Pension Schemes Bill (First sitting)

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Sir Christopher Chope, Emma Lewell, Esther McVey, † Karl Turner

† Anderson, Callum (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)

† Bailey, Olivia (Reading West and Mid Berkshire) (Lab)

† Bedford, Mr Peter (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)

† Bell, Torsten (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions)

† Blackman, Kirsty (Aberdeen North) (SNP)

† Blake, Rachel (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)

† Darling, Steve (Torbay) (LD)

† Edwards, Sarah (Tamworth) (Lab)

† Egan, Damien (Bristol North East) (Lab)

† Garnier, Mark (Wyre Forest) (Con)

† Grady, John (Glasgow East) (Lab)

† Jones, Gerald (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)

† Macdonald, Alice (Norwich North) (Lab/Co-op)

† Milne, John (Horsham) (LD)

† Murphy, Luke (Basingstoke) (Lab)

† Pinto-Duschinsky, David (Hendon) (Lab)

† Smith, Rebecca (South West Devon) (Con)

Claire Cozens, Anne-Marie Griffiths, Aaron Kulakiewicz, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Witnesses

Rob Yuille, Assistant Director, Head of Long-Term Savings, Association of British Insurers (ABI)

Zoe Alexander, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Pensions UK

Patrick Coyne, Director of Policy and Public Affairs, The Pensions Regulator

Charlotte Clark CBE, Director of Cross-cutting Policy and Strategy, Financial Conduct Authority

Christopher Brooks, Head of Policy, Age UK

Jack Jones, Pensions Officer, TUC

Colin Clarke, Head of Pensions Policy, Legal and General

Dale Critchley, Policy Manager, Workplace Benefits, Aviva

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 September 2025

(Morning)

[Karl Turner in the Chair]

Pension Schemes Bill

09:25

[The Chair]

We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed to be drunk during sittings. We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral evidence session begins. In view of the time available, I hope we can take these matters formally and without debate.

Ordered,

That—

(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 2 September) meet—

(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 2 September;

(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 4 September;

(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 9 September;

(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 11 September;

(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 14 October;

(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 16 October;

(g) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 21 October;

(h) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 23 October;

(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence on Tuesday 2 September in accordance with the following table:

09:25

The Committee deliberated in private.

Examination of witnesses

Rob Yuille and Zoe Alexander gave evidence.

09:27

[The Chair]

Before we hear from witnesses, does any Member wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill?

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

If the Government amendments in relation to the local government pension scheme go through, I have an interest as I am a deferred member of a local government pension scheme in Scotland.

[Rachel Blake (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)]

I also wish to declare such an interest.

[Damien Egan (Bristol North East) (Lab)]

So do I.

[Gerald Jones (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)]

As do I.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

So do I.

[Sarah Edwards (Tamworth) (Lab)]

And I.

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Rob Yuille, assistant director and head of long-term savings at the Association of British Insurers, and Zoe Alexander, director of policy and advocacy at Pensions UK. We must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this panel, we have until 9.55 am. Will the witnesses briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Rob Yuille: Hello. I am Rob Yuille. I am head of long-term savings policy at the ABI. We represent several of the largest defined-contribution workplace providers across group personal pensions and master trusts, insurers in the pension risk transfer market and retail pension providers. Between them, they serve tens of millions of customers and manage hundreds of billions of pounds in assets.

Zoe Alexander: My name is Zoe Alexander. I am director of policy and advocacy at Pensions UK. We are a not-for-profit organisation run for the benefit of our members. Our members serve 30 million savers, who invest more than £2 trillion in the UK and abroad.

[The Chair]

I call Mark Garnier, the shadow Minister.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Thank you very much for coming to give evidence. It can be a little intimidating, even for us, to see so many Government Back Benchers sitting across the table.

I will start with the most controversial point: the mandation of local government pension schemes when it comes to amalgamation and being forced to go into assets. There are two parts to my question. First, is it fundamentally right to entrust trustees with looking after the interests of the members of pension schemes and then, separately, to tell them how they should be investing that money? Secondly, are there any guardrails to protect pension fund members from being forced to invest in unwise investments?

Zoe Alexander: We are concerned about the precedent set by the reserve power in the Bill. We realise that it might not be used, and we hope that that will be the case. We hope that the work the industry has done to create the Mansion House accord and get DC schemes on track to invest more in the UK will fulfil its promise. The presence of the power creates a series of risks, and certainly enacting it would create a series of risks for savers in terms of its impact on investments, on price and, ultimately, on the value that is accrued to savers in the market.

We are looking for more guardrails on the power. We would like it to be constrained to apply specifically to the commitments in the Mansion House accord, and no more than that. We think that is appropriate, because the market and the Government have together set out what “good” looks like. If we agree on that, let us put that in the Bill and make it clear that that is the extent of the power.

We would also like the sunset clause on the power to be brought forward from 2035 to 2032. That would give more than enough time for the industry to deliver on the commitments in the Mansion House accord, and for the Government to assess progress and whether the power is required. We feel that keeping it on the statute book until 2035 would introduce undue political risk.

[Mark Garnier]

Q To summarise, you are saying that the general direction of the policy, which is to get more investment into the UK and therefore more infrastructure, is not in itself a bad thing.

Zoe Alexander: We absolutely support the general direction of the policy. Our members are very committed to investing more in the UK and they are doing a huge amount of work on that. They have already invested heavily in the UK, with huge investments from schemes such as the local government pension scheme. On the DC side, schemes are maturing; they need time to get to the scale of investment of schemes such as the LGPS, but they are on the journey and they are committed to doing that. We do not take this position because we do not agree that schemes should be investing more in the UK; it is to do with trustee discretion to make the decisions about where to invest.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Ironically, I met some annuity providers who are enthusiastic to invest in equities, but they told me that they are being prevented from doing so. For example, an investment in the equity of a wind farm is a very good asset, because there are predictable returns from it, contracts for difference in the price, and all the rest of it, but they are not allowed to invest in that because they are not allowed to invest into equities. Do you think there are better ways the Government can achieve its aims—that mandation is a bad way of achieving it, but that there are other, better ways that are being missed out in the Bill?

Rob Yuille: Yes, there are better ways. The specific point that you mentioned about prudential regulation rules are not for this Bill, but other measures that could be taken, essentially to make the UK an attractive place to invest, are the kind of things that the Government are trying to do. Along with the Mansion House accord, which we were delighted to take forward with Pensions UK and the City of London Corporation, we agree with the Government’s assessment that use of the reserve power should not be necessary and will not be necessary.

Firms are already investing in the UK. The Pensions Policy Institute’s latest statistics show that 23% of DC assets are in the UK, and annuity providers say that it is around two thirds, so we are talking about hundreds of billions of pounds in the UK. There is the appetite to invest in the home market, because they know it best, in the kind of projects that the Government are trying to drive forward and provide policy certainty about. We share the concern about the precedent it sets and the potential impact on scheme members, and we would propose another guardrail.

There is already provision for a review, were this power to be used, of the impact on scheme members, which is right, and the impact on the economy, which is also fair enough, but they should also look at the impact on the pensions market and the market for the assets that would be mandated, because there is a risk that it would bid up prices in those assets, and that it would create a bubble in them. There are guardrails, but more important, there are other measures, including things that the Government are already doing, that make this power unnecessary.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I have one final question. The key point, from the point of view of your members and the local government pension scheme, is that the interest of the members should not be trumped by the interest of the wider economy—their interest comes first. Is that right?

Zoe Alexander: That is right, but often those things are consistent, and our members would agree with that. Those things are not inconsistent.

Rob Yuille: I agree.

[Sarah Edwards]

Q I am interested in hearing a little more about unlocking surplus and some of the challenges, particularly in the way that it is described or calculated, and what the thresholds might be. Obviously, there is an opportunity, but there is also a balance around conflicts arising when an employer might wish to access the surplus. Perhaps you could comment on your understanding and interpretation of how the Bill deals with that issue.

Rob Yuille: The challenge is aligning it with scheme members’ interests so that they are not put at risk. If a surplus turns to a deficit, which it can do because it is by no means guaranteed, and if an employer then fails, there is actual detriment to those scheme members. As we know, economic conditions can change. It is an opportunity for employers, though—that is the purpose of it—and schemes can and do extract surplus now, often when they enter a buy-out with an insurer.

It does need guardrails, and the Bill includes the provision that it has to be signed off by an actuary and it is the trustees’ decision. That is important, but there is a related challenge about the interaction of the surplus and superfunds. Each of those is okay: you can extract a surplus, for the reasons that we have discussed, and you can go into a superfund if you cannot afford a buy-out. The problem is, if a scheme could afford buy-out, extracts a surplus and then no longer can, and then it enters a superfund, the scheme members are in a weaker position than they would otherwise be. There are a couple of things that could be done about that: either leave the threshold for extracting surplus where it is—which is buy-out level, rather than low dependency—or change the Bill so that the combination of surplus and superfund cannot be gamed to get around that. In any case, as you say, it is important to monitor the market, and for the regulators to be alive to potential conflicts of interest.

Zoe Alexander: Pensions UK is content with the idea of using the low dependency threshold for surplus release. We think the protections are sufficient. Providing that the actuarial certification is in place, the sponsoring employer is in a strong financial position and a strong employer covenant is in place, we think there are real benefits to be had from surplus release. We highlight the fact that some employers and trustees will be looking to move benefits from DB to DC using surplus release, or even to a collective defined-contribution scheme. We are interested in the potential of that to bolster the benefits of those types of scheme, and we would like Government to look at the 25% tax penalty that applies when doing that, because if those funds are kept within the pensions system, that is to the benefit of savers, so perhaps that tax charge need not apply.

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

Q Do you think that the proposed value for money framework could have the unintended effect of causing excess caution or short-termism in investment decisions? If so, what mitigations would you suggest?

Zoe Alexander: There will of course be metrics in the value for money framework that look at the longer term, and looking at longer time horizons is really welcome. One concern at Pensions UK is about the intermediate rankings in the value for money framework meaning that schemes cannot accept new business. That may well result in schemes doing everything they can, at any cost, to ensure they do not drop from the top rating to the intermediate rating. That could cause damaging behaviours in terms of herding. We want to ensure that people in the intermediate ranking, whether that is within a couple of intermediate rankings—perhaps you have a top one and then a bottom one, but somewhere within that intermediate scale—you can continue to take on new business, and the regulator will perhaps put you on a time limit to get back into the green, back into the excellent rating. We think that if it is so binary that as soon as you drop into intermediate, you cannot take on new business, that will heighten the potential downside risks of investment behaviours that you are describing.

Rob Yuille: I agree with that. I strongly support the value for money framework—I think both our organisations do—and the intent to shift the culture away from just focusing on cost and to value for money more generally, but yes, there is that risk. There are multiple trade-offs here: it is about transparency and how much you disclose, versus unintended consequences of that. We want high performers but, for high performance, you need to take risks.

As well as what Zoe says, which we might build on, we do not want a one-year metric. One year is too short a period; pensions are a long-term business. There should be a forward-looking metric, so that firms can say how they expect to perform over the longer term and then regulators and the market can scrutinise it.

On the points that were raised about intermediate ratings, this is another area where there is a potential combination of two bits of the Bill. There is provision for multiple intermediate ratings. It was originally conceived as a traffic light system, so there would be three ratings. If there were four, it would be okay to say to schemes, “You are not performing; you need to close to new employers,” but if there are three, firms will do everything they can to play it safe and make sure they get the green. So the interaction of those is really important.

[John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)]

Q This question is for Ms Alexander. A lot of my constituents are driven mad by small pots; they have worked in different jobs and have no idea how much money they have saved for a pension, so please could you outline the benefits of the small pots reforms to people in my constituency, and the practical steps needed to make the small pots regime work—for example, by way of IT?

Zoe Alexander: The small pots reforms are absolutely critical. The problem of small pots was foreseen by the Pensions Commission years ago. We all knew we would face that problem with automatic enrolment, and I think people would agree that it has taken too long to grasp the nettle. We at Pensions UK are really delighted to see the measures in the Bill to deliver the multi-consolidator model. It is really important that the pot size is kept low, as is proposed in the Bill, at least initially, to solve the problem of the smallest pots in the market. Pensions UK has undertaken a feasibility study, working with Government, to look at how that small pots system might be delivered in practice. That work is publicly available. It gets quite technical quite quickly, so I will not go into the details of it, but we believe there is a feasible model of delivering the small pots solution at low cost—one that should not involve Government in a major IT build.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

Q We have already had some exploration of mandation and other opportunities around getting greater investment within the United Kingdom. I would welcome some more drawing out of how investing in UK opportunities could be amplified without the need for mandation.

Rob Yuille: We have both mentioned the Mansion House accord already. In addition to the ambition to which providers committed, there were a series of critical enablers. Several of those are in the Bill already—thank you for that—including value for money and the drive to consolidation. But there were other things in there as well, including the need for alignment by the Department for Work and Pensions and the Financial Conduct Authority of their rules and guidance in relation to the charge cap pipeline of infrastructure projects, which I know the Government are proceeding with separately; and the need to ensure that the whole market buys into the value-for-money framework. In the pension investment review, Government did not take forward regulation of intermediaries—employee benefit consultants and so on—and we think that they could keep that under review.

The Government are seeking to take other steps that will evolve over time, such as crowding in investments. There are examples such as the British Growth Partnership and the LIFTS scheme, where the Government are either convening or investing alongside providers, which we would like to see more of. Outside of DC, as has been mentioned already, it is about working with annuity providers on eligibility for certain assets.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q There is a question around surplus release, and the power of trustees in relation to surplus release. It makes sense that there should be surplus release, but trustees may feel under pressure from employers to release the surplus when it might not be the right thing for scheme members. Do you think the Bill has got that balance right? How can that be monitored to ensure that trustees are not pressured when it is not the right thing for scheme members?

Rob Yuille: The most important thing is that trustees do have the power that is in the Bill—that power should stay there. Conflicts of interest were mentioned earlier; it is interesting what surplus release could do to make occupational schemes more like commercial schemes. With master trusts, commercial schemes and superfunds, if pension schemes could be run for the benefit of the employer by taking surplus, that gives rise to a different relationship and potential conflicts. The Pensions Regulator needs to be alive to that. In any case, TPR is becoming more like the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority as a regulator, and I think that needs to continue.

[Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)]

Q Many aspects of the Bill command cross-party support, but I want your view on where the Bill does not quite go far enough, and where it perhaps goes too far.

Zoe Alexander: I would probably lean towards talking about the local government pension scheme in that context. There are some parts of the Bill where we feel powers are being taken that may not be required; one is around requiring funds to choose a particular pool, and one is requiring particular pools to merge. We think that the LGPS is moving in a very positive direction. Obviously two pools have been closed, and funds are merging with other pools already. We are not sure that those powers are actually required. We think that the direction of travel is set and that the LGPS understands that, so we feel that those powers might be overstepping the mark.

Rob Yuille: I have no view on local government. I think what I am about to say should have cross-party support, or at least cross-party interest. It is a macro Bill about how the market and the system work, but it is also about people and the decisions that they need to make. We are glad to see the small pots provision in the Bill, but it is on an opt-out basis, similar to the default pension benefits solutions. People have decisions to make, such as whether to stay in or not, and they need to be supported in the decision making. We are proposing a textbook amendment that would enable schemes to communicate electronically in a way they currently cannot and in a more positive way—even where people did not have a chance to opt in to that kind of communication, which is seen and regulated as direct marketing. We know that there is cross-party interest in the ability to communicate more clearly with customers, specifically in relation to those provisions.

[Rachel Blake]

Q I want to probe the suggestion that the mandation sunset clause should come back from 2035. You alluded to your rationale for that, but can you expand on the argument about what difference that could make?

Zoe Alexander: If you put yourself in the position of pension scheme trustees, having the presence of the reserve power, which may or may not be exercised, to direct the way that you invest does not necessarily feel like a comfortable position to be in. We understand why the Government are taking that power. We understand the imperative to get more investment in the UK and we support that. Clearly, the longer the power abides on the statute book, the longer there is that risk hanging over those trustees. They may be required to invest in particular ways. We do not know where we will be politically in 2035. We do not know what Government will be in place. It pushes us potentially into another Government, another Parliament—it is the unpredictability. So we did talk with many of our members about this, and had lively debates about whether it should be 2030, 2032 or 2035. There was a really strong consensus around bringing it forward to 2032. We do not want it too early because it might pre-empt a decision that need not be taken. But 2035 felt too far away.

[Rachel Blake]

Q My understanding is that there is broad industry support. You have alluded to it in terms of recognising the direction and the purpose of the mandate. So there does not seem to be that much difference between those years, is my observation.

Zoe Alexander: I think the trustees we have spoken to, of the schemes in our membership, would disagree. It is a significant point to them, which they have asked us to pass on.

[Rachel Blake]

Q Mr Yuille, in terms of your analysis of why there is a higher rate of investment in the UK from international funds than UK funds, do you think that the direction of the Bill will address those causes?

Rob Yuille: I am not sure there is, first of all. Canadian and Australian schemes have a big presence here, but I am not sure that they invest more, especially compared with our bigger schemes or in percentage terms. But will the Bill help that? Yes, it will. Driving scale and consolidation, which was happening anyway but which the Bill will accelerate, will open up different types of investment opportunities for those firms. They will be more likely to have in-house asset capability and bargaining power to invest in those kinds of assets. One caveat, however, is that they will be able to invest globally—the same as Canadians and Australians—so it is not a given that they will invest more in the UK. The UK still needs to work hard to be an attractive place to invest.

[Callum Anderson (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)]

Q I have a short question about scale tests. Both organisations have reflected a concern that the drive to consolidating may be undermining smaller schemes. How can we ensure that there are sufficient reassurances in the Bill that support better transition pathway rules?

Zoe Alexander: I am pleased to talk on this point. We are supportive of consolidation and we absolutely see the benefits of scale, but we are concerned that there are a very small number of very high value schemes in the market that are already adversely affected by the presence of the scale provisions in the Bill. EBCs are not sending business their way because they are under £25 billion or cannot necessarily show those that they are on a path to that number. It is really critical that the transition pathway is in place as early as it possibly can be, and also that EBCs are encouraged to understand the way that the market dynamics will work here. What we do not want is for really high-value schemes that are delivering great investment returns, that are really innovative and that may be investing very heavily in the UK to fail simply because of the scale test. We want those schemes to provide and to grow, in the interests of members.

Rob Yuille: I agree with that, but I would like to make a wider, related point about the route to 2030 and the importance of getting the sequencing right for—

[The Chair]

Order. That brings us to the end of time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence. I apologise for having had to cut you off.

Examination of Witnesses

Patrick Coyne and Charlotte Clark gave evidence.

09:55

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Patrick Coyne, director of policy and public affairs at the Pensions Regulator, and Charlotte Clark, director of cross-cutting policy and strategy at the Financial Conduct Authority. Again, we must stick to the timings in the programme order, which the Committee has already agreed. For this session, we have until 10.25 am. Would the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Patrick Coyne: Hello, everyone. My name is Patrick Coyne. I am the director with responsibility for pensions reform at the workplace Pensions Regulator. I am pleased to be here today to talk about the Bill, which we believe is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to make the system work for savers.

Charlotte Clark: I am Charlotte Clark. I am the director of cross-cutting policy and strategy at the FCA, where I have lead responsibility for pensions.

[The Chair]

Thank you. I call the shadow Minister.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Thank you very much for coming to give evidence. Can I get straight into a detailed question regarding the repayment of surpluses, starting with the local government pension scheme? I am advised that regulations 64 and 64A of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013 currently allow for surpluses to be paid out of local government pension schemes, but the problem is that actuaries and trustees get nervous when a local government pension scheme is in surplus and are reluctant to allow the surplus to be paid. The provisions of the Bill therefore try to address something that has already been addressed, but they are not tackling the right problem.

Patrick Coyne: I think that question is more relevant to me. The reforms across the Bill could be good for savers, but they could also be good for the UK economy. What you are pointing to is a wider, systemic issue in the marketplace, where we have a patchwork quilt of regulation that has built up because the pension system is idiosyncratic, and in some cases 70 years old. The Bill is trying to give trustees the tools for the job. On surplus release, it is trying to give them a statutory override, to look across the piece and say, “When I am a well-run, well-funded pension scheme, is it right that I can extract surplus if it is safe to do so?” We think that is a really important principle.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I agree that is an important principle, but if you are a trustee, you are potentially personally liable for any deficits, and you could get yourself in trouble. I will come on to the defined benefit pension schemes in a minute, in relation to the same point. At the end of the day, if you have an actuary who is advising you, “It is fantastic that we are in surplus now, but markets change, we could have a stock market crash and we could be in deficit next week,” you may be more cautious than the Bill would perhaps like to encourage you to be. Do you think that is a fair criticism?

Patrick Coyne: Another important part of the Bill is making sure that we get implementation right. There will be a period now when we can consult, and all of us—Government, industry and the regulators—have a role to play to make sure that that happens. I would say that the Bill will actually prompt a discussion that might not have been had by many trustee boards over the last few years. If you look at the amount of surplus that has been released in recent years, it is in the tens of millions, not the billions. We now estimate that three quarters of schemes are in surplus on a low-dependency basis, which is an actuarial calculation of self-sufficiency. That means there could be up to £130 billion across the market. We think it is right that well-funded, well-governed schemes can consider releasing that surplus, if it is in the interest of members to do so.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Would you be happy if the full £130 billion was released, and therefore these pension funds were right down to the wire, even if they are still technically in surplus?

Patrick Coyne: I think it is highly unlikely that that scenario would happen. Our engagement with the marketplace tends to show that firms considering a different endgame option, which might include running on and releasing surplus, tend to be doing so on a basis where they have hedged their assets, so that they can manage economic volatility, and they are using growth assets above that limit to consider surplus release.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I will turn to DB pension schemes—where you have a sponsor company. For example, I have heard the British Telecom pension scheme described as a pension scheme with a telephone provider attached to it. One of the criticisms I have heard is that, because of the rules that were brought in as a result of Maxwell raiding the pension schemes many years ago, DB pension funds are reluctant to invest in equities, because they could end up going into deficit reasonably quickly. One of the intentions with the Bill is to get funds investing more in equities, but there are still elements left behind encouraging behaviour that does not follow the grain of the Bill. Those particular rules—I refer to them as the Maxwell rules—that defend against host employers raiding a pension scheme are having a wider detrimental effect, but that is not being addressed by the Bill.

Patrick Coyne: It is important that we have a regulatory framework that can cope with different economic conditions. Over a number of years, Parliament has introduced a number of pensions Acts to ensure that defined benefit schemes, which are mostly mature—mostly closed—are secure.

There is a real opportunity in the Bill to build on the fantastic success that we have had in creating a nation of savers—11 million more people putting something away for retirement—and turn that system into something that can provide an adequate income in older life. That means turning the focus of the DC system on to value for money. That is where I believe the real potential is.

[Mark Garnier]

Q You just triggered another question. Charlotte, can I quickly ask you about the retail distribution review? The retail distribution review came into effect on 1 January 2013. One of the criticisms at the time was that moving from a commission-based model, where IFAs were paid by commission, to being paid by cash, reduced the number of people seeking financial advice from something in the region of more than 50% to something in the region of 9%. RDR, although a very well-intentioned change brought by the FCA, has had the unintended consequence of making it more difficult for people who need that advice to get it from an IFA. Have you guys had a think about that within the FCA?

Charlotte Clark: It is not in this Bill, but there is a very large work programme going on at the moment around the advice guidance boundary review. As Patrick said, as pensions have changed—there have been big changes in the market over the last 10 years or so—more and more people have come to need support, particularly at the point of retirement, but also in thinking about how you build assets in pensions and more generally. All the targeted support work we are doing is about how you help people more to make these difficult decisions. This Bill is very much about, “How do you get the market right?” but at the same time, we want to make sure that savers have the right support to make the right decisions at the point of retirement or before.

[Mark Garnier]

Or, indeed, when they first start to work. As somebody once said, compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

Q I definitely agree about the eighth wonder of the world. Thank you for coming this morning. This is the Committee’s first sitting, and it is great to have both of you before us. One of the features on the DC side of our pension landscape is the two different regimes that we are operating. The Government’s policy intent is that, from the experience of the saver, they do not see a difference between the trust and the contract regime in so far as possible. That will certainly be true for their experience of the measures in the Bill on value for money and decumulation. Could you share a bit about how the FCA and the TPR are working together to make sure that is the case?

Patrick Coyne: Over a number of years, we have worked closely with the Financial Conduct Authority to ensure that when we deliver interventions within the pensions landscape, the outcomes are consistent. One way we have done that is through an update to a joint strategy. We also have almost daily calls with one another to ensure that when we consider interventions and how to enable the system to provide value for money and support people at retirement, we do so in a coherent and comprehensive way. We must really understand the different constituents of our marketplace, whether they be workplace versus non-workplace pensions, or, in the People’s Pension space, pensions analogous to the master trust offer.

Charlotte Clark: To add to Patrick’s point, we meet fairly regularly. There are various different forums and working groups. As you say, Minister, there is that sense that it does not matter where you save. Most people are probably saving in both the contract-based side and the master trust side, given that people have pots in lots of different places. It is important not that people understand where the regulation is, but that the regulation is consistent and there is no arbitrage between the two systems.

[The Chair]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Steve Darling.

[Steve Darling]

Q We have heard a little about value for money from the previous witnesses. I would welcome some reflections from you on how that could be shaped appropriately to allow risk taking without dumbing down the returns for members, because the crucial thing is driving maximum return without too much risk taking. I would welcome some reflections on how the proposed value for money terms could be tweaked in the best interest of investors, because it could force down returns significantly if people are playing it too safe.

Charlotte Clark: I will talk a little about the value for money framework and then specifically about your concern on risk. The value for money framework, which is an area we are working on very closely, will have three aspects to it. One is costs. One is, as you say, investment performance and investment allocation, and one is service. All of those will be important aspects of getting the value for money assessment right.

On the investment side, I hear the opposite charge, actually, rather than dumbing down. There is a sense that a scheme could take too much risk so that it looked like value for money, but there is a trade-off between risk and return. If you are going to do that, and if you have high-risk assets in a downturn, there is a possibility of volatility. Within all these schemes, you still have trustees, independent governance committees and professional advisers who make sure that the investment allocation is right for the saver. That is almost the first part before you get to the value for money assessment. I do not think there should be a dumbing down of investment.

One of the other challenges, which links to the move into private assets that has been raised a couple of times, is the possibility of pension schemes getting more involved in things such as infrastructure. One thing that the industry has asked us to consider is whether, when you invest in those sorts of assets, there is a J-curve in terms of the returns; there might be a suppression at the beginning as projects get up and running. We have been looking at the Australian examples and we do not really see that happening in their data, but it is something we are considering and we are talking to the industry about how to get it right. We do not want the value for money assessment to stop people being able to invest in those sorts of assets.

