Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting)
Wednesday 12th February 2025
(1 week, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesTerminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 View all Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 February 2025 - (12 Feb 2025)
The Chair
Will everyone please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent? I like to maintain the flow of debate, so I remind everybody not to say “you” and “your”, as Members should speak through the Chair, and not to go out of scope. I will stop Members if that happens again today.
Clause 1
Assisted dying
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 1, page 1, line 19, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment would include the absence of undue influence for the making of a person’s decision. This reflects the changes proposed in Amendments 24 to 33.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 82, in clause 1, page 1, line 19, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This would add a lack of encouragement to the list of requirements for a person to make a decision to request assistance. This reflects the changes proposed in Amendments 83 to 92.
Amendment 113, in clause 1, page 1, line 19, after “coerced” insert “, manipulated”.
This amendment reflects the changes in Amendments 114 to 115 which require steps to be taken to establish that the person seeking assistance has not been manipulated by any other person.
Amendment 24, in clause 7, page 4, line 14, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 83, in clause 7, page 4, line 14, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
Amendment 114, in clause 7, page 4, line 14, after “coerced” insert “, manipulated”.
This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person has manipulated.
Amendment 25, in clause 8, page 4, line 37, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 84, in clause 8, page 4, line 37, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
Amendment 115, in clause 8, page 4, line 37, after “coerced” insert “, manipulated”.
This amendment requires the independent doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person has manipulated.
Amendment 26, in clause 12, page 8, line 13, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 85, in clause 12, page 8, line 13, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
Amendment 27, in clause 13, page 9, line 33, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 86, in clause 13, page 9, line 33, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
Amendment 28, in clause 18, page 12, line 26, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 87, in clause 18, page 12, line 26, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
New clause 5—Encouragement—
“(1) For the purposes of this Act, ‘encouraged’ means an act capable of encouraging suicide which would constitute an offence under section 2 (Criminal liability for complicity in another’s suicide) of the Suicide Act 1961.
(2) A person is not rendered ineligible to request assistance to end their own life on the basis of—
(a) an act of encouragement that they were unaware of when requesting and going through assisted dying, or
(b) an act of encouragement which was not specifically directed at that person.”
This amendment provides a definition of encouragement is consequential on Amendments 82 to 92.
Amendment 29, in schedule 1, page 25, line 22, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 88, in schedule 1, page 25, line 22, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
Amendment 118, in schedule 1, page 25, line 22, after “coerced” insert “, manipulated”.
This amendment adds a requirement to the first declaration for the person to declare they have not been manipulated. It is linked to Amendment 113.
Amendment 30, in schedule 2, page 27, line 11, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 89, in schedule 2, page 27, line 11, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
Amendment 119, in schedule 2, page 27, line 11, after “coerced” insert “, manipulated”.
This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to sign a declaration that to the best of their knowledge they believe that the person has not been manipulated. It is linked to Amendment 113.
Amendment 31, in schedule 3, page 28, line 9, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 90, in schedule 3, page 28, line 9, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
Amendment 120, in schedule 3, page 28, line 9, after “coerced” insert “, manipulated”.
This amendment adds a requirement to the declaration that independent doctor has to sign, that they to the best of their knowledge they believe that the person not been manipulated. It is linked to Amendment 113.
Amendment 32, in schedule 4, page 29, line 5, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 91, in schedule 4, page 29, line 5, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
Amendment 121, in schedule 4, page 29, line 5, after “coerced” insert “, manipulated”.
This amendment adds a requirement to the second declaration for the person to declare they have not been manipulated. It is linked to Amendment 113.
Amendment 33, in schedule 5, page 30, line 22, after “coerced” insert “, unduly influenced”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 92, in schedule 5, page 30, line 22, after “coerced” insert “, encouraged”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 82.
Amendment 122, in schedule 5, page 30, line 22, after “coerced” insert “manipulated”.
This amendment adds a requirement to the declaration that coordinating doctor has to sign, that they to the best of their knowledge they believe that the person not been manipulated. It is linked to Amendment 113.
Rebecca Paul
One of the major concerns that we have heard from members of the public and MPs relates to the importance of ensuring that appropriate safeguards are in place, so that people make genuine choices and do not request an assisted death because somebody else has pushed them towards it. For that reason, it is vital that subsection (2)(b) is as comprehensive as it can be. It currently refers specifically to a person having been “coerced” or “pressured”, which covers only the more direct kinds of influence, not more subtle ones. It seems clear to me that amendments are required to ensure that more subtle kinds of influence are covered adequately, and that clinicians do not just look for obvious signs of coercion or pressure when considering eligibility.
In her oral evidence on 29 January, Dr Mullock said:
“In terms of the Bill that we are discussing, one possible weakness here is that it identifies, only very obviously, problematic conduct in terms of coercion or pressure exerted by another person, and actually the kind of undue influence that might occur might be very subtle. More needs to be done to recognise that and the subtle encouragement that might take place, where a relative might frame their support for the person seeking to die in terms of, ‘This will be better for you,’ and, ‘Have you considered this?’ That is not necessarily an example of clear abuse, so when the person seeking to die then consults the doctor, they are not going to characterise what has happened to them as coercion or abuse. More needs to be done to discuss with the person whether or not they have been encouraged by the people around them.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 162, Q204.]
Amendment 23 would add the term “unduly influenced” to the clause. It is an important addition, as it is a recognised term in law. It is designed to ensure that relationships of dependence are considered. In some cases, there is no bad intent, but there is a power differential, subtle as it may be, and it is important that we recognise how strong it can be. A child not wanting to disappoint their parent; a wife not wanting to go against her husband’s wishes—there may well be no threats or explicit pressure, and there may be a lot of love shrouding it, but the influence is there and it is strong. That is why the concept is applied in probate cases to test whether someone has faced influence, domination or pressure that prevents them from exercising free and independent volition with regard to the act. It has also been applied in medical decisions, including over a refusal of treatment that can lead to death. For example, there was a case of a Jehovah’s Witness who refused a lifesaving blood transfusion under undue influence from her mother. It is therefore a natural addition to the Bill.
In important judgments, the courts have said that undue influence will have more impact on people who are very tired, in pain or depressed, and that
“a patient in a weakened condition may be unduly influenced in circumstances in which if he had been fit, he would have resisted the influence sought to be exercised over him.”
This legal concept could have been designed for the context of assisted dying. That is why it is important that the amendment is made. In her oral evidence on 28 January, Dr Cox said,
“I would say that you cannot always identify coercion. You can identify it when it is very obvious and extreme, but when it is very subtle, we cannot always identify it. After the event, there is nobody to tell us about coercion, so it is very difficult to monitor.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 73, Q90.]
I would also like to point out that California’s law prohibits coercion or undue influence, so there is established precedent in using this phrase in the safeguards of assisted dying law. If we have the ambition for our law—if it is to pass—to be the safest in the world, we need to add the term “undue influence” as a minimum.
Even with that additional safeguard, however, Dr Spielvogel rather worryingly said in his oral evidence,
“I have seen assisted dying laws go into practice across numerous states and have helped many, many people through this process, and I have never seen a case where I even suspected coercion.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 101, Q139.]
Richard Robinson of Hourglass, in his oral evidence, said,
“I think that coercion is underplayed significantly in cases of abuse of older people…One of the biggest issues we face is the fact that we have no idea of the levels of training that healthcare professionals and the judiciary receive to understand and recognise coercion. That leaves us in a situation where medical professionals say that coercion in these circumstances is minimal, but people need to understand what coercion is and how to recognise the signs of it in the first place, especially bearing in mind that the vast majority of cases that we see take place in the home and by family, rather than by professionals.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 158, Q196.]
Additionally, psychiatric and legal experts have said that undue influence is relevant in this context. In written evidence, Professor Allan House refers to undue influence as
“coercion in its less overt or threatening forms”.
He also draws attention to the great risk of undue influence in the case of couples seeking assisted suicide at the same time. The probate lawyer Tamasin Perkins, in an article on the Bill, says,
“Undue influence or coercion is depressingly common in the arena of contested wills and gifts.”
She suggests that the current law on undue influence could be usefully incorporated into the Bill. To those who worry that adding undue influence could make things more difficult for clinicians when assessing, I would say that it is absolutely right on something of this gravity that rigorous consideration is given to the possibility of undue influence.
I turn to amendment 82, which adds the term “encouraged” to coercion and pressure. This amendment is in line with Dr Mullock’s advice in both her written and oral evidence. It is important to note that encouraging suicide is currently a crime under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. It is also important to note that the Bill does not decriminalise encouragement, only assistance. Clause 24 decriminalises only the assistance component, not the encouragement component. Thus, if the Bill were to pass, encouragement of assisted dying would still be a crime. That is absolutely right and something that I fully support.
As encouragement of suicide is clearly recognised as a heinous crime, it surely must follow that when considering whether someone is eligible for such assistance to end their life, consideration is given to whether they have been a victim of such a crime. This feels like a rather basic safeguard that is missing from the Bill and must be rectified. As former Attorney General, Victoria Prentis, has written,
“maintaining the prohibition on encouraging suicide is key to protecting vulnerable people”.
