House of Commons (15) - Commons Chamber (10) / Written Statements (3) / Petitions (2)
House of Lords (9) - Lords Chamber (7) / Grand Committee (2)
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Grand Committee(10 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am obliged to say that if there is a Division in the Chamber while we are sitting, this Committee will adjourn as soon as the Division Bells are rung and resume after 10 minutes or as soon as members of the Committee are able to get here.
Schedule 13: Abolition of contracting-out for salary related schemes
My Lords, before I speak directly to the subject of the amendment tabled in my name, I would like to address some of the points raised in debate last Wednesday while we were still considering amendments to Clause 24 and Schedule 14. I will start by acknowledging the points made in Wednesday’s debate about the need to ensure that statutory mechanisms to amend schemes are used with care. We have not chosen to apply an override lightly and we recognise the need to ensure that the extent is tightly defined.
The primary legislation sets out the key limits on the scope of the changes under the override, but much of the detail that deals with this, including how the extent of the changes is limited, will be set out in the technical regulations that we have been working on with trustees, scheme managers, the actuary profession and pension lawyers. We intend the regulations to set out a methodology and the assumptions that will apply to the calculation of the lost rebate.
We also intend to set out in the same way how the impact of changes to scheme rules are to be valued so that the actuary can certify that the employer is not recovering more than the lost national insurance rebate. We will of course conduct a full public consultation before these regulations are laid. As I said in my letter to Peers, if it would be helpful I would be happy to offer a separate briefing meeting with officials before Report. This will allow us to go through our thinking in detail in a way that is not possible in debate or correspondence.
I also want to make clear that we do not see use of the override as a default position for employers. We expect the override to be used by employers only as a fall-back position where they need to offset the costs resulting from the end of contracting out and have no options available other than closing the scheme. As several Lords pointed out, there are long-standing and established ways in which employers work with trustees to make changes to schemes when required. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, when paraphrasing the Pensions Minister, said:
“The strong incentive, therefore, is … to have a mature conversation with the trustees in order to reach an agreement”.—[Official Report, 8/1/14; col. GC 427.]
The Government have every expectation that, in the majority of cases, employers will do that and trustees will fully engage.
However, employers have told us that without the override, some of them will have few or no options available to them because such agreement cannot be reached or because scheme rules will not allow it. They tell us that this will force them to close their schemes. Some trustees have told us that without the override, they will find it difficult to agree changes. We therefore believe that the override is necessary to avoid schemes being closed, even though we believe that in most cases employers and trustees will be able to explore other options. As employers and trustees can be expected to discuss scheme changes as a matter of routine, and as it is in their interests to do so, we do not believe that those discussions would be facilitated by overlaying legislative requirements concerning the content and time limits of consultation. That is why we have not provided for that.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne, also asked whether the changes had been discussed with employers and, especially, small businesses concerning the impact of the increases to national insurance that they and employees will have to pay on the ending of contracting out. In particular, what would be the impact of large numbers of employees leaving schemes because of the increases in contributions? During the development of our policy we have engaged with a large range of employers, including the British Chambers of Commerce and the Federation of Small Businesses. Small businesses expressed no particular concern on the ending of contracting out. When we consult on our regulations, we will of course ensure that we gather views from employers of all sizes.
I turn now to scheme members. Notwithstanding the potential for increased contributions, members of defined benefit schemes will continue to get good-quality pension provision. Our expectation is that members, as demonstrated by the low opt-out rates with automatic enrolment, will choose to remain in their schemes. Our communications strategy will seek to ensure that both employers and employees are properly supported through this change and that both parties understand why the changes are taking place and what options and outcomes are available to them.
As to whether the override regulations should follow the negative procedure, I recognise the desire of the Committee to ensure proper scrutiny of the regulations. There is just over two years until the end of contracting out. To ensure that employers have adequate time to consult with actuaries, trustees and members about any potential changes, regulations need to be finalised as soon as possible. We are working hard to complete the regulations. However, these are complex provisions that require us to have extensive discussions with employers and trustees during and after a consultation period before we can get them right. Based on previous experience, we do not expect a final version to be ready to present to Parliament until May or June.
Our concern is that, with the affirmative procedure, we would not be able to secure time for a debate in both Houses before the Summer Recess. This would potentially delay the point at which employers can start to plan with confidence until October this year, just 18 months before contracting out ends. So, while recognising that the negative procedure does not allow Parliament the same level of scrutiny, it will mean that employers and schemes have longer to consider and consult on any changes. We believe that, on balance, this is the right approach.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne, specifically referred to the power in Clause 24(8) to extend the five-year window in which the employer override can be used. I will make clear that we think it important that there is a strict time limit on when the override can be used, which is why the Bill repeals the relevant provisions of Schedule 14 after five years. We fully expect those employers who wish to employ the override to have done so by 2021. However, we recognise that, in limited circumstances and given the complexity of some schemes, some employers may find it difficult to meet that time limit; for example, if several diverse employers have to agree on changes to a multi-employer scheme.
We therefore think it is vital that the time limit can be extended if absolutely necessary, but we also think that the extension of an existing time-limit period should not require the affirmative procedure when using the power would only allow employers otherwise prevented from using the override to do so. The power does not allow us to alter the way the override works or to extend its scope—only to extend the window in which employers can use it. As such, I do not believe the affirmative procedure would be appropriate. I apologise for the length of my contribution to the debate, but I hope that I have helped to reassure noble Lords on the issues that were raised last time we met.
I turn to Amendment 44 to Schedule 13. As I said when we last met, the abolition of contracting out is a natural consequence of the implementation of the single tier. With the ending of the additional state pension, there will no longer be anything to contract out of. Employers who contract out of the additional state pension must provide their scheme members with pension benefits that are broadly equal to, or better than, the benefits they would have received had they remained contracted in. To do so, they must satisfy the statutory standard set under Section 12A of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.
This is a consequential amendment to existing legislation to remove the reference to this statutory standard, as the standard will no longer exist once contracting out has ended. The amendment is to the provision for pension protection when someone transfers employment under TUPE regulations. For future transfers, and those who have already transferred, the intention is that regulations will ensure that employees will receive or continue to receive the same protection of their pension rights as they currently enjoy. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for giving in his opening remarks a reply wider than the amendment before us merits. I have no particular objection to the amendment, in so far as I understand it, but a few issues were raised in the debate last week that I do not think the Government have yet fully answered, even given the Minister’s speech today.
We have a difficult situation here. Everyone understands that contracting out has to cease in this respect, but the way in which it is done is vital. The Minister referred to the measures for private sector occupational schemes being tightly constrained by technical regulations. They definitely need to be tightly constrained because the Bill provides the ability to override trustees in all circumstances, to avoid any form of negotiation, and to place the full cost of any replacement of the contracting-out benefit on the employees. The cost of contracting out will jeopardise the solvency and therefore the future of many of these schemes. As we discussed at some length, and as was pointed out by my noble friend Lord Browne in particular, there is also the question of statutory protection in some circumstances in certain fairly significant schemes.
The Minister continues to justify doing all this on the basis of a negative resolution procedure. This is quite a revolution that will be imposed by this statute on private sector occupational pension schemes. There is not even, for example, a provision that states that there should be no retrospection. The whole principle of pension scheme regulation is that at any given point, benefits accumulated by an individual until that point will be frozen, even if changes are made by the trustees, by statute or whatever. That is not written into Schedule 14, as far as I can see. We need some reassurance on that.
The wider point is the one I raised last week. Where do the Government think we are going on private sector occupational pension schemes? The Minister said—perhaps not with relish; I would not put it quite like that—that it was a matter of inevitability that the decline in the number of people covered by defined benefit schemes had already reduced from more than 2 million to 1.6 million, and that the figure was expected to be roughly 0.9 million in a couple of years’ time. The Government seemed to regard that with some complacency. Of course changes will have to be made to those schemes, but it is not right to say that this imposition will have an effect only on defined benefit schemes, because the lack of trust in the future for any form of scheme is affected by the way that the Government can change solvency rules and the prospects of this scheme so drastically.
I am grateful to the Minister for offering us a meeting between now and Report. We will probably wish to take up that offer, and some schemes may wish to write to the Minister, but my point is that it is extraordinary that the Government seem to be relaxed about the prospect of the whole occupational pension scheme sector being undermined without any serious guarantees to beneficiaries or a clear strategy as to where we are going on the pensions scene.
The proposal is even odder coming from a Conservative-led Government, because these private sector schemes allow individuals to provide savings for the whole of their working lives. They are a way of providing security in retirement. They are a form of collaboration between employees and the employer in providing that. They defer pay in a way that, because it is in the pension pot and not in the pay packet, reduces inflationary pressures. Of course, they also create funds that will be the long-term investors in our business and industrial performance.
I thank the Minister for taking the opportunity to address some of the issues we were concerned about—we ran out of time, in effect—in our previous Committee session. My major concern in this debate has been the sufficiency of protections when a statutory override is given or is exercised. It sets a precedent and I am sure that this will not be the last statutory override we are going to see in the pensions arena over the next three or four years, given some of the agenda items we know are coming our way.
I am genuinely concerned that what is proposed or what we can see is weak. The Minister said that he expected that the override would be used in exceptional circumstances. To an extent that is true, because if the sponsoring employer does not need, as a requirement of the scheme, to get trustee consent, there is no need for a statutory override. I had conceded that point in my opening comment. Of course, there will be a need for statutory overrides where the scheme’s rules do not allow what is being proposed on the recoup arrangements, or where trustee agreement is required and the trustees do not want to give their consent.
There are expressions of hope that somehow this consultation will take place and everybody will act appropriately and only in extremis—having gone through due process but finding barriers in the way—will the employer be able to invoke the statutory override. Of course, the Minister has no idea how employers will behave in practice in individual schemes. One hopes that they will all consult, but some may be in a hurry and some may simply see that they are not required to consult or gain trustee consent. A statutory override is being put in the Bill without, as far as I can see, an explicit requirement to consult—merely an expression of hope from the Government that it will take place. That worries me deeply.
The other area about which I remain concerned is the fact that the regulations will still be subject to a negative procedure. Again, we face key issues about the value of what the employer can recoup, and this would be setting a precedent on a significant issue. The Minister conceded that these are complex issues, and that is right. In multi-employer schemes, if the decision is taken to amend the protected order status for certain employees if there are shared cost arrangements, one can see the multiplicity and complexities that could arise. They would arise anyway, but they will arise.
We have no clear indication from the Government about how they will value what it is that can be recouped. As I asked when speaking the other day, is it the net or the gross loss? Will it be crystallised in terms of the 2016 value of the rebate? These are quite significant issues. On one level, setting out some actuarial assumptions in the regulations may be a good thing, although we would perhaps want to see the actuarial assumptions first. But we have no way of seeing them and when we do, the regulation will be subject to the negative procedure.
I know that the Minister said that there would be a full consultative exercise. Consultative exercises are important and I do not wish to detract from the importance of their taking place, but we all know that they can be dominated by organisations that have the capacity, the means and the interest to dominate them. I just hope that in the consultation exercise fair regard is given to the views of employees and trustees.
I was drawing to a close. I have a final point on the negative procedure. In response to my suggestion that there could possibly be time limits on consultation in order to meet the spirit of what I aspired to achieve before the constraint of April 2016, the Minister said that seemed too prescriptive and asked why one would want to put constraints on the consultative process. It seemed rather contradictory to say that one cannot go for negative procedures because affirmative procedures take too long and could push up against the efficient way in which employers could adjust in time for April 2016. If the balance were a trade-off between defined periods or timetabled periods of consultation with the employers and the opportunity to deal with the regulation by affirmative procedures, it would be fair.
Like my noble friends, I am grateful to the Minister for engaging more generally with the issues of statutory override in his remarks in support of Amendment 44. That has been of some assistance to the Committee. It is obvious from the engagement he has already had with my noble friends that they believe that to be the case. I, too, wish to be associated with the words of thanks to the Minister for the offers of further briefing and engagement. They will be taken up.
Before I take advantage of his generosity to ask him a few additional questions, one of the advantages of anticipating that he would do this—because he was gracious enough to indicate that he was prepared to do it—was that I was able to read the official record of the previous debate we had in Committee, and there are one or two things that occurred to me that he could expand upon.
Before I turn to that, I shall deal somewhat formally with government Amendment 44, which I accept is a consequential amendment. I have to say—I do not expect the Minister to engage very fully with this—that reading the statutory provision which he seeks to amend, the section of the Pensions Act 2004, I am slightly at a loss to understand why the amendment is necessary. It makes the precise provision more elegant, but I am not sure that it changes much of the content. It is genuinely consequential. Section 258(2)(c)(ii) already contains these words, although they are further qualified.
In the more general debate I shall try to be complementary to the points already made and not go back over the issues that my noble friends have addressed, although I have some notes here which are similar to some of their observations. I turn first to the issue of whether it is appropriate to deal with the regulations anticipated by these provisions by affirmative procedure in your Lordships’ House and in the House of Commons, or by negative procedure, and consequently whether it would be appropriate to deal with the limited issue of the extension of the period by negative or affirmative procedure. It seems to me, first, that it is improbable in the extreme, given the way the Minister has described these regulations in terms of their comprehensive nature, their complexity, and the difficulty associated with understanding them, that they will not be debated in some form in both Houses. It is unlikely that there will not be a desire to engage with some aspects of them to—at the very least—achieve some further clarification.
My second point to the Minister is that it seems to be counterproductive to the argument that negative procedure is appropriate to go to such length to explain just how complicated the regulations are. It seems to me that the more complicated the regulations are, and the more the primary legislation has to be supplemented by complicated regulations, the weaker the argument for doing this by negative procedure becomes. I suspect that that is why, reflecting on the Minister’s words, he referred again to the issue of parliamentary time. With respect to the Minister, getting parliamentary time in our current Parliament is the weakest argument possible.
I am struck by the number of times the House of Commons rises before what I consider to be its normal rising time. I do not know whether that is a function of the fact that the coalition Government have run out of agreement about what they can legislate on —that may happen; it is a perfectly natural thing with coalition government—but I am also struck by how much time is spent in the House of Commons debating what is now called “Members’ Business”. As far as your Lordships’ House is concerned, I am struck by the fact that we are all expecting—and I think we will see—that an extraordinary amount of time will be found to debate a Private Member’s Bill over the coming weeks.
If regulations are debated in the normal way, it seems to indicate an expectation that there will be no great competition for parliamentary time between now and the general election. In fact, I go so far as to suggest that the business managers of the respective Houses may have difficulty in filling the time they already have, so I do not think the argument about parliamentary time is all that strong. If the Minister is to continue to promote the idea that these regulations—complicated, difficult, comprehensive and substantial as they are—are still best dealt with by negative procedure, then, with all due respect, I think he will need better arguments than those he has already deployed.
Secondly, perhaps I may take advantage of the opportunity to debate these issues and ask the Minister to give some clarification about information that he gave us when we last debated these issues about the effect that the abolition of contracting out will have on people’s expectations. Early on in his contribution to our last Grand Committee, he came to engage with the issue of trustees and pension funds and their responsibilities. I will quote him fully, not in short. He stated:
“Referring to those private sector employees who are contracted out immediately before implementation, who reach state pension age in the first decade of single tier, around 75% of them will receive enough extra state pension to offset both the increase in national insurance contributions that they will pay over the rest of their working lives and any potential adjustments to their occupational pension schemes”.—[Official Report, 8/1/24; cols. GC 430–431.]
That is an argument that was deployed by the Pensions Minister in the House of Commons, too, when addressing that issue. It is clearly designed to allay, and does allay, the concerns of a significant number of people about the denial of their expectations. However, in col. GC 433, when the Minister was discussing the issue of protected persons under statutory override, he deployed a similar but different argument. I shall quote it to him, because I am interested in the difference, and what it actually means. He said:
“We also have to factor in that the design of the single tier reforms means that those with a long history of contracting out will in most cases build up significantly more state pension. Around 75% of people in the private sector who pay higher national insurance contributions and reach state pension age during the first two decades following implementation will receive enough extra state pension over their retirement to counterbalance the increase in national insurance contributions”.
He went on to say:
“This is a very complicated issue with many different and conflicting interests”.—[Official Report, 8/1/14; col. GC 433.]
But we know that.
Were these different ways of saying the same thing, or were they different things—and, if so, what is the difference? Why does he say “two decades” in one case and one decade in the other, and why is there a reference only to counterbalancing the increase in national insurance contributions in one while there is a reference to eventual benefits in the other? It may not be easy for the Minister to answer that immediately, and I apologise if it is not, but I would be interested to know whether he intended those two things to mean the same—and, if not, why there is a difference.
On the issue of protected persons, in col. GC 433, the Minister addressed my question about the defeated expectation that the decision that the Government promised following the consultation would be made clear to Parliament. He told the Committee that a decision following the consultation about protected persons would be made as soon as possible, and that when it was made, Parliament would be informed. But what he did not say was important. The Pensions Minister in the other place said at one stage that it would be done in the summer of 2013—and we know that that is now long gone. No matter how generous one might be with Governments who use seasons to give an indication as to when something might be done—and having been a Minister myself I know how wise it is to do that sometimes—in no one’s view are we still in the summer of 2013.
The Pensions Minister gave both the Standing Committee and the whole House of Commons to believe that, at the very worst, a decision may be made when the Bill was still before Parliament. That is not a phrase the Minister used. Was that deliberate or can he repeat the phrase? It is important for the 60,000 people who consider themselves to be protected persons. Their expectation is that the decision and therefore some engagement with the consequences of that decision will still be a live issue while the Bill is still before Parliament.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their observations. I shall first take the query from the noble Lord, Lord Browne, about whether Amendment 44 is needed. I am conscious of his forensic skills in looking at particular bits of legislation in this area, and I therefore take his warning seriously. What it does is to remove a defunct reference on which legislation is worded. The default test is to meet the statutory standard. Actually, the legislation could work without this particular amendment, but it is confusing to those applying legislation and would leave an out-of-date reference on the statute book. The noble Lord, as usual, has picked up something quite clever.
He also picked up another clever thing: that I mis-spoke about my decades. I should have said two decades in each case, so I am pleased to correct that, and impressed that I was picked up.
On the negative procedure issue that the noble Lords, Lord Whitty and Lord Browne, and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, mentioned, at this stage I do not have anything to add except to say that we are genuinely concerned about timing if the affirmative procedure is used. But that may be something we have a chance to discuss in our briefing ahead of Report.
On the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, about the override being net or gross, as I mentioned in my letter on Friday, the intention is that the current rebate rate of 3.4% will be used for these calculations. Without reform, this rebate would change over time, but it is impossible to predict what would happen, and therefore creating a net value for the rebate in future years would be impractical.
I shall desist from arguing that point, as we are going to have a meeting, but it is such a wrong approach because it is an unexpected premium for employers. You can have net at the employer level and at the aggregate level—what employers would have to pay taking into account taxation and tax relief—as well as how you set the figure for NI overall. Individual employers would have been able to set the cost of the additional NI against their tax liabilities.
We are going to have another meeting, but the effect of what the Minister has just said worries me. Employers will be allowed to recoup the value that is crystallised in 2016, but everyone knows that if there had not been changes the post-2016 value would have gone down. In addition, the employer’s NI charges are an expenditure that can be taken into account and set against tax. If those two elements are not built in, is that not a little unfair in term of the rules for recoupment—a little imbalanced?
I do not think that I am in a position to say anything further, but we will pick this up later and if we cannot satisfy the noble Baroness at that stage, I will have to write very specifically on that matter and the tax implications.
It goes to my point about negative regulations. We just do not get the opportunity to address these issues because they are not drafted.
I hear the point. Clearly we will be looking at it some more.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, about whether the override can be used for retrospective changes, the answer is no. That is contained in paragraph 3 of Schedule 14, which prohibits changes that might adversely affect subsisting rights; that is, rights to benefits already accrued.
On the noble Lord’s point about whether this undermines schemes, the override has been introduced precisely so as not to undermine schemes. Employers have told us that without the override, they would close schemes; the override is there to help them find ways of avoiding that.
On the protected persons question from the noble Lord, Lord Browne, I agree that it would be most unusual if the Government were not able to notify Parliament of their decision before the Bill completes its passage.
The noble Lord had a query about the rights of trustees to challenge. They could apply to the courts for direction, because amendments to the rules are not valid if they are beyond limits. Costs fall to the scheme, and ultimately the employer pays.
I hope that I have covered all the issues. Clearly this is an area of some interest and we will be spending more time on it.
My Lords, Part 1 of the Bill is about future generations of pensioners who will benefit from the certainty of a contributory state pension set above the level of the basic means test.
We have dealt with a great deal of complexity as we have discussed the transition provisions. These are intended to respect past contributions by giving people reaching state pension age on 6 April 2016 onwards the higher of the value of their national insurance record calculated under both single tier or old scheme rules. As a result of this calculation, many people retiring in the early years of the single tier will have their pension boosted using new-scheme rules. So a woman with 30 qualifying years and £10 of state earnings related pension scheme in 2016 would get £123.30 of single-tier pension, which is around £6.30 a week more than under the old scheme rules. As illustrated here, the groups who will benefit most are those who have only modest amounts of additional state pension, if any at all. These tend to be, in the main, women and the self-employed whose social and economic contributions were not captured in SERPS and are not fully reflected in the state second pension.
As set out in these amendments, we now want to give existing pensioners and those reaching state pension age before 6 April 2016 the opportunity to boost their additional state pension by paying a new class of voluntary national insurance contribution: class 3A. The intention is that a unit of additional pension, obtained by paying the class 3A contribution, will provide £1 a week of extra pension. The extra pension itself will simply be added to people’s state pension. The intention is for the scheme to start from October 2015 and run for a limited time of between 18 months to two years. There are just two entitlement conditions to class 3A—entitlement to a UK pension and that the person reaches state pension age on or before 5 April 2016.
We published a briefing paper that provides more details of the scheme, but we have left some decisions to secondary legislation. These include questions such as whether there should be a cap, perhaps of £25 a week; how long the scheme should be open; and whether people should have a cooling-off period after paying class 3A contributions. As the extra pension obtained will be the additional state pension, it will be uprated by CPI, it will be heritable and people will be able to defer, in line with existing rules.
I turn now to costs. As noble Lords will know, covering basic state pension gaps through existing class 3 is relatively cheap. A person paying class 3 to acquire one qualifying year of basic state pension will get their money back within four years of reaching state pension age. A different approach is required for class 3A to ensure that the arrangements do not become a burden for today’s national insurance contributors. So the costs of class 3A, which will be set by the Treasury, will be based on actuarially fair terms, in consultation with the Government Actuary’s Department. In keeping with this, the cost will be adjusted to reflect the age of the pensioner at the time they pay class 3A.
The briefing paper provides an example of how pricing based on life expectancy will work. The Government Actuary expects to report back to us on a pricing structure shortly. The report will take account of the latest ONS life expectancy estimates that were published on 11 December. I should clarify at this point that entitlement to pay existing class 3 voluntary national insurance contributions, which allows people to cover gaps in their contribution record for basic state pension, will be unaffected by this measure. DWP and HMRC will put in place administrative arrangements to ensure that individuals applying to pay new class 3A contributions are made aware that they should check their eligibility to make class 3 contributions.
My Lords, the Minister has been very helpful in his introduction, but how can the consultation that he reports he has had with possible users be at all meaningful when they do not know how much they are going to have to pay and what they may be likely to get? Following that, can he give us any indication of the ball-park figure? Say someone is 70: what is the lowest possible price and the range for which the extra year of pension will be bought? Otherwise, people’s views cannot be taken seriously because they have not got the relevant information.
My Lords, following my noble friend Lady Hollis, I support the inquiry about the pricing structure and whether we will know that by the time the Bill completes its passage through your Lordships’ House. I listened carefully to the Minister’s explanation, because at the heart of it this is basically a savings plan. It is effectively an annuity arrangement. It is attached to the additional state pension but you could delete all that and describe the fundamental proposition here very much as an annuity. We know that that cannot be done because the DWP does not have the power to do it. However, we should be clear what this is about.
It is attached to the additional state pension and gives people a chance to enhance provision they have made in that respect. As I understand it, you could avail yourself of this opportunity if there was currently no additional state pension due—or there was a very significant amount of additional state pension due because you had been investing heavily in it, certainly above the level of the single tier of pension. Indeed, if somebody was contracted out of additional state pension I think they would still be able to avail themselves of this opportunity. I am just trying to work out how easily that sits with the whole concept—this is all about people who have reinvested in additional state pension, not just about an investment product.
I did not find the rationale for leaving these arrangements open for only a limited period, and the online survey is a bit difficult to interpret. Can the Minister give us any more information about the expectation of the number of people likely to take this up and the amounts that they are likely to take up? The Minister said—and this was said in the briefing session as well—that nothing has been scored in respect of these proposals so far as the public accounts are concerned, but presumably it will be scored at the next Budget, and certainly credit for any take-up of this will feature in the year 2015-16, presumably with its consequential impact on the deficit and government debt arrangements. Indeed, the lump sum would be taken out in the year in which it is received, and the flow of pension contributions will just score over the years and decades ahead.
Given the nature of this, I am interested to understand the sort of explanations and information that people will be given when they are looking to make their choices. In a sense, the information about their class 3 and 3A voluntary contributions is relatively straightforward, but we are in an environment where we know the annuities market is generally very opaque. The Financial Conduct Authority is on the point of publishing a review of the annuities market. Given the closeness of this product to annuities, what sort and range of advice and information is it proposed that the Government will provide for people thinking about taking up these opportunities? We accept some of the potential benefits. In a sense, it is risk free; it is inflation protected; and it can be shared on divorce. One sees the benefit of those arrangements, but I have one or two queries on the wording of the amendment which I hope the Minister can help me with.
Would my noble friend not agree that the Treasury is following the same philosophy as it is in trying to abolish the lump sum as an option for people who have deferred taking their state pension for two years in order to avoid paying out the money upfront and is now trying to do exactly the same thing—a sort of mirror opposite—in terms of this package?
Indeed, I agree with my noble friend. It is the converse of that. A cynic might say that this is all to do with managing the deficit and the debt in the run-up to a general election, but that is for us cynics, I guess.
Looking at Amendment 62, I wonder whether the Minister can help me out on what will eventually be new Section 14B dealing with the arrangements for repayment of contributions. I am a little unclear about proposed new subsection 14B(4), which states:
“Regulations under subsection (1) may provide for benefits paid to a person because of the unit of additional pension to be recovered by deducting them from the repayment”.
I am not quite sure whether the benefits referred to there are the additional pension that has hitherto been received or whether there is something else because typically one would not expect extra benefits to be paid if somebody has extra income—quite the reverse. Perhaps the Minister can help me on that provision.
Proposed new Section 61ZA is headed “Shortfall in contributions”. I was a bit bemused by this. It states:
“This section applies to a person who has one or more units of additional pension if the person … is not entitled to a Category A retirement pension, but … would be entitled to a Category A retirement pension if the relevant contribution conditions were satisfied”.
It goes on:
“The relevant contribution conditions are to be taken to be satisfied”,
but in a sense it negates the impact of that in terms of payments as you get only the additional pension attributable to units of additional pension. I was trying to fathom what that was about because if somebody is not entitled to a category A pension presumably they would only be entitled at all if they had a category B or D pension. Or is this saying, basically, that even though you do not have a pension entitlement, we will treat you as having a pension entitlement for the purposes of being able to take up these provisions? That seems to undercut one of the two requirements—and there are only two requirements—to be able to access these arrangements.
I do not know why there needs to be consultation with the Government Actuary or the deputy Government Actuary—I do not know whether you can choose who to go to for advice. I would have thought that going to the Government Actuary’s Department would include going to the deputy if the Government Actuary is not available. But there may be good reason for that formulation. This may well be a nice little earner and deserve support on that basis, but until we know more detail it is difficult to judge. It is an odd formulation to attach this to the additional state pension in the way that is proposed.
My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for his explanation of these provisions. I take this opportunity to thank his Bill team on behalf of my noble friends and myself for the briefing that it provided to explain some of the issues that have been raised. When the Chancellor announced the scheme in the Autumn Statement there was much excitement among financial journalists, I recollect. It was hailed as a great deal for consumers by commentators, many of whom missed crucial words in the small print that it would be at a broadly actuarial fair rate. My understanding—and the Minister's explanation confirmed this—is that the price will vary according to age at purchase, much as an annuity would, and that it would be gender-neutral.
The Minister has effectively confirmed that the only factor that will be taken into account in pricing a class 3A contribution will be age. No account will be taken of any regional or occupational differences in life expectancy, which are issues that will engage the Committee later in this evening’s debate. As that is not going to be the case, have the Government done any work on the likely distributional effects of this scheme? If this scheme is broadly actuarially fair in pricing and the proposal is that over time the policy will be broadly cost-neutral as the briefing paper says, if some people are getting a good deal others must be losing out. Those who lose out will be those with shorter than average lives, and there is a clear socioeconomic correlation there.
There is much that we do not know about the scheme and the Minister was absolutely candid about that. In fact, there is much that the Government do not know about the scheme because they have not worked it out. We know, however, that it will start in October 2015 and that the Government are minded to run it for 18 months or two years only. I digress here to point out to the Minister the irony of telling us in one short unqualified sentence that the affirmative procedure will be used for the regulations for this in a scheme that is due to start in October 2015 when he spent a significant amount of his last contribution to the Committee explaining that it would be very difficult to find time for affirmative regulations in this Parliament. That irony was not lost on the rest of us. He may find that fact being played back to him at some time in the not-too-distant future.
We do not know the range of prices, but the illustrative price given in the briefing paper sent to Peers showed a charmingly named couple, Mr and Mrs Average, who will be 65 in 2015. They could be expected to live for another 24 years. It suggests that they would have to find £1,248 to acquire another one pound a week. That would be a better deal for them than going to the market, said the briefing, because the extra pension that it would buy would be uprated by CPI and without charges, and would be inheritable under the additional state pension rules. I am not sure whether that was meant to be the price for them to receive an extra £1 per week each because it seems in the polling reports that the prices tested were between £300 and £800 to buy an extra £1 per week, depending on age. I make this point because the value of polling is of course dependent on the nature of the questions asked. If the questions that were asked in the polling were on an expectation that one unit per week would cost between £300 and £800, and in fact it is likely to cost £1,248 to acquire, that polling may need to be redone as it will be of limited value.
It does not count. I can answer that straightaway because the discussions on the welfare cap have been around working-age benefits, not pension benefits. The Labour Party may have been discussing a wider pension cap but that is not what we—
It is the pension cap that this Committee is discussing. I am grateful for that clarification, which was appropriate at this time.