Patrick Coyne: Just to add that the competitive pressure on the marketplace at the moment is on cost, and cost is not value. To illustrate that point, for the average saver, a 1% increase annually in investment returns would generate a pot that is 20% bigger at the end of a lifetime of saving. We have to move the competitive dynamic, but implementation, as Charlotte said, is critical.

[Steve Darling]

Q The other element I just want to touch on briefly is whether you have any thoughts on educating firms’ trustees about what value for money really is? Quite often, as you have alluded to, it is the cheapest investment, rather than the one that gives the maximum return, that they might be seeing from the HR department of a company, rather than getting a broader perspective. That would be really helpful. Any thoughts around that world?

Patrick Coyne: I think bringing consistent comparable metrics that matter to the marketplace in a format that people can trust can start to drive competitive pressures on what matters, which is holistic value. Trustees—and across the Bill—want to do the right thing. They want to act in members’ best interests, but they do not have the tools for the job. The starting point is to provide them with quality information to act on that intent.

[John Grady]

Q With DC—defined contribution—schemes, as you know, savers themselves have discretion about where they put their money. The issue we face, illustrated by Dimson, Marsh and Staunton’s regular review of asset returns, is that people are not saving in things that will get them a long-term return, are they? The other issue we face is that there has been a real shift from public markets to private markets over the past 25 years or so. If you are not investing in those, you are missing out on returns that mean more money when you retire. I was just wondering, Ms Clark, if you could just put into context the work you are doing on the advice guidance boundary review and wider advice to savers, and how that will help pension savers and, therefore, help these reforms succeed?

Charlotte Clark: It is important to say that most people who are saving in a pension are probably saving in the default. When you say that they are choosing their investment, most of them are not. Whether it is the trustees of that scheme or whether it is the independent governance committee of that scheme, most people are going into that default, so the importance of the default is really crucial. While it is important to really think about engagement and talk about the advice guidance boundary review and some of the work that is happening there, it is also important that some people will not want to make those decisions. It is only people like us who seem to care about these sorts of things. Getting other people engaged in their investment is quite a challenge.

You are right that we are doing quite a lot of work, largely around the ISA area and the at-retirement area. One of the challenges at the moment is people taking money out of their pension and then putting it in cash. That may seem like a really wise decision if you are 55, but if you do not need that money for 20 years, it may keep track with inflation but you are going to miss out on asset returns, equity returns or other aspects of investment. So, we are really thinking about how we engage with people about those sorts of discussions. How can we make sure they are getting the right support? It comes back to the targeted support programme, which goes live in spring next year. So, working with providers at the moment on how they can support people when they are making these sorts of decisions, and just think about whether, if it is not full financial advice—I understand that can be very, very costly—are there other areas where we can give people help that is not as kind of extreme as that but allows people to think about those decisions in the round?

Patrick Coyne: I would just add that one of the reforms in the Bill around guided retirement is reflective of that default conundrum we face. We have a brilliant system—11 million more savers—but nobody making an active choice. That means that when people approach retirement, only one in five has a plan to access and when they do, as Charlotte said, half are taking it as cash. That cannot be the right outcome. Within the Bill, introducing a guided retirement duty enables those institutional investors to start to guide individuals or cohorts of members into the right kind of products for them, with clear opt-outs for them to choose a different way. As Charlotte said, the type of support and new form of regulated advice could really help inform savers and make good choices at that point.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

Q Obviously, a big part of the Bill is the assumption that mandation is a good idea. I would be interested to know to what extent you agree with the Bank of England Governor, Andrew Bailey, that mandating pension scheme investments is not appropriate?

Charlotte Clark: Following on from Zoe and Rob—I think they have articulated this issue really well—I do not think anybody disagrees with the direction of travel: trying to get more assets into private markets and higher return markets, and making sure there is more diversity within portfolios and that the scale of pension funds in the UK are using that in an effective way on investment. The issue of whether mandation is the right tool to use is ultimately one for you and the Government. There are obviously challenges, which Rob and Zoe have articulated, around how you do that, when you have a trustee in place whose responsibility is to the member, and making sure that is paramount in the system?

Patrick Coyne: I agree with that. I think it is fair to say that there is a degree of consensus in the marketplace, among Government, industry and regulators, that we need to make structural reforms to the marketplace and put value for money at the heart of the system. A big part of that is a move towards fewer, larger pension schemes, because of some of the factors that Charlotte just outlined—the ability to in-house your investments; the ability to consider a broader range of investments, which can sometimes be quite complex; and broader governance standards. Mandation is of course a matter for Parliament, but clearly structural reform is needed within the marketplace.

[Rebecca Smith]

Q We are not all Government Members in this room, so we are quite keen to hear what bits you think might work and what bits might not work. That is where the question came from.

As a supplementary question, do you think trustees and scheme managers should be provided with a safe harbour if they are required to invest in assets that underperform? I think that is probably what a lot of the public would be interested in as well. You do not want somebody to be mandated to put money into something that is doing worse than it was doing before it was moved.

Charlotte Clark: There is an exemption in the Bill, though, that basically says that if you are a trustee and you do not believe it is the right thing for your members then you should not put that money in. That is just going to be a very tricky assessment for the trustees or the scheme manager, and then for the regulators, at the point of addressing why they did not meet those levels. If they believe that it is not in the interests of the member, the Bill allows for that.

[Rebecca Smith]

Q Are there not going to be too many hoops to jump through to prove that the trustee is correct, if they have to prove it to a regulator? I suppose that is what the safe harbour means. Will the trustees have the benefit of the doubt, or are they going to have to be watertight in their belief that they are right, to make sure that they can stand up to the regulator?

Charlotte Clark: The level of that process would be something that we would put into secondary legislation and rules. We would really have to think through what that process looks like.

Patrick Coyne: Yes, absolutely. Implementation is critical here. This will be something that is done with wide consultation with the industry.

[Torsten Bell]

Q It is not right to say that mandation is at the centre of this Bill. There is one backstop power and there are a lot of clauses that we are going to spend a lot of the next few months—

[The Chair]

Order. We need questions to the witnesses.

[Torsten Bell]

The question to the witness is to expand a bit more on that point. In reality, this provides a “comply or explain” power. In terms of the point Charlotte was just making there, it is absolutely right about the ability of the trustees to say, “This is not in the interest of our members.” It might be worth talking a bit about how when we move forward the consultation will allow us to set out how that would work in practice.

Charlotte Clark: It is an area that we would need to work through in terms of the road map. At the moment, our focus is very much on getting the value for money framework right. How the mandation would work and the process around it—as the Minister says, first, we would consult on it. We would have to have a look to see what information was given and how we would monitor it in the period from now to 2030 or 2035. We would have to work through all of those aspects of the process. We would do that in conjunction with the industry, making sure that what we were asking for was information that it could readily provide and that we felt confident that we could make a good assessment around.

Patrick Coyne: Our engagement with the marketplace so far already shows that many are considering investment strategies that have significant proportions of diversified investments, so the market is already responding based on some of the Mansion House accord commitments.

[John Milne]

Q Do you think that the finance industry has a clear understanding of how to apply its fiduciary duty? Do you think the Bill makes that clearer or muddies the waters, or somewhere in between?

Patrick Coyne: I think that fiduciary duty is a powerful force for good. Across the Bill, this is about giving those trustees the tools for the job. I think there are a number of areas where that is true. Within the value for money framework, at the moment, it is very difficult for employers or schemes to effectively compare performance. As an anecdote, I was speaking to a provider recently. They were pitching for new business. They came in and pitched their investment data, and the employer said, “You’re the third provider today that has shown us they are the top-performing provider.” That cannot be right.

Then, when you are looking across the Bill towards the DB space, because of the funding reality that many schemes are facing at the moment, there is choice in end game options—so, “How do I enhance member outcomes at the same time as securing benefits?” Actually providing a statutory framework for super-funds as another option is a good first step, as is allowing the release of surplus, if it is in the members’ best interests to do so.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q I have a question about the balance of decision making. Trustees are obviously required to steward and grow assets on behalf of scheme members. This Bill slightly changes the priorities in relation to value for money. There is potential for future mandation, in that it basically allows the Government, or the regulators, more say in what direction trustees are taking. In practice, it is relatively difficult for scheme members to influence decisions that trustees take. My reading of the Bill is that it does not increase scheme members’ power over the direction. For example, if they wanted to disinvest in something, or if they felt strongly about investing more in UK assets, they will not have any more power to do that. Am I correct in my reading of that? Do you feel that some scheme members feel that they should have more influence over what trustees do and the direction of travel?

Charlotte Clark: It is a good question. It is hard to get over the fact that the vast majority of people are very inert in the pension system. Of course, there are some who are not, specifically around ESG—environmental, social, and governance—investments, but most trustees take those things into account, and there has been clarification about how that aligns with things like the fiduciary duty. Obviously, within the contract-based scheme, there frequently are options, if somebody does not like something that is invested in within the default, to have their own investment strategy, if that is what they choose to do. Do I think this Bill changes that? I do not think so. I think what the Bill is essentially trying to do is use the power of scale and collectivism to get better returns and, really, a better service for most savers.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q Do the majority of trustees already take into account what they think scheme members would think about certain investments anyway, or about ESG, for example?

Charlotte Clark: Almost certainly.

[Luke Murphy (Basingstoke) (Lab)]

Q I want to ask about Unison’s point about LGPS funds requiring equal member and employer representation on boards—I should declare an interest as a member of said trade union. According to Unison, the Bill will mean a lack of member voice on LGPS board governance. I wonder how you respond to that criticism?

Patrick Coyne: TPR’s responsibility is not for the asset pools, which are FCA-regulated entities, but we do have responsibility for governance across public sector schemes, including LGPS funds. It is really important to recognise the member voice within good decision-making, as Ms Blackman’s question indicated, but there are a number of ways to do that within standardised corporate governance boards and reporting functions, and that is something that we would look to explore over the coming months. With the LGPS boards, like the rest of the Bill, there is the ability, through greater scale, to start hiring better colleagues, introduce better systems and processes, and put in place better governance practices, and we would expect to see that come to pass.

[The Chair]

A last, short question.

[Sarah Edwards]

Q I just wanted to ask for your reflections on the current levels of funding in the UK compared with other funds. Canada is often touted as having a higher rate of funding. Can you comment on what you think some of the barriers might be? Why is that not happening, and do you think the Bill will address that?

Charlotte Clark: As Rob says, sometimes it is slightly overplayed. There is a lot of investment from UK pension schemes, whether they are DB or DC, within the UK. Why does Canada look like it invests a lot? It is a very mature system. We have two systems—one is in decline and one is in the ascendancy—whereas the Canadian system has been established for 40 years. The auto-enrolment system is essentially 10 years old, so they have a much more mature system. You see within those schemes that they have scale—they are very large and very mature schemes—and, in terms of things such as their investment approach, it is frequently internalised. They have been looking at private assets for longer than we have, particularly in the DC master trusts, auto—

[The Chair]

Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence and apologise to hon. Members whom I am afraid time did not allow me to call.

Examination of Witnesses

Christopher Brooks and Jack Jones gave evidence.

10:25

[The Chair]

We will now take oral evidence from Christopher Brooks, head of policy at Age UK, and Jack Jones, pensions officer at the TUC. Once again, we must stick rigidly to the timings in the programme motion, as the Committee has previously agreed. For this session, we have until 10.55 am. Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Christopher Brooks: I am Christopher Brooks, head of policy at Age UK. We are the national charity for older people.

Jack Jones: I am Jack Jones, pensions policy lead at the Trades Union Congress.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Thank you. I am particularly interested to hear from the two of you, because one of the interesting things about this Bill is that we have had a lot of lobbying from the profession but very little on behalf of the members of these pension funds, who are so important. Mr Jones, if I may start with you, Unison made the point that there is a clear lack of member voice in the Bill. Do you think that is a fair criticism?

Jack Jones: I believe that was aimed specifically at the LGPS requirements, but yes, I would certainly agree with that, and it probably extends to some other areas of the Bill as well. Unison is not alone; all the unions involved in the LGPS scheme would agree that the pooling structures mostly have a clear lack of member representation on their governance boards. There is a real mishmash of governance arrangements and of reporting and transparency arrangements across the different pools at the moment.

We have some examples of quite good practice—there are pools with a meaningful number of member representatives on them, but they are few and far between. Many have no representatives or only have observers that do not have any voting powers. Member representation has an important role in the LGPS, with a long history of ensuring that members’ interests are represented when investment decisions are made. Moving away from that has taken something away from the scheme.

It is particularly important when looking at measures that will make investment decisions more remote from members by pooling into larger geographical areas and larger funds, and by requiring—or expecting—them to invest in more complicated assets with higher up-front fees. That is the point at which it becomes even more important to have oversight, to give reassurance that members’ interests are at the heart of all those decisions.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Could you expand a little on the technicalities of how that would work? Obviously, the trustees are there to represent the members, but they are merely a small board of individuals. If you take something like the British Telecom pension scheme—I do not know how many people are in it, but it is perhaps tens of thousands—how would a group of trustees find out what members are thinking about what they would like? You could have representation, but would you have polls?

Jack Jones: That is a good question, and it is a wider issue. Member representatives are there to ensure that people with skin in the game are around the table when decisions are made. They are there to reassure members that people like them—those who will be relying on the scheme for their retirement income—are involved in those decisions. Yes, they cannot represent the full range of any large scheme’s membership. A lot of interesting work could be done around how you find out what members think about how their money should be invested and how we then take that into account in decision making.

That is one area where, at the moment, there is potentially a little bit of a gap. The trustees have clear guidance that they can take into account non-financially-material ESG factors, but we hear a lot from unions that there is a very high level of wariness from schemes about actually doing that. They quite often point to their fiduciary duty and say, “Actually, our primary responsibility is towards the financially material factors.” They quite often ignore the guidance that says they can take into account other factors where they know it is in their members’ interest. Work needs to be done on what the best mechanism is to find out what Members think, but there is also a job to make sure that trustees know that they can and potentially should act on that.

[Mark Garnier]

Q You raise a very interesting point. Members could come up with an idea. For example, you mentioned ESG, which is a fine thing—I would not disagree with that—but sometimes it could be right to invest in something that a lot of people feel uncomfortable about, such as the arms trade or weapons manufacturers. Very sadly, they are having a bonanza at the moment, because of all the problems that are going on in Ukraine and Gaza. As I say, it is for very tragic reasons. None the less the pension itself could do very well out of investing in that, yet the members may decide it is a bad idea on ethical grounds to invest in something like munitions manufacturing.

Jack Jones: Well, it is the members’ money that is being invested. You have to make a balancing decision, but where you have clear evidence that the majority of members have these ethical beliefs that they want to see reflected in how their money is invested, you need to take that into account.

[Mark Garnier]

Q My last question—Chris, leap in at any point if you feel you have an answer—is about paying out surpluses, either to local government or defined benefit pension schemes. Lots of people have argued why it is a good idea and good for the country, and all that kind of stuff, but are there any concerns in the TUC or Age UK that it could put some of these pension schemes—particularly the private ones, the defined-benefit ones—into risk unnecessarily and the wrong thing could happen, even though the intention was well meaning.

Jack Jones: Clearly that risk is there, and it would have to be managed very carefully.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Do you feel the Bill covers that management?

Jack Jones: I think it puts a lot of responsibility on trustees to make that assessment. I think it is fair enough to set out the criteria under which trustees might consider surplus release—that is where you have sustained and high surpluses on quite a prudent basis. Whether you actually make that decision to release that surplus and whether you think that is in the members’ best interests relies a lot on trustees making that decision.

One particular weakness at the moment is around potentially allowing sole trustees to make that decision. This is usually where you have a closed DB scheme that, instead of having a fully constituted board with member representation, will have a sole corporate trustee appointed by the sponsor. There, the conflicts seem too great to possibly manage for that corporate trustee to make a decision on behalf of the members and say, “Yes, we think it is appropriate for surplus to be released.”

It would also be really useful for guidance to lay out the ways in which any kind of surplus release must benefit members as well as the sponsor. There is obviously the argument that if the sponsor then goes and invests that money in, for example, either higher pay or better contributions for DC members or investing in the business, that is in the members’ wider interests, but we need to recognise that although employers suffered quite a lot because of the really high deficits that we saw over a sustained periods by having to put in those employer deficit coverage contributions, members also suffered.

You saw schemes being closed and benefits being cut in various ways. We had reductions to accrual, changes to indexation and that kind of thing. Guidance should probably recognise that and say to the trustees, “If you are going to consider releasing surplus, it needs to be done in ways that both benefit the member directly by improving their benefits in some way.” It is a complex question: what is the best way of doing that? I would not want to prescribe that too much. However, the principle that trustees have to consider is how that money is used to actually improve benefits, as well as potentially to—

[Mark Garnier]

Q Christopher, do you have any thoughts on that, quickly?

Christopher Brooks: We do not work on final salary pensions, so I do not take a view on it.

[Torsten Bell]

Q As we have just heard, there is some cross-party agreement that the main purpose of the changes is ensuring that we drive up the returns to members—particularly financial returns, but also more generally. What do you think will make the most difference, from the perspective of the returns, particularly to DC savers? Balance between VFM; scale metrics; decumulation changes; small pots—all of these are about driving up returns for members. What are you most excited about?

Christopher Brooks: I think they all work together, so I would say it is a combination of them, but scale seems to be one of the main drivers. I am thinking about NEST in particular, which has been leading the way in terms of investing in private assets. It is able to negotiate a good deal, because of its scale. If you can drive that with similar outcomes across the marketplace, it will be really beneficial to members.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Could you explain a bit about what NEST has done in order to do that?

Christopher Brooks: NEST has essentially negotiated with the private finance industry, and is not paying the “two and 20” classic fee structure, so it is not paying the performance fees. It has incorporated it all into its existing charges. If the intention is to drive greater investment in private finance, that is the way to go about it. If that scale is replicated across the industry—across the 15 to 20, or however many, schemes remaining at the end of the consolidation process, which I fully support—then hopefully you would be in a position to replicate those types of outcomes for members across the board, in their DC savings.

Jack Jones: I would say something very similar. As a package, on the DC side, it is scale that potentially has the greatest power. It is probably important to look at the factors that would make sure that the scale results in the changes you want. It is interesting to look at NEST; it has scale, but it also has a business model and governance structure that incentivise it to go and build up its experience in investing in those markets, and to have an understanding of what its fiduciary duty is, which very clearly includes looking at the widest range of assets possible and investing in them. So I think it is scale, as long as you have everything else in place there to make sure that schemes are using that scale in ways that benefit members.

[The Chair]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Steve Darling.

[Steve Darling]

Q Thank you both for coming. My questions are for Christopher Brooks. From your perspective at Age UK, what are the three wicked issues that the Bill could help tackle—the ones that come most often across your desk at Age UK, which people find a challenge in later life?

Christopher Brooks: That is a really good question. I think that first, I would flag the decumulation provisions, which are a really excellent idea. They are exactly what should be happening at the moment. Because it is a new regime, there are lots of challenges around designing and implementing it, which probably need quite a bit of thinking through, just to make sure we can get it right for members.

There are some tensions in that process: if you are defaulted into something at, say, 65, there would be some tensions around the point at which you should do certain things. I think the general consensus is that it will result in people purchasing an annuity further down the line—probably around, say, age 75 or 80. We have seen for many years, pre-freedom and choice, big issues with the annuity market, with people shopping around, or failing to shop around, to get a better deal. If you are encouraging people to do that at age 80, that is potentially a recipe for disaster. First, because people will be taking a decision that they are not familiar with, and it is alien to them. Secondly, at age 80, a number of people are experiencing cognitive decline, so it is going to be even more challenging than it would have been at 65. That kind of thing, exactly how it works, needs thinking through in more detail.

On that point, I still think that ultimately, if you are going to force people into the open market, you probably need some kind of clearing house, so that it removes the risk, because there will be scammers out there, listening to this session, I am sure, and rubbing their hands with glee at the thought of lots of people taking those decisions.

The second point is about the contractual overrides, which are clearly crucial to make the whole system work. I think we need to make sure that the best interests test is working for members. When I read the Bill initially, the thing that stood out most for me was that there seemed to be a lack of consumer protection at that point. When the provider undertakes the best interests test, if they are making an external comparison, they only have to compare with one other situation, one other scenario. That is what it says in the Bill. I do not think it is sufficient. I think the Bill should be amended, at least to say, “Make two comparisons,” or possibly to be a bit vaguer and say, “Make a reasonable number of comparisons,” so that it can be left open-ended and give a bit more scope for flexibility. That seems to be one area.

I think the best interests test needs to consider different classes of members as well. At the moment, it just looks at members as a whole, but there are different people in different situations within any scheme. For example, people approaching retirement are in a completely different position from people in their 20s or 30s, so any decisions about transfers need to make sure that all those interests are considered.

Probably the main point is about the independent assessor, who will then look at the best interests test and how it has been conducted and rubber-stamp it according to some FCA regulations yet to be written. We think quite strongly that the independent assessor should have some kind of fiduciary duty applied to them. I do not think there is any reason why this could not work, but at the moment they do not seem to be fully incentivised to act in the members’ interests or prioritise members’ interests above those of the scheme.

That is another really clear addition to the Bill that we think should take place. I think that would make the system so much more robust. There are potentially some really negative outcomes for members if they are transferred into inferior arrangements. I am sure it is not the intention of the Bill to do that, and it is probably not the intention of most providers, but it could still happen. I think putting some kind of fiduciary duty on the independent person would give this a lot more strength and make it fairly watertight for members.

[Damien Egan]

Q Christopher, a number of us are on the Work and Pensions Committee and we know that one of many big issues is people coming up to retirement and being prepared—even knowing how much they have got to take into retirement. How do you see this Bill—you have talked through some of the challenges—helping people to prepare for their future, know how much money they will have and make decisions at a better time?

Christopher Brooks: How the Bill tackles that is probably through the governance structures that will be put in place. When there is a fiduciary duty, the governance is reasonably strong. I believe it is stronger under a fiduciary duty than under the contract-based system. For example, the trustees are better placed than IGCs—independent governance committees. I think we will see IGCs potentially play a greater role in some of the transfers. That is an opportunity to make sure that IGCs can do their job more effectively and have better access to the necessary data, which was flagged previously by the FCA as not always being the case. Clearly they need to be independent, so it will not be appropriate to have employees of the firm sitting on them any longer. I believe a number of them do at the moment, but I do not think getting employees taken off will be an issue.

Once you are in retirement, you have a separate issue. Because the decumulation part of the Bill leaves a lot to the regulators to decide in the future, it has not been clearly specified how the governance will work, so there is an issue about making sure, when those regulations are written, that it does work well for people. There is clearly going to be a gap around information as well. We recently did some research with Aviva, and one of the recommendations was that we need some kind of intervention for people in their mid-70s about how they look after the rest of their lives and how they manage their pension. That kind of support is going to be crucial if people are expected to take a decision in their late 70s or early 80s with regard to annuitisation or how they draw down the rest of their money. There is a big gap there as well.

[Mr Bedford]

Q I think financial education is the key to ensuring pensions adequacy. To build on Damien’s question about ensuring that members are fully informed about their pension assets and what the returns are going to be, what they will provide, what are your thoughts on what support the Bill offers, or does not offer, to ensure members are fully informed on the key decisions they have to make?

Christopher Brooks: Providing information takes you so far, and it is really important to do that: there are some really big gaps, as we see with Pension Wise UK, which is a really good and well-liked service, but has a really low take-up. That is just an example, but we need to get more people into a position to access the information. However, they will then still need a lot of support, because pension decisions are really challenging for the vast majority of people.

[Mr Bedford]

Q Where is that support going to lie—with organisations such as Age UK, charities or the pension provider? Where do you see that balance sitting?

Christopher Brooks: It could lie either with Government and the Money and Pensions Service providing a widespread service, for example. It could lie with charities, or providers could be told to help people with these decisions—they could potentially commission charities. We are working with Aviva to look at running a pilot in the retirement space, which will hopefully go ahead soon and give us some insights into what kind of support people need. People think about their lives holistically, and they are not necessarily thinking about a pension as separate from their current accounts, so we need to think about how it works for people. That is the key thing.

Jack Jones: I think we look at this slightly differently. I am not convinced that any more financial education, guidance, or points at which we need to intervene in the system to ensure that people are equipped to make decisions is the way forward. This Bill recognises that, and the introduction of default retirement products is a recognition that everywhere else in the pension system, it works on the principle of default and generally works quite well. We have seen that that principle is really powerful; if people are defaulted into something, they will stay there, whether that is their contribution rate or the investment options. Defaults are really sticky; we rely on that and make use of it through auto-enrolment, to get people into saving schemes.

More and more, as we find ways in which that does not work, we need to go back and look at fixing the system a little bit so that it works better by default, rather than providing people with more education, because that is pushing against the grain of all of our experience of what works and what is effective. I think that Chris is right that it puts a lot on the governance structures and on the consumer protections there, but I think that is where this Bill has to work. It has to put in place something that will be appropriate for the vast majority of members, and that will work with the minimal amount of engagement—we have to have some kind of engagement on retirement, such as, “This is what I am going to retire and this is where my pension should be paid,” but not beyond that.

[David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)]

Q I want to build on the questions that the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire and my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North East were raising. Obviously, part of the challenge we face is around the proliferation of small pots; certainly, when I talk to my constituents about issues of long-term retirement planning, that is the consistent theme. The Bill obviously sets out a path to try to deal with some of that proliferation that has been caused since the introduction of auto-enrolment. What are your views on the extent to which the Bill provides the right framework for dealing with that kind of proliferation?

Jack Jones: As Zoe said earlier, we should be here already. It has taken us a long time to get to the point where we have an agreed solution. It looks as if the mechanics of it will work. I think we need to let that bed in and prove that it works. The main concern from our perspective is the £1,000 definition of a small pot. Obviously, from a lot of angles, £1,000 is a lot of money—but as a pension pot it really is not. Looking at this once you have proved the concept and you have a system that works and that hoovers up the smallest pots and those most likely to become orphaned is one thing, but I think if you are looking at helping people to avoid accumulating 10 medium-small pots over their career, we need to look at how to increase that over time.

Christopher Brooks: I agree with Jack. I think the Bill is really strong on small pots and the system that is envisaged will really help. I guess my only comment would be that £1,000 is not a huge amount of money, so maybe over time that amount could be raised, and some kind of indication that that is the intention might be helpful.

[John Milne]

Q Do you think there is evidence that fiduciary duties are not interpreted in a way that optimises outcomes for pensions savers? If so, would you support any change in legislation to help?

