a general authority approved by the Secretary of State.
In fact, the amendment would remove a useful route that enables the ORR to issue a licence outside the scope of a general authority or in circumstances where amending a general authority would not be practical. Far from strengthening the ORR’s ability to issue non-GBR licences, the amendment would instead likely weaken it.
Finally, amendment 126 would require the ORR to agree to GBR’s business plan before it is approved. I agree that the ORR provides invaluable input as an expert, independent regulator and it must have a robust role in the determination of GBR’s business plans. That is why the Bill gives it an explicit role to run the funding process, provide advice on the business plan and validate the costs within it, and independently publish its advice, whether that advice is supportive or critical of GBR.
However, it is not appropriate for the ORR, an unelected body, to decide how public money is allocated to the railway. Public spending decisions at this level should sit with elected Ministers who are responsible for funding the railway. I hope the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham can see this Government’s commitment to a robust and independent role for the ORR, but it is clear that the ORR can fulfil its role assuring the business plan without needing to be a funding approver to do so.
Further, the ORR will have an expanded monitoring role though the powers in the Bill, being able to monitor all GBR’s activities against its business plan. If GBR does not deliver on its plans, the ORR will be able to publish its findings, as well as escalating the matter to the Secretary of State. The ORR will be a trusted expert adviser to the Secretary of State, combining the strengths of an expert regulator with the need for the Government to control taxpayer money.
I encourage the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham to withdraw the amendment, and not to press the others in this group to a vote.
Jerome Mayhew
I listened with interest to the explanation the Minister gave and his request that the amendment be withdrawn. I was particularly interested to hear him describe the role of the ORR as a “trusted expert adviser”. In my submission, when we have GBR as the player and referee in many of the areas it will be active in, with a designed-in conflict of interest, we need more than a trusted expert adviser to hold the Government and GBR to account; we need an independent regulator. That is exactly what the ORR currently is.
I intend to press amendment 233 to a vote and, dependent on the outcome, I will not proceed to press amendments 110, 111, 112, 118, 114 and 115 as they address similar wording in other parts of the Bill. However,but I will seek to press amendment 126 to a vote if we get the opportunity to do so this afternoon.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
New clause 26—Great British Railways: funding review—
“(1) Thirty months after the commencement of any five-year period covered by a funding settlement for Great British Railways, the Secretary of State must publish a review of Great British Railway’s funding.
(2) The review set out in subsection (1) must include figures for—
(a) funding allocated to;
(b) ticket revenue raised by;
(c) amount of government subsidy received by;
Great British Railways.
(3) A copy of the review must be sent to the Transport Committee of the House of Commons.
(4) References in this section to the Transport Committee of the House of Commons—
(a) if the name of that Committee changes, are references to that Committee by its new name, and
(b) if the functions of that Committee (or substantially corresponding functions) become functions of a different Committee of the House of Commons, are to be treated as references to the Committee by which the functions are exercisable.”
This new clause adds statutory transparency to rail funding cycles.
New clause 34—Great British Railways: Certainty of Funding—
“(1) Within 12 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a funding certainty framework for Great British Railways (‘the Framework’).
(2) The purpose of the Framework is to establish and maintain terms for the funding of Great British Railways.
(3) The terms of the Framework must include provision that—
(a) The Secretary of State may not vary, reduce, or reopen the funding settlement for an active Control Period, unless either—
(i) a statutory provision made after this Act amends Great British Railway’s duties requiring funding revision, or
(ii) an emergency has been declared within the meaning of section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004;
(b) the Secretary of State must publish—
(i) the confirmed funding determination,
(ii) the assumptions underpinning it, and
(iii) any exceptional circumstances to justify any adjustments,
within an active Control Period;
(c) the Secretary of State must agree the funding for the next Control Period not less than two years before it is due to start;
(d) when determining the funding settlement for a Control Period, the Secretary of State must take into account—
(i) the Long-Term Rail Strategy,
(ii) Great British Railway’s duties, and
(iii) whole system planning considerations across infrastructure, passenger services and freight;
(e) The Secretary of State must work with Scottish Ministers to align as far as possible funding determinations so that Great British Railways receives a single, coherent, funding determination no less than two years before the relevant Control Period starts.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on—
(a) any funding determination for each Control Period;
(b) any exceptional revisions of the funding determination for a Control Period within that Control Period;
(c) whether the Office of Rail and Road, or any other relevant body, has met any relevant deadline to confirm funding for the next Control Period, and where it has failed to do so, the reasons for that failure.
(5) Nothing in this section amends or removes the ability of Office of Rail and Road to carry out Periodic Reviews for each Control Period.
(6) The Secretary of State must annually lay before Parliament a report on—
(a) the stability of Great British Railways’ funding;
(b) the effect of any instability on—
(i) the efficiency of,
(ii) delivery of services by, and
(iii) management of risks associated with projects run by, or associated with,
Great British Railways.
(7) For the purposes of this section, ‘Control Period’ has the meaning given in any final decision taken by the Office of Rail and Road which concludes each periodic review of access charges as described in Schedule 4A of the Railways Act 1993.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to prepare a Funding Certainty Framework, with funding for each Control Period set two years before it is due to start, to enable Great British Railways to plan effectively.
New clause 39—Great British Railways: financial duties—
“(1) Great British Railways has a duty to ensure that its operating expenditure does not exceed its operating income in each financial year (‘the duty’).
(2) The duty does not apply to capital expenditure aligned with national infrastructure investment and enhancement pipelines.
(3) Within 12 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must provide guidance to Great British Railways about its duty under subsection (1).
(4) This duty must include guidance about—
(a) operational income, including fare revenue, access and charging functions, commercial income, and non-fare revenue streams;
(b) operational expenditure, including staffing, operations, support, maintenance, rolling stock operation, management and renewals; and
(c) the exclusion of capital expenditure aligned with national infrastructure investment and enhancement pipelines.
(5) Great British Railways has a duty to ensure its business plan and operational decisions have as a priority its long-term fiscal sustainability within the objectives set out in the rail strategy.
(6) In meeting its duty under subsection (5) Great British Railways must seek to increase its revenue.
(7) For the purposes of subsection (6), ‘revenue’ includes—
(a) fare revenue through passenger growth,
(b) commercial retail income,
(c) income from property, station and land commercialisation,
(d) freight access revenue, and
(e) market expansion.”
This new clause puts duties on Great British Railways to ensure its operating expenditure does not exceed its income, and to deliver long-term fiscal sustainability. It makes further provision relating to those duties.
New clause 40—Great British Railways: non-reliance on taxpayer funding—
“(1) Within its first operational Control Period, Great British Railways must set out a transition plan towards ending any reliance on taxpayer funding.
(2) The transition plan under subsection (1) must identify—
(a) any efficiency improvements Great British Railways can make, and
(b) any cost-reduction measures necessary for Great British Railways to operate in such way as does not rely on taxpayer funding.
(3) For the purposes of this section, ‘Control Period’ has the meaning given in any final decision taken by the Office for Rail and Road which concludes each periodic review of access charges as described in Schedule 4A of the Railways Act 1993.”
This new clause requires Great British Railways to set out a plan towards ending any reliance on taxpayer funding.
New clause 41—Great British Railways: annual statement of financial performance—
“(1) Great British Railways must publish an annual statement of its financial performance, including—
(a) its operating income and expenditure,
(b) whether it achieved operating cost self-reliance,
(c) the reasons for any failure to achieve operating cost self-reliance,
(d) where it has failed to achieve operating cost self-reliance, any actions it will take in the next financial year to achieve it, and
(e) an assessment of its compliance with its duties under section [Great British Railways: financial duties].
(2) The Secretary of State must lay the annual statement before Parliament.
(3) The Office of Rail and Road must review Great British Railway’s performance as set out in the annual statement, and publish an assessment of whether Great British Railways is meeting its efficiency and revenue targets.
(4) Where the Office of Rail and Road concludes that Great British Railways has not met its duties under section [Great British Railways: financial duties], a Minister of the Crown must make a statement to each House of Parliament setting out—
(a) the reasons for Great British Railways’ failure to meet its duties, and
(b) any corrective action to be taken by—
(i) the Secretary of State, or
(ii) Great British Railways.”
This new clause requires Great British Railways to publish an annual statement on its financial performance, and for the Office of Rail and Road to assess that performance.
New clause 44—Great British Railways: savings target—
“(1) The Secretary of State must publish a savings target for each financial year for Great British Railways.
(2) The Secretary of State—
(a) must keep the target under review,
(b) may revise or replace the target, and
(c) must publish any revision or replacement to the target.
(3) Great British Railways must, when exercising its statutory functions, have regard to the target set by the Secretary of State under this section.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to set a savings target for Great British Railways.
Keir Mather
Clause 12 establishes a new funding process for GBR that takes what we have learnt from the successes of the periodic review process today and applies them to the new GBR world. That new funding period review will not only provide GBR with five years of funding to carry out its job of operating and maintaining the railway network, but will create a structure through which GBR will develop and own integrated business plans, across track and train, that reflect its role as the directing mind for the railways. That five-year funding certainty will help to drive the best price for Government and the taxpayer, through lower risk and the benefits of economy of scale. It will also generate consistent, longer term work for private partners in the rail supply chain, keeping good, well-paying specialist jobs alive and thriving.
Jerome Mayhew
Clause 12 is an enabling clause. It is very short and merely refers to schedule 2, so I make no representations to change it and shall not seek to divide the Committee on it.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
I want to make a few remarks about the Conservative new clauses, on which we have mixed opinions. New clause 34 perhaps has some merit in terms of its intention to strengthen protections for the five-year funding review period process. My hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset will speak to our new clause 26 shortly.
We feel that some of the other Conservative new clauses have not necessarily been fully thought through or recognise the reality of how railways work. For example, new clause 40 seeks to end GBR’s reliance on taxpayer funding. Of course, in an ideal world we would love all public services to end their reliance on taxpayer funding—that would be paradise because we would not need taxation—but the reality is that extremely few railways in the world are entirely independent of taxpayer funding. We invest public money in railways because they are significant enablers of all sorts of economic and social benefit, so we have some concerns about new clause 40.
Some of the other Conservative new clauses have good intentions. For example, new clause 41 seeks to require the publication of data on financial performance. But it also seems to be over-fixated on GBR needing to reach a self-financing state, which seems somewhat unlikely.
I have said enough. I look forward to hearing the comments of the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham on his new clauses and of my hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset comment on ours.
Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)
I wish to speak briefly to new clause 26, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage. In simple terms, the new clause would ensure that Great British Railways’ funding is reviewed, published and scrutinised by Parliament halfway through each funding cycle, so that there is transparency and accountability on public money and it is spent effectively.
Any long-term rail strategy, particularly one that involves large sums of public money, must be open to proper scrutiny, regularly reviewed and accountable to Parliament. This is especially important as the Bill in its current form gives the Secretary of State a significant concentration of power over the future, shape, funding and direction of the railways. If Parliament is to be asked to confer that level of authority, accountability should increase alongside it. New clause 26 provides a sensible and proportionate mechanism to do exactly that without dragging Ministers or officials into day-to-day micromanagement.
As currently proposed, Great British Railways risks becoming the rail equivalent of NHS England—a fear raised previously in Committee—a large, centralised body distant from accountability and with blurred lines between ministerial direction and operational responsibility. Transparency is the safeguard to protect against ending up with another unaccountable arm’s length body.
The new clause would require a statutory funding review halfway through each five-year settlement. That review would set out, in clear figures, exactly how much funding GBR had been allocated, how much revenue had been raised from fares, and how much Government subsidy had been received. Crucially, it would also be sent directly to the Transport Committee, thereby ensuring proper parliamentary scrutiny. That matters because taxpayers are funding the railway twice: once through general taxation and again through ticket prices. Passengers and taxpayers alike deserve to know where their money is going, how it is balanced between subsidies and fares, and whether it is being spent evenly and effectively across the funding cycle, not just all at the start or at the end.
A mid-point review would also allow us to see what is working and what is not, particularly given that GBR will be a new organisation. It would give time to correct course when things are failing, and to continue or scale up when results are delivered. Above all, it is about hardwiring trust into the railway system, with clear information, published transparently and scrutinised by Parliament, with a focus on passengers. We believe new clause 26 would strengthen the Bill and hope the Government will give it due consideration.
Jerome Mayhew
Thank you, Mr Western, for allowing me a second bite at the cherry. I misdirected myself in dealing just with clause 12 in itself, rather than the new clauses in the group.