She says it is a problem, though, that
“doctors and judges under the bill are not required to check whether the person’s decision is their own or whether they have been encouraged by others.”
She goes on to say that she hopes the Committee will support my amendment, and David Hughes—formerly of the Law Commission—says that keeping the offence of “encouragement” would help to prevent “insidious pressure”.
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
The hon. Lady uses the term “encouragement”. If I were in a situation where a loved one wanted to access assisted dying, and I said I supported their wishes, would that fall under the scope of encouragement? We do not want to end up in a situation where people who support their loved ones end up dragged through a legal process, when it is actually the case that they are there to enable their wishes, rather than pushing them to it. How would she differentiate between those?
Rebecca Paul
That is an important point. Obviously, case law becomes quite important in this. Supporting someone’s decision is very different from encouraging someone who was not in the place of wanting to go through with assisted dying. Again, these things do sometimes end up in the courts, because sometimes it can be a grey line. It is important that we have this protection. Right now, it is an offence to encourage someone to commit suicide, and we need to recognise that. That is the law right now.
Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)
The hon. Lady makes an important point. The idea is that the Bill makes an exception to the Suicide Act. I fully support her point about the supportive nature of the conversations that would take place with families. If we use the word “encourage”, we are in danger of lacking clarity. Where is the line between encouragement and support? I would like her to expand on that, if she could.
Rebecca Paul
I do not think that we are trying to exempt something from the Suicide Act through the Bill; we are decriminalising something that is currently a criminal offence. Right now, it is a criminal offence to assist someone to commit suicide, and clause 24 decriminalises that. I totally support what you have done here, but your Bill does not decriminalise encouragement. I imagine that you have done that for very good reasons, which I support; we do not want people to be able to go round encouraging people to commit suicide. It is vital that there is protection for the vulnerable people we have talked about. You are absolutely right that what constitutes encouragement can be subjective and difficult to determine, but encouragement is already in the law, so we have to deal with it. It is already a criminal offence to encourage a suicide, so it does not make sense not to deal with it in this Bill.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
I will do my best to abide by that, Ms McVey. My recollection of the oral evidence is that the practitioners from California made it very clear that there was not a great deal of coercion, but they had seen families put undue pressure on people to prevent them from pursuing assisted dying. Given human nature, I find it incredible that the pressure would go only in that way and not in the other. I see the proposals as ensuring that and safeguarding people who are at a very vulnerable stage of their lives. Will the hon. Lady speak to that?
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree. It is important to recognise that different people will have different views on levels of coercion. I have already quoted some of the witnesses; I found it quite jarring that certain witnesses who had facilitated assisted dying for hundreds—perhaps thousands—of people said that there were no cases of coercion. I find that difficult to believe, although I do not doubt for a second that they believe it.
Kim Leadbeater
The witnesses gave evidence in good faith, and I would be uncomfortable if we started to question the validity or truth behind their testimony.
Rebecca Paul
Just to clarify, I am not questioning that they were not telling their truth. I completely believe that, from their perspective, they honestly believe they have never seen a case of coercion. Maybe I am more of a glass-half-empty kind of girl than some other people, but I question whether that is really the case. In my 45 years on this planet, I have learned enough about humankind to know that these things do happen, but different people will take different views when it comes to detecting them.
Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
The hon. Lady has made some important points. I repeat something I said yesterday in response to another Member: the word “coercion” and the idea of encouragement were not even in the vocabulary in this place until very recently—only 10 years ago. I do not want to dismiss people’s expertise, but for me it is quite a leap of faith—I wonder whether she shares that idea—to believe that in that jurisdiction, zero people were coerced, when every other jurisdiction records people being coerced and people saying they feel a burden.
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree. The hon. Member has made some powerful points over the course of this Committee. The reality of the matter is, like the hon. Lady said, this has not really been considered fully until recent times. I think we are now all much more aware of the coercion and pressure that goes on. It is only right, when we are making this decision now, to be fully aware of that and have our eyes wide open to the realities.
At the end of the day, we are not legislating for when it works perfectly for that ideal candidate who absolutely wants to do this for all the right reasons and they are in pain, which is exactly what the Bill is designed for. We are legislating for that big group of people who are vulnerable, and who it may not work for. That is a much bigger group. We heard compelling evidence from Dr Jamilla Hussain, which really impacted me, about this big group of vulnerable people who could be detrimentally impacted. We must make legislation for the group that could be negatively impacted. They should be our focus.
Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
I am very struck by that last point. Does my hon. Friend agree that the purposes of these amendments build on the principle of the Bill? The Bill recognises the existence of vulnerable groups and attempts to introduce safeguards. It is not a free-for-all. The absolute purpose of the Bill is to ensure that vulnerable groups are protected.
My hon. Friend’s amendments support the principle of the Bill, which says that encouraging suicide remains illegal. By implication of the Bill, to encourage people to take an assisted suicide should be illegal too. My hon. Friend is actually building on the principle of the hon. Member for Spen Valley’s Bill, and I hope the Committee will not regard these amendments as in any way harmful to its purpose or as an attempt to make it more impractical in operation. They would make the Bill clearer. To the point made by the hon. Member for Spen Valley about overcomplicating things—I think the complications exist in the current text of the Bill, whereas my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate would be clarifying its purpose.
Rebecca Paul
My hon. Friend makes the point powerfully. I say to everyone in this Committee—we had this discussion yesterday—that I am not opposed in principle to the concept of assisted dying, but I see my role here as to protect the vulnerable. That is what I am trying to do, and I know everyone here wants to do exactly that. I cannot really see any downside to these amendments. Why would the Committee not want them included, if we want to protect the most vulnerable? Yes, it may put a bit more onus on clinicians, because they would need to look for a lower level of coercion. But that is absolutely right—of course they should have to do that. We are talking about assisted death. It is really important that we have a higher level of consideration.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
I understand that much of the difference between us on this may founder on our perception of what is actually happening. She speaks of suicide, and to some of us—certainly to me—suicide is a healthy person taking their life, but what we are talking about is somebody who is seeking to take control of their inevitable death in these circumstances. For me, those two are qualitatively different.
I am concerned about my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate injecting an element of jeopardy into what should ordinarily be normal conversations with one’s family. For example, I could see a point at which, if I were in those circumstances and was thinking about seeking assistance to end my life, I would discuss that with my wife: “Darling, am I doing the right thing? Is it the best thing for the kids? I think I’m going to have a horrible death, and I’m trying to decide.” We heard from families—and have done over the last 10 years—who, very often in anguish support their loved one, even to the extent that they are willing to break the law. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough said, the line between support and encouragement is quite fine. If somebody were to come forward and say, “Well, I’ve spoken to my family. They all think I am doing the right thing”, could that not be interpreted as encouragement? I am conscious that we should not try to police what should be open and natural discussions between families in a way that injects jeopardy for them and the person to the extent that they might start to modify what they say to the doctor to ensure that they get the outcome they want.
Rebecca Paul
I thank my right hon. Friend for that very useful contribution. First, I am saying “suicide” because we are talking about the Suicide Act, and I cannot perform this role without naming the actual bit of legislation that we are talking about. I know people here are a little bit squeamish about the word “suicide”, but it has a clear legal meaning.
Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)
Will the hon. Member give way?
Rebecca Paul
Not yet; I am finishing my point. It has a clear legal meaning, and we must not put the blinkers on. I would suggest to Members that if they have an issue with the word “suicide”, they remember that this will actually result in the end of someone’s life. We must not be squeamish about using correct and accurate terminology in what we describe.
The second point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire is a really good point: it is a fine line and it is really difficult. I have proposed this amendment not because I want “encouragement” specifically to be in the Bill, but because the encouragement of suicide is already a crime. I am being logical and taking what is already a criminal offence under the Suicide Act. If we do not include it in the Bill, it means that someone can commit a criminal offence against a victim, and that does not preclude the victim from being eligible for assisted dying, so I am suggesting a very logical amendment. My right hon. Friend makes a great point, but if we have an issue with the word “encouragement”, we need to take that up with the drafters of the Suicide Act, which was long before my time in 1961.
Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
Does the hon. Lady agree on the value of her amendment, and the value of introducing the word “encouraged” into the Bill? Reflecting on what has been said about the “fine line” argument by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire and the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, the value of inserting this amendment is that, where it can be proven beyond doubt that someone has encouraged or actively sought to influence someone else to choose assisted death, that is a crime encoded in the law.
To the point made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire, in discussions among families about this possibility, and where spouses are supporting each other in this decision, it will never be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a crime of encouragement has taken place. By putting it in law, where encouragement can be proven—and it must be proven—it can be prosecuted as the criminal offence that it would be.
Rebecca Paul
As ever, the hon. Lady so eloquently makes her point and I completely agree. I am not a lawyer but, given that the Suicide Act made the encouragement of suicide a criminal offence back in 1961, I imagine there is quite a lot of case law that would help define where that line is drawn on encouragement, but I would refer to better qualified people than myself.
Rachel Hopkins
I reassure the hon. Lady that her sweeping statement about us all being squeamish when talking about suicide may not be accurate. I would put it back to her: how squeamish is she when talking about assisted death, because we are actually talking about two separate things here? I reiterate the point made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire: a healthy person taking their own life by suicide is different from a terminally ill person, who is facing their death, ending their life by shortening their death. Would she accept that point?