Finally, there are the decision points for individuals. Will they get advice on whether they should buy class 3A contributions? After all, there are significant considerations for individuals, such as their life expectancy, which may be significantly affected by where they live in the United Kingdom; whether they are married or in a civil partnership, or likely to be so; and what other income or savings they have—and, therefore, whether it is a good idea, if it may affect their entitlement to incapability benefits, for example. After all, if someone with £10,000 in savings decided to spend £4,000 of those in buying another £5 in income, would they not simply lose that in pension credit and have 40% less of their savings? For all the reasons that we have discussed, those savings may be necessary at later stages in their life. Crucially, who would sell this to them? In the context of the briefing that we received from the Minister’s team, we were told that engagement between the purchasers of this and the Government would be through the Treasury. Does that mean that the Treasury will have certain responsibilities to people who call to inquire about buying these class 3A contributions? If so, how will they be discharged?
There are many questions to ask. The Committee will not be surprised if the Minister cannot answer them all now, because, with respect, he was unable to answer even any of his own questions on his introductory remarks. We may have to wait and see about some of the detail. I understand the reasons for haste; this legislative vehicle is important for this initiative and, if it proves to be positive, that is a good thing. But the scheme was rushed out in the Autumn Statement and added on to the Bill when it had gone through another place. We have no costings or details on price, and no idea how it will be administered—but we still look forward very much to the Minister’s reply.
Can I ask a question following on from my noble friend about the interaction of pension credit, which I was trying to tease out as he was going along? At the moment, if you have savings of more than about £40,000, the first £10,000 of pension credit capital is disregarded for pension credit purposes. Thereafter, you have the tariff income of £1 for every £500, which means that if you have savings at the moment of about £40,000 and you are single—I am not sure how it would work for a couple, because I do not have the figures in my head—you would be just about ineligible for pension credit, because your tariff income would float you above it. But turn that capital into a pension, given the fairly unattractive rates for annuity purposes, and I think as a result you would come into pension credit. I shall try to do some more work on this as the discussion moves on, but, if I am right, what the Minister will get in upfront savings he will lose not only in payments in perpetuity while those people live, through his additional pension, but also the immediate payments he will have to make in pension credit—because, having disbursed their capital, they will now come within the pension credit income rules.
I need to thank noble Lords, as usual, for a mine of interesting questions, and I shall try to deal with as many as I can. On the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, raised about the research and the understanding of the prices, we are clearly looking at how much the original research needs to be complemented—and, indeed, we may consider more polling work. The original testing was based on a stylised scheme, and further work, playing in the fact that the scheme is secured in national insurance and state pension, may be beneficial. We will also look to consider qualitative research to find out what sort of barriers there may be to taking up class 3A contributions, and I will be happy to provide further details of that research. On the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, about whether some of that research needs to be redone, I think we would say that it needs to be complemented.
The example of £1,248 raised by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, was not the cost of £1 for a 65 year-old; it was illustrative only, and we are looking to do some more research on the final price. In answer to questions from both the noble Lords, Lord Browne and Lord McKenzie, about information and timing, we will provide comprehensive information and get it quality assured by stakeholders, and we build on the kind of information we provide for class 3, which noble Lords will be familiar with. This is the standard background that we will build on.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne, raised the question of the amount of financial advice that people will need before buying class 3A. Again, in this document, as in others, we draw people’s attention to the fact that they may wish to take independent financial advice before taking a decision that could affect their current or future income. We also need to note that HMRC, rather than the Treasury, administers this scheme.
On the point about pension credit that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, was developing in front of our eyes, she is correct that some people would come within the scope of pension credit, but it is up to the decision-maker to decide whether people deprive themselves of capital in order to derive income. We will look at that point further.
There is certainly a rule within all social security, along with the rule that capital may be treated as income and income treated as capital, that you may not wilfully deprive yourself of capital in order to boost income. However, to do so wilfully in response to a government campaign would be very different from handing a gift of £10,000 to your grandchild. I think that the Government would be open to mis-selling claims if they went down that road. I do warn the Minister.
I am, of course, always very grateful for warnings from the noble Baroness or other members of the Committee. That is clearly one of the areas in which quite a lot of detailed work needs to be done. I suspect that it is a minority sport that she is defining, but nevertheless we will need to look at it.
On the question of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, about what pension entitlement is necessary, people can have a pension entitlement that consists of graduated retirement benefit or state pension based on their own record of national insurance, which is a category A pension, or one derived from a spouse or civil partner’s record, which is a category B pension. Proposed new Section 61ZA overrides the rules that prevent people having an entitlement to more than one pension at a time.
On the question about what we call it, I think that the noble Lord called it a savings vehicle. We have to be rather careful in our language, which the noble Lord was good enough to recognise and acknowledge. Class 3A will be a one-off opportunity for today’s pensioners, with a cap on the amount of additional pension that can be bought and a limited window during which applications can be taken. As with other forms of voluntary national insurance, we do not expect it to be seen as an investment in a commercial sense. As class 3A is not an investment product, it does not require regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and, therefore, people with defined contribution pension savings will not be able to get their pension pot refunded in order to take up class 3A as an alternative to an annuity.
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, about the belt and braces approach of the Government Actuary or the Deputy Government Actuary, this is a provision to cover situations where the post of the Government Actuary is vacant. It enables engagement for consideration. I know the noble Lord takes an Occam’s razor attitude to legislation, but that is the reason.
The question from the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, on the recovery—
I apologise to the Minister—he will have to finish in a few minutes. A Division has been called. The Committee will stand adjourned for 10 minutes.
My Lords, I should start by quickly apologising to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, on my belt-and-braces comments. I should have directed my admiration towards the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, as regards the deputy Government Actuary. I need to address to the noble Lord the point on recovery, which is a straightforward matter, to the extent that if someone changes their mind we will undo both sides of the payment and consider only any actual additional payment made to balance up.
Perhaps we can clarify the point to get rid of it. In that case, does the reference to benefits paid basically include the additional pension that has been earned from the payment?
Yes. To the extent that if someone changes their mind about wanting to buy class 3A contributions and recoups that fund, we will recoup the early payments made on that benefit in order to balance both sides of the position.
We hope to have the pricing details bottomed out by Budget time, although I cannot give any range at this point.
As regards the query on numbers from the noble Lord, Lord Browne, of the 7 million pensioners we assess as potentially being able to afford it, we estimate that around 30% will have savings of between £1,500 and £10,000, 20% will have between £10,000 and £20,000, and 50% will have more than the £20,000 limit. So if we assume that pensioners would not want to spend more than, say, 25% of their capital on this, we might expect the average amount bought to be £5 a week. However, those are, again, premature estimates, and it is not worth spending too much time on that because there will be more information later.
I also take on board the points made by noble Lords about the importance of communicating the new scheme effectively and giving people the right information at the right time. We will take great care in going through the detail of implementation and delivery arrangements to put the customer first and will work with key stakeholders to ensure that this happens.
As I said in my opening remarks on pricing and revenue raising, we need to bring regulations back to the House, and at that time we will have the details required for a fully informed debate. We will introduce those regulations as soon as possible. I hope that I have been able to assure noble Lords that the new voluntary national insurance class 3A policy is well intended, designed to give some people who may have lost out on the opportunity to build additional pension the chance to do so.
Will the Minister clarify a couple of points? Is it the case that someone can avail themselves of these provisions if they are currently contracted out and that there is no prohibition on that?
Whatever the level of their current S2P arrangements—they might have paid in significantly or they may have nothing at all—can they still avail themselves on the same basis as everyone else?
I should point out that this debate has been de-grouped from subsequent Amendments 52 to 58.
My Lords, Clause 25 increases the pensionable age to 67. It is a key clause, but I wish to oppose the question that it should stand part of the Bill, as I hope to get the Government to think again about it. I know that in legislation that has an impact on millions of people, as this Bill does, it is useful to have arrangements that are the same for everyone—the same benefits and the same retirement age—as that makes things much easier to administer. The problem with that is that we are not all the same. Even more important, jobs are not all the same.
As I said at Second Reading, some people are happy to work for longer. They like their jobs and the social aspect of working with others is important to them. Such people do not look forward to retirement; they like to go on working if they can. These people are often employed in administrative jobs, but for others things are very different. Some industries involve strenuous and often hazardous work—the construction industry is one such. Those who work in such industries do work that is necessary for the rest of us. Without them, we would not have the comfortable lives that we now have. Yet such industries often have a record of industrial accidents and disease, which we should all find unacceptable. It may be dangerous for older workers to work with others in such a working environment. Therefore, an earlier retirement may well be necessary. This simply cannot be left to the private sector. We cannot have legislation that says that all people must work longer before retiring.
It is not only industries that are hazardous where this is a problem. There are many low-paid workers in dreary jobs who are only too happy to retire, as long as they have enough money to do so. People who work in hospital cleaning and dreary jobs of that kind are only too happy to retire if it is possible for them to do so and to receive reasonable benefits when they are retired. Such people long to retire. It is not enough for us to say, “Oh well, you have to work for longer”.
We are often told of the evidence that we are all living longer, but it is not always sensible to use that as a reason for extending working life—not for everyone, anyway. We are not alone in thinking this. A number of my colleagues have tabled amendments to subsequent clauses to seek a review of retirement ages. I certainly think that that is necessary. Have the Government thought through what all this means? What is the impact on people working in particular jobs and their health? What happens when people live longer? What is the effect on their health? Therefore, it seems to me that this simple provision in legislation to ensure that people work for longer is not a good idea. I hope that the Government will be prepared to look at it again, in the light of some of the things that have been said both at Second Reading and in Committee today.
My Lords, as this is the first discussion of Part 2 of the Bill, it may be worth setting out a couple of principles from these Benches at the outset. First, we agree with the principle of raising the state pension age to reflect longevity, as people are living longer than when the current arrangements were put in place, largely in post-war reforms. As I indicated at Second Reading, we also accept the need for periodic reviews of the state pension age, but we differ from the Government on how best to do that—we will return to that issue in the discussion of our later amendment.
Fixing the state pension age is never easy, and an issue of fairness is always at stake. There needs to be a balance between the interests of the generations on the funding of retirement incomes in a pay-as-you-go system, where today’s taxpayers fund today’s pensions. As we will discuss in later groups, our view is that having a careful, evidence-based review before taking any future decisions on changes to the state pension age is a crucial element of ensuring fairness between generations.
However the arguments made by my noble friend Lady Turner require careful attention from all of us. Sometimes fairness also requires at least a consideration of difference, and my noble friend has highlighted some crucial differences, particularly in relation to longevity and health. We all know that life expectancy is increasing, but that fact conceals as much as it reveals. Mortality rates vary widely, as do morbidity rates. There is a huge amount of socio-demographic data available to inform our debate—and I am sure we will hear a great deal of it in the groups to come—from the Wanless and Marmot reviews to government figures and other outside research. There are also some very interesting data from the TUC. I will say more on this later, but I do not want to pre-empt what I think could be a very substantial discussion coming up shortly.
There are no easy solutions to these problems. The biggest challenge to the Government is to address the question of differential mortality and morbidity rates through urgent attention to public health, but we also need time to reflect on how best to deal with these questions in relation to the state pension age. It is our view that the best way to do that is to ensure that the mechanism for reviewing the state pension age includes a review panel which has on it representatives of a wide range of interests in society, including employer and employee representatives and representatives of different parties and, indeed, our own Cross Benches. I shall move an amendment later today to that effect, but in the mean time, I hope very much that the Minister will take the concerns of my noble friend seriously. I look forward to his reply.
My Lords, the purpose of Clause 25 is to bring forward by just over eight years the point at which the state pension age completes its rise to 67. The latest evidence shows that we are living longer and, on average, healthier lives than ever before. To illustrate this point: a man in the UK reaching the age of 65 30 years ago—in 1983—could expect to spend 14.5 years in retirement. Today, a man reaching that same age can expect to spend about 21.5 years in retirement.
The noble Baroness, Lady Turner, raised the key issue of differential life expectancy. I do not propose to go into that in great detail at this point because we will have the opportunity to address that full-on in the next amendment; so, if she will forgive me, I shall concentrate my remarks on raising the age to 67.
The Pensions Act 2007 was informed by the Office for National Statistics’ 2004-based life expectancy projections. Those projections suggested that a man aged 67 in 2028 would survive for a further 19.9 years. However, on our latest understanding, this same man is projected to survive for a further 21.5 years, fully 1.6 years longer than we thought when setting the original timetable in the 2007 Act.
We continue to believe that it is only fair that those enjoying the benefits of longer life expectancy pay a share of the associated costs. Bringing forward the increase in pensionable age to 66 through provisions in the Pensions Act 2011 ensured the short-term sustainability of the UK’s state pension system. Now, the measures contained in this clause to accelerate the increase to the age of 67, combined with the regular review mechanism as set out in Clause 26, will help ensure the fairness and affordability of the system into the medium and long term. The savings projected to result from this proposal are significant—some £73 billion in net savings between 2026 and 2036—but not only are there net spending reductions, but this measure is projected to increase employment rates and boost GDP by around £100 billion over the same period.
Bringing forward the rise to 67 by some eight years will affect around 8 million men and women born between 6 April 1960 and 5 April 1969: people who are now aged between about 44 and 53. As with previous increases in state pension age, the transition to the higher age will be phased in gradually: men and women born between 6 April 1960 and 5 March 1961 will have a state pension age of between 66 and 67, and those born between 6 March 1961 and 5 April 1969 will have a state pension age of 67. Those born after 5 April 1969 will not be affected by this change because they already have a state pension age of 67 or 68, or somewhere in between the two, as legislated for in the Pensions Act 2007. The proposals in this clause mean that the maximum increase that any individual will experience in their state pension age, in relation to the Pensions Act 2007, is one year. By starting the transition to age 67 in 2026, no one who was affected by the Pensions Act 2011 will have their state pension age changed again by the measures in this Bill. To help people prepare for the change, we announced these proposals back in November 2011, giving the first cohorts affected more than 14 years’ notice.
Finally, noble Lords will be aware that an ageing society is not a phenomenon unique to the UK. That is why other countries in Europe and beyond are moving to adjust the age at which retirement benefits become available. Indeed, even by moving to a state pension age of 67 in 2028, we will still be behind many other countries—Ireland will get there in 2021, the Netherlands and Australia in 2023, and Denmark and the US in 2027. In bringing forward the rise to a state pension age of 67 we are ensuring that the system as a whole remains fair between the generations and sustainable and that we are doing so in a way that is on a par with elsewhere in the developed world. I beg to move that Clause 25 stands part of the Bill.
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I suspect I will also speak to some of the other amendments in the group en route. Clause 26 states that the Secretary of State must review pensionable age from time to time,
“having regard to life expectancy and other factors”,
he considers relevant. In preparing this report he must consult GAD and a panel appointed by him which will produce their own reports to inform his. All that seems entirely sensible and I welcome it.
This amendment is a limited and modest one, which I hope the Government will find helpful and might even accept. It simply asks to put in the Bill, for the avoidance of doubt, those factors that the White Paper of January 2013 on page 77, paragraph 161 stated:
“are expected to be considered”.
There is also one additional factor, gender, which slightly oddly was omitted.
What factors does the White Paper expect “to be considered” both by the Secretary of State and the review body? The first is:
“evidence of variations in life expectancy … by socio-economic class”,
and therefore, by implication, as my noble friend Lady Turner said, by occupation, and by geographic reason. Secondly, there are,
“trends in healthy life expectancy”,
a point I am sure we will pick up and explore as my noble friend already has done in referring to the Marmot report. Thirdly, there are
“alternative ways of measuring life expectancy”,
and, finally,
“impact on the labour market”.
As I said, all these factors, which the amendment seeks to put in the Bill, come from page 77 of the Government’s own White Paper from January 2013—The Single-tier Pension: a Simple Foundation for Saving. The only missing factor, as I have said, which I have added in was gender, which I presume was an oversight, given the recent fusses we have had over unisex annuity rates and the like. This amendment is very simple. It seeks to put in the Bill that the considerations in the Government’s White Paper will come into play.
Why bother to spell it out in the Bill instead of leaving well alone and keeping it in the White Paper? My noble friend has mentioned the Marmot report, which was highly important. I, and I am sure other Members of the Committee, have read—and I know the Chair of the Committee knows it very well—the recent Lords report from the Committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, called Ready for Ageing?. I have been through all of its 1,000-plus pages of evidence. It was an important and valuable report, especially for the evidence coming in from the wide range of contributors. However, I was surprised to see how relatively little attention, particularly in the recommendations, was paid to these other factors. Instead, there is an insistence on trying to connect retirement age, in some rather formulaic way, to increased longevity, as, I fear, the Minister has just done.
We have recently had the Autumn Statement, in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer again seems to think that retirement age should be mechanistically linked to longevity by defining a set proportion of adult life that should be spent in retirement, irrespective of what happens to whom or what the quality of that retirement is like. It is all, in my view, highly elitist, and I am delighted that the DWP is not following the Chancellor’s approach, which is the easy, mechanistic way, but is seeking appropriate evidence with which to inform its decisions. This amendment would strengthen the DWP’s decent, evidence-based approach against a simplistic, bulldozing Chancellor, now or in the future, who wanted easy money to cut the welfare budget in its entirety by raising the state pension age.
What are the issues? Some have been touched on by my noble friend Lady Turner. Most commentators go over the well worn statistics—a year for every three or four years; the doubling of numbers of those over 85; the trebling of centenarians, and so on. They end up with the glib assumption that we cannot afford it so we must all work longer or, more specifically, delay drawing our pension to pay for all those—not us, of course—who in future will linger too long; and if we do not do this we are destroying the life chances of our children and grandchildren. That argument is pretty well nonsense. The issue of affordability is invariably prayed in aid and is, I think, inappropriately stated—indeed, badly misstated.
The first point is that half the population growth among the elderly, by which we are so financially frightened, is a temporary bulge left over from the baby boomers and will scale down from the 2030s on, at which point we will have one of the best worker/pensioner support ratios in Europe. I do not think the Chancellor told us that, if he actually knew it. The second point is that I remember doing a speech at the Institute of Directors 18 months or so ago and to a man—as, indeed, they were—they thought that the state pension age should be 70 and that they should have the right to dismiss staff at 65. No connection was made between the two. There is little point in raising the state pension age if people do not stay in the labour market. It merely means that they linger longer in the twilight of inadequate working-age benefits.
The latest statistics I have—the Minister’s may be more up-to-date—is that some 30% of men have left the labour market before the state pension age of 65, though the averages are skewed and in practice it is actually a higher number because some men, and women, continue working for a couple of years after 65, a subject we debated when talking about lump sums earlier in Committee. At the moment, that 30% or so of men who leave the labour market early, whether through unemployment or poor health, are protected. This is a point that is never raised in any of these discussions and I do not know why, because it is very relevant. They are protected because they can claim pension credit on the same terms as women and thus, while pension age remains unequal, they have, or have had, a level of benefit equivalent to the state pension topped up by pension credit for up to five years while they linger in the twilight world between leaving work and pension credit age. That will disappear as the state pension age is equalised and poorer men, unable to work but unable officially to retire will find themselves in a no-man’s land on a low level of benefits with no top-up by pension credit as the state pension age continues to rise. As far as I know, no consideration at all has been given to that by anyone, and it should have been.
I come to my third point. What matters, therefore, when we consider the cost of state pensions is their percentage of GDP, which over the next 20 years will actually fall. Why has that not been brought into play as an argument? It depends also on employment levels and productivity during working years; savings ratios, including pensions, which conventionally are not counted in the savings ratio—the difference between outgoings and incomings; rising real incomes, which can buy adequate heating and food, both before and during retirement; and the ability in the later years of retirement, the decade of growing disability, to release assets such as one’s home. Those are also not counted in the savings ratio—and there is a big difference between us and Germany. That could be done by trading down, or equity release, can help co-payment of the cost of old age. Then there is the degree to which heavy-end caring, especially dementia, can be pushed back.
My Lords, that was a real tour de force by my noble friend. She has laid out the problems of simplistic answers to the setting of the pension age. I would have preferred it if the strategy embodied in the Bill had been preceded by the kind of review referred to by my noble friend. The reality is as she spelt out. There has been due consideration and serious assessment of the statistics, certainly, but a simple and mechanistic relationship has been made between increased average longevity on the one hand and a Treasury-led assessment of what the nation can afford in the medium term on the other, on a fairly spurious basis.
I have two amendments in this group that move in much the same way as my noble friend’s amendments. She has made the case for looking much more widely when we come to review the pension age next time and ensuring that we do that by including it in the Bill. The central problem was also referred to by my noble friend Lady Turner in the previous amendment: the range of longevity and life experience is still enormously wide. One of the problems in this House, frankly, is that most of us have spent most of our lives in relatively comfortable positions and healthy and salubrious surroundings. In so far as we have been under pressure, it has probably stimulated our brains to function for slightly longer than many of our fellow citizens. None of that will go on forever for any of us but, nevertheless, we are in a fairly privileged group in that regard.
At the other end of the scale, there are people whose whole life has been in physical and intellectual distress and who have come in their 60s—let alone 67—and sometimes in their 50s to a position where they cannot sensibly work any longer. This is a minority group, but it is quite a large minority. It tends to be defined by occupational background, geographical area and income. All of those factors need to be taken into account in a much more sophisticated way in any future review. My noble friend referred to two wards in Norwich having that differential. We have long said in London that life expectancy declined if you went from South Kensington across to Mile End roughly by one year per stop on the District line. This is not an equal society, and we should not be imposing an equal retirement age on everybody, however they got there.
All these amendments ask is that we recognise that change is necessary. We recognise that there will be another review but at least let us ensure that our successors, in undertaking that review, look at these wider elements. The extra bit in my Amendment 57 is that we should look specifically at the lowest end of the longevity increase or achievement, if that is the word, to see whether we need to make special provision for them in so far as we can define them. That is an exercise in the future, but this Bill could ensure that it is effective and undertakes a much wider review of life experience than a direct correlation between average longevity and the state pension age. I am very pleased to support my noble friend in her amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 52, 55 and 58. I acknowledge that increasing the state pension age consistent with increases in life expectancy is part of delivering a sustainable state pension system. For the regular reviews of the state pension age rules, however, we also need to ensure that a clear and wide range of relevant factors is considered and that there is clear and authoritative public presentation of the evidence to inform that debate, while recognising, of course, that the Government of the day will determine the policy that is brought to Parliament.
Intergenerational fairness requires that each generation should enjoy a roughly similar proportion of adult life in state-supported retirement, and we may well see newer and higher projections for life expectancy in the future which will bring huge challenges to how our society operates. For example, who knows where advances in modern medicine will take us in terms of life and health expectancy? State pension policy clearly has to be robust, in the face of not just increasing life expectancy but major uncertainty about how fast that increase could proceed. However, I am also concerned that increasing the state pension age should not be seen as the silver bullet for automatically delivering sustainability without considering some of the complexities and collateral consequences which need to be addressed at the same time.
This requires a range of factors to be considered in the periodic review of the state pension age. My noble friend Lady Hollis has clearly identified these factors, and I shall add arguments about why it is important that they are in the Bill. On average, life expectancy is increasing and yes, on average, ageing appears to be healthy, but averages do not tell the whole story. There are major inequalities, as has been articulated. Life expectancy varies significantly by socioeconomic class and while it has risen significantly in all social classes, there are widening absolute inequalities. Lower socioeconomic groups live for fewer years post-retirement, a smaller percentage of which appears to be free of sickness or disability, and they are far more likely to leave the workforce early for health reasons. In part, this reflects differences in key lifestyle predictors of future health.
The key implication is that there may be limits to the feasibility of across-the-board increases in the age of retirement from the workforce, particularly if the increases are more than proportionate to the increase in life expectancy of particular socioeconomic groups. Similarly, for those who are healthy, since the state pension accounts for a larger share of their total retirement income, this suggests that an increase in the state pension age would be most likely to induce lower income workers to work longer and less likely to induce higher income ones.
It is important to understand how trends in life expectancy and health by socioeconomic class will develop in the future. Certainly, figures indicate some significant differences in life expectancy and healthy life expectancy between regions. The recent figures, kindly provided, show that there is a widening gap between local authority areas with the lowest and highest life expectancies at age 65. Of course, one can speculate on the causes of these differences—major industrial shocks, unemployment rates, specific health problems and cultural and behavioural issues. However, if one looks below age 65, lower socioeconomic groups are also not participating equally in the significant reductions in death rates between the ages of 45 and 65.
An optimist could argue that the major occupational sources of ill health that played a large role in previous generations, such as coal mining or heavy industry, and whose impacts can still be seen in the regional incidence of unemployment, will decline in importance. Conversely, a pessimist would stress that the increasing divergence of some lifestyle factors, continuing differences in working conditions and new labour market features may offset some of these positive developments. The issue therefore is whether policy levers can be deployed to mitigate the disproportionate impact of a rising state pension age on lower socioeconomic groups.
Variable state pension ages may not be an appropriate response for addressing the significant differences in morbidity, life expectancy and early departure from the labour market. However, where differences exist a response is needed. Simply ignoring them is, in itself, a default public policy response with potentially negative consequences for many people. Measures need to target reducing health inequalities but the welfare system needs also to be sensitive, efficient and protective in supporting those for whom working longer is problematic because of their class and health. If these inequalities persist or widen should, for example, the age of eligibility for pension credit be lower than that for the state pension itself?
The UK state pension system, even with these reforms, will not be particularly generous in relative terms. Its focus is poverty prevention rather than an income replacement system. The value of the single tier will be only a little above the guaranteed credit. Yes, it will be the foundation for private saving to enable people to achieve a reasonable level of replacement income but it will be some years before auto-enrolment delivers the necessary savings levels. We are still only staging and phasing its introduction. Meanwhile, lower socioeconomic groups will still be facing a greater likelihood of ill health and earlier exit from the labour market as they get older.
Understanding the extent to which increases in life expectancy are accompanied by increases in healthy life expectancy, monitoring inequalities between socioeconomic classes and regions and identifying the implications for policies associated with the evolving policy for state pension ages will remain an important part of any review. The key responses should include a strong focus on health service and occupational health policies and on the measures to reduce the life expectancy gaps and to compress morbidity. The long-term aim must be to narrow health inequalities rather than treating them as permanent barriers. We should aspire, for example, for the men in Glasgow and Liverpool to have as good an average life expectancy as the men in Kensington and Chelsea, or even those in East Dunbartonshire. Policy needs to be designed to be both equitable and affordable in the face of whatever rise in life expectancy actually occurs. Higher pension ages are essential but are not in themselves a sufficient response.
Increasing labour market participation by older workers is, equally, an integral part of sustainability. Analysis of trends in average age of retiring from the labour market and in employment rates among older people by gender, region, occupation and socioeconomic class is required to understand the extent to which increases in state pension age are accompanied by increases in employment. Unless increases in state pension age are accompanied by higher labour market participation by older workers, then the effective contribution of those pension ages to public expenditure pressures will be weakened, GDP will be lower and other benefit expenditure could well increase. However, major inequalities in life expectancy and health may make across-the-board increases in retirement ages unfeasible unless these differences disappear over time.
The policy of raising the state pension age needs to be accompanied by measures that facilitate higher labour market participation by older workers, because barriers certainly exist. Take, for example, the position of some women. Although women have a higher average life expectancy than men, the figures also reveal that the gap between them is narrowing. The gap between women in higher and lower socioeconomic classes is increasing and women’s participation in the labour market has reached a plateau, partly because of care requirements and the cost of care provision, particularly childcare. Older women are increasingly looking after their elderly parents or grandchildren. An older woman’s earlier age of retirement from the labour force may, for example, be the price paid so that her younger daughter or son can be economically active.
The cultural biases against older workers are often embedded in personnel practices and employers’ assumptions. Take training as an exemplar. The evidence suggests that employer-provided training is skewed towards younger workers, with an assumption that some workers are too old to train. Yet the experience of workers in their 50s plays an important role because beyond the age of 65, participation in the labour market is driven by participation up to the age of 65. Once older people exit the workforce, they are much less likely to work again. The challenges facing business in embracing older workers will be very real. I recall quite vividly 10 years ago the CBI, anxious about that challenge, simultaneously arguing for an increase in the state pension age to 70 but a default retirement age under discrimination law of nearer 65. I described it at the time as a five-year gap between loss of employment rights and receipt of pension. The debate has moved on but that indicates what tensions will be there as industry responds to increased longevity and increased state pension age.
The extent to which increases in state pension age are accompanied by increases in labour market participation will inform government of what initiatives they need to take, be it tackling discriminatory cultures, financial incentives for later retirement, incentives to employers to employ and train older workers, flexible employment practices, cultural attitudes and health policies and changes to welfare policy and welfare payments themselves. Whatever decisions are made in response to the periodic reviews of state pension age, and however much desirable continuity in policy can be achieved, delivering both a fair and sustainable pension policy and level of public expenditure will and should be subject to fully informed debate continuing over time, in the light of new information on a series of relevant factors becoming clearly available and systematically considered.
I was not going to intervene, but there is not as much difference between the two sides of the Committee on this, as earlier contributions seemed to suggest. I certainly thought that the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, were right down the line and I was sympathetic to them. Nobody is suggesting that the Labour Government were wrong to start the debate on early retirement. Everybody knows that life expectancy is improving and there are great complexities with inequalities. I would question whether the inequalities have necessarily got worse. I will come to that in a moment, but there is also the issue of overriding affordability.
One of the problems of extended life expectancy is that it almost certainly results in higher social care costs—and, as we know, higher pension costs. We all want to see better pensions, and you cannot often have both a lower retirement age and better pensions. It has to be recognised that you have to get a balance. We have all seen the extra costs that this Government have put into pensions through the triple lock. We want to see that continue into the next Government as well, but that will add to the overriding costs.
I question the inequality issue. As someone who worked in the mining industry when there were 250,000 people working in it, having seen the consequences of early retirement on a lot of those communities and the effect that it is already having on inequalities and lifetime expectancy, I would expect to see some improvement, as we have moved away from older, heavy industries. Another argument was about boring jobs—and boring jobs in the health service. The boring jobs of my generation were in the car assembly industry. With improved technology, anybody organising cleaning jobs should certainly know that that is one of the most important jobs in the health service. It should be respected and there should be pride in it, and there are ways and means of managing that.
That takes me to my further point. You have to have a uniform state pension age and it has to be an average. There will be difficulties with certain occupations, but those have to be respected. We already have some occupational pension schemes that have a lower retirement age because of the consequences of people working in those sectors.
My final point is on the categories that we are using here and the factors that will be included in any review. Those will change over the next 20 years. You could put in the proportion of people smoking or having bad diets as factors that should be looked at specifically. In fact, there is a whole variety of factors and I do not think that the Government are saying in the Bill that there will not be a variety of factors considered in these reviews. We all have an interest in reducing the health inequalities that arise in terms of life expectancy. Under the Government’s proposals, these factors will be taken into account, but we are giving people a recognition that this will be done formally, as part of a set procedure, whenever this is looked at every six or seven years. This will give some certainty as we go forward. I doubt whether the differences between us are really very big.