A forward view of funding certainty is key to stopping the stop-start approach to infrastructure funding. The Committee has received plenty of evidence from the industry—both in written evidence and in the oral evidence we heard on Tuesday last week—that this is a major concern. The date in schedule 2(1)(d) is therefore important, and needs to be a minimum of two years prior to the start of the next five-year funding period. That is because, given that we currently have five-year control periods, funding certainty decreases in the run-up to the end of one control period and the beginning of the other and, as a result, the amount of work undertaken and committed to by Network Rail decreases proportionately. We therefore get a wind-down of activity, with specialist staff being laid off by the supply industry, before it all grinds up a gear at the beginning of the next control period. We end up with a bell curve of activity.
We have heard strong evidence—I will read some out in a moment—about how that uncertainty disrupts the ability of the supply sector to service Network Rail and its infrastructure development plans efficiently. It does two pretty terrible things: first, it drives up costs for Network Rail and therefore for the taxpayer, and secondly, it means that less work gets done per pound. It is expensive and it takes longer.
In written evidence to the Transport Committee, the Rail Forum states:
“The Bill states in Schedule 2 Part 1 that the SoS can ‘vary the financial assistance’ previously agreed as part of the GBR five-yearly settlement during the five-year term. This flies in the face of providing the stability that the Transport Committee was seeking to address through the ‘Rail investment pipelines: ending boom and bust’ inquiry earlier this year. Re-opening of the settlement should only be allowed in very exceptional circumstances that should be explicit in the legislation.”
Why has the Minister moved away from the position that was previously articulated? Why is the sanctity of the funding settlement within a five-year control period—which has been, albeit imperfect, so valuable for the industry—actively removed by schedule 2? To put it another way, why is the Secretary of State being granted new powers to vary the financial settlement without notice?
The Rail Industry Association, which represents the supply sector for the railways, states:
“The railway, and rail supply businesses, need stable funding to be able to plan effectively and be efficient. Changes to the Control Period style five-year infrastructure funding settlement (Schedule 2) undermine this and amplify the uncertainty already faced by suppliers.
RIA and our members are very concerned the current Bill drafting allows the Secretary of State for Transport to remove railway funding mid-period, at no notice and with very limited transparency over the impact, for example, on safety, performance or efficiency.
We disagree with the principle that the Secretary of State should be able to remove funding mid-period. Stable multi-year funding settlements are a longstanding principle for infrastructure networks because short-notice funding changes reduce the efficiency of spending and make it harder for suppliers to plan ahead with any confidence.
Supply chain confidence in the UK rail market is already historically low with 64% believing the rail market will contract in 2026 and 62% freezing recruitment or reducing headcount (over one in three business leaders plan to lay off staff in 2026), according to a RIA-commissioned Savanta survey of rail business leaders.
There is…currently already a lack of full work visibility to the end of the current Control Period, which completes in March 2029, and companies are now repositioning themselves away from rail to target other industrial sectors in the UK and overseas rail markets—the ability for the Secretary of State to remove funding would clearly exacerbate this situation…Concerningly, even on its own terms Schedule 2 does not require transparency over the impacts on efficiency, performance and safety if there are changes within a funding period and longer-term.”
Mr Western, you cannot tell me you agree that that is a very troubling statement from the industry, but I am sure you do agree, or are likely to. The difficulties with the current system are only going to be exacerbated by the proposed changes under schedule 2.
The statement of funds will indicate what the Secretary of State
“reasonably considers may be…available”.
That gives no certainty of funding, which is a key concern of the sector. It would be a backward step from the status quo. Paragraph 4(3)(c) of schedule 2 contains no focus on minimising the cost for the taxpayer, but merely refers to
“how Great British Railways proposes to meet those costs.”
Paragraph 4(5)(b) refers only to “good value for money” and not to good value for money for the taxpayer.
Under paragraph 4(7)(a), regarding the business plan, Great British Railways could retain a huge amount of information from potential open access operators, thereby preventing a level playing field.
Finally, paragraph 7(3) removes the whole point of funding periods, which is to provide funding certainty for five years. On its own, that provision removes that funding certainty—which is obviously a backward step. The RIA has stated:
“The railway has benefited from 5-year funding settlements for infrastructure for over 30 years, but the legislation proposes that the Transport Secretary will be able to reopen these at any time without consultation. Any deviation from 5-year funding stability risks increased future costs for taxpayers and a deteriorating experience for passengers.”
Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)
I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but we have to consider the new clauses before us as drafted. Does he accept that almost no railways in the world run without subsidy on a net basis and that, where they do, there are unique geographical circumstances? The railways in Great Britain have operated with subsidies under all models since the early 1950s, and the effect of the hon. Gentleman’s new clauses, if they were to be implemented as written, would be Beeching on steroids.
Jerome Mayhew
I agreed with the hon. Gentleman until that last sentence, because new clause 40, which I will come to in a moment, would require not the removal of subsidy but looking towards it—it is aspirational. It would set GBR’s sights on minimising its costs to the taxpayer, not through penny pinching if that would be the wrong decision, but through growth in its revenue by becoming efficient and doing more for less. Those are all good incentives that a private business inevitably has because of the challenge of competition.
New clause 39 would require Great British Railways to focus on other opportunities for funding and on minimising operational costs, just like any other business. The areas of focus under subsection (7) are the revenue opportunities.
New clause 40, on non-reliance on taxpayer funding, would make the direction of travel for GBR clearer. It may be—in fact it is almost certain—that it will never achieve it, but it is a noble objective. It should be clear that GBR should aspire to reduce the need for the taxpayer to support the rail sector by making it as efficient and attractive to passengers as possible, thereby attracting more passengers and freight on to the railways. That would create a virtuous circle, rather than the opposite. We should start thinking about that, which is what new clause 40 is intended to achieve.
New clause 41, also tabled in my name, would require Great British Railways to publish an annual statement of its financial performance. The new clause builds on the theme, forcing Great British Railways to focus on its financial performance and reduce its reliance on the taxpayer. It may be the skimmed-milk version of new clause 40 that the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield might find more palatable.
It is important that we do everything we can to design into a nationalised structure, where there is no competitive tension, incentives for GBR naturally to seek to achieve efficiency and productivity enhancements. There is a very real need for that, because the taxpayer’s pound can only be spent once, and funds are needed in many areas of Government. Apart from anything else, we need to reduce the tax burden, which this Government have raised to the highest on record, so anything we can do to build a structure that incentivises GBR to reduce its dependence on the taxpayer is a good thing. It also forces public accountability.
Finally, new clause 44 would require the Secretary of State to give GBR an annual savings target. Taking all the new clauses together, the intention is to allow GBR to focus on providing genuine value for money for the taxpayer, not just in abstract terms, and to cut away some of the existing inefficiencies in the infrastructure commissioning and decommissioning process, to provide a longer period of certainty for the supply chain so that it can pass on the resultant efficiencies to the taxpayer. That money can be either reinvested in accelerated infrastructure roll-out, rather like the ability of ScotRail electrification to do more for less, or—heaven forbid—used to produce tax cuts for the hard-pressed taxpayer. I hope the Minister will be bowled over by those suggestions, and look forward to hearing his response.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
It is an honour to speak with you in the Chair, Mr Western. I will touch on three of the new clauses—one at greater length than the others—to follow up on the words of my hon. Friend.
For me, new clause 39 highlights something that is clearly missing from the Bill: what actually happens when these currently franchised, privately run rail services come into public ownership across the board. Over many years, unions have fought hard for terms and conditions for staff and railway companies, but these are not uniform across the board. There is a huge differential in the terms and conditions that staff are subject to.
I pay huge tribute to the men and women who work on the railway; they are a brilliant group of people. I am obviously on a train every week, coming up and down from my constituency. However, it is really important that we have this conversation about what the Bill will actually mean. As my hon. Friend pointed out, value for money is mentioned only once in the Bill. We are, in effect, writing a blank check for GBR to spend whatever it wants on bringing all these staff into its employment.
We were told very clearly when the Committee began that this is not a civil service; it is the public sector, so there is a difference there, but it is effectively a private body as well. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments about how staff are being brought across—obviously some franchises have been brought into Government control already—and about the Department’s plans going forward, because time and again, we see pay going up for public sector workers without that necessarily reflecting any changes in performance.
Laurence Turner
The 1992 White Paper that preceded the Railways Act 1993 said that, at the time, British Rail had the second highest workforce productivity of any railway in Europe. What does the hon. Member think went wrong in all the years under privatisation that followed?
Rebecca Smith
That is a very long time ago. Under privatisation, the unions have done a very good job. In my constituency in the south-west, there are no seven-day contracts, for example. If I want to get a train up from my constituency on a Sunday, those trains are cancelled quite regularly, because the service relies on the good will of the staff to do overtime to make the train even come up to London.
Whatever we do, we need to look carefully at the terms and conditions that will be brought forward into this new public body. Up to this point, it has been down to each individual company to negotiate. That has been done with highly professional and competent union representatives, but we are not on a level playing field at the moment. As a member of the public, I want to be sure that those public sector staff are not receiving undue recompense for what they are doing, which would not be in accordance with other public sector bodies.
Private companies have been expected to give their staff a huge amount of benefits—quite rightly; that is their choice as private companies. If the staff become public sector, things like free rail travel need to be on the table. We must at least acknowledge those issues and make a decision to continue them, rather than assuming it is a given, which is down to unions to negotiate.
There is no conversation in the Bill about that TUPE-ing across of staff members. Value for money is really important. We do not want inequality being built into our public sector workforces simply because we are renationalising something.
Subsection (7) of new clause 39 provides that we should be showing where revenue comes from. That is absolutely justifiable. The private companies that will continue to operate in the railway system will have all that information available to their shareholders—to the people they are reporting to. If Great British Railways does not show that information, there is, again, no opportunity for scrutiny. If commercial retail income is flopping because GBR is not doing a very good job, we have no way to hold it to account for that. I do not see why it should be frightened to share that revenue information. It should instead see this as an opportunity to show good practice and how things could potentially progress under GBR.
I have one more point, which came up right at the end of the Select Committee hearing—I managed a question to the Minister, Lord Hendy, but have not seen a response. There is a huge amount of land and value that belongs to these railway stations, currently run by private companies, in some cases, including for things such as parking. What happens with all that income and all the opportunities for Great British Railways to potentially make some money? How will we know about that money and where it is coming from? New clause 39 seeks to bring that information to the fore and ensure that it is transparent and in the public domain.
Turning to new clause 40—this might be something of a segue, but I am going take the opportunity to put it on the record anyway—there is something about the aspiration to move from heavy taxpayer-funded reliance that speaks to the devolution conversation that we have been having. We have had multiple conversations, and I am sure we will have more, but ultimately GBR is being set up to give more powers to certain local authorities and local areas if they wish it, which is great—we want those communities to be able to control more of what happens. However, as we have been discussing, we are effectively developing a two-tier system, whereby anyone who is not in a mayoral authority will effectively be paying into the railway company and GBR, but not necessarily getting the levers to effect change locally. The Minister has reassured me that that will be done through business units and so on, but given that we do not know the scale of those business units or which regions and communities they represent, it is important that we know how that taxpayer money is to be used for funding across the country.
There has been a huge amount of storm damage in the south-west this weekend. Where will the funding come from under the new GBR? The south-west is not a mayoral strategic authority. Will we get our fair share of funding through the set-up for GBR? New clause 40 sets out the aspiration to move away from taxpayer funding and would surely create a more equitable system for the future.
Finally, new clause 44 would introduce a savings target. My hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham has been alluding to the point about the costs we currently see in the system, particularly around infrastructure. That has certainly come up in the Transport Committee, in terms of how much it costs to build a bridge or a new station and the lack of competition and challenge. The new clause would create an opportunity to ensure that we pay as little as possible for the best outcomes. We have had lots of evidence in the past few months to show that other parts of the world can produce the station infrastructure that we need for a lot less than we are paying for it. I believe that is down to how the system currently works, and new clause 44 would force us to look at how it could work under GBR.
Keir Mather
I thank Members for tabling amendments on GBR’s funding and financial framework. In this chunky group of important amendments and new clauses, I first turn to new clause 26, tabled by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, which would require the Secretary of State for Transport to publish a mid-funding period review of GBR’s funding, and new clause 41 from the shadow Minister, which seeks to create a GBR annual statement of financial performance.
In my view, the Bill already creates sufficient transparency about how GBR is funded. Further process could constitute unnecessary bureaucracy. Under paragraph 7(2) of schedule 2, the Secretary of State is already required to publish details of the financial assistance given to GBR using the funding period review funding power. Under paragraph 5 of schedule 2, GBR must publish its business plan and keep it up to date throughout the five-year period. Between those two commitments, the Transport Committee of the House of Commons will already have key information about how much funding the Secretary of State is providing to GBR, and the details on GBR’s business plan to understand what GBR is doing with its money. It would be unnecessary and inefficient to conduct an extra review.