Rebecca Paul
I am talking in legal terms, because we must use the right language. Under the law, I think what the hon. Lady said is not correct. I stand to be corrected by someone who is a lawyer, but given that we are amending the Suicide Act, I think technically an assisted death is the assistance of a suicide. I understand that the hon. Lady would like to reframe that and use different words to describe it. Maybe that could be done, but right now, under the law, it would be suicide.
Rachel Hopkins
If the Bill becomes law it would be a different situation, which is exactly what we are scrutinising.
Danny Kruger
What the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire said is not the case at all. What the Bill would do is to exempt people who go under this new procedure from the operation of the Suicide Act. It would not create some new category of person; the law would just operate in a different way. I recognise that she is saying that, in her mind, there is a difference between somebody who is dying who has an assisted death and somebody who is healthy who commits suicide, but that is a completely arbitrary distinction in reality. Many people who have terrible diagnoses kill themselves, even though one might say that they are not actually dying and they could be treated. Should that person qualify?
Entering into the mind of someone who wants to take their own life is an absolute impossibility, and that is the whole problem with this Bill: we are trying to create distinctions that are impossible to police properly. It goes to the point of my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire about trying to police private conversations. That is what this Bill entails. We are inviting the state to intrude, in an absolutely impossible way, on what is going on in people’s minds. To go back to the point made by the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire, there is no clear distinction between somebody who would choose assisted dying through a doctor’s prescription and one who would choose to take their own life without assistance. It is not possible to draw that distinction. In fact, we have seen so many times that people who might want to kill themselves one month change their mind a month later. I am afraid that this is the challenge with the whole Bill.
Rebecca Paul
I support my hon. Friend’s comments. Outside of this place, I speak about this topic in a manner that is as sensitive as possible. When we are talking about the legislative changes that are needed to this Bill and how it interacts with other legislation, I will use the correct legal terminology, because I think it is really important that we do that.
Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)
I appreciate the hon. Lady raising the need to use accurate legal language. Does she agree, therefore, that introducing “undue influence”, which is used regularly in the law of equity but not in the criminal law, would unhelpfully complicate matters, considering that coercive behaviour is defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 where it provides for an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in that context? We have 10 years of case law. The hon. Lady rightly pointed to the importance of looking at case law and at how courts have dealt with this; the understanding of coercion in the criminal law offences is well known and well rehearsed, whereas the use of undue influence in the context of criminal law offences, which is what we are dealing with in clause 26, is not.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Lady for that point, but I do not think we are talking about criminal law here. This debate is not relevant to clause 24—it is relevant to eligibility. We are simply saying, through this amendment, that if a clinician thinks someone has been unduly influenced, they would not be eligible. I think the hon. Lady is crossing over to the encouragement point, but these are separate points.
Rebecca Paul
I am sorry, but I am going to give way to the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, if he still wishes to intervene, as I am aware that he has been waiting.
Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)
I want to bring us back to the points raised by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire. I may have misread this, but I understand that, under the current law and under the law as it would stand if this legislation were introduced, it would remain an offence to encourage somebody to commit suicide with a 12-month diagnosis—perhaps someone with motor neurone disease or Parkinson’s disease, who may still be a loved one. I do not understand the counter-argument about not using the word “encouraged”: it would remain a criminal offence, unless I am mistaken, to encourage someone to take that decision if they had a diagnosis of longer than six months left to live.
Rebecca Paul
That is exactly right. As I have mentioned, I am not bringing in the concept of encouragement; it is already in the law and currently an offence. I am putting forward this logical amendment in order for the Bill to deal with that. If we do not do that, we have not circled the wagons.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
I have no doubt that my hon. Friend speaks to the amendment with very good intentions due to genuine concerns about the safeguards. We have talked a lot about coercion. Clause 1(2)(b) sets out a requirement that the person,
“has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it.”
“Pressured” is an important word. If we look at the case law, there are the comments of Lord Nicholls in the case of Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Etridge (No. 2) in 2002. He looked at two components of the concept of undue influence. There are acts of improper pressure or coercion, such as unlawful threats, which fit with the coercion element of the Bill as drafted. There are also relationships where one has acquired over another a measure of influence or ascendency, of which the ascendent person takes unfair advantage without any specific acts of coercion. Could my hon. Friend set out why she thinks “unduly influence” would add something beyond what “pressured” already does in the Bill?
Rebecca Paul
My hon. Friend is very knowledgeable about these things and is well qualified on the legal side. I value his contributions on this matter. The reason I want to include “unduly influence” is because it deals with those more subtle forms of coercion. Arguably, it could be included in “coerced or pressured”, but by including “unduly influence” in the Bill it becomes more explicit that a clinician has to be looking for it. In the absence of the language, clinicians will not be required to look for those more subtle forms of influence.
The provision is something that is included in the assisted dying laws of other jurisdictions. We have the opportunity here to learn and benefit from jurisdictions that have already implemented it. We heard various witnesses give us very useful evidence during the sessions. For example, California includes “undue influence” in the law. We should recognise that there is value in including it here. It is a well-established legal term that is used in myriad situations, so it is relevant that we include it.
Naz Shah
May I take the hon. Member back to the point of clause 24, and the issue of suicide and the terminology there? Perhaps the Minister could respond as well, although I am not sure how that would work in this Committee. What I think we are doing in clause 24 is to decriminalise encouraging suicide. That is my understanding. So can we have some clarity? Are we trying to decriminalise encouraging suicide? That is what clause 24 says, so in that case it would be absolutely right to talk about the word “encouragement”.
Rebecca Paul
Clause 24 decriminalises assistance to commit suicide, in order that assisted dying becomes lawful. It does not specifically decriminalise encouragement, which means that the Suicide Act 1961 still applies if someone were to encourage someone to commit suicide. It would therefore be a crime and have a sentence associated with it. However, the hon. Lady makes a really good point: it would be of great value at the relevant time to hear from the Minister on the legal point I am making. I hope everything I am saying is coherent and sound, but it would be useful to hear from the Minister.
Kim Leadbeater
The hon. Lady is doing an amazing job—and taking lots of interventions. As I have always said, I am very open-minded to whatever we need to do to make the Bill more robust. I am not a lawyer, like the hon. Lady—we have lawyers in the room, fortunately, who can provide guidance and assistance in that regard—but what has been made clear to me is that the law needs clarity.
The hon. Lady has already mentioned a couple of times that this change could be described as a lower level of coercion, or it could be argued that there is a lack of clarity there. I think the sentiment is absolutely right, and I really support that, but we need the law to be clear. And if legal colleagues are assuring us that the concept of undue influence would be covered under “coercion”—and I am kind of hearing that—then I think it would be covered. I think that point about the law being clear is really important. Does the hon. Lady agree with that?
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. I know that she is wholeheartedly seeking to make sure that the safeguards in the Bill are as good as they can be, so I very much appreciate her recognising the positive intent behind my amendments.
It would be useful to understand whether those who are legally qualified believe that undue influence is already covered by “coercion”. I am not qualified to give a view on that, but if that were the case, that would provide some reassurance, and that could then maybe be included in guidance. However, I would want to see a legal opinion on that.
In the absence of such a legal opinion, putting that on the face of the Bill is the safest—and the right—thing to do at this point in time. I suspect that we will be voting on this shortly, before we can get a legal opinion, and given that we are talking about safety here, I would rather go for belt and braces and include “undue influence” on the face of the Bill.
Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)
Can I just clarify something? As my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said, I understand that “undue influence” has an existing meaning, but only in equity law. The hon. Lady herself mentioned wills, for example, being challenged in probate. There, as I understand it, the burden of proof rests fully on the person challenging the will; there is not an active test that someone has not been unduly influenced. If the hon. Lady is to use undue influence as an existing legal concept, would she favour reversing the presumption on the burden of evidence? In addition, I think there is a distinction between actual undue influence and presumed undue influence in the case law. I wonder which of those she thinks we should be using when considering this amendment.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I think the point on probate is right; it is commonly used there, but it is not just used in that situation. My understanding is that, when it comes to decisions by clinicians with regard to withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, undue influence is one of the considerations.
Danny Kruger
Just to amplify that point, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. In the “Re T” case, the Court of Appeal judged that undue influence should be taken into account in medical decisions, so that is an existing principle in law. It feels totally appropriate to bring that in here, seeing as, as we have discussed, the principle already exists that it is wrong to encourage suicide, and that it is possible to have undue influence without coercion or pressure being present. To address the point made by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, I do not think those terms are adequate to include undue influence; undue influence can exist even when there is no evidence of coercion.
Rebecca Paul
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. The point that I would make is about an example that we talked about a lot yesterday, so I know that it resonates for many on the Committee. If someone is making a decision and a treatment is being withdrawn, or life support is being turned off, undue influence is already one of the things they consider, so when we are considering assisted death, surely, in order to be consistent, we would apply undue influence to that as well, rather than having a lower level. Why would we have a lower threshold for assisted dying compared with withdrawal of treatment?