My Lords, there are times when one feels rather redundant in these proceedings—and, after a range of extraordinary speeches from my noble friends, this is one of them. I thank very much all those who contributed to this debate.
Perhaps I might start by briefly responding to the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham. I think I may have misheard him, and I hope that he will correct me if I did. He said that inequalities had not got worse, but perhaps I might refer him to the brief sent out by the DWP on equality in life expectancy and in healthy life expectancy. It said that while life expectancy has risen substantially for all social classes, this has resulted in a widening of inequalities, and that the smallest growth in life expectancy at age 65 was experienced by those in the lower socio-economic groups. What has been happening is that life expectancy has been rising for all classes, but because of the differential rate at which it has been rising, the gap has been widening. In fact the inequality problem is significant. That is a question for public policy to address.
We have heard today about trying to find a way to do two things: First, the analysis was made very clear by my noble friends Lady Hollis and Lord Whitty that people are living longer, but the proportion of years spent in full health is not keeping track at the same rate. We have significant inequalities in health within the UK, and significant variations in mortality and morbidity rates as a result. Also, we have people who are not able to work safely through to retirement age. Those are the issues that somehow public policy has to grapple with.
The fact is that mortality rates start rising slowly when people hit their mid-50s, and rise significantly from 65 onwards. That has significant implications for workers and employers. First, we have the implication—to which a number of noble Lords alluded—of having an older workforce. There will of course be employees who find, as my noble friend pointed out, that they cannot work until the state pension age. I wonder what consideration the Government have given to the risk that we will see a growing number of people who are recognised as sick or chronically disabled, but are having to wait so long for their pensions that they end up eating through the savings that they have set aside for retirement and so move into retirement without the very nest eggs that we want them to build up. Has any assessment been made of whether that will be one of the consequences of the changes to state pension age?
Secondly, what happens to those who know that they are unable to work safely at 67 but cannot retire? We have heard various examples mentioned of people in different professions. This is not simply a case for those in unskilled jobs. I would not want to be operated on by a surgeon who felt that his or her eyesight was no longer up to it, either. The reality is that a number of people in different roles may find that they have to face up to the fact that they cannot continue in the same role until a higher retirement age. The real question is whether their differential experience and resources may give them differential strategies for dealing with that. One of the questions for public policy is how we address the problems of those who do not have the resources or choices available to them in that circumstance.
Then there is the question of employers. We know that many employers welcome the wisdom and experience of older workers, but they have often expressed concern that older workers may get seriously ill and be off work for longer periods. I know that the Government have often reassured them that that is not the case and that older workers do not take more time off sick than younger ones. Have the Government given any consideration to whether that is likely to change as the state retirement age increases? Of course, at the moment, people can choose to work beyond the state retirement age and therefore there must be an element of self-selection among older workers who carry on working. As the retirement age increases, people may have no choice but to continue working, and I am interested to know whether any work has been done on whether that could make a difference to the composition of the older workforce.
We then heard about the issue of inequalities in health in relation to the fairness test. I read very carefully through the DWP document on equality in life expectancy and in healthy life expectancy, but in the end, I almost wrote at the bottom, “Baroness Hollis was right”. I found it hard to summarise it other than with something I have heard my noble friend say repeatedly almost ever since I have known her—one can expect 10 years of healthy retirement, 10 years of declining health and the rest of one’s life with significant levels of infirmity and disability. Yet despite that fact, she has pointed out the tendency of Governments to put so much store by actuarial information on average life expectancy. That of course is precisely what the Bill says in bald terms, whatever assurances we may want to receive about how it will be done in practice. The point has been made that average life expectancy tells us something, including quite a bit about how medical advances can keep us alive, but it does not tell us very much about our health in retirement, or about differential mortality rates.
We have heard a huge amount of information about clear socio-economic differences and the health inequalities that result from them. There is also clearly still a gender divide. Women still live longer than men, although the gap is closing. I also note that we are only now seeing a generation of female pensioners who have worked for most of their lives as well as raised families. We do not yet know the impact of that on female longevity—it will be interesting to see that.
My Lords, in addition to a gender divide, we have heard that there is a class divide and a geographical divide. To add to the examples from Glasgow, Liverpool and Norfolk, I offer Dorset, which I am reliably informed is the place to live—statistically, you are expected to live longest in the UK. Women in east Dorset can expect to live nine years longer than women in Corby—the area with the shortest life expectancy for women. Men living in east Dorset can expect to live 7.1 years longer than men in Manchester—the area with the shortest life expectancy for men. Then there is the effect of this differential life expectancy on state retirement incomes. Those living shortest post retirement, primarily the poorest and least skilled workers, will obviously receive less in state pension than their better-off counterparts in Dorset. Women in Corby will get £67,000 less and men in Manchester will get £53,000 less. And, of course, those manual workers may well have contributed for longer than those who spent longer in education.
Where does all this take us? It does not take us to any straightforward policy solutions. As I am sure is the case with other noble Lords, many representations have been made to me on ways in which the Government should tackle this—that perhaps they should not raise the state pension age until we have tackled inequalities in health; or that a variable retirement age should be brought in, taking account of life expectancy, work pattern or contribution history; or that there should be flexible retirement proposals or the idea of paying actuarially adjusted pensions early for those retiring in their 60s but before the state pension age. It is quite likely that none of these will commend themselves to the Minister. Given the look on his face, I expect that I am right in that. However, I am sure the Minister will accept that what we have heard today is an analysis that suggests that a significant set of public policy issues needs to be addressed. They are not all pension issues—a point that my noble friend Lady Drake made powerfully—but are effectively spillovers from decisions around the state pension age, which will then impact on public policy-making in a range of other areas.
If the Minister does not feel able to respond positively to any of those concrete suggestions on how to deal with this issue, I encourage him at the very least to go along with the idea of spelling out in the Bill the need to take account of all these factors, because that would then at least put the review process for setting the state pension age in the position of having to tackle all these complicated issues and making some recommendations to government on which we could all, I hope, place some store.
My Lords, the purpose of Clause 26 is to ensure that every Government consider state pension age in light of the latest life expectancy projections and other relevant data. The legislation sets out that a review must be informed by a report from the Government Actuary on the proportion of adult life spent in retirement and corresponding implications for state pension age.
On the point about pensions as a percentage of GDP raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, the single-tier impact assessment shows that even with an SPA of 67 in 2028 and an SPA of 68 in 2046, the proportion of pensioner benefit expenditure could rise from under 7% of GDP in 2016 to 9% of GDP by the 2060s. I am addressing her point about the baby boom.
It is true that life expectancy is different between socio-economic groups, and even in the latest figures it slightly widened. However, it is increasing for all groups. Such inequalities have always existed and, as the Minister noted in Committee in the other place, adjusting the pension age is not the right way to address these inequalities. We need to address these issues elsewhere through tackling the factors that lead to these differences in life expectancy. To illustrate the rate of increase, the period of life expectancy at age 65 for males in the lowest occupational class between 2002 and 2006 was 15.3 years. You have to go back only to 1999 for the average period of life expectancy of males from all occupations to be the same figure.
I will not go into detail on one of the amendments regarding adult age because we have not discussed it very much, but I will pick up the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, and the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, on the timing of when people enter the labour market.
The single-tier pension’s key features are simplicity—giving people the clarity and confidence to save—and a value set above the minimum income guarantee standard. Allowing early access would mean that we would have actuarially to reduce the pension, and this would severely undermine both these key features of the new system, complicating outcomes and meaning that, if people’s actuarially reduced state pension was below the minimum guarantee, we would retain an extensive and complex system of means-testing. International organisations have repeatedly advised countries to withdraw incentives to early retirement. Indeed, in recent years, a number of countries have put in place measures to discourage it, including Denmark, Finland and Germany.
The changes to state pension age are primarily about fiscal sustainability and fairness between the generations, such as taxpayers and pensioners, at any given time. It is therefore right that the Government Actuary’s Department focuses on total life expectancy from state pension age and not on healthy life expectancy. Indeed, the Pensions Commission advocated that pension age should rise proportionately in line with life expectancy, thereby maintaining the proportion of adult life spent in retirement. Just last week, the noble Lord, Lord Turner, reasserted this principle. This is what the GAD element of the review is for.
We also think it is crucial that future Governments have access to wider evidence before laying any proposals to change state pension age before Parliament. We have been clear in the White Paper and in the other place that we believe the reviews of state pension age should consider healthy life expectancy but also differences between socioeconomic groups and the wider economic effects of increasing state pension age.
On my original point about flexibility, we do not want to be too prescriptive in setting out factors that must be looked at by each review. We want to foster a more long-term view which would allow each Government to specify factors relevant to the circumstances at the time of commissioning the review. There is the danger that, by setting out a list of things for each review to consider, future Governments will simply have a tick-box approach to the reviews. As my noble friend Lord Stonham said—
When I last talked to the noble Lord he was pretty indifferent about his pronunciation, but I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham. He made a point which I want to reinforce. When we are looking out for 10, 20 or more years, it is quite difficult to specify all the considerations that a review should take into account. The risk is that that if you specify them, you become restricted.
The Minister is being a little unfair in this argument because at no stage did I suggest that we remove the words “other factors”. They would remain. All I am trying to do is transpose the wording from this document into the Bill; they are both the Government’s documents.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her advice, but we want to make sure that future Governments look at this themselves, take a proactive approach to the review process and are transparent and conscious about what they are commissioning. Stipulating now all the variables and all the factors to be taken into account restricts rather than supports that responsibility. Greater discretion will also allow an iterative approach with future Governments building on the reviews of previous ones.
A lighter touch approach will help to generate more debate at the time when the state pension age review is conducted. This should encourage all interested parties across Parliament and industry to feed in their thoughts and contributions and involve them better in the process.
The noble Baroness and, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, discussed quite a lot of the factors. I do not wish to get into a huge debate about healthy life expectancy, and so on, but I will make just make a few points on it. The first is to warn noble Lords that the ONS measure of healthy life expectancy from 2000 onwards was changed to run in comparison with our EU partners, so we do not have a consistent data run for the whole period, although we have evidence that shows that healthy life expectancy has increased consistently since the 1980s. Do not use the run because there is a discontinuity in it.
It is a very fair point that health is, importantly, attitudinal. It is not a matter of just taking a medical model for this. I accept that point.
However, where we have an unbroken record, which is the time spent free of disability, which runs from 1981 to 2010, the figure for men in Great Britain rose by 2.9 years and by 2.8 years for women. It is possible to take a rather more encouraging attitude towards our healthy life expectancy compared with some of the gloom I sometimes hear. The House of Lords report, Ready for Ageing—the Filkin review to which the noble Baroness referred—concluded:
“The Government were right to raise the state pension age, but they are now adopting a timetable of increases slower than that recommended by the Turner Commission and will have to revisit this with rising healthy life expectancy”.
Yes, but one of the problems is that people quote that without reading the 980 pages of evidence that went with it, which show that the summary of those recommendations did not pick up most of the debates in the evidence.
My Lords, I can only go with the conclusion that I would like to leave on the record alongside my warning to take a little care on some of the conclusions that have been drawn on the progress of healthy life expectancy.
The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, asked whether people can work longer and what the trends are in the labour market. The SPA has remained at 65 for men since the 1940s and the average age of labour market exit in 1950 was just over 67 for men and just under 64 for women. That figure has declined, ironically, along with the nature of the work that we have been talking about—hard physical labour. We have seen a countertrend in what has happened since then.
I genuinely welcome this debate and believe that it is important to keep having these discussions, whether inside or outside the House. But we should not seek to prescribe every last detail in the Bill; we must make sure that each and every Government revisit the issue in the light of the circumstances. I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Despite being interrupted by a couple of votes, we have had an interesting, valuable and, I hope, important debate. I am very grateful to the number of noble Lords who have taken part in it, including those who had not expected to do so. I was certainly grateful to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham—not to be confused with the housing association called Stonham.
I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Whitty and Lady Drake for joining me in pressing the Government to put these provisions in the Bill, not to challenge where we are now but for future consideration, when we are thinking about raising the state pension age—and I cannot emphasise too strongly—so that we have a coherent policy across government. We need that, because, as pension credit is withdrawn, with every year that we equalise the state pension age between men and women, we reduce the income of men who are in their twilight and who have dropped out of the labour market early, as 30% or more have and do. That figure will increase as the pension age rises—that 30% will probably go up to 35% and 40%, and so on, as we raise the state pension age, unless we can keep people in the labour market for longer, as my noble friend says.
Let me just make a point, before we take those figures absolutely on face value. When you have differential incentives—in other words, the point that the noble Baroness is making precisely, when you have a higher level of pension credit than working age benefit—you cannot be too surprised when people elect to go with the better paying structure. That probably tells you less than it could about what is happening to those people.
Oh, dear me. Are we assuming that somebody who has a real choice about whether to stay in work is going to make a rational decision to forgo a job that pays £400 a week to take an extra £30 or £40 or £50 in pension credit to top up an employment support allowance? Is that what the Minister is saying—that that person is so rational that he will willingly reduce his income to one-third of what it was because of the enticement of pension credit? Is that the Minister’s position?
I was referring to the differential between the two benefit structures. I was not referring to enticement; I was just saying that one cannot be too surprised if people select the better of two options.
I think that I am right in saying that under 10%—probably about 7%—of those in that position do not choose to go on pension credit when that choice is available to them, and the rest do. So clearly the Government’s position assumes that people are making a choice that is attractive because they have been financially encouraged to do so by the relative generosity of pension credit. I cannot attach any other understanding to the Minister’s position. If pension credit did not exist, the assumption would be that the benefits structure was less attractive and therefore, presumably, that they would stay in work for longer—and that therefore they are being encouraged because of pension credit to leave earlier than they need to and that, therefore, withdrawing pension credit is a wise move in the process of the rationality of economic thought in the labour market. Is that what the Minister is saying?
My Lords, I am saying that when you have a higher benefits structure, it is not surprising if people select it, other things being equal, over a lower one.
I think that the Minister and I have a very different understanding. My view is based on my experience representing—I do not know if the noble Lord has ever had that privilege—one of the poorest wards in my city for nearly 25 years. My noble friends here have either represented such wards or constituencies with very poor members and I can tell the Minister that if people can work they want to work. They want it for self-respect, for income, for social mobility and they regard going “on the club”, as it used to be called in my ward, or taking benefits as something that they are not proud of but reluctantly do because the labour market does not make appropriate provision for them, given the state either of their skills or their health. If that comes from experience of working with people, as I have done and as I am sure my noble friends have done, then I regret that the Minister cannot share that personal experience, which might give him a greater respect for the pressures that some people face in making decisions when they have to leave the labour market. I am not for a moment suggesting that he is lacking respect, but there is a great difference in perspective on this and I do not know that I can bridge it with the noble Lord.
It is certainly the case that, as pension credit is withdrawn, it will reduce the income of people who have already had to leave the labour market, usually on grounds of ill health, and as a result they will have less money for heating, diet and all the other things that we know they will need. People going onto pension credit are already effectively entering that second decade of disability without, in many cases, having gone through the first decade of reasonably healthy retirement. By withdrawing pension credit and putting no substitute in its place, we are ensuring that all we do is increase people’s poverty and thereby progressively increase the rate at which they go into further ill health, since they can no longer afford the heating, the diet, the aids and appliances, the cleaning help and all the rest of it which keeps them more effectively fit and engaged in society. Again, I am really disappointed in the Minister if he does not appreciate that.
I cannot understand the difference between what the noble Baroness has just been talking about and what she was saying the other day when she was so indignant that men could get pension credit at women’s state pension age. She described it, if I remember right, as a smooth path to the beach before getting state pension.
Indeed so—I made the image up on the spot, but I will, indeed, repeat it. What I was arguing there was that women were facing a cliff edge. Men had always had that slow path to the beach, but that is now being withdrawn from them and as a result they have a cliff edge in the future between where they are, on benefits, and state pension. Unfortunately for the Minister, the argument continues to be made.
I do not think that any of us disagree, as my noble friend Lady Drake pointed out so well and as was reinforced by my noble friend Lady Sherlock, that we need to extend healthy life expectancy and that that requires health policies. We need to make the second decade of average life expectancy, of increasing disability, of as decent a quality as we possibly can. The noble Lord, Lord Stoneham, said that factors will change. Of course they will. The Minister said that factors will change, but the point is that that is already covered, as was pointed out by my noble friend Lord Browne, but the wording of Clause 26(1)(a) gives the Secretary of State alone the privilege of determining the other factors. Putting all these factors in the Bill, as listed in the White Paper, does not exclude other factors that may develop as time permits; it is a basis on which I would hope that the DWP has its arm strengthened as it engages in battles for resources with other departments and with the Treasury.
Does the Minister really think that he will have greater powers of persuasion to get those health policies that we would want to extend healthy life expectancy, or those supporting policies from local government or from the DCLG for the second decade if these factors are not in the Bill and if the Government are not bound by the legislative requirement to consider those factors? On the contrary; by putting those factors into the Bill we will strengthen the DWP’s arm in requiring other departments to play their part in seeking to extend healthy life expectancy and to improve the quality of the decade of disability. Without it, his position will be weaker, not stronger. The other factors, as my noble friend Lord Browne has reminded me, remain the same. I hope that this addresses the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham. We are absolutely right to challenge the assumption of reduced inequality.
My noble friend Lady Sherlock said that we are going to eat into capital. The point is that, for example, somebody who is in a position to draw down an occupational pension has a choice of when they retire and they are not dependent on their basic state pension. The people we are talking about in this Bill are, and they have no such choice. As my noble friend Lady Sherlock said, they will eat into their capital, thus ensuring an impoverished old age as they wait to reach their state pension age.
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 54. Amendments 53 and 54 are tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hollis. They provide for a report on the periodic review of the rules about pensionable age, having regard to life expectancy and other factors, to be prepared by an independent commission.
There is an important role for an independent commission, while recognising that the Government of the day would determine the policy that is brought to Parliament. The demographic challenge poses unavoidable choices, which are partly for society to make and partly for individuals. However, for those choices to be rational and sustainable, they have to be informed, barriers have to be removed and a broad consensus has to be achieved. One of the useful roles of an independent commission is to present society with those difficult but unavoidable choices. It can spell out the facts and choices clearly and starkly. It can identify the complexities. That process will also assist the parties in reaching a political consensus.
Public debate on policy changes will be better focused and more likely to arrive at consensus if there is a permanent independent body charged with presenting to society the evidence and the issues. A commission can provide the public with a clear and comprehensive narrative about what is happening and what it means. Delivering a sustainable state and private pension system and responding to the demographic challenge are long-term projects that cannot be delivered in the lifetime of any one Government.
A consensus needs to be held over a long policy framework, because optimal outcomes take decades to come through. However, securing and maintaining a consensus will not be easy, because deciding the way forward involves important political judgments, and successive Governments have focused very often on immediate challenges. Trade-offs are the essence of political debate, but achieving some degree of consensus on core principles will be easier to achieve if there is an independent commission supporting that consensus. We know that the long-term management of public finances requires intensive debate now about the state pension age—but, notwithstanding the desirability of continuity in policy being achieved, the detail of pension and associated policies will and should be subject to continuing debate over time, in the light of new information becoming available.
Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy may change significantly from current forecasts, trends in voluntary private pension savings could turn out to be more or less favourable, and the participation rate of older workers in the labour force may prove problematic. As the information available changes, so the precise public policy direction can be refined, even if the overall framework of the system maintains as much continuity as possible. It is important that an independent commission should consider the sort of issues and complexities that we all referred to in the previous debate.
As to the type of commission, it should be small, so that the quality of engagement between commissioners is dynamic and qualitative, but sufficient in number to allow for wider input and for the stimulation of considerations that an individual by definition could not achieve. The commission could become a source of authoritative and independent presentation of the facts, and of the estimates of public expenditure consequences and of what future rises in the state pension age might be implied by the principle of pension ages rising in proportion to life expectancy increases. A commission could maintain a clear and steady focus.
The report could capture the key trends in life expectancy and the differences in morbidity, employment and retirement patterns among older people, by gender, region, occupation and socio-economic classes. This analysis would also allow early and regular identification of whether increases in state pension age are accompanied by increases in productive employment and/or a greater reliance on means-tested benefits and whether major inequalities in healthy life expectancy can make across-the-board increases in retirement ages feasible or unfeasible.
For example, if state pension ages rise and average retirement ages rise, state pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP will be reduced, not only by a pension expenditure reduction but by a rise in GDP. However, if pension ages rise and average retirement ages do not, the reduction in pension expenditure will be offset by other non-pension benefit expenditure and lower GDP. These issues are matters of some moment when we are looking to achieve sustainability in the light of what is a major demographic challenge.
Engaging the public is important. Individuals consistently underestimate their own life expectancy. Research confirms that. Individuals on average are unaware of, or do not believe, the projected increases in life expectancy—in some instances, even when the evidence is presented to them. Such attitudes make it difficult for people, particularly young people, to think rationally about the savings rate/retirement age/pension level trade-off that they personally and society face. An independent commission would assist in changing those attitudes and getting those key messages across in a way that very often government and political parties cannot do successfully.
The commission’s analysis could also identify the latest trends in private pension provision on average and across different gender, socio-economic and ethnic groups, and thus of the overall coverage and adequacy of pension provision. This analysis coming from an independent commission could assist in future debates about appropriate adjustments in employee or employer default contribution rates. This is a not insignificant matter and a key debate—one that people are probably feeling tentative about in view of other, wider considerations, but one which certainly an independent commission would help address, as well as helping the formation of a political consensus.
In the debates on previous amendments we heard much reference to data—the quality of the data, what they show, their integrity, whether they are sufficient and so forth. The quality of choices made and policy decisions taken is directly influenced by the quality, quantity and type of data that are available. An independent commission would be well placed to interrogate the quality of the data available and to make recommendations on the gaps or omissions in the data collected, and on the data needed to inform debate.
As the Minister conceded in an earlier discussion, there is a need to take a long-term view on these issues. In considering those long-term issues, long-term projections also need to focus on the uncertainty inherent in such analysis and on important sensitivity analysis. These are issues that a standing commission could focus on. It could assist in helping the debate and in helping the quality of government and individual decisions.
To repeat what I said at the beginning, one of the useful roles of an independent commission is to present society with difficult but unavoidable choices. It can spell out the facts and choices clearly, and it can identify the complexities and assist government and political parties in making the type and quality of decisions that are necessary in the light of the challenges that we face. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 55 and 57A in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Browne of Ladyton. I shall speak also to Amendments 53 and 54 in the names of my noble friends Lady Hollis and Lady Drake.
As we heard in the very clear speech from my noble friend Lady Drake, Amendments 55 and 57A provide that the periodic review of rules on pension age should be prepared by an independent commission. I can think of no one better to suggest how a pensions commission might work than my noble friend Lady Drake, who was such a distinguished member of the Turner commission.
As I indicated previously, we agreed that there should be periodic reviews of the state pension age to reflect changes in longevity and the need for people to fund their retirement and also to achieve a fair balance between generations. The question is how to achieve that, and we have grave concerns about the way in which the Government are approaching this matter.
As it stands, the Bill simply says that the Secretary of State shall review the rules about pensionable age. That leaves us with some significant gaps. There is insufficient information about the kind of review mechanism that there might be. There is also insufficient detail about who will conduct a review or how it is to be done, and there seems, on the face of it, to be insufficient scrutiny by Parliament of any recommendations that emerge. Perhaps the Minister will clarify that for us when he replies.
At the heart of this lies a very important question: how do we enable people to have confidence in the system? If we want to encourage people to save for their retirement and we need them to save more, they need to trust the Government, to trust Parliament and to believe that their pensions are safe in our hands. The public need to know that they will not be at the mercy of political expediency and will be protected from any adjustments that might otherwise be made too quickly. After all, they may be nervous about this. There has been a succession of changes to pensions legislation, pensions levels and the state pension age. To suggest just one example, under the previous Labour Government the number of years of contributions required to get a basic state pension—
My Lords, we have to adjourn the Committee for 10 minutes.
My Lords, as I said, there has been a succession of changes to pension policy and legislation. One key example is that under the previous Labour Government the number of years of contributions required to get a full basic state pension fell significantly, only for there to be a change of Government and for the number now being proposed to shoot back up again. The Chancellor did not help by giving the appearance of using the Autumn Statement to make an ad hoc announcement about the raising of state pension age. Once the dust settled, that turned out to be nothing more than what was already in the Pensions Bill and was therefore not necessary. However, that ran the risk of reinforcing the impression that pensions policy is made on the hoof, and we need to tackle that.
If we are serious about getting Britain saving for retirement, we need a proper, cross-party consensus on the way forward for settling the state pension age. Rather than simply being a matter for the Secretary of State, as the Bill proposes, we need a proper external panel which has the kind of cross-party and independent representation which will reassure the public and give confidence to parliamentarians from across the spectrum. We need a review mechanism that is clearly understood, a review body that is clear in purpose and function and ways of working, and clear parliamentary scrutiny of its finding—the kinds of things that will come from the report.
I know that the Minister will want to be reassuring about the Government’s intentions. In another place, the Pensions Minister said, in the face of pressure from the Opposition, that he had always envisaged a model such as the Hutton review, where the review is chaired by someone who people respect and who has credibility across the spectrum. That point was underlined by the Minister at Second Reading. I am happy to accept that the current Pensions Minister means that. However, even if that proposal were satisfactory, he will not always be Pensions Minister. I mean no disrespect when I say that I hope very much that in 18 months he will not be Pensions Minister any more. I can recommend my right honourable friend Mr Gregg McClymont, should anyone be looking for an alternative. However, Mr Webb, even when he is Pensions Minister, cannot bind the hands of his successors, even in this Parliament, never mind a future one. That is why this matter needs fixing in legislation.
Our amendment proposes simply that the review body should include representatives of the opposition parties and of the Cross-Bench Members of this House to ensure that Parliament as a whole is at the heart of this process. It would also include representatives of trade unions as those who represent those who are spending their ever-longer working lives saving for retirement. This broader representation on the review panel will give people confidence that a wide range of views will be heard. This amendment does not seek to shape the remit beyond that of having a range of competent and representative people sitting on the review panel. I urge the Minister to accept it.
My Lords, I start by acknowledging the expertise and experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, as a member of the Pensions Commission, on which she was able to rest when she moved this debate.
The purpose of the review is to inform the Secretary of State. Its job would be to collect and analyse the latest data, compiling a report to give the Government of the day the information they need to make a decision. Of course, we are all keen that the Secretary of State receives a report that is both impartial and credible. We appreciate the attraction of a panel to ensure that a wide range of views are reflected in the compilation of the report. However, we have been clear that we do not think that prescribing a committee is the right way to go. We do not want to restrict future Governments by prescribing exactly what the review looks at and who is doing the looking. There is greater merit in allowing Governments to choose whether to appoint a single reviewer—as with the review of public service pensions by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton—or a larger commission, such as the Pensions Commission. Indeed, the latter, set up by the previous Government, was made up of three individuals, two from the worlds of academia and business, neither of which, incidentally, was mentioned in the amendment.
Both of those cases show that a legislative underpin is not required to set up a review that can win cross-party and wider public support and that there is no consensus on where is the best place to find the right people. We do not think that the proposal by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, to set up a permanent commission—an NDPB or a standing commission, as she put it—is appropriate. That kind of structure is simply not necessary for a review that will come together and publish a report on a single issue, wide-ranging though it may be.
Is that so very different from the Low Pay Commission, which is also a single issue?
The Low Pay Commission reports on a much more regular basis than the five years envisaged here. To pick up the timings that we have experienced, there is the example of Independent Public Service Pensions Commission. The noble Lord, Lord Hutton, was appointed in June 2010 and reported some nine months later, in March 2011. In the intervening period the noble Lord held two calls for evidence, undertook a research event, published an interim report and published his final report. It is clear that a lot can be done in the space of a year, and that is the kind of period that we imagine is about the right length of time required for a review.
NDPBs also tend to look at a wide variety of regularly changing data in the areas of longevity, healthy life expectancy, socioeconomic variations, trends in the labour market and so on, and they tend to be published on a much less regular basis than this. I want to be clear, though, that the groups indicated in Amendment 57A and many others should all be encouraged to participate and contribute in the process. Indeed, the review has been designed to ensure that both Parliament and stakeholders will have ample opportunity to participate in the process and shape the outcomes. Furthermore, because the reviews will be regular, stakeholders may indeed be able to better prepare and contribute than they are now.
Of course, if the Government decide to bring forward changes to the pension age, then those changes must be secured through primary legislation and subjected to the full scrutiny and approval of both Houses, as now. However, to have such extensive and political input at the data-gathering and analysis stage risks stymieing the process before information can even be provided to the Secretary of State. Indeed, the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 prevents MPs sitting on many public bodies, precisely in order to avoid politics influencing their work.
Regarding the publication of this report, subsection (6) of this clause requires all reports prepared under the clause to be published. This means that both the Government Actuary and the report from the independently led review, including any recommendations that that component of the review makes, will be published, so all the evidence that has been taken will be made available. Every report will be laid in Parliament and published, including the report from the Secretary of State. As I said before, any proposed changes will require primary legislation.
It is for the Government of the day to put forward proposals resulting from the reports and to present any legislation to Parliament. Responsibility for publishing any overall report on the outcome of the review therefore has to remain with the Secretary of State. I hope that I have been able to provide some reassurance about how we envisage the review working and why. In this case, less is more. I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the Minister for his comments. I certainly was not trying to overleverage my experience on the Pensions Commission; that was not necessarily the main driver for my amendment. I shall respond to some of the points that he made. In Clause 26 the periodic review on the state pension age is a standing arrangement, which is why it provides an opportunity to create an independent commission in support of that arrangement. It is not a case of a one-off job and then it finishes, otherwise it would not be in the Bill. It is obviously intended as a standing arrangement, which is meritorious; I do not disagree with that. However, that is materially different from a one-off commissioning of something. It says that if you are going to have this standing arrangement and periodic reviews and assess whether the current rules on state pension age are fit for purpose, that lends itself to being supported by a commission on a standing basis.
Again, on reading Clause 26 it is not simply dealing with the narrow issue of the state pension age rules, it is also quite clearly saying it will review other factors relevant to the review. The implication in that must be that the Government recognise that complexities would arise around the demographic challenge. That would need to be understood in order to influence policy decisions across a range of issues. Again, a standing commission would be able to assist in looking at that wider range of factors that would inform the review.
I also repeat the point I made in moving the amendment because it is really important. The long-term management of public finances, particularly in respect of responses to the demographic challenge, would be really helped by having a standing commission. The fact that so much progress was able to be made on a political consensus that we are still getting the reward from was because there was a commission. It was able to present the issues and the case to Governments and political parties, as well as the country as a whole, in such a compelling way that it drives, almost from a sense of political responsibility, a consensus on the long-term management of public finances on that issue. It would be a shame to lose that.