New clause 34 would require the Secretary of State to set funding two years in advance of the funding period. First, I believe that it is misplaced to require that funding be committed two years in advance. There will inevitably be changes to economic circumstances over a five-year period, and new projects will surface. That was well acknowledged by all the witnesses at the oral evidence sessions, including those representing the railways supply chain. If there is no practical discretion, a settlement agreed two years in advance will be redundant before it even starts.
I can also assure the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that the Bill already accounts for the need to provide the railways with certainty, and ensures that the funding process completes before the start of the next five-year funding period. The ORR, which will run the process, intends to set deadlines so that funding is committed in time for the industry to prepare. Secondly as with new clause 26, new clause 34 seeks to introduce additional reporting requirements that are unnecessary, given the transparency requirements already provided for in the Bill.
I now turn to new clauses 39 and 40. New clause 39 would create a duty for GBR to achieve value for money and long-term fiscal sustainability. New clause 40 would require GBR to develop a transition plan toward ending any reliance on taxpayer funding within its first operational funding period. I agree with the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that GBR must deliver as efficiently as it can, ensuring good value for money and reducing costs to the taxpayer, and I assure him that the Bill is already very specific about GBR’s achieving value for money. Clause 18(2)(f) includes a specific legal duty on GBR and the Secretary of State to take into account
“the costs that will need to be met from public funds and the need to make efficient use of those funds”.
The ORR must also provide advice to the Secretary of State on whether GBR’s estimated costs in GBR’s draft business plan represent good value for money, with a requirement to publish a summary of that advice as part of the funding process. That is before the Secretary of State signs off on the business plan. Therefore, the hon. Member’s intent is already achieved by the Bill, and the amendment would only create extra bureaucracy and inflexibility without adding to transparency or financial sustainability.
A statutory transition plan to eliminate taxpayer funding would be unrealistic, and would undermine the railway’s ability to achieve its social goals. The reality is that taxpayer subsidy will always be needed for some parts of the railway. For example, while we aim to have the most profitable and efficient network possible, there will always be some lower-population regions of the UK in which rail travel will not make a profit and will need taxpayer subsidy. Clearly, it would not be appropriate for the Government to withdraw funding and neglect connectivity in those important rural regions, whether that be in Devon, Dorset or elsewhere—constituencies represented by Members across the Committee. Rapidly forcing GBR to operate without public support would be devastating for the economy and for the mobility of the public, not to mention reducing efficiency and the long-term capacity of the network.
Finally, new clause 44 would require the Secretary of State to set and publish an annual savings target for GBR. Introducing a statutory savings target risks creating a rigid measure that might not reflect the operational realities of the railway. Efficiency is already embedded in the Bill’s framework and will be a key consideration when GBR publishes its business plan and sets out how to meet its objectives, including on efficiency. Statutory targets are therefore not required to drive performance.
Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)
In the context of efficiency and cost, I want briefly to pick up on a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon. What assessment have the Government made of the financial cost of bringing together a whole range of diverse terms and conditions and salary structures, from multiple train operating companies, into GBR?
Keir Mather
When it comes to setting up the operational structure of GBR, including questions about workforce and staffing, it is fair to say that no piece of railway legislation for 113 years has specified in statute what the operational decisions will be. Those conversations are ongoing, as they have been while rail companies have been taken into public ownership through DfT Operator, and they are always held, I am pleased to say, in close consultation with the workforce and trade unions.
On the overall principle of cost, I would point out to the right hon. Member that the Department’s view is that establishing GBR is set to cost £200 million to £400 million overall—which is 1% to 2% of a single year of operating budget—but could unlock up to a billion pounds-worth of efficiencies across the rail sector. Value for money is not only baked into the legal duties under this legislation, but is part of GBR’s operational ethos.
Laurence Turner
I again draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that I am a member of Unite the union. Does the Minister agree that changes to terms and conditions, if they happen at all, often take place on a very long-term transitionary basis? Indeed, that is my understanding of what happened the last time that the railways came under public ownership, when many people remained under pre-1948 terms and conditions for several decades. I would not wish to make assumptions or pre-judge future discussions, but can he confirm that nothing in the Bill would prevent similar transition arrangements in future?
Keir Mather
As my hon. Friend rightly highlights, questions about the operational structure of GBR have been left outside the framework of this Bill. That is precisely to allow those conversations to continue and so that the legislation can be fit for the creation of a railway system that works for the long term.
I thank hon. Members for their contributions, but would encourage them not to press their amendments.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
I remind Members that decisions on new clauses are usually taken after decisions on existing clauses and schedules, even though we may have just debated them—one for a future day.
Schedule 2
Funding Great British Railways
Jerome Mayhew
I beg to move amendment 119, in schedule 2, page 60, line 2, at end insert—
“(1A) The date specified in section 1(d) must be at least 24 months before the start of the funding period.”
This amendment would ensure the Secretary of State has to notify the ORR and GBR of the amount of financial assistance for the next funding period at least two years before that funding period is due to start.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 216, in schedule 2, page 60, line 39, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—
“(3) The objectives set out under sub-paragraph (1)(a) must include objectives relating to passenger rail services.
(3A) The objectives set out under sub-paragraph (1)(a) may include, in particular, objectives relating to—
(a) the carriage of passengers or goods, save as already provided for under sub-paragraph (3);
(b) the railway network or railway assets (including objectives relating to the provision of the railway network or railway assets after the end of the funding period);
(c) fares;
(d) the accessibility of railway services to people with disabilities;
(e) the protection of persons from dangers arising from the operation of railways.”
This amendment would align funding of designated passenger train services with the five-year funding cycle for infrastructure.
Amendment 129, in schedule 2, page 63, line 26, at end insert—
“(6A) The Secretary of State may not, however, vary the financial assistance provided to Great British Railways”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from varying the financial assistance provided to GBR.
Amendment 147, in schedule 2, page 64, line 1, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—
“(3) The Secretary of State may not vary the financial assistance to be provided under paragraph 6 unless—
(a) the Secretary of State has consulted the Office of Rail and Road on the propsed variation, and
(b) the Office of Rail and Road provides written consent that the variation does not undermine the approved business plan required by paragraph 4.”
Amendment 215, in schedule 2, page 69, line 25, at end insert “including passenger services”.
This amendment, along with Amendment 216, would align funding of designated passenger train services with the five-year funding cycle for infrastructure.
Jerome Mayhew
Our amendments in this group develop the theme that I spoke about in the debate on the last group. We have tabled two small probing amendments to challenge the stop-start nature of funding under the current control period. Amendment 119 would insert the following new paragraph (1A) into schedule 2:
“The date specified in section 1(d)”—
which, to paraphrase, refers to the funding agreement for a control period—
“must be at least 24 months before the start of the funding period.”
Amendment 129 would insert the following new subparagraph (6A):
“The Secretary of State may not, however, vary the financial assistance provided to Great British Railways”.
Olly Glover
May I correct an earlier omission, Mr Western, by stating that it is a pleasure to serve under your chairship?
First, I want to make some general comments about this part of the Bill, which appears to be based largely on the existing five-year control period framework for rail industry planning and funding. Overall, that is a system that has been felt by the sector to work reasonably well. I had intended not to bore the Committee too much with war stories from my own time on the railway, but perhaps the only drawback of the system is that there tends to be an enormous consultant bonanza halfway through each control period, when the planning starts for the next one even while some of the plans and good intentions of the current control period gather dust on a shelf without necessarily being reviewed. That applies not so much to infrastructure enhancement, but more to process improvements for making the railway better.
First, I will say a little about our amendment 147, and then I want to speak, at perhaps rather more length than usual, about amendments 216 and 215. If there is one hill that I would be willing to perish on when it comes to this Bill and its design, it is probably the decision to not include funding for passenger services as part of the five-year funding settlement.
Our amendment 147 is basically intended to support what the Government are planning to do on five-year funding settlements, but to strengthen and protect them by simply creating a mechanism for the Secretary of State to reopen their funding should a major eventuality arise. The examples that the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham gave are pertinent; it is a bit of an extreme example, and hopefully we will not be there, but I think it would be reasonable to review the five-year funding of the railway in case of the outbreak of war. Our amendment would not stop the Secretary of State doing that; all it would do is require them to consult the ORR and make sure that the ORR gives written consent. It is a simple step to provide that little bit of extra governance and peer review.
I agree with the hon. Member’s comments on the shortcomings of his own amendment 129 in this area. I admire his honesty and the reflective nature of those comments—that is commendable, and something to which we can all aspire. Compared with his amendment, which would prevent variations entirely, perhaps ours is a compromise. I agree with his amendment 119, which shows good intention to make sure that the planning and funding happens in advance of the next five-year period.
Before I talk about our amendments 216 and 215, which I really do feel are critical, I want to read a couple of extracts from the policy paper on how the Government plan to fund GBR, which was published on 5 November 2025 as part of the series of factsheets on the Bill, because it will set the context for what I am about to say. The first thing that the factsheet explains is how passenger services—now known as train services—are currently funded. It states that passenger services
“run by government contracted train operating companies, such as Thameslink, are funded differently to”
Network Rail. It continues:
“The overall money available for passenger services is set at the Spending Review and then allocated via an annual business planning and funding process. Train operating companies also receive money from other sources, such as ticket fares. The train operating companies set out what they intend to deliver in annual business plans, then they seek approval from government. When approved, the contents of these plans are reflected in service agreements with the government.”
That is what the factsheet says about how things work today. It goes on to explain how things will work in future and in relation to the five-year funding review periods for other things. It states:
“Given the greater uncertainty of passenger services spend and income, due to changes in passenger demand which are difficult to predict, Passenger services will not be included within this commitment at this point. Passenger services and other activities outside of infrastructure operations, maintenance and renewal will be funded using existing powers, which will be updated to account for GBR. As these powers already work well in allowing the government to provide transparent and flexible funding to the railway industry, we have decided to keep them and continue to use the Spending Review for these aspects of GBR funding.”
Why does this matter? My real issue with the exclusion of funding for passenger services from the five-year funding review periods, and the failure to align it with infrastructure funding, is what the Rail Minister in the other place, the noble Lord Hendy, says about the objectives of the Bill. He has said it on the record on many occasions, including in front of the Transport Committee and when speaking at the Rail Industry Association reception a couple of weeks ago. He says that one of the key aims of the Bill is to properly enable the alignment of track and train—of infrastructure and train operations. He is absolutely right about that; I agree with him very much. Having worked on both sides of the fence, for Network Rail and for train operating companies, I have seen the endless misaligned objectives, budgets and ways of working and can say that he is absolutely right in his diagnosis and his prescription. However, the omission of passenger services from the five-year funding period runs the risk of undermining that. Let me explain why.
The key issue is that critical elements of the running of the railway are included in passenger services funding. Those include staffing on stations, in rolling stock maintenance depots and, critically, of train crew—drivers, guards, conductors and so on—as well as train crew training, which for many train operators has been a complete mess since the pandemic. Often, the temptation is to paint those train operators as evil private sector ogres and figures of terror from whatever fantasy franchise one wishes to quote, but in reality, since the pandemic, they have been subject to very tightly prescribed contracts by the Department for Transport, and that has led to some very poor short-term decisions about train crew training that have, at times, led to serious service cuts. We are thankfully recovering from some of that, but not wholly: for example, CrossCountry is still running at a significantly lower level than before the pandemic.
There is also the key question of the impact on Network Rail delays. A figure is often cited by those who like to bash Network Rail—having worked there, I know that there are plenty of reasons for doing so, but this one is a bit spurious—that 60% of delays are caused by Network Rail and only 40% by the train operators. Therefore, they say, aren’t the train operators wonderful and isn’t Network Rail terrible? The problem is that, partly because of the way that train crew operations and train operators are funded, a lot of the delays counted in that 60% are fundamentally train operator delays—delays that they have the most ability to influence.
Very sadly, from time to time, people commit suicide on our rail network. That is of course terrible. It initially causes very significant delay and passengers are generally sympathetic to that. Generally speaking, the benchmark for clearing and reopening the line in a way that is safe for everyone, having done the scene of crime investigation and so on, is 60 to 90 minutes. Passengers are understanding of that. They are not understanding when 12 hours later the service is still in complete meltdown because the trains are in one place, the drivers are in another and the guards are in yet another.
A few months ago I was travelling from Didcot to Cambridge via London, because we still do not have East West Rail—maybe one day we will, but that is one for another time—and many hours after a fatality between Reading and London, Reading was a trainpark. Every platform was strewn with Great Western inter-city trains or commuter trains, because its train crew and rolling stock diagrams are so complicated that it is not able to recover during disruption. That has happened partly because there is not a whole-system focus on the alignment between infrastructure funding and train crew and train operations funding.