Sarah Olney
The hon. Members for Sunderland Central and for Penistone and Stocksbridge said of existing concepts in law, “This is how they have always been used.” It was reminiscent of the conversation we had yesterday about the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and mental capacity being an established concept in law, and “This is the way that it is always applied.” Does the hon. Lady agree that although precedent and established usage are extremely important, the Bill is quite a novel piece of legislation, and it is really incumbent on us as a Committee to ask ourselves whether we need to approach this piece of legislation in a different way, compared with other pieces of legislation that have gone before; and whether, just because something has always been used in a particular way, it is still appropriate for it to be used in that way for this legislation, as a general principle?
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree. If we do not incorporate undue influence, we are at a lower threshold compared with withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. That does not feel to me like the right position, but equally, this is a novel bit of legislation and we need to increase the safeguards further. Obviously, we shall be debating numerous amendments whose purpose is to raise that threshold. It is always very hard—how long is a piece of string?—to know exactly where to set a threshold. Different people have different views. My personal view is that in this Bill the threshold is too low, so we need to raise it by agreeing some of these amendments. So far, none of the amendments that have been suggested has been accepted. I really hope that during this Committee stage we will increase the safeguards.
Kim Leadbeater
Hopefully this will be my final point on this subject. I believe there is consensus in the room; no one is saying that undue influence is acceptable. The question is, where does it sit within the Bill in terms of definitions? That is where I would appreciate, along with the hon. Lady, advice from legal experts—and indeed the Minister—around whether we are confident that with the concept of coercion we are including undue influence. Does she agree that that clarity would be helpful?
Rebecca Paul
I absolutely agree that such clarity would be very useful. The hon. Member and I both want to ensure that undue influence is captured somewhere; I am less picky about where. As long as it gets covered somewhere in the Bill, that would be an improvement to the Bill, and I hope that everyone would really welcome that. I think everyone recognises the issue. I am not hearing that people are opposed to this; they recognise that there can be more subtle forms of coercion. If we can work together to find the best place for that to go in the Bill, I am very open to that.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)
It might help if I offer—with the usual caveat that of course the Government are neutral—the Government’s position with respect to what the hon. Lady has been discussing. It is important to point out that the terms “coercion” and “coercive behaviour” and “pressure” that are used on the face of the Bill appear in existing legislation without statutory definition. In other words, they are given their ordinary meaning and they operate effectively in that manner in the criminal law. The hon. Lady is absolutely right that clause 26, which we shall come to in due course, is a separate matter, but of course it will be important to review the Bill as a whole and to understand the interaction between the different provisions in clause 1, as we trace it through to the criminal offences.
It is the Government’s view that manipulative behaviour or undue influence—the terms that the hon. Lady is using—would come within the normal meaning as understood in case law by the judiciary of the terms “pressure” and “coercion”. In terms of the integrity of the statute book, there is a concern that by adding additional terms, we run the risk of creating confusion, because when it comes to the interpretation of those provisions, judges will be looking to understand and ascertain what Parliament meant by “undue influence” that was not currently covered by coercion. Given that those terms are commonly broadly interpreted, it is the Government’s view that the sorts of behaviours that the hon. Lady is describing—“undue influence”—would be covered by the terms used on the face of the Bill. For simplicity, given that our existing body of law interprets those provisions widely, and to ensure consistent application of the law in this context and other contexts where coercion arises, it is important from the Government’s point of view to retain the Bill’s current wording.
Rebecca Paul
It is helpful to understand the Government’s position. If the amendment is not made, I hope that the Minister is right, but one thing that I have learned in my time is that different judges will have different views on these things. Personally, I would prefer to see this provision in the Bill, as it would absolutely ensure that the protection is in place. We all know that decisions in the courts can sometimes go a different way from what we expect.
Naz Shah
I have a concern about what the Minister says. As one psychiatrist put it, the Bill is very novel and untested. The MCA has not been tested. Now the Government say that this will work, without consultation or any impact assessment. I struggle to understand that. Does the hon. Lady share my concern that this does not feel right?
Rebecca Paul
It is reassuring to hear that I am not the only one worried about this, so I thank the hon. Lady for that.
Danny Kruger
I understood the Minister to say that the judge needs clarity when they come to adjudicate on a case. We have heard through the media, although an amendment has not yet been tabled, that a judge will not oversee the process. Does my hon. Friend share my concern that we are setting up a legal system that will not provide proper legal oversight of the proposed measures?
Rebecca Paul
My hon. Friend’s point goes to the heart of the case, and to the point that I made earlier: it is extremely difficult when the Bill is a moving feast. We are tabling amendments to the Bill as drafted, but if substantial changes are made, that will impact some of what we did earlier.
Kim Leadbeater
We are looking at different amendments as the Bill progresses, but a judge would always be involved in criminal offences, which is what we are talking about now.
Danny Kruger
This is a very helpful conversation, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for allowing all these interventions. It is right that there would be a judge in the event of a criminal offence. We are trying to ensure that we do not get to that point by insisting that in the early stages of the process, when a doctor makes their assessment—indeed, when a judge makes their assessment, if there is still that judicial stage, as we hope there will be—they are required to ensure that there has not been undue influence. It is important that, at that early stage, they are asked to check not just whether there has been coercion. I hear what the Minister says about the concept of undue influence hopefully somehow being incorporated in the definition of coercion or pressure, but we need to ensure that that test is applied at a very early stage. The first people who discuss the matter with the patient should ensure that there has been no undue influence, which by the way is about much more than outright coercion; it is about an imbalance of power in the relational dynamics within families, which as we all know can be very complicated. That is what necessitates the amendment.
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. As always, he makes the point powerfully.
Naz Shah
Does the hon. Lady share my concern? My understanding is that, in normal parliamentary business, if the Government announce any changes to the law in the press first, they are usually rebuked by Mr Speaker in the Chamber. I appreciate that this is a private Member’s Bill, but a Guardian piece yesterday outlined how we will now scrap the involvement of a High Court judge and have a panel instead, with an amendment to be tabled to that effect. I am happy for my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to clarify how the system is going to change.
Once we have debated the amendments on undue influence and coercion, we have debated them. We cannot then come back to them, because of the nature of private Members’ Bills. Does the hon. Lady share my concern that, as we said yesterday, the horse has bolted? We are having to go over things and we might not be able to revisit this issue, which is why it is even more important to have probing conversations on the record so that, if nothing else, we can refer to them on Third Reading, for which we have only five hours.
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree with the hon. Lady. We should not make the mistake of assuming that certain amendments will be accepted. Until there is a Division, we do not know what the Bill is going to look like. It is incredibly difficult to table amendments early on when we do not know whether other fundamental things are going to change. That is why it is important that we are really thorough and improve the safeguards as much as we can, clause by clause. I do not want to get to the end of this process without our having accepted any of the improved safeguards, only for the Bill to be turned on its head at the end when there is a Division on something fundamental. As the hon. Lady rightly says, we do not get the opportunity to come back and review the decisions we have made on the back of that.
Sarah Olney
Further to the point made by the hon. Member for Bradford West, is it not a further complication that if a question is put in Committee and considered settled, it cannot be revisited on Report by any other Member outside the Committee? It may well be the case that amendments that are accepted further down the line fundamentally change the nature of the Bill, and Members who are not on this Committee will be prevented from revisiting questions in respect of the early clauses because the matter has been discussed in Committee, is considered settled and cannot be revisited on Report.
Rebecca Paul
As a new MP—there are many in the room today—I am still very much learning the process; we have to contend with not quite understanding how the full process works. In two years’ time, I think that I and many other new colleagues would be in a different position and would fully understand all the interactions and the subtleties of the legislative process. But it is a challenge I have, which is why, right now, I will always table the most robust amendments that I think will safeguard the most vulnerable in our society.
Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)
I would like to bring the Committee back to a certain amount of reality. What we are talking about is how we can assist clinicians to assess coercion and pressure. I like the way we have discussed this in a very good way, trying to make the Bill safe, but would the hon. Lady’s amendment make that any easier for the clinician? I do not think it would. The Bill is very clear as it is. I do not think there will be any implications if there are further amendments, because the Bill provides a statement of what we do; as a clinician, I would understand and be able to apply that.
Rebecca Paul
The hon. Member is absolutely right that the amendment would not make it easier for the clinician. My job is not to make it easier for the clinician to determine that someone is eligible for assisted death. It should be a robust, rigorous and well-considered process.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
I find the hon. Lady’s point about the mechanism by which we are making this legislation to be very pertinent. I have been here for almost 10 years. As somebody from a small party, I suspect we are all experiencing how Bill Committees work from the outside, if you like. We need a note of humility. On the one hand, we are all here trying to make this Bill a piece of legislation that is as watertight as possible. That very much then comes over to the Government; I know we are here on a private Member’s Bill because of the nature of the ethical question with this Bill, and I am very comfortable with that, but none the less there is an immense responsibility in the next stages with the questions we raise. Perhaps it might be an idea not to push this question to a vote—although I leave that entirely to the hon. Lady—because that keeps the matter alive. There is an immense responsibility on the Government to listen to the issues that we can only touch upon here and to ensure they are all sewn together.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the right hon. Lady for that really helpful intervention. That is exactly the kind of advice that is extremely useful to us new MPs undertaking this process. I will have to make the decision on that question in a matter of minutes, and it is very difficult, but I will do my best to make the right decision.