Sustainability is a long-term project. Secretaries of State change, Governments change, but as a society we want a political system that delivers rational policies that give us good long-term outcomes. The one thing that characterised pensions in the last 20 years of the previous century was the incremental decisions that Government after Government made about both the private and public pension system. When you stood back you could see the complexity and the dysfunctionality of what the political system, motivated as it might have been in each instance in a very positive way, created. Certainly, when employers started to withdraw from the private pension system it started to show the weaknesses of our political system.
If we are looking for long-term effective management of public finances, the sustainability of the private pension system and the demographic response over the long term this strikes me as a way to go forward. To take an anecdotal example, I remember telling my husband that I was about to go and tell the whole country that they had to work significantly longer and we could not even promise that even the first forecast of how much longer they would have to work would not be increased further in the light of experience. He thought that I was committing career suicide and could not believe that I could possibly do that. I explained to him that the evidence was so compelling and if one cared desperately about a pension system and the interests of the people in this country you had to have the courage to take that debate out to people.
I can remember the CBI being horrified at the thought of having to retain older workers. I can remember trade unions being mortified at the prospect of the default retirement age being raised or abolished because it was a stalking horse for raising the state pension age. However, because you had a commission you could have a much more positive influence on that debate. I remember, as I am sure the Minister will experience, lots of people from around the world, particularly in Europe, asking how the UK managed to get such a consensus from the country about the reforms that needed to be made to the pensions system and the state pension age in particular. I genuinely think that one of the reasons that was possible, compared with some of the problems that are being experienced in other countries, is because the analysis and the narrative that were taken out to people were not just the product of party politics. They were the product of a commission that sought to identify the issues and the choices on the basis that even if you did not make a choice, that by definition was a choice because you would be inevitably moving along a certain line.
I think that that is right. There are 60 million people in this country who have an investment over the very long term, either for themselves, their children or their grandchildren, so we must get this right. What is there to fear in trying to sustain the political consensus by having a group of independent people who assist that process by being able to assist with the narrative and identify the issues? It is that passion that makes me move the amendment, not just that I happened to be on a commission at a point in time. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to require all banks which have refunded payment protection insurance (PPI) monies to customers to send each such customer a statement, without charge, setting out how much money has been refunded under each of the three separate elements comprising a PPI payout.
My Lords, the Financial Conduct Authority requires banks to explain clearly to customers, free of charge, how their PPI redress offer has been calculated. The FCA is actively monitoring banks to ensure that they are complying with this requirement. If a bank has not provided this information, or it is not clearly presented, the consumer can bring a complaint against the bank and, if it is not resolved, raise a complaint with the Financial Ombudsman Service.
I thank the noble Lord for that Answer, but will he take it into account that the banks got off on the wrong foot with the repayment programme by refusing to write a letter to everybody telling them that they owed them some money? It was left to customers to initiate their own claim and there is no certainty that many have not slipped through the net. The noble Lord’s Answer does not allow for the possibility that there are a great many people out there who have no knowledge that a great deal of money is still owing to them.
My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord that the FCA is taking this matter seriously and I am sure that someone would be happy to meet him to discuss this in more detail. The FCA is already looking at this general area as part of the thematic review it is currently undertaking into PPI complaint handling.
My Lords, does my noble friend not agree that the breathtaking scale of the PPI scandal is matched only by the volume of telephone calls that have been received by many people throughout the country, offering to help, and taking a slice of the proceeds that are then obtained? Will the Government look into this to see whether another scandal is not under way?
My Lords, I think that all Members of your Lordships’ House will have had such telephone calls. I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government have acted in this area. During last year’s passage of the banking reform Act, we gave the claims management regulator the power to impose penalties on claims management companies which make speculative claims. We are also giving the regulator more enforcement staff and requiring claims management companies to pay for this extra effort.
My Lords, every call made in respect of PPI is not necessarily inappropriate. Some are. Many people have used claims management companies because they did not feel confident going through the process themselves. I accept that there has been abuse. The key thing we have done is to give the regulator power to crack down on firms which make speculative claims to the banks when there is no justification for it.
My Lords, the noble Lord has not answered the point made by the noble Lord, Lord James, which was that individuals have to apply to the banks for restitution of PPI claims rather than the banks recognising the obligation that they know they have. Why are the Government letting the banks off the hook?
My Lords, the Government are not letting the banks off the hook. The banks have paid out almost £13 billion in respect of PPI claims, which is about 70% of the total we think is payable, and a lot more claims are in the pipeline. The concern raised by the noble Lord in his Question relates primarily to the way in which the detailed amounts were calculated and the extent to which individuals can understand those calculations from the material that they receive from the banks.
My Lords, is not the problem around individual complaints that very often those people who do not claim are the most vulnerable?
My Lords, a great deal of publicity has been generated on this issue, and consumer organisations are looking at how they can do more. As I have said, a very considerable number of claims have already been made.
My Lords, the noble Lord will recall that in 2011 the chief executive of Barclays said that the period of remorse and apology should now be over. Since then we have had this scandal, described by the noble Lords, Lord James and Lord Wrigglesworth, as breathtaking and utterly unacceptable. We have Lloyds Bank, which is still being funded from the public purse, in the middle of it. Since 2011, we have had the rigging of LIBOR and we have had RBS, another publicly supported bank, handing out massive bonuses while declaring a pre-tax loss. When are the Government really going to get tough with the banks and make sure that the Vickers reforms are honoured in spirit and in practice?
I think that the noble Lord must have been somewhere else in recent months because I seem to remember spending many days over last autumn in your Lordships’ House putting through, under the banking reform Bill, the tougher new approval regime for senior bankers, instituting the new criminal offence of reckless misconduct and more generally looking at ways of vetting the suitability of bank staff to a greater extent. The legal framework within which the banks operate moving forward is substantially different from that in place when this Government came into office, and it will make it much more difficult, although not impossible, for many of the problems we have seen in the past to recur. It will be much easier for the regulators to take effective action if they think it is necessary to do so.
My Lords, it is not for the claimant to put his or her claim forward, but for the banks to justify the holding of moneys to which they are in no way entitled. If the banks know that to be the case, are they not deliberately withholding those funds from their rightful owners? If they do not know, although in most cases and with few exceptions they should know, that puts them constructively in a position of trust with regard to the holding of those moneys. Is not that the way to look at it?
My Lords, there is a certain amount in what the noble Lord says, but I repeat what I have said: there has been a huge amount of publicity around this issue and not only have a very considerable number of people made claims, but £12.9 billion has been paid out in respect of those claims.
When will my noble friend go a little further than Vickers and actually break up those banks that are too big to fail and seem also to be too big to manage?
My Lords, again this is something that we have debated at some length. The Government have taken effective steps to ring-fence retail banks and to make sure that a resolution position is in place so that if they get into difficulties, there is a prearranged way of dealing with that to ensure that the Government are not faced with the problems they had in 2008, when essentially all the banks which got into financial difficulties had to be propped up.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact on high street businesses and employment of measures relating to business rates announced in the Autumn Statement.
My Lords, our £1 billion package will benefit all 1.7 million business rate payers. The measures announced in the Autumn Statement include the annual increase to be capped at 2%, around 360,000 businesses to receive 100% small business relief, and around 300,000 shops, pubs and restaurants to get a £1,000 discount. The package exceeds expectations and was welcomed by the CBI and the British Retail Consortium, and it will provide the support that high streets need to grow and provide employment.
I thank my noble friend for that Answer, but does she agree about the importance of the problem of empty shops on the high streets, made worse by empty rates introduced by Gordon Brown and the Labour Party some time ago? What action are the Government taking to address that matter?
My noble friend is right that this pressure on businesses was made worse by the tax hikes on empty premises introduced by Gordon Brown. To help to relieve that pressure, and as part of our £1 billion business rate package announced at the Autumn Statement, we also included a relief that provides a 50% discount for 18 months for new occupiers of retail premises that have been empty for a year or more. This is on top of exempting all empty new-build property from business rates for 18 months.
Is my noble friend aware that the Government’s actions have been exceedingly well received and that many in the business community would like to say “Thank you for listening for once”? Nevertheless, is it not true that the business rate today, particularly in the retail sector, where more than 20% of trade is done online and those companies pay no business rate, is no longer fit for purpose? Therefore, will Her Majesty’s Government look to review in toto the impact and structure of the business rate as we move forward?
My noble friend is right that the measures that we introduced were born out of listening to businesses, and measures have been introduced that support them to grow the economy without adding any extra burdens on other taxpayers. I make two points. Online retailers do, of course, still pay taxes, including business rates, on the properties that they use to facilitate their businesses. As to the business rate system itself, as my noble friend will know, my right honourable friend the Chancellor keeps all taxes under review. He is certainly looking at the administration of business rates and this review will take place later this year.
My Lords, we are in the era of the business rate retention scheme but there are emerging representations from councils, via the LGA, that currently the risks of the new system outweigh the rewards. This is partly to do with appeals but also business rates avoidance—exploiting the current relief and discount framework. What specifically are the Government doing to address these concerns about business rates avoidance?
The noble Lord will know that one of the changes that we have introduced is to allow local authorities to retain 50% of all the business rates that they raise. This is so that they can enjoy and benefit from business activity in their area. We have also changed the law so that local authorities are able to introduce their own discounts, and since April this year central government is funding 50% of those discounts. We think this is the right thing to do to make sure that there is the incentive there for new businesses and local authorities to receive the benefit from that activity.
My Lords, many of the shops in secondary retail locations will never return to retail. Given the figures that we have seen on the growth of online shopping, it seems inevitable that they will remain empty. Does my noble friend agree that the sensible thing is for local authorities to encourage the ground-floor units, as well as those above, to turn into residential accommodation?
My noble friend is right to highlight the changes in the way that consumers are shopping and spending their money. We have introduced, as she has acknowledged, some flexibility to high streets and are currently consulting on additional measures that will allow towns and high streets to adapt even further to this new world.
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact on leaseholders of changes to the operation of the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal system, introduced in October.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I declare my interest as listed in the register.
My Lords, in October 2013, a revised fee remissions scheme was introduced across the courts and tribunals system. The impact of the revised remissions scheme will be reviewed after October this year.
I thank the Minister for that. Can he confirm that people will not be charged management costs unless their lease specifies that they must be and that they will not be obliged to pay—win or lose—the head lessee’s or freeholder’s slice of the action?
My noble friend comes to this issue with great experience and has been a long-standing campaigner in this regard. She raises the issue of administration charges on leases. Some leases contain covenants for the recovery of legal costs, which is a slightly different issue from the recovery of costs as service charges. I understand there have been calls for the Government to consider the feasibility of creating a provision to prevent the recovery of administration charges, similar to the protection over service charges already provided under Section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. We understand the concern that this topic provokes but, as I am sure my noble friend will agree, we need to look at this very carefully and consult quite widely before deciding on any action that can be taken in this regard.
My Lords, I declare an interest as I have some interest in a leasehold flat. The former cap of £500 on costs has been removed, as the Minister has said, and the Church Commissioners, of all people, recently persuaded the court that a default judgment over service charges allowed them to forfeit a lease. Furthermore, in another case, a landlord recovered from two pensioners £40,000—not £500—as an administrative charge in a dispute over service charges. Is it not time that the Government acted to replace leaseholds for residential properties with commonhold?
My Lords, as the noble Lord will know, the Government have already taken forward the issue of legal costs in relation to service charges. I have already alluded to the Section 20C order, as provided for in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, which allows a leaseholder to seek for those service charges—if the landlord is claiming that—to be voided. He also raised the point about the £500 fee. Normally in tribunal cases, we have found that parties pay their own costs, and it is rare for costs to be awarded in the property chamber itself. Only where the tribunal considers that a party has behaved unreasonably could it make a costs order against them.
My Lords, I remember debating the Bill very carefully here in 1996, because it was stated that the total costs would be recovered from the applicants, down to,
“the milk for the office cat”.—[Official Report, 10/7/96; col. 348.]
These charges, under the previous system, were limited to a maximum of £500 and the only abuse was when the other side charged it back to all the leaseholders in the block, even if only one had brought the case. Now, it is a different matter. You have to put up the £500 even to take your case to the tribunal and you have to pay further costs all the way. Can we at least be assured that if, as the noble Lord says, it is not possible to limit it in some cases, the costs will not be charged to all the tenants, as is now the case, instead of just to the one person who brought the case? Will the court, or the First-tier Tribunal as it is now called, have the power to determine where these costs are actually justified?
Bearing in mind the series of questions that my noble friend has asked, perhaps writing to her in this regard would be more appropriate and beneficial.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what progress is being made in European Union free trade agreements.
The EU is currently negotiating 12 free trade agreements, including those with major trading partners such as the United States and Japan. The EU has also reached conclusion on 10 more agreements that have yet to enter force, adding to the 50 that have already been agreed and are now active. These negotiations are complicated endeavours, but I believe that the EU has made good progress. The Government will continue to be a champion for free trade and of the benefits that it brings to this country.
I thank the Minister for that Answer, which draws our attention to the huge number of free trade agreements that are in course. I would direct his attention to the EU-US free trade agreement. In that connection, has he seen the projections that were issued of the benefit there would be to both the EU and the US, which, interestingly, appears to be roughly evenly divided? Does he agree that the assumption of a virtually equal division of the benefits should be revisited in the light of the huge competitive advantage that the US now enjoys, thanks to its access to abundant supplies of cheap energy, whereas we are increasingly locked into expensive energy to the disadvantage of our businesses?
My noble friend is right to draw attention to TTIP, the US-EU agreement, which will indeed bring substantial benefits. I believe that the UK is expected to gain around £10 billion a year, which is about £400 for every family in the UK, the US is expected to gain about £80 billion and the EU about £100 billion, so there are very substantial gains. In addition, there will be very substantial gains for the rest of the world, which are believed to be in excess of £80 billion.
I take my noble friend’s point that energy presents some challenges. Certainly, we hope to see the US exporting energy, so that the benefits of shale to global energy prices would help all industry rather than just those in the US. In any event, we believe that helping to have openness and convergence of standards will assist all citizens, not just in the EU but in the US and around the world.
My Lords, if we left the political construct of the European Union, is there any reason why, as one of the world’s largest economies, we could not maintain our existing trade agreements and sign new ones with Commonwealth countries and the markets of the future? Surely we would enjoy our own seat on the World Trade Organisation.
If we were to exit the EU, there would be no certainty that any of the free trade agreements would actually continue. While the UK is a significant economy in its own right—and that is important—these agreements take many years to negotiate. Even assuming that we could renegotiate them, we would not have the leverage that the EU has, as the single largest trading bloc in the world, to make such agreements. Therefore, I think that it would be very difficult to replicate them, particularly within a short space of time.
My Lords, will the Minister comment on progress on the negotiations between the European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, which have now been going on for 10 years and are meant to focus on development and reciprocal free trade? Is it not the case that there is a strong chance that, unless the October deadline is met, we will see an unprecedented situation wherein African countries will lose their preferential access to European markets?
The noble Baroness makes a good point in raising those countries. There has been a lot of focus on the most developed nations, but we also have an obligation to continue to push the economic partnership agreements that we have been trying to make with Caribbean and African countries. However, I would stress that there was a major breakthrough with the WTO agreements. The WTO agreement to aid trade facilitation is worth around £100 billion to the world economy as a whole and the vast majority of that will go to developing nations, which I think is to be welcomed. Certainly the UK will continue to push for trade agreements with Caribbean, African and ASEAN countries. We are great proponents of free trade and of the benefits that it brings for all nations involved in it.
My Lords, does my noble friend the Minister agree that concluding the EU-India free trade agreement would bring enormous benefits to the economies of both sides and, therefore, that finding solutions to the remaining obstacles should be a priority this year?
Indeed, the Indian agreement would be of great benefit. Of course, India is one of the major powers and is growing fast. However, as we know from our debates in this House, there are challenges with internal Indian beliefs on trade and there are elections in India in, I believe, April this year. Discussions are ongoing, and I believe there will be discussions in Davos with the Indian trade Minister regarding progress on this agreement. We will certainly be pushing the Indian Government for a wide-ranging agreement, but whether that will be feasible this side of the Indian election is extremely doubtful.
Will the EU-US prospective trade agreement as currently envisaged continue to allow the United States to ban the export of crude oil or natural gas, as they do at the present time?
The discussions are still ongoing. Clearly, we would like to see free trade of all descriptions, but the TTIP agreement will be largely focused on reducing import tariffs and particularly on the convergence of rules, which will help all countries. We would certainly like to see its energy exports being made available all around the world, as is the case with UK exports from the North Sea.
Does the noble Lord agree that the advantages of TTIP to the consumer need to be more emphasised? At the moment, most of the emphasis is on the benefits to producers on both sides of the Atlantic, but in terms of price reduction and a widening choice of products and goods the TTIP stands to do the consumer a great deal of good as well.
My noble friend is entirely right that the TTIP will bring a lot of benefit to consumers. When you get a convergence of standards, global models being made and lower tariffs, prices will come down and consumers will have more choice, not just in the UK or the EU but in the US as well. Certainly, we feel it is very important—Her Majesty’s Government have done a number of pieces of good work on this—to highlight the benefits that free trade will bring to consumers on both sides of the Atlantic. I absolutely agree with my noble friend that it is very important to highlight the positive impact that will arise.
Does the Minister agree that it is a very encouraging sign that the US Administration are now pressing for fast-track authority for this agreement, as with the Pacific one, and that this is essential if the agreement is to go through in a reasonable amount of time? Will the Government do what they can to let their friends in Washington know that this fast-track authority is really important and to let our friends in Brussels know that this is a sign that the negotiation really is for serious?
Indeed it is. The timetable for TTIP is very aggressive, with the aim of completion by 2015, which would be almost unprecedented. I met with the US ambassador to the UK just before Christmas and we discussed TTIP at some length. Certainly, his enthusiasm for it is there, albeit that I recognise that not everyone in the American political system feels that way. However, we made that point very clearly. The Prime Minister said at the G8 conference that this is a once-in-a-generation opportunity and, understandably, I would not disagree with the Prime Minister on this issue.
Is the Minister confident that free trade agreements would be good for African economies? Historically, did not the US, our own country and the countries that are now successful—the industrialised countries of south-east Asia—build up their economic strength behind protectionist barriers? Is it not the case that when the countries of the advanced West pressure African countries into free trade agreements, they are doing so not for the benefit of those African economies but for themselves?
As I indicated earlier, from the free trade agreement that was recently conducted in Bali, for example, the biggest beneficiaries by far will be the developing nations. The improvement of trade facilitation will yield £100 billion in benefit, most of which will come to them. Actually, a lack of free trade, rather than the absence of it, has been the challenge for a lot of developing nations. The UK will continue to push to see free trade around the world, not just with developed countries but with developing countries.
My Lords, in all these agreements that the European Union makes with third parties, there is a standard clause on human rights. Can he tell me of any such agreement in which that clause has ever been invoked?
My noble friend is correct that EU agreements, including for instance the one with Canada, have standard clauses on human rights. I am not aware that any of these clauses have been invoked, although it is feasible to suspend all or part of the agreement if human rights have got worse in a particular country. I think that the engagement in free trade and the free movement of people, services and goods, is something that should help human rights. I certainly think that ensuring that human rights are on the agenda when we try to negotiate is a major help.
My Lords, without doubting the importance of free trade agreements to lifting an estimated 800 million people in the world out of starvation, despair or poverty, will the noble Lord nevertheless take into account the exploitation of children in a country like India, for instance, or exploited labour elsewhere in the world? Will he tell the House what balance is struck in determining free trade agreements in relation to protecting the rights of those who are likely to be exploited?
The challenge of child labour in certain countries can happen irrespective of free trade, but I think that free trade will actually help through the exposure and openness of the economies, which is a major help to improving the conditions of workers in individual countries. That is something we will continue to push for. As I said earlier, we also put human rights clauses in the various agreements and the UN has certain statements on human rights, which we also look to comply with. It is an important subject, but it is not peculiar to free trade agreements.
My Lords, is it not inevitable that, as long as European energy prices are double—or, in the case of Germany, triple—that of the United States, there is inevitably going to be a transfer of manufacturing to the United States?
As I said earlier, energy prices are a significant issue for EU-US relations, but they are not the only issue and there are many industries that are not wholly reliant on energy prices. In fact, energy prices are just one part of the total package. We would also look to see the exploitation, for instance, of alternative energy sources in the UK, which will hopefully act to balance some of that. With that in mind, I was delighted to see the comments from the Prime Minister about looking for alternative energy sources. The UK, which is already an energy producer through conventional means, is also looking at alternative sources of energy, and that is going to be very important for the future of the UK.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment seeks to extend the legislation requirements introduced by Clause 1 to all lobbyists who are engaged in that activity on a professional basis. If the amendment is agreed, incidental amendments will be required, but these can be included at Third Reading. I do not intend to rehearse my observations at Second Reading or in Committee but will set out my reasons for this amendment.
The Explanatory Notes to the Bill state that the main purpose of the provisions in the Bill on lobbying is to ensure that people know whose interests are being represented by consultant lobbyists who make representations to government. To that end, Clause 1 requires that those carrying on the business of consultant lobbyists must register. They cannot operate unless they are entered in the register. I agree that lobbying undertaken in an open, transparent and responsible manner is integral to our democratic system, but it should be regulated to ensure, as was said by the Minister at Second Reading, that we dispel any public perception that,
“certain powerful organisations and individuals could exert a disproportionate influence on government”.—[Official Report, 22/10/13; col. 893.]
The registration system proposed in the Bill will not dispel that public perception. It is limited in scope and is confined to those businesses above the VAT threshold which are involved in lobbying as consultants for others. It does not apply to lobbyists employed by those firms of consultant lobbyists, nor does it apply to national or multinational companies or organisations which seek to exert influence on the Government and choose to do so by using in-house lobbyists. The public want to know who is engaged in lobbying the Government and are not interested in whether the lobbying is undertaken by consultants or in-house lobbyists. In short, the decision to restrict registration to consultancies is fundamentally flawed.
The desire to include in the provisions in-house lobbyists is not academic. They represent about 80% of the lobbying industry. Moreover, the statutory register would replace the current voluntary register operated by the Public Relations Consultants Association, which is the professional body that represents United Kingdom PR consultants, in-house communication teams and individuals. Those who have chosen to register with PRCA include the largest consultancies in the industry as well as the in-house teams of various organisations. Registration in the voluntary register requires members to update their entries about staff and clients on a quarterly basis and to sign up to the PRCA’s code of ethical conduct, which is supported by rigorous disciplinary structures. It is appropriate that there should be a statutory register, assuming that it is supported by enforceable codes of conduct—a matter to which we may return in later amendments.
However, it is unlikely that the voluntary register will survive after the introduction of a statutory scheme and, in any event, it might be confusing and undesirable to have more than one register. The existing provisions would have the effect of removing from the public domain information that already exists about certain in-house lobbyists. Rather than concealing such information, it would be more appropriate to extend it to those lobbyists who have not already registered on a voluntary basis.
I invite your Lordships to support this amendment for a number of reasons. First, it will increase transparency of lobbying. Secondly, it will give the public greater confidence in the political system by affording them greater powers of scrutiny of lobbying activity than is offered by the Bill. Thirdly, it will ensure that they are not denied information about the activities carried out by the vast majority of lobbyists in this country represented by those employed by large national and multinational companies representing the energy sector, alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries and many other activities affecting people’s lives. It is only right that the public can judge the extent to which government policy has been influenced by lobbying activities and the extent of such activities. The consequences for the public are the same, whether lobbying is by a consultancy firm or by in-house lobbyists. Finally, this amendment will ensure that the benefits of the current voluntary system of registration are maintained and indeed enhanced. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak briefly, simply because my Amendment 136 is grouped with the other two in this grouping. My amendment is slightly different from the others, and signals what we will need to do if some of the amendments we are discussing this afternoon are not accepted. My amendment seeks to change the title of the Bill. As it stands, it is Transparency of Lobbying, but the Bill does not enhance transparency and it is not actually about lobbying. It is about lobbyists; it is about status, not about activity. There is a mismatch between the Short Title and the Long Title. The Long Title makes clear what the Bill is about: it is about the registration of lobbyists; it is not about transparency of lobbying. As I say, this is really to signal later debates, but unless the Bill is changed quite substantially, we will have to amend the title to bring it into line with what the Bill actually contains.
My Lords, I want to speak for less than a minute; I spoke at some length on this matter in Committee. The Bill is deceiving the public. The public expect the matter of the registration of lobbyists to be dealt with in this legislation. However, Parliament is now considering a Bill which excludes the vast majority of people in the industry. I object and I hope that the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, is accepted by the House.
My Lords, I also support Amendments 1 and 11. I hope that I will not also have to support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, as we hope that we will have made the changes that will make supporting it unnecessary. Amendment 1 also stands in the name of my noble friend Lady Royall and myself. It is already clear that establishing a register only of consultant firms would add nothing to the existing voluntary register. It would omit hundreds of employers—the in-house, public bodies, charities and, perhaps most importantly, trade associations—as well as more than 1,000 individuals who work in this industry.
We have heard the Government boast about being part of the Open Government Partnership, and Ministers say that the public should be able to see who is lobbying Ministers. However, as we know, the Bill will not do that. It will only tell us the companies for which, for example, Bell Pottinger has had direct contact with a Minister over the past quarter. It will not name the individual lobbyists concerned, nor will it identify the company on whose behalf that meeting took place. So if a lobbying company met a Minister, for example, on behalf of a defence company, we still would not know that. In the hypothetical Bell Pottinger case, it has, according to Marketing Week, some 900 clients; so we would only know that Bell Pottinger was meeting somebody on behalf of one of those 900 clients but not which one it was. If the Minister, instead of meeting a consultant, met the actual defence company itself, or its trade association, that would not appear on the register at all, because the lobbyists would be direct employees.
This is very different from the United States where, we understand, Mr Cameron’s election guru, Jim Messina, has just taken up a job with the American Gaming Association, which is about to lobby on online gambling. That will all be declared, but in the UK, there will be no record of such lobbying by organisations such as the Association of British Bookmakers, despite the public interest in knowing who is lobbying the Government, in this case, on gambling.
According to today’s Daily Mail, the Chancellor took the boss of one of the world’s biggest makers of betting machines on his trip to Beijing. That is something that the company would not have to declare because it would be doing that lobbying direct. It is interesting that the Rank Organisation discloses far more than the Bill actually asks. It has decided to set out the spending that it makes in its government and regulatory affairs work—for example, £115,000 to Luther Pendragon, Ernst & Young and FTI and another £88,000 in membership fees to three trade organisations: the Bingo Association, National Casino, and the Remote Gambling Association. However, none of those would be required under the Bill. So, congratulations to Rank but not to the Government.
Similarly, we would know nothing about meetings between the big six energy companies and HMT or DECC officials because they use their direct staff for that. Or consider the anti-electronic-cigarette lobby, largely funded, I understand, by the pharmaceutical industry, which produces nicotine replacement therapy and ideally would like e-cigarettes off the market. Johnson & Johnson, GSK and Novartis have teams dedicated to that lobbying work, and none of that would be known under the current provisions.
I am afraid that the Bill is rather a damp squib and, unless we amend it, it will exclude virtually all business lobbying, whether done by the companies themselves or by their trade bodies. Worse, even where one of the big agencies such as Weber Shandwick or Bell Pottinger register, we will still not have a list of their staff so that if one of their lobbyists met a Minister, we would be no more the wiser about who that lobbyists’ clients actually were.
In the debate on Part 2, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who is not currently in her place, warned us of the danger to our democracy of American-style lobbyists, and indeed her autobiography, which I recommend, draws on her wide experience of that side of the Atlantic. She talks of the powers of lobbyists there and the extraordinary influence of organisations such as the American Association of Retired Persons, the National Rifle Association and the American Israel Political Action Committee. As she and your Lordships’ House must know, though, none of those or their UK equivalents would have to be registered under the Bill—nor the British Insurance Brokers’ Association; the Building Society Association; Philip Morris; FOREST; the nuclear industry; One Hub or None, which is in favour of Heathrow’s expansion; the CBI; the TUC; or the drinks industry, despite 130-odd meetings with civil servants to resist minimum unit pricing.
What is the point of the Bill, particularly this clause, if it does nothing to shed light on what goes on behind closed doors in Whitehall? For the sake of democracy and good governance, we need to see who is lobbying whom and about what. The register should cover the act of lobbying—the status, I think the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, said—not the type of lobbyist, otherwise this is open to abuse. If an issue becomes very sensitive, you can simply have the lobbyists who have been working for an agency become directly in-house and put on the payroll of a particular company at that time, and then none of their activity will have to be registered. Or a small lobbyist could simply work part-time for 10 clients and be paid directly by them, and then we would know nothing about them.
A list of lobbying firms is not enough. That is not what was foreseen in the coalition agreement, it is not what the lobbyists themselves want and it is not what Unlock Democracy or Spinwatch want. The charities and trade unions have told us that they are very content for their public affairs professionals to be registered and to disclose their lobbying meetings. We strongly support Amendment 1 regarding the production of a proper, comprehensive and statutory register of all professions lobbying the Government. Democracy demands nothing less.
My Lords, the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, and supported by the opposition Front Bench would amend Clause 1 such that the register applied to professional, rather than consultant, lobbyists. The noble and learned Lord said that if the amendment was carried then it would need some consequential amendments. I respectfully suggest that it would need more than just consequential amendments because there is no definition of “professional lobbyists” in what he is offering to the House, of which I will say more in a moment.
From the discussions which I understand took place in Committee on this issue and on amendments previously tabled by the Opposition, it appears that they would capture—as the noble and learned Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, made clear that they would wish them to—so-called in-house lobbyists in addition to consultants and, with Amendment 11, also employees. However, as I have said, there is no definition given of professional lobbying to accompany the amendment and its effect would therefore be that the provisions of this Part would be undermined such that a functioning register could not be established. I do not believe that that could simply be resolved by a number of consequential amendments.
We have discussed at length, in various debates on the Bill, the importance of clear definitions. Until now, the Opposition have struggled somewhat to define what they mean by “professional lobbying”, and now seem to have abandoned such a definition altogether. It is vital that we understand exactly who is intended to be captured by the amendments—whether this includes, for example, charities and all the paid employees of charities. Does it include church groups? Does it include the vicar who makes representations on behalf of his parishioners, because he is in paid employment? The noble Baroness shakes her head, but the problem is that without any definition we simply do not know who is intended to be covered by what she proposes.
We have said throughout that the definition used by the professional organisations—which would absolutely answer every point, as I am sure the noble and learned Lord must have read—is one that we are very content with.