There has been a lot of pressure, through the franchising process, to cut back on train crew costs, and therefore to diagram—forgive the jargon; I am trying to avoid using it. Diagrams are the daily allocations of instructions as to which trains drivers, guards and others work on. The way to reduce train crew costs, particularly given that there have been above-inflation pay increases, is to tighten those diagrams and squeeze every bit of productivity out of them. When the train service is working normally, it is fine if the train does one thing, the guard does another and the driver yet another.
Edward Argar
The hon. Gentleman is making a very good point, in the context of infrastructure and operating companies coming together—although it also applies more broadly—about the tightness of those diagrams and that scheduling. On East Midlands Railway, although normally the trains are short-formed, we regularly see a 10-car train that is packed in the front five carriages because the back five have to be locked, completely empty, and travel to London with no one sitting in them because there is not a member of staff to staff them. That is because the diagrams are so tight that there is no contingency to put extra staffing in place at short notice when someone does not turn up.
Olly Glover
The right hon. Gentleman gives another good illustration of the problem, and of the foolishness of our current obsession with ordering five-coach inter-city trains, which no other serious western European country does. So often, they are either short-formed as five coaches or the other half is unavailable—or even, when it is available, no one knows, because they cannot walk all the way through and access the other half of the train. We should not be doing that anyway, but he makes a very good point.
There are many other examples of what I am talking about, but I hope that underlines why I really do think that amendments 216 and 215 are critical, and why the objectives in schedule 2 should include passenger rail services, which should be subject to the five-year funding period so that they are not subject to the short-term whims of the Treasury—dare I say that it has any influence on this—and so that the fulfilment of the Bill’s key objective of properly integrating track and train is fully enabled. We will press amendments 215, 216 and 147 to Divisions. I look forward to the Minister’s comments.
Edward Morello
As always when following my hon. Friend, I find myself with little to add. All of the very good points have been made, but it is probably worth reinforcing why we think amendments 216, 147 and 215 are important.
Amendments 216 and 215 speak to an absurd anomaly. I am probably unusual in this Committee in that I am not a rail expert—far from it—but the absurdity of not having aligned funding cycles for passenger and infrastructure strikes any outsider as madness. As somebody who regularly travels on the Salisbury to Exeter line, which is in need of electrification and new rolling stock, I ask any Minister who is responsible to tell me when the operator should make a decision on whether to buy new rolling stock, when they do not know whether electrification is going to happen. Do they wait for the electrification and then buy the rolling stock, having just spent all this money extending the life of diesel carriages? Having the two interoperable is just common sense. I would hope that making the two funding cycles run simultaneously would be a non-contentious idea.
On amendment 147, my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage gave the example of the outbreak of war, which is definitely an extreme one, but we must also insulate any piece of legislation against future politicians—Ministers—wanting to meddle and perhaps not adhering to the desire that it was designed around. The amendment is intended to make sure that Ministers, whether in the Department for Transport or the Treasury, cannot rip the funding carpet out from under the rail operators. If the Bill really is about long-term planning, then there has to be long-term security of funding as well, and amendment 147 is about making sure that there is an additional safety net should any future Government, of any make-up, not want to adhere to the spirit of the Bill. For those reasons, I hope the Government will give consideration to our amendments.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham for tabling amendment 119, which would require the Government to commit funding for a five-year funding period at least two years before the period starts. I can appreciate and identify with his desire to provide certainty to industry, and agree with the ambition that the amendment presents to generate a stable operating environment for the railway. However, as I said in response to new clause 34, I believe that the desire to require funding to be committed so far in advance is misplaced. There will inevitably be changes to economic circumstances and new projects will surface. If there is no practical discretion, a settlement agreed two years in advance may be redundant before it starts.
I can assure the hon. Member that the Bill already accounts for the need to provide the railway with certainty and ensures that the funding process completes before the start of the next five-year funding period.
Jerome Mayhew
I heard what the Minister said, but it flies in the face of the evidence that the industry itself gives him and all of us about the need for certainty towards the end of a control period. All that the amendment seeks is certainty for two years at the start of a control period. How is he going to address that particular issue?
Keir Mather
It is of course our obligation as the Government to meet the concerns of stakeholders, whether raised in the oral evidence session or elsewhere. It is also incumbent on me to point out that we want to abolish boom and bust in the rail system. On the fear about cliff edges, as was acknowledged by the ORR in its oral evidence, in reality there is not a cliff edge when funding always tends to run over the five-year period. Five years is the basis for the decision process by which funding allocations must take place. It is important to take the oral evidence in the round. It is also important to note that the ORR, which will be running the process, intends to set deadlines so that funding is committed with time for the industry to prepare. The amendment is therefore unnecessary.
Amendments 129 and 147 both seek to prevent or restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to vary the agreed funding settlement. I assure Members that the intention of providing a five-year funding commitment is that it lasts for five years. The Government are signed up to that principle. I also agree that certainty for GBR and industry is beneficial. More funding will mean we can get the best out of the railway and encourage investment, innovation and value for money.
Putting a hard restriction on all change, as amendment 129 suggests, would not be proportionate, as the shadow Minister acknowledged. As he noted, there may be unforeseen circumstances that require changes to funding, either to provide more or to reduce the amount. For example, GBR may outperform expectations and need less than is awarded, in which case Ministers will need to recoup the costs for the taxpayer, and can choose to do so in whatever way they see fit.
Keir Mather
Indeed! The operating environment may also change and GBR may need more funding than is committed. It is right that elected Ministers are able to make decisions on public spending and allocate resources as needed, balanced against the clear benefits of certainty.
Amendment 147 would restrict Ministers’ ability to vary funding by adding a requirement that the ORR must provide written consent. Although the Office of Rail and Road will have an important advisory role, it would not be appropriate for it to entirely determine changes to funding. Responsibility for decisions of public expenditure must remain with the Secretary of State, particularly where changes may be required due to wider fiscal circumstances. The amendment would also result in ORR consent being needed for increases in funding and immaterial changes.
The Bill provides assurances. If the Secretary of State considers that the impact of a funding reduction could be material, the Bill requires her to notify the ORR, giving it an opportunity to comment publicly on the likely effects on the railway. That balances the need for the Government to retain control over Government funding with the opportunity for independent evaluation and, if needed, public pressure, to protect certainty for the railway.
On amendments 215 and 216, I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for so ably setting out, based on his practical experience, and far better than I ever could, the need for a single guiding mind for the railway. His explanation was buttressed by the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston. I thank the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage for his amendments, which seek to align passenger service funding within the five-year infrastructure funding cycle. I support that intention. The Government agree that many benefits are derived from integrated funding streams. However, I do not agree that the amendments are necessary.
It is important to note that passenger services are already fully considered under GBR’s statutory duties and through the integrated business plan, in which GBR will plan all its activities on a five-year basis across track and train. The Bill requires GBR to deliver safe, reliable and efficient services, taking passenger needs into account.
Jerome Mayhew
GBR may plan on a five year basis, but it is not the same five years, is it?
Keir Mather
The shadow Minister is right to point out that allocation of funding for passenger services, as opposed to other GBR activities, initially takes place through the spending review funding process. I am about to address his point, but I should say that the Bill contains the ability for Ministers to extend the five-year funding process to passenger services once GBR is set up and prepared to manage that. It would not be responsible to do that from the outset when GBR is still in the transition and set-up phase. Ministers need to feel confident that GBR is financially mature enough before they can consider integrating funding further. I hope that addresses both the shadow Minister’s point and the contribution from the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage.
Olly Glover
I understand what the Minister is saying, but I am sure that in his line of work he has already encountered many instances where, despite noble intentions for something to perhaps happen at some point in the future, it ends up being years, if not decades, before it does. That is why it would be rather more sensible to enshrine the requirement in legislation.
Keir Mather
Respectfully, I believe it is more sensible to be prudent and cautious regarding the funding of passenger services, rather than risk creating a situation that a newly created GBR might not be in an immediate position to sufficiently accommodate within its operating structure. Erring on the side of caution, I encourage Members to withdraw their amendments.
Jerome Mayhew
As I intimated earlier, amendments 119 and 129 are probing and I will not press them to a vote.
I was interested to hear the Minister’s apparent position that there is no boom and bust, that the current situation for infrastructure funding is fine and that the evidence from the industry appears not to be—
Keir Mather
For the record, I said that we shared the aspiration to abolish boom and bust as it exists within the rail system. That applies to our infrastructure as much as it does to any other part of the railway’s operation.
Jerome Mayhew
I am grateful for that clarification, but although the Minister may share that ambition, he is not choosing to do anything about it. Having said that, I said I was not going to press the amendments to a vote and I will not. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Jerome Mayhew
I beg to move amendment 120, in schedule 2, page 60, line 36, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment would require the statement of objectives to contain standards to be achieved when carrying on activities in relation to railways and railway services.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 121, in schedule 2, page 60, line 39, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State’s statement of objectives to include objectives relating to the list in sub-paragraph (3).
Amendment 122, in schedule 2, page 60, line 41, after “(a)” insert “increasing”.
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set the objective for GBR of increasing passenger and freight journeys.
Amendment 123, in schedule 2, page 61, line 7, at end insert—
“(f) delivering improved productivity and efficiencies.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State’s statement of objectives to include an objective of delivering improved productivity and efficiencies.
Amendment 206, in schedule 2, page 61, line 7, at end insert—
“(f) customer experience and satisfaction.”
This amendment expands the objectives the Secretary of State sets for railways funding settlements to include customer experience and satisfaction.
Jerome Mayhew
Amendments 120 to 123 aim to strengthen GBR’s value for money and wider performance duties. As drafted, paragraph 2(2) in schedule 2 only gives the Secretary of State the option of tying performance objectives to granting public funds. The performance objectives should be at the core of the granting of funds, so amendments 120 and 121 seek to change the wording of the current drafting by replacing “may” with “must”. In other words, they would make it clear that it is not an option but core to the application of the process, and should therefore be mandatory.
Amendment 122 would make it clear that Great British Railways should aim to increase passenger services. I do not know why this has become such a hot topic; I would have thought it would be obvious—I was about to use unparliamentary language for a moment there. Increasing passenger services should obviously form part of the functions and aspirations of GBR, and that should be included on the face of the Bill. It should be clear that GBR aims to increase passenger services, not just freight. In addition, the list of objectives in the schedule is missing a specific objective on productivities or efficiency, which amendment 123 would add.
This series of simple amendments seek to perfect the currently imperfect drafting, to put performance at the heart of the Bill and to recognise that the pursuit of increased passenger numbers should be a key objective of GBR, in addition to its focus on growing rail freight, which we all agree with.
Edward Morello
I wish to speak briefly to amendment 206, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage. The amendment goes to the heart of what we Liberal Democrats believe the Bill should be about: putting passengers first. It would expand the objectives that the Secretary of State sets for the rail funding settlement to include customer experience and satisfaction explicitly. In other words, it would ensure that when decisions are made about money, priorities and trade-offs, the people who actually use the railways are not an afterthought.
Making customer satisfaction central to GBR would help to rebuild trust in the railways, which many people currently feel have stopped working for them. If we are serious about encouraging people to shift away from the convenience of cars and toward more sustainable public transport, customer experience has to be central. People will not make the switch because they are told to; they will do so because trains are easier, more comfortable and more reliable.
The creation of customer satisfaction targets and objectives that are tied to rail funding settlements will create the incentives for change. It will make it more likely that investment decisions will focus on what actually improves journeys for passengers, rather than just on what is cheapest in the short term. It will find the balance between what is affordable and what is best for users.
Keir Mather
I thank the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for West Dorset for their amendments, all of which look to amend the Secretary of State’s statement of objectives.
First, amendment 120 would require that the statement of objectives contains standards for GBR to meet when conducting its railway activities. I agree that we need to measure GBR’s performance against clear standards to ensure high-quality delivery. However, the statement of objectives, which is a document to set direction and inform the funding process, is not enforceable, and consequently it is not the right place to require standards.
The original drafting provides flexibility, letting the Secretary of State specify what standards should be achieved by GBR when delivering against the objectives in the statement. This allows for circumstances in which providing a standard helps to better articulate the strategic vision for GBR over the five-year funding period.
However, it may not always be appropriate for an objective in the statement of objectives to be accompanied by a standard, particularly when an objective is straightforward or high level, such as a requirement to have regard for security threats or to support economic growth. The Bill contains other mechanisms, including the business plan and the licence, to ensure that there are robust and enforceable measures against which to hold GBR to account.