New clause 5 seeks to define encouragement for the purposes of the Bill and includes some exclusions. We have already talked about some of the challenges with exactly what encouragement means, and clearly there are certain acts that we do not want to be captured by it. The aim of the clause is just to ensure that it is only intentional, targeted and effective encouragement that is covered. I am very open to working with the Government to ensure that the drafting reflects the intent; it may well be that some other things go in there to address some of the concerns raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire around support being given by families. No one wants to see that included in this definition—I think we all agree on that.
In summary, I hope hon. Members will view these amendments, incorporating undue influence and encouragement into clause 1, favourably, in order to bolster the safeguards in this Bill. It is vital that subtler forms of influence are addressed, to protect patients and to ensure that it is not just the obvious signs of coercion that are looked for. I also welcome amendment 113, tabled by the hon. Member for Broxtowe, which is very much in the same spirit as amendments 23 and 82 and would insert the word “manipulated”. I hope we will debate it because, if accepted, it would certainly improve the safeguards in the Bill.
Naz Shah
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady. Just to put it out there, to begin with on amendment 23, the Court of Appeal, in the case of “Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)”, held that undue influence was relevant to medical decisions and said that doctors must check for it. Undue influence is about power imbalance, rather than outright coercion.
That brings me nicely on to the points we discussed in some detail yesterday. The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire talked about having a conversation with his family, with his wife and children and so on. I will give another example. Say there is a woman who has been the victim of domestic violence—we know this happens; we know two women a week are killed in this country, to this day—and she is subtly encouraged: “Sweetheart, you’ve got a diagnosis and the option is to have this.” There is a fine line, and the fine line conversation has been mentioned quite often as well, but I would rather stay on the side of caution with that fine line conversation when it comes to domestic abuse, coercion and the power imbalance in a relationship.
Let me come back to that woman or elderly person whose loved ones have the conversation—and they indeed have the conversation; it happens every day. Ask any victim of domestic violence. On average, it takes a woman 40 attempts to leave an abusive partner—that is the fact—because we do not even recognise it.
I know somebody who recently left an abusive partner—that took three years of encouragement because she did not recognise that what was happening to her was about power and control. It is when power is juxtaposed with vulnerability that there is the potential for abuse. That happens—it happens every single day. Victims of domestic abuse are not just younger people; according to Age Concern, over 375,000 older people are at risk of domestic abuse.
The abuse of people is a cancer in our society, and that very subtle power imbalance is where the fine line is crossed. Given that the Court of Appeal has ruled and is already saying that medics have to look out for undue influence, I would argue that amendment 23 actually strengthens the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has repeatedly insisted that this Bill needs to be the tightest in the world. How does the amendment not complement her view? How does it not strengthen the Bill, to protect victims?
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
My hon. Friend mentioned domestic violence and vulnerable people. Do we not also need to think about the many people in hospital beds and nursing homes who may not have any relatives? They might get influenced or encouraged to choose this route by professionals because of the pressure on the NHS and hospices. Amendment 23 would strengthen the Bill in that respect as well.
Naz Shah
I would like to hope that that would never happen; I have a huge love of the NHS and of the people I know in it who make decisions every day, particularly given all the cuts—even more so, post covid. But there is that risk; I would like to hope that it is very small.
When it comes to mental health, the debate is similar to the one about capacity: it is the same conversation about whether something is fit for purpose. Just because something already exists does not mean that it will necessarily suit what we are doing here.
On International Women’s Day, the Minister for Safeguarding and Violence against Women and Girls, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), eloquently reads out a list of victims of domestic violence who have been murdered. There are two a week—I make no apologies for keeping coming back to this. Only yesterday, there was an article about women’s charities that support victims of domestic abuse citing their concerns. The amendment speaks to those concerns. How could it not be supportive?
I am not convinced by the idea that the amendment would introduce an element of jeopardy. People make decisions with their families every day. We sit and have conversations. I speak from a position of privilege—as we all do in this place, frankly. We speak from positions of privilege about how we could have these conversations with our families. But we know that inequalities exist and that some people do not have those privileges. We know that society is unequal. We know that domestic abuse, elder abuse and mental health issues exist.
In my constituency, it takes 14 months just to get a child and adolescent mental health services referral for a young person; I appreciate that we are not talking about young people. My point is that there is a real backlog in the NHS—in terms of waiting times and pain medication, for example. Palliative care is not equal, as I said yesterday. I am genuinely asking Committee members: which bit of the amendment can we not support?
Sarah Olney
The hon. Lady is making a powerful speech. She referred to an article she read yesterday about domestic violence in relation to the Bill; it may have been the article by Sarah Ditum in the New Statesman, which I also read yesterday. It cited two cases in which people had been on trial for murder and had pleaded mercy killing, or said that they had carried out the killing of their spouse or partner on the basis that that person was suffering greatly at the end of their life. In both cases, when the evidence was examined, the men were found guilty of murder, because it was very clear that that was what had actually happened.
The article had a profound impact on me, because it demonstrated the risk that we are running: that people will be able to use the Bill in instances of domestic violence. We have to take that very seriously and consider the implications.
Kim Leadbeater
My hon. Friend is making some powerful and important points about, sadly, a lot of the ills in society, which we all deal with.
Let us take the example of a woman who has a terminal illness and is coerced and pressured by a loved one to end her own life. At the moment, we have no idea whether that has happened, because there is no legal framework around that dreadful situation. The Bill would create a legal framework, so that conversations would be had with that woman prior to that point and, hopefully, that point would never come. She would speak to two doctors, potentially a psychiatrist, and other experts to ensure that that did not happen. At the moment, there is no legal framework around that. The Bill also includes a criminal offence of coercion, for which someone could go to prison for 14 years. At the moment, that just is not there.
Naz Shah
I thank my hon. Friend, but I feel that the point is being missed. It is true that there is no framework, but for somebody to get to this point in the first instance they need to have a terminal illness. There is a framework around domestic violence, and domestic violence laws exist for everybody. Frameworks already exist for women fleeing domestic violence, and there is no shortage of attempts to try to get those legal frameworks right across society. That is why we had the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, why we have committed to halving violence against women and girls, and why the Prime Minister made a personal commitment in that regard—and rightly so.
There has already been a test case in which a judge said that medics have an obligation in this context. An hon. Member referred yesterday to assisted dying being a treatment, although I disagree, and we had that conversation later.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
That was a misunderstanding; I was talking about “treatment” as a legal term.
Daniel Francis
From what I understand from the promoter of the Bill, the argument is that we should put these measures in place to protect from coercion people who have less than six months to live, but we would not put those protections in place for people who have nine or 12 months to live. If we are putting the measures in place for someone with six months to live, why are we not doing so for someone with nine or 12 months to live?
Naz Shah
My hon. Friend makes a valid point. There has already been a test case, and the Court of Appeal has ruled that undue influence is relevant to medical decisions and that doctors must look at it. If that is already a ruling, I struggle to understand the resistance to adding the words “undue influence” to a Bill that, in the promoter’s own words, should be the safest in the world. A judge has already ruled on it. We already know that we are not going to get to a judge. I struggle to understand this.
Kit Malthouse
As the Minister pointed out, the concepts that the hon. Lady is trying to embed in the Bill are already covered by what is a settled legal interpretation and a framework that, over the last 10 years, has become used to dealing with those issues. Do not forget that families who are going through such situations will be advised and will examine the legislation quite carefully. I am nervous about injecting yet another level of consideration for them that might mean that conversations are interpreted—by them, but not necessarily in a legal sense—in a way that is not beneficial to the patient.
I understand the group that the hon. Lady is seeking to protect—that is what we are all trying to do. But what about the majority of people in such circumstances, who might say, for example, “Darling, I am thinking about taking an assisted death because of my horrible disease. If you were me, what would you do?” If I then say, “Well, painful though it is for me, I would do exactly the same thing,” how would families interpret that?
I also want to respond to the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. He made a strong point, but I am not sure he is exactly right. I think that if at nine months I have a disease that is progressing, and somebody in my family says to me, “When it comes to it, Kit, you have absolutely got to take an assisted death. We really want you to,” and then when I get into the six-month period I do, and I tell the doctor, my interpretation is that would be covered under the Bill.
I think what the Minister was eloquently trying to establish was that we have to be careful about the clarity of the legal language, and not make it embroidered in a way that makes interpretation by laypeople as well as by lawyers more difficult and complicated. I will come on to this in the next grouping, but we must not use language in a way that skews behaviour, or that makes what should be healthy and fulsome discussions within families guarded and nervous.
Naz Shah
I have to respectfully disagree with the right hon. Member that this is a settled position. I also challenge, on the record, what the Minister said. I struggle to understand how the Minister and the Government can say that this is a settled position without having gone to consultation on the Bill and without having an impact assessment. That does not satisfy me. My role when I agreed to be on the Committee was to come in to scrutinise and help strengthen the legislation. In doing so, these are the things that I am pointing out, because the safeguards are not strong enough for me.