Christopher Brooks: Yes; I think a lot of schemes do not interpret it broadly, so they probably take things literally regarding financial materiality—that is obviously very important, but they could probably do more. I think there is a very strong case for reform in fiduciary duties, just to make it clear in the law what it actually means. It is more of an enabling tool for providers, I think, rather than anything restrictive. When there needs to be some direction for schemes to invest in particular ways, I think there is sometimes a bit of reticence. That is true of investing in the UK, maybe with some private finance and maybe with regards to climate change. The larger schemes no doubt do understand it, but all schemes need to understand that they can invest in these things and that that is possible.

I am no expert on this, but, as I understand it the fiduciary duty is all over the place in the law, and sort of hinges on bits of case law and bits of very old legislation, so clarifying that would be a really good move.

Jack Jones: I would agree with that. I think there could be statutory guidance to make it very clear to trustees what their fiduciary duty actually involves, and that it does go beyond that kind of narrow interpretation. As I say, you should take into account your members’ quality of life more generally—for example, investing in ways that support the UK, when that is where your members are, is something that is in their wider interests, and managing systemic risks such as climate change is obviously very material financially, but also has an impact on the kind of world they will be retiring into.

As I said before, we do hear fiduciary duty occasionally being used as a reason not to do the hard stuff and not to think through that. There is nothing inherently problematic there, but clarifying and making sure that trustees are fully aware of the breadth of fiduciary duty would be helpful.

[The Chair]

For the last question, I call Rachel Blake.

[Rachel Blake]

Q I want to go back to member and trustee transparency around surplus flexibility. Could you be more specific on what preparations and possible changes would be needed to give that confidence to trustees and members about any surplus flexibility?

Jack Jones: Like I said, I think the one specific measure is not allowing surplus extraction where you have a sole corporate trustee.

[Rachel Blake]

Okay, so that is the one specific measure.

Jack Jones: Yes, that is the one specific one. More generally, I think there should be guidance that makes it clear to trustees that they have to weigh up the benefits to members, or to make sure that any kind of surplus extraction benefits members through improved benefits, rather than just through improving the company or returning money to the sponsor in some way, which they may or may not then use to do things that would give the member more security in various ways as an employee. Those are the two areas.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much indeed. We have a couple of minutes, actually—

[Rachel Blake]

Can I follow up, then?

[The Chair]

Please do.

[Rachel Blake]

Q Do you foresee any risks or additional challenges to the regulator in overseeing some of those decisions that might be made by trustees on surplus flexibility?

Jack Jones: It sounds plausible, but we have not really looked at that yet. However, that is certainly something that we can do, and we will look at including that in our written submission.

[The Chair]

Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted. I thank the witnesses for their evidence, and we will move now to the next panel. Thank you very much indeed.

Examination of Witnesses

Colin Clarke and Dale Critchley gave evidence.

10:54

[The Chair]

Q We will now hear oral evidence from Colin Clarke, head of pensions policy at Legal and General, and Dale Critchley, policy manager for workplace benefits at Aviva. Once again, we must please stick rigidly to the timings in the programme order that the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 11.25 am.

Please could the witnesses briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Colin Clarke: Good morning, everybody. I am Colin Clarke, and I am head of pensions policy at Legal and General.

Dale Critchley: I am Dale Critchley, and I am policy manager for workplace pensions at Aviva.

[The Chair]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Thank you very much for coming along to give evidence this morning. I want to start with a general question: what do you see as the risks associated with surplus extraction? As we know, a lot of the funds are now in surplus, but we only need interest rates to start crashing back again—it is probably unlikely—and they could go back into deficit. Do you think the safeguards for surplus extraction are sufficient?

Colin Clarke: It is a very good question. There are risks that an employer could extract surplus so that it puts the scheme in a position where something might happen in the future that caused them to be underfunded. It is quite key that, although the Bill has some very high-level rule-making powers at the moment, the guidance that comes out alongside that makes very clear the circumstances in which it would be appropriate for trustees to be able to do that.

Scheme rules aside, trustees today are able to extract surplus, and they have to follow fiduciary duty, follow a process and get advice from independent advisers to make sure that what they are doing will not jeopardise the security of members’ benefits. The Bill itself is mainly to override any sort of constraints that trustees have within their rules that might prevent them from doing that. However, trustees would still have to follow the same process they would follow today to make sure that they are in a good position from a funding perspective, that they do not take anything out too hastily and that they look a few years ahead. It is not just a case of being able to extract surplus from an affordability point of view today; they need to be looking ahead to the long-term funding position as well.

[Mark Garnier]

Q One thing we have not talked about is what the surplus extraction will be used for. If a host company starts taking advantage of this and they invest in building the business, most people would probably agree that that is rather a good thing. However, if they pay out dividends, is that a good thing? If they do share buy-backs, is that a good thing for the host company? How do you think trustees should examine what the purpose is of the fund extraction, and whether it is a good idea or a bad idea—or even an unethical idea?

Dale Critchley: It is a trustee decision to take. I do not necessarily think that the trustees need to take into account what the employer is using the surplus for. They are looking at whether it is appropriate to return the surplus to the employer.

If you look at a case from 2023 that went to the ombudsman, Aviva was involved in the buy-out for a company that subsequently returned £12 million of surplus to the employer. The trustees, the ombudsman found, had acted quite rightly by taking into account the fact that the company had made considerable contributions, including considerable deficit contributions, over the years, and that it was right, in the trustees’ opinion, that once all of the benefits promised to the members had been secured, the excess was delivered back to the employer. I am not sure that that company or those trustees took into account what that company was going to use the money for; they just looked at whether or not it was appropriate to return the surplus to the employer.

[Mark Garnier]

Q But is that right? Do you think that is a good use? Ultimately, as we have discussed, there is always the tricky question about how a fund could go back into deficit again. The flipside of that is that deficit then appears on the balance sheet of the host company, so there is an incentive not to raid it too much. A lot of private equity is very good, but there are certainly accusations that some people can invest into a company through private equity and be quite punchy in terms of revving up the balance sheet of a company, taking out dividends and borrowing lots of money to pay back to the shareholders. If you start opening up the possibility that a pension fund could raid—to use the word “raid” is provocative, but you see what I mean—then an unethical investor could do the wrong thing, even though it is legal.

Dale Critchley: I am not a defined benefit pension scheme trustee, but I would expect the trustees to look at the members first of all: are the benefits secured that were promised to the members? Is there room to reasonably augment those benefits? However, to say, “We will only give you this surplus back if you use it for x” is, I think, overstepping the duty of the trustees.

[Mark Garnier]

Q That is interesting; I will go and have a think about that one.

Both of you manage annuity funds. For the record, I have had a chance to meet representatives of your organisations and have had long discussions about this. One of the interesting points that has come out of conversations with many people and organisations in your position is that, while the thrust of the opportunity of this Bill is to bring together pensions and make them more efficient, and another is to be able to unlock opportunity to invest into the UK and into various opportunities, yet there are some rules that are not being addressed. As one of your colleagues mentioned to me, Dale, an annuity fund is not allowed to invest into equities, yet investing into something like a wind farm would be an ideal opportunity to get a predictable return. Do you think the Bill is missing out on some of these measures that could be updated?

Dale Critchley: I do not think it necessarily needs any change incorporating into the Bill. It is a matter for the Prudential Regulation Authority to allow us to make the investments that back our annuities. We would be quite happy to take that up afterwards, but I think that could be achieved through a change to PRA rules rather than incorporation into the Bill.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Also, similarly on the equity point: with defined benefit pension schemes, as I mentioned a bit earlier, if you have a deficit, that then appears on the balance sheet. The behavioural outcome of that is that if you are a trustee or from the host company, you would want to avoid the risk—rather like with the BT pension fund, which I think is £7 billion in deficit, and which now restricts the ability of BT to raise money. The behavioural outcome is that you do not invest into something that has high volatility but long term growth, i.e. the equity market. The 1987 stock market crash was hideous at the time—I am probably the only one present who remembers that—but the long-term growth over the equity market proved that was just a mere blip. However, at that time a company would have had a deficit on its balance sheet. Should we change those rules about the deficits on the balance sheet in order to allow pension funds to invest into equity, which is really what we want to get out of this?

[The Chair]

Can I ask for short answers now, please, because we need to move on to other Members.

Colin Clarke: It is an interesting question. It is not something I am a huge expert on, to be honest, and it needs careful thought, because there could potentially be some unforeseen consequences that I have not considered. If there were going to be any suggestions to change any rules in that regard, there would have to be evidence gathered to understand what the potential implications of that would be.

[Torsten Bell]

Q I want to move to DC pensions, not just DB, given what you do. One of the larger changes in this Bill for your providing to savers is on the default pension benefit solutions. Would you give us an update on your internal thinking about how you plan to operationalise those requirements, if this Bill receives Parliament’s support?

Dale Critchley: Obviously, this is dependent on regulations, but DWP people have been very open in conversations. That has been really welcome, and we have a good picture of where we are headed. We launched a “flex first, fix later” solution called guided retirement. We are now looking at flexing that guided retirement solution to offer different flavours to fit the different cohorts and the amount of risk people can take in terms of fluctuations in their income, dependent upon guaranteed income from elsewhere, or the level of their fund. At one end, you might have a cohort of people who almost need a guarantee. We could go down the route of an annuity, but we are reluctant to do that, because we think that an immediate annuity purchase might put people off. We need to ease people into the idea of an annuity purchase, and that is where we are going. For those people who want more of a guarantee, it might be lower-risk investments and in a drawdown phase for a shorter amount of time. For people who can take more risk, it may be higher-risk investments in the drawdown phase and in drawdown for longer, with an annuity purchase later. That is where our thinking is at the moment.

[Torsten Bell]

Q So when you are thinking about segmenting, your main segmentation is size of pot and other pensions.

Dale Critchley: It is the ability to take risk.

[Torsten Bell]

Your metric for that is just other income sources plus size of pot?

Dale Critchley: It is those main two at the moment. We are also working with a guy called Shlomo Benartzi, who is a behavioural science expert, to look at the whole concept of defaults in retirement. It is one thing defaulting people into taking £120 a month from their salary; it is a very different thing to say, “I am now going to take the biggest amount of money you have ever seen in your life and use that to purchase an income.” That is what we want to test, because if the default is strong and if inertia works, we will get people moving away from the poor solutions they are choosing at the moment, but if people still think, “Well, I do not like the look of that,” they will go on to make the same poor decisions they are making now, and we will not achieve the policy aim. So we think we need to deliver what is right for customers and members, but also what is attractive to them—so looking at their wants as well as their needs.

[The Chair]

Could we have shorter questions and answers? Does Mr Clarke have anything to add?

Colin Clarke: We have been working a lot on the FCA’s targeted support proposals, which are very supportive of the measures proposed in the Bill. We have been doing a lot of research around member segmentation and looking at the different scenarios and outcomes, so potentially going a little bit further than looking just at age and pot value, and also looking at what sort of questions we need to ask people to ensure that they are guided to the solution that is appropriate for them.

I agree with Dale that decumulation defaults and accumulation defaults are completely different things. In accumulation, there is more of a “one size fits all” approach, because it is all about delivering the best returns for members, whereas when you get to decumulation, it is very personalised, and you do not want to put people into something where they cannot change their mind. It needs to be flexible; people have a wide variety of different needs, and we are doing a lot of research on member needs at the moment.

[The Chair]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, Steve Darling.

[Steve Darling]

Q Thank you both for coming. Reflecting on pensions systems around the world, what one silver bullet would you both say would help drive positive change through this Bill and strengthen it if applied to it?

Colin Clarke: That is a good question. Both our companies have recently been on various trips, to Australia, in particular, and there are various references in the Bill impact assessment to measures that are being or have been done there. One of the key learnings is around improving adequacy. In the round, there are lots of measures in the Bill that will help achieve that—for example, the introduction of the value for money test and the potential for better returns. One of the learnings we took away was around Australia’s “Your Future, Your Super” test, how they define value for money and how appropriate it is to set certain benchmarks. What are the risks if you do set those benchmarks, like the risk of investment herding and things like that? I think the value for money framework, if it is done right, has the potential to improve outcomes for members.

Contributions, obviously, is one big thing—I know that is not in the Bill. The Pensions Commission is going to be looking at that for adequacy in the round. I think that the measures around performance and value, and ensuring that the focus shifts away from cost to value, are among the key things that the Bill will seek to deliver.

[Alice Macdonald (Norwich North) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q My question is related to that. Aviva, in your written evidence, you spoke quite a lot about the value for money framework. Could you expand on what you think the benefits and challenges are? You also referred to the Australian regulator’s model, in terms of learning. You have already covered a bit of it, but if there anything you could add on what we could learn from that model about incentivising investments in the right areas, that would be great.

Dale Critchley: What we have heard from Australia is that the thing to avoid is regulator-defined targets, which will probably lead to herding, and can lead to schemes avoiding certain investments. For example, in Australia, property includes social housing and commercial property, but there is one benchmark for everything. So pension schemes do not invest in social housing, because they cannot achieve the benchmark through investing in social housing, as the benchmark is common across all property. Those are things to watch out for.

The other piece is that if you have set benchmarks, people will look to achieve the benchmark and not exceed it—they do not want to be the white chicken among all the brown chickens. Those are the things to avoid, in terms of the value for money benchmarks.

[Rebecca Smith]

Q This builds on something that was mentioned in the previous panel by Age UK—that a lot of the education that will need to be done to ensure that people understand what is going on, particularly with the small pots consolidation, could fall on Government, charities or providers. As pension provider representatives, what is your view on how far into the detail the Bill has gone in terms of who is responsible for that? We have seen in other, similar legislation an expectation put on businesses to provide the service, and it is often done at your cost rather than any sort of Government cost. I would be interested to know what you think about that.

Colin Clarke: I think it is right that the Bill, as I understand it, places the responsibility for member education and member communications on the provider, because ultimately the pension provider will be the organisation facilitating these things and making them happen. As was touched on in the previous panel, the availability of Pension Wise and other services like that is valuable, but I think pension providers ourselves have a responsibility to make sure that we deliver the right guidance and support for members.

Dale Critchley: The only thing I would add to that is that, if we start to edge towards guidance, we can come into an issue around marketing. If we sell the benefits of, for example, the default solution, rather than just say, “This is who the default solution is designed for,” and leave it to the customer to join the dots, we may have a better outcome, but it would be marketing, and we cannot do that, because of the privacy and electronic communications regulations. We would need member consent to deliver marketing communications, even though we are trying to help the customer.

[Rebecca Smith]

Q Are you effectively saying that if you put the customer first, which is ultimately what this entire piece of legislation is trying to do, then, at the moment, other regulations will stop that from happening, so we might want to look at that?

Dale Critchley: Yes.

[Rebecca Smith]

The privacy piece came up earlier this morning as well, so that needs looking at.

Dale Critchley: If we deliver something that looks towards targeted support, where instead of just saying, “This is the solution you will go in if you make no choice,” we say, “This is the solution we think is best for you, and you will go in if you make no choice,” that would edge towards marketing, and we could not say that.

[Sarah Edwards]

Q I want to pick up on the changes around DC, and the fact that there are quite a lot of different things—we have talked about value for money, changes in scale and, obviously, default retirement ages. From your perspective, is there a sequencing that needs to happen to make sure that they work, and is that provided for? What would your guidance be around that?

Colin Clarke: I do not think the Bill itself necessarily has the timescales in it, because it will be left to secondary legislation to look at when all these things actually fit together. A very helpful document was published alongside the Bill, with a potential road map. There is a logical order in which certain things have to happen. For example, the value for money test will require movement of members from historical defaults into something that will deliver better value. To achieve that, the contractual override for contract-based schemes would need to be in place in good time before the value for money exercise happens. Otherwise, there will be constraints that might inhibit the ability to do that.

Similarly, with small pots, a lot of the measures will lead to consolidation at scheme level. That will address some, but not all, of the small pots issue. The road map sets out small pots being at the end, and that is a sensible place to put them, because there will be a lot of other activity that happens first that will solve some of the problems. It does not make sense for small pots to be moved before they are moved again—you could see things moving around a couple of times.

On guided retirement, the potential timing of implementation is quite tight if it is going to be 2027 for certain schemes, when we do not have any secondary legislation yet. It is very important that that is consulted on as soon as possible so that we have clarity. Dale mentioned working on various different solutions. We have been doing something similar at L&G, and they may well be the right thing for members, but we know that we will have to fit them around regulations and make some adjustments, so having clarity on those early would be very helpful.

[John Milne]

Q From your perspective, what would be the main obstacles or difficulties in fulfilling the value for money requirement in the Bill?

Dale Critchley: From a practical perspective, producing all the data. We need clarity in the regulations and clear definitions, so that everyone is producing the same data in the same way so that it can be compared.

Setting practical considerations aside, one of the risks is that there is a disjoint between the market and value for money. Value for money is looking at value. We still see lots of evidence in the market in terms of looking at price—“We want the cheapest thing possible”—not necessarily the best value. There is a potential tension there.

Longer term, there is the risk we pointed out around herding: if you set benchmarks, that creates a behaviour which, instead of optimising outcomes for members, produces an average. An example of that is in the metrics around service that are currently being thought about. They are what I have described as 20th-century metrics. Rather than metrics that are looking to engage members to drive decisions through electronic engagement, they are measuring, “How long does it take to change someone’s address? Have you got their national insurance number?” We think we could stretch things further, but that creates some challenges for some providers.

Colin Clarke: One of the other things that the industry as a whole needs to consider is around capacity. The value for money framework, if it is managed and regulated effectively, is going to result, ultimately, in members being moved into things that have the potential to deliver better value. All those kinds of projects take a lot of work and a lot of resource, so it would need to be managed carefully to make sure that the industry has actually got the capacity to manage the high volume of traffic that is going to be going through as funds consolidate.

[The Chair]

Mr Bedford, we do have a little time if you wish to ask a question.

[Mr Bedford]

Q I want to go back to your point around the value for money implementation, which a few Members have already raised. Specifically, there is always this competing challenge between satisfying the metrics that are in there and delivering returns for your investors. How do you see that balance in the Bill? Do you see it being too much one way, or do you see it hindering the performance of investment?

Colin Clarke: At a high level, the Bill, as it stands, is primarily rule-making powers. A lot of the detail is going to be in the secondary legislation. In terms of rule-making powers, as it stands, I think the Bill has the right provisions in place. The detail is going to be around the actual assessments that you have to follow for determining whether something is delivering value, not delivering, intermediate and so on. For me, getting that detail right in the secondary legislation is going to be quite key, as is having clarity at an early stage on what that is, so that it can go through the proper consultation paper and we can look at the risks and at whether there are any unforeseen consequences. At a high level, we know that the Bill’s rule-making powers set the right framework for that secondary legislation.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, I thank our witnesses for their evidence. That brings us to the end of our morning session. The Committee will meet again at 2 pm in the Boothroyd Room to continue taking oral evidence.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)

11:20

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

Pension Schemes Bill (Second sitting)

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Public Bill Committees

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Sir Christopher Chope, Emma Lewell, Esther McVey, † Karl Turner

† Anderson, Callum (Buckingham and Bletchley) (Lab)

† Bailey, Olivia (Reading West and Mid Berkshire) (Lab)

† Bedford, Mr Peter (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)

† Bell, Torsten (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions)

† Blackman, Kirsty (Aberdeen North) (SNP)

† Blake, Rachel (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)

† Darling, Steve (Torbay) (LD)

† Edwards, Sarah (Tamworth) (Lab)

† Egan, Damien (Bristol North East) (Lab)

† Garnier, Mark (Wyre Forest) (Con)

† Grady, John (Glasgow East) (Lab)

† Jones, Gerald (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)

† Macdonald, Alice (Norwich North) (Lab/Co-op)

† Milne, John (Horsham) (LD)

† Murphy, Luke (Basingstoke) (Lab)

† Pinto-Duschinsky, David (Hendon) (Lab)

† Smith, Rebecca (South West Devon) (Con)

Claire Cozens, Anne-Marie Griffiths, Aaron Kulakiewicz, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Witnesses

Councillor Roger Phillips, Chair of the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board

Robert McInroy, Head of LGPS Client Consulting, Hymans

Helen Forrest Hall, Chief Strategy Officer, Pensions Management Institute

Sophia Singleton, President, Society of Pension Professionals

Patrick Heath-Lay, CEO, People’s Partnership

Ian Cornelius, CEO, NEST Corporation

Tim Fassam, Director of Public Affairs, The Phoenix Group

Michelle Ostermann, CEO, Pension Protection Fund

Morten Nilsson, Executive Director and CEO, Brightwell

Chris Curry, Director, Pensions Policy Institute (PPI)

William Wright, Managing Director, New Financial

Roger Sainsbury, Founding Member, Pensions Partner, Deprived Pensioners Association

Terry Monk, Member, Pensions Action Group

Rachel Elwell, Chief Executive Officer, Border to Coast Pensions Partnership

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 2 September 2025

(Afternoon)

[Karl Turner in the Chair]

Pension Schemes Bill

Examination of Witnesses

Councillor Roger Phillips and Robert McInroy gave evidence.

14:00

[The Chair]

I remind Members that questions are not limited to what is in the brief, but your questions must be within the scope of the Bill. In line with this morning’s session, for each panel of witnesses I propose to call the shadow Minister first, then the Minister and then the Liberal Democrat spokesperson. I will then go back and forth between the Government and Opposition Benches; anyone who wants to ask a question should catch my eye.

We must stick to the cut-off times specified in the programme motion, so I will have to interrupt questioners if necessary. I remind Members that they must declare any relevant interest both when speaking in Committee and when tabling amendments to the Bill. If there are no further questions, I will call the next set of witnesses.

We will now hear oral evidence from Councillor Roger Phillips, chair of the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board, and Robert McInroy, head of LGPS client consulting at Hymans. We have until 2.30 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?

Councillor Phillips: Good afternoon. I am Councillor Roger Phillips. I chair the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board and have done so for the last 10 years. Prior to that, I was on the working party that reformed the pension scheme from final salary to career average.

Robert McInroy: Thanks for inviting me. My name is Robert McInroy and I am the head of LGPS consulting at Hymans Robertson. We provide actuarial, investment and governance services to around 75% of LGPS funds, and it is pleasing to say that we have had some of those partnerships for many decades. In fact, Hymans Robertson was created over 100 years ago to provide services to the LGPS and local government.

[Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)]

Q64 Thank you for coming to this afternoon’s session. Councillor Phillips, I will start with you on the big argument about mandation. Obviously, these are reserved powers, which will not necessarily be used. Local government pension schemes will not be forced to go into things that they do not want to, but in the last two or three weeks the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) has spoken about potentially using local government pension fund money to bail out 50% of Thames Water. That would be £9 billion or £9.5 billion going into something that is not a productive asset. Does that type of talk from senior politicians make you worry about the potential misuse of mandation?

Councillor Phillips: I think there is general concern within the sector when language like that is used, because we are talking about a considerable sum of money that belongs to 6.7 million pensioners. You therefore have to treat that with utter respect. You have a fiduciary duty to look after that money and ensure that the investment is wisely made. The fiduciary duty of the funds and pools is there—the funds own the pools—so there will be concern if somebody wants to politicise it. That is a very dangerous road to go down.

When it comes to UK investment, the LGPS is already investing in the UK in a very big way. This is not a case where you use a stick and say, “You’ve got to invest in the United Kingdom.” It is about identifying risk, return and sometimes conflicts of interest. Certainly we should be investing where it is sensible to do so for the benefit of our pensioners and for the least obligation to our employers as well. That should be clearly understood by everyone.

[Mark Garnier]

Q For trustees, the arrangement will be slightly different if it goes into a big pool, but to what extent do you think local authorities, if they are going to see mandation, would be keen to invest into their local areas, to support local investment?

Councillor Phillips: Local investment is difficult because, again, I go back to this business of it being our duty to invest wisely, prudently and sensibly. That is important. With local investment, first of all, it depends on your definition of “local”, particularly given the current pooling arrangements. You could have a strategic mayoral authority that has three different pools, because the pools come from all over the geography of England and Wales, so that is a difficulty.

Secondly, it is about return and making sure the pipeline of potential projects is there and that those projects are investable. If LGPS is going to invest in them, surely the rest of the investment industry will also want to invest in them, including the Canadian people.

The other thing I would say, which I surely do not have to tell you as Members of Parliament, is that some local matters are controversial. You may think that a particular local investment is what an area needs, but actually a large part of your people do not. You have to show a little bit of discretion. You may invest in offshore wind, which is very popular, but getting the link to the grid, going across open countryside with massive pylons, is not popular. The LGPS will have to bear that in mind, because sometimes the members, the constituent authorities and the council tax payers will not appreciate it.

[Mark Garnier]

Q It is difficult. You raised the point about geographical location and that a mayoral authority could have three different funds within it. More important, Cornwall county council, for example, may suddenly discover it is having to invest into Northumbria because that is where somebody decides it needs to invest, and may feel very embittered or cross about that.

Councillor Phillips: We go back to the importance of fiduciary duty. You are there to invest for the benefit of your pensioners and to make sure that you do that in a sensible and reliable way. As has been proved to date, the most popular element is probably affordable housing. Cornwall, which you mentioned, has invested very wisely in affordable housing. Together with its relationship with local government as the owners of much land, there is huge potential there, but it only comes right when the return is there. If the return is not there, you are not going to enter into it.

[Mark Garnier]

Q So the key point is that every single investment must be done on a benefit analysis rather than a social good analysis?

Councillor Phillips: If you do not do that, I do not know where you are going with your pension investment.

[Mark Garnier]

Q There is potential for surpluses to be paid back into the community. Is that not a good alternative for that type of more social investment as opposed to non-commercial investments?

Councillor Phillips: We anticipate that the latest round of valuations will show a very good surplus for all the pensions. That is credit to the investments that have been made to date. That does pose some issues as to what you do with those surpluses, but we live in a very volatile situation, and circumstances can change. You have to be careful, because if you reduce contribution rates considerably, that is a great benefit at this moment in time, but if you then turn around and start to increase them again, that can be very difficult for all employers to deal with, including local government.

[Mark Garnier]

Q That is very helpful. Robert, would you like to add anything?

Robert McInroy: Yes, on the last point about surpluses. I am a fund actuary. We are working through the 2025 valuations, and it is pleasing to see improvements in funding levels across the LGPS. We think that that, in turn, can mean lower contribution rates, particularly for councils—something in the region of 3% to 6% of pay, so that is positive. It is important to realise that the success of the current scheme has perhaps not been picked up in some of the language and assumptions built into the reforms that have been put forward.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Would you suggest a higher hurdle for valuations in terms of surplus distribution?

Robert McInroy: That has been discussed on a fund-by-fund basis—whether the funding target should be increased from something like 100% to 120%, for example. That has been actively discussed.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Would you support that?