There is a similar case to be made on amendment 121, which seeks to set a structure for the statement of objectives, and amendment 123, which proposes to expand the list of potential objectives to include a section on productivity and efficiencies. The amendments would change the list from illustrative objectives to a set of requirements. It would fundamentally not be appropriate to impose such a structure on the statement of objectives, which needs to be able to take a different approach each time it is made, in response to wider environmental concerns and socioeconomic circumstances. The intention is that the list serves as a guide to future drafters, and I believe that the flexibility to allow adaptation to circumstances that we cannot predict will ensure that this legislation remains fit for purpose into the future.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
I understand, although I do not agree with, the argument the Minister is making on amending “may” to “must”—he says it would be unenforceable—but he seems, unless I have misunderstood, to have conflated that argument with his point about amendment 122, which seeks not to make a discretionary provision a mandatory one but to expand the considerations. The explanatory statement says:
“This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set the objective for…increasing passenger and freight journeys.”
Perhaps I have misunderstood.
Keir Mather
To my knowledge, I am not conflating the two amendments. My point is that setting objectives that are so closely tied to discernible and prescriptive standards would, in effect, contravene the original intention of the schedule, which is to provide flexibility in setting objectives over the five-year period. If, in the hon. Gentleman’s view, I continue not to meet that intention, I will happily give way again.
Jerome Mayhew
The Minister wants flexibility, and he says that is why amendments 123 and 206—tabled by myself and the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage respectively—should not be agreed to. Will the Minister set out the circumstances in which he thinks it would not be appropriate for the organisation to focus on
“delivering improved productivity and efficiencies”
or on
“customer experience and satisfaction”?
Why does he need flexibility to ignore those objectives?
Keir Mather
No, I am not willing to say that those objectives, in principle, should not be pursued as a result of this legislation. The question is where within the Bill these things reside. If we are talking about short-term objectives relating to GBR’s operational efficiency as an organisation through, say, a key performance indicator, that is best placed within the business plan. If we want legal duties to ensure that we improve passenger experience or the reliability of train services, they are best placed as legal duties. There is a question about where we apportion the responsibilities and accountability mechanisms within the Bill. I do not believe that schedule 2 is the right place to be as prescriptive as the shadow Minister intends with those specific requirements.
On amendment 123, there is already a mandatory requirement in the Bill for the Secretary of State to obtain advice from the ORR on whether the activities that GBR is to undertake represent value for money. Unlike the list of potential objectives, that is mandatory. I also direct the Member to the assurances that are already in the Bill: there is a duty on GBR to make efficient use of public funds when exercising its functions, and a clear role for the ORR to assess the value for money of GBR’s proposed plans and to publish that assessment.
Edward Argar
Will the Minister confirm that the advice it will be obliged to seek will be published? If it is private advice, it has no teeth whatsoever, because the Secretary of State could accept it or refuse it, as could GBR, and no one would ever know. Would that advice be public?
Keir Mather
The purpose of issuing advice is so that we can enter into an era for the railways where these discussions happen in a way that is far more commonplace than the broken-down patterns of accountability that currently exist. I therefore envisage the sort of adversarial situation that the right hon. Member suggests occurring less than it does under the existing rail system.
The ORR and the Secretary of State are both required to consider value for money when they advise on and approve the business plan. I hope that the relevant measures will show the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that we are serious about getting the best out of GBR and provide him with enough reassurances to seek to withdraw his amendment.
Amendment 122 would specify that the Secretary of State’s statement of objectives may include an objective on increasing passenger numbers and freight. It would narrow the wording of the objective in paragraph 2(3)(a) of schedule 2 from relating to passengers and freight to just increasing the numbers of those things. I do not think it would be wise to require ever-increasing passenger numbers as an objective in itself. Different objectives—such as increased reliability, improved passenger experience or references to spare freight paths—might contribute to that overall outcome while being more important in the moment. Again, that should be for the Government of the day, not inflexible legislation, to decide. I urge the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham to withdraw his amendment.
Finally, amendment 206 proposes to expand the list of potential topics that could be covered in the statement of objectives, with the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage suggesting the inclusion of a section on customer experience and satisfaction. The current list in the Bill is purely illustrative, so Secretaries of State may in future add to the list of topics, and include just some of the topics or slightly different ones in their statement of objectives. I invite the Committee to note that the illustrative objectives already included in the Bill contain reference to the carriage of passengers or goods, as well as to fares and accessibility—all matters that are important to passenger experience—so it is unclear what more would be achieved through the amendment, which would simply add a further example to the list.
Furthermore, the Bill contains a duty for the Secretary of State and GBR to exercise the functions in the manner best calculated to promote the interests of the users and potential users of railway passenger services. Unlike the list of potential objectives, that duty is intended to be mandatory. I hope that demonstrates to the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage that we consider passenger experience to be absolutely central to GBR’s objectives, and provides him with enough comfort not to press his amendment.
Jerome Mayhew
We have heard with interest what the Minister has to say, but I am wholly unpersuaded that he is adequately reflecting the needs of the industry, so I will seek to press amendment 120 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Jerome Mayhew
I beg to move amendment 124, in schedule 2, page 62, line 9, at end insert—
“(d) measurable performance indicators for each statutory duty listed in Section 18.”
This amendment would require the business plan to include measurable performance indicators for GBR’s duties.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 125, in schedule 2, page 62, line 9, at end insert—
“(3A) The plan must set out how Great British Railways will ensure its activities minimise costs to the taxpayer.”
This amendment would require GBR to consider how to minimise costs to taxpayers.
Amendment 127, in schedule 2, page 62, line 22, at end insert—
“(c) whether carrying on those activities will be done in such a way as to minimise costs to the taxpayer.”
This amendment would require the ORR to provide an assessment of whether GBR will minimise taxpayer costs before the Secretary of State approves the business plan.
Amendment 128, in schedule 2, page 62, line 27, leave out from “publish” to the end of line 28 and insert—
“the approved business plan in full, apart from any sections which it considers to contain commercially sensitive information, and”.
This amendment would require GBR to publish its full business plan saving any sections which are commercially sensitive.
Jerome Mayhew
We now turn to paragraph 4 of schedule 2, which deals with the business plan and approval by the Secretary of State.
To receive public funding under paragraph 4, GBR is required to include in its business plan an explanation of how it will meet the objectives set by the Secretary of State. Amendment 124 seeks to strengthen this obligation by requiring GBR to set meaningful KPIs against which its performance and meeting its statutory duties—as set out in clause 18, which we will come to in a bit—can be measured. We had the saga of the missing licence; now we have the saga of the missing KPIs—and 19 other documents. This is important, given the absence of any direction from the Government on KPIs, despite being repeatedly requested on the Floor of the House over a number of months. The only response from the Government as a result of that probing is that they will be “robust”, whatever that means, hence the need for amendment 124.
Amendments 125 to 128 would strengthen GBR’s focus on minimising the cost to the taxpayer and increasing the role of the Office of Rail and Road to make sure that that happens. Amendment 125 would require an express focus on how plans will minimise costs to the taxpayer, which is too often overlooked—the Bill makes hardly any reference to value for money. The taxpayer is ignored entirely. This amendment would make it a legal requirement to address that and would—under the maxim that “you get what you measure”—drive behaviour.
Amendment 127 would require the Office of Rail and Road to provide an assessment of whether GBR’s plans to minimise costs to the taxpayer are, in fact, likely to do so. That would be undertaken before the Office of Rail and Road approves the business plan. Again, this is about driving behaviour through focus and making sure that the taxpayer is not forgotten in the deliberations between nationalised Great British Railways and civil servants at the Department for Transport.
Finally, amendment 128 would require GBR to publish its full business plan, save for commercially sensitive sections, which they should of course have a carve-out from displaying to their potential competitors—although most of their competitors have been designed out under the wording of the Bill. Amendment 128 would welcome transparency, which—given the huge amount of public funding that the organisation currently requires and no doubt will continue to require—is necessary, so that the public can see how their money is being spent, and whether the organisation is focused on driving down the cost to the taxpayer and driving up value for money.
I commend all the amendments to the Minister.
Keir Mather
I thank the hon. Member for the amendments, which seek to add requirements to the production of GBR’s business plan and the ORR’s advice on that plan. However, on the subject of the publishing of advice, I briefly return to a question that was put to me by the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston. I feel that I was unnecessarily circumspect in the answer that I gave him, and it did not reflect the incisive nature of his question, which was about a mandatory requirement that exists in the Bill for the Secretary of State to obtain advice from the ORR on whether the activities of GBR represent value for money, and whether or not that advice can be published. I tell him that the ORR must publish a summary of that advice, and it can publish the advice in full. Although I do not wish to predict the future, I expect that it will likely to so, as part of its work in holding the Government to account. I hope that that is a full answer for the right hon. Member.
Edward Argar
I thank the Minister very much. I cannot imagine where that flash of inspiration and recollection came from, but I am grateful to him for the clarification.
Keir Mather
Committees move in mysterious ways—that is all I will say.
I will take each amendment in the group in turn, starting with amendment 124, which would require GBR to develop key performance indicators for each of its statutory duties. I am sure the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will agree that KPIs should be realistic and measurable, so they would also need to be grounded in the specific proposals for what GBR intends to deliver over the next five years. They also need to be allowed to evolve over time, to ensure that they are most relevant to GBR’s planned delivery and can be effectively used to track GBR’s progress.
The way an indicator is set out can influence how an organisation behaves, and we should be able to refine them over the course of several funding periods, to get GBR to deliver in the way that it needs to. Therefore, a more flexible process works better than fixing the nature of the indicators in legislation—and I give way to the hon. Member.
Jerome Mayhew
The Minister is a mind reader; I was just about to ask him to give way. He says he cannot agree to amendment 124 because we need flexibility in the future, but he will see that it refers to
“measurable performance indicators for each statutory duty listed in Section 18”,
so that flexibility would only run so far as any alteration to the statutory duties set out in his own clause 18, which GBR has no ability to change. The Government do not intend for there to be flexibility, so why does the Minister say he needs it?
Keir Mather
I respectfully disagree with the shadow Minister’s interpretation. This is about how GBR discharges those legally binding duties, and whether we should be overly prescriptive about the means by which it does so. It is important to have flexibility. Given the amount of technological change that we have seen in railway processes over recent decades, as well as socioeconomic factors and the need for GBR to balance those duties, we cannot be overly prescriptive about how we ask it to meet them—apart from the fact that it is legally required to do so.
I assure the hon. Member that GBR’s business plan will have not just a robust but a comprehensive set of KPIs against which it will be held to account. Progress against them will be tracked, and GBR will publish updates in line with the requirements in the Bill. The ORR will also monitor GBR and its business plan, and provide advice to the Secretary of State.
Rebecca Smith
I am thinking through the schedule. Forgive me if I am wrong, but ultimately, it is GBR’s business plan. Effectively though, there are going to be wheels within wheels, in terms of each of the business sectors, the different mayoralties, and the operators that are doing different things in different countries. To me, it feels overly simplistic: we have got one plan, which is the plan for the funding of the entirety of GBR, but if there are no KPIs at all, how are we supposed to even compare parts of the country against each other? Surely there will be different funding streams and business cases for different things. To me, it just feels like one overarching plan. How on earth are we supposed to hold the Government to account for delivering that, let alone ensuring parity and equality across the country, and making sure that funding is going into the right places, where it is most needed?
Keir Mather
That is a very important point. While the hon. Member points to a system that is simple in the objectives that it sets out for the railway overall, I see one that provides sufficient breadth to allow the organisation to develop over time and offer a system of operation that is closer to the communities it seeks to represent—and which, most importantly, is agile in adapting to changing socioeconomic circumstances and technological innovation.
The need for objectives that are not overly prescriptive, and the place for KPIs being in the business plan, allows a holistic approach to setting objectives for the railway, which can guide work overall for a national organisation, offering a single uniting mind, while at the same time not fettering GBR’s ability to evolve as an organisation in future.
In that sense, I believe we desire the same outcome: to make sure that the railway operates in the most effective way possible. In the light of the measures in the Bill that I have outlined, I hope that the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham will withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 125 would require GBR to include in its business plan information about how it will minimise costs to the taxpayer, while amendment 127 would require the ORR to advise the Secretary of State on this. I agree that it is important for GBR to deliver in the most efficient way that it can. That is why GBR, the ORR and the Secretary of State—all the people involved in the railway, and in the business plan—are all subject to a cost and efficiency duty, which is applied by clause 18. That will ensure that GBR aims to be cost-efficient at all times, which aligns with the intent of amendment 125.