I come back to the Court of Appeal. This would be a medical intervention, albeit to end somebody’s life. It would be administering a lethal drug to end somebody’s life, and it would be done by medics. Medics are involved in every stage. If there is case law that has already established that doctors have to look at undue influence in medical decisions, then I say to every single person on the Committee: what are we resisting? When the Court of Appeal has already said so, why is the Committee debating keeping this language out because it makes things complicated?
Let us go back to the words of Dr Jamilla Hussain, who gave evidence to the Committee. She is a clinician, and she absolutely accepts that there are some people who would really benefit from this law. As a clinician, she wants to get there. Indeed, I spoke to Professor John Wright, and he said, “Naz, absolutely—this is where we need to be.”
Sean Woodcock
My hon. Friend is making a very powerful argument. She is absolutely right to focus on protecting the vulnerable people who this law might apply to. She has touched on medics. I also want to mention the state and its role in what we are talking about. For example, I am opposed to capital punishment, and I link this discussion to that because we are talking about the state providing an individual with a method by which they can end their own life, such as by handing them a pill. I am concerned that, if we are not taking these safeguards seriously, we are abandoning vulnerable people by allowing the state to aid and abet the misuse of the Bill against them. Does my hon. Friend share my concerns?
Naz Shah
I share my hon. Friend’s concerns about the Bill not being tightened and fit for purpose. We cannot afford for those people to slip through the net. One woman’s death is one too many. One older person’s death is one too many. That is the bar we have to set.
I come back to the words of Dr Jamilla: she said, “Yes, absolutely.” Every single Committee member, and anyone familiar with this debate, found it heartbreaking to listen to those who came in to give testimony about how members of their families died. Those stories will stay with us forever, and rightly so. That is why, in principle, I am supportive of where we need to get to with the Bill. However, as Dr Jamilla said, we cannot get there by ignoring this big lot of people with vulnerabilities and inequalities, who would absolutely need this legislation. We need to fix the inequalities first.
Let us be honest: as legislators, we know that we will not fix every ill in society, otherwise we would not need a police force. We would not need laws if everybody behaved as they should and supported each other. However, it is incumbent upon us, as legislators in this place, to try our best.
Nobody came to this Bill Committee thinking it was going to be a walk in the park. We certainly did not know that we were going to get evidence throughout it, and plenty of challenges are popping up. We came to this Committee—I came new to the subject—because it is of such importance. I sat in the Chamber for five hours on Second Reading, bobbing, but I did not get the chance to speak—and that happened to another 100 colleagues, who also did not get to speak. However, those who made contributions—whether they were for the Bill, concerned about the Bill or were clearly not going to support the Bill—did so because they feel very strongly about it. That is our responsibility.
I come back to amendment 23, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate: we should really consider adding it to the Bill, because that would strengthen it. The amendment does not dilute the Bill, and it does not add another hurdle given that the Court of Appeal has already said that there is a responsibility to look for undue influence. I do not understand the resistance to the amendment, which I will support.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
This debate has been very interesting and has reminded me of my life before being elected. When I was a barrister in court, I was often junior counsel and, by the time I stood up, all the best points had been taken. I feel a bit like that this morning.
I have some observations, the first of which is on what is in the Bill currently. My central submission is that the Bill does more than enough in this area, and that simplicity is what is required, especially when dealing with very complex and difficult subjects, which coercion is. There are two sides to the coin of coercion: one is about acts by third parties, such as family members or society at large, and the other is the individual making the decision.
Clause 1 is clear that, as part of the assessment made by the doctor, judge or panel, the person must have
“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”
voluntarily. That precisely echoes words from the Crown Prosecution Service guidance on whether to prosecute that is currently in operation. That guidance has been in use for some time, and it seems perfectly rational and logical to continue that.
The focus of the assessment should be on the individual and whether they make the choice freely. Clause 1 makes that clear, and I presume purposefully echoes the language from the CPS guidance. It then says it must be established that the person has
“made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it.”
That must of course be read with clause 26, which introduces a new offence:
“A person who, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure, induces another person to make a first or second declaration, or not to cancel such a declaration, commits an offence.”
That carries a sentence of up to 14 years in prison.
Jake Richards
I am very happy to share my CV afterwards. I practised as a barrister mainly in family law and Court of Protection law, but back in the day I also practised criminal law as a very junior barrister in the magistrates courts up and down the land.
I do not want to delve into the criminal element too much, because we are on clause 1, but it appears to me that the criminal offence set out in clause 26 is far stronger than the Suicide Act 1961, which talks of an act of encouragement. That is not included in clause 26, which talks about inducement—a much more holistic and wider concept than that of an Act probably drafted back in the late 1950s. In my submission, that brings the law far more up to date with modern concepts of coercion and pressure.
Rebecca Paul
The hon. Gentleman is making interesting points. This is probably more a question for the Minister. I have been focused on clause 24, in terms of encouragement, but clause 26 obviously makes coercion and pressure a criminal offence. The hon. Gentleman says he thinks coercion includes undue influence; does it include encouragement?
I seek clarification of whether undue influence and encouragement are captured in clause 26. When I tabled the amendments, I assumed not. If it is the case, how does that interact with the Suicide Act, which already makes the encouragement of suicide a criminal offence, and is probably not—I have not checked, so I would have to look—consistent with this? That needs to be looked at. It is easy to say that undue influence is included in coercion, but it has a knock-on impact on a lot of other things. We need to be really clear on that point.
Jake Richards
My answer to the hon. Lady’s first question is yes. In my view, clause 26 covers undue influence and encouragement—I could go on to state why.
My reading of the Bill is that clause 24(3) essentially removes from the Suicide Act persons who are by all the other criteria eligible for assistance in death under the Bill. The Act that will be created is, in my view, stronger in any event. That is why—I genuinely mean this respectfully, because the hon. Lady made good points in an impassioned speech—this argument about encouragement in the Suicide Act does not follow through. What we have here is a much safer and more modern piece of legislation, which is reflective of what we all think of when we think of coercion and pressure.
Rebecca Paul
Forgive me—I hope the hon. Gentleman will bear with me as I seek to understand this; he is obviously very learned in these matters. My understanding is that clause 24 takes out only the assistance piece, not the encouragement piece. I think the hon. Gentleman just said, if I am right, that encouragement now falls under clause 26, but encouragement is also captured in the Suicide Act 1961. That is my non-lawyer interpretation of reading the Bill. I am not saying that is absolutely right, but I would appreciate it if he could clarify that.
Jake Richards
My reading of the Bill—we are dealing with clause 1, but we will get to clause 24—is that clause 24(3) says:
“In the Suicide Act 1961, after section 2A (acts capable of encouraging or assisting suicide) insert”,
followed by the provisions in new section 2AA.
Juliet Campbell (Broxtowe) (Lab)
I have a question for the promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. We are having a lengthy conversation about coercion and pressure, and whether those two words are a catch-all for things that can be much more subtle and nuanced. That is the point of the amendment, and it is the point that I will make when I speak to the amendment I have tabled. Clause 26 suddenly introduces new language, with the word “dishonesty”, which brings in another type of coercion and pressure. Could we rethink the wording of clause 1(2)(b), which refers to a person who
“has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured”?
The words “coerced” and “pressured” are insufficient to cover the safeguards that we are asking for. They are not a catch-all. We are asking for something much more nuanced, and for other words to be added, just as the word “dishonesty” appears in clause 26.
Jake Richards
I did not draft the legislation, but my understanding is that the reason why the word “dishonesty” appears in clause 26—I do not know whether the Minister wants to comment on this—is that when there is a criminal offence, there needs to be a mens rea. The person who has committed the offence needs to have been intentional or reckless in doing so. As I say, I was a criminal barrister only very briefly; I am sure my law tutors are shaking their heads.
Naz Shah
The principle of statutory interpretation means that by mentioning one thing, we exclude others, so it is my understanding that having the terms coercion and pressure in the Bill excludes undue influence. Will my hon. Friend, who has clearly gone through this in detail, also comment on the fact that section 2A of the Suicide Act says that encouragement includes pressure?
Jake Richards
With respect, I think my hon. Friend is wrong: it is certainly not an exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account. The courts—this is why we have a common law system—interpret the language used in legislation.
Naz Shah
To build on that, I referred to the Court of the Appeal earlier, but when it comes to someone giving their organs, I think from the age of 12 or 13—I will try to find the reference—the words “undue influence” are used in the legislation. It comes back to the crux of my argument; I would like to understand why my hon. Friend is so concerned, from a legal perspective, about putting in the words “undue influence”, when they already appear in legislation.
Jake Richards
The issue I have is that if we open the door to all different types of terminology, it will never end. The law is best served when it is clear, simple and straightforward.
Jake Richards
Let me just make this key point. Members have raised the case of Re T. I must admit that I do not know that case, but I believe it is a 1992 Court of Appeal case about a refusal of treatment, so it is 33 years old. The law has moved on. As the Minister said earlier, the terminology of coercion and pressure is much more modern, and is used in legislation that has been drafted in the last decade, rather than the Suicide Act drafted in the 1950s and that Court of Appeal case from the early 1990s.