My Lords, it is fair enough to say that, but it is not what the House is being asked to vote on today. It is being asked to vote on something which is devoid of any definition.
If the professionals have designed a system which includes them, why can that not be in the consequential amendments? Why do the Government not come back at Third Reading to include those provisions?
Because, my Lords, there have as I understand it been many attempts made to pin down and define what is meant by “professional lobbyists”, none of which has met with approval or the kind of certainty we want in previous debates. Perhaps we can answer two of the points of the noble and learned Lord and the noble Baroness. Simply to introduce ambiguity to a prohibition provision that is accompanied by serious criminal sanctions is unacceptable. That lack of clarity leaves the amendment fatally flawed.
As the Government have made clear throughout the passage of the Bill, our proposals for a register are designed to address the specific problem that we have identified. One of the things that gave rise to complaints in the media was that when consultant lobbyists were lobbying, people did not know who their clients were. That is the issue which the Bill addresses. It is not always clear whose interests are represented by consultant lobbyists when they meet Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. The context is that this Government have for the first time made it clear to the public exactly who Ministers and Permanent Secretaries are meeting. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee’s report on the Government’s initial proposals for a statutory register of lobbyists made clear that identifying the problem that the register is intended to address is critical if successful regulation is to be achieved.
While we acknowledge that there are those who consider the focus of the proposed register too narrow—I am aware that these criticisms have been made—we have yet to see a clear articulation of the problem that would be addressed by expanding the scope to all so-called professional lobbyists. The point has been made about in-house lobbyists. It is quite clear whose interests are represented by an in-house professional lobbyist: it is the person who employs him or her. If you are an in-house lobbyist for the Scotch Whisky Association—I am not sure if that association has in-house lobbyists, but let us assume that it does—it does not take a genius to work out that if you are lobbying a Minister or Permanent Secretary, those are the interests that you would be representing. If you are an in-house lobbyist for one of the utilities and you meet a Minister or Permanent Secretary, it does not take a huge leap of the imagination to guess that you are representing the interests of the organisation which employs you. I cannot honestly see what is added by creating a list of people and their employers. If I have missed the point, I am more than happy to have it explained.
There are two issues. The first is that there are some enormously large employers and we do not know whether they are lobbying over a particular application for planning permission, for a new medicine or for something else. The second is that unless they meet a Minister or a Permanent Secretary under the silly bit of this Bill, we will know nothing; whether they meet senior civil servants, Bill teams or policymakers in the Civil Service, that will not be covered at all.
My Lords, we shall come on to the second point made by the noble Baroness. I think it is the subject matter of the next group of amendments. We would not know any more just by listing the names of in-house employees who engaged in lobbying. You would still not know from doing that—and that is what this amendment seeks to do—whether that person was actually lobbying with regard to planning permission or not. That is why it is important that the parallel provisions which the Government are doing in quarterly returns as to which people Ministers and Permanent Secretaries are meeting is an important part of the whole picture. We shall deal in a moment with the points made by the noble Baroness because I think that she is missing out that crucial part.
Just on the example the noble and learned Lord was giving of the Scotch Whisky Association, if it was to buy in a consultant lobbyist to advise it but did the lobbying itself, how would that be caught by the Bill?
If the Scotch Whisky Association was lobbying itself, then the important thing is that if the Scotch Whisky Association is meeting a Minister or a Permanent Secretary, then that would be in the returns which the Minister or Permanent Secretary makes. That would make it very clear that it is the Scotch Whisky Association that the Minister has been meeting. That is what I think people wish to know. In a moment I will address my noble friend’s amendments to say some of the things which the Government intend to do to actually improve the openness to which we are already committed and delivering.
The position—as I understand it—which we have adopted or sought to adopt is the position in Australia. I am delighted to see my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire here—I just wish he was actually right here because he has a wealth of knowledge and experience on this Bill. He very helpfully reminded me that we have modelled these provisions on the position as it is in Australia, whereas Canada has what might be described as medium regulation, which requires some of the information on employees and in-house lobbyists to which the noble Baroness and the noble and learned Lord referred. That system costs £3 million a year and, as my noble friend says, there is actually so much detail that it almost ceases to be useful. There is almost a detail overload, whereas our system replicates the Australian model. We expect it to cost considerably less, at £200,000 a year, and we believe that that is a very good system where the consultant lobbyists are identified, their clients are identified and the Minister works hand in hand with the regular returns from Ministers and Permanent Secretaries as to whom they have met.
I was actually struggling to see how the problems raised by the noble Baroness would be addressed by just adding more names to a register of people who are employed, unless—as we have committed to and are doing—you also indicate who Ministers are actually meeting. It does not add anything else by having the name of the person who was the in-house lobbyist, for the sake of argument, at one of the utility companies when they met the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change.
Until we see evidence of the case for introducing a register of all professional lobbyists, we remain reluctant to expand the scope of these proposals because we believe that what we have here is proportionate and problem-specific and will increase transparency without discouraging engagement by those who will be affected by policy and legislative decisions, such as businesses, charities, community groups and members of the public.
Amendment 11 would require consultant lobbying firms to disclose the names of all who undertake consultant lobbying activity on their behalf. The Government do not consider that such a requirement is either necessary or appropriate. The Bill requires the publication of the clients of consultant lobbyists, and the existing meeting publication scheme publishes both the persons Ministers and Permanent Secretaries meet as well as the body or firm that employs them. Transparency of who a consultant lobbyist is is therefore achieved on that information alone. To require the disclosure of the names of every private individual who is employed by a consultant lobbying firm would raise issues of proportionality and justification when the disclosure of such names provides no greater transparency, because we will know what the group, organisation or company is that meets the Minister or the Permanent Secretary. Therefore in return for listing a large number of names there seems to be no increase at all—not even a proportionate one—in the amount of the transparency than what is made available at the moment through the scheme of publication of persons whom Ministers and Permanent Secretaries meet.
The Minister will recall that at every previous stage of the Bill I have pressed that the Government should recognise that the key issue is not who the lobbyist is but who he or she meets, for what purpose and when. I very much welcome what my noble and learned friend has just said about the quality of the record of meetings that this Government have introduced. Perhaps he can go just a step further. He will be aware, from the discussions that have taken place across the House—and there has been support for this at every stage—that the present records of meetings are very often way out of date and not very detailed, and there is a grave discrepancy between the records that come from some government departments and those that come from others. In addition, it is very difficult to access them in a normal way through the computer. I instanced that we tried to find 23 different websites that would give us that information. Is my noble and learned friend now saying that there will now be active involvement by the Government to make sure that the situation is improved right across government?
I am very grateful to my noble friend and I recognise his long-standing interest in this, not just in terms of the Bill. I hope that I will directly address the points he has raised in responding to points made by my noble friend Lord Norton.
My noble friend’s amendment would revise the title of the Bill so that it referred to the registration of consultant lobbyists rather than the transparency of lobbying. His amendment appears intended to suggest that the provisions outlined in Part 1 of the Bill will not enhance the transparency of lobbying. He will not be surprised to learn that I respectfully disagree. This Government have done more than any before to enhance the transparency of government and decision-making, and these provisions will extend that transparency. We are the first Government to proactively and regularly publish details about Ministers’ and Permanent Secretaries’ meetings with external organisations, and we do so alongside a huge amount of open data regarding departmental spending and procurement. We are recognised as international leaders in open government and we continue to introduce initiatives to further extend transparency in government and the public sector.
We listened carefully to the concerns expressed during the Committee stage debate. In response to the question raised by my noble friend Lord Tyler, I am pleased that I can today commit to noble Lords that we will make further improvements to the accessibility of government transparency information. We will ensure greater co-ordination of the publication of data sets so that all returns within a quarter can be found on one page. I hear the criticism that he makes, and we ought to get better at the speediness with which we make this information available, but we will improve the access to and presentation of those data, including by improving the consistency of presentation and titling. We will also ensure greater consistency in the content of departmental reporting, particularly on including the subject of meetings. Finally, we will ensure that the gov.uk transparency pages contain a link to the statutory register of lobbyists so that the data can be easily cross-referenced.
The practical implications of those improvements are that: rather than having to visit a number of different sites or pages, all information will be accessed via one easily located page of gov.uk; the consistency of those data will be improved so that the transparency reports can be more easily located via search functions; and the subject of the meetings will be set out more helpfully—for example, rather than describing them as “introductory” or “catch-up” meetings, the detail of the meeting discussion will be outlined. Therefore, if, for example, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change was meeting someone, the subject would include not just energy policy but things such as fracking.
I hope that these practical proposals to which the Government are committing themselves will improve the transparency of decision-making further than we have already achieved, and that the Part 1 provisions will complement and enhance them. I dare say that they will do more to improve transparency than just having a long list of employees of a consultant firm. Obviously, if an employee—the noble Baroness mentioned Bell Pottinger, so for the sake of consistency let us say that this was an employee of that firm—had a meeting, the record would list not just “Joe Bloggs” but “Joe Bloggs of Bell Pottinger” and the subject of the discussion. As a result of the Bill, the list of Bell Pottinger’s clients would also be made available. I therefore believe that what we propose today does far more to improve transparency than simply making available a list of employees, and it reflects suggestions made by a number of colleagues who have made representations.
Although this does not relate directly to the actual register or to the Government’s scheme, I can also indicate that in our response to debates in Committee and to concerns that have been raised by Members of your Lordships’ House—I do not believe that this has been raised on any of the amendments now before us—we are committing ourselves to subjecting the appointment of the registrar to the scrutiny of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the other place. By doing so, we are reiterating our commitment to the independence of the registrar.
If I put a scenario to the Minister, perhaps he will be able to give me the answer. If an in-house lobbyist from, let us say, IGas, the shale gas production company, were to meet a junior Minister or a civil servant in the department, by what means would a member of the public or a journalist know about that?
My Lords, if a lobbyist meets a Minister or the Permanent Secretary, there will be a scheme of publication—as, indeed, we are committed to publish at the moment, and we do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, who moved the amendment, will recognise the name if I mention Mr Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland. If I met Mr Clancy, at the moment I would register that, and put on my quarterly return that I had met Mr Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland. In the last term I think there was an issue relating to the banking reform Bill; I cannot remember if I actually met him or had correspondence with him about that—but this is what I would envisage would happen. There would be a reference to “Mr Michael Clancy, Law Society of Scotland: representations on the banking Bill”, or whatever its formal title was. That is how I would envisage the system working. The record would not simply say “catch-up meeting”—a term which has, perhaps, caused frustration to some in the past.
My Lords, these commitments show that the Government have listened—
Perhaps I may ask my noble and learned friend for further clarification about meetings. When I was in business I sometimes found that a note of a meeting was sent to the company before being made available under freedom of information or other provisions. The problem often was that the report of the meeting was not very accurate. Will there be any system of clearing or showing notes of the formal meetings that he has described to the people who were involved in them, simply for the sake of accuracy?
I am grateful to my noble friend for asking that question. I have not said that we will publish the minutes of meetings; the example I gave showed that we would record the detailed nature of what the meeting was about. I hesitate to use the word “subject matter”, because until now that term has also covered “catch-up meetings” and “introductory meetings”. It is not anticipated that we would publish minutes of such meetings. If a meeting had taken place on fracking, I do not think that any clarification would be needed between the Minister and the company as to whether the meeting was about fracking. It is not proposed that minutes would be made available, but there may be other ways—under, say, freedom of information provisions—in which other information might become available. None the less, what we are committing to today takes our commitment as a Government that much further. Ours has been a listening response, and I believe that it will do far more for transparency than—
Can the Minister help me in the following regard? He relies upon the fact that a system of recording meetings has been introduced. That is, of course, very welcome. He gave the example of a meeting with Mr Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland—and I am sure that he and his officials are very diligent in recording such meetings. However, what if we have a Minister or officials who are not as diligent and who perhaps record it as a meeting with Mr Michael Clancy full stop and do not explain who he is? Clearly, if Mr Michael Clancy is a lobbyist and my amendment is accepted, the cross-reference of the register will identify who he is and what his interests are.
My Lords, I hear the point that the noble and learned Lord is making. As I think my noble friend indicated, if the register is anything like the Canadian register you may have difficulty finding out who it is. However, more importantly, the transparency part of it comes in because of what Ministers would be obliged to put in their scheme. There is an ethics and propriety department in the Cabinet Office. I assure the noble and learned Lord and your Lordships’ House that when we submit our returns that department can get back to us. If we just put “Mr Michael Clancy” and there is no indication of who he is, we will be pushed to elaborate on that.
The noble Baroness said that, if a defence contractor was involved, we would not necessarily know that. In fact, under the publication scheme, the company’s name would have to be given. If that company was a defence contractor and the meeting was about the provisions of the defence Bill that is before your Lordships’ House, such information would be far more relevant, transparent and informative for the public than just giving the name of an employee of that particular company. Therefore, I ask the noble and learned Lord to consider whether his amendment advances transparency at all, given what I have indicated that the Government are willing to do, and whether it would lead to considerable uncertainty. Indeed, if it took the matter as far as the Canadian experience, it could, through an overload of information, be even less effective in promoting the transparency that we both wish to see.
I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate and to those who have spoken in support of the amendment. As regards the noble and learned Lord’s criticism that the amendment does not include a definition of professional lobbyists, I would say two things. First, is not that definition self-evident from the words “professional lobbyists”? Is it not a similar situation to that of a solicitor who is a lawyer performing legal services as either an employer—a principal—or as an employee? Equally, is not a professional lobbyist someone who lobbies as part of his profession as either a principal or as an employee? As regards the noble and learned Lord’s difficulties with the definition, what efforts have the Government made since the very full debate we had in Committee to try to come up with a definition? If that is a difficulty for the Government and this amendment is carried, perhaps they could put in a definition, although I do not think that is necessary.
The noble and learned Lord asks a fair question. The answer is that that is not the scheme that the Government have been following. We did not think that we needed to produce a definition of professional lobbyists. I ask him to reflect on the fact that if the managing director of a large drinks manufacturer were to meet the Secretary of State on a particular issue—for example, minimum unit pricing—I do not think that one would consider that person to be a lobbyist. Why should it matter that the name of a lower-ranking official in a company who lobbies on behalf of the company is in the public domain but not that of the managing director, when the information that the public want relates to the latter? I have said that we are willing to give that information, because a Minister would have to say that he had met the managing director of company X to discuss minimum unit pricing. Surely that is a much better route to transparency than putting the name of a much lower-ranking official than the managing director.
I take the noble and learned Lord’s point but it is not an alternative: it is not either disclosure by the Minister or registration. The transparency arises from the combination of the disclosure by the Minister and the registration, and the ability of the public to cross-reference the two to see precisely on whose behalf the lobbyist is speaking.
The noble and learned Lord also mentioned cost and referred to the Canadian system. He will be aware that the system has to be cost-neutral. The cost would be met by the various people who had to register. Of course, the larger number of entries in the register would—or should—offset the increased cost.
The professional body, the Public Relations Consultants Association, supports this amendment. Although it currently operates the voluntary register, it sees the benefit in having a statutory register provided that that register covers all in-house lobbyists as well. As I said earlier, some of the register already includes entries relating to in-house lobbyists. The noble and learned Lord also referred to charges, but there are already charges on the existing voluntary register. In all the circumstances, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, this amendment reflects a similar amendment to that which was debated in Committee, along with other amendments, including an amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. The Bill regulates lobbying activities only where the object of the lobbying is a Minister of the Crown, a Permanent Secretary, a Second Permanent Secretary or a person serving in the government offices listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1. Again, I do not intend to repeat what I said in Committee, but it is my respectful submission to your Lordships that the class is too restrictive, as was observed by many noble Lords both at Second Reading and in Committee. There seemed to be a general consensus across the Committee that the persons listed would not be the first port of call for lobbyists, who would probably concentrate on political advisers, Parliamentary Private Secretaries and more junior civil servants before approaching Permanent Secretaries, Second Permanent Secretaries and Ministers. Indeed, in the very helpful contribution made by my noble friend Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, who is not in his place, it appears unlikely that Permanent Secretaries will be lobbied if the noble Lord’s own considerable experience is taken into account.
The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, confirmed my own experience that Parliamentary Private Secretaries have direct access to Ministers and are involved in some meetings determining departmental and government policy. The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, observed in Committee:
“When this Bill was considered in the other place, the point was well made that it appears to have been written by people who do not understand lobbying”.—[Official Report, 5/11/13; col. 139.]
Lobbyists would focus on the channel for reaching the Minister and that channel would include a political adviser, a Parliamentary Private Secretary or civil servants below the level specified in the Bill. It is clear that the Bill will be of little effect if it confines communications to those currently specified in it and does not focus on those people more likely to be the object of lobbying activity. If lobbying is confined to the more effective targets and the Minister is not directly lobbied, there will be no requirement for registration, not even by the restrictive category of consultant lobbyist. Such a result is contrary to the stated desire and the desirable intention of transparency that underpins Part 1 of the Bill.
In his response in Committee the Minister—I am delighted to see him in his place after his illness—referred to the number of civil servants who would be affected if the scope of this provision were extended as proposed. As noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, observed in his intervention at col. 149, the number of such civil servants is irrelevant. What is at issue is the identification of the class of persons the lobbying of whom will require registration. That class has to be sufficiently wide to make lobbying transparent.
In view of the discussion in Committee, it is disappointing that the Government have not come forward with their own amendment to improve the Bill in this respect. The amendment in my name is an attempt to remedy that omission. Without this amendment, the Bill will fail in its objective of increasing the transparency of lobbying Government. It will further undermine public confidence in our political system because it will be seen as an example of Parliament either failing to understand the lobbying process or failing to take effective measures to address and identify a problem. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 3, in my name and that of my noble friend, is grouped with the amendment just moved by the noble and learned Lord. As has already been made very clear this afternoon, the key issue is not the role, title or job description of the people who take part in the activity of lobbying but the activity itself. That is absolutely critical. I have a lot of sympathy with my noble friend Lord Norton, who, in his usual way, has put his finger right on that point. That is why I thought that it was extremely important to have the statement from my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness a few minutes ago about the nature, character, efficiency and accuracy of the register of meetings with those who are taking decisions, or making proposals to Parliament, on behalf of the Government.
I should say in parentheses, in welcoming back my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that way back at Second Reading, let alone in Committee, he expressed a lot of interest in the proposals that we were making from these Benches about improving the status of the record of meetings that was introduced for the first time—for which the Government should get credit—in the past few years. As I said in that earlier debate, I am not so worried about who the lobbyists are but am very worried that we know who they lobby, what they lobby about and when. The very full statement made by my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness a few minutes ago goes a very long way to meeting that anxiety. We have made it clear at every stage of the Bill that, for us, that is the core issue. The proactive publication of data on ministerial meetings by the Government makes a potentially huge difference. That is what transparency should be all about.
We also believe it is important that that record should indicate when the meeting with in-house lobbyists takes place. Whether they are the managing director of a whisky firm, or a lowly employee of any other firm, it is the subject matter of the meeting, when it happened and with whom that is of considerable importance. I agree with my noble and learned friend and I am delighted that the House agreed too, a few minutes ago, that simply extending the register into a sort of enormous directory, like a telephone directory, with every lobbyist in the land, whether from a church, charity or voluntary organisation, would not really seem to be anything more than disguising the wood for the trees.
Amendment 3 deals very specifically, and only, with the issue of special advisers. Many in your Lordships’ House have had enormous responsibility in the Civil Service. What is unusual about a special adviser is that he or she of course is not responsible to the head of the department: he or she is not a full-time employed member of the Civil Service, and their first loyalty and responsibility is to the political master for whom they work. The special adviser’s responsibility is to the Secretary of State, or other ministerial politician, and his or her relationship is with them. It is therefore our view that this is the one major exception that should be tackled, either in this Bill or in some other way, because these are special people—special advisers are, by definition, outwith the normal hierarchy of responsibility to the Permanent Secretary in the department.
The principle in the Bill is that if the consultant gains access to or influences a Minister on behalf of a client, the public should know who they and their clients are. However, anyone who has been in this building for any length of time or who has lobbied knows perfectly well that influencing a Minister does not necessarily mean seeing them yourself. There is sometimes an even better way: to meet the Minister’s special adviser. Spads have a rather unfair bad reputation in the press. Many will remember Clare Short’s description of them as living “in the dark”. I think that was about a particularly period in the previous Government, perhaps, and it may not be appropriate for all periods of recent history. That epithet then led to a thought-provoking analysis of the role of special advisers in a book of the same name by the respected academic Dr Andrew Blick. In my limited experience of being on the Government side of the House in the past three years and therefore having spads in my own party, it does not feel as though many now live in the dark. We see them all the time. They are helpful, they are influential; in many cases persuading a spad is the first step to persuading a Minister.
I know that this is also part of their job: to meet outside groups. It is very proper and very effective—a proper role that they should undertake. Perhaps it is a better one than a civil servant in the normal hierarchy. Ministers have only a certain amount of time and sometimes it is the right judgment to ask a senior adviser to see someone first, sound them out and explain the Government’s thinking—there is absolutely nothing wrong with that. However, these meetings with outside groups are important and details of them, like the ministerial meetings which were so fully referred to earlier, should be transparent.
The first step we could take today to make that point in this House is to say that in this Bill those consultants who lobby spads should have to register, just as if they were meeting Ministers. It would then follow, of course, that although this is outside the immediate scope of the Bill, for this to be meaningful spads would also need to publish all their meetings with all lobbyists, whether they be consultant lobbyists or in-house, just as Ministers do. I very much hope that when we look in detail at the record of meetings in future to see how these can be improved and made even more influential and transparent, my noble friends on the Front Bench will acknowledge that this would be an important step to take.
This is not in any way intended to malign spads or imply that anything they do is wrong. It is the opposite. It says that what they do is useful and, on many occasions, necessary, but keeping any aspect of it hidden feeds a largely unnecessary suspicion that they are up to no good. I referred at earlier stages of the Bill to the fact that two of the big lobbying scandals in this Parliament have involved close advisers to Ministers rather than Ministers themselves, and that resignations resulted.
For example, the Murdoch empire recognised these facts of life very early on. We should too. Both scandals would probably never have got to this stage had encounters between close ministerial advisers and outside groups been a matter of public record. It is therefore as much in the Government’s interests as in the public interest—surely the two should fit hand in glove anyway—for this information to be freely available. I quoted before and I shall quote again. The Prime Minister memorably said:
“Sunlight is the best disinfectant”.
I agree.
My Lords, briefly I support the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, and those of my noble friend Lord Tyler. I also associate myself with my noble friend’s comments about special advisers. He is absolutely right. This Bill is flawed in two major respects. First, political consultants rarely lobby directly. They advise clients and the clients do the lobbying. That point was well made in the other place, not least by those who have direct experience of the lobbying industry.
The second flaw is that when they do lobby, they rarely lobby Ministers or Permanent Secretaries directly. We know that from the debates in this House from those who have served as Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. The amendment before us goes at least some way to addressing that second problem. The Bill remains flawed and we want to look at that later in more fundamental respects, but at least this amendment would try to make a bad Bill less bad.
My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend’s amendment and that put forward so effectively by the noble and learned Lord on the Cross Benches. Having been a Minister, I want to say a few words about what in my view is the absolutely vital importance of including special advisers in this Bill. I would add to that the first three ranks of the Civil Service, by which I mean under-secretary, deputy secretary and Permanent Secretary.
I find it very puzzling that the specific rank of civil servant mentioned in the Bill is that of Permanent Secretary. I can think of almost nobody less likely to be open to exploitation by lobbyists. To be a Permanent Secretary, you have to be somebody of outstanding integrity, whose honour cannot be doubted, who will be respected in his or her own department and who sets the quality and standards of that department. You are, frankly, the last woman or man to be likely to fall for the more dodgy approaches of some slightly dodgy lobbyists. In fact, it is close to inconceivable that this particular person is likely to be open to temptations of a kind that all of us would eschew.
However, I am asking the Government to include the first three levels because, as has been very rightly said, the much more tempting position is that of people near but not at the top. For example, I was for some years on the Government’s Advisory Committee on Business Appointments. We looked consistently at what the gap should be between a senior civil servant leaving his or her department and being free to take up other employment afterwards. Members of this House will know that certain departments have very close links with the private sector and that, therefore, their officials carry with them a level of expertise that is quite exceptional. They are indeed very attractive recruits to private business because obviously they have a great deal of experience and knowledge.
Generally speaking, in the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, consideration is given to how wide the gap should be between leaving one’s employment as a civil servant and joining a private industry with which one may previously have had some kind of relationship. It is extremely tempting, obviously, for somebody to join a private sector business when they have a great deal of knowledge that would be useful to that business, but the longer the gap the less useful that knowledge may be. It is therefore strange, to say the least, that the level of seniority in the Civil Service that makes an individual so attractive to major industries that have close relations with a certain department should not be covered by this Bill.
I have suggested that we should limit that practice as much as possible. I quite agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness, but it is no good having what he called a laundry list or a telephone list of names. Deputy and under-secretaries are very limited in number and particularly attractive to those who want their expertise. I do not doubt that both sides behave with full honour but I also think that lobbyists will be very attracted to people in that situation, and therefore it would be strange if the Bill did not cover that particular group of civil servants.
When I first became a Minister the number of special advisers was extremely closely controlled. According to Prime Minister Wilson, the absolute maximum number of special advisers any Minister, however senior, could have was two. They had to be shown to be knowledgeable about the kinds of organisations with which that Minister would interact; for example, in my own case as Minister of State for Education and Science, it was very clear that the special advisers I needed had to be able to show expert knowledge and evidence of science, universities or the education of children in schools. The two I had were both eminently well suited in that way. But the general attitude towards special advisers was very limited. They were experts, they were there to advise, but they were not there to substitute.
That has rather changed over the years. There are now many more special advisers than there were. There have been one or two worrying cases where a special adviser has taken upon himself or herself responsibility for something that clearly should belong to the Minister. My noble friend Lord Tyler gave an example. Some of your Lordships may remember the famous occasion when a special adviser told her Minister that it was a good time to issue bad news and crises were ideal because they meant that the bad news was hidden by the interest of the media in other issues. I do not want to push that very far, but there are certainly a few cases—not many—where special advisers have behaved as if they were autonomous, and beyond what seems to be either the wishes or the desires of the Minister concerned. Some people may remember that the previous Prime Minister, Mr Gordon Brown, had difficulties with at least one of his special advisers, which did not do him or his reputation any great good, despite the fact that he is undoubtedly a man of integrity and honour himself.
Quite straightforwardly, that means there is a very strong case indeed for recognising that special advisers are, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, and my noble friend said, something of a highway to a Minister. They are the quickest route to his personal information; they are probably closer to him than anyone else in his department, with the possible exception of his PPS. Often, they are also people who have their own agendas, and those agendas may not invariably be the same as that of the department. I therefore feel that it is important that special advisers should be held accountable. Indeed I would go further and say that it is crucial that they should be held accountable, and that this Bill takes congnisance of the relationship between a Minister and a special adviser.
Therefore I hope that the House gives full consideration to the proposals in these amendments and will recognise that, without some movement towards including special advisers, the effectiveness of this Bill will be very much limited. I have already argued for the top three ranks of the Civil Service. I hope that the amendment will be seriously considered in this House, and that the Government will reconsider the narrowness of the interpretation of which people are open to lobbying. As the Bill stands, it is steadily getting better. I pay full credit to my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness and his noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire for the improvements that have been made to this Bill, but we should include special advisers in evidence that we are serious and committed to the idea of limiting unfortunate and ill-motivated lobbying to those who might be effecting it.
Could I ask for the noble Baroness’s assistance from her great experience on whether she sees any difference between special advisers, to whom Lord Tyler refers, and political advisers, to whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, refers?
My impression is that there is not any real difference between the two. It is possible that some Ministers prefer to use the term “political adviser” to indicate to the public the scope of a particular special adviser’s responsibilities, but I do not believe there is any more to it. I hardly dare say that to a former leading justice in this country, but I hope he will agree with me that there is no real difference between them in terms of their responsibility.
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie. I very much welcome the statement made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, in terms of improving the quality, the usefulness and the timeliness of ministerial reporting of the meetings they have. But that makes me even more puzzled about what specific problem this Bill and this register are intended to solve. As we have heard, it is only going to cover consultant lobbyists who represent—if anything—less than 20% of all those operating in this area. Currently, this amendment extends only to Ministers and Permanent Secretaries.
When I worked for IBM in its public affairs function, I occasionally met Ministers, usually on what I might call ceremonial occasions. I hardly ever met Permanent Secretaries. What I did have was numerous contacts with other civil servants, and indeed with special advisers. That is where all the real lobbying activity went on, and where we pursued our interests as a company for IBM. I am completely baffled why my activities on behalf of IBM should be treated differently from the consultant lobbyists that we sometimes employed to advise us, one of which was an extremely good firm of which the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, was one of the leading lights. They would advise us on how we should approach civil servants, special advisers and others in the political process. It was not self-evident what we might have been lobbying for, because the range of interests that IBM had, and the range of issues in which it might have had an interest, was very broad indeed.
I am very conscious of the risk pointed out by some members of the lobbying industry that, under the Bill, transparency might end up being less than it was previously because the Bill sets such a low threshold that it might remove any incentive to go beyond it—although I welcome the intention to include reference to codes to which lobbyists have subscribed. If it turns out to be only a very small number of consultant lobbyists who need to register, I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, that the burden of cost on that small number of firms of this rather elaborate structure may be unacceptable.
Finally, I am completely baffled as to how the Bill will address concerns among the public about who is saying what to whom on some of these issues. I therefore strongly support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, has put forward and some of the related points made by the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Tyler.
My Lords, as a former Permanent Secretary, I rise still bathing in the warmth of the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. Would that some of the current Permanent Secretaries were here to hear them; I think that they might have been moved to tears.
I shall speak only briefly in support of the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, and the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. It is one thing for Parliament to show that it does not fully understand, or understand very much, the lobbying process; it is a rather more serious thing for Parliament to show that it does not understand how Whitehall and the decision-making process work. That process works increasingly through special advisers and senior civil servants, not through Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. For this not to be recognised in the Bill is very odd and shows serious flaws.
My Lords, I spoke in Committee on this matter, so I shall be brief today. My concern is that special advisers often have more influence on ministerial decision-taking than do Members of Parliament, because they have daily access.
I want to tell a story of an incident that I experienced in 1999 on a train coming from my former constituency of Workington to London. To my side in the carriage was the Member of Parliament for Blackpool and opposite were two young men who were on their way to London, and we struck up a conversation. They told us that they were going to London to lobby in the department on the need to introduce new gambling legislation. As Labour MPs, we had absolutely no idea that discussions were going on in the department about gambling and gambling legislation. That was in 1999—some 14 years ago. Those two young men were going to meet the special adviser in the department concerned. I was very interested and asked them how they had made contact. They explained that they had done so at a political level, locally to start with, and had then been referred to the special adviser. There was no need as far as they were concerned to see Ministers.