Adding additional requirements for GBR in this space could create perverse incentives. For example, a focus on minimising costs, without other checks and balances, could drive GBR to cancel unprofitable lines even if they are important to local communities because doing so will save money. Clearly, it would not be appropriate for GBR to neglect connectivity in those important rural regions. GBR will also be robustly scrutinised from a value-for-money perspective by the ORR, and the Secretary of State will need to consider the ORR’s advice before approving GBR’s business plan. I hope that is enough to assure the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham that the Bill can deliver the outcome he seeks without amendment, while allowing GBR the autonomy necessary to plan in the way it sees as most appropriate.
Finally, amendment 128 seeks to limit the information that GBR could redact from its approved business plan. I agree that GBR’s activity must be transparent, and that will be an important part of how we hold GBR to account. That is why the Bill already requires GBR to publish its business plans. The Bill provides for slightly more discretion for GBR to redact sections of the business plan than amendment 128 proposes. That is because it is important that all types of sensitive data, not just the commercially sensitive, are able to be protected. Personal data, security-sensitive information about stations or anything legally privileged are all examples of content that may need redaction from the final plan. A flexible requirement can be better used to navigate these nuances. However, let me be clear that GBR’s public law duties and wider accountabilities framework will ensure that GBR will not be able to hide information that is important and relevant to public scrutiny.
In the light of these considerations, I ask the hon. Member not to press the amendments.
Laurence Turner
On amendments 125 and 127, I have full sympathy with the ambition of reducing costs to the taxpayer wherever possible. However, the word “minimise” is important here, because a natural reading would be to bring that cost to a minimum.
Each Government have recognised that there is a balance to be struck between the charges raised against the taxpayer, fare payers and other users of the railway. We heard evidence from Richard Bowker, the former chief executive of the Strategic Rail Authority, who has contributed what is sometimes known as Bowker’s law—there are only two sources of income to a railways: passengers and taxpayers.
I fear that if these amendments were incorporated into the Bill, the natural outcome would be that fares would rise, as indeed may charges levied upon freight users of the railway. For that reason, I hope they are not supported.
Jerome Mayhew
Mr Western, you get what you measure. We on this side of the Committee are very keen that we measure the level of involvement for the taxpayer and that we do our best to look after the taxpayer in the design of this structure, so I intend to press all the amendments.
Keir Mather
Schedule 2 will establish a new funding process for GBR that takes what we have learned from the successes of the periodic review process and applies them to the new GBR world. The new funding period review will provide GBR with five years of funding to carry out its job in operating and maintaining the railway network, and will create a structure through which GBR will develop and own integrated business plans across track and train that reflect its role as the directing mind for the railways.
The schedule retains the role of the ORR in testing and scrutinising the plans, ensuring they are ambitious but deliverable, and providing confidence to the Government. The new funding process, with the five years of certainty it provides, will help to result in the best price for Government and the taxpayer, and generate consistent, longer-term work for private partners in the rail supply chain—keeping good, well-paying, specialist jobs alive and thriving in the United Kingdom.
The schedule will also give greater representation to devolved Governments and mayoral strategic authorities, providing them with a real opportunity to advocate for the countries and places they serve at the national level. The funding period review will provide GBR with the structure it needs to set out how it will make our railways reliable, offer better value and be more accessible. I therefore commend schedule 2 to the Committee.
Edward Argar
I will not detain the Committee for long. As ever, I am grateful to the Minister for his succinct explanation. However, I have two concerns; while he may be able to reassure me on these, I certainly think they need an airing. First, how does he propose to ensure that the funding period is properly aligned with a spending review period? I have seen the challenges faced in government when there is a misalignment, or where one period overlaps the other.
I was only very briefly Chief Secretary to the Treasury, but I have also been a Minister in a spending Department, and I have seen the challenges that occur when there is a misalignment, because the Treasury is very clear about non-commitment beyond an existing comprehensive spending review period. How will the Minister ensure alignment and certainty? Without alignment, although there is the impression of certainty, we all know the all-powerful hand of the Treasury if one, as a spending Minister, cuts across its bow on such matters.
The other challenge has been raised by my hon. Friend the shadow Minister a number of times in various contexts. Although I take the point about the five-year period—and the Minister referenced seeking to bring greater certainty to investment decisions with that—I am still not quite clear. I may have missed it, but I do not think I have heard a clear explanation of what steps are being taken to iron out the peaks and troughs that my hon. Friend the shadow Minister mentioned, because it is still a five-year period.
Unless the budget is set for the next five-year period in, say, year two or year three, well ahead of its coming into force—I would posit that the Treasury would be highly unlikely to agree to that—it still does not get around the problem: year one is scaling up, we might see spending in years two and three, and possibly in a bit of year four, but then that spending will drop off again due to a lack of certainty about what is coming in the next year one. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify how what he sets out in the schedule will help to address the peaks and troughs that my hon. Friend the shadow Minister so ably highlighted to the Committee previously.
Keir Mather
I thank the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston for his contribution. He is right to note that the five-year funding process has a different period from that of the spending review. It is tested in the sense that the funding process for Network Rail works similarly now. As was acknowledged in the oral evidence from the ORR, there is not in reality a cliff edge through the five-year funding settlement, as funding always tends to roll over the five-year boundary, but five years is the envelope through which those decisions take place.
That is my assessment of how the process works; if I have failed to answer any of the right hon. Gentleman’s questions, perhaps he will illuminate me on what they are and I can provide him with a more fulsome response later on.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 2 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 13
Charging and terms and conditions
Jerome Mayhew
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 13, page 7, line 22, leave out “as it thinks fit” and insert “as are reasonable”.
This amendment would ensure Great British Railways only charges what is reasonable for provision of services in circumstances where it is a monopoly supplier.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 23, in clause 13, page 7, line 28, at end insert—
“(3) A person aggrieved by a charge, or terms and conditions issued under this section, may appeal to the Office for Rail and Road.”
This amendment allows appeals against the charges and terms and conditions issued by Great British Railways under section 13.
Clause stand part.
Jerome Mayhew
This afternoon is turning into a marathon session, and the only people who cannot take a comfort break are the shadow Minister and the Minister, so far as I can work out; I have my legs crossed.
Clause 13 allows GBR to charge people to whom it is providing a service relating to its functions—this is the important bit—“as it thinks fit”; there is no qualification there. The clause will allow GBR to charge for services that it provides that are currently chargeable under the existing rail regime, such as the back-of-house services currently provided by the Rail Delivery Group, from which all passenger operators, private and public, including open access operators, benefit.
There is a very significant problem with the wording of the clause, because the difference between now and then is that GBR will be a monopoly provider of those services. If we add the two factors together—first, the fact that it is a monopoly provider and secondly, that it is allowed to charge as it thinks fit, with no qualifying criteria—the result is at least the opportunity for GBR to abuse its position to inflate charges and kill competition. GBR will be in direct competition with competitors that can only buy those services from GBR. We know that that will cause a huge issue for open access operators because they have told us so, as GBR will once again be acting as a player and as the referee. That is a clear conflict of interest designed into the structure that the Bill creates. The clause needs to have much greater protections on the calculation of access charges.
The Government use the example of the back-of-house services currently provided by the RDG to explain what would be applicable under the clause. The Rail Delivery Group is a membership organisation consisting of train operating companies, owning groups and Network Rail. The key services they provide are journey information, reservation systems, railcards and working to improve performance, safety and accessibility.
The language in the clause as drafted gives Great British Railways carte blanche where no alternative provider of those key services is allowed—a conflict that will lead to abuse and is contrary to the direction of the Competition and Markets Authority, which expressly said that there needs to be a level playing field when dealing with matters of this kind. That is the Government’s Competition and Markets Authority, so who is right here—the CMA, or the Bill as drafted?
Rebecca Smith
I want to briefly speak to the proposed new subsection added by amendment 23, which would offer anybody given conditions by GBR the opportunity to appeal that decision to the Office of Rail and Road. The issue of accountability and the unequal playing field faced by those on the outside compared with those on the inside came up in the Transport Committee’s evidence sessions and last week. Having heard a lot of that evidence, the amendment appeals to what I think is the right way to do things. We must ensure that organisations engaging with the railway, or offering services to the railway—even if they are being paid separately for them—have the opportunity to appeal a decision that affects or impacts them. I feel that not having such an opportunity is particularly onerous. I support amendment 23 and concur with everything that the shadow Minister has said.
Keir Mather
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling amendments 22 and 23 and the hon. Member for South West Devon for speaking in their support. Amendment 22 seeks to require GBR to set reasonable charges for the delivery of its functions, and amendment 23 seeks to require the ORR to provide an appeals role for anyone who considers the charges set by GBR to be unfair.
On amendment 22, we clearly agree that GBR must act reasonably when setting charges and there is no suggestion that it will not do so. In fact, safeguards to ensure that GBR cannot levy unreasonable charges already exist in the Bill. Clause 18 requires GBR to act in the public interest and to ensure that railway service providers, such as devolved operators, freight operators and open access operators, can plan, invest and make decisions about their own businesses. When setting charges, GBR must therefore do so in a manner consistent with those duties, and it must not set charges that undermine operators’ ability to run viable and successful businesses.
Jerome Mayhew
The Minister refers to clause 18(2)(e), which states:
“They must exercise the functions… in the manner best calculated to be in the public interest”.
Can the Minister not see that GBR’s assessment of what is in the public interest could very well be what it considers to be in its own interest, because it is a public body? The provision would allow GBR to prioritise its own interests, such as the increased receipt of revenue from third-party operators, at the expense of the competition. That is not the safeguard that the Minister says it is, is it?
Keir Mather
I disagree with the shadow Minister’s interpretation of how the duties function in this regard. GBR cannot take a wholly self-interested, cynical interpretation of what constitutes “best use” under clause 60, which we will turn to in due course. GBR has to make a best-use decision that takes into account the needs of open access and freight. Also, under GBR’s duties, it must take account of promoting the interests of users and potential users of the railway, some of whom—even though open access constitutes a small proportion of the railway network usage overall—will be people using open access operators. Further, the duty in clause 18(2)(d) says,
“so as to enable persons providing railway services to plan the future of their businesses with a reasonable degree of assurance”.
Such persons would not be able to do so if they were being levied unreasonable charges.
There are supplementary safeguards that I will turn to. Existing competition legislation will also require GBR to ensure that the charges it sets are fair, non-discriminatory and not anti-competitive. The ORR will retain its enforcement role in consumer and competition law, concurrent with the Competition and Markets Authority, so it will be able to ensure that GBR is treating the private sector fairly. It is also important that, as a public body, GBR must be able to recover appropriate costs from those who benefit from the services that it provides. If it were prevented from doing so, the burden would ultimately fall on taxpayers and passengers. The Government’s ambition is to have a successful rail industry that attracts investment and can support its own costs, rather than unnecessarily relying on the taxpayer.
Amendment 23 would introduce an appeals role for the ORR on these charges. Again, we fully support the principles of fairness and transparency that underpin the amendment. For significant charges, such as charges for access and the use of infrastructure, the Bill already provides an appeals route to the ORR. However, an appeals route to the ORR for every possible charge that GBR may levy in relation to its statutory functions is clearly disproportionate. The amendment would require an appeals route to be provided even when those charges may be small, such as contributions to cover a railcard cost.
Clause 13, in its sum, simply ensures that GBR can recover the costs of managing and delivering services, such as back-office retailing services, by charging those who use GBR services, such as non-GBR operators or retailers. It is essential that GBR should have a clear statutory right to recover costs from users of its services. That supports the sustainability and efficiency of GBR’s operations, and ensures that taxpayers and GBR customers are not subsidising the operations of others. Importantly, it replicates how those cross-industry functions are paid for today. The Bill and existing competition law already provide adequate protections for third parties and a route of redress, should that be required. I urge the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham to withdraw his amendment and commend clause 13 to the Committee.
Jerome Mayhew
The Government’s defence is pretty extraordinary. What they are saying is that GBR should be free to charge unreasonable amounts—otherwise there would be no objection to the wording of the amendment, which simply seeks to put the word “reasonable” into the requirement. The Government say that even though this monopoly provider can charge as it thinks fit, there should be no specific right of appeal and that the other operators should rely on the CMA taking an interest or on wider competition law—in other words, after-the-event litigation.