Robert McInroy: I support looking at the range of options, which includes reducing employer contributions and flexing investment strategy, including for some of the areas that we have talked about and will be talking about, that could be available to the LGPS in terms of investments.

[Mark Garnier]

That is very helpful; thank you.

[Luke Murphy (Basingstoke) (Lab)]

Q I want to return to your comments, Councillor Phillips, to be sure that I caught your meaning. You mentioned the popularity or otherwise of network grid schemes running across the countryside. I was not quite sure whether you were saying that those were a relevant consideration for investment.

Councillor Phillips: Like the local government sector, the local government pension scheme operates in a goldfish bowl: constantly, on a weekly basis, an article is written about you or you receive a freedom of information request. So you are very conscious of the scrutiny, and that helps direct you to manage the investment risks as part of your fiduciary duties. What people do not realise is that there will be particular packages that Government and strategic mayors may think a fine investment that they should be in, but there might be some local problems. To go back to the previous question, it might be better for Northumberland to invest in it rather than Cornwall. That sensitivity has to be there.

[Luke Murphy]

Q But would that outweigh the fiduciary duty and the question of monetary benefits to lenders?

Councillor Phillips: The fiduciary duty would still be your main concern but in managing your risks you would have to take that into consideration as well.

[Luke Murphy]

Q How do you measure the unpopularity or otherwise? Do you look at polling? Is it just a broad sense of sentiment? As a measure, it feels a bit vague. If you are weighing that up against fiduciary duty, are you doing any actual research? I am just trying to understand how you weigh it up against the fiduciary duty.

Councillor Phillips: That is problematic, but at the same time you know when there are things it is perhaps best to steer clear of—perhaps a bypass, or something hugely controversial. It goes back to the mandatory business. If you are forced to invest in something that does not go well locally, that is not going to sit right or do the reputation of the scheme any good. Ultimately, as my colleague has said, we are talking about a well-run scheme with good integrity. Our businesses supply pensions to some of the lowest paid people in the public sector.

[Luke Murphy]

Q It does not appear to be easily definable. What the financial benefits to members of an investment will be is easier to define through the fiduciary duty, but what is popular locally feels like a bit of a value judgment.

Councillor Phillips: Like a lot of judgments.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)]

Q Since we have gone to mandation and surplus, I encourage you to clarify that the reserve power and the surplus measures in the Bill do not affect the LGPS in any way. Those are not within the remit of the Bill.

Councillor Phillips: My understanding is that it is a back foot.

[Torsten Bell]

indicated dissent.

Councillor Phillips: It is not a back foot?

[Torsten Bell]

Q The reserve power is about automatic enrolment contributions; it has no impact on the LGPS. It is the same for surplus: the changes do not apply to the LGPS. Could you confirm that I am correct in saying that?

Councillor Phillips: Right.

[John Milne (Horsham) (LD)]

Q Earlier, you were touching on possible investments in local matters, such as affordable housing, which have a strong and desirable social benefit. Could it not be argued that there are extra interests for a local investor? Basically a council could both own the houses and effectively supply the customers via its housing lists, so there is an extra reason for investment from a local government pension fund versus other investors. Alongside that, do you think the Government need to help create these investment vehicles so that there is a sufficient pipeline to invest in?

Councillor Phillips: The Government have a responsibility to support the strategic authorities in developing the pipeline and the vehicles for investment. Affordable housing is probably one of the best examples to use. The pensioner receiving a pension or paying into a pension from the local government sector would be quite proud of the fact that some of their pension money is being invested in providing homes for the next generation of key workers. That is probably one of the best examples you can ever get of local investment. There is real potential, but I go back to the fact that it has to provide the necessary returns. Just as you have to be careful about some of those controversial ones, there is one that you can absolutely lap up.

[John Milne]

Q But would you agree that that could have very stable returns—say a 5% return for affordable housing, or for a care home—because effectively the customers are also coming via the local authority?

Councillor Phillips: There is great potential in all the activities that local government can do, but the fiduciary duty is where we need that clearly spelt out and some guardrails put in for that.

Robert McInroy: Where the LGPS can potentially bring an advantage to bear is by tapping into its local connections and local expertise—when it can see local investment opportunities that others potentially cannot. To come back to affordable housing and the fiduciary duty, if you are the asset owner, you have to be looking at the returns, and that is a difficult challenge for LGPS funds, particularly when it is in their local areas. You are talking about, for example, whether you push up rent and potentially displace a family or basically taking a lower return as a result of that. It is a very difficult thing to stack up. It is new to the LGPS. We need to make sure there are guardrails around it. Within the Bill it would be useful to bring fiduciary responsibility into the elements of local investment and how that overrides any of the local considerations.

[David Pinto-Duschinsky (Hendon) (Lab)]

Q The Minister picked up a point that I was going to touch on, but I would like to ask about broader consolidation. Councillor Phillips, you mentioned that often councils are wrestling with multiple pools in a small area. I think there is broad consensus that consolidation is a good idea, and clearly this is the direction of travel being laid out by the Bill. What kind of challenges do you see to successful implementation of consolidation and how will the Bill drive that forward?

Councillor Phillips: Let us be quite clear. I think the Government’s frustration, which is shared by many of us, is that we are talking about what is generally accepted to be the sixth largest pension scheme in the world, and it does not punch its weight, which is what it needs to do. That is what pooling, which began in 2016, was meant to address, and to date, it has been successful, but it needs to be better. That is where I see a very big positive of coming together.

[David Pinto-Duschinsky]

Q How do you see the Bill helping?

Councillor Phillips: From that point of view, it is very helpful. Because we are a very transparent pension fund, pressure will be put on some of the pools to make sure that their workings are done in a transparent manner. They are now, but there will be even more pressure because lobby groups will go straight to them rather than the funds.

Consolidation with regard to administration is not quite so easy. The last consolidation was between Northumberland and Tyne and Wear, and that was with maximum co-operation on both sides. This is a very well administered scheme, but bringing two administration authorities together is quite challenging. It needs to be done with co-operation and collaboration, never with a big stick behind it.

Certainly in London, there is a case for some rationalisation of the number of funds, and there is always going to be an issue about some of the smaller funds as they deal with it, but pooling is not just about consolidating your investments. It also brings the opportunity for the member funds that own the pools to start working more collaboratively, particularly on things like communications and other areas of work. There is great potential there. One of the things that the scheme advisory board is very keen to do is to make sure we develop and grow those chairs of funds to be the competent leaders that they are, and make them even better.

Robert McInroy: I think you were asking about the challenges of implementation. It is easy to see the direction on this and to think that there is not much change for the LGPS. There is a huge magnitude of change in these reforms. The LGPS funds and the pools already have a very full to-do list. They have stretched resources. They are asked to deliver an awful lot in a short period of time. They are transferring all of the remaining assets from the funds to the pools—there is still about 30% of those assets to come across in a short period of time.

Two pools have been asked to change their operating model to be FCA-regulated. Every pool has been asked to build advisory functions—that is all from scratch, apart from one. They have been asked to build local investment capabilities as well, which is of paramount importance to be able to kick-start and contribute to the UK economy, and to implement some of these governance reforms, and now we know that two of the pools are being asked to wind up, so there is £100 billion of assets to transfer, which is implicated across 21 funds.

That is a huge amount to do under any timescale. Some of what is envisaged in the consultation is that this would be completed in a little over six months’ time. That puts risk on some of these reforms, and I think that should be recognised.

[David Pinto-Duschinsky]

Q Clearly you are talking about a large administrative challenge, but also about building capacity. We know the funds need capacity to raise their investment sophistication and their ability to invest in a broader set of assets. What do you think the minimum efficient scale for this is, and how quickly could the pools get there?

Robert McInroy: At the moment, there are eight pools across the £400 billion-ish of assets. I believe the plan at the moment is to reduce that to six. You would imagine that that gives a big enough scale. Some of those pools will be £100 billion-plus; that should be able to punch its weight internationally, I would imagine. The LGPS itself is of course open to accrual and to new members joining, so that is just going to grow over time. In some ways, I think these reforms set the plan for the future as the scheme continues to grow.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

Q I am pleased to hear you talking about what scheme members want, not just in terms of the return that they are expecting, but also the projects that are invested in.

My question is about consolidation and local concerns that people might have. For example, they may not want a wind farm invested in because they are worried about the infrastructure that goes alongside that. If there is consolidation, will that remove the ability to take account of local concerns and to find great local investment opportunities? Will it dilute the input that people have locally, because it is taking it further away from them, or do you think it will be okay?

Councillor Phillips: As we already know, the establishment of the pools does take it away. There is no denying that. The important thing is to have member representation on pools. The scheme advisory board has always been supportive of that, although you need flexibility in how you do it; I certainly would not go for 50:50, because of the governance and regulatory responsibilities that the administration authorities have. I think Border to Coast particularly has employee representatives on there, and that works very well. In particular funds, you will have representatives on the committee and on the pension board. That is always important.

Getting the right engagement is always going to be a struggle, with all the rest of it, but, particularly with some of the ESG issues, that helps to better understand some of the issues. Of course, elected members that sit there are representatives of their community as well. They are aware as well. They are also aware that when they sit at the table on a pension, they have a responsibility first and foremost to that pension.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q Obviously, there is a mix of people on some of these boards that you would not necessarily find on other trust boards. I have been a councillor, so I am well aware of the different directions you are pulled in if you are a councillor or an officer in local government. Are boards able to find enough engaged members to be on them who have got enough skill? You were also talking about training and ensuring that they are better trained; is that something that you are working on currently?

Councillor Phillips: Absolutely. We laid recommendations from the board before Government some time ago. They have now been implemented and rolled out, and that is very much a crucial part of all of this. The headline is all about the pooling, but the Government’s changes, and training and developing your members, are absolutely critical because of the important decisions that they make.

[Sarah Edwards (Tamworth) (Lab)]

Q I want to go back a little and talk about transfer of funds into pools. During the transitional phase there are funds that might have ordinarily been making investments and would have had a set of investment principles and a strategy, and who for 12 months may potentially not be making those decisions. Are there risks to the members in terms of value, or do you not foresee that being a problem?

Robert McInroy: It is important to point out that the members are not directly impacted by the scheme returns or cost: their benefits are set in statutes and are guaranteed. However, you can see how that might indirectly implicate them; for example, if there was a higher cost to employers because the scheme was not performing the way we would have liked, that could impact on their business.

Councillor Phillips: We know the deadline has been set for the transfer and it is very much business as usual until that happens. Of course, virtually all the funds have been contributing to their pools anyway, so it is just a case of transferring the rest. There are some sensible discussions going on about where it would cost money to pull out of an investment, and common sense must be the first rule, but the direction of travel is what the Government want to see: that the pool is effectively in charge of delivering that investment strategy, which still remains the responsibility of the fund.

Robert McInroy: Within the 21 impacted funds, there are two pools that are being wound up and they are to find a new home, and they do not know for certain where that will be. There is sometimes a degree of inertia in some of the decisions made: why would you make a new investment when you do not know whether that is going to fit into your new pool? I appreciate that is why there are some short timescales on this; we need to get clarity and move through this quickly, or there will be increased risk, but the short timescales create risk in themselves, so there is a balance to be made and a tension there.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence today. We will move on to the next panel.

Examination of Witnesses

Helen Forrest Hall and Sophia Singleton gave evidence.

14:27

[The Chair]

The Committee will now hear oral evidence from Helen Forrest Hall, chief strategy officer at the Pensions Management Institute, and Sophia Singleton, president of the Society of Pension Professionals. We have until 3 pm for this panel. Could the witnesses briefly introduce themselves?

Helen Forrest Hall: I am Helen Forrest Hall, chief strategy officer at the Pensions Management Institute. We are the leading professional body for those running pension schemes in the UK. We provide qualifications and training to the sector, as well as continued professional development, and have almost 8,000 individual members.

Sophia Singleton: I am Sophia Singleton, president of the Society of Pension Professionals, and in my day job I am a partner at XPS Group. The society represents providers of advice and services to pension schemes and employers. As such, we represent quite a broad range of the industry, from pensions lawyers and actuaries through to professional trustees, pension providers and administrators.

[Mark Garnier]

Q There has been a lot of talk about mandation, which you will be well aware of. Over the time that I have been researching it, over the last few months, we have had pretty much exclusively commentary that it is not a very good thing. Tell me that that is wrong. Why is it possibly a good thing?

Helen Forrest Hall: I would love to say that. I start by saying that the PMI supports the principle that larger pension funds are likely to lead to better outcomes for members. A great and growing weight of evidence, and obviously an awful lot of international experience, shows that they provide greater economies of scale and greater opportunities to invest in a broader range of assets. Unfortunately, we believe that the reserve power sets a dangerous precedent of political interference with a trustee’s fiduciary duty. The considerations of each individual pension scheme are a matter for the trustees, taking into account their members’ experience and what will drive the best outcomes for those members.

Obviously, significant progress has already been made in terms of pension schemes demonstrating their desire to meet the Government’s eagerness for them to invest in a broader range of assets, and the consolidation elements of the Bill should help with that. But I think that the reserve power provision runs a serious risk of cutting across that well-founded fiduciary duty, as well as creating all sorts of disruption to long-term investment planning—another thing that pension schemes are well set up to do—and creating market distortion.

Sophia Singleton: We are very much aligned with the Government’s objective around investing in these assets. We believe that they can deliver and, as Helen has said, the industry has already made quite a strong move towards investing in them. We are going to get there, and it is really about not forcing that to happen too quickly. Schemes need to deploy capital when the opportunities arise and when the right time is, otherwise we risk distorting the market. That is a real concern, because it could deliver poor outcomes for savers. I am sorry we cannot give you a different answer, but we have three concerns about the mandation. Who is legally accountable if there is underperformance? Underperformance is possible. Is it the Government? Is it trustees? How will it affect the markets? How will it affect public trust? At a time when people need to save more into their pensions, they will worry that their pension scheme is no longer investing for returns as a priority.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Helen, can I pick up on your comment that you have to make long-term decisions? These reserve powers have a sunset clause that will apply in 2035. Presumably, if you are making an investment decision, you have to take that into account. An investment decision could be expected to pay out in 2040, and in making that decision you would have to take into account the possibility, remote though it may be, that your investment objectives may be forced to change between now and 2035. How will that affect the performance of a fund, even if the power is never used?

Helen Forrest Hall: That is the problem with a reserve power. It does not have to be used to influence the decisions that trustees are making about their investment strategies, because they have to consider the instances—and there is not an awful lot of clarity in the Bill about what those instances would be—in which this power might be used. They might suddenly find their long-term, well-considered investment strategy outwith Government legislation. That is a dangerous place to be. Pension schemes, quite rightly, are doing their job when they are thinking about their members and their beneficiaries, and making long-term investment decisions. They have the capacity and the joy of being able to do so, but that means that they have to think about those kind of time horizons. That means that a reserve power with a sunset clause with that kind of short-term time horizon will start impacting decisions that people are making at the moment.

[Mark Garnier]

Q So if this clause is passed, we could potentially see a drop-off in the performance of pension funds?

Helen Forrest Hall: I am not sure that we would draw a direct correlation, but the point is that it will start to influence investment decisions. Those may be good decisions, or not, and they may be decisions that trustees would have made anyway; the challenge is that the reserve power exists, a good trustee and their legal advisers will be taking account of that at the moment.

Sophia Singleton: We believe that the threat—just the threat—of this power is the worst of all worlds, in a sense, because the lack of clarity about what trustees should do and take into account when investing for the long term makes it very difficult for them to carry out their fiduciary duties.

[Mark Garnier]

Q It has been suggested to me that the mere fact that this reserve power is in existence may subconsciously encourage funds to invest in the UK, and that therefore they can naturally find 5% investment into the UK and infrastructure, or maybe even more. Do you think that is a valid point?

Sophia Singleton: What I would say is that we are already moving in that direction. If you look back a few years ago, it was very difficult operationally for defined contribution schemes to invest in those types of assets. If you look at things now, both on the supply side and the demand side we see factors that are really supporting investment in those assets.

On the demand side, the new value for money framework really incentivised investment into private market assets because of the risk-adjusted metrics included within the framework, and the work that the industry and regulators have done to take away the operational barriers that existed. On the supply side, the Government have committed to help to create that pipeline of investments. Publishing the pipeline that is coming up is very helpful, because people can plan how to employ their capital, and having the British Growth Fund and so on to invest in alongside the private sector is also helpful.

We are already seeing it happen: we are seeing funds recruiting investment experts to help to manage those assets, so they are already gearing up and skilling up to do this, and we are seeing fund managers releasing private market funds suitable for DC schemes on a regular basis. We do due diligence on those funds, and there are more and more that we have to look at. So it is happening.

[Mark Garnier]

Q It is happening; that is very good, and it is good to hear that there is a pipeline being developed. It is certainly something that has been talked about for a number of years. When I was the investment Minister back in 2017-18, we were very keen to get foreign direct investment coming in to the UK, so there was the Office for Investment in No. 10 doing all that stuff.

That begs the question that, as the Government at any time is trying to attract foreign direct investment into the UK, not least to try to sort out the current account deficit, you as pension fund managers will find yourselves in competition with, hopefully, foreign investors coming into the UK. What is the hierarchy of offer? Do you think UK pension funds should be offered exciting investment opportunities before foreign direct investors?

Sophia Singleton: I do not think we should be interfering with the market; I think it needs to be a free market and, as trustees of pension schemes, we need to be exercising fiduciary duty to choose the right investments for our members and to give the returns.

[Mark Garnier]

But you would rather see the opportunities first?

Sophia Singleton: Absolutely—we would love to see the opportunities first.

Helen Forrest Hall: The other dynamic there is that international pension funds, for example, are often looking to invest in the UK for reasons different from the reasons UK pension funds might want to invest. For them, it is often a smaller part of their portfolio, and part of their own need to diversify where their assets are, in order to manage their own volatility risks. There has been a history of going after the same investments, and unfortunately that is the market and that is healthy competition. One of the challenges and one of the market distortions we see with things such as the reserve power is that you will have the same group of people fighting over what, for a short period of time, is inevitably going to be a short pipeline. That will have an impact on things such as the value for money that you are getting for those investments.

[Mark Garnier]

That is very helpful; thank you very much.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Thank you both for joining us today. I want to ask you to reflect on the internal consistency of some of what you have said. Implicit in what you are saying is that pension schemes should have been investing in a wider range of private assets over the course of the past 10 years, and that that is what they should want to be doing in future—so in some ways we have not been living up to our fiduciary duties in the past, and we are now making changes to do that.

Given that that is your logic, the question is why that has not happened. If you go and ask actual pension providers why that has not happened, they will tell you they have a collective action problem and an industry focused exclusively on cost and not on returns, and that they struggle to deliver against that. If you have a collective action problem, you need to ask how we resolve that.

You then get to the fact that the Mansion House accord is entirely industry led, with numbers set by them—it is not about distortion to the market; you might want to reflect on that, given the comments you have just made. You also spoke about a lack of clarity, but the Mansion House accord provides clarity about the objectives: everyone can see them and they are set by the industry. When it comes to savers’ interests, you know that the Bill includes a carve-out for trustees to say, “This isn’t in my members’ interests, so we won’t be doing it.” Reflect a bit on the consistency of the argument you have made about the real progress you want to see on investment in a wider range of assets—because it is in savers’ interests and should have happened in the past but did not—and the changes in the Bill. I would gently suggest you might want to think about the consistency of that.

Sophia Singleton: We are not a mature industry—the defined contribution industry—and in the past we have not invested in these assets because there have been operational barriers, including the focus on cost.

[Torsten Bell]

That is not the view of the whole industry, which points to the collective action problem of an exclusive focus on cost, as much as it is a barrier—

Sophia Singleton: The value for money framework in the Bill is extremely helpful—

[Torsten Bell]

It is.

Sophia Singleton: —and we have said that we need to move the focus from cost to value, and we are seeing that very much come through in the culture within the industry, to be focusing on value. I have given evidence about funds recruiting investment teams to invest in these assets, because they are not simple to invest in for DC schemes. If you look at the experience in Australia through the covid pandemic, there were some real challenges that those schemes had to face relating to stale pricing, intergenerational fairness and cross-subsidies. They are not simple assets for DC schemes to invest in. The market is moving, going, and will get there. What we are saying is the mandation power is not needed to achieve that, because we are, with your help, getting to the right place.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Again, I would look at the actual history of what happened. The industry committed to private assets under the previous Government, and it is failing to deliver on that because of collective action challenges. You have to face up to this at the level of the sector as a whole; I am afraid you are giving answers that are very happy with the status quo, the way you are describing it. I would reflect that it is definitely a failure of fiduciary duty over the last 10 years not to have made more progress.

Helen Forrest Hall: Just to give my own perspective, there are a number of structural issues with the development of the sector. Defined benefit has been in run-off, which has driven a particular type of investment strategy. DC has not been at scale, and a number of us in the sector have been calling for consolidation for a long time. I think it goes without saying that we are having this conversation in the context of being very supportive of the vast majority of provisions in this Bill.

[Torsten Bell]

I was encouraging you to say that; you got there.

Helen Forrest Hall: Apologies; we are very, very supportive of the vast majority. This is basically the one substantive issue from our perspective. As Sophia has said, the value for money and consolidation elements in particular are incredibly helpful in removing some of the barriers that have existed, including for trustees. They technically have the ability to operate within their fiduciary duty, but sometimes the legislation and the structure of the industry get in their way. Things such as value for money and scale will really help with that. This Bill is incredibly enabling in the vast majority of its provisions. There are just a small number—mandation being one of them—where we have a bit of concern.

[John Milne]

Q Pension scheme funding ladders can go up, and they largely have done in recent years, but also they can go down. Do you think that the proposals and the framework in this Bill for surplus extraction have the right balance of risk versus actually achieving the objective?

Helen Forrest Hall: From a principles basis, yes, and just to address the funding point, they absolutely can. I know there will be a number of us in the room who have either experienced or been subject to the outcomes of what has happened when those significant events have taken place. In the context of where we are with DB now, a significant proportion of schemes are employing investment strategies that really do protect them against the kind of volatile market movements you might see.

The provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between, as I said earlier, giving trustees greater flexibility to exercise their fiduciary duty in discussion with employers, while also ensuring that they are considering the best interests of the members. One of the key considerations for trustees in that conversation is: how confident are we that our investment strategy would withstand significant market movements at the point when we might release a surplus? That is a key consideration.

We have seen that a number of pension schemes did not benefit from September 2022 in the way that others did, and that was because they had decided to protect themselves against that kind of market movement. There are things that schemes can deploy to give themselves that level of confidence.

Sophia Singleton: We were very pleased to see the stringent funding safeguards that are in the Bill in order to allow a surplus to be released. One thing I would say is that, as Helen says, it is giving the trustees the tools to properly exercise their discretionary power and, in a sense, fiduciary duty, but it has created an opportunity for trustees to negotiate and agree a win-win situation, in a sense. The conversations we are having with schemes is that they are now more likely to be able to feel comfortable in paying, and be able to pay out, discretionary benefits than they would have been before the Bill was in place. It gives schemes the opportunity to run on and for the employer to access the service, but also for members to have more access to discretionary benefits and to additional benefits.

[John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)]

Q I apologise: I should say that my wife sits on the committee of the Scottish Government pension scheme. I should disclose that to the Committee.

I would like to move on to a slightly different topic: small pots. Ms Singleton, the SPP made supportive comments in its submission about small pots. Would you like to elaborate on why you support the small pots element of the Bill, and are there any practical considerations you would like to draw to the Committee’s attention?

Sophia Singleton: Small pots are a challenge for both the industry and for individuals. You have got a much more mobile workforce, and more and more people have small pots and have lost sight of those pots. Obviously, the dashboard will help them to gain sight of them, but actually bringing them together will help them to manage it. We know that it is much easier for people to manage greater-sized pots of money. For the industry, it is a huge cost to manage lots and lots of very small pots of money. I think it benefits savers and it benefits the industry to have this.

This is a pragmatic solution that is within the Bill, as far as we are concerned. The industry has considered a number of different ways of addressing this problem, and we feel that this is actually a very pragmatic solution. It does rely on a technology platform, so we were pleased to see that it is further down in the timeline for the Government’s road map for implementation, because we all know that introducing technology platforms can take some time and there are a lot of other things that we need to be working through, including consolidation and so on.

We did put forward some small technical suggestions within the Bill. Did you want me to talk to them?

[John Grady]

No.

Sophia Singleton: Good. We are positive that this will help, and we are also positive about the timeline for it.

[Damien Egan (Bristol North East) (Lab)]

Q I would like to move us on to the aspects of the Bill that place a duty on schemes to offer members default retirement products. We touched on it a bit this morning. What do you think they could look like?

Sophia Singleton: I might start on this because I think that the Bill should not set out what the product looks like. The policy should set the rules of the game, providers and pension schemes should be allowed to innovate and to develop solutions that meet the needs of their members, and then policy should obviously monitor and oversee product development to ensure that it is effective. When I say “set the rules of the game”, I mean clear guidance around the things that should be considered when developing these solutions. It should consider whether it should deliver an income and consider whether it should provide longevity protection. It should consider those factors, but an income for life might not be the answer for all schemes. It will probably be the answer for many, but not for all, so that is why there needs to be flexibility for providers and schemes to develop solutions.

Helen Forrest Hall: From a PMI perspective, obviously we recognise that with the shift from DB to DC, the choices that are facing people at retirement are growing ever more complicated, and at the moment, they are largely left to their own devices and that is a far from ideal situation so we very strongly support the proposals in the Bill to provide those default pathways, particularly for those who have not made an active choice. Actually, we support the focus on those default options as generating an income because, after all, that is what a pension is for. We do strongly support that.

We have a question around where this sits in the pensions reform road map. We very much share the desire to provide people at that point of retirement with a bit more support, guidance, help and some form of default pathways as soon as possible. But we are concerned that doing so in advance of trying to bring those small pots together and reaching scale in the market puts a burden on schemes, in terms of the number of DC schemes that might not meet the scale test having to put this in place in the meantime, and potentially confuses members. For example, if you have got 11 pots that all happen to be trust based, and you have got 11 different default solutions, that is potentially going to be confusing.

We do not think that nothing should happen in the meantime. Our proposal would be to extend the point at which the mandation requirement would come in, but use engagement from regulators, particularly for large schemes—those that are going to meet scale or be exempt from the scale test—to really start piloting what good looks like in terms of both the guided retirement requirements and the FCA’s proposals for targeted support. There is a really important piece of work to be done thinking about how all of those align into a better, but not perfect, pension saver member journey at the point of retirement. It is not about moving slowly; it is about thinking about the right time that the mandation kicks in so that schemes can plan effectively and things can be tested in the meantime.