In that particular case, the embryo of the debate had started with access from the industry directly to political advisers in the department. The discussion would then permeate within the department between, as has just been said, civil servants and the special advisers, to the exclusion of Parliament and individual Members of Parliament. I find that deeply troubling. One of the reasons why I want special advisers to be included in the Bill is that I want that process to become more transparent, so that individual Members of Parliament can at least see what is happening within a department, what influences are being brought to bear and the dangers that might arise. If those special advisers then organise meetings between various groups and Ministers without Members of Parliament being aware of the scale of the lobbying going on—I know that I am making a very subtle point—it is at that point that Members of Parliament need to know that such relationships are being forged. That is why I strongly support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and I hope that we have the opportunity to vote on it.
My Lords, this is the first time I have got involved in this Bill.
The current structure is indeed rather peculiar: lobbyists or lobbyist consultants are to register themselves and report those whom they represent, but we will find out whom they lobby only by an indirect process of interrogating a list of external meetings of all kinds that Ministers and Permanent Secretaries have attended. The case for this amendment is that lobbying takes place with a much wider group of people, which in a typical department would be about five or six individuals. I was a Permanent Secretary for 11 years in three departments and I do not think I ever had a conversation with a lobbyist as defined in this Bill. The lobbying always took place with officials who were working on the policy or were experts on the subject or were working on a Bill team.
Should we extend the requirement to civil servants? Well, there are 412,000 of them, so we have to define whom we mean. The people working on a policy would probably include the senior Civil Service, which is probably about 3,000 people. The logic of this Bill is that we extend the requirement to assemble and publish a list of external meetings—of course, these are not only meetings with lobbyists—to a very much wider group. In my view, there would be a lot of dead-weight cost in this: most of those contacts are part of the regular and desirable interchange between government and industry. In the White Paper that launched this whole process, it was stated:
“The Government does not wish to create an obstacle to necessary interaction with policy makers”.
If that is the price—that we extend this to all of the senior Civil Service, who then have to report all external meetings involving not just these people but everyone—in my view that is a price too high.
On the other hand, I am taken by the arguments about special advisers. There are now 98 of them; there were 38 in 1997 at the exit of John Major’s Government; there were about 74 by 2010; the number dipped for about three months but now there are 98. If I really had to distinguish between the amendments in this group, I would vote against Amendment 2 but for Amendment 3.
I rise to speak to Amendment 2 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, my noble friend Lady Hayter and myself, which extends the parameters of who needs to be lobbied to prompt registration to include special advisers, civil servants and PPSs.
I, too, welcome the enhanced transparency in relation to reporting that was mentioned by the Minister in response to the earlier debate. However, I believe that will not be enough if the subjects who are principally lobbied are not asked to report. There has been progress, but it is simply not enough.
Both today and in Committee, a powerful and clear case has been made by former Ministers, former senior civil servants—which includes those in the Diplomatic Service, pursuant to the discussion we had in Committee—and former special advisers as to why the remit of the Bill must be extended if it is to have proper impact. As the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, said in Committee, the target is normally the Minister and you therefore have to focus on the channels for reaching the Minister. The Permanent Secretary, as we have heard, is not a significant channel for this purpose. Indeed, the lobbying industry itself has said on numerous occasions that,
“we do not make personal representations to Ministers or Permanent Secretaries”.
So there we have it from the horse’s mouth. Yet the Government did not provide any convincing reason for why only meetings with Ministers and Permanent Secretaries should be subject to the provisions in Part 1. I hope that this short debate will persuade the Minister that there need to be some changes to this Bill in order to make it properly creditable.
Civil servants here and in Brussels should be included, not because there is any suggestion that they are conducting themselves in any inappropriate manner but to fulfil the purported aim of the Bill—that is, transparency. Last week it was revealed that there had been 130 meetings between representatives of the alcohol industry and the Government since 2010. The BMJ investigation showed that they had an extraordinary level of access to the Department of Health, which later decided to U-turn on the question of minimum unit pricing. It was a comment from the Minister for Public Health on the “Today” programme on Wednesday that caught my attention. Of those 130 meetings, she said, “But most of those were with officials”. Precisely. If the Bill is to increase transparency, the public should have access to this information.
I turn to special advisers. Naturally, I support Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Greaves. Special advisers should certainly be subject to the same level of transparency, given how closely they work with their Ministers and the influence that they can and do have on policy. The case has already been well made but I make no apology for returning to the News International lobbyist Fred Michel, whose case proves quite how large the loopholes in the Bill are. He was summoned to the Leveson trial after DCMS released 164 pages of e-mails between him and Adam Smith, the then Secretary of State’s special adviser. This came to light only in what I am sure everyone would agree were quite extreme circumstances. Again, if the Bill is to increase transparency, the public should be able to access these details.
Given the stance taken in Committee, I imagine that the Minister may well object by saying that the provisions in our amendment are disproportionate; indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, has just made that case. Of course that argument cannot apply to extending the Bill to cover special advisers—that should be a given now—but, if proportionality is the Minister’s only concern, I hope that he will commit to bringing an amendment back at Third Reading that at least includes special advisers, civil servants and Parliamentary Secretaries. There is time for the Government to work on an amendment that could ensure that these people are included in the least bureaucratic way.
The Minister may also point to the fact that the limits that the Government have put in the Bill mean that there is no obvious place to publish such information. In Committee I asked the Government to look at the least bureaucratic way of extending the scope of those lobbied, but they do not seem to have taken the opportunity to find a solution. We can provide the Minister with two solutions. No doubt the Minister will be aware that on the website data.gov.uk, the meetings between special advisers and newspapers editors, proprietors and executives are already published, so there is no convincing argument why that cannot be extended. The other solution may have been provided by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and it is elegantly simple: the Minister, when publishing details of his own meetings, publishes information about the meetings of civil servants and special advisers in his department.
This House has explained—very graphically, in many ways—the problems relating to the Bill and its extent, but we have also pointed the Government towards solutions. I very much hope that they will accept these amendments. If not, I trust that they will go away and come back with an amendment at Third Reading that takes these crucial issues into account.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, has moved an amendment that would extend the scope of the register to include meetings with Parliamentary Private Secretaries, civil servants and political advisers, while the amendment of my noble friend Lord Tyler would extend the scope to include meetings with special advisers.
At the outset, I want to pick up the point that was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who asked whether there was a difference between “political adviser” and “special adviser”. My understanding is that the term “special adviser” is defined in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. In Committee the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, indicated that the term “political adviser” was really referring to special advisers. One is a term of art already recognised in statute, but for the purposes of this debate I think that everyone is talking about the same entity, if that is the right word.
The Government have previously outlined that the register is designed to complement the existing government transparency regime, to which I referred and on which I made announcements in the previous debate, whereby Ministers and Permanent Secretaries proactively publish details of their meetings with external organisations—I should add, for the avoidance of doubt, that these will be external organisations whether the Minister meets them in Whitehall, Edinburgh, Brussels, Washington or wherever. The register will address a specific and discrete problem within that context: that it is not always clear whose interests are being represented by consultant lobbyists.
On that point, I raise the question of whether the three most senior classes of the Civil Service are not in a much narrower area in terms of cost than the wider range of civil servants to which my noble and learned friend has been referring. They seem to be almost completely distinct in terms of the costs involved.
My Lords, I accept that it would be more proportionate, but I really am not in a position to say. One of the problems is that some of the terms used, such as “director-general”, mean completely different things in different departments. That has been another issue. At a time when we should be streamlining public services, not imposing additional costly burdens upon them, I do not believe that the added burden of 5,000 extra diaries would be proportionate.
I should like to raise two issues. First, nobody is suggesting that all meetings with all civil servants should be included—I have some sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said—only meetings with lobbyists. Secondly, the Minister has not answered the point made earlier in Committee, I think, or the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, that when publishing details of his or her own meetings, Ministers should also publish information about the meetings of civil servants and special advisers in his or her department. That seems a very unbureaucratic way of addressing the issue.
My Lords, the noble Baroness says that they are not asking to include all civil servants’ meetings with everyone, but the amendment does say all civil servants, although I admit that she says that it would cover any lobbyist who met civil servants. As for Ministers’ reporting regime, we have said that Ministers will report the people with whom they have had meetings whether they are lobbyists or non-lobbyists. To further subdivide that would be a considerable burden on 450,000 civil servants. I do not believe that it would add to the transparency that we have tried to enhance and improve by what we have already done as a Government, some of which has been unprecedented. I think that the noble and learned Lord is seeking to intervene.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The point that I am seeking to make in this amendment is that one has to go back to the definition in Clause 2. In the terms of that definition, it is people who fall within the category of persons carrying on the business of consultant lobbying who have to register under Clause 1. Clause 2(1)(a) states that they are required to register if, in short,
“in the course of a business and in return for payment, the person makes communications within subsection (3)”.
It is the communications that we are addressing. Subsection (3) states that the communications are,
“oral or written communications made personally to a Minister of the Crown or permanent secretary relating to”,
the various matters mentioned. I think that second Permanent Secretaries are on the list of people in the schedule.
The point of this amendment is to highlight that the narrow definition of people to whom communications are being made which require registration on the part of consultant lobbyists renders the whole concept of registration almost worthless because, as has been clear from the contributions across the House, these people are not just lobbying Ministers. To get round that, a lobbyist who lobbies a special adviser or a civil servant concerned with policy would not be required to register.
I think I understand the point that the noble and learned Lord is making about the requirement to register if you are making communications with these people. It may be that that would bring more names on to the register—I simply do not know—but to enhance transparency, the complement to such an extension would be the introduction of meeting reporting obligations on these public officials. Otherwise you have a list of names of consultant lobbyists and their clients but there is nothing there to which you can then relate them. It becomes fully meaningful only if you have that complementary extension of the scheme. On the amendment, I sought to make the point that that would be a huge burden and one that would not be consistent with efficiency in government; nor indeed would it be proportionate to improving transparency.
The Minister has not responded to the very narrow point that was made by my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon. She asked a very simple question: why should a Minister, in his or her registration, not register the activity of that Minister’s individual political adviser? That political adviser is working on behalf of that Minister. No doubt the noble Lord, as a Minister, has political advisers of his own. In the event that they meet lobbyists from outside, they are meeting them on his behalf. Why should not he, in his registration, refer to those meetings?
My Lords, until I became Deputy Leader of your Lordships’ House I did not have a special adviser. I now have one but I am not sure that she has met anyone, although she has said that if she could get a diary secretary it might be a bonus. We take the view, as I indicated earlier, that it is the Ministers who are making the decisions. On that basis, we believe that it is communications with Ministers—and not just meetings, as the noble and learned Lord said—that are pertinent. We believe that these proposals are appropriate and proportionate. I therefore urge the noble and learned Lord—
I am grateful to my noble and learned friend, who is very good to take points from us all. I sympathise with the point he makes about the scale of the increase in the number of people who would be involved if Amendment 2 was agreed, and the potential enormous cost as a result. However, that does not apply to Amendment 3, as has been made clear on all sides of the House. The very specific nature of the character, responsibility and role of special advisers—I think the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, said that there are 98 of them—would not require a great increase in the amount of information to be given by government in terms of both the record of meetings and who, as regards lobbyists, meets them. Can he give an undertaking that between now and Third Reading he will look very hard—in sympathy with the views that have been expressed on all sides of the House—at the practicalities of including special advisers? In terms of both the meetings they have and the nature of the people who they meet, there is broad support right across the House for their being exceptional. They are indeed, as their title states, special. In those circumstances I hope that my noble friend is prepared to look again at that issue.
My Lords, I know that my noble friend knows me well enough and I hope that I have made enough appearances at this Dispatch Box for noble Lords to know that I would not wish to give the kind of undertaking that my noble friend seeks if it were to raise an expectation that I am not necessarily able to deliver on. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Can my noble and learned friend clarify what he has said? If a consultant lobbyist lobbies a Minister directly to achieve policy X, that consultant lobbyist must register. If that consultant lobbyist only lobbies the special adviser, who then advises the Minister, who decides to implement policy X, they do not have to register. The second point is on civil servants. Does he think that lobbyists will lobby any passing civil servant as opposed to those members of the senior Civil Service who have responsibility in particular areas, and are therefore a very narrow and usually clearly defined group?
On the second point, I was responding to the amendment as it is tabled, which does not narrow it down at all to senior civil servants—it applies to all civil servants. I am sure that bodies make arrangements with junior officials as well as with members of the senior Civil Service. On the issue of special advisers, I cannot elaborate on what I have already said.
I am grateful to noble Lords on all sides of the House for their support for the amendment. I realise that the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Turnbull, suggest that the matter should be confined to special advisers. However, as I said in Committee, when I was in practice at the Scottish Bar I was standing junior counsel to the City of Edinburgh district council, and then, latterly, senior counsel—and it was clear from my experience there that it was not the senior director of administration or the director of planning who was the subject of contact by people seeking to influence policy. The contact was with the local authority officials—in this context, the civil servants—who were concerned with the formulation of policy. It strikes me that to exclude the very policymakers, whether civil servants or special advisers, makes nonsense of the registration process. I therefore beg to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, the amendments in this group are a number of technical amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire. It may assist the House if I briefly go through them and explain their purpose.
Amendments 4, 5 and 6 clarify, and provide greater consistency to, terminology used in relation to the recipients of the lobbying communications and the communications themselves. The minor amendment, Amendment 6, which clarifies the term “Minister of the Crown”, does not, in the context of the Bill, capture the corporate bodies of the Defence Council and the Board of Trade. As Clause 2 makes clear, the communications that the register is intended to capture are those that are,
“made personally to a Minister of the Crown or permanent secretary”.
The definition in the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975 includes the Defence Council and the Board of Trade. Both these entities, however, are corporate bodies with which it is not possible to make personal communications. As such, these amendments remove those bodies from the definition and, in doing so, provide further clarity regarding the communications that fall within the scope of consultant lobbying.
Amendment 8 clarifies the position in relation to employees who make lobbying communications as a part of their employment. Specifically, the amendment provides that employees will not be considered as carrying on,
“the business of consultant lobbying”,
if they make lobbying communications as an employee in the course of a business carried on by their employer. The amendment therefore clarifies that in-house lobbyists are not captured by the Part 1 provisions, and that it is a consultant lobbying firm rather than its employees that are required to register in respect of any lobbying activity. As Ministers have made clear—indeed, as we have already debated—the register is designed to address the problem that it is not always clear whose interests are represented by consultant lobbyists.
Amendment 9 provides, first, that where an individual makes a communication in the course of the business of another, then both the individual and that other business or person make that communication. As such, the amendment ensures that the client on whose behalf consultant lobbying communications are made is always declared on the register even if that communication is undertaken by a subcontractor that the consultant lobbying firm has engaged. The amendment also provides that if the individual happens to be an employee—as opposed to a contractor, for example—then the employee is not to be regarded as making the communication on behalf of their employer but, rather, only on behalf of their employer’s client, reflecting the fact that in-house lobbyists and employees of consultant lobbying firms are not required to register.
Amendment 10 is intended to remove any ambiguity as to the maximum period of a reappointment term of the registrar, which is three years. An individual may be reappointed twice, and the maximum period for each of those terms is three years.
Amendments 18, 20 and 21 ensure consistency in the language used in the provisions relating to the cancellation of an information notice or the variation or cancellation of a penalty notice. By ensuring consistency of terminology, these amendments will further clarify the detail of the provisions relating to the cancellation and/or variation of these notices and ensure consistency with approaches to such matters in other legislation.
Amendment 19 clarifies that any individual, not just employees, can commit the offence of carrying on the business of consultant lobbying while unregistered if they and/or their organisation are unregistered. The amendment will remove any ambiguity as to whether the provisions apply to individuals who undertake consultant lobbying in the course of a business but are not employees of that consultant lobbying business—for example, contractors. It will therefore ensure that the application of the provisions in this respect is absolutely clear.
Amendment 24 has been tabled to clarify that the charges associated with registration will be set to ensure that the sums received offset the total costs of the registrar’s activities. Treasury guidance requires that if a charging regime recoups costs other than those directly associated with the service provided—in this instance, the keeping of the register—then the position should be made explicitly clear to Parliament. This amendment reiterates that the charges provided for in Clause 22 will be set to recover the total cost of the registrar’s activities, including those that are not directly connected with the keeping of the register, such as enforcement activity.
Amendment 25 removes drafting in relation to the netting-off of monies from the Consolidated Fund for the funding of the registrar. Such funding will instead be arranged administratively between the Cabinet Office and the Treasury.
Amendment 27 is tabled to fulfil the Government’s commitment to implement the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in relation to Part 1. The Government, as ever, are grateful to the committee for its thoughtful consideration of the delegated powers in Part 1 and have accepted its recommendations in relation to this part in their entirety. The amendment alters the part to require that regulations under Clause 4(5) or Clause 5(4), the first regulations to be made under Clauses 11(3) and 17(3), and any regulation which amends or modifies the provisions of the part, must be made by the affirmative procedure. As a result, Parliament will be provided with the opportunity to undertake detailed scrutiny of any regulations made under the powers in these clauses. Again, I express thanks to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its detailed report on this part of the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I declare an interest. As I explained in Committee, I am a member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan and have received hospitality from that Government in the form of social events. Several years ago, I visited Taiwan on two occasions as a guest: the first was as part of a judicial delegation from Scotland and the second was as a lecturer at an international conference. As I advised the registrar of interests last week, I have now been invited to speak at another conference next month, and my expenses will be paid by the Taiwanese Government. It is a legal conference.
Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 excludes from lobbying activities communications from an official or member of staff of a sovereign power. In Committee, I sought clarification on whether that included countries such as the Republic of China (Taiwan), which is not a member of the United Nations and with which we have no formal diplomatic relations, although we do have an office and a representative there and it has offices in this country. The Minister promised to write to me. I received a letter dated 7 January from the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General to the effect that communications from any foreign Government, irrespective of their country’s membership status with the United Nations or its diplomatic status with UK, would not meet the criteria for lobbying for profit in Clause 2.
In view of that response, it seemed that paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 was unnecessary, and I wrote accordingly to the noble and learned Lord. I received a reply dated 9 January, in which he confirmed that communications from foreign Governments,
“will not be captured by the definition of consultant lobbying outlined in clause 2”.
However, he added that paragraph 3 of Schedule 1,
“provides helpful clarity, especially to international colleagues, in relation to the application of the register and it is not our intention to remove it by amendment at Report stage”.
It seems to me that Clause 2 should be sufficient assurance to sovereign powers, and the addition of paragraph 3 may have the unintended consequence of causing concern for foreign states that are not sovereign powers. For that reason, the amendment seeks the removal of this paragraph.
In moving the amendment, I seek clarification from the noble and learned Lord as to what is meant by the term “sovereign power” in the Bill. Sovereignty would seem to me to include such issues as control over a geographical area whose citizens are governed by its rulers, whether they have been democratically elected or not. Taiwan is a democracy whose citizens enjoy universal suffrage from the age of 20. There are elections for the President and the legislature every four years. The President can hold office only for two successive terms. The Government pass legislation and govern their citizens, and Taiwan has diplomatic relations with a number of countries, including the United States of America. Does the noble and learned Lord accept that sovereignty does not depend upon membership of the United Nations or having diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom? In those circumstances, will he confirm that Taiwan would satisfy the test of sovereignty for the purpose of this provision? Even if Taiwan does satisfy that test, what about countries which do not? Which ones are they? Does the inclusion of sovereign states not cause concern for those countries which do not come within that category? I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, has moved an amendment which would delete paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 and, as such, remove the explicit exemption from the requirement to register for members of staff and officials of sovereign powers and international organisations.
As the noble and learned Lord very fairly explained in moving his amendment, we have been in correspondence over the past week on this matter. The Government believe that, by establishing a statutory register of consultant lobbyists, this part of the Bill aims to make clear whose interests are represented by consultant lobbyists when they meet Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. It is not our intention that the register should capture international or diplomatic communications by representatives of foreign Governments or authorities or of international organisations. Communications made by representatives of foreign Governments or authorities will not be captured by the definition of consultant lobbying, as the noble and learned Lord has said, as they will not meet the criteria outlined in Clause 2 and the associated schedule. Those include, among other things, that lobbying must be done,
“in the course of a business and in return for payment”,
and,
“on behalf of another person”.
However, out of an abundance of caution, the Bill also includes a specific exemption in paragraph 3 that explicitly excludes officials or members of staff of sovereign powers and international organisations from the requirement to register in respect of their communications to UK Ministers and Permanent Secretaries.
Noble Lords will recall that Schedule 1 provides a number of explicit exemptions that are designed to provide absolute clarity regarding the application of Part 1 provisions. Those exemptions include one specifically excluding parliamentarians from the scope of the register. Although the Government have been absolutely clear that communications made by parliamentarians to the Government will not be captured by the Clause 2 provision, I understand that, none the less, noble Lords and Members of the other place have been particularly grateful for the extra clarity and reiteration provided by paragraph 4. Paragraph 3 is intended to provide equivalent clarity to sovereign powers and international organisations and the Government are not persuaded that it should be removed.
The noble and learned Lord asked specific questions regarding Taiwan. I am sure that he and perhaps other Members of your Lordships’ House would agree that the Report stage of the transparency Bill is perhaps not the most appropriate forum in which to discuss matters of international diplomacy. Indeed, if the noble and learned Lord wishes to pursue the issue, he may wish to take it up with my colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In these circumstances, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for putting those remarks on the record and, in the circumstances, I seek leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving the amendment standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire, I will also speak to Amendments 15, 16 and 22. As the Government have made clear throughout the debates on this part of the Bill, the statutory register of consultant lobbyists is designed to address a specific problem—that it is not always clear whose interests are represented by consultant lobbyists. Our objective is to ensure increased transparency without disrupting in any way the fluency of the dialogue between government decision-makers and those who will be affected by policy and legislative decisions.
It is not, nor has it been, the Government’s intention to attempt to regulate comprehensively all those who communicate with government, and the register will not, therefore, be associated with a statutory code of conduct. Instead, the Government are committed to ensuring that the statutory register complements the existing self-regulatory regime by which the industry promotes the ethical behaviour that is essential to the integrity and reputation of the lobbying industry.
We have been very grateful to those Members of your Lordships’ House for their thoughtful suggestions as to how this might best be achieved. After careful consideration of the debates both in this House and in the other place, and discussion with the industry and transparency groups, we have concluded that the most effective option is to provide for a statutory link between the statutory register and the industry-hosted voluntary codes of conduct. As such, Amendments 12, 15 and 16 will require consultant lobbyists to state in their register entries whether or not they subscribe to a publicly available code of conduct in relation to their lobbying activity and, if so, where a copy of the code can be accessed. Such a provision will enhance both the transparency and the scrutiny of registered lobbyists, and the Government hope that the measure will therefore be welcomed.
Additionally, the Government have tabled an amendment to clarify that the registrar can both revise and replace the guidance that he or she has published. I appreciate that this group also includes amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, and I will perhaps respond to these after she has moved them.
What are the circumstances in which a lobbying firm would not wish to sign up to the code of conduct?
I am not sure that this should be addressed to me as opposed to the lobbying firms, since it is sincerely hoped that they would sign up to a code of conduct. What we seek through these amendments is for them to indicate that they have signed up to a code of conduct and for there also to be a link as to where that code of conduct can be found.
Amendment 13 (to Amendment 12)
My Lords, Amendment 13 stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Royall. I shall also speak to Amendments 14 and 23. This Bill should be about raising standards within the lobbying industry, not least to provide reassurance for the public about the behaviour of lobbyists. While we therefore welcome the Government’s amendments, which build on the arguments that we made in Committee—because they at least recognise the existence of a code of conduct—it is extremely regrettable that the Government have not gone one step further and made it a requirement for registered lobbyists to undertake to abide by a code of conduct. Without something which makes a code of conduct obligatory, there will be absolutely no qualification as to who can get on to the register. Yet once someone is on a register, they will put it on the bottom of their headed notepaper and it will look as though there is some sort of approval for being on that register. That, of course, will not be the case.
I raised this question in Committee and as a result, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, kindly wrote and clarified to me that even if someone was convicted under the Bribery Act, that would not prohibit them registering as a consultant lobbyist. As the noble Lord wrote in the letter, the register is not an accreditation system and anyone on it will not be considered to be “approved”. In other words, regrettably, this does nothing about raising standards or changing behaviour and nothing about giving assurance to the public that the lobbying of their elected Government is legitimate and above board.
Without any such a requirement to comply with a code, it will also be impossible to remove even the worst offenders from the register—the “slightly dodgy” lobbyists which were described by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, in the earlier debate. Our amendment to the Government’s Amendment 12 makes the voluntary adherence to a code a requirement.
Our lesser amendment, Amendment 23, would permit the registrar at some time in the future to publish a code of conduct. This might simply be a best practice code, an indication of expected behaviour or an indication against which any allegation to a professional body might be judged. However, it would keep in play the idea that the register should be about behaviour and not simply a list of lobbying companies. I beg to move.
My Lords, in Committee I moved an amendment to deal with the linkage between the registration process and existing codes of conduct in the lobbying industry. I warmly welcome the movement that the Government have now undertaken. If I recall rightly, we were given encouraging noises on that particular point in Committee. Therefore I very much support Amendments 12, 15 and 16. I shall listen with interest to what my noble and learned friend has to say about the stiffening of that resolve—if I may put it like that—incorporated in Amendments 13 and 14.
Amendment 23 is, almost by definition, premature. I want to see how this works. I do not want to put more responsibilities on the statutory register than it can easily undertake at the outset. The noble Baroness was quite right to talk about the future. In this particular case, we legislate for the future when it arrives, rather than put more responsibilities on the registrar at this stage. I will listen with interest to what my noble and learned friend has to say about Amendments 13 and 14, to see if there seems to be a practical way in which these could be incorporated and therefore give an even stronger statutory link between the register and the existing codes.
My Lords, as I understand the present arrangement—and I am only going by memory from what was said in Committee—the Public Relations Consultants Association already has a code of conduct. If it is correct that the professional organisations may over the longer term actually wind up—and in the period between Committee and Report we were led to believe that this is the case—then I presume that no code of conduct will necessarily apply. That is unless the Government introduce a model code on the basis that my noble friend on the Front Bench has just argued for. I asked the Minister in what circumstances an organisation that registered would not wish to introduce a code of conduct. I presume that during the consultation to which the Minister referred when he moved his amendment, they made clear what those circumstances would be. I wonder if we can be told what Ministers were told. There must be some explanation for why they resist. If there is an explanation—perhaps it is in the written brief or something—maybe we could see it prior to Third Reading. I simply cannot understand what they are objecting to, and we need to know during the course of the debate what it is.
Perhaps I can answer the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. In the debate about the first amendment today, I referred to how the PRCA requires people who sign up to the voluntary register to sign up to the code of conduct, which has strong enforcement of regulations or provisions. My point earlier was that if that disappears and there is to be a statutory register in place, it would be appropriate that we have something which is at least as good, not something that detracts from the current position.
My Lords, I appreciate the welcome given to the government amendments by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Tyler. As I indicated, we listened carefully to the debate in Committee. We have responded by tabling these amendments, which will require consultant lobbyists to state in their register entries whether they subscribe to a publicly available code of conduct in relation to their lobbying activity and, if so, where a copy of the code can be accessed.
The Opposition’s amendments, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would require that lobbyists declare on their register entry which publicly available code of conduct they subscribe to, implicitly requiring such a subscription in order to register. The Government are not persuaded that the amendment is appropriate. Moreover, there is no provision that would require compliance with such codes or provide for enforcement.
The objective of the Part 1 provisions is to enhance transparency and scrutiny. We are not seeking to regulate behaviour. The noble Baroness mentioned the exchanges she had in Committee with my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire about lobbyists who breach the Bribery Act. Of course, breaches of the Bribery Act are punishable by unlimited fines and up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. The Government do not consider it appropriate for a Bill to contain separate sanctions in addition to those already included in the Bribery Act, which are clearly very substantial indeed. It is quite proper that the Bribery Act includes serious and proportionate sanctions but it would not be appropriate for the transparency Bill to duplicate those sanctions. The Government considered the option of including a penalty whereby a person could be removed from the register but concluded that imposing a limitless prohibition on someone conducting their profession was too extreme a penalty.
Requiring lobbyists to declare whether they subscribe to a code will expose those who do not abide by the ethical principles that are so essential to the integrity of the industry. It is not the Government’s intention, however, to introduce a high-regulation regime whereby the registrar is responsible for monitoring and enforcing subscription to, and compliance with, codes of conduct. The Opposition also suggest that the registrar should be responsible for publishing a code of conduct. As my noble friend indicated, that is premature. The Government’s amendments are intended to complement the existing self-regulatory regime, not to replace or undermine it.
To pick up the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, we do not anticipate that lobbying associations such as the PRCA, CIPR and APPC will withdraw their codes. Indeed, the industry has welcomed the link between its codes and the proposed register, which it recognises will enhance the existing self-regulatory regime. That was the feedback we got during the consultation. I heard the noble Lord’s inquiry but I am not aware that any explanation or example was given of circumstances in which a firm would not register. Rather, the industry anticipates that it will continue with its codes and that the proposed register—and the government amendment—will enhance the existing self-regulatory regime.
Would Ministers be happy to meet a lobbying company that did not subscribe to the ethical standards that have been set down, either by the association or any code that the Government might wish to introduce at some stage in the future? Indeed, are there circumstances in which Ministers would refuse to meet them?
My Lords, I do not think the noble Lord can reasonably expect a blanket application. There may be reasons—I do not know what they might be—that are not malign as to why a particular group has not signed up. We already know that a majority of lobbying firms sign up to and adhere to the respective codes of conduct, but we believe that making it a statutory requirement would lead to unnecessary pressure and that what we are proposing has struck the right balance.
I have a lot of sympathy for the point the noble Lord is making but it would not be appropriate to make a sweeping general obligation on all future Ministers when you cannot foresee particular circumstances that would occur at any time or place. I believe we have struck the right balance. I urge the House to support the Government’s amendments and I urge the noble Baroness not to press the amendment in her name.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, for what I think is his support for the approach we are taking on this.
Of course, Amendment 23 would be only permissive. It does not require the registrar to publish a code of conduct; it simply permits the registrar, should at some time in the future he or she feel the need to, to be able to do so. I am slightly surprised that the Government cannot even allow a registrar at some time in the future to be able to publish a code of conduct. They seem to be turning their back on any interest in raising standards.
The Minister spoke about the Bribery Act. Of course, the issue is that nobody will be able to be removed from this register for any criminal offence. We could have people convicted all sorts of tax evasion—anything—still on the register. I and others think that this would be very misleading as it will appear that they are on a statutory register and therefore have some stamp of approval.