Last night, I briefly went back to my law books—I sound like I am really missing my old job—and looked into where the concept of coercion is used across different jurisdictions and areas. This is what I read: “Coercion is a phenomenon the courts have experience of handling. Generally, coercion as a concept in our law involves applying pressure, whether physical, psychological or moral, to force someone to act against their free will or better judgment. This pressure can manifest in various forms, such as threats of intimidation and undue influence, and is recognised across criminal, family, consumer and contract law.” It is used in forced marriage legislation. It is used in criminal legislation. Case law has made it very clear that coercion is used interchangeably with duress, defined as a constraint on a person’s choice.
I feel that we are dancing on the head of a pin. The law has been drafted by one of the most senior parliamentary draftspeople. The Government Minister has confirmed that the Ministry of Justice deems this to be a sensible course of action if this legislation is to proceed.
Dr Tidball
Does my hon. Friend agree, as Max Hill did in oral evidence, that it would be helpful to have definitions of the three concepts in clause 26? Although we are discussing an earlier clause, it is important to thread the needle with this statute and ensure that we are looking ahead, as the hon. Gentleman has rightly pointed out.
Jake Richards
That sounds very sensible—I think my hon. Friend is talking about her amendment.
Rebecca Paul
I am so glad that the hon. Member has spoken, because this is a really important conversation. I appreciate that we are getting a little ahead of ourselves, so I will be quick before the Chair tells me off. Section 2A of the Suicide Act includes pressure when it talks about encouragement. That is why it is so useful to have this conversation—because that could mean that encouragement is captured by clause 26. There is some work to be done. I stand by the amendments—it is really important that we have them on the face of the Bill—but, when we get to the relevant point in Committee, we need to think about the interactions of clauses 24 and 26 with the Suicide Act. I am sure that the Ministers will want to look at that, but we may need to be very clear what is included in what, which may require some things in the Bill so that there is no ambiguity. Does the hon. Gentleman agree?
Jake Richards
Yes. As I say, the amendments are perfectly reasonable; it is sensible to raise them and it is good that we are having this conversation. I have looked into this carefully and I take it seriously. I feel that the square is squared—or the circle goes all the way round, to mix my metaphors—but that does not mean that we should not look into this further when we get to the relevant clauses.
Danny Kruger
I am worried about the constant suggestion that we look at these issues later. The fact is that we do not know what the Bill will look like later. We do not know what amendments will be tabled or what will be agreed. It is always possible to revisit amendments that have been passed in the earlier stages if subsequent amendments make them otiose. The point is that we should not pass this opportunity to strengthen the Bill if we can.
On the point that the hon. Member for Rother Valley was discussing with my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate about the Suicide Act explicitly referring to pressure as a subset, as it were, of encouragement, that Act specifies that encouragement is the general, catch-all term and includes pressure. I think the hon. Gentleman is suggesting, and other hon. Members have suggested, that it is the other way round: that coercion or pressure somehow include encouragement. Surely encouragement is the broader term—it exists in the current law on suicide. What is the problem with using that term in addition to coercion and pressure, consistent with existing law? It is a broader and more sufficient term.
Jake Richards
On the first point, in fairness, the hon. Member for Reigate was talking about a clause that we are going to consider and the link between two different criminal offences in the 1961 Act and clause 26 of the Bill.
On the second point, the Bill—to coin a political phrase—needs to be fit for the future. The language used in legislation over the last decade when we are considering coercion—I use that word automatically because that is the language we use now—is much more appropriate than “encouragement”, which is slightly archaic, to be honest. Perhaps we need to look at the Suicide Act as well—although not in this parliamentary term; that is for the second term. [Laughter.] I have nothing further to add.
Juliet Campbell
I rise to speak to amendments 113 to 115 and 118 to 121, which would require steps to be taken to establish that a person seeking assistance has not been manipulated by another person.
The amendments would require the co-ordinating doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person has been manipulated, and would account for additional ways that a person can be influenced by another person into choosing an assisted death. Pressure and coercion may leave an individual feeling that they have no choice but to take that path; however, manipulation can make the person think that they made the choice themselves. Coercion is an overt and clear means of controlling someone, whereas manipulation is a hidden, psychological and deceptive means of control.
Dr Opher
We are all in this together. We all want the safest Bill possible, so we should defer to the legal side to form the safest language. I am not a specialist on this legal subject but we all want the same thing and we are arguing about words on which we perhaps just need to take advice, to make the safest possible Bill.
Naz Shah
In response to the intervention of my hon. Friend, we are here to make the Bill as safe as possible, but this is a new thing. When the Bill returns to the House, I have to make a decision on whether to support a new Bill that is of such huge magnitude to our communities and the whole country. This Committee is the only process available to us, and words matter.
I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe. The concept of manipulation, as she set out, is very important. I come back to the issue of abuse, particularly in respect of women. I have never heard the phrase “Fifty Shades of Manipulation”—that is an interesting one—but this happens every day, across society. I encourage people to talk about these words. We, as parliamentarians, benefit from that: we are better people for understanding other experiences, because different people bring different experiences to this conversation. I have certainly learned a lot, and it strengthens the House itself when we speak from positions that we have debated. That is the whole purpose of us being here. I am not concerned by talking about adding language—I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe shares my view—because that is point of us being here in the first place.
Juliet Campbell
To reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, I understand that the writers, promoter and sponsors of the Bill want it to be as simple as possible. The thought is that if we make it as simple as possible, there is less room for confusion and misinterpretation, but there are times when we can make things so simple that we allow far too much interpretation. Words such as those that the hon. Member for Reigate wants to be put into the Bill are really important. Manipulation is really important. Coercion and pressure are not measures of every type of controlling behaviour that happens to individuals.
Kim Leadbeater
I am very supportive of the sentiment behind my hon. Friend’s amendments, and she is making some really good points. Again, the question is about the simplicity of the language that goes in the Bill. The CPS guidelines on coercion and coercive control includes behaviour that is
“highly manipulative such as: ‘love bombing’ where the suspect will intermittently do what appears to be loving acts, seeking to present these as interrupting or negating the course of conduct”,
so there is language in there about manipulation. I hope that provides some reassurance that manipulation is seen to be part of the broader concepts of coercion and coercive control in the eyes of the law.
Juliet Campbell
I thank my hon. Friend for looking that up so swiftly. I still think that those additional words need to be included in the Bill. “Coercion” and “pressure” are used as a catch-all for manipulation, but the Bill does not allow people who are using it in their everyday life—doctors, clinicians, nurses and social workers—to understand that.
Naz Shah
I thank my hon. Friend for being so generous with her time. To come back to the CPS’s terminology, does she agree that, in an ideal situation, the Bill would be so safe that we would not need to look at that CPS definition? The Bill would be so tightly defined that nobody could be prosecuted for coercing somebody into taking the option of assisted death.
Juliet Campbell
I absolutely agree that we do not want people not to understand what the Bill allows them to do or not do. We spoke earlier about making the Bill simple enough for professionals to understand so that they know how to deal with particular instances, but it is not here to make life easy for professionals; it is here to ensure that anyone who is vulnerable—anyone who has six months to live, or for whatever other reason—is protected.
A continuous theme of our debates and all our conversations is that we must make safeguarding as tight as possible so that people are protected. I believe it is not too much to ask to include those additional words to ensure that the wording is as tight as possible and protects the people who need our protection every single day.
Danny Kruger
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady. May I say how much I agree with what she has been saying and the purpose of her amendments, which I will be supporting if we get the chance, as I will the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate?
I do not want to repeat what I said yesterday, but my general point is that we make decisions in a context. We are directly influenced by the people around us. I want to highlight the very powerful phrase that my hon. Friend used. She said that love can shroud decision making, and the influence and pressure that is applied to us can be shrouded in love.
Professor House, who gave evidence to us, talked about the enmeshment of people’s decision making with the influence of their loved ones and people around them. The fact is—hon. Members have made this point—that power dynamics in families are complicated, and where there is an imbalance of power, there is risk. The Bill implicitly acknowledges that through the safeguards that it attempts to create, but I do not think they are strong enough.
I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire is concerned that strengthening the Bill in this way will create an opposite risk, which is that a family member who was behaving perfectly properly could somehow be dragged into a prosecution, or that the application would be denied on the basis of a reasonable conversation that had taken place between loved ones—“My darling, do you think I should do this?” It is a lovely fictional conversation, a sweet exchange between a loving couple, but saying to somebody that you agree with the decision they have made and that you would support it, or that you are content with it or understand it, is not the same as undue influence—it is not even the same as encouragement. It is similar to the debate we will be having in due course about the role of the doctor making an overt suggestion of an assisted death, rather than consenting to a suggestion that has been made by the patient.
Kit Malthouse
My hon. Friend is asserting that those two things are different, but obviously, those assertions would be tested in court. If a person were to appear in front of the co-ordinating doctor and say, “Doctor, I want an assisted death and my husband thinks I should do it,” is that interpreted as encouragement? Is it support? Under the current legal framework, that would be interpretable and inquirable. However, as I said to my hon. Friend, I am not necessarily nervous that families would be dragged into some kind of legal conflict. I am concerned that they would seek to not get there at all, because the insertion of those words would make them so nervous about the conversation that they would become guarded.