Sophia Singleton: Just to add one other element to that point around timescale, I think master trusts are going to be required to comply by 2027. One of the solutions, which might be the right solution for schemes, is the decumulation CDC. We do not expect that the regulations to facilitate that will be in place by 2027. Ensuring that those align so that that option is available to schemes when they are considering their decumulation solution would be beneficial as well. I agree with everything Helen said, but just add that extra element.

[Mr Peter Bedford (Mid Leicestershire) (Con)]

Q I have just a couple of general questions. You have articulated this in your points already, but where do you think the Bill goes too far and may have an adverse impact, and where does it not go far enough to make progress in this space?

Helen Forrest Hall: I will take this opportunity to reiterate that we strongly support the vast majority of the provisions in the Bill: the consolidation, value for money and retirement provisions; finally legislating for DB superfunds, which we warmly welcome; and striking the balance on DB surplus—there was a better balance to be struck. To a certain extent we have already talked about our key issue where the Bill potentially goes too far, which is around the mandation requirement and the reserve power.

On value for money, I think that the Bill is doing the right thing. Value for money is going to be an everchanging set of circumstances, particularly if we build scale in the market. What might be required on day one for value for money—we probably want a core set of metrics that can be easily comparable across schemes—might really mature as the market consolidates into a small number of fairly significant defined contribution funds. You might quite rightly expect regulators and the regulations to ask an awful lot more of those schemes in terms of what they are doing under value for money.

We think it is only right and proper that they sit in secondary. There have occasionally been issues with putting too much in a pensions Bill, and creating problems with the market being able to adapt as we go. So I think that this is actually the right thing to do, albeit that we would welcome further clarity from regulators around the fact that they would like to start small and grow—at the moment there is very little detail on the value for money measurements. We are talking actively with them, but it is useful to get the reassurance that we will start from a principle small basis and move out, rather than potentially creating additional burdens for schemes during what will be, on a number of fronts, quite a busy pensions reform road map.

Sophia Singleton: We very much support almost all the provisions in the Bill; mandation, as we have already talked about, is the exception. Where would we go further? There are two things that we would ask for.

The first is in relation to DB surplus. We have talked about how we were pleased to see that the safeguards were in place—we feel that they are very robust. We would like some clarity in the Bill, though, that that provision overrides any existing restrictions in scheme rules, because as it is currently drafted there are some schemes that might not be able to utilise that provision. We have provided some more details about making it open to all in our submission—making it clear that the provision overrides any existing restrictions, subject to the safeguards being properly used and so on.

The second one is an addition that we would love to see to the Bill: the removal of the admin levy, which pays towards the Pension Protection Fund admin costs. The DWP did a review in 2022 that concluded that it was no longer needed—it is a cost to schemes and therefore to employers. We have prepared a simple draft for the legislation that we have shared with you and the DWP that would remove it, and it is a very easy way to remove a cost on employers.

Helen Forrest Hall: If I could just add one point on the DB surplus, because Sophia’s points reminded me of it, I think there are a couple of areas where there could be further easements. They are not necessarily for a pensions Bill—some of them are more Finance Bill-related—but in giving trustees full flexibility to consider all the beneficiaries of a scheme, it would be useful if there were further easements that enabled them to make, for example, one-off payments to members without being subject to extraneous tax charges and, similarly, that would allow employers to pay some of that surplus as DC contributions into another trust. At the moment, the legislation does not provide for that, and obviously that would be a way to help trustees, and actually employers, who might be looking to enhance their pension provision overall—not just being able to move money around within one legal structure.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q On that last point about paying the surplus to scheme members—I am afraid we have had a massive pile of evidence—is that written in any of the evidence there, along with a suggestion of how to go about it?

Helen Forrest Hall: Yes, I think at least one of us has something, but we can certainly provide more details if that would be helpful.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Thank you, that would be really helpful.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, can I thank the witnesses for their evidence this afternoon? We will move on to the next panel. Thank you very much for your attendance.

Examination of Witnesses

Patrick Heath-Lay and Ian Cornelius gave evidence.

14:57

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Patrick Heath-Lay, chief executive officer of People’s Partnership, and Ian Cornelius, CEO of NEST Corporation. We have until 3.30 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Patrick Heath-Lay: Good afternoon. My name is Patrick Heath-Lay. I am the CEO of People’s Partnership, a large DC master trust with £35 billion of assets under management and about 7 million members. Importantly, we are a not-for-profit organisation. Within that, we are an asset owner, not an investment manager, so our asset ownership activities are solely for the benefit of members and not commercially for ourselves.

Ian Cornelius: I am Ian Cornelius. I have been the CEO of NEST since May last year. I will say a few words about NEST. It was set up by the Government at the inception of auto-enrolment to make sure that every individual has access to a good-quality pension. It has been a great success story. It now looks after over 13 million members, which is a third of the working population, and manages over £53 billion of assets on their behalf. We receive about half a billion pounds of assets every month.

The focus of NEST has been, and will continue to be, on low to moderate earners, so the typical NEST member earns just under £25,000. In many ways, NEST is probably one of the best examples of the sort of megafund that the Bill is looking to create. It has been able to invest in private assets, invest in the UK and deliver good outcomes for members.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Ian, can I start with you? One of the problems with auto-enrolment is where individuals move from one job to the next, not with a small pot under £1,000 but with a slightly bigger pot that is none the less still administratively tricky. Do you think that the Bill sufficiently tackles that problem?

Ian Cornelius: I do not think that the Bill particularly focuses on that problem, but the question is whether it is a problem. The pensions dashboard will help to provide more visibility of where people’s money is and help them to manage that more effectively. I think it is right to focus on small pots, because they are inefficient. It is much harder for consumers to track lots of small pots, and it is driving costs in the industry, so I think that that is the right initial focus.

[Mark Garnier]

Q One of the original ideas of the last Government was to have a lifetime pot, whereby an employee would pay into a fund, but it was deemed by the industry to be quite difficult to administer, because as an employer you would have to be dipping bits into different pots. What was put up as an alternative was a magnetic pot, whereby an individual would be able to move their money from one pot to the other. Each time they changed jobs, that pot would be picked up from employer A and moved to employer B’s pot. Do you think that is a sensible alternative?

Ian Cornelius: Customers—members—can already do that if they choose to.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Do they know that they can do that? Somebody who is changing jobs quite a lot would not necessarily be the sort of person who is making strategic decisions about their retirement.

Ian Cornelius: I think that is right. It probably goes back to dashboards. They are key to helping to increase visibility. That will get people thinking about the choices they can make, how they want to manage their pension and how they can consolidate their pensions. That will drive that type of activity naturally. At NEST, we have always had one pot per member to make it as easy as possible for our members. Ultimately, it is about member choice.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Yes, that is kind of helpful.

Patrick, could I turn to you? We met and had a very interesting chat. One thing we discussed was the scale of the funds. There is a requirement in the Bill that funds such as yours will need to be valued at £25 billion by 2035. One thing we discussed at the time was whether that creates a barrier to entry for new asset managers, and a lack of competition among asset managers in order to provide the best value for those funds. Would you share some of your thoughts about the £25 billion minimum size?

Patrick Heath-Lay: Yes, of course. We have conducted research. Toby Nangle did some research for us in 2025, and WPI Economics has also looked at the issue of whether scale drives better economies. Generally, aside from all the international comparisons from Canada and Australia, it is proven that scale will drive better economies. You can leverage scale to drive a more efficient administration. If you are asset owners like these two organisations, we get to choose where we invest the money, which managers we use, who will come with the best solutions and who has the best routes and access to market to allow us to invest in a way that benefits and shares the benefit of that investment with the end saver, which for us as an organisation is the sole focus.

I believe that scale, utilised in the right way, does deliver those efficiencies, but this is where the package in the Bill, and particularly a key element like value for money, is critical to establishing that as this market evolves. You want to be reassured that the investment activity at that scale is delivering increasing value for members, which is really the sole purpose of driving that scale. From our own experience and the research that we have done, it is a proven model, but that scale needs to be harnessed in the right way.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I completely agree: I think it is absolutely right that the more money you have, the more negotiating power you have and the more you can diversify risk and all the rest of it. But part of what I am worried about is this: how is anybody going to prove to the regulator that they will have £25 billion of assets under management by 2035? Surely that is an incredibly difficult thing to prove.

Patrick Heath-Lay: I do not want to be flippant in my response, but our scale already means that we are over that limit, so I have not really put too much thought into how they will do it. I believe that there is enough, within the business plans of entities that might be affected, to be able to make some reasonable assumptions as to what ongoing contributions will be coming through the door and how they will respond to some of the opportunities that may arise in this market over the next few years, from organisations that are choosing to move because of the extent of change that is coming.

I emphasise that I still think that the package of measures and that scale test is the right thing to instil that movement, because I think savers will be better off, provided that it is harnessed in the right way. That is why I come back to this: value for money is the proof point, and we need to make sure that we centre on that as an industry. Being able to evaluate how these changes have created a more competitive market in key areas going forward is really quite important.

[Torsten Bell]

Q This morning we heard from Legal and General and from Aviva on how they are planning to operationalise the requirements in the Bill on default drawdown products. I thought it would be good to give you the opportunity to answer the same question: how are you thinking about that within your organisation?

Ian Cornelius: It is one of the elements of the Bill that we very much welcome. I think guided retirement solutions are overdue. Certainly, our members have been opted into a retirement savings scheme, and they end up with a pot of money rather than an income. I think their expectation is an income. In fact, in the research we have done with our members, they say that the most important things for them are to have a sustainable income, confidence that it will not run out and an element of flexibility, because their circumstances can change very quickly in retirement. I think the guided retirement solution moves us in that direction.

At NEST, we have been working on this for some time, as we recognise that it is a core issue for our members. We therefore want to introduce a guided retirement solution—it is very much a work in progress—that delivers that sustainable income, but also gives them a guarantee that it will not run out. That will be some sort of deferred annuity, purchased probably when they are 75, to kick in when they are 85. We are actively working on that and will be looking to introduce it in 2027, aligning with the expectation in the Bill.

Patrick Heath-Lay: It is very similar from our perspective. We should not underestimate how much onus the shift from final salary to DC has put on individual savers, in terms of the decision that they have to make, in a very complex world that they really do not understand. Even if you surface a lot of information, your constituents will still struggle to navigate those decision points. We also should not underestimate the onus they have taken on, in terms of the risk of their own fund, when you think about the productive finance agenda and other things here. I think it is absolutely the right move. It is a good development for us to bring about guided retirement journeys in a way that is either “Do it for me” or “Do it with me” for policyholders.

Similarly, we are thinking about drawdown and how we can facilitate or help people to understand the implications of the actions they may take with accessing their funds, and then, when they get to later life, some sort of deferred annuity as an approach. The really important aspect is the guidance and how we can help, but have certain obligations on ourselves, as providers, to make sure that we are accountable for the help that we are giving as we go through the process.

[Torsten Bell]

Q You have both been involved in the discussions with the industry on the wider move to private asset investments. As you talked about earlier, you are further along the journey than most. You know the numbers in the Mansion House accord. In lots of cases, I know you are planning to be significantly above those de minimis levels. Tell us a bit—for the industry as a whole, not just for your individual schemes—about how we should think about those numbers, as de minimis or as targets, or where people are going to be in 20 years’ time. In the end, that is what we are always thinking about; we are not thinking about the next five years.

Ian Cornelius: It is difficult to speak for the industry, but I can speak for NEST. At NEST, we are very committed to investing in private markets: 18% of our assets are invested in private markets, and 20% of our assets are invested in the UK.

[Torsten Bell]

And that compares to the Mansion House benchmarks of 10% and 5%.

Ian Cornelius: The Mansion House commitment is 10% into private markets, with half of that into the UK, so we are already well ahead.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Are you already doing that because you think that that is what is in savers’ interests?

Ian Cornelius: Absolutely. It is providing attractive returns, it diversifies risk and it also invests in the UK.

[Torsten Bell]

Q Given that you think that it is in savers’ interests to be well above the Mansion House targets, why have some people not got to those targets? Are they failing in their fiduciary duties? Why have they not got there yet?

Ian Cornelius: It is hard to speak for others, but scale is an important factor, as we have talked about. You need scale and sophistication to access these investment opportunities. NEST has that scale and is building that sophistication. It often involves quite innovative solutions and partnering. Partners want to partner with someone who has got scale and assets coming in at pace, and we have those things. There are some unique circumstances that have made it attractive for us. I will let Patrick speak for People’s, but it is on that journey as well.

Patrick Heath-Lay: Yes, we are, although we are much nearer the start of that journey. Again, it comes back to the scale point. Why is £25 billion or £30 billion about the right amount? Because it is about the right part that you can economically start investing in those items.

To answer your question, and to pick up a more general point, it is incredibly important that we work collaboratively on the issue, because, as an industry, there is not much point in us all sailing our own little boats around trying to find the right harbour to invest. There is a degree of collaboration that the industry, together with Government, can do to open up the opportunities where that investment needs to go and how it can be executed in the most efficient manner. The biggest risk with investing in private markets is that they are expensive. If the vehicles that are being used on a commercial basis are not sharing the economics of that investment well enough with savers, it will certainly not be an investment that we are interested in pursuing.

The other point is that putting down the foundations for this to be a pipeline of repeatable investment activity is critical. Because of its scale, NEST has got ahead of where we are today, but that is the phase we are in at People’s at the moment. There is over £1 billion a year from our scheme alone that will be invested in those markets on an ongoing basis. Given the scale that we are both experiencing, in terms of how we are scaling up, that will be an ever-increasing number, so it is important that we have reliable and very cost-effective routes by which we can deploy that capital.

Ian Cornelius: Going back to your original question, I think that the industry is moving in the right direction. The Mansion House accord had 17 signatories and we are seeing the right moves.

[Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)]

Q Default solutions are an important part of the Bill. I suspect that, for the more modest savers, they will colour the outcomes for a lot of their pensions. How can the final offer in that area be enhanced so that we get the best outcomes? What tweaks would you make to the Bill to ensure that we are looking after those with more modest incomes, around these final solutions?

Ian Cornelius: There is no doubt that there is detail to work through across the whole Bill. One of the really interesting areas will be the interaction of targeted support and default solutions. There is now a consultation on targeted support, being led by the Financial Conduct Authority. That opens up lots of opportunities to provide an enhanced level of support to people who cannot afford to take advice. The fact is that financial advice is only available to about 9% of the population. Nearly all our members cannot afford to take financial advice, so they need that enhanced level of support, either to check that they are making the right choices—“Is the default solution the right one for me?”—or because they might have circumstances that mean that they want to explore something different. Targeted support is very welcome, and we look forward to engaging with the Pensions Regulator and FCA in making that a reality and making it work for low and moderate earners.

Patrick Heath-Lay: I am probably going to sound quite boring, but this is an area in which value for money and making sure the solutions are developed in the right way to support consumers can be really quite effective.

[Mr Bedford]

Q Going back to the consolidation of small pots, have you any thoughts or comments on the timeframes involved in how that would be implemented, particularly in the context of the roll-out of the pensions dashboard, which has taken quite some time to be rolled out in the industry?

Patrick Heath-Lay: The Government have put forward a default consolidator model. We are completely supportive of that; we think it is the right solution to tidy up the 13 million small deferred pots that are out there and those that are being created on a daily basis. That model has been done with extensive consultation with the industry.

To go back to the first question, which was about all the different options that have been considered before, we do think that this is the right approach. A couple of things around it are critical. First, we need to make sure that the technical solutions—the IT capability or infrastructure—should be as efficient as possible. We are contributing to the various pieces of research being done at the moment to evaluate which models are in existence and ready to be utilised. There is no doubt that the dashboard will contain some elements that will be helpful, such as a pension finder, that will be helpful, and I suspect that they will utilise pieces of that technology. But I do think—and I suspect the conclusion will be—that we need something new. Some of the expertise in the industry can be leveraged. I suspect that that is expertise that our organisations can provide. Given that we have already addressed the big pension savings gap for savers, we can help to develop that model.

On whether the solution is doable within the timeframe, 2030 is a big ask, but we should have that target to go after. We should try to be in a position where default consolidators exist in the market, we are developing the solution and we are able to solve the problem, because the number of small pots being created almost daily by the industry is a big problem for savers.

Ian Cornelius: I agree with Patrick. It is a problem that needs fixing. We also support the default consolidator approach. The sequencing is sensible: we want scheme consolidation first and then small pots, because there is no point in going through the complexity of consolidating small pots before consolidating at the scheme level. Dashboards will help, but they will not solve the problem. A solution is required, because this is driving a lot of cost and a lot of complexity. It would be nice if it were sooner than 2030. Given the ambition of the Bill as a whole, I think that that is probably realistic, but it does need to come after scheme consolidation, as I say.

Patrick Heath-Lay: The requirements on those organisations that choose to apply to be default consolidators need to be of a good standard. Our organisations operate a single-pot model. Whenever anyone rejoins from a different employer, their money goes into exactly the same pension pot. That is not a common model across the industry. Things like that should be thought through when defining the requirements for being a consolidator. Those that wish to apply need to hit a good regulatory standard to ensure that value is delivered through those models.

[David Pinto-Duschinsky]

Q Patrick, we have heard loud and clear your message that getting the value for money framework right is at the core of this. The Bill aims to put that on a sound footing. Which elements are required to get it right? How do you think the Bill will help to build them up?

Patrick Heath-Lay: As a package, the Bill brings forward the concept of value for money in a general sense. We need to move the conversation in our industry, particularly the conversation around workplace pensions, to the subject of value. We are all here to deliver value for members. The bit that always gets a lot of conversation is what value really means, but you cannot walk past the three fundamental drivers of a pension proposition, which are the investment return we give our members, what we charge them for it, and how our service shows up for them, probably in those moments of truth when they need us for guidance. Those are the three core elements to value, which we should not walk past.

We see this as an incredibly important area. I certainly believe that we should try to get this right as an industry, as best we can, from day one, because I think that it will be an important measure that we—regulators, Government, everyone—will lean on to understand how these reforms are playing through.

As an organisation, we have led a pound-for-pound initiative that others have joined. We brought in expertise from Australia, which is about 20 years ahead of us, and brought together a group of providers that are effectively going to dry-run some value for money measures and utilise that concept to provide some findings to regulators and Government that will hopefully help the iteration of our value for money framework. We really do see this framework as an important area, and I would like to see those three elements at its core.

Ian Cornelius: The focus on value has to be the right thing for our members. That is what they care about; that is what we are here for. There is some complexity to work through, such as how you measure value and what timeline you measure it over. Quite lot of engagement is required. We are piloting and trialling it; we almost certainly will not get it right the first time. It will be important to make it as practical and simple as possible. As Patrick said, it has real potential, in combination with the rest of the Bill, to shift the focus from cost to value. In the past, there has undoubtedly been too much focus on cost and not enough on value.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q This is about people who do not get financial advice, which is the vast majority of people, and their understanding of pensions and what they are likely to get. On a DB scheme, you get an annual statement that says you will get x amount a month or x amount a year. On a DC scheme, it is more like, “This is your total pot.” As everybody’s circumstances are different, they have no idea what that might actually look like if they were to get it on a monthly basis. I appreciate your positive words about the guided retirement and the targeted support. Do you think there is potential in the future for moving towards ensuring people get that advice earlier, so they can ensure the sufficiency of their pot, as well as ensuring that they are making the right decisions when they take that pot?

Ian Cornelius: It is definitely desirable. One of the challenges with auto-enrolment is—it is a positive and a negative—that people are not engaged. Inertia has worked really well, but you have to work to engage them to make sure they are contributing the right amount, thinking about what they will need in retirement and thinking about their circumstances. For example, at NEST, only 40% of our members are registered with us online, so we have a really big job to play to engage more of them, get them to register, and get them accessing the tools and support that are available to deliver the best outcome for them. It is our fiduciary duty to do that. There is a lot more that we can, need and want to do in that space. Guided retirement is a big step forward. Targeted support would be helpful. There is a big challenge for the whole industry there.

Patrick Heath-Lay: I agree. As this unwinds, we should think a little bit more about how engagement will help. It certainly is a big driver. Both the introduction of these propositions and the guidance and targeted support we can provide through those processes will be important, but we also have to accept that even in the most mature economies’ pension systems, people still do not engage very closely on this. Even when they do, they find it incredibly difficult to interpret what they are being told. How many people can do good compound interest calculations, for example? It is sometimes mind-boggling what we expect people to know. There has to be more onus on us through those processes, as an industry, for the guidance that we provide and the obligation on us to enable effective, accountable support to be there. There is much more, and this Bill goes a long way to enable us to do that.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q In relation to investments and some of the stuff that was not invested in historically, if we are talking about renewable projects and affordable housing—things that, historically, pension funds have maybe not invested in—you said that investing in these projects is a problem for smaller companies until they build up that level of scale. Are there other barriers? Are there legislative barriers, or other barriers—maybe finding schemes to invest in—that you or other companies could do with additional help in overcoming?

Ian Cornelius: Having a strong pipeline of investable assets is key. There is no doubt about that. Patrick touched on this earlier: one other inhibitor has been cost. It is actually quite expensive to invest in private assets. One of the things that NEST does successfully is to drive that cost down, but that is a barrier. The focus on cost rather than value in the past made it harder. The Bill shifts the focus towards value, which will be really helpful. There are a number of challenges that the bigger you are, the easier it is to work through. The Bill as a whole will therefore definitely be helpful, but collaboration with Government and across industry should help to unlock more of those attractive private market opportunities.

Patrick Heath-Lay: I have previously discussed this with the Minister. There is a role for Government to play here. It was even acknowledged within the Mansion House accord that this is for the benefit of savers, and there is a role for all of us to play in finding those efficient routes to deploy that investment through. The problem right now is not whether there is investment to come; there is. The Mansion House accord has created that. There is a wall of capital potentially available. The issue is connecting it in the right way with the investable opportunities—not only the planning and whatever is needed to create those investment opportunities in the first place, but the routes of access and the investment vehicles used. There are further conversations to be had about how we can do that as an industry. Efficient deployment is probably the biggest challenge for us as an asset owner in ensuring that we are sharing that benefit back with members.

[John Milne]

Q Auto-enrolment is a great success story. It has certainly got lots more people investing in a pension than would have done otherwise. However, the fact remains that large numbers of them are nowhere near on course to have a reasonable pension in retirement. Small pot consolidation helps, but we have to admit that it is going to be a modest contribution to solving that problem. Do you think we are missing a trick in the Bill? Is there something else that could or should be there to help—or is that a job for another day?

Ian Cornelius: That is where we welcome the Pensions Commission. It has been set up to actively look at adequacy: what is right, and are people saving enough? There is no doubt that many people are not saving enough and there are a lot of people who are still excluded from retirement savings. There is a big issue and challenge with the self-employed. There is a challenge for the industry and the Government to work on, but the Pensions Commission creates the right environment to do that. Auto-enrolment has been a big success, but it is only a job half done. Completing that job through the Pensions Commission is incumbent upon the Government and industry.

[John Milne]

Q Is there anything you think should or could be in this Bill that would help?

Patrick Heath-Lay: I completely agree with what Ian just said. The review is the right way, and we need to look at the interaction between saving rates, state pension and the general economic conditions. One thing that we were concerned about with the Bill is this. There is a lot in here that is trying to create better value in the industry as a result of the transformation, but what we have very much seen over the last few years is the rise of retail consolidators, which encourage people to consolidate their lost pensions towards them and effectively put their pensions on their phone. They have taken control of that future. That is a positive thing in terms of people acting and doing something about the number of small pots they have. The issue is that the Bill ignores the rise of that market.

From our own research, we know people are consistently moving their pensions to these types of vehicles, which are much more expensive and, for an average earner, effectively mean that they will retire three or four years later than they could have done, because the value delivered through those models is not going to be anywhere near the level of the competitive workplace market as it operates today. We would like to see the extension of value for money and those types of issues into that market as soon as possible, as there are some bad outcomes where well-meaning people are trying to do the right things and do not understand the consequences of what they are doing. There is not sufficient obligation on providers in that market to make those people aware of the consequences of their actions.

Ian Cornelius: I wholly welcome the Bill. It will increase and improve standards across the workplace pensions market—but only across the workplace pensions market. The pensions landscape is already pretty complicated with contract-based schemes, trust-based schemes and personal pensions. Consumers do not understand the differences between those—and why should they? The fact that the changes only apply to workplace schemes, and that things such as value for money do not apply across personal pensions, is an issue for consumers. They will be confused and will not necessarily make the right decisions. We need to think about how the landscape can be equalised and made as simple and clear as possible for consumers.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. That completes the questions from Members. I thank the witnesses for their attendance and evidence this afternoon.

Examination of Witness

Tim Fassam gave evidence.

15:30

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Tim Fassam, director of public affairs at Phoenix Group. We have until 3.45 pm for this panel. Will the witness please briefly introduce himself for the record?

Tim Fassam: I am Tim Fassam from Phoenix Group. We are one of the country’s leading pension and long-term savings providers. We look after about £290 billion for our 12 million customers across a range of brands, most famously for Standard Life. We are a major player in the workplace automatic enrolment market as well as the bulk-purchase annuity market for DB schemes. We are also proud of our history as a consolidator of historical private pensions.

We have been passionate about the investment agenda. Our chairman, Sir Nicholas Lyons, took a year out of being chairman of Phoenix to be Lord Mayor, and the Lord Mayor who co-ordinated the Mansion House compact, which we were supportive of. We were also heavily involved in the development of the Mansion House accord. In order to facilitate that, we worked with the leading asset manager Schroders to create a joint venture called Future Growth Capital to deliver private market investments that are specifically designed for the pension market. We have made an initial commitment of £2.5 billion to that and are looking to invest up to £10 billion over the next five years. This is an agenda that we think is incredibly important, and we are very supportive of the focus that Parliament is giving this Bill.

[The Chair]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I want to ask about the value for money framework. There seem to be a lot of fans of the value for money framework. Are Phoenix as enthusiastic about it as everyone else seems to be, if that is not too loaded a question?

Tim Fassam: The short answer is yes, we are big fans of the value for money framework, but it is worth thinking about why that is. When we are looking at why we have not had the investment that we would necessarily expect, and that we see in other similar countries—so, exposure to private markets and exposure to productive assets—we think there are roughly three groups of reasons. Some are cultural and have been helped by things such as the accord and the compact. Some are regulatory, and that will be a major topic of conversation in this Committee. But some are market, and the market challenges are really around who is the buyer of automatic enrolment pensions. That is usually the employer.

Historically, we have seen most employers focus on the charge, and the charge alone. That means we are now seeing charges well below the price charge cap for automatic enrolment, which is a good thing for consumers, but it is at such a low level that it is very hard to offer more enhanced investment solutions, so that means they tend to be invested in more passive investments and trackers. The value for money framework is important because it should have an impact on those purchasers, making it easier for them to see a more holistic view of the value that they are getting from the pension that is being offered to them, in terms of investment, service and a wider range of metrics. We are not sure it is perfect, as currently developed, but it is certainly in the right direction.