As to the question of who would not sign up to it, I am sure that your Lordships’ House is well aware that the Association of Professional Political Consultants is supporting our amendment. It very much feels that it will be only the bad boy who does not bother signing up and that this really undermines the code of conduct.
I am not going to test the opinion of the House on this amendment. But in withdrawing it, I will say two things. First, it was very sad to read in the paper yesterday that the UN special rapporteur called this Bill,
“a stain on British democracy”.
Secondly, my fear is that, as per the warning of the Prime Minister, the next scandal waiting to happen will be from a consultant lobbyist, it will be behaviour that would have been caught by this code and it will be this Government who said they did not want to make signing up to a code mandatory. With those words, I withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this amendment seeks to give a right of appeal to someone whom the registrar has removed from the register. Clause 6(6) says:
“If the Registrar has reasonable grounds for believing that a registered person is not (or is no longer) a consultant lobbyist, the Registrar may decide that—
(a) the person’s entry should include a statement to that effect, or
(b) the person’s entry should be removed from the register”.
If the latter course is taken, the consequence is that the person—although of course we may be talking about a company—who is operating the business of a consultant lobbyist, once he has been removed from the register, can no longer operate as a consultant lobbyist. Clearly, that will have implications for not only the business itself but its employees.
Moreover, this measure has implications for the criminal law. Clause 12 provides that it is a criminal offence to act as a consultant lobbyist if you are not registered: once you are removed you can no longer act as a consultant lobbyist, but if you choose to do so it will be an offence. What is worse is that Clause 12(1) states:
“If a person carries on the business of consultant lobbying in breach of section 1(1) (lobbying whilst unregistered), an offence is committed by … the person”—
that is understandable, because the person will presumably know—
“and … any employee of the person who engages in lobbying in the course of that business”.
So if an employee of the company is not told that their registration has been removed, he or she will be guilty of an offence. It is strict liability; there is no statutory defence for the employee in that situation, so the consequences for the person and for the employees are quite significant. This decision to deregister a person is at the instigation of the registrar, if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that they are no longer trading or what have you. There is no right of appeal against that. I am suggesting that there ought to be a right of appeal to the tribunal. There is a tribunal in existence in terms of the provision. If the employee accepts that he or she should be deregistered, there is no issue; but if he considers that the registrar has made a mistake, that would enable an aggrieved employee to have the right of appeal.
The Minister’s answer in Committee was that the registrar will act in a bona fide way and will not make mistakes. I am not questioning the bona fides of the registrar, but we all know that people make mistakes and there ought to be a remedy for someone in that position. In those circumstances I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for his amendment. It might be helpful if in response I indicate the Government’s thinking on sanctions and appeals. When considering the most appropriate sanctions in respect of non-compliance with the register, Ministers did consider the option of removing a person from the register, thereby prohibiting them or the company from continuing to operate as a lobbyist. We concluded, however, that such a sanction would represent a disproportionate penalty as it would essentially take away their livelihood. There are very few industries where, unless one is imprisoned, one is prevented from carrying out one’s professional activities if one has made errors in the course of doing so, and the Government are not persuaded that the lobbying industry should be singled out for such treatment. The sanctions regime that we have designed is therefore a proportionate one, designed to provide appropriate deterrent against, and punishment for, non-compliance with the provisions of the register.
Clause 6(6) does, however—as the noble and learned Lord has pointed out—provide the registrar with the ability to remove a person from the register. That provision is not drafted as a sanction, but rather as an administrative housekeeping measure to enable the registrar to maintain the accessibility and relevance of the register. The registrar may, for example, wish to remove individuals who have retired, passed away, chosen a change of career, or who work for a company that has been wound up. The noble and learned Lord’s amendment would enable a person to appeal against the registrar’s decision to remove them from the register, as under Clause 6(6).
We do not envisage that the registrar would remove any person from the register unless they were confident that the person no longer engaged, or no longer wished to engage in future, in consultant lobbying. I take the noble and learned Lord’s point that there are potential criminal sanctions attached to it. Obviously, as a former distinguished Lord Advocate, he will know that there is a discretion. Indeed, Clause 12(9) indicates that proceedings for an offence under this part in England and Wales may be instituted only by, or with the consent of, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and in Northern Ireland by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.
Therefore, if a person was to find that they had been wrongly removed, if they wished to object, they could immediately advise the registrar that they were still living, or that they had not given up consultant lobbying, and accordingly the registrar could reregister that person without the need for an appeal and without any difficulty. If they remained dissatisfied in spite of the fact that they could prove that they were still living and consulting, it would be possible to judicially review a decision, although that is very unlikely given the much simpler course of reregistering.
The important point is that this is not intended as a sanction or a penalty, but rather one of administration where the company or the individual is no longer believed to be performing the role of consultant lobbyist. Therefore in those circumstances, if a person becomes aware of that and wishes to challenge it, the best and most simple thing to do is to ask to be reregistered rather than to go to some expense in seeking an appeal to a tribunal.
I hope that the noble and learned Lord is reassured by that explanation. This provision is not intended as a sanction and I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for that explanation. I simply comment in passing that if it got the stage of having to have a judicial review, then that is a sledgehammer to crack a nut. But in all the circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, my amendment gets, I think, to the heart of Part 1 of the Bill. The purported purpose of Part 1, as we have heard, is embodied in the first three words of the title “Transparency of Lobbying”. The problem, or rather problems, is that Part 1 does not deliver transparency—it adds little, if anything, to what is already known—and it is not concerned primarily with lobbying. It covers lobbyists rather than lobbying. It registers those who engage in the activity, or rather some of those who engage in the activity, but does not enlighten us as to the particular activity. We may know who some of the lobbyists are, but not necessarily what they are doing in respect of individual measures. As has been argued throughout the stages of this Bill it will not capture the totality of those who are professional lobbyists. Indeed, given the exemptions, it will catch very few. Precisely how many is a matter for conjecture as the Government admit they do not know. The Bill introduces a new bureaucracy for the purpose of registration but achieves nothing substantial in terms of enhancing the transparency of lobbying.
My amendment is designed to ensure that the Bill does what it says on the tin, or rather what it says in the title. It shifts the emphasis from those who lobby to those who are lobbied. It is also comprehensive. By requiring Ministers at the time they make a statement on policy or any of the matters listed in Clause 2 to publish details of those who lobbied them on the matter, one ensures public awareness of who has sought to influence the outcome. Any representation made to anyone in the department would be within the scope of the provision, thus ensuring that those lobbying are not able to avoid their activity being made public. It would capture lobbying, whether direct to the Minister or indirect through someone else in the department. It would not matter whether the lobbyist was a consultant lobbyist, an in-house lobbyist or a part-time lobbyist: all would be caught by the provisions of the clause.
The clause therefore delivers transparency of lobbying. The principal case for the amendment is compelling. What are the arguments against? In Committee, the Minister argued that the objection was essentially practical. I do not accept that; I do not think that it is impractical. Under my amendment, transparency would be achieved through developing existing practices. There is already the quarterly publication of details of ministerial meetings. Ensuring publication of details of those who have lobbied at the point of a policy statement is thus not a paradigmatic departure from what is done already. As my noble friend Lord Tyler explained in Committee, it is achievable. Much information is already published, but it is a case, as he said, of being hidden in plain sight. As he went on to say:
“Indeed, by the time that department does publish that information, the influence that has been exerted over important legislation might have come and gone, right through Parliament. There is simply no opportunity to see what has happened … a simple and searchable central database for all their meeting data would mean that we could take the sting out of the calls, here and elsewhere, for an enormous lobbying register. We would have immediate access”.—[Official Report, 5/11/13; col. 164.]
As he mentioned, his office managed to draw together material from different departments, so it would hardly be beyond the wit or the limited resources of government to achieve. Indeed, I think that the case for that has been made today by my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness in what he said about the further publication of details. We are already moving in that direction, so I believe that it is achievable. It is a step—it might be more than a small step, but it is none the less a step—from what my noble friend developed to what is encompassed in my amendment.
The problem, as I argued in Committee, is not one of resources but one of political will. The Government have produced a mechanistic and very limited provision in order to be seen to be doing something. They have sought to hide just how limited it is by the use of the term “Transparency of Lobbying”, when, as I have said, it does not deliver transparency and it is not about lobbying. If the Government are serious about delivering on what the Bill says in the title and ensuring that the public can see who has lobbied government on a particular policy, they have to change the emphasis from lobbyists to lobbying, from status to activity.
Accepting this amendment would ensure that we are making a great stride towards transparency. As the Bill stands, it is not so much a great step forward as a faltering tip-toe. If the Government are keen, and have the political will, to deliver transparency, they should embrace this amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, seems to me an elegant and efficient way of achieving the principal aims of this part of the Bill and enhancing the transparency of lobbying, which is what it claims to be all about. I see it as a much more effective and less bureaucratic approach than the very limited transparency offered by the Bill.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, has argued on a number of occasions that when Ministers and Permanent Secretaries are lobbied by consultant lobbyists, it is sometimes not clear on whose behalf that lobbying is being done. I find it hard to imagine such circumstances but, in any event, it seems to me that the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, would fully address them.
Meanwhile, the register proposed looks to me increasingly like a Potemkin village: elaborately constructed to persuade the public that an effective process of regulating lobbying is in place. I very much fear that the public, not to mention the media, will not be fooled and that this Bill may only increase their appetite for a proper, comprehensive system to be put in place, as already exists in other jurisdictions, designed not only to enhance the transparency of lobbying but also to assure and improve the standards of conduct of the lobbying industry.
My Lords, about five or six years ago, I sat on a pre-legislative scrutiny committee dealing with the bribery and corruption Bill. During consideration of the draft Bill, there was a realisation within the committee that the Government were going into the issue from completely the wrong position. That was the view right across the committee. I always remember the civil servants sitting at the back of the committee wriggling in their seats as they saw their case being destroyed along with all the work that they had done in the production of the Bill. I tell that story because I believe that that is precisely what would have happened here if this Bill had gone into pre-legislative scrutiny. If it had done so, a very different approach would have been taken and I think that there would have been agreement on the way forward across the House. We would not have been going down this particular route; we would have taken the route set out by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, in moving this amendment. His is the right approach. The approach that the Government are taking is the wrong approach. His solution is cheaper; it is more efficient; it provides for a greater level of transparency; and it is what the public have expected of Ministers in the introduction of legislation. In the end, we will probably end up where the noble Lord is starting when we find, particularly in the light of the previous amendment, that there are problems in the way in which the system is operating. I know at this late stage that we will not see a change in the minds of Ministers, but I am really sorry that they missed a cue given by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, when he moved his amendment in Committee and gave the Government the opportunity of at least changing their approach.
My Lords, I have little to add. Like my noble friend, I deeply regret that this Bill was not subject to pre-legislative scrutiny. I still do not see the urgency for this Bill. It would have been better if pre-legislative scrutiny had been undertaken now and we could have adopted the Bill in the next Session. Notwithstanding that, I strongly support this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, which, as he said, would enhance transparency. The Government have moved today in terms of improving the reporting in ministerial diaries of when lobbying takes place, but that is still a very narrow measure. This amendment is so clever but so simple in that all it does is develop existing procedures. It is not about a new bureaucratic mechanism; it is a very simple means of moving forward. I hope that, even at this late stage, the Minister will consider either adopting this amendment or coming back at Third Reading with the Government’s own. That would not only hold the Government in good stead but improve the governance of our parliamentary system and of government.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Norton for moving his new clause, which would require the Government to publish alongside any statement on a matter of policy, legislation or a contract or grant records of any oral or written communication directed to a Minister, the Minister’s Parliamentary Private Secretary or special adviser, and any departmental civil servants concerned with that matter. This is an issue in which my noble friend has long taken an interest. His amendment would also provide exemptions from the requirement to publish for commercial or security-sensitive material.
I do not think that this is a simple proposition, although I certainly think it is an intriguing one. However, at a time when we seek to ensure more efficient and effective government, one should pause to reflect that a statutory requirement that every oral or written communication received by every civil servant, special adviser, Parliamentary Private Secretary or Minister be recorded, collated and published in parallel with any relevant statement is not as easy and simple as was perhaps suggested.
Not only would the system impose a considerable bureaucratic burden on the public sector but one would wish to consider whether it would lead in turn to an information overload. Publishing information in relation to a very small public policy statement may well have some merit, but the volume of information that the Government would be likely to be required to publish in relation to, let us say, the Budget, the Autumn Statement or the Queen’s Speech could be so overwhelming that any transparency value would be undermined by the inaccessibility and quantity of the information.
The Government’s objective is to provide the public with valuable information which they can utilise to scrutinise our actions and hold us to account. The focus should be on the value of information and the insight it can provide, not on the volume. As I have already indicated, this Government have taken exceptional steps to publicise information about decision-making, and the register is intended to extend that transparency to those who seek to influence decision-makers. It is already standard practice that responses to government consultations are published in full or in summary, and if the public require further information about certain policies or decisions, then they have the right to request that information under the Freedom of Information Act.
I recognise that my noble friend is urging the Government to extend or improve their information publication regime, and I know that this view is shared. However, I hope that the commitments to the improvement of transparency that I made on behalf of the Government during the debate on the first group of amendments will show that not only have we already taken unprecedented steps, but we are furthering them. I recognise and acknowledge that they fall short of what my noble friend is seeking, but I hope he will reflect that to publish the volume which he is suggesting—particularly in circumstances such as the Budget—might not enhance transparency, but could lead to an overload that might not assist those he seeks to help with his amendment. I hope that it will be acknowledged that the Government have already taken steps and are committed to more steps; and that what we are doing will increase the level of transparency more than any previous Administration have done. In these circumstances, I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I seek a point of clarification. In light of the decision of the House to accept the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, on special advisers, will the Minister tell the House whether it is the Government’s position that, notwithstanding that decision, the Government have no intention of adding information relative to special advisers’ meetings with lobbyists when the Minister makes his or her return?
My Lords, I stand by what I said when I replied to the question asked by my noble friend Lord Tyler in the first group of amendments. Obviously, the Government have not had an opportunity to discuss the matter, as I have been here since my noble friend’s amendment was passed. I have had no opportunity to discuss with ministerial colleagues and others how we will respond.
My Lords, I agree with my noble and learned friend in that I certainly welcome what he announced earlier about the Government moving towards greater provision of information. However, I disagree with him on all the other points. I am inclined to ask, “What price transparency?”. I am not persuaded by the argument that, “Oh dear, this is all too much trouble”. The body of policymakers is a relatively small number of people who would actually be affected. The Minister seems to envisage some great body of civil servants that would be brought within this provision—they would not. It is doable and it is a fundamental point of principle. We have to go down that route. Either we are going to have transparency or we are not really going to do very much at all as far as this Bill is concerned. This is absolutely fundamental to Part 1 and this is the last chance we have to get it in order. Given the support that has been expressed for the amendment, I would like to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 28B, 28C, 28D and 31A, standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Stevenson.
To give some brief context to those who are new to this subject, we have moved from Part 1 of the Bill to Part 3, which is concerned with trade union administration. It seeks to strengthen the public supervision of union membership records, with a duty on unions to produce a membership audit certificate annually. Unions with more than 10,000 members would have additionally to appoint an assurer—a new term to me in public life—whose job would be to check the veracity of union records. Perhaps this is a precedent, and perhaps we could do with assurers to be appointed to check some companies’ tax affairs from time to time.
Why is union membership being singled out? Are there are a lot of complaints? Is there widespread public concern? Is there a lobby around to say that there are some scandals in this area? Let us have a look at the facts: between 2000 and 2004, the last time that any records were taken, six complaints had been received by the certification officer, and there has been only one since, which is current. Is there public pressure for this intrusion into internal union affairs? No one knows who has been asking for it because the Government have never been able to provide any information about that.
This provision seems to be the product of a fevered imagination, convinced that it is quite legitimate to pile a load of red tape on to unions when generally the policy is against red tape and overregulation. In today’s Conservative Party it does not actually seem necessary to have a reason to make union lives more expensive and complex; it is almost a reflex action that they wish to perform from time to time.
It is not just about the expense and trouble that this part of the Bill is likely to cause. The measures have only one parallel in the EU: in Malta, in connection with a specific circumstance of rivalry between unions, a public official got involved in checking membership records. Every other country keeps the state and employers out of union membership records.
This is not a theoretical discussion about what might happen. There are 2,000 cases currently in procedure over allegations of blacklisting, and the people being accused—some of them have admitted it—are eight of the major blue-chip construction companies in this country. This involves sites as huge as the Olympic site, which of course is being regenerated for other purposes, and the Crossrail site, which we are all aware of if we travel around central London. There is a risk of information falling into the wrong hands and becoming available to people who should not see it. We know that the more people get hold of records and information of this kind, the more likely it is to fall into the wrong hands and be used to people’s detriment.
That is what this series of amendments is about. They would strengthen protection for the individuals. The Data Protection Act 1998 classed trade union membership as “sensitive personal data”, and was quite correct to do so. A specifically protected category under the EU data directive is a derogation for unions. Unions should be affected only where there is a substantial public interest. Where is the substantial public interest in this measure? There have been hardly any complaints, and very few people have spoken on this subject.
Amendment 28A would make clear that the assurer, this new creature, would have a duty of confidentiality to the union and its members, and a duty at all times to abide by the trade union’s own obligations under the Data Protection Act to protect the personal information and data of members. It is important that we recognise that this information is very sensitive and the assurer should have a duty of care and proper responsibility. I hope that the Minister will be able to accept these rather simple points. After all, if you reverse the situation, will he be saying that there is no duty of confidentiality to the union and its members and no duty to help a union maintain its obligations under the Data Protection Act?
Amendment 28B would strengthen the hand of the union to get rid of an assurer who breaches confidentiality or some other statutory duty, or for some other justifiable reason. In the Bill, the only way in which an assurer can be sacked is by a resolution at a general meeting of members or delegates—an annual conference, if you like. That is limited scope indeed for termination of this position. Surely, a union, which will be paying the assurer, should be able to discharge a person who is unsuitable, just as it can an accountant, an auditor or its solicitor. The Bill’s assumption here is somehow that the assurer will be in conflict—an investigating officer looking into the affairs of a miscreant union and an adversary who must be protected. The Bill gives the game away on the Government’s rather hostile approach to what unions are doing and how they are administering their affairs.
Amendment 28C reinforces the point about the assurer complying with the Data Protection Act, and reminds us that information can easily be obtained nowadays by people who should not have it, particularly if it becomes too widely available.
Amendment 28D would narrow the circumstances under which the names and addresses of members can be disclosed. It would specifically remove requests from the certification officer, the government registrar, who already has significant powers over trade unions in this area but not normally to get personal data. We are trying to stop him from being able to ask for personal, individual data. There is an inspector in addition to the assurer in this cast list of new people who will be rolling around union administration. We also want to stop an inspector, appointed by the certification officer, getting this individual, personal information. In effect, we are seeking to establish the principle that the disclosure of an individual’s name and address is done only with the individual’s consent, and not with some blanket power given to the assurer, the assurer’s officials and the certification officer. In this way, we are trying to help to protect against breaches of the Data Protection Act.
My Lords, I support this group of amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Monks. My reason for doing so is the hope that, in his response, the Minister will spell out clearly the duties of the trade union assurer, particularly—a point made by my noble friend Lord Monks—the duties of confidentiality.
Confidentiality is of the utmost importance. We have all read about the blacklist constructed by the consulting association. It is a subversive list which can damage the individual both financially and in terms of their reputation. I have read nothing in the Bill, and have heard nothing at Second Reading or anywhere else, which gives any protection at all to the possible victims of this new office of assurer. I ask myself why the trade union is a target, because it has much less information than, say, the CBI, the IoD or the Federation of Small Businesses. Those organisations have information which is relevant to the whole notion of behaviour within the context of the workplace. Now, however, the trade unions are at the sharp end.
I will not rehearse here the names of the consulting association; I do not want to pollute the debate. If the organisations involved were not in the category of trade unions or any other membership association, I suspect that the consulting association’s behaviour would be the subject of criminal investigation. However, that is not a matter which we decide here. What we decide here is how to ensure that the new office carries with it the responsibility and obligation which it owes to the people who can be impacted by its decisions. The assurer’s task will be an onerous one, in so far as it relies on the co-operation not just of individual trade unions but of employers. I therefore hope that when the Minister replies he will make absolutely clear that this particular office carries with it the highest notion of responsibility because it has the propensity to ruin so many lives and so many reputations. For those reasons I support the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Monks, and look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.
The whole philosophy of Part 3 seems quite astonishingly inequitable between what you might call the TUC family on one side of industry and the CBI or the employers’ associations on the other. Now, the counterpart to a trade union—as set down by the famous Donovan royal commission in 1965-68—is an employers’ association, but it has no responsibilities, no obligations of transparency or membership finances or anything else. So this is a purely political measure. It was no doubt agreed by the quad over the heads of people in the department of business, but we are never going to be told that. This is going to be another trophy on the mantelpiece of the Conservative Party and other people will have their attention drawn to this trophy on that mantelpiece in due course.
I had not intended to say anything but I have listened with care and sympathy to what has been said. I hope that when my noble friend comes to reply he will be able to give at least some of the assurances which have been sought by the noble Lords, Lord Morris, Lord Monks and Lord Lea of Crondall. Every man or woman is entitled to privacy. It is more and more difficult in this modern age for them to have it but it is something we all cherish and prize. No one should be put into a position where it is in jeopardy. What has been said by the noble Lords on the other side during this very brief debate has convinced me that there is at least a case to answer and I very much hope that my noble friend, for whom I have very real regard, will be able to give at least some of the assurances that have been sought when he replies to this debate.
I support the noble Lord, Lord Monks, and others who have spoken regarding these amendments. At one time it went without saying that anyone who had private information or was privy to it would not divulge that information except when obliged to do so in legal circumstances. Recent matters have come up in the media—I will not stray into the sub judice area—exposing people who have been involved and pleaded guilty to misconduct in public office where they have handed over private and confidential information to those who are not entitled to that information and received payment for it. We need assurances from the noble Lord the Minister that things are going to be kept very tight indeed.
I notice in the Bill that the removal of the officer concerned has to be carried out either by a meeting of the whole membership or of the delegates. That can be a very cumbersome area. If the executive of a trade union found that such an officer was wanting in his or her behaviour, it would take a long time to get all the delegates together, find a venue for them and check their credentials before they met. If it was going to be the membership, bear this in mind: it used to be the cry of the employers and the Conservative Party—a cry they were entitled to make—that there were too many small unions. I belonged to a small union, the metalworkers’ union, which was only a few thousand members and everyone said, no, we should have larger trade unions. As a result, my own circumstances changed and I now belong to the union called Unite, which is an amalgamation of many other unions. I have got to be careful because perhaps next week the name might change—I have to keep track of the name of the union to which I belong. The downside of all those amalgamations means larger membership and if we carried out the legislation to the letter by saying we should have an aggregate membership meeting, it would be some venue that we would have to create.
The important thing is that sadly we have people in confidential situations who have divulged information, and some sides have done it in what we in Scotland call a very sleekit way because they put out information by e-mail. If an e-mail goes out in a certain way, you have a trail of other e-mails which divulges a great deal of information. This matter has got to be looked at.
I very strongly support the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Monks and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. Since we have seen some of the troubling issues—for example, the keeping of a blacklist in the construction industry—it is clear that somebody whose personal details have been revealed can be at risk in a way that should not be acceptable. It is very sound and sensible to propose that there should be very stringent sanctions against any inspector who fails to recognise that confidentiality of individuals. It is accepted in this country that very strong and good relations should exist between responsible employers and responsible trade unionists. An amendment like this should be supported by the House.
I declare an interest as a retired member of a large union. As the noble Baroness has just said, it is common ground that the unions in Britain play a significant part in the modern economy. They should be cherished, not castigated. As has been mentioned, if the Government had brought forward such a burdensome set of duties on any other section of civil society, there would have been an outcry. Well, there is an outcry and the Government should listen.
For many employees, their membership or lack of membership of a trade union is a private choice, and one which they desire to keep confidential for what may be very legitimate reasons. The knowledge that under these new powers, trade unions could be required to provide their membership register to a government-approved official for “good reason” may act as a disincentive for workers to join unions, particularly in light of the current concern over union blacklisting. As my noble friend Lord Monks said, the Government are introducing this series of measures at the same time as the full extent of the scandal of blacklisting in the construction industry is gradually coming to light. This is by no means the only industry in which members of a union may wish to keep their membership confidential for fear of being subject to discrimination.
These measures clearly go beyond what is necessary and they are certainly not proportionate if they are to achieve any legitimate aim behind the proposals, if indeed there is one.
Before I address the amendments I would like to say a few words about blacklisting, which was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Monks and Lord Morris, and my noble friend Lady Williams, because at each stage of this Bill we have sought to emphasise how seriously this Government take any allegations of blacklisting. The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 makes it unlawful to refuse to employ a person because they are a member or not a member of a trade union or because they refuse to join or leave a trade union. This position was strengthened in 2010, when in response to the Consulting Association blacklist uncovered in 2009, the Government introduced anti-blacklisting regulations and increased the penalties for unlawful processing of data. Data controllers can now be fined up to £500,000 for serious offences. There have been several allegations of new evidence of blacklisting to date, but no evidence of this practice recurring. The Scottish Affairs Select Committee and Information Commissioner are both currently investigating the potential for ongoing offences, and the Government continue to take a close interest in this issue. Therefore, the provisions that we are considering today do not increase the risk of blacklisting, because of the protections in place around the treatment of membership data.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. I admired his straight bat, which could have been used down under, against the Australians, in the last few weeks.
I hope that noble Lords have noticed the complex web of officials who are going to be busying themselves around the union world. There is quite a cast list of people for unions to deal with. First there is the certification officer, whom they are used to dealing with, but now he has extra powers. Then there is the new assurer, who is unique in British public life. Nobody else has an assurer. No political party has an assurer. Do we have assurers to check the electoral roles in some inner city areas? Of course we do not. People do their best, and we get 80% accuracy, on average, in this area.
Why are we appointing this network of officials, who will no doubt be passing the buck if problems really do arise? I know that at the end of the day it will be the trade union that ends up in breach of the data protection legislation in the event of any complaints, despite the fact that it will all have passed through the hands of the certification officer, the assurer and an inspector. And of course, there have been no complaints—I remind people of that.
One of the problems with this debate is that the Committee stage was truncated. These measures were brought forward quickly. Because Part 2 of the Bill was paused, Part 3 was rushed forward to fill the timetable gap. So we have not had a chance to get many people interested in this particular issue. This is perhaps the best attended debate that we have had. I hope that people who are listening with an open mind—I know that that is the position of many in this House—will reflect on this complex, bureaucratic, red-tape way of spinning some kind of web around unions, causing expense, difficulty and possible problems where no problems exist.
Union members want to be confident that their information is not misused. Contrary to what the Minister said about confidence, they will be less confident with this measure than they would be on the ground that the union accountants are doing their job properly. They are reasonably confident about that now—as confident as they can be. I am not saying that union membership administration is perfect; of course it is not. But it is in the unions’ interest to make it perfect, and the certification officer keeps an eye on what is going on.
I appreciate the Minister’s straight bat, but I would like to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, Amendment 29 would deal with the problem that was alluded to in the previous debate. A number of my noble friends referred to the new office of assurer and queried why we needed it, what exactly the role of the officeholder would be and suggested that it was an additional level of red tape and bureaucracy for trade union administration. In replying to the previous debate, the Minister did not address this point but rather sought to reassure the House in relation to confidentiality. However, in seeking to leave out Clause 37, my amendment suggests that there is no point whatever in inventing this new role. The oversight of trade union administration is clearly in the hands of the certification officer, and has been so for many years.
The Government may feel that the certification officer needs new powers—they are contained in the Bill to a limited extent—or that he needs new resources to carry out his job, but the relevant apparatus for doing that is already in place. They have invented a new officer without defining that officer’s qualifications, which will be defined in technical regulations at a later stage. The Minister referred to a list from which trade unions could choose but, presumably, the list is drawn up by the Government. The House does not have before it the qualifications that are required for someone to be on the list, the details of how you get on to it or what professional standards the assurer should meet.
As my noble friend Lord Lea asked, why is no other body in society having an assurer imposed upon it? No reason has been given for that by the Minister so far; perhaps he will do so when he replies to this debate. The only reason given in the impact assessment for not moving entirely down this road is because, as he says, assurers are an important part of society and the public and union members need to be assured that their membership records are in order. As far as the rest of society is concerned—I include in that employers and the Government—clearly the membership records of a union are most important at times of possible industrial strife. The list of members taking part in a ballot on a potential industrial dispute must accord with the union membership covered by the issue under dispute. There are reams of case law in that area, so the assurer has not been invented in order to monitor strike ballots more rigorously as that issue is already covered.
The full union membership list, excluding members’ personal details, is an important document when union elections are held. We need to ensure that internal elections are proper and fair, that members who are given a vote in those elections have the right to vote in them and that everybody who falls into that category has a vote. However, that issue is also covered in existing legislation and there are already complaint mechanisms and potentially draconian sanctions for a union which breaches those rules. Therefore, I see no reason to invent another officer.
Unions, through their own rules and through legislation more generally, are already required to audit their financial records. A significant part of those financial records comprises the receipt of membership dues and the recording of those receipts. The auditor of a trade union already has to do that. The oversight of that process is already there with the certification officer, who has substantial powers to intervene. Where in this does the assurer rest? He is not an auditor, a lawyer or an officer of the certification office. No standards of professional attainment exist for such a creature. In the previous debate, the Minister failed to reply to my noble friends Lord Lea and Lord Morris of Handsworth as to why such a person was necessary.
My Lords, I think the word that my noble friend Lord Whitty could not quite conjure up, because it is not often used in this House, is hypocrisy, and it has to do with red tape. My noble friend Lord Monks reminded us that, not only because of Christmas and the new year but also because of the pause, we are between Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill, and now are dealing with Part 3. It is all rather confusing. There is overkill of all these lists of people who have some sort of role. We mentioned the electoral roll and how 80% might be up to date. I think that 50% would be a very good score for a candidate examined on this set-up even when it has been a year in use. It is quite remarkable. I will not go through the whole list.
It reminds us of the point made by a number of colleagues at Second Reading to do with the famous impact assessment and the enormous costs falling on the trade unions and many other people as well, which requires some justification. In particular, some justification is required of a Government whose raison d’être seems at some times to be to cut out red tape. If this is not red tape, what is it? The Government are clearly are going to be obstinate and will stick to their guns, whether the bowling is fast bowling, a googly or whatever else. We know that they have been taken over by dogma on everything to do with industrial relations.