We all know that in a business environment we can argue about the chaos at the end, but a business can already have been destroyed by a decision from a monopoly provider—on which there is no right of appeal and which could not be held back until an appeal has been heard. This is an absolute charter for GBR to run roughshod over independent retail operators, open access operators and even rail freight. It is with no hesitation at all that I seek to push for a vote on both the amendments.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Keir Mather
In today’s system, the ORR can require Network Rail to pay a fee to cover some of the costs of the ORR’s railway activities; that is done via Network Rail’s licence. The clause will ensure that, in the future system, the ORR will continue to have the independent funding it needs, by allowing it to require a similar fee from GBR. That ensures that the ORR will continue to operate in an impartial and independent way—a crucial part of enabling it to provide high-quality advice to railway funders and to conduct its role as the access appeals body fairly. I commend clause 14 to the Committee.
Jerome Mayhew
So here we are: this is the eminently sensible approach to providing funding for the ORR to continue its operations as a safety regulator. Clause 14 allows the Office of Rail and Road to require GBR to pay a levy to the ORR for performing its non-safety railway functions. That provides the ORR with a legally guaranteed funding source independent of the Secretary of State or Government. The provision aims to provide the ORR with a stable and predictable funding stream that will enable it to plan and carry out its activities. Those were remarkably similar words to the ones used by the Minister—I wonder why!
What I have described replaces the current system under which the ORR requires Network Rail to pay a fee for it to perform its non-safety functions via the process set out in the Network Rail licence. The ORR, as we all know, is an independent regulator, so decisions on its funding should be kept separate from organisations that have a vested interest in its decisions, which is why GBR, despite paying the levy, will not determine the amount. The amount is agreed between the ORR and the Treasury and then provided by GBR through this levy.
This is one of the few clauses through which the Bill is not actively diminishing the role of the ORR. Instead, it provides the ORR with a legally guaranteed funding source, independent of the Secretary of State or Government—save, obviously, for its negotiations with the Treasury. The aim of that is to provide the ORR with a stable and predictable funding stream that will allow it to plan and carry out its duties successfully. That duty already exists in the Network Rail obligation, as I have already mentioned.
I am glad to see from the Government’s explanatory notes on the clause that GBR will not determine the amount of the levy, which will be agreed between the Treasury and the ORR. It seems that the Government do understand the concept of partiality and bias, but are prepared to admit that only when it comes to certain clauses in the Bill.
Keir Mather
I thank the shadow Minister for his support—slightly barbed support, but support nevertheless. I have nothing further to add. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Rail strategy
Olly Glover
I beg to move amendment 134, in clause 15, page 8, line 18, at end insert
“for the next 30 years for”.
This amendment would ensure that the rail strategy set out in Clause 15 must cover a 30-year period.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 137, in clause 15, page 8, line 21, at end insert—
“(c) the support given to rural communities in accessing rail travel, and
(d) the co-operation with relevant local and regional transport authorities for greater integration between trains, buses, trams, cycling, walking and other active travel options.”
This amendment would require the rail strategy to set out the long-term strategy for supporting rural communities in accessing rail travel and co-operating with transport authorities to integrate travel options.
Amendment 207, in clause 15, page 8, line 21, at end insert—
“(c) the consideration of the national rail network as a whole, and
(d) the development of national and regional integrated timetables including—
(i) any infrastructure enhancements necessary to facilitate such development,
(ii) strategies at a local or regional level to deliver these enhancements in line with the 5-year funding periods; and
(iii) a system of prioritisation of connections between services, taking into account interchange times and overall end-to-end journey times resulting from those connections.”
This amendment introduces a requirement for the rail strategy to consider the rail network as a whole, and the relationship between integrated timetables and infrastructure enhancement to enable such integration.
Amendment 224, in clause 15, page 8, line 21, at end insert—
“(c) the development of rail freight network usage.”
This amendment would require the rail strategy to include developing rail freight.
Amendment 25, in clause 15, page 8, line 21, at end insert—
“(1A) The document issued under subsection (1) must be in force for a minimum of three control periods.
(1B) A control period as set out in subsection (1A) must be no shorter than five years.”
This amendment would require the rail strategy to remain in place for three control periods at a minimum.
Amendment 260, in clause 15, page 8, line 23, at end insert—
“(2A) The rail strategy must include a strategy for level crossings (‘the level crossings strategy’).
(2B) The level crossing strategy must set out an assessment of the impact of level crossings on the economy and community of the area in which the level crossing is situated, for the purpose of reducing disruption caused by level crossings.”
Amendment 261, in clause 15, page 8, line 23, at end insert—
“(2A) The rail strategy must include an assessment the ability of passengers to change between—
(a) main line rail services and branch line rail services, and
(b) rail services and other modes of public transport.
(2B) An assessment under subsection (2A) must consider how to reduce delays and disruption to end-to-end journeys involving a change between rail services, or between rail services and other modes of public transport.”
Amendment 135, in clause 15, page 8, line 25, at end insert—
“(3A) The rail strategy must include an international rail strategy to—
(a) support the development of new international routes,
(b) support operators in introducing and operating any such new routes, and
(c) support new and existing operators in using the Channel Tunnel and London St Pancras High Speed.
(3B) In meeting the objectives under subsection (3A), the international rail strategy must—
(a) consider options to increase rail depot capacity at, and to supplement, Stratford Temple Mills;
(b) consider any enhancements that may be required to conventional rail network in the Southeast of England for the purpose of enabling international rail travel;
(c) consider options for electrification, changes to gauge clearance, and any other alterations to rail infrastructure as may be necessary to increase the potential for increased rail freight to travel via the Channel Tunnel.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to include an international rail strategy as part of the Government’s long-term rail strategy. The international rail strategy would specifically look to support new routes and operators, and increase Channel Tunnel and London St Pancras High Speed rail capacity.
Amendment 136, in clause 15, page 8, line 25, at end insert—
“(3A) The rail strategy must include a network electrification strategy to—
(a) require that any new rail lines are electrified, and
(b) set criteria for determining which existing rail lines should be fully electrified, based on current and potential operation of those lines, and set a timetable by which electrification should be completed.
(3B) In preparing the network electrification strategy under subsection (3A), the Secretary of State must take into account the current and potential future—
(a) maximum operating speed of,
(b) average number of trains in an hour using,
(c) average volume of freight transported on,
(d) maximum potential reliability of rolling stock using, and
(e) acceleration requirements of
trains using the relevant lines.”
Amendment 225, in clause 15, page 8, line 32, at end insert
“, and persons wishing to operate services for the carriage of passengers or goods on Great British Railways’ infrastructure.”
This amendment requires consultation with freight operators during the preparation of the rail strategy.
Amendment 213, in clause 15, page 8, line 35, at end insert—
“(8) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament an annual report setting out any progress on the rail strategy.
(9) The report under subsection (8) must be sent to the Transport Committee of the House of Commons.
(10) References in this section to the Transport Committee of the House of Commons—
(a) if the name of that Committee changes, are references to that Committee by its new name, and
(b) if the functions of that Committee (or substantially corresponding functions) become functions of a different Committee of the House of Commons, are to be treated as references to the Committee by which the functions are exercisable.”
This amendment requires regular reporting to Parliament and the House of Commons Transport Committee on delivery of the rail strategy.
New clause 27—Great British Railways: national rolling stock strategy—
“(1) Within 12 months of the passing of this Act and every subsequent 12 months, Great British Railways must publish a national rolling stock strategy.
(2) Each strategy under subsection (1) must set out rolling stock requirements by operating region and route.
(3) Great British Railways must align each strategy to the infrastructure capacity plan in section 60, the rail strategy in section 15, and each funding period as set out in Schedule 2.
(4) Great British Railways must set out how the strategy is used to inform procurement, leasing and allocation decisions.”
This new clause would require GBR to publish a national rolling stock strategy each year, setting out the expected rolling stock requirements per operating region and route, aligned to current and future planned infrastructure, and aligned to the long-term rail strategy and 5-year funding periods.
New clause 28—Great British Railways: cyber security and technology strategy—
“(1) Great British Railways must publish a cyber security and technology strategy (‘the strategy’).
(2) The strategy must set out how Great British Railways will—
(a) use emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, to innovate in respect of its operations and services,
(b) develop resilience for rolling stock and critical systems in line with industry and international standards, and
(c) increase the use of technology to improve passenger experience and services including—
(i) WiFi access,
(ii) digital ticketing,
(iii) real time information systems, and
(iv) accessibility for passengers with sight or hearing loss.
(3) Great British Railways must publish an annual report describing progress that has been made against the strategy and any challenges that have arisen in delivering the strategy.”
This new clause would require GBR to publish a cyber security and technology strategy, as well as an annual report on progress.
New clause 29—Railway services: Sunday working arrangements—
“(1) Within one year of the passing of this Act, Great British Railways must publish a report on demand for railway services on Sundays.
(2) The report must set out—
(a) current figures for use of railway services on Sundays, and
(b) projected figures if services on Sundays were increased.
(3) The report must identify and set out actions that can be taken to increase demand for railway services on Sundays.
(4) When setting out actions under subsection (3), the report must have due regard to five-year funding periods for Great British Railways.”
This new clause would require GBR to publish a report on current Sunday demand, suppressed Sunday demand, and identify actions to be taken to increase demand for railways services on Sundays in line with the 5 year funding periods.
New clause 54—National signalling strategy—
“(1) Within 12 months of the passing of this Act and every subsequent 12 months, Great British Railways must publish a national signalling strategy.
(2) Each strategy under subsection (1) must set out expected signalling renewal requirements by operating region and route.
(3) Signalling requirements as set out in subsection (2) must be informed by the principle that new or renewed signalling will be digital and based on standards set by the European Train Control System.
(4) Great British Railways must align each strategy to—
(a) the infrastructure capacity plan in section 60,
(b) the rail strategy in section 15,
(c) each funding period as set out in schedule 2, and
(d) current and future planned infrastructure including electrification and rolling stock changes.
(5) Great British Railways must set out how each strategy is used to inform procurement, leasing and allocation decisions.”
This new clause introduces a national strategy for digital signalling rollout to create an approach to signalling renewals, enhancements, and interfaces with rolling stock, and to realise signalling safety, capacity, and performance benefits of digital signalling.
Clause stand part.
Olly Glover
We have reached a rather long group of amendments at this point in the afternoon. I would generally have liked to have used that as an opportunity to be concise. However—[Laughter.] No, no, the substance is too severe for that to be the case.
Let me start off on a positive note: this rail strategy is perhaps the strongest element of the Bill. It is absolutely what our railways need to hopefully get us out of the endless cycle of decision, indecision, dither and delay: “Yes, we’re doing it,” then, “No, we’re not,” or committing to things that are undeliverable before they have been properly planned, thought through, funded and so on.
In this part of the Bill, we even have the potential to put ourselves on as glorious a footing as Switzerland and its approach to its rail network. Somehow, I have managed to avoid talking about Switzerland so far in this Bill Committee—
Olly Glover
Oh right—okay. I seemingly stand corrected. Well, there we go; this probably will not be the last mention either.
It is good that an element of the Bill enables us to have some hope of reaching the glory of the marvellous rail network in Switzerland, which genuinely merits admiration. We so often assume, lazily, that railways in Europe are better than those here. Some of them are in some respects; others are not. However, Switzerland’s railway is pretty much better than ours all over.
I turn to our amendments. Generally speaking, the intention behind them is either to strengthen or enhance what is already in clause 15 regarding the rail strategy. New clause 2 proposes to expand the number of factors that should be considered in developing the strategy, to ensure that critical elements that have not necessarily been well-planned or managed on our network hitherto are better stewarded in the future.
I turn first to amendment 134. It would very simply put what is currently in an accompanying piece of commentary on the Bill into the Bill itself, including the clarification that by “long-term” we mean “30 years”. The problem is that at the moment “long-term” can mean many things to many people, depending on their own particular agenda. We could include in clause 15 the words “for the next 30 years”. That would make it very clear what the rail strategy was focused on, but would not preclude its being changed in the future. That is important, because any strategy should be regularly reviewed and refreshed in the light of changing circumstances. However, the amendment would enshrine the idea that the strategy is intended to get GBR to engage in long-term thinking in its future planning of our network.
Amendment 137 would add a couple of elements to clause 15. First, it would ensure that the long-term rail strategy considered the support that rural communities need to access rail travel and the need for
“co-operation with relevant local and regional transport authorities”
and GBR. That is so we can have a real focus on
“greater integration between trains, buses, trams, cycling, walking and other active travel options.”
I hope that is welcomed by the Government, given their own commitment to introduce an integrated transport strategy at some point in the future.
Amendment 207 intends to ensure that the rail strategy considers the rail network as a whole and the relationship between the integrated timetables that we need to move to and the infrastructure enhancements necessary to enable those timetables. Let me explain that a little further. The historic focus of development on our rail network has been, with some exceptions, an obsession with reducing journey times to and from London on major inter-city routes. In and of itself, that is not a flawed goal. However, tens of millions of pounds will often be spent on cutting a couple of minutes from journey times.