[Mark Garnier]

Q There was an interesting intervention yesterday from the Reform party about local government pensions. I know that is not necessarily part of what we are talking about now, but they made the point that 50 basis points is way too much to charge for assets under management and that it should be 10 basis points instead. You raise exactly that point, which is that it is not about how much you are being charged, but about a combination of that and the performance and how much you are growing. I am 100% behind that particular point, because it makes a huge amount of sense, but one of the things that slightly bothers me is about the metric data. It looked at the quality of service provided to members, which is a nice thing to have—it is about whether you are looked after properly—but it is a marketing type of thing. Slightly more important are the investment performance and the cost, and also the asset classes that the scheme or arrangement invests in.

Where I begin to get slightly confused is that it then switches to member satisfaction surveys. I am curious as to what the member is. You raised the very good point that the customer is the business, but that is not the same as the member. Who is being asked whether they are investing in the right assets? That is quite a technical question by the time you start looking all of this. Can you see that there are anomalies and Gordian knots within this?

Tim Fassam: There is certainly a lot of detail to be worked through. That will include understanding the impact of all these factors. For example, investment return will be an incredibly important part of the value-for-money framework. It is very hard to do forward-looking investment return analysis, but if you do backward-looking, you cement the best of what we have today. The premise of the Bill is that we want to see a different investment pattern going forward. It will be very hard to, say, model a higher allocation to private markets in a forward-looking metric unless we have some creative thinking. Getting those investment metrics right is absolutely critical.

Service does matter to customers in terms of how easy it is to deal with and how much support they are getting to make good investment decisions. That will have a significant impact. When you combine it with things like the potential for targeted support, that could make a very significant difference in terms of the outcomes that the consumers get. We always think of the end customer being the individual. We have a close and important working relationship with the employer, and they are often working with employee benefit consultants to choose their scheme, but the most important stakeholder in all of this is the end user. We want them to get the best possible result to help them prepare for retirement.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I have one final question. Various clauses look at the asset manager and the trustees effectively marking their own homework on this. There are consequences of an intermediate rating, consequences of a “not delivering” rating and various other issues. Is that the best way of doing it? To a certain extent, the managers and the trustees have a vested interest in doing well.

Tim Fassam: We are certainly concerned about the intermediate rating and the risk that that could cause a cliff edge if it means that, to get an intermediate rating, you are effectively closed for new business and potentially existing new joiners for a new firm. We think an intermediate rating that aligns with delivering value, but with a warning light that gives the firm a couple of years to get back into high value for money, will stop the perverse consequences. What I mean by perverse consequences is that if the cost of underperformance is significantly higher than the benefit of outperformance, you will see everyone herding in the middle. That will mean that you may well get a better outcome than today, but you will not get the competitive pressure to be the best of the best, which I think will see the better outcome in the longer term.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Very quickly, if you get an intermediate rating, is it published?

Tim Fassam: Your value for money rating will be published.

[Mark Garnier]

Q So you could run into the same problems that we saw recently where the Financial Ombudsman Service was publishing who has been under investigation, which caused problems. That has now been changed, but we could be entering into that same problem.

Tim Fassam: If you see very strong market or regulatory consequences for hitting an intermediate rating, the focus will be on not being intermediate rather than on being the best that you can be. We would like to see a focus on delivering the best value for money that you can.

[Luke Murphy]

Q In your written evidence, the Phoenix Group encourages Parliament to reassess some of the timelines for the initiatives to ensure that there is sufficient time for market participants to respond in the interests of members and consumers. However, you also advocate for bringing forward the 2030 timeline for small pots and extending its scope to all pension schemes. How do you reconcile those two comments? Could you elaborate on why you think the deadline should be brought forward for small pots and extended? What are some of the barriers or challenges that might make the Government reluctant to take up your suggestion?

Tim Fassam: That is a very good question. One of the things that makes the Bill powerful but more complex is the number of elements that interact. Eventually, we hope, it makes the whole greater than the sum of its parts, but it does mean it is critical that you get the ordering right. For example, we need the value for money framework and transfer without consent as soon as possible, so that we are able to get in good shape for the 2030 scale test—so those deadlines brought forward. Small pots are part of that scale: we are seeing thousands of new small pots generated every year, so the quicker we can get on with managing small pots, the fewer of them there will be for us to manage going forward.

It is critical to think very carefully about the staging and phasing of the various elements of the Bill. That is the point we are trying to make. On the elements that help the market get to where we hope to get to by 2030, we need to get in as swiftly as possible, with enough time after the detail is in place for the industry to implement. I appreciate it looks like we are asking for things to be slowed down and sped up, but it is just making sure the ordering is correct and we have enough time to get into good shape for that 2030 deadline.

We think the scope should be extended partly because of how supportive we are of the measures. Being a historical consolidator of private pensions, we have millions of customers who are not workplace customers but who could benefit from being transferred into a more modern, larger scale scheme and from going into a consolidator of small pots, for example. We see that value in our own book. We look at the opportunity and think, “We wish we could do that for this group of customers. They would really benefit.”

The pensions market is quite complex, as others have pointed out. It is contract-based and trust-based. You also have workplace and private pensions. The more consistent we can be across all the different types of customer, who often do not think of themselves as being any different from each other, the more coherent a scheme we are likely to get at the end result.

[Luke Murphy]

Q What would be the challenges of that extension and scope?

Tim Fassam: We see it predominantly as opportunity. We are not saying that the rules necessarily need to change. We are just saying these new opportunities should be extended to a wider group of available schemes, but the infrastructure we are putting in place regarding workplace auto-enrolment savers can be utilised across the piece.

[Steve Darling]

Q The bar for small pots is currently set at £1,000. Is that ambitious enough? Should it be £2,000? £5,000? Or is it a matter of eating an elephant and having to be sensible about what is achievable?

Tim Fassam: I think eating an elephant is a very good way of putting it. I think £1,000 is certainly a good place to start. This will be an incredibly valuable part of the pensions ecosystem, but it will be complex and getting it right will require a lot of thought and a lot of close working between Government regulators and industry. Having that narrow and focused scope allows us to get it in place and get it working; then it would be perfectly reasonable to look at the level at a later date. For the time being, I think that is a very clear cohort of individuals who are likely to benefit from consolidation, because at the moment they are in uneconomic pools.

[The Chair]

I call Kirsty Blackman. Very quickly, please.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q In relation to private assets and the investment in them, is the balance between carrots and sticks correct in the Bill, or should more carrots, for example, be provided to encourage that investment?

Tim Fassam: That is another very good question. As the previous witnesses said, it is important to ensure that there is a pipeline of assets coming to us. A lot of what the Government are doing with the national wealth fund and the British Business Bank is helping with that. We would like to see—we would say this, wouldn’t we?—a little more focus on insurance versus banks. Banks are a vital form of capital—I am absolutely not suggesting they are not—but there is a skew towards banks. A few more insurance experts in the national wealth fund, and ensuring we have that pipeline of investable assets, could be valuable.

We are very lucky in the UK that we have fantastic start-ups, and amazing universities that are generating brilliant ideas. What we really need is scale-up capital. At the moment, about 70% of firms that need major scale-up capital go overseas for it, and then their head office moves. We need to make sure that we have an attractive environment for those firms to stay in the UK, and that is where scale comes in. A number of witnesses have talked about the benefits of economies of scale and professional asset management capability. That is absolutely right; they are critical benefits. One of the less discussed benefits is if you want to—

[The Chair]

Order. I apologise for the interruption, but that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions of this witness. On behalf of the Committee, I thank the witness for their evidence this afternoon.

Examination of Witnesses

Michelle Ostermann and Morten Nilsson gave evidence.

15:45

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Michelle Ostermann, chief executive officer of the Pension Protection Fund, and Morten Nilsson, executive director and CEO of Brightwell. We have until 4.15 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Morten Nilsson: I am the CEO of Brightwell. We administer 380,000 members and about £35 billion of assets. Our largest client is the BT pension scheme, which we manage end to end.

Michelle Ostermann: I am the chief executive of the Pension Protection Fund. We were created by legislation in 2004; we have been in existence for 20 years. We manage a little less than Brightwell does, £30 billion. We are effectively a monitor of the entire DB system. We protect and backstop £1 trillion in it, pay compensation to almost half a million members, and enable the industry in general.

[Mark Garnier]

Q The Bill provides for surplus extraction from funds. Do you see that as a good or a bad thing?

Morten Nilsson: I see it as a good thing. I think it will change the pension industry quite a bit as a positive innovation. Closed DB schemes, which we focus on, might be seen more as an asset for sponsors, rather than a liability that they would like to get rid of as quickly as possible. I think that it will create quite a lot of innovation, and a lot of good things will come out of that.

[Mark Garnier]

Q For defined-benefit pension funds?

Morten Nilsson: Yes.

[Mark Garnier]

Q One of the questions around that is what drives a removal. We heard from previous witnesses that if a host employer puts in more money than is necessary, it seems perfectly reasonable for them to get some of that back. In some cases, that money could be used for investment in plant and machinery to expand the employer, but at the other end of the scale it could be used for share buy-backs to enhance the share price of the employer. Do you think it matters what happens to the money that is being withdrawn from these pension schemes, or should that be up to the host company?

Morten Nilsson: I see it pretty much as you described. The main duty of the sponsors and the trustees is to ensure that there is enough money in the scheme to pay the benefits that were promised to members. If there are excess funds, it is reasonable that they can be invested back into the economy. In May, we surveyed 100 finance directors who are responsible for schemes with over £500 million of assets: 93% of them said that they would want to access the surplus, 49% said they would reinvest it in their local business, in the UK, to create jobs and do other good things, 44% said they would consider sharing it with members, 42% said they would invest it in their global operations, 40% said they would pay it back to shareholders, and 33% would invest it in DC. That is quite a wide range of uses. I think some of it will be paid back to shareholders, which may be local or abroad, but I expect a lot of it would be invested back into the UK economy in one way or another.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Michelle, you run the compensation scheme. Do you see any risk in surplus extraction? I know that by definition, it is surplus and therefore you should be able to take it out, but at the moment, a lot of funds are in surplus. We went through a period of low interest rates, where it was a bit tricky, but now interest rates have gone up, and suddenly those funds are in a lot of surplus. We are probably not going to see interest rates come down to super-low levels anytime soon—well, who knows? If the economy does particularly badly, they may well do. My first question is, do you see any increased risk as a result of this? You are presumably looking at the risk of having to pay out. Secondly, should the benchmark be slightly higher for surplus distribution?

Michelle Ostermann: Obviously, just as you describe, because we backstop the entire industry, what we are watching most closely is the fundedness of schemes, combined with the credit quality or the covenant, and the financial stability of the organisation itself. Those two combined are what help us to assess industry-wide risk and determine how much reserve we need to set aside for future claims on the PPF.

There is a spectrum of schemes out there, clearly—some that are very well funded, which you have been speaking of, and several that are not as well funded. On that spectrum, our focus is on the left side tail—the ones that are most underfunded, or nearing the potential to be underfunded. Given the measures that are being discussed for the release of surplus, we at the PPF feel comfortable with it not imposing a material amount of risk to us, as it is currently defined. It seems to find a nice prudent balance between allowing some flexibility for sponsors to use that money in hopefully a productive way, combined with the test to make sure they do not fall below a certain level, which would bring risk upon the industry and the PPF. We have been a constant participant in that conversation, and we would like to suggest that we will continue to play that role as a surveyor of the net residual impact to the industry.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Do you stress test the pensions industry in the same way as the Bank of England stress tests the banking system?

Michelle Ostermann: Yes—it is very similar.

[Mark Garnier]

And you war game it?

Michelle Ostermann: Yes. The biggest variable that we have a hard time predicting in those scenarios is the likelihood of this being used and the manner in which it is used, but we test deep into the tail. We try several scenarios that give us a high probability of it being abused or overused, and the opposite, and we have come out with pretty strong confidence. As it is defined today, we feel comfortable.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I must ask a question that is perhaps a self beat-up, if you like. There was a disastrous mini-Budget a few years ago under a different Prime Minister—of course, at the time, we got rid of our bad leaders. Did you stress test a scenario such as that?

Michelle Ostermann: Not here in the UK, but as you can tell by my accent, I am not a local. I worked in Canada for most of my career, at two of the largest Canadian “Maple Eight” pension plans, and those are things that we would assess quite regularly. In fact, the open DB schemes here in the UK function very similarly to those in Canada. I joined the PPF in large part because it is a mini-version of the Canadian model. It is exceptionally similar, to me. You will notice that during the liquidity crisis that occurred it was the liability-driven investment strategies, with the degree of leverage, that were most at risk, and it was interest rate-sensitive. Those open DB schemes that were using a more balanced degree of risk, including some equity risk, were unencumbered. It was Railpen, which I worked for when I was here previously. I was phoning back to my peers both there and at the universities superannuation scheme and PPF, and they all withstood that very well.

[Mark Garnier]

Q So while we were all running around like headless chickens trying to figure out what was going on, you were saying, “We told you so. We knew that was going to happen.”

Michelle Ostermann: It is definitely something that was on our radar. When we build the investment strategy for an open DB scheme, such as those I described, it is quite different and less susceptible to that type of risk.

[Steve Darling]

Q I seek some clarification from Michelle. At the moment, there is a fee extracted to support your organisation. What if that fee were ceased?

Michelle Ostermann: I assume you are speaking of our levy?

[Steve Darling]

Yes.

Michelle Ostermann: We have several types of levies that support our organisation. If I may, I will just take a step back to help everyone to understand what role they play.

The PPF is not terribly well understood because we are a bit unique in this industry and there are only half a dozen bodies like us in the world. The UK is one of the few countries that have a protection fund such as this. In some ways we back as an insurer in that we collect premiums or levies from the industry from the 5,000 corporate DB schemes and backstop 9 million potential future members that still sit in those schemes. We collect the levies and hold them in reserve much like an insurance company. We are not an insurance company, but we do so much like they would mathematically and with similar models.

At the same time, if a corporation fails, we take its pension scheme, which is usually underfunded, and its orphan members and put them into a pension scheme. We are both a pension manager and an insurer of sorts. When there is a failure and a scheme comes to us with insufficient assets to make good on its pension liabilities, we take some of our reserves almost as a claim, and move them over to the pension fund so that it is fully funded at all times using a largely liability-driven investment-type strategy. The levies that we collect are twofold: first we collect a levy related to the risk of the industry. You may be familiar with our purple book and the industry-wide assessment we do. We monitor the risk of that entire complicated £1 trillion industry to decide how much to set aside as reserves.

Our reserves are often referred to as a surplus, but they are not a surplus; they are reserves sitting there for potential claims in 50, 80 or 100 years. We will be the last man standing in this industry. We are here as an enduring and perpetual solution. As long as there is DB in the industry, we will have to backstop it. We set aside those reserves for the 9 million members and current £1 trillion in case of future market environments that we cannot predict today. Those levies have been collected over 20 years from the constituents of that industry. We have collected just over £10 billion from that levy system and have paid out £9.5 billion of it as claims to the pension fund.

As those levies were coming in over that 20-year period we were investing them in an open DB growth-type strategy. As such, we have built up £14 billion of reserves and so now consider ourselves largely self-funding. We no longer need to collect that levy from the industry now that those reserves are sitting there—in so far as we can best tell with our models today. We prefer to reserve the right to turn it back on should we need it in the case of a market correction event, some unforeseen circumstance or an evolution in the industry. However, right now, those fees are no longer required by us; it is a risk assessment that is suggesting that.

[Mr Bedford]

Q Building on Steve’s question on the levy, some hon. Members have asked about surplus extraction feeding into the overall risk profile in the markets. Clearly, if that was to happen and there was perceived to be an increased risk, it could result in an increase in the levy. The Bill allows for the levy to be reduced to zero. What are your thoughts about that?

Michelle Ostermann: We have thought a fair bit about that. We do not see very many scenarios in which we would need to turn it on, although it is always difficult to predict. As you know, the industry evolves in many ways and over the 20 years we have seen quite an evolution, including the creation of new alternative covenant schemes and commercial consolidators. We will backstop those as well, and we will need to charge a levy for them. There could be an unforeseen market event, similar to that just described, so we need the ability to turn the levy back on—simply to keep it as a lever. Today, the legislation reads that if we were to lower it to 0%, we can only increase it year on year by 25%. However, 25% of zero is zero, so we are a bit cornered. We have asked for a measure that would allow us to increase it by as much as a few hundred million a year. The most we have ever charged in one year was just over £500 million.

As I said, we have collected £10 billion gradually over many years. The new measure allows us to increase it by no more than 25% of the ceiling number every year, which is currently £1.4 billion. That means we could go up as much as £350 million in a single year, if needs be. However, we are a very patient long-term investor. Even though we are taking on closed corporate DB schemes, we run it as if we were an open scheme, because we are open to new members all the time. As such, our investment strategy does most of the heavy lifting for our organisation now.

On our £14 billion reserves, we make over £1 billion a year in gains from that investment strategy, which funds the £1 billion we pay out in the pension scheme to members. We are now a mature organisation that should be able to maintain a steady state. The most we would be able to increase the levy by in one year is £350 million, but we would expect to be patient, wait a few years, and try to ride out the situation not needing it, only turning it back on should we need it. We consult before we turn it on and we take a lot of feedback on this. We are quite thoughtful, as we have always been, and I hope people agree.

[Mr Bedford]

Q I am just interested in examples of recent shocks that have happened, where you had to pay out significant sums and what those sums were.

Michelle Ostermann: The biggest example is a macroeconomic shock that would affect the solvency of corporations. The failure of the corporation itself is more likely to have an impact than just a change in interest rates or equity markets. The change in interest rates can affect the fundedness of a scheme, but many of those schemes, over 75% of them now, are actually really well funded. And they have pretty well locked down their interest rate risk because they have put a good chunk of assets against their liabilities in a fairly tight hedge. Although we saw, as a result of the liquidity crisis a few years ago now, that things can change. The degree of risk, specifically leverage risk inside some of those strategies, does make them fallible. I would say the biggest shocks would be massive interest rate movements that are unforeseen, a very significant macroeconomic environment causing failure in many corporations, and technically, even a significant move in equity markets, but we would usually just ride that out. Markets can go down 20% or 30%. We would only go down 10% or 15% and we would be able to recover that in under five years, historically speaking.

[John Milne]

Q It has been a long-standing battle over pre-1997 compensation rights. Would you agree that this Bill is perhaps an opportunity to at last address that issue, perhaps by a judicious amendment or two? Do you think that that is feasible, and what framework might that take?

Michelle Ostermann: We have been progressing on this quite a bit lately. It is one of the most prevalent discussions, both with our board and with our members. We speak very often with the entirety of the industry. Several are very strong advocates for it as well, a few of which are here today, and we have taken quite a bit of humble feedback. We have worked as best we can with the Work and Pensions Committee to estimate a significantly complex set of potential scenarios for making good on historical indexation needs for pre-’97. They range in price, are quite expensive and would require us to incur or crystallise a liability. They are not cheap. It would be difficult for both us and the Government to be able to afford. The taxpayer would have an implication to some of these, depending on how they are formed, and it is beyond our prerogative to make that decision but we have been facilitating and encouraging it to be made. We would welcome progress on that. I understand, in fact, an amendment was tabled earlier today in that regard, so I was warmed by that.

[John Milne]

Q The DWP argues that the funds are on the public balance sheet and therefore they object to using them for this purpose. Do you think that is fair, given that the funds were not acquired by the taxpayer?

Michelle Ostermann: To clarify the word “using”, as I think it is important, the PPF is an arm’s length body and those assets are ringfenced. Our board has independence over those. It was set up that way—arm’s length—20 years ago to make sure that it was a dedicated protection fund for that industry. It so happens that we do fall under some of the fiscal measures, so both our assets and liabilities do show. However, there is a bit of a conflict there in that we manage them in the prudent, almost in a trusteed fashion, on behalf of our members and all of our stakeholders. But the use of them would have to be prescribed by the board, legislated, and then approved by the board for its affordability, so as to not put at risk the rest of the industry that we are backstopping.

The ability for us to be able to afford that and the risk to the organisation is the primary, most sacrosanct thing that our board does. We have very complicated actuarial models to figure out the affordability of all the risks that we take on in the entire industry. That is why we have gone through quite a bit of work to build, just recently, a much more sophisticated model to estimate both the asset and liability implication to us and have even started to form a plan for how we might implement it. So we stand at the ready, but it is beyond our responsibility to be able to legislate the necessary change for it.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

Q Given the international experience that both of you have in this realm, I am interested to know whether there is either anything in the Bill that you think is a red flag or anything that you think is a missed opportunity and not in the legislation in front of us today.

Michelle Ostermann: That is fascinating. I came to the UK, and back to the UK, because I have so much enthusiasm for the UK and the pension system. I am very fortunate to be the chair of the global pension industry association, so I study pension systems around the world and am quite familiar with many of them. The UK pension system is the second largest in the world by size if you include underfunded pensions. It is one of the most sophisticated, but it is the second most disaggregated. As I think a few of my peers mentioned before we got up here, it has fallen behind, frankly. I think the motives that are in this Bill are exceptionally important—they are foundational. I love that we are speaking on scale and sophistication. These are absolutely key, in both DB and DC. I want to underscore that; it is really key.

One thing that is not spoken of quite as much is the concept of an asset owner and the importance of governance. In relation to the successful countries that I have seen, which have mastered the art of pensions and the ability to translate pensions into growth, it is not a proven model, but there is a best practice such that countries are able to make growth by leveraging pension systems. I think that right now we are trying to solve a problem of two things: reshaping the pension system and trying to solve the need for a growth initiative. They are one thing in my mind; they really are one thing. It is not a surprise that as we have de-risked the pension system over two decades, it has, I suspect, quite directly, but at least indirectly, affected overall economic growth.

Making members wealthier pensioners in general and less dependent on social services is what many countries are trying to do and use their pension systems for. I see that out of the commission that is being started, so I am most excited about the next phase. I think there is a lot of potential, and we at the PPF are doing quite a bit of research and want to be able to feed some global ideas into that.

Morten Nilsson: I come from Denmark originally and I think, to echo some of what Michelle said, scale just matters in pensions. The Danish pension industry has been fortunate to have few and relatively large schemes. One of the things I saw when I came over to the UK 15 years ago was that the industry here is very fragmented, and that fragmentation means also that there are so many conflicts of interest in the market. That in a way makes it quite hard to get the best outcomes, and that of course leads into the governance models that Michelle talks about. So this Bill is something we very much welcome across what it is covering. I think it is a really good initiative, but I think scale matters, and governance really matters. I would not underestimate how big a change it is, in the defined benefit sector, that we are moving from two decades of worrying about deficit into suddenly worrying about surpluses and having very mature schemes, which is the other thing that is important. Most of the DB schemes are closed.

If I talk about the BT pension scheme, the average age is 71, so they are pretty old members and that means there is a risk level, from an investment perspective, that really matters. We are paying out £2.8 billion a year in member benefits. That means liquidity is really important. It is really important that we have the money to pay the members and that we do not end up being a distressed seller of assets.

So there is quite a lot in that evolution we are on, and when we go into surplus management or excess funds—Michelle was talking about this at macro level; we would be managing at our micro level in each scheme— I think it becomes really critical that we have the right governance to manage what is a new era. I would really recommend that the Pensions Regulator issue guidance as soon as possible on all this, because it will be quite uncomfortable for a lot of trustees. It will be quite difficult also for the advisers in how we manage this new era.

[David Pinto-Duschinsky]

Q I am really glad that you both mentioned governance, because that absolutely stands at the heart of this. You also mentioned conflicts. We have not talked much about the role of consultants and things like that, but it is clear that you think the framework laid out by the Bill will be helpful and a key part of mobilising those things.

Conversations that I have had also flag up the importance of culture among trustees. We can give people the tools, the powers and the permission to invest, and we can be clear in the framework we set up, but, culturally, they may still be very risk averse. Of course, some of that is appropriate because they have to safeguard member benefits, but there is a point about whether they are overly cautious and about how one creates the appropriate culture to go with the change. From your perspective, what is needed to create the right culture to go alongside the right governance?

Michelle Ostermann: I have one small observation from when I first came to the UK. I recognise that there is a very strong savings culture, but not necessarily an investment culture, and there is a distinct difference there. I even notice the difference when we talk about productive finance targets. We speak in terms of private assets, but there is a difference between private equity and private debt, and between infrastructure equity and infrastructure lending. All those lending capabilities are here in this country. I feel that the debt sophistication is strong, but where it lacks is the equity.

I am a Canadian. With one of the largest Canadian schemes, we had no problem coming in and buying up assets here in the UK—you may have noticed. We own a lot of it, and with Australia, most of it. The supply was never an issue for us. We brought the scale and sophistication, but what we did not have was a local British anchor. We did not have an anchor investor. We did not have a home-grown Ontario Teachers, a Canada Pension Plan or even an ATP that we could use as the local one. I see that the PPF, NEST and Brightwell can be that. We are still not megafunds. I know that we are referred to as behemoths and megafunds at £30 billion and £60 billion, but the peers with £100 billion, £200 billion and £500 billion are those that are putting in £0.5 billion or £1 billion in one investment. They are not lending, but investing.

That is the biggest difference I notice: the definition of scale and the degree of sophistication. It is even about sophistication in the governance model, and having a board and a management team with that sophistication. It is about having a management team with some power that you are hiring out of investment, and being a not-for-profit and an arm of the Government that is allowed to put in that sophisticated capability, with a board that can properly oversee it so it is not done without proper consideration.

Morten Nilsson: I think it is quite critical that you have trustee boards that are supported well by regulation and guidance, as we talked about before. It would also be helpful to start to focus on the management teams that are supporting the trustees. Cultural change is always very difficult. We must acknowledge that we are coming out of a situation that was really quite difficult for a lot of trustees and sponsors in terms of finding out how to fix the big deficits that schemes had. We must acknowledge that that is where we are coming from and that is the mentality we have had for decades. Regulation and guidance is still all over the place, and we must work through how we move that forward. I really recommend more guidance from TPR and, sooner rather than later, more guidance on surplus extraction. That would help a lot of trustees to take more risk and think in a more balanced way about risks.

Of course, if we are considering allowing excess funding to go back, we need to ensure that we are doing that on a prudent and well-considered basis. It is an educational challenge more than anything, but it is also about the advisers. The market really needs to get comfortable with investing for the longer term. Within that, it is critical that we move away from being obsessed with a mark-to-market, day-to-day obligation. We measure our liabilities on one day of the year and then we might panic if there is a little swing in the market, but we are actually working through quite a long horizon and therefore we can smooth that out in a different way. We need to think about how we look through some of these blips.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We will move to the next panel. Thank you very much indeed.