Finally, I have here the report about which my noble friend Lord Monks and I have had a conversation. We asked people in the international departments of European countries to tell us, in answer to a questionnaire, what goes on in these successful democratic countries on these sorts of questions. No one remotely has a top-heavy superstructure such as this. I have little doubt that the only reason why a Labour Government might not repeal this on day one is that they would have very much bigger fish to fry, no doubt, in some respects.
I have little doubt that the life of this legislation will be very short, which is the only saving grace I can think of to mention in support of my noble friend Lord Whitty on this amendment.
My Lords, it is interesting that the questions we are left with keep coming back and keep being unanswered. What is the serious public policy issue behind this proposal? What exactly is the problem? What will this Bill achieve that current legislation does not achieve? Will the measures being proposed do more than simply increase the regulatory burdens on trade unions? We have all those questions and very few answers.
We know that union membership is already regulated by the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act. Section 24(1) puts a duty on unions to maintain an up-to-date register of members’ names and addresses so far as reasonably practicable. This legislation has stood the test of time since the days of Mrs Thatcher. As has been said already, we are not aware of any calls having been made to the Government to extend this provision. BIS, the certification officer and ACAS have confirmed under freedom of information requests that they have received no representations for such a measure.
As my noble friend Lord Whitty said, it may be that a better self-certification system could be an advantage. I say “it may be” because we do not know what the problem is but cloaking the issue in some spurious idea that there is some public concern out there that would be remedied by having an additional checking arrangement is simply not sufficient.
My Lords, I turn to two amendments which seek to drastically reduce the effect and extent of the provisions as drafted. This would in practice undermine the Government’s key policy objective, which is to introduce a proportionate and effective reporting and enforcement mechanism alongside the existing duty of unions to maintain an up-to-date membership register so far as is reasonably practicable.
Amendment 29 would remove Clause 37 and the role of the independent assurer from the Bill altogether. Clause 37 gives credibility to the assurance process by requiring independent scrutiny, which is in line with the Government’s overarching aim to provide greater assurance of the maintenance of trade union membership registers for the benefit of members, employers and, importantly, the wider public. As some unions become large organisations representing members across a variety of employers and workplaces, their administrative requirements become more complex. As a consequence of the prevalence of very large unions in recent years, there is also now an increased public perception of a union’s scope of influence.
This may be an appropriate moment for me to restate what I said in Committee: I am not minded to comment on the media coverage of particular industrial disputes, such as the Grangemouth refinery or, more recently, the issue affecting Howdens. Instead, as I should, I will focus on the separate issue at hand relating to the obligation of unions to maintain up-to-date membership registers. Perhaps this can also be described as playing a straight bat. I hope so.
The nature of union membership data means that they decay easily—for example, addresses can quickly become out of date. About 2 million people move in and out of union membership every year, which equates to around one in four union members. The register for a union which has a 25% turnover in membership could theoretically be entirely out of date in four years. Unions are already required by statute to maintain a register of the names and addresses of their members. What we are introducing is annual reporting on the compliance of unions with this duty where currently there is none. I believe—
I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way. This must be about the fourth time that he has said that, on the one hand, of course there is “churn”, as the word is now fashionably used, in trade union membership—20% or something like that. That is where I suggest the figure of 80% comes from; there is always churn going on. There is then a huge leap of logic, and the word “proportionate” in this context strikes me as astonishing. It is straight out of Alice in Wonderland—words mean what I say they mean, no more and no less. It cannot be proportionate to say that, because of churn, there is only 80% accuracy at any moment in time, therefore we will make it accurate by saying we will make it more accurate because we will have inspectors running around the country making it accurate. They will not make it accurate. In terms of what we have described as the problem with churn, how can they make it accurate? So the punishment will not fit the crime, even if there were a crime in the first place. Can the Minister give a more reasonable justification for an extraordinary lack of logic in his pronouncements?
My Lords, the reasoning behind this is simply to look at the bigger picture in relation to unions. The noble Lord, Lord Lea, needs to be reminded that unions with 10,000 members or fewer will be self-certificating. We are looking at those unions which have large membership lists. Many colleagues of the noble Lord—certainly in Committee—acknowledged that it is a challenge to keep membership lists up to date. This is why—in a very light-touch way—we are bringing in an assurer so that we can be sure that the lists are up to date, so far as is reasonably practicable.
I believe that the membership audit certificate will be credible for larger unions only if it is independent, and this is because larger unions often represent workers across a range of different job types and employers. They have complicated branch structures—I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Lea, would agree with that. They often have different IT systems and there may be greater time delays for updating information. A union official or rep would not, therefore, have the same credibility as an independent expert in ensuring that the systems used across the entire union are fit for purpose. This is the essence of what we are aiming to do. That may also be helpful in response to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty.
Clause 37 requires trade unions with more than 10,000 members to appoint a qualified, independent person, called an assurer, who has a duty to provide an annual membership audit certificate to the union. The membership audit certificate must state whether, in the opinion of the assurer, the union’s system—and please note this word “system”—for compiling and maintaining the register is satisfactory to comply with the duties in Section 24. This is analogous with the regime in place for financial reporting, where all unions are required to appoint an independent auditor to approve their accounts. An assurer has the right to access the membership register and other relevant documents at all reasonable times, and to require information and explanations from the union. This is necessary for the assurers to be able to meet their duties and carry out their functions. However, as I mentioned in a previous debate, they will be subject to the obligations of the Data Protection Act when handling union membership data.
The assurer may request access only to documents which may be relevant to the union’s duties in Section 24. At the outset, when the assurer is appointed, the union and the assurer could agree terms as to the relevant documents to which the assurer should have access. If, after making inquiries, the assurer’s opinion is that the union’s system for maintaining the register is not satisfactory, or the assurer is unable to obtain the information necessary to provide the certificate, they must state this on the certificate and give reasons for doing so. If the certificate is not satisfactory, the assurer is required to send it to the certification officer as soon as is reasonably practicable but after submitting it to the union. Again, as part of the contractual arrangements, it would be possible for the union and the assurer to agree that the assurer must alert the union of any possible issues before the certificate is finalised.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I just wonder how the assurer can help a union in a situation where there is very rapid labour turnover, lots of short-term contracts and great difficulty in keeping membership rolls up to date. What possible value can the assurer add to that situation, except to confuse it?
It is certainly not to confuse, my Lords. As I explained, the role of the assurer is to provide that element of credibility which is not there at present. The assurer will also be working closely with the union and a contract will be drawn up with the union, notwithstanding the core powers that the assurer must have. That is why we believe this is necessary, in particular for the larger unions with 10,000 members and above.
The current statute does not provide an assurance of the union’s compliance as there is no sufficient enforcement mechanism. The Bill addresses this shortcoming by allowing the certification officer to investigate instances of possible non-compliance where there is good reason to do so. The certification officer will require access to the register and other relevant documents in order to determine whether a union is diligent in maintaining a register that is up to date so far as is reasonably practicable. The current system relies on individual members making formal complaints to the certification officer before he can investigate. As members can have no way of knowing the state of the register as a whole, the route for the certification officer to determine whether a union is compliant with its statutory obligations is not that effective to ensure that the existing duties are complied with. There may be a good reason for the certification officer to investigate a union’s compliance with the overarching duties even in the absence of a complaint including, for example, where a membership audit certificate has not been provided by the union or it is unsatisfactory.
We want to give members and the wider public an assurance that all unions are complying with their existing statutory duties. If the measure is applied only when the certification officer receives a complaint, we will not achieve this objective. Just because there are few formal complaints that we are aware of, it does not mean that there is no problem and this is an important point to make bearing in mind the comments that were made earlier by the noble Lords, Lord Whitty and Lord Monks. The access to and handling of union data is a concern that has occupied a great deal of time and debate. The Government understand the sensitivity of union membership data and agree with the importance of protecting them. However, for the reasons discussed at length previously, I reassure noble Lords that this amendment is unnecessary. Membership data will be well protected by both the existing and new legal safeguards. The assurer will owe a contractual duty of confidentiality to the union as set out in the Bill. The assurer, the certification officer and the inspector will be subject to the obligations of the Data Protection Act whenever they handle union membership data. Furthermore, the certification officer is obliged to act in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, which includes the individual’s right to privacy.
These two amendments between them would undermine the Government’s policy objective in Part 3 of the Bill. Amendment 29 would remove the independent scrutiny that is fundamental to the credibility of large unions’ annual reporting on duties. Amendment 30 would remove the provision for the certification officer to proactively investigate and assess a union’s compliance with Section 24 of TULRCA where there is good reason to believe that there may be an issue. For these reasons I cannot accept the amendments.
Just before I ask the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, to withdraw his amendment, I want to respond to a question he put to me. He raised the important issue of who would be appointed to be an assurer. We have already said that we will consult on who will be eligible to be an assurer, and further to this consultation the Secretary of State will make an order setting out who is eligible. They are likely to be qualified professionals such as solicitors and lawyers, which was alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, auditors or independent scrutineers. This is similar to the system in place for independent scrutineers, and furthermore the unions will have discretion over whom to appoint from the list of eligible assurers and to remove them from the role on agreement with their members. Unions will be able to define the detailed terms of contract and their relationship with the assurer. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that lengthy reply, in which he repeatedly referred to the Government’s key policy objective. However, it is not clear to me what the policy objective of the whole of Part 3 is, and in particular the invention of this new category of assurer. I am glad that there is to be a consultation on it, but I do not see that anything is likely to emerge at the end of that consultation which could not be written into the terms of the annual audited return from the trade unions, whereby the external auditor would be required to certify that their membership system complied with the requirements. Why we have to invent a whole new structure is creating grave suspicion among the unions. The whole of Part 3 is very difficult to understand, but its effect will be a significant cost on union administration. The creation of an intermediate level between them and the certification officer is bound to increase distrust, and there is a suspicion that the Government’s motive in this is, at the very least, suspect.
Some of the motives that we have to tried to impugn have been denied by the Minister. It is not about tightening up on strike ballots. It is not about assurances on internal elections. It is not about the political fund. It is about imposing a cost and a bureaucracy on trade unions that will increase the likelihood of conflict between them and their regulator. I do not think that that is in the interests of trade union members and I cannot see that it is in the interests of wider society. The suspicion therefore has to be that other, sinister motives are involved here—that the Government wish to impose someone right in the heart of the administration of the trade unions, someone employed or contracted theoretically by the trade unions but who is actually a different type of person. I do not want to go too far down the paranoid road but I am quite a long way down it.
It seems to me that all the objectives that the Minister has mentioned can be achieved by a tightening up of the audit and by the certification officer and his or her powers. This intrusion of an assurer has not been justified. Had we not been voting so much today and we are all getting very tired, I would have asked the opinion of the House. I think that this is a bad part of the Bill and this is the worst part of that bad part. Before they put it into operation, the Minister and the Government need to think about this very carefully again. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 33A concerns the commencement of Part 3. We have already debated the purposes of the Bill and I must say that I am still in a state of some mystery about exactly what it is supposed to do, other than give trade unions a provocative prod, and it is certainly doing that. For the Government to act in this way without any clear justification for doing so other than through some sense of confidence and assurance—for whom, I am not sure—is a dangerous road to go down. We will be watching other developments in this area, if there are any, very carefully.
I am not going to go through the speeches and points that have been made already. This amendment seeks to ease the regulatory burden by extending the period before the Act is brought into force. The Minister has learnt about union administrative procedures. To change the rules, which would have to be done to allow the assurer access to this kind of information, is a time-consuming, complicated and expensive prospect. The kind of costs we are talking about are those for a union with, say, 1 million members that holds a rules revision conference every two or three years of 1,000 delegates. If, because of the timing, a union has to hold a special conference, that will cost another £500,000. The Government’s estimate that the cost to unions collectively will be around £460,000 pales into insignificance against the costs of union conferences and administration. We debated earlier that the assurer can be got rid of only by the decision of a delegate conference, and again you can see the kind of costs that are beginning to stack up; they go way beyond where the impact assessment took us. In Committee, the Minister indicated some scope for flexibility about this aspect and I know that there have been talks about it. The TUC has been involved and some noble Lords have had contact with the Minister as well.
Let me emphasise that there does not seem to be any great urgency about the need to bring this in. It is not a matter of widespread public concern. There are no current, or indeed historical, problems screaming for attention and for the early implementation of this legislation. It would very much help unions, which would obviously have to comply with the law, if they had adequate time to prepare the necessary changes to their rules without the need to have special conferences and rules revision processes that are exceptional rather than in their mainstream work. It would be cost effective, economical and practical, and would minimise some—not enough but at least some—of the red tape that has been dolloped on the administrations of trade unions. Therefore, I ask the Minister if there can be an adequate period of digestion that avoids unnecessary costs and administrative complexities.
This is a probing amendment, so I wonder whether the Minister can say something about what talks he has had on this issue and whether he has been able to give any more thought to it that he could disclose today in addition to what was said in Committee. I hope that if there is a chance for further dialogue, he will agree to come back to the House on Third Reading to give a report about where we are. However, this is a plea for a road map of where the unions go in relation to full implementation, for some additional time and maybe even for a scintilla of sympathy for the union position as we are forced into this particular corset, which is unwelcome in so many aspects.
My Lords, let me first apologise for not taking part in the earlier stages of the Bill. As a new Peer I had not made my maiden speech and therefore under the conventions of the House could not intervene.
There is a common misconception in many parts of the United Kingdom that trade union membership equals Labour Party support. This is not true. Setting aside the fact that voter turnout among trade unionists is not dissimilar to that of the rest of the population, of those who do vote around one third of TU members vote for the Conservative Party—may that grow in the future.
Unions are already firmly regulated in two ways, first by provisions in the Trade Unions and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, passed by the last Conservative Government and left on the statute book by the Labour Government. I noticed the noble Lord, Lord Lea, mentioned the life of legislation as being short, but that is not the precedent we have from the party opposite when it was in government—indeed, it left most trade union legislation firmly in place. Secondly, the contractual relationship between unions and their members is set out in each union rule book, which is a legal document that governs how unions operate. In order to change its rules, a union must obtain support from its members. Having received that support, the rule changes can be made only within the context of statutory legislation.
In order to ensure—and I am sure we all support this—that small and unrepresentative groups of members cannot change the rules of unions without fully consulting the members, unions all have democratic procedures in their rule books which must be followed if changes are to be made. In order to give effect to the provisions of the Bill, many unions will have to hold special rules revision conferences where members vote to change their union rule book to comply with the new provisions. This is, of course, especially and usually the case with larger unions.
Tonight I ask the Minister to consider two points: first, to raise the exemption limit in Clause 37 from the present 10,000 members to a figure of around 40,000. Mention has been made of turnover in big unions. Small unions often face a very different situation. Many are professional unions, such as the radiographers or the physiotherapists, who will be caught by this Act, but have a very low turnover indeed, as do many of the others. If we went from 10,000 to 40,000, we would go from 22 to 37 unions but we would exempt all the unions that traditionally have a low turnover and a highly professional membership.
The noble Lord, Lord Martin, who is not presently with us, earlier mentioned small unions. I had the privilege for many years to belong to a very good small union called AUEW-TASS. I must say that since TASS merged, it has got more and more out of touch. Now I am almost ashamed to say I am a member of Unite, as I remain a member of Unite. I still look forward to the day when we might have an engineering section in Unite that could compare with AUEW-TASS. None the less that is a digression. Even if this change were accepted, 90% of union members would remain within the assurer provisions of the Bill.
Secondly and finally, no doubt the Government and the certification officer will want to ensure that unions are able to make these changes following the agreed procedures. This will mean giving notice to members of a special conference. Good administration—which I am sure we all support—would indicate that a transition period of at least 17 months would be helpful. I would welcome an assurance from the Minister that the transition period after commencement will at least accommodate the 17 months, because it is in all our interests that this is done properly and competently.
My Lords, I have never in my long life met a Conservative member of a trade union. It is very nice to be introduced to one and to hear him speak. It has been very evident from the speeches we have heard, both in this small debate and previously, that if the Bill is to progress and be brought into law it must operate with the best chance of success otherwise it will not have been worth a candle doing it. As my noble friend Lord Monks said in an earlier intervention, the right way to do this is to give the unions—particularly the larger unions—adequate time to comply with the Act in a way that is cost effective, economical and practical, but also from their point of view. Unions are, after all, independent self-governing bodies. As the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, said, they rightly have procedures for making complex changes in their constitutions and it will be necessary, as the Bill recognises, that the unions will make some changes through rules conferences and the like. This is not to say in any sense that there is not anything wrong with what is currently in the Bill, but I detect in some of the comments made that we are still not absolutely clear about how the procedures will operate and the timescales that will be on and that will interfere a little bit with transparency.
When he responded to this point in Committee, the Minister said that he shared the sentiment that,
“trade unions should be given sufficient time to prepare”,
and he hoped he could,
“offer a positive and emollient answer”,—[Official Report, 11/11/13; col. 596.]
to allow time for the bedding down of the new legislation. I take it from that that he is still interested in trying to make sure that this works well. Picking up on what has just been said, I get to 17 months from the comments that were made during Committee if I follow two tracks. The first is that a union whose reporting year ends on a fiscal basis—that is, 31 March—would not need to submit a report for the year ending 31 March until the end of August 2015, which I think is 17 months if I do my maths correctly. However, a union that reports on a calendar-year basis would have a little more time. It would not have to submit its report for the year ending 31 December 2015 until the end of May 2016.
That is the sort of level of complexity which we are operating on. If we are going to fit a 17-month period, which I think was mentioned earlier as being appropriate, combining it with a Royal Assent, possibly by March 2014, and a period of consultation on the question of how assurers are going to be both defined and appointed, that suggests that it would be sensible to have one further round of discussions before it is finalised. Will the Minister consider having a short meeting with me and a few colleagues to try to run over this so that we can get some absolute clarity on it? Thereafter, we can all work together, not in any sense to shake the principles which are part of this part of the Bill, but to make sure that they work effectively.
My Lords, Amendment 33A could delay commencement of the provisions in Part 3, as they would not come into effect until the certification officer knows that all trade unions with more than 10,000 members have changed their rules to provide for the appointment and removal of an assurer. I know that noble Lords have been concerned that unions should have sufficient time to prepare for these new arrangements. In particular, we have been told that many unions do not routinely have an opportunity to make rule changes—I think the noble Lord, Lord Monks, alluded to that earlier. I am happy to offer reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and other noble Lords that unions will have the time that they need. They will have at least 17 months to comply from the point at which the legislation takes effect, because the provisions will not apply retrospectively.
Unions will be required to submit a membership audit certificate alongside their annual return for the first full reporting year after the changes become law. The 17 months is the combination of the 12-month reporting period plus the five months that is allowed after that period to submit the annual return. The earliest that the provisions will take effect is October this year, which would depend on Parliament granting Royal Assent next month. That being the case, unions would have a minimum of 25 months from Royal Assent. In practice, many unions will have much longer.
Unions have different reporting years: many work on either a calendar or a financial year, which the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, mentioned. Were the legislation to take effect in October 2014, a union with a calendar reporting year would first provide the membership audit certificate by the end of May 2016; for a union with a financial reporting year, it would be the end of August 2016. The noble Lord, Lord Monks, raised the issue of allowing unions sufficient time to meet the new requirement. I entirely sympathise with that and have said something about it just now. I have to confess that this is not the most straightforward of timetables to set out and I would be very happy to meet the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Monks, and any other noble Lords to clarify the timings and state why we think this would be sufficient for trade unions to make the transition. That reflects the discussions that we have had with the TUC and others.
I take this opportunity to warmly welcome the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, and the experience that he brings on union matters, something I mentioned earlier in respect of the noble Lord, Lord Monks; it is only fair to acknowledge the experience that the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, has as well. I have had some discussions with him, at his request, on the question of whether the £10,000 threshold is set at the right level. Our primary objective is to supply assurance to union members, and to the wider public, about the existing statutory requirement to maintain an up-to-date register of members. The requirement to maintain a register applies to all unions, no matter what size. However, at the same time, the Government do not want to unnecessarily prohibit the creation of trade unions or undermine their ability to operate. We believe that it is possible for a union to be confident in the accuracy of all its records where its membership is small. We also believe that the wider public will think it reasonable that special provision is made for the smaller union and accept that where numbers are smaller it is reasonable to rely on the union’s own assessment.
Self-certification means a union officer assuring that every individual record is up to date, so far as is reasonably practicable. We think that this is achievable for unions with 10,000 members or fewer, but it becomes much more challenging where there are more members than that, which was part of the debate that we had earlier. The union official would have to be confident of the position and union members and the wider public would have to have trust that this was reasonable—a point, again, that I made earlier. By contrast, independent assurance focuses on whether the system in place for monitoring records is satisfactory, as opposed to making a statement about the accuracy of individual records. I therefore believe that this amendment is unnecessary and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.
My Lords, it was a pleasure to hear the noble Lord, Lord Balfe. I welcome him to this House. It was a pleasure to hear him praising TASS, which, as its chosen acronym suggests, was not exactly aligned with the Conservative Party—nor, from time to time, with the Labour Party either. However, we all change and I am interested in what his views were when he was an active member of that union.
We appreciate the way in which the Minister responded on the timetable point. It will be useful to just see if we can tie this matter down in the next couple of weeks and see where the different positions that we hold meet, so that unions comply in a way which is sympathetic to the necessary costs and timetables. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to open the debate on the Bill. This is a consolidation Bill which brings together and modernises the law relating to co-operatives and community benefit societies, and other societies registered or treated as registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965, with amendments to give effect to recommendations of the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission.
As a consolidation Bill, the Bill aims to remove ambiguities but does not seek to introduce any new policy or make substantial changes to law. It is still, however, an important step in reducing legal complexity for new and existing societies. In January 2012, the Prime Minister announced that, in support of the co-operative movement, the legislation dealing with co-operatives and other mutual societies would be consolidated into one co-operatives Bill. This Bill represents the Government’s delivery of that commitment.
The industrial and provident society sector forms a major part of the mutuals landscape, with a diverse mix of over 7,000 independent societies in the UK. Given their clear importance to the diversity and strength of the UK economy, the Government are keen to continue their support for the sector. This consolidation Bill is one element of the key reforms we are making to help ensure that industrial and provident societies are well placed to play a central role in the UK economy for years to come.
As part of the Government’s continued efforts to simplify and modernise legislation, the Law Commissions made a number of recommendations for modifications which have been incorporated into the Bill. For example, the language regarding the conditions for registration as a community benefit society has proved problematic. The Bill now clarifies this position and provides that a society may be registered as a community benefit society only if it is shown to the Financial Conduct Authority’s satisfaction that the society’s business is being, or is intended to be, conducted for the benefit of the community.
The Law Commissions also identified areas where some of the language used in the legislation was unnecessarily complicated. For example, there is no reason to distinguish between documents in electronic format and those in other forms. The approach has been harmonised in the Bill, with relevant sections applying to all of a society’s business correspondence and other business documentation in any form. The Bill has been warmly welcomed by sector trade bodies, particularly Co-operatives UK.
In addition to the consolidation Bill, we are taking further steps to modernise industrial and provident society legislation by commencing various sections of the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit Unions Act 2010. The Government are also introducing a package of measures in support of co-operative societies through secondary legislation, and the consolidation Bill takes account of these measures. These are due to come into force in August 2014 and are: first, increasing the cap on the amount of withdrawable share capital that an individual can put into a society, which will increase from £20,000 to £100,000; secondly, allowing for troubled societies to enter insolvency rescue proceedings; thirdly, giving the FCA additional powers to investigate societies; and, fourthly, making electronic submission of registration documents simpler.
Following a public consultation earlier last year, all of these measures have been warmly welcomed by sector representatives. Co-operatives UK, the main industry trade body, has welcomed the changes, saying that:
“The appetite and commitment to do business the co-operative way has not waned”,
and that this is,
“a massive vote of confidence in the strength of the co-operative sector and recognises the movement’s ambitions for growth and development”.
This is a useful and overdue Bill.
Will the measures that the Minister has just described come before Parliament, either as affirmative orders or as negative orders?
My Lords, I believe that they will. I will confirm that to the noble Lord, but that is my understanding.
As I was saying, this is a useful and overdue Bill, which will allow the Government to continue their support for the mutuals sector, as underpinned in the coalition agreement where it sets out their commitment to foster diversity and promote mutuals. The Bill is a key part of wider legislative reforms aimed at strengthening the sector and encouraging increased investment in the country’s co-operative sector, allowing it to thrive. In short, this Bill is good for the mutuals sector, and I commend it to the House.
My Lords, I am grateful for an opportunity to speak briefly in the gap. I am afraid that I was away on business in the United States last week and I arrived back at Heathrow only at 10 o’clock last night. By the time I got my mind into gear, I am afraid that the speakers list had closed.
My two simple points refer to the point made by my noble friend in his opening comments. The heavy type on page 3 of the Law Commissions’ report, which is the first recommendation, says that,
“a society may be registered as a community benefit society only if it is shown to the Financial Conduct Authority’s satisfaction that the society’s business is being, or is intended to be, conducted for the benefit of the community”.
I would like to explore with my noble friend some of the practical implications of this. First, who defines “benefit of the community”, where is it defined, who judges whether the definition has been met and who hears appeals against judgments perceived to be unfair? Secondly, does the test precisely match the public benefit test applied by the Charity Commission, which is the key to charitable status? If not, is there not a danger that the unscrupulous will game the system to take advantage of whichever regime is laxer? As far as the charitable sector is concerned, which is under pressure with the Cup Trust and executive pay, further adverse publicity would be surely unwelcome.
My second point concerns the question of “to the FCA’s satisfaction”. Is my noble friend convinced that the FCA will devote sufficient resource to ensuring that the benefit to the community test is met? When I reviewed this as part of my charity review, it was clearly low on its agenda. At paragraph 10.29 of my report I said:
“Only a small proportion of IPS are charities; all of those are community benefit societies. Charitable IPS are exempt from registration with the Charity Commission and, although they are registered with the Financial Services Authority … the FSA undertakes no regulation in respect of any type of IPS. This, then, is essentially an unregulated sector”.
It needs to be a test that is not just a nod-through. It needs to be a test that is reapplied from time to time; it should not be the case that, once a society is through the hoops, it is in the pen for ever.
I appreciate that these are detailed comments made in very short order. I have not been able to give my noble friend any advance warning, and I apologise for that. I would be happy if he wanted to write to me, but these are potentially very important issues, which deserve a public response and airing.
My Lords, before I commence, I wonder if the Minister has some information from the Box that he might share with me in response to my question.
My Lords, I am extremely pleased to be able to reassure the noble Lord that the four measures that I referred to will be brought before Parliament shortly. One will be brought forward in an affirmative resolution and the other three in a negative resolution.
I thank the Minister for that response, which will make my brief speech even shorter.
At somewhat short notice we were asked if we would take this consolidation Bill and it fell to me as the sort of second tier on our team—because we have only two now—to look at it. I thought, “What is a consolidation Bill?”, so I looked it up and it seemed that the first role of the Opposition was to have a reasonable confidence that it was a consolidation Bill. The test is in the Companion at 8.205 and there are five reasons, (a) through (e), and it is fair to say that the Bill seems to fall among (a), (b) and (c).
The first thing I did was to get a copy of the Bill. I was just about to start reading it when I got another document, the table of origins, which convinced me that I should not read it. Almost fortuitously, the Printed Paper Office offered me a copy of the Law Commission report, and I have read that. I take the point that these Bills have to be looked at very carefully to ensure they pass the test for a consolidation Bill but, reading the Law Commission’s report a little bit carefully, its recommendations seem to fall within the overall requirement.
Certainly, when one goes on to read how this Bill will now proceed, to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills, where there will be detailed scrutiny of the origins of the parts of the Bill and the Government, through their witnesses, will have to assure the committee that it meets the test, we can be comfortable that this is a proper consolidation Bill and serves a useful purpose.
The thing about consolidation Bills is that no parliamentarian—except when you are in government, I suppose—can be other than joyful about their arrival. I cannot think of parliamentary language to describe much of our legislation but, having sat through so many variations of financial services Bills—FiSMA and so on—in the sure and certain knowledge that no reasonable human being using the source document could possibly understand it, consolidation Bills are a joy to the eye.
However, one has to ask: why this one? The Government’s response to the consultation offers the rather nice words that it will,
“consolidate existing IPS legislation in one place, and is an important step in reducing legal complexity for new and existing societies”.
I agree that it is an important step but I ask the Minister: why this Bill and not many others? Do the Government have a plan for a programme of consolidation Bills? I particularly hark back to the travail that he and I and others have been through with the various financial services Bills. I have to say that the Treasury did a splendid job of producing Keeling schedules and such things to help us but even with all that help it was an uphill battle. Will the Government bring forward further consolidation Bills?
The next area I was going to venture into concerns the merits of the other actions that stand alongside the consolidation Bill and are set out in the consultation document. Because of the Minister’s assurance that they will come in front of Parliament as either negative or affirmative instruments, I will not waste the time of the House on those issues now and will not ask the Minister questions he would have to promise to write to me about.
Accordingly, we broadly support the concept of a consolidation Bill. We wish it well and I wish the members of the Joint Committee who have to go through all this paperwork all the luck in the world.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in this pleasingly short debate at this time of the evening.
The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, asked me some very technical points and I will of course write to him as he suggested. He asked about the extent to which the FCA will prioritise looking at IPSs. The FCA is committed to maintaining the registration requirements of being a bona fide co-operative or community benefit society. One of the measures that the Government will bring forward will give the FCA additional powers to investigate these societies for irregular activities, as well as disqualifying directors where appropriate. There has been a long-held view that the FSA has devoted very little attention to this sector, but there is a logic in the regulators putting in more effort to make sure that, as the sector grows both in size and prominence, it is well regulated. However, I will certainly pass on his view that this is a sector which the FCA certainly cannot afford to ignore.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, very kindly welcomed the Bill. One advantage of consolidation Bills is that if you do attempt to read them, the first parts—until one gets into the schedules—are often a much better read than what preceded them. This is a consolidation Bill albeit with the Law Commission’s drafting amendments to clarify various ambiguities. Why, he asks, are we consolidating in this area rather than in a lot of others? We have been very keen as a Government to simplify and develop the law in this area. It has been a bit of a patchwork quilt. There has been a long tradition that mutuals legislation is introduced as private Member’s legislation, and more than with other types of legislation, little pockets of provision have developed over the decades. As the sector grew, however, it needed legislation that was commensurate to its new status.
There will be other consolidation Bills in due course. The challenge is, as much as anything else, around resources. Sadly, this Government are no less keen than their predecessor to produce a large volume of legislation; and sadly, from the parliamentary counsel’s point of view, there are limited resources. The other challenge, as always, is to consolidate at a time when there are often new changes which are sometimes difficult to provide for legislatively. However, the whole process of consolidation is an important one in terms of keeping the law up to date and useable. The Government are committed to maintaining that approach.
I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken. We believe that this is a useful piece of tidying-up legislation, and I commend the Bill to the House.