A particular example of that was removing an avoiding line at Stoke-on-Trent as part of the modernisation of the west coast route. It was for the 7 am Manchester to London inter-city train, which has been the subject of so much controversy recently in relation to ORR decisions. That passing loop was taken out just to save 30 seconds from the journey time for one train a day, which does not even stop at Stoke-on-Trent. That shows the extent of the obsession with reducing journey times to London, which I have just alluded to.
What there has not been is an accompanying focus on trying to improve connection times between trains at Birmingham New Street, for example, or at Manchester Piccadilly or in Leeds. That is important, because there is very little point in cutting some time off inter-city routes if that time saving is negated by having a longer connection and waiting time at a regional hub. What puts a lot of people off using trains is the lack of decent connections and having to wait for their next train at stations that might not have particularly amenable environments.
By contrast, that is what has been done so well in Switzerland. It began in 1987, when a national referendum approved what was a 20-plus-year plan, to upgrade the country’s rail network around connections. That led to a nationwide investment in infrastructure improvements designed to enable a nationwide inter-city timetable, so that at all the key hubs—such as Zurich, Berne or Basel—trains would arrive within a 10 or 15-minute window and passengers could easily change from inter-city train to inter-city train, or from a local train to an inter-city train. Such integration is not just limited to the rail network; it is applies to other public transport. Anybody who has travelled extensively in Switzerland by public transport knows that the same level of timetable integration exists for buses, cable cars, mountain railways and so on.
Amendment 207 would create the framework for that kind of thinking: we would have to think hard, in the long-term strategy, about what sort of timetabling we want to see on our network in the future and what infrastructure enhancements are needed to get end-to-end journey times down.
Our amendment 135 would ensure that the rail strategy considers international rail. For the purposes of the Bill, that is not the Dublin to Belfast Enterprise service, which is of course the subject of entirely different legislation—a very good train it is, too, and not just because it is named after that series of wonderful flagships from “Star Trek”—but international rail through the channel tunnel. The amendment would simply require that the rail strategy includes an international rail strategy to support the development of international routes and consider some of the key challenges in increasing capacity, particularly rail depot capacity, to the channel tunnel and beyond, as well as options for upgrading the existing rail network so that we can get far more rail freight directly through the channel tunnel, which is currently not possible because of limited gauge clearance on the existing network.
Our amendment 136 would require the rail strategy to include a network electrification strategy, which another amendment alluded to. Something that has so far been absent from this Government’s thinking, as it was from that of most previous ones, is clear criteria for electrification, of whatever type—including the current fetish for discontinuous electrification with batteries. The amendment would create a framework for us to be very clear about the criteria that will be used for each electrification type, including maximum operating speeds, which lend themselves far more to full electrification than to batteries, the intensity of traffic, whether there is freight, and so on. It is a very strategic amendment that would help to focus the output of the long-term strategy on things that need to be addressed.
I have a bit more to say; I am attempting to be concise, Mr Western, and I thank you for your forbearance, as I thank the rest of the Committee for theirs. Amendment 213 would require the Secretary of State to update Parliament annually on progress on the rail strategy. This is not intended to hamper the strategy or bog it down in bureaucracy; it would merely involve updating Parliament, from time to time, on the development and delivery of the rail strategy. The key purpose is to ensure that the Transport Committee can carry on the great review and scrutiny that it does of so many things—that is not a comment on my contribution, but on that of all Transport Committee members, past and present.
New clause 27 would require the strategy to incorporate a national rolling stock strategy. I understand from remarks made by the Minister and by the noble Lord Hendy in the other place that that is very much the intention anyway. Perhaps we will have another of those debates where they say that that is the intention anyway but for some reason we cannot possibly put it in the Bill. Nevertheless, I will press the new clause, because it is so important.
New clause 28 would require GBR to set out a cyber-security and technology strategy. Technology is changing all the time, and the railway has not always been the fastest at embracing it. There is a particular issue with cyber-security. A couple of months ago, I attended a forum in Parliament, which was well attended by representatives from the rail industry. There are real issues about how software on rolling stock is kept up to date, and the funding for that. The new clause is intended to ensure that proper thought is put into a framework for cyber-security.
New clause 29 would require GBR to publish a report on demand for railway services on Sundays and the current arrangements for staffing of the railway on Sundays, which in my opinion and that of many of my constituents simply does not align with the 21st century nature of the Sunday economy.
Finally, new clause 54 would require GBR, within 12 months of the passing of the Act and every subsequent 12 months, to publish a national signalling strategy. The reason this is so important is that we have been slow to embrace digital signalling and the European train control system in this country. That is starting to improve, with ETCS currently being introduced to the southernmost 100 miles of the east coast main line, but those in the industry are clear that the current fragmented structure makes it hard to introduce ETCS and digital signalling, because open access operators, particularly freight operators, are not necessarily incentivised to align their driver training and locomotive upgrades with the plans to introduce digital signalling.
Jerome Mayhew
Clause 15 requires the Secretary of State to publish a document that sets out the long-term strategy for the railway, which we welcome, after consulting with Welsh Ministers and the passenger watchdog. The Secretary of State must keep the strategy under review and publish any revisions.
The clause does not provide any detail, which is part of the problem. The industry is in the dark now, and it will still be in the dark if the Bill ever becomes law. There is no draft prepared. There is no indication of the direction of travel. There is just subsection (4), which is very limited. All it says is:
“(4) The Secretary of State—
(a) must keep the rail strategy under review, and
(b) may revise or replace it.”
Well, with what and when? We are in trouble here, with no direct reference to even the development of rail freight, which we have seen in other parts of the Bill is apparently in the Government’s mind. Amendment 224 would serve to correct that by making specific reference to rail freight.
More widely, the Government have missed an opportunity to set clear targets for the strategy to achieve. Colleagues will know from the debate on clause 3 that we have already tried to amend the Bill to assist with that. Our purpose clause, new clause 1, would have set a clear direction, and new clause 2 would have set KPIs for what the strategy should achieve. That would have helped to inform our set of amendments to clause 15.
We are told that Great British Railways should be the guiding mind, so our approach is that GBR will implement the long-term strategy for rail, based on the Secretary of State’s long-term priorities for the railways. GBR is intended to be the stand-alone expert implementer of the development of the railway. The priorities are set out by the Secretary of State through the licence in schedule 1, access to funding in schedule 2 and the long-term rail strategy. All recognise that the political cycle and control periods are far too short for rail infrastructure projects. The industry really needs more predictable forward views. There is inevitably an uncomfortable fit between the needs of democracy and the political cycle—political views change with general elections and sometimes even between them—and the long-term investment certainty that large projects need. There is currently no indication of how long term the strategy will be, or even what it will seek to achieve.
Amendments 24 and 25, which we debated with clause 13 but would also affect clause 15—I do not seek to repeat the debate, but I wish to mention the impact that they would have—seek to address those failings by requiring the rail strategy to be geared towards enabling GBR to meet its key performance indicators. Without the amendments, the clause will set out a long-term strategy that includes no requirement to set clear growth targets for passenger numbers or freight use, meaning that there will be no measurable outcomes or performance metrics. I intend to seek to divide the Committee on those amendments when the time comes.
The Liberal Democrats’ amendment 134 would ensure that the rail strategy covers a 30-year period. That is logical given the infrastructure life cycle, and any timeframe is, by its nature, arbitrary, but I have to say that 30 years feels on the long side, given the political cycle of four or five years. I wish the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage well and we should be having a stab at setting out what long term actually means, but that is why we have tabled an amendment that would set the period at 15 years. That would be long enough to show the direction of travel, as he has in mind, but short enough to have some sense of connection between the political cycle and the objectives of the strategy. We may have a difference of opinion, but we are pointing in the same direction.
Olly Glover
I understand the shadow Minister’s point, but I put it to him that the fact that our Parliaments tend to be four or five years long is precisely why the strategy needs to be very long term, so that we avoid subjecting our railway to the political cycle and the whims and whimsies of the Government of the day. But perhaps the key point is that the Government’s own guidance on the Bill, in the section entitled, “What is the Long-Term Rail Strategy?”, states:
“It will set out strategic objectives for the railway over a 30-year period.”
Would it not be coherent to put that on the face of the Bill?
Jerome Mayhew
From the Government’s perspective, yes, it would be, but we have recent experience—this is a slight tangent, but I hope the Committee will bear with me—of Governments passing key objectives to achieve long out in the distance. I am thinking of the Climate Change Act 2008 and its objective of achieving net zero by 2050. That all sounds good in 2008, but in my view it does not achieve the objective of balancing democratic accountability with a long-term direction. Look, we are slightly arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Both parties agree that we want a long-term strategy, but should it be 15 years or 30 years? In a sense it does not really matter, but it needs to be significantly beyond the current five-year control period.
Amendment 137, also in the name of the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, would require the strategy to set out a long-term strategy for supporting rural communities in accessing rail travel and co-operating with transport authorities to integrate travel options. It is a worthy objective, although we would want to go further if extending clause 15(1) beyond the railway network and railway services—the catch-all descriptors. The amendment is slightly a halfway house, but it nevertheless points in the right direction, and in so far as it makes progress, we are happy to support it.
Amendment 207, again in the name of the Liberal Democrat spokesman, would introduce a requirement for the rail strategy to consider the rail network as a whole, and the relationship between integrated timetables and infrastructure enhancement to enable such integration. There is perhaps a better solution tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer), who is engaged somewhere else as we speak—there may be a better way to achieve that outcome.
Amendment 224, which I tabled, would add paragraph (c) to clause 15(1). As drafted, the provision requires the Secretary of State to
“prepare and publish a document that sets out”
her
“long term strategy for…(a) the development and use of the railway network in Great Britain, and…(b) the railway services that the Secretary of State wishes to see provided in Great Britain.”
This important amendment would add a focus on “rail freight network usage”. Rail freight does, in a sense, come under “railway services”, but we need to give it particular focus, and the amendment offers a good opportunity to do so.
Amendment 25, which is also in my name, would require the rail strategy to remain in place
“for a minimum of three control periods”,
which would be 15 years. We have already debated whether it should be 15 or 30 years, but the provision would provide the industry with a genuine long-term strategy and mean that that strategy is less likely to be used as a political football when Governments come and go. The period of 15 years is short enough to have political weight, but long enough to give the certainty that the industry also seeks.
I will briefly mention amendment 260, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. I know that the subject is close to my hon. Friend’s heart because he has told me so, multiple times.
Jerome Mayhew
Yes, repeatedly, which is great, because my hon. Friend is absolutely fighting for his constituency and his constituents. He has told me of a repeated trouble that communities experience when a level crossing closes very frequently and for long periods with no regard to the economic impact of that on the town in which it is based. That can cause long periods of tailbacks, but there is no consideration of that when the usage of the piece of line is set, and the Bill, as drafted, makes no provision for GBR even to take that problem into account. Amendment 260 would insert clause 15(2A), which states that the
“rail strategy must include a strategy for level crossings (“the level crossings strategy”)”,
and clause 15(2B), which states:
“The level crossing strategy must set out an assessment of the impact of level crossings on the economy and community of the area in which the level crossing is situated, for the purpose of reducing disruption caused by level crossings.”
That is actually a very sensible point, because it recognises that the railway does not impact just trains. If a level crossing temporarily closes arterial routes, there is an impact on other modes of transport, so it would be sensible for a strategy to take into account the full impact of the changes that the Secretary of State has in mind.
Amendment 261, which my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge also tabled, would insert an alternative subsection (2A) in clause 15, stating:
“The rail strategy must include an assessment”
of
“the ability of passengers to change between…main line rail services”
and from rail services to
“other modes of public transport.”
The amendment would also provide that the
“assessment under subsection (2A) must consider how to reduce delays and disruption to end-to-end journeys involving a change between rail services, or between rail services and other modes of public transport.”
This is, again, my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge standing up for his constituents and the particular issues that they face with the co-ordination of services. Having heard the experience of Mayor Burnham with the Bee Network in Greater Manchester, the Committee could argue that the increased integration of all modes of transport should properly be a focus of GBR, and the amendment would apply that integration to areas that are not mayoral combined authorities. Later in Committee, we will consider an amendment that seeks to extend the same courtesies to local transport authorities as the Bill extends to mayoral combined authorities, and I know that my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon will be keen to speak to that.
Liberal Democrat amendment 135, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Didcot and Wantage, would require the Secretary of State to make an international rail strategy part of the Government’s long-term rail strategy. That would specifically look to support new routes and operators, and increase channel tunnel and London St Pancras high-speed rail capacity.