Examination of Witnesses

Chris Curry and William Wright gave evidence.

16:15

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Chris Curry, director of the Pensions Policy Institute, and William Wright, managing director of New Financial. We have until 4.45 pm for this panel. Would the witnesses kindly introduce themselves?

Chris Curry: Good afternoon. My name is Chris Curry, and I am director of the Pensions Policy Institute. The PPI is the leading UK research organisation working in pensions and retirement income, with a remit to provide an evidence base, analysis and data across all pensions issues.

William Wright: Good afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today. My name is William Wright. I am the founder and managing director of New Financial, a think-tank that makes the case for bigger and—crucially—better capital markets across the UK and Europe.

[The Chair]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Obviously, the most controversial part of the Bill is mandation—or rather, reserved powers for mandation; I am corrected by the Minister, who is flashing me interesting looks. Why do you think it is that Canadian pension funds are investing more into UK assets than British pension funds are—without being mandated?

Chris Curry: We heard a little about that from the previous witness, who I think also has first-hand experience of the Canadian investment models, but there are a number of different reasons. First, there is the aggregation in the system that was talked about; the UK has a very fragmented pensions system. There are a number of different large sectors, but each large sector is not large internationally speaking. Scheme maturity, scheme size and scale generally are a factor. Very few individual schemes have the scale and the amount of assets to invest large-scale in some of the UK opportunities in the way that Canadian schemes have invested on a large scale—as has been said. Half a billion pounds to £1 billion in a single investment is very large by UK standards, compared with the size of schemes.

There is also, because of that lack of scale, a lack of development of the expertise required by some of those specialists—sophistication has also been mentioned—across some of the different individual schemes that we have in the UK. If you are larger, you can afford to have those specialist management teams or specialists on the board. It is not such a proportionate cost as it would be to a relatively small scheme.

Cost is another factor. As we heard from previous witnesses, in the UK a lot of focus on schemes has been on the cost of providing a scheme; in the workplace especially, by default a lot of competition is based on cost. With some of the opportunities we are talking about, especially in productive finance, in the UK space, investing in the UK would come at a high cost, so there is less scope for that cost to be absorbed in an overall larger fund. A lot of the things that the Bill is trying to address are probably some of the reasons why we have not seen that UK investment up until this point.

[Mark Garnier]

Q A previous witness, Michelle Ostermann, made two really interesting related points. One is that, having derisked the UK pensions industry, there is not the appetite to make some of these investments. The second is that other countries are much better at leveraging their pensions industries in order to promote economic growth. Is that something you have looked at, William?

William Wright: Certainly on the derisking side, while we are blessed to have the second or third largest pool of pensions assets in the world, the structure of our pensions system—the fact that so many DB schemes have closed or are running off—means that the overall risk appetite simply is not there. There is a danger in this debate of comparing the outcomes that we see in different types of pension fund systems around the world and thinking, “We like the look of that. Can we have a bit of that, please?” I am simplifying here, but we tend not to be too keen on looking at the inputs and the decisions, often taken 20, 30 or 40 years ago in different markets around the world, that have helped to lead to the development of those systems as they are today. The Canadian public sector defined-benefit model did not happen overnight. Michelle knows the history of it better than I do, but it goes well back into the 1980s. That is why so many of the aspects of the Bill should be welcomed. They look at the fundamental drivers of what will help to define pension fund outcomes for members and the structure of our system in 10, 20 or 30 years’ time.

On how other systems think about pension systems in relation to growth and economic wellbeing in their domestic markets, one of the things that we found particularly striking is that when you compare DC pensions in the UK with DC systems in other countries, or public sector DB in the UK with public sector DB in other countries, there tends to be, for DC pensions in other countries, a higher domestic bias. There tends to be more investment, whichever way you look at it, in their domestic equity market than we see from UK DC pensions in the UK equity market. You also see, almost universally, higher levels of investment in private markets. So much of that comes back to scale. Scale is a threshold—it is not enough on its own—and then there is the sophistication, governance and skillset that needs to be built over many years on top of that.

[Mark Garnier]

Q On this derisking thing, a number of investment managers over the years have pointed out to me that the rules were brought in as a result of Maxwell absconding and taking a lot of money out of his pension fund. Deficits are now placed on to the balance sheet of the host company, which means that the inclination of those companies is to prefer those pension funds to be invested in less volatile assets, not equity markets, where you can have a stock market crash one day as a minor correction in a long-term growth market. Do you think that is the kind of thing that Michelle was referring to in talking about derisking, where legislation that was well-intentioned at the time has had perverse outcomes?

William Wright: Yes. As a number of witnesses have mentioned today, because of the structure of the UK pension fund industry, there are many different perspectives, often not entirely aligned, shall we say, with each other. Every participant in the industry has responded perfectly rationally to the incentives in front of them and the regulation behind them in their investment behaviour and risk profile. International accounting standards, rather than just UK standards, have helped to drive that in the private sector. We have seen similar derisking in other corporate DB pension systems around the world. It has been an entirely rational response. It is really interesting to see which elements of which markets around the world seem to have found a more positive response. Canadian public sector DB, the closest comparison to LGPS in this country, is one example. Others are Australian DC or some of the Nordic models—the Swedish and Danish DC models.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Chris, following on from the points about derisking and all the rest of it, we heard from Phoenix a little earlier about the value for money framework. Everybody seems to agree that the framework is a good thing because it is going to drive better performance and all the rest of it, with one exception, expressed by Phoenix: the consequences of an intermediate rating. It is one of those difficult things where you seek mediocrity rather than going for good performance. Do you think that is a valid criticism of that particular part of an otherwise welcome part of the Bill?

Chris Curry: First, I agree that we have seen lots of positive response to the value for money framework. Looking across international examples—Australia, in particular—it seems as if it will be very welcome in trying to ensure that, as part of the consolidation and what is potentially coming with the next Pensions Commission, with more investment going into UK pensions, that investment is going into a place that is actually going to work on behalf of the members who are investing their money. That is really important in what we are doing. I would also echo some of the views we heard earlier that it is really important in moving away from just a cost-based analysis of pensions and into value, and in looking at the whole range of different factors that are going to determine whether you get a good outcome rather than just at how much the investment costs.

There are challenges. What we have seen in particular, which Tim mentioned earlier and echoes what we have seen in Australia, is that where you have a very hard measure over a relatively short period of time, that will affect investment behaviour. Because there is such a penalty for falling behind over a short space of time, you do everything you can to avoid falling behind, and there is fairly conclusive evidence that that has led to herding of investments in Australia. That is not to say that a framework, or even an intermediate marker, necessarily has to lead to that; I think that depends on the parameters you set and whether you are looking at the returns over one year, three years or five years, and how that works.

Ideally, recognising that pensions are a long-term investment, you would not want to be looking too much at what happens over a short period of time in investment markets; you would want to be looking over a much longer period and at how the underlying strategy is performing. That is always very difficult, and one of the challenges is trying to get the balance right between what you can measure objectively and what you can measure subjectively. Where you are looking at things like an intermediate report, you tend to be looking at something that is objective, and it is quite difficult to do that over a long period of time. There is always a balance to be struck as part of this, and it would be good to investigate that more as we get further through this process, to work out the best way of doing it in order to achieve the best outcome for members.

[Mark Garnier]

If I remember rightly, the Bill allows for the detail to come in afterwards, so we will have a bit of work to do when this is all over. Thank you very much.

[Torsten Bell]

Q We all have work to do; it is never all over. Chris, this question is mainly for you, as I am conscious that you have done lots of work over an extended period on the dashboard. Obviously, there are elements of the Bill that relate to that—mainly relating to the PPF—but not many. However, is there anything you want to tell the Committee about the lessons from it for when we come to the small pots work, which obviously is a central part of the Bill?

Chris Curry: I listened with interest to some of the earlier witnesses talk about dashboards, and there certainly are some lessons that we can learn from the pensions dashboards programme, as it has been evolving over the past few years, for small pots in particular.

There are two issues that I would pull out. The first is on the technology front. I think someone suggested that the next five years or so could be quite a tight timetable to build a technological solution and get it in place. You have to be very careful—you cannot underestimate just how much complexity there is and how long it takes to do these things—but I would say that the work that we have done on pensions dashboards is giving us a bit of a head start. That is not to say that we necessarily need to build on or use parts of the system that we have already built, but it has helped us understand a lot about, for example, how you can find pensions—the way you can use integrated service providers rather than having to go direct to all the schemes, and use a syndicated model to find where people might have their pensions.

It has helped the industry get a long way down the path to where it needs to be, as well. One of the big challenges for pensions dashboards is the quality of data. Enabling individuals to find their pensions means data quality: it needs not only to exist and be there; it needs to be accurate and it needs to be up to date. When you are thinking about an automatic consolidator or default consolidator for small pots, that is even more important. You are not just transferring information, but transferring money, so it is really important that the data is high quality. The work that is being done on pensions dashboards will get people in the industry a long way to having part of that in place as well.

There are definitely lessons that can be learned from how we progressed on the pensions dashboards programme. It has got us much closer to where we would be if we had had a completely blank page to start from, but there is still a reasonable amount of work to do, because it is working in a slightly different way.

[John Milne]

Q The Bill makes the notion of using pension money for macroeconomic benefit—investment in the UK—an explicit objective. Other countries seem to have done this already. Did they do so explicitly and deliberately, or was it just an accidental outcome of good investment decisions? Did it take a conscious effort to make it happen?

William Wright: I think it is a mix of both. It very much depends on what sort of assets we are talking about. For example, if we are thinking about the UK stock market or domestic equity markets, we tend to see that markets such as Canada and the Netherlands have an even lower allocation to domestic equities, whichever way you look at it, than comparable UK pensions have to the UK market.

Ultimately, this comes down to what you might call the accidental design of the UK system. It has evolved over 20, 30 or 40 years, whereas the systems with which we like to compare the UK system, or large parts of them, were actively designed anything from 30 or 40 to 50 or 60 years ago. We are now seeing the benefits of that active design in those systems. Their focus on scale enables them to invest in a far broader range of assets at a lower unit cost.

Going back to the value for money point, UK pensions have ended up in the worst of both worlds. Fee pressure, particularly in terms of winning and transferring new business between providers, is driving down fees, but the average fees on DC pensions today are very middle of the pack: 45 to 50 basis points a year. That is much higher than much larger schemes in Canada, such as the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, the big Canadian reserve fund, and much higher than large UK schemes, such as the universities superannuation scheme, but they are stuck in the middle: they are actually paying higher fees, but because of the fee pressure they have a very vanilla, almost simple asset allocation. As Tim Fassam from Phoenix pointed out, that tends to steer people towards the lowest cost investment option. Active design, focusing on scale and sophistication, enables pension schemes to take a much longer term and much broader view of what they should invest in and where they should invest in it, whereas in the UK we have tended to accidentally move from one system to another.

[John Milne]

Q So to summarise, you approve of the attempt to take control, as it were.

William Wright: Absolutely. One of the huge challenges in the UK pensions debate over the past 25 or 30 years has been that we sort of knew what was not working and where corporate DB pensions were going to go, and then there was a hiatus and no real active design of what was going to replace them. Auto-enrolment did not start to kick in for a couple of decades, and now we are beginning to see the benefits of that, but the opportunity to actively redesign the structure of the defined-contribution pensions system in this country, and the structure of public sector DB, is long overdue.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses very much for their evidence this afternoon. Given that the Committee has been sitting for a couple of hours non-stop, I will suspend the sitting for a brief period.

16:34

Sitting suspended.

Examination of Witnesses

Roger Sainsbury and Terry Monk gave evidence.

16:45

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Roger Sainsbury, founder member and pensions partner of the Deprived Pensioners Association, and Terry Monk, a member of the Pensions Action Group. We have until 5.15 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses kindly briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Roger Sainsbury: As the Chair said, I am a founding member and the lead organiser of the Deprived Pensioners Association, which was set up for the purpose of fighting for what we loosely know as pre-1997 indexation for Pension Protection Fund members.

Terry Monk: My name is Terry Monk. I have worn various hats over my almost 70 years in the industry. I am probably—with respect to Roger—one of the oldest people in the room. I have been a financial adviser, and I ran a financial services company that was part of Lloyd’s broking group. That group did the first compromise deal to try to save the group and therefore left a lot of its employees, including myself, with hardly any pension. My pension went down from 100% expectation when I was 59 or 60 to just 10% afterwards. Through the restructuring of Bradstock, I joined Independent Trustee Services, part of the Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group—the company that probably saved my life in many ways, and gave me a future. Through that, I became involved with companies that became insolvent.

I then began to work very closely with my colleague Alan Marnes—who is sitting behind me—in the Pensions Action Group, trying to fight for some kind of protection to reverse the disasters that ourselves and our families were facing. That included demonstrations. People ask about the history of the financial assistance scheme and how long FAS has been there. Well, I have brought a picture of my granddaughter when she was young—she is now 22—at one of our demonstrations in Whitehall. FAS started the thing. Alan, John Benson, Phil Jones and the like started the campaign—in Downing Street, on College green and at party conferences—to bring about the compensation that was needed to stop this happening to anybody else.

My take from today is that you guys are all doing what you are doing to make the future work. I am concerned for the people I work with and represent, and I want to make sure that their past is not forgotten, that their pension becomes secure—not one of the future, but one of the past—and that they can rely upon the past. I am afraid I will get emotional at this point— I apologise that I am not doing my introduction; I am doing a speech—because 5,343 FAS members have died since Richard Nicholl and myself gave a presentation to the Work and Pensions Committee. I said to someone just now that my tie is loose because I do not wear ties these days, but I have worn a tie twice in two months at the funerals of founder members of the Pensions Action Group. It just has to stop. I am sorry—I will keep quiet now.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much indeed. I will go immediately to the shadow Minister, Mark Garnier.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Thank you very much for the work you are doing on behalf of pensioners—it is important. Mr Sainsbury, the PPF has some £14 billion in reserves. Could you share with us the main arguments for and against using that to benefit PPF and FAS scheme members?

Roger Sainsbury: In the light of Terry’s extended life history, I will just add that I am a fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering and a former president of the Institution of Civil Engineers.

Before I come to your important question, I would like to feel sure that everybody in this room really understands the huge seriousness of the issue we are considering. This business of removing indexation from people who had pensionable service prior to 1997 has been going on for 20 years. Many of the people involved have seen the value of their payments eroded by maybe even more than 50% in that time. It is really very serious.

The second thing I would like to mention is that the scale of the problem is actually greater than the Post Office managers scandal. Of course, I am not suggesting for a moment that any of our claimants is suffering in the appalling way the postmasters did, but the numbers of our people are so huge compared with the postmasters that the actual amount of money at stake is greater. We have 140,000 PPF members who are affected by this bizarre clause of limiting the indexation, 60,000 of whom are 80 and have zero indexation, so it is a truly serious thing.

I would also like to mention one other dimension, which is timing. In our written submission to the Committee, we did not even bother to press the basic argument for why indexation should be awarded; we just focused on timing, because time is absolutely not on our side at all. Our claimants are dying, on average, at the rate of 15 a week—it is probably three while we have been holding this meeting this afternoon—or 5,500 a year. We have been told by the Department that the necessary amendment to the Pensions Act 2004 cannot be made by statutory instrument. There would have to be a new Bill and a new Act, and goodness knows how many years that might take or how many more thousands of people would have died. That is why we are pressing to get an amendment to this Bill to give a more timely answer.

Now I come to your question: what are the main arguments for and against using the reserves to benefit the members? Well, the first argument is simple, but really rather powerful: it is the only purpose that, legally, the PPF is allowed to spend its money on. The Act is very clear: unless some legal judgment was made against them, which is not on the horizon at all at the moment, the only way they are allowed to spend money is either on their own overheads or on giving benefits to members, such as the indexation that we are now talking about.

That is reason No. 1; reason No. 2, in my mind, is that expectations have not been met and promises have not been fulfilled. I go back to the Secretary of State who introduced the Second Reading debate on the 2004 Bill. He pledged that pension promises made, by the original schemes that people were in, must be met—that is, met by the PPF, which is the reason why the PPF was to be, by that Act, created. Yet that has not happened because, somehow, into schedule 7 to the Act came these dreadful words that have had the effect of not permitting the PPF to pay any indexation at all to people for time worked prior to 1997.

The third reason—ultimately, this is the important reason—is that the 140,000 people need this money. They desperately do, some of them. I mean, obviously not everybody’s condition is the same, but a lot of people will be suffering real misery and hardship. They need this money. I ask myself: “Were this Government elected on promises of governing with humanity and compassion? Are this Government going to meet that need? Or are they going to walk by on the other side?” I do not myself believe that they are; I believe that they will come up to the mark and find a way through the perceived difficulties that they have.

I think those are probably sufficient reasons to be going on with; as to the reasons against granting this, frankly, I cannot see any.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Well, there is one, which I would like to test both your opinions on. The Government point out that the reserves are on the public sector balance sheet, and therefore are treated as an asset of the Government, which is obviously offset against Government debt. Do you think that is a justifiable reason not to—

Roger Sainsbury: Well, if—

Terry Monk: Can I have a go? Alan, who is sitting behind me, and all of us say that we did the right thing at the right time to secure our futures. There was no risk—we were guaranteed there was no risk. The minimum funding requirement was seriously flawed post-Maxwell. That changed it. We were told our pensions were safe. They were no longer safe—I found out to my cost, and many others did, that our pensions were not safe.

If I try to use the argument to our members that are still alive, “We can’t give you these increases because of the national accounts,” they will say, “Hang on, I did the right thing. I was told my pension was safe. I did the right thing all the way along in my life, and I saved for my future—for my comfortable retirement. I did not want to depend upon the state. I wanted to do it for myself. That is what I was proud to do.” To use the argument that the national accounts do not allow these people to get their benefits? I could not use that argument, whatever the reasons might be behind it.

Roger Sainsbury: May I try to answer your question more specifically? I think that indexation would have an impact upon Government finances. The impact would be that cash would flow into the Treasury, because if indexation is permitted and starts to be paid, there will be income tax paid on that money. The money will be going out from the private funds of the PPF, but the income tax and subsequently the VAT on expenditures will be coming into the Treasury coffers. I have yet to meet anybody, other than people in government, who can comprehend how it can be that when the PPF, from its private funds, meets an obligation, which has the incidental effect of bringing cash into the Government coffers, that can at the same time lead to a failure to meet the fiscal rules.

The fiscal rules, incidentally, are set up for a period of four years, when the unravelling of the indexation obligation will take many decades. We have been told in ministerial letters that it has been set up this way with a view to improving transparency. Well, I am sure you have all heard of the fog of war, but I think we are now up against the fog of transparency. I do not think it is real money that the Government are talking about. Even in their own letters, they say it is a statistical way of handling the figures.

The recent Government line on this is that it is the fault—I do not want to put blame on anybody—or the responsibility of the Office for National Statistics, because it was the Office for National Statistics that decreed that the assets and liabilities of the Pension Protection Fund should be counted as part of the public sector national financial liabilities, rather than as part of the public sector net debt, but that decision was made in 2019. We are therefore more inclined to hold responsible the present Chancellor, who, in her Budget of last October, made the decision that, for the Government financial rules, the metric should no longer be the public sector net debt, but the public sector net financial liabilities. It was that that brought the PPF, as it were, on to this part of the playing field.

[Mark Garnier]

That is very helpful, thank you. I am very conscious that other Members will almost certainly have questions, but I must say that I entirely agree with you that a sum of money set aside for compensation should not be brought into the Government’s balance sheet.

[Steve Darling]

Q Have you done any reviews of the impact of enhancing payments to those in receipt of the financial assistance scheme? You alluded to some suggestions around VAT payments and tax payments if payments were enhanced. Have you engaged with any studies on that, and what that input may be?

Terry Monk: We have looked at all sorts of scenarios. I do not know whether Michelle is still here, but the problem is that, although the PPF has done all sorts of “what if” calculations about all sorts of “what ifs”—we have had copies, and the Work and Pensions Committee has had copies—we do know what the “what if” is. We know what our members have lost, but we will not know, until such time as we hear from the Government, what they are proposing. We have offered time and again to meet not just the current Pensions Minister, but previous Pensions Ministers—I have to say that a few of them would not even meet us. This Minister has met us, and he knows the issues, but we do not know what is in the mind of the DWP or the Treasury in dealing with this issue. Once we know that, we will know whether we are fighting or we are working together, and what the answer will be. To answer your question, there is a net effect benefit of paying that amount, but we are in the dark—we do not know how long the bit of string is.

Roger Sainsbury: Incidentally, one of the benefits of the cash coming in, supposing we do get indexation, is that it would at least make a contribution if the Government had decided they were also going to pay money to the FAS members. It would be a contribution to help offset the Treasury payments that would have to be made for the FAS.

Terry has referred to the situation, but I think the key thing is that in 2023 the Select Committee asked the PPF to provide financial estimates for what it would cost to do indexation. The PPF then produced some really excellent tables that showed a number of different hypothetical systems for delivering indexation. It was a bit like a restaurant menu. There was a possibility to have a scheme that would not be hugely beneficial, but that would not cost all that much money to administer, right through the range to a Rolls-Royce scheme, which would obviously cost a lot more money.

We have been asking for RIPA. Just to be absolutely clear, we are not asking for the grim reaper; we have had enough of him already, with people dying. This the bountiful RIPA—retrospective indexation plus arrears. We are pressing for that, but we did not invent it. It was not invented by the DPA. It was part of the menu that the PPF produced, and we merely picked it from the menu. RIPA is reasonably high up the menu, but it is not at the very top. There are other things that we are not asking for that we might have asked for, so we are not being greedy.

With respect to Terry, we are not bothering too much about what is in the PPF’s mind or in the Government’s mind. We are much more concerned with what we are trying to put into their mind. When we decided to go for pushing for RIPA, it was because RIPA is the minimum scheme of indexation that would have the effect of doing away with what is presently a two-tier membership within the PPF. There are two classes of membership: those with indexation and those without. There is nothing in the Bill making any provision for that. It is grossly unfair and it needs to be done away with, and it just happens that the RIPA option is the minimum way of getting rid of that deplorable two-tier membership. I think that gives you perhaps a fuller answer about the situation.

Terry Monk: Are we virtually out of time?

[The Chair]

We are not quite out of time, but I am going to call other Members to ask questions of the panel. I call Kirsty Blackman.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q Thank you very much for all your hard work on this, for your passion and for how articulate you are, particularly for those people that cannot be there and cannot make the case themselves. I really appreciate it. I absolutely agree with what you are saying on indexation; I think it is incredibly important. You were talking about the people that would benefit from these changes. Are they overwhelmingly well-off people, or are they people that are really struggling because of the lack of indexation, and who would therefore be more likely to spend the money and to grow the economy by spending their money, if the Government are worried about balance sheets?

Roger Sainsbury: I have to say that there is a great range.

Terry Monk: I cannot remember what it is, but the average FAS member’s pension is something in the order of £4,000 or £5,000 a year, and if you look at the steelworkers, because they are our example, it is those sorts of guys. I worked in the City. I had a different job, but the majority of the people in the scheme had good benefits and good salaries but their pensions were important and they reflected the role they had in their life. I am not sure off the top of my head, but I think the average of the FAS pension is £4,500—some more, some less, obviously.

I want to make a point that I think Roger mentioned: at one stage, we were not at the table to talk as part of the pensions Bill. We lobbied hard. I know some of you have definitely put forward amendments to the pensions Bill to ensure that pre-1997 becomes part of the pensions Bill, which is why we are here today, but we had to work hard just to get that.

[Sarah Edwards]

Q I am interested in exactly what you were saying around the two-tier element, partly around the challenge of the fact that there are people who have got the full recompense or equivalent, and you have not. Do you feel that this is an opportunity to change that dial and set the record straight? Obviously, an amendment has been tabled. I recognise that; I just wanted to get a bit more from you on the fact that there are people who are in a completely different situation, and I just wanted you to build on that point that there are two sides to this. Some have not lost and some have.

Terry Monk: FAS stopped when PPF opened its doors in 2005, so most of the people in FAS did not have much opportunity to accrue any increasing benefits post 1997. The majority of them are old—the average age of the FAS member is now 73, which is much younger than I am. It is that age group of people who would really benefit, and their widows and their spouses—let us not forget them—and they would therefore spend money that they currently do not have to spend. They can afford their council tax. They can afford their heating. It would change their lives, in terms of feeling that they have achieved this success on their behalf and on behalf of the members.

Roger Sainsbury: I would like to talk a bit about the concept of an amendment. We have observed that one amendment has already been offered: new clause 18 suggested by Ann Davies MP. Our team and I have had a bit of a look at that in the last couple of days. While we very much appreciate her good intention in putting the amendment forward, it actually does not do the job in a number of respects. I do not know how many of you have ever grappled with the obscure and complex language of schedule 7 to the Act, but it is mighty complicated. Some time ago, I and my team spent several days trying to work out what an amendment should be to deliver what we wanted. I have got some first class people on the team, but in the end we decided we actually could not do it, and would have to leave it to the expert drafters in the Department.

That is yet another reason why—I mentioned it in the written evidence—at a meeting I have already asked the Minister if he would himself table the requisite amendment. When you come up against the sheer complexity that Ann Davies has obviously already come up against, this is another reason why we think that would be a very good idea. It is slightly unusual for a Minister to table an amendment to his own Bill, but it is permitted, as the Minister said when I was talking to him about it. In a complex situation like this, it would absolutely be the best way of getting straight to the desired answer, so I plead with all of you to join me in urging the Minister to take this on.

[Sarah Edwards]

I was contacted by my constituents, so thank you for that.

[John Milne]

I think you have answered all my questions already. We have tabled an amendment, and I would really appreciate your input on whether we could improve it or argue around it between now and when it is raised in Committee.

Roger Sainsbury: Thank you.

[Rachel Blake]

Q Thank you very much for your evidence and your considered responses. There has been a discussion about the £12 billion surplus. Have you done any research on what you estimate would be the extent of the cost of RIPA—the scheme that you have promoted?

Roger Sainsbury: That is a very timely question, because for the past couple of years, we have been working on the basis that the RIPA scheme would cost £5.5 billion. That was the estimate given to us by the PPF. Now—I might almost say hallelujah!—about three days ago, the PPF notified us that they had redone the calculation using a much superior methodology. I think it is a phenomenally difficult calculation to do, but they have redone it, and the answer now is not £5.5 billion, but £3.9 billion, or possibly a bit less. Whereas for two years we have been arguing that £5.5 billion is eminently affordable, £3.5 billion, for example, is obviously even more affordable. We do not get that much good news, but that was definitely a bit of good news we recently received. I am pleased to be able to share it with you, if you did not know it.