We know from other jurisdictions that over time, people will come to understand this process. As I will refer to during our debate on the next grouping, they will also start to understand what they should not say, if we put into the Bill that there are things that will play negatively if they are revealed to the relevant authorities. My concern is that unless we keep the Bill simple and clear, and leave families and medics the space to have free, frank and open conversations that—from the medical point of view—cover the full range of options, we will start to restrict and police the conversation, and therefore make it that much more difficult.
Danny Kruger
The risk of gaming—of patients playing the game, and doctors seeking out words to say or not say—is an issue throughout the Bill. That is a general problem with the Bill; thankfully, it is not just a free-for-all. However, in the scenario that my right hon. Friend suggests, that is exactly my concern: if the patient says that their spouse agrees with them or encourages them, that should be a red flag. Under the current Bill, it is not clear that it would be. There is no obligation on the doctor to record that there has been undue influence or to push back, because at the moment, the doctor is looking only for evidence of coercion. As I will come to later, that bar is too low to use, so if the doctor hears those words, I would like him or her to start asking questions, to push back, and to satisfy himself or herself that there has been no overt encouragement or undue influence. That is the point of what we are trying to do.
Naz Shah
To come back to an earlier point—I want to make these points, simply because it is really important that we get them on the record—my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley talked about undue influence and encouragement perhaps being archaic terminology. However, just last year, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 cited undue influence, as did the Anatomy Act 1984. Acts passed by Parliament in the last few years have used that terminology, so does the hon. Member for East Wiltshire share my concern about the resistance to having those words added to this Bill?
Danny Kruger
The hon. Member is absolutely right—undue influence does exist in law, including in laws that have been passed very recently. I recognise that the hon. Member for Rother Valley is not impressed by laws that are more than 10 years old, but I hope he might be satisfied that a law passed last year is sufficiently up to date and modern for him to regard as morally valid. Undue influence is an existing term, and we should apply it in this case.
Kim Leadbeater
On that point, and in response to the comment made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, although I stand to be corrected by my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley, I do not think that he said that undue influence was an archaic term. I think it was the word “encouraged”.
Danny Kruger
If we are going to rule out the word “encouraged” on the basis of archaism, I do not know what we are going to do with the language. It is a perfectly acceptable term. We are still governed by the Suicide Act, to which the Bill refers and in which context it is framed, so it is appropriate to remember that the Act specifically prohibits encouragement and includes pressure within that concept. The two terms co-exist in the same section of the Suicide Act, so the idea that we cannot have more than one word, and that that is somehow confusing, is wrong.
Rebecca Paul
In the light of my hon. Friend’s points, I have an interesting fact that he might enjoy: “encourage” was added to the Suicide Act by the last Labour Government in 2009, and replaced “aids” and “abets”, so it is not that archaic.
Danny Kruger
My goodness, 2009 might be in the mists of history for the hon. Member for Rother Valley, but it was the last Labour Government. That is very good to know, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend.
The hon. Member for Spen Valley made the point, which is quite often made in defence of the Bill, that there is currently no framework to spot coercion, therefore the Bill creates greater protections for people. The fact is that, as the hon. Member for Bradford West said, there is no law that currently allows assisted dying, so no framework is necessary to prohibit encouragement or inducement to an assisted death—the opportunity does not exist. I think everyone must acknowledge that, if we pass the Bill, we may open up a new avenue for abuse, and it is necessary that the Bill close it off. That is right and appropriate.
Coercion and abuse no doubt go on and are tragically common, but the answer to that problem is not to legalise assisted suicide and put a regulatory framework around it with limited protections against coercion and influence. We have to deal with the terrible cancer of abuse and coercion that exists in our society, as the hon. Member for Bradford West said. If we are concerned about undue pressure in families, that should be our social mission. If we are to have an assisted dying law, let us make it as strong as possible. As I say, we are potentially opening up a new avenue for abuse within families.
Kim Leadbeater
For me, the law needs to change for a number of reasons, and we will talk about some of them as Committee proceedings continue: autonomy, dignity, personal choice and bodily autonomy. In terms of this issue, we heard from families who faced police investigations as a result of a loved one taking their own life. Not only were they dealing with the trauma, grief and loss of their bereavement, but they faced often months and months of police investigation. In the oral evidence sessions, we heard from Pat Malone, who was in that situation after his brother took his own life. Surely the hon. Member has to acknowledge that that is a problem. It is not the only problem, and it is not the only reason for the Bill, but he has to acknowledge that we as legislators have a duty to correct it.
Danny Kruger
I am sure that the hon. Lady will acknowledge that those investigations will still happen, because not everybody who commits suicide will be subject to the Bill; not everybody who is terminally ill and wants to take their life with the assistance of their loved ones will be caught under it. I am sure she acknowledges that it is therefore still appropriate to have safeguards against assisted suicide outside the law—in fact, the Bill strengthens those safeguards. Those will still continue. I also regard it as appropriate and necessary to have a law against assisted suicide, for all the reasons that we have been discussing.
The hon. Lady is right that it is appropriate for Parliament or the authorities in general to ensure that cases such as those we have discussed, and that have been powerfully testified to us, are handled sensitively. In an overwhelming number of cases, the police do handle them well and sensitively. It might be that we need to improve the guidance around prosecution, and that is an important question. I certainly do not want the families of people who have taken their own lives to be harassed and chased through the courts, and I think we would all agree on that. In that respect, the guidance for the CPS and the police will always evolve.
Naz Shah
The hon. Member may recall that we heard from the former head of the CPS in the oral evidence sessions, and I asked him whether the Bill would address concerns about such prosecutions. I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley that we want to address that. However, this Bill is not the route to address those issues unless they fall into that six-month bracket.
Danny Kruger
I think that is right. I do not accept the claim that this Bill is somehow a response to the problem of abuse, coercion or the pressure to end life in families. Tragically, in jurisdictions that have an assisted dying law, the number of unassisted suicides—suicides that happen outside of the law—go up, because no law can catch all the people who might want to take their own lives. Thankfully, there is no blanket support for any assisted suicide; all the jurisdictions have some restrictions.
More significantly, if the state said that some people’s lives are not worth living and that it is an acceptable choice for them to end their own life—which is not what the current law says; we have legalised suicide, not actually endorsed it—by passing a law that endorsed the choice of some people to take their own life, we would be sending a signal that we agree that some people’s lives are not worth living. The social consequence of that is clear in the evidence from other jurisdictions: suicide in the general population goes up as a result of an assisted dying law.
Kim Leadbeater
On that point, the evidence does not clearly show that there is a direct relationship between those two things; there are other factors and no way of knowing that. On the concept of ending one’s own life and giving people the choice under the provisions of the Bill, what would the hon. Gentleman say to people who frame that concept very differently—as a way to shorten their death? Those terminally ill people, in my experience—I have met many of them now—do not view this as a way of ending their life, because they want to live, but the reality is that they are dying and want to take control of what their death looks like. How would he respond to that?
Danny Kruger
First, there might not be a causal link between assisted suicide laws and the increase in unassisted suicides in those places, but there is such a clear correlation that it is difficult to understand what else might be going on—unless there is something in the water in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands that is not there in other countries. It might be that those countries have such a disrespect for the frail, elderly and ill that they are taking their lives. However, I think there would be a direct social impact from the signal that this law would send into our culture, which is very concerning.
I hear the hon. Lady use that phrase quite often about people wanting to shorten their death rather than their life, but I am afraid to say that it is absolutely meaningless. We are here to make law. Death happens: you are either alive or you are dead. People might want to shorten their death, and might use that phrase, but what they are doing is shortening their life. There is no conceptual difference and certainly no legal difference between those two things. Trying to say that some people’s motivation for suicide is legitimate and some people’s is not makes no sense. This law will allow them to shorten their life and have assistance in committing suicide, and there is no other way to describe it in any terms that make sense. I do not regard the distinction that the hon. Lady makes as valid.
Our obligation to ensure that the Bill sets out what it is claimed that we all want it to do, which is to ensure that people are not pressured unduly into taking an assisted death, means that we should put that in black and white. The hon. Member for Rother Valley said that the current term is more than enough, and we had a bit of an exchange about that. I emphasise that it is a clear principle of the statutory interpretation of law that courts will look at not just the words that are in the Bill, but the words that are not. The decision to include some words and not others is regarded as significant by courts. If the term coercion is there but not influence, it is appropriate for the courts to conclude that influence was not intended by Parliament. It might be the case that the term coercion is interpreted to include influence, but if so, let us make that clear.
Sean Woodcock
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way while he is in full flow. One of the areas that I have been confused about in this debate is that the Minister said—I have no reason to dispute it—that coercion is a clear term, so the courts know where they are with it, because they are already dealing with it. However, we have also heard from proponents of the Bill that it is about making life easier for the professionals who are involved. I mention that because, overhanging all of this is the fact that the Bill as it stands—as it passed Second Reading—has a High Court judge intervention. We are told that an amendment is coming that will remove that for a potential panel of professionals—