[Rachel Blake (Cities of London and Westminster) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q You said that it is a very complicated calculation. How much confidence is there in that calculation? What input has there been from your members and part of your group on the confidence of that calculation?

Roger Sainsbury: We would not have any ability to do that calculation at all. It all depends on the statistics held by the PPF of the age of all the members, the amount they have all been receiving and so on. It is way beyond us to make that calculation.

Terry Monk: I worked with FAS before FAS even came about—at the conception, rather than the birth, of FAS. The PPF and I have worked closely with them for over 20 years. I have immense trust and faith in what they do, how they do it, and what they deliver. Whenever we ask them for help, they give it to us as far as they are able.

Roger Sainsbury: I would support that. The PPF have been very helpful and I have had a good working relationship with them. I have to say, that was not always so—about three years ago, it looked as if we would be fighting a continual battle against them, but over time we have got to a really good working relationship, and they have been very helpful. In a question of challenging or doubting their ability to do this sort of calculation, when you look at the asset returns that they are getting, boy, they have got some people that know how to handle numbers, haven’t they?

[Rachel Blake]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, can I thank the witnesses for their evidence this afternoon? I will move now to the next panel of witnesses.

Examination of Witnesses

Rachel Elwell gave evidence.

17:13

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Rachel Elwell, Chief Executive Officer of the Border to Coast Pensions Partnership. We have until 5.30 pm for this panel. Would you kindly introduce yourself for the record?

Rachel Elwell: Thank you, Chair, and thank you, everyone, for your time today. My name is Rachel Elwell, and I am chief executive of Border to Coast Pensions Partnership, which is responsible for the assets of 11 of the local government pension schemes, although with due care and attention to governance, that may well become 18 LGPS funds and over £100 billion by April next year.

I would like to give a little bit of background to explain to the Committee why I feel so passionately about both the local government pension scheme thriving in the future, and pensions more generally in the UK. I am a pensions actuary by background, and I have worked in the industry now for 30 years. I took this role in Leeds for three reasons. One was because it is Leeds—you probably know that most people from Yorkshire will tell you that within five minutes of meeting them, so there you go: I am from Yorkshire—and Yorkshire has a fantastic financial services region, but we were missing asset management. For me, this was a fantastic opportunity to strengthen that, levelling up, and over the last eight years since I took on the role we have built the largest asset manager outside London and Edinburgh.

I am also passionate about learning and creating new opportunities. Again, this is something that the LGPS has built from scratch since the original policy intent of pooling was introduced about a decade ago. Finally, having worked in many different areas of the financial services industry over the last 30 years, for me the sense of being able to give something back, and doing that for a purpose, is really important. The LGPS, as I am sure you have already heard, has 7 million members—some of the lowest-paid people in the UK. It provides an important policy intent around low-paid earners, as well as potentially having the opportunity to provide real investment drive into the UK. So I am happy to answer any questions and to contribute to your thinking.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. I will hand over to the shadow Minister.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Thank you very much, and thank you for coming in this afternoon. I do not know how much of this you have listened to, but there are a lot of worries about mandation coming in on pension funds. Of course, this does not include the local government pension scheme, because this is about defined contribution pension funds. However, there are measures in the Bill that enable the Secretary of State to have the powers to issue directions and guidance to local government pension scheme pools. Do you worry that these could be mandation by another method?

Rachel Elwell: The LGPS is already investing significantly in the UK, as you have probably already heard. We invest more than 25% of the assets we look after on behalf of pension funds in the UK, and there is a very good reason for that, which I can explore a bit further if you would find it helpful.

To answer the specific question, I am not concerned that the power will instruct the LGPS to invest in specific things. I think there is a real intent; it would be helpful if the Bill were clear that it would not be against fiduciary duty and would not interfere with the FCA regulations that we are also subject to.

I am very thoughtful about how we carefully manage the weight of capital that might come into the market if there is mandation for the wider industry to move quickly into investing in the UK. Work will need to be done on the supply side as well as the capital side, to ensure that the UK can invest well the capital that should be being invested into the UK. So it is important that any use of mandation is very carefully considered, and that the laws of unintended consequences are really thought through.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Do you think there is a risk that mandation could come in on the LGPS by subtle, behavioural outcomes rather than necessarily through directive outcomes?

Rachel Elwell: I can understand why the Government would want to have a backstop power to direct pools, because the LGPS is significant—it is one of the top 10 globally by size. It has an impact on council tax, and on the economy more generally. If you have a pool that is not delivering and all the other mechanisms available to their stakeholders have failed, I can understand why that power would exist. But it is important that we clear the scenarios in which it is envisaged that it might be used.

[Mark Garnier]

Q On surplus extraction—because there are various different ways you could do it, one of which is a payment holiday or a contribution holiday for local authorities—do you worry that there could be surplus extraction by one form or another, that could reduce the surplus on these funds, thereby increasing risk of liabilities?

Rachel Elwell: History does not necessarily repeat itself, but it is important that we learn from that. The LGPS, and pensions more generally in the UK, have had many, many decades—including through the ’90s, having to manage the fact that there were contribution holidays taken that were using surpluses very quickly. Actuaries have the ability to work with all employers, including those in the LGPS, to smooth out that experience. Where you have a surplus, some of that could absolutely be used to help manage the costs over the long term, and when you have a deficit, you do not try to pay that all off very quickly, so I think there is an opportunity. I am not worried about it because I can see that the LGPS is a very well run, well governed scheme. It has good advice from its actuaries and is well used to making sure that both surpluses and deficits are smoothed over time.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I have one final question, if I may. You run a pool of 11 funds. This is taking 87 into six. Everybody seems to think that is a good idea. Are you included in the “everybody”?

Rachel Elwell: I do think there is a fantastic opportunity for us to harness the benefits of scale that come from being one of the top 10 globally by size, but it is important, as we do that, that we maintain the link to local people who are the members of this.

[Mark Garnier]

Q This is tricky, though, is it not? Because there is no geographical definition of those six pools, Cornwall could, as I mentioned earlier, find itself investing in Leeds. That would be lovely for you in Leeds, but it would not be so great for people down in Penzance.

Rachel Elwell: Border to Coast, if we do have those 18, will stretch from the Scottish border to the southern coast. Even today, we have partner funds who are right across England, which is brilliant because those are people who have actively chosen to come together, form a partnership and work together.

Time permitting, if it is of interest to the Committee, we could talk a bit more about local investment and the way of getting investment that is truly local for each individual fund but also a way of crowding investment from other people into the slightly larger opportunities that might be in a region. Every investment we make is local—it impacts local people.

You do not need to only have, for example, Durham council investing in Durham. You want all of the LGPS and all asset owners to feel that they can do that. Some of the ways that we are working through doing local investment with our partner funds have really got an eye to the different ways in which you can crowd in versus something very specific that needs to be addressed in the region or locality.

[Torsten Bell]

Q It is lovely to see you again, Rachel. Thanks for making the time today. A few people have asked questions about the LGPS through the lens of member engagement. There are obviously some implications with the move into greater pooling for that. Given that you are running that and seeing it up close, it would be good to hear your reflections on how that currently operates, as you have seen it over the last few years.

Rachel Elwell: Again, for all of us working in the LGPS, that sense of purpose is really important. I know my partner funds do a huge amount to make sure they are engaging directly with members, running events, as well as the importance of member representation on the pensions committees and on the pension boards, whether that is through union representation, pensioner representation or other scheme member representation.

We also have two fantastic scheme member representatives on our joint committee, which is the body that comes together across all of the partner funds to oversee and engage with what we are doing on their behalf. They are really bringing that voice into our considerations as a board and the wider organisation—the wider partnership.

[Torsten Bell]

Q The other thing to touch on is that all the pools are moving towards FCA authorisation. What is your experience of that? Obviously, you are further ahead than most.

Rachel Elwell: This is before I was employed to bring it to life. This is a decision our partner funds made really early, because they recognised the real benefits that can come from being FCA regulated. This is really important. We will hopefully be managing over £100 billion on behalf of the LGPS, and a good proportion of that is managed directly within my team. We are managing that for, hopefully, 18 different customers—effectively, investors and our owners. We need to have those disciplines in place, and we need to make sure that we are following those regulations. We do not need another regulatory set. There are already some very good, strong regulations that exist, so we, as a partnership and as a company, think that is the right thing to do.

[Steve Darling]

Q Thank you for coming today. Reflecting on the Bill as a whole, what would you particularly like to see weakened or strengthened in the Bill? What particularly leaps out at you?

Rachel Elwell: There are some fantastic provisions in the Bill, particularly around implementing the good governance review, and the clarity of roles and responsibilities between the different parties within the LGPS. About five or six years ago, we, along with some of the other pools, commissioned some work looking at good practice internationally, so talking to about 15 others—from Australia, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Norwegians—and looking at the journey they had been on with this. They are about 15 years ahead of us, really, with that policy. We wanted to learn from what they had done.

There were various success factors, some of which Michelle shared with you earlier, but one of those was real clarity about the Government’s policy intent, and I think the Bill really does help with that. That will help us, in turn, engage with our pensions committees and partner funds to make sure that we are providing a holistic joined-up view. There are some areas in the Bill where, particularly for the LGPS, the detail will be in the regulations. I would just make a plea, given the timelines we are working towards, that we see the regulations sooner rather than later, please. I have already said that I think it would be helpful to maybe get a bit more clarity on the circumstances in which we may be directed by the Secretary of State.

[Rachel Blake]

Q I used to be on a local government pensions committee, so I bring some of that experience to this question. The Bill talks about the merging of funds and what benefits that could have for savers and members, but it does not talk that much about administration. What impacts do you think that might have on local government pension administration—either positive benefits, or what risks you foresee that perhaps the Committee should consider?

Rachel Elwell: The primary focus of the Bill is the consolidation of the assets in pools, but there are provisions, particularly when we see some of the wider things that are happening in policy such as local government reorganisation, where that might lead to closer working between funds and potentially merger. I am fortunate enough—I think Roger Phillips mentioned this earlier—that Tyne and Wear and Northumberland are part of the Border to Coast pool, so I was there and living that experience with them personally. They were working very hard together, with very joined-up thinking and close relationships, and it was still fairly hard work.

I suppose from that perspective, like any merger of entities, it comes down to relationships and people. Administration in the LGPS is complex, and many funds have been facing recruitment challenges. What we are seeing already is funds working closely together. For example, again within Border to Coast, Tyne and Wear has recently taken on the administration for Teesside, bringing it in-house. It was previously an outsourced arrangement. There are benefits from that, but it needs to be done very carefully and thoughtfully—it is not something we should rush at.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witness for their evidence, and we will move on to the next panel.

Examination of Witness

Torsten Bell gave evidence.

17:30

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Torsten Bell, who is the Minister for Pensions at the Department for Work and Pensions. We know who you are, but for the record and for those in the Public Gallery and watching the broadcast, would you kindly introduce yourself?

Torsten Bell: I am Torsten Bell, and I am the Pensions Minister.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Minister, thank you for coming to give evidence—we have a long few weeks together. I will start with the evidence we heard from the Deprived Pensioners Association and the Pensions Action Group. I was rather surprised to hear that a fund that had been put aside, worth £14 billion, has now been taken into the Government’s balance sheet, when in fact that money is there to pay for the exact issues that were raised by those two witnesses. However, we suddenly find that the money is being used to fill in a £50 billion black hole—discuss.

Torsten Bell: No, obviously. The change that you are referring to is a 2019 change under the last Government. It was taken not by the last Government but by the Office for National Statistics, and it refers not just to the PPF but to funded public sector pension schemes. The same issues apply to the LGPS in the same way. It is a 2019 change made by the statistics body following international guidance on accounting. The changes you are talking about have affected public sector borrowing since then.

[Mark Garnier]

Q Yes, but there is a serious issue here, which is that you are now the Minister for Pensions and in a position to be able to do something about this. We can look back on the last 14 years and have that conversation—let us get that out of the way—but here is your opportunity to resolve this problem.

Torsten Bell: In stark contrast to lots of my predecessors, I have to say, I have spent a lot of time meeting members of both the PPF and the FAS who have been affected by the issue of pre-1997 accruals. If I am honest, the issue has been a real one since then, but it is a significantly bigger one because of the recent phase of high inflation, which made the pace of inflation eating into the real value of those pensions significantly faster. As I said on Second Reading—this was raised then by a number of colleagues on the Committee—we are considering the issue, but it needs to be considered in the round because of the wider public finance implications. That applies to other issues in this space as well; you will have seen that in other pension schemes where the Government have a role.

[Mark Garnier]

Q When you talk about the wider public finance implications, I completely get it; we understand that there is a lot of debt and all the rest of it. The bit I am struggling with is that this is a fund that is set aside for exactly this type of thing. It worries me—and I hope it worries other colleagues on the Committee—that a fund that had been earmarked for specifically this type of thing is now being earmarked for something else.

Torsten Bell: To be clear, that is just wrong—it is not. The 2004 Act is very clear about the purposes for which the board’s assets can be used, and there is no question about that. The Office for National Statistics does not get to countermand Acts of Parliament on the use of resources—the 2004 Act is very clear on that. It is nothing to do with that.

If you look at the public sector finances in the round, there are all kinds of different forms of funds that are classified in different ways. The classification within the public finances is not determining the use to which funds can be put. The same applies to whether things are classified as taxes or not. They do their job, and obviously those classifications exist for an important reason, which is that we need to have clarity about the public finances. We use those for discipline in terms of making sure that Government objectives in fiscal policy have metrics that they can be tied to. It is totally reasonable for different parties to take different positions on what those metrics should be. There have been different choices made on that by lots of different parties in recent years, but I think everybody in this room probably accepts that you need to have those metrics. When you accept that, you will be in a situation where classifications by the Office for National Statistics impact on those.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I move on to value for money, something which, in the broadest sense, everybody seems to agree is a good thing, but I want to pick up on a couple of points. In the evidence given to us by Michelle Ostermann, she made the very interesting point that one problem we have in the UK is that we have not derisked our pension industry. People are still worried about the risks of the pension industry. But she did make the point, which I am sure you will agree with, that you can leverage growth of the economy through leveraging pension fund investment. I think that is something that we both agree with. It goes with the grain of the Bill, and we both want to do that.

We heard some interesting evidence from Phoenix, who referred to clause 15 and the consequences of an intermediate performance rating. While we are going to have big arguments about mandation—that is something we fundamentally disagree on—one thing I hope we can both agree on, as we progress this, is that certain elements of the Bill could have unintended consequences. It seems that this one, the intermediate rating, could have the effect of maintaining the derisking of pension funds, because you are trying to avoid getting an intermediate rating and therefore you will avoid doing the slightly more progressed growth. Sorry; I am being incredibly inarticulate after rather a long day, but you know the point I am trying to make.

Torsten Bell: I definitely get the point you are making. Let me say one thing about the big picture, and then I will talk about the specifics you raise with the intermediate rating. On the big picture, I absolutely agree that one thing we have done badly in the last 30 years is to think about how changes we make to our pension system, which exists to provide income in retirement for the vast majority of the population, also underpin our capitalism. That is a lesson we have learned painfully.

On the substance of risk reduction, I would put it slightly differently, because you have different things going on in the DB and DC landscapes. In the DC landscape, we have been building up a new system. Understandably, because it was starting from small scale, we did not jump to trying to solve all the problems that came with that system, not least getting it to scale, not least what happens in retirement, and not least small pots and the rest. I see this Bill as doing that—taking the next step forward and saying, “Right, we are building this new system. We made big progress in the last 15 years with that, but now is the time to put the change in place.”

On scale and on value for money, that will support the wider range of investments more broadly, not just in the UK, but with a wider range of assets. That is absolutely the right thing, in savers’ interests, to do. I also completely endorse your point on unintended consequences, and that is exactly why scrutiny of the Bill is important to make sure that we pick those up as we go. The last 40 years, not just in this country but in others, shows that that can be the case, for good and ill.

Specifically on your point about the intermediate rating, we are very much aware of the issue. We are not aiming to replicate a hard metric: “fall one side of this line, and suddenly you are de-authorised from taking auto-enrolment contributions”. That is exactly what we need to avoid, which is what we will be doing. There is a reason behind the provision for more than one level of intermediate ranking, and my view would be that you would not expect people who fall into some of those levels being banned from taking further contributions. It is absolutely right that you do not want an absolute binary—just one metric, one division. The consultations that the FCA and TPR have taken forward are all about making sure that we have worked all those issues through. There are lessons, for example, from what happened in Australia.

[Mark Garnier]

Q I have one very last question, if I may, going back to the mandation piece and the evidence that we heard from Helen Forrest Hall. The mandation piece is a reserved power, with a sunset clause in, I think, 2035. I have discussed with another member of this Committee how that reserved power will encourage pension funds to take action and potentially invest more into the UK, which is a good thing—we all agree with that. However, interestingly, Helen Forrest Hall made the point that because there are potentially 10 years in which this could happen, it may cause a reluctance to do the right thing. Actually, the right thing could be to invest in other countries. If we are having a fundamental problem here and there is growth in the economies of, say, the Asia-Pacific rim, the right thing might be to invest there. Investing there might support British businesses, by the way, although it would not necessarily benefit the UK economy. There could be perverse outcomes in investment management behaviour because that reserve power is something in reserve, even if it is never used. Have you thought that through?

Torsten Bell: I understand the point you are making. I think you have to step back to the big picture, which is a consensus right across the industry that savers’ interests would be better served by change. It does not make sense that the UK industry is a complete outlier compared with other pensions systems around the world when it comes to exposure to wider ranges of assets. What comes with that exposure to a wider range of assets? The nature of assets, where you are likely to see a larger home bias in that more of them would be in the UK.

There is a wider point: is there a good reason why the UK DC pension landscape has a particularly large exposure to equities rather than to a wider range of assets that we see around the rest of the world? No. That is why you have seen the Mansion House accord coming forward—because it is in savers’ interests to change how we are operating. The scale and value-for-money measures, and a lot of the other approaches that we are taking, will facilitate that, but the industry is saying that that is in savers’ interests, and it is right to do so.

Ultimately, we have to step back and say that we are not in the business of just making individual random decisions about the pensions system. The question is: what is there a consensus on about the world we need to move to that has a better equilibrium? One of the strong elements of that, along with larger scale, is investing in a wider range of assets because that is in savers’ interests. That is why there is a voluntary Mansion House accord, setting that out as the objective, with relatively low levels of target, particularly on domestic investment, compared with what we see in other countries. That is what is going on.

What we are saying is that when you speak to the industry, particularly in private, it is very clear that there is a risk of a collective action problem. Under previous Conservative Chancellors, it signed up to commitments that it has not been delivering. Why has it not been delivering? Because of the collective action problem—the risk of being undercut by somebody else who is not making that change because of the nature of a market that is too focused on cost and not focused enough on returns.

I make only one vaguely political point. It is easy to join people in being anxious, but we have to ask ourselves something. There is a reason why the first Mansion House compact was not delivered. Do we want to be here in 15 years saying, “Actually, we all signed up to it and said it needed to happen, but it hasn’t”? No—I am not prepared to do that. Change is going to come. Everybody says that change needs to come because it is in members’ interests. All the reserve power does is to say that it is going to happen.

[Mark Garnier]

Thank you very much.

[Steve Darling]

Q I have two key questions. We have heard repeatedly in evidence today about questions to do with secondary legislation and guidance. As we go through the Bill Committee and further stages, what confidence do you have as Minister that you will be able to give some clear signalling to the industry about what is likely to be in that guidance and legislation, to drive the confidence it needs in the short to long term?

The other area that I want to ask about relates to the information that we heard from Nest: only 40% of its members had signed up online. That demonstrates that the issue is about getting positive engagement from those who are perhaps less financially secure. Are you confident that we are doing all we can through the Bill to help those who are most financially challenged? How are you going to hold yourself to account as we proceed to ensure that that is the case?

Torsten Bell: Those are great questions. On regulations, you are absolutely right. This pensions Bill, like most recent ones—although there have been exceptions that have come with unintended side effects, to go back to what was just mentioned—does rely heavily on secondary legislation. My view is that that is the right thing to do and is almost in the nature of pension schemes. That is partly because the detail should rightly be consulted on and partly because things will change in the context.

You are right that there is a large reliance on secondary legislation. Yes, in some areas, as we go through the detail, clause by clause, we will be able to set out to you where our thinking is up to. In lots of cases you will already see consultations by the FCA and TPR, starting to develop the work that will then feed into the regulations—that is particularly true, for example, on value for money, which we have just been discussing. I also think that it is important for us to provide clarity on when we will bring forward those regulations and when we will consult on the input to them, so that people know that. That was why, when we published the pensions reform road map, and when we published the Bill itself, I set out when we anticipate bringing forward those regulations so that everyone in the industry and in the House can see when that will happen. Page 17 of the road map sets out how we envisage that happening, and it is absolutely right. When we come to the clause-by-clause discussion, there will certainly be things where we will not be able to say, “This is exactly what will happen,” and rightly, because there needs to be further consultation with the industry on those things.

On the broader question of engagement with people, particularly those with smaller pensions—there is a very heavy correlation between the chance of someone being engaged with their pension and the size of that pension pot, partly for obvious reasons, but for wider context reasons, too—the pensions dashboard that Chris Curry mentioned earlier is a large part of facilitating that engagement. Lots of countries have had versions of the dashboard; it does make a material effect. One of the lessons from Australia is that the average size of DC pots, as they start to build rapidly—as that becomes the default system in an auto-enrolment world—does have a material effect.

I was with someone who runs one of the big supers recently; her view was that they hit a tipping point when there was suddenly this huge engagement where people were looking at the app provided by the super every week. There are pros and cons to that, by the way. Remember that there is a reason why we default people into pension savings. There are good and bad ways to engage with your pension. We do not want people on an app, in the face of a short-term stock market downturn, making drastic decisions to do with their investments that have long-lasting consequences. It needs to be done right; that is exactly why, when it comes to the dashboard, we are user testing it extensively.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q I have two questions. If the Minister could just answer “yes” to the first one, that would be great. The Regulatory Policy Committee has said in its assessment of the impact assessment that the monitoring and evaluation plan is weak—it has used that word. It has said that more detailed plans are needed on monitoring and evaluation, outlining success metrics, reporting requirements and methodologies. Will the Minister commit to considering those and to updating us during the course of the Bill Committee about when monitoring might happen?

Torsten Bell: I am happy to take that away. Obviously, the monitoring will need to be different for different parts of the Bill, which are on different timelines.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Q The other question is in relation to the fact that there are 273 amendments—240 normal amendments and 30 new clauses—which we got yesterday. I have raised my concerns with the Minister privately about this, but I want to say publicly that this is a really big issue. It is very difficult for us to read 273 amendments in 24 or 36 hours, and to be able to make sense of the Bill. Does the Minister understand that this is an awful lot of amendments to be dumping on Committee members, and that it might make the line-by-line scrutiny significantly longer as we try to work out what the Bill will look like? The one that we discussed on Second Reading is very different in some areas from the one that the Government are now proposing.

Torsten Bell: Let me address that in two minutes before the Chair cuts us off. I definitely recognise that there is a large number of amendments. It is not unprecedented—the Procurement Act 2023 had 350 Government amendments, and 155 on Report.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I was on that one as well.

Torsten Bell: We have all made life choices. The thing that I am trying to avoid—and the reason why there are so many at this stage—is what has happened with other Bills, such as the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill in the last Parliament. I do not want to table loads of amendments on Report, after the line by line. That is the alternative. This is a very large Bill. The number of amendments, in part, reflects the fact that everyone has signed up to a Bill that is complicated and very large. My judgment was that it is right to get as many of those amendments down now, so that you have them for line by line. Also, I have gone out of my way over the last 24 hours to spell out to you all where the major changes are. The substance and the purpose of the Bill have not changed. In almost all cases, the amendments are relatively minor and technical.

[The Chair]

Last question—Luke Murphy.

[Luke Murphy]

Q You said on Second Reading that you would encourage trustees, if they are considering a surplus release, to prioritise indexation of those that have not received it on their pre-’97 accrual. But some evidence submissions have suggested that it should go beyond encouragement, and maybe to mandation. Will you consider that?

Torsten Bell: I understand why people say that but, as I say, it is for trustees. We are not going to legislate to change the offer made in scheme rules to savers, because that would be to fundamentally change the system. But trustees will want to consider that, and they will be in a very strong position to take a strong view about that when discussing with employers what happens with the surplus release situation.

[The Chair]

Thank you. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank all our witnesses, including the Minister.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gerald Jones.)

17:50

Adjourned till Thursday 4 September at half-past Eleven o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

PSB01 The Association of Investment Companies (AIC)

PSB02 Pensions Action Group

PSB03 Mike Smith

PSB04 Pensions Action Group (further written evidence)

PSB05 Society of Pension Professionals

PSB06a Aon

PSB06b Aon

PSB07 Association of Mirror Pensioners

PSB08 John Ward

PSB09 David Robertson

PSB10 Allan Roberts

PSB11 Insight Investment

PSB12 Deprived Pensioners Association

PSB13 The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA)

PSB14 Ann Howarth

PSB15 Mel Earp

PSB16 BP Pensioners Group

PSB17 UNISON

PSB18 Pensions Management Institute

PSB19 SouthWest Action

PSB20 Brightwell

PSB21 Fidelity International

PSB22 The Investing and Saving Alliance (TISA)

PSB23a Sam Seaton

PSB23b Sam Seaton

PSB24 My Pension Expert

PSB25 Chris Drury

PSB26 ShareAction

PSB27 Hewlett Packard Pension Association (HPPA)

PSB28 Just Group plc

PSB29 New Capital Consensus

PSB30 Pension Protection Fund

PSB31 Graham Holloway

PSB32 Railways Pension Trustee Company Limited

PSB33 Hargreaves Lansdown

PSB34 Andy Lewis and Stuart O’Brien

PSB35 American Express UK Pensioners Justice

PSB36 A&O Shearman

PSB37 Clara-Pensions

PSB38 Society of Pension Professionals (SPP) (further written evidence)

PSB39 People’s Partnership

PSB40 Pensions UK

PSB41 AEA Technology Pension Campaign Steering Group

PSB42 Pensioners of Atos UK

PSB43 Impact Investing Institute

PSB44 Association of Professional Pension Trustees

PSB45 BVCA

PSB46 Aviva

PSB47 Brian May

PSB48 Aegon UK

PSB49 Barnett Waddingham LLP

PSB50 Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd (USS)

PSB51 Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW)

PSB52 The Investment Association

PSB53 Unite the Union

PSB54 Border to Coast Pensions Partnership

PSB55 ABI

PSB56 Association of Pension Lawyers (APL)

PSB57 Phoenix Group

PSB58 Origo

PSB59 Pensions Policy Institute (PPI)

PSB60 Esso Pensioners Working Group