(13 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 4—Section (Expiry and repeal of TPIM powers): supplementary provision.
New clause 7—Annual renewal
‘(1) Except in so far as otherwise provided under this Clause, Clause 2 and all other consequential clauses in this Act will expire at the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act comes into force.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument—
(a) repeal Clause 2 and all other consequential clauses in this Act; or
(b) provide that Clause 2 will not expire at the time when it would otherwise expire under subsection (1) of this Clause but will continue in force after that time for a period not exceeding one year.
(3) Before making an order under subsection (2)(b) of this Clause the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Independent Reviewer of Counter-Terrorism Legislation;
(b) the police; and
(c) the security services.
(4) No order may be made by the Secretary of State under this Clause unless a draft of it has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.
(5) Subsection (4) of this Clause does not apply to an order that contains a declaration by the Secretary of State that the order needs, by reason of urgency, to be made without the approval required by subsection (4).
(6) An order under this Clause that contains such a declaration—
(a) must be laid before Parliament after being made; and
(b) if not approved by a resolution of each House before the end of 40 days beginning with the day on which the order was made, ceases to have effect at the end of that period.
(7) Where an order ceases to have effect in accordance with subsection (6), that does not—
(a) affect anything previously done in reliance on the order; or
(b) prevent the making of a new order to the same or similar effect.’.
Government amendments 11 and 13.
Amendment 8, page 15, line 41, clause 27, leave out from ‘Act’ to end of line and insert
‘will come into force on 1 January 2013’.
Amendment 20, page 15, line 41, clause 27, leave out from ‘Act’ to end of line and insert
‘will come into force the day after the Home Secretary reports to Parliament to confirm that paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) below have been complied with—
(a) no later than one month after the day on which this Act is passed, the Senior National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism will produce a report to the Home Secretary detailing the additional required resources (“required resources”) that will be needed to manage the increased risks arising from the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the passing of this Act;
(b) no later than two months after the day on which this Act is passed the Home Secretary will agree with the Senior National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism the required resources under paragraph (a) and the timetable for such required resources becoming deployable for use in implementing and managing measures relating to TPIM notices;
(c) this Act cannot come into force until the required resources as agreed under paragraph (b) above are made available and ready for deployment.’.
In starting our consideration of the Bill, we will be reflecting on a number of points and issues that were debated in Committee. I look forward to continuing some of the debates that we had with Members who were part of that Committee, and with other Members joining today’s consideration.
This group contains two related but distinct sets of amendments. The first deals with expiry and renewal of the legislation, and the second with its commencement. On expiry and renewal, the Government new clauses and amendments return to an important matter that was raised on Second Reading and in Committee: the duration of the Bill’s provisions and whether they should be subject to any form of sunset or renewal.
A number of arguments have been advanced. The Government previously set out their view that the Bill is the product of a lengthy and considered review, that it makes significant improvements to the control orders system, and that it establishes a framework that ought to be able to operate stably and effectively on a permanent basis. The point has been well made that we are legislators, and that we are fully competent to review the necessity of legislation, and to amend or repeal it if it is no longer necessary or if changes are needed. However, it has also been argued with some force that the nature of the powers in the Bill makes some form of regular review appropriate, both to reflect the weighty responsibility on Parliament when it accords the Government such powers, and to focus minds on the need to ensure that the legislation remains in force only as long as is necessary.
If this Bill is the product of a long and considered review, why did the Government think it necessary to publish an alternative Bill last Thursday night?
I will come to that point during consideration of further amendments, but I draw the right hon. Gentleman’s attention to the Government’s counter-terrorism review—which specifically contemplated the necessity of enhanced measures, should exceptional circumstances require them—and to the specific paragraphs and references in that review. That is why I have said that the product of this legislation has been subject to that careful consideration.
I believe that this is the hon. Gentleman’s first time at the Dispatch Box with his new responsibilities as counter-terrorism Minister, so may I congratulate him on his appointment and on taking on that portfolio?
I am concerned about Lord Macdonald’s role in the Government’s latest suggestions. He was their reviewer of counter-terrorism policy, he produced a report and there were differences between him and the Government on a number of important points. Has he had the opportunity to comment on the Bill? Has the Home Secretary spoken to him about the substance of what is before the House today?
The right hon. Gentleman is probably aware that Lord Macdonald produced a separate report alongside the counter-terrorism review document to which I have alluded. That analysis and ancillary documentation fitted alongside the review, which was published earlier this year. We will deal in further detail with the points I made about the Bill’s provisions and with the concept of the need for exceptional emergency measures when we discuss the second group of amendments.
I am sorry if I have not satisfied the right hon. Gentleman’s inquiries.
As the right hon. Gentleman will know, the foreword to Lord Macdonald’s report said that he was invited
“to provide independent oversight of the Review”.
That is the role that he conducted. He was asked to
“ensure that it is properly conducted, that all the relevant options have been considered and the recommendations are balanced.”
That was the role he was required to carry out in the counter-terrorism review, which, obviously, led to the preparation of this Bill.
I will give way one further time and then I will make some progress.
I am not comfortable with the draft Bill, but will the Minister accept my congratulations on moving the Government forward from the position set out in comments made by his former colleague, Baroness Neville-Jones? She said that this emergency power would be discussed only with the Opposition and would not be scrutinised by Parliament, so will he accept my congratulations on moving to a much more democratic process?
We have made it clear that the draft Bill will be subject to review and scrutiny by a Joint Committee of the House, and we believe that to be the right way forward.
Let me return to the new clauses in this group. We have carefully considered the various debates in Committee on the length and duration of the Bill. An amendment was tabled that would have introduced an annual renewal of the powers, equivalent to that currently contained in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 in relation to control orders. An amendment with the same effect is before us today as new clause 7. Members of the Committee will recall that we had a helpful debate and that I made a commitment to consider the matter further and return to it. I thank the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) and other members of the Committee for the manner in which that discussion was held and for the points made. In line with that commitment, I reflected carefully on those points, noted the feelings and introduced new clauses 3 and 4. They specify that the operative powers under the Bill will expire after five years, unless they are renewed by the Secretary of State, by order, subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
There would also be an order-making power to repeal the powers or to revive them when they had been allowed to expire without their having been renewed. We consider that that approach strikes the right balance. It ensures that there will be a statutory requirement regularly to review the need for the legislation and each new Parliament will have the opportunity to debate it in the context of the situation at the time and to take its own view. We do not believe, however, that such a review is necessary annually.
The requirement for a review every five years, rather than every single year, as with control orders, seems to us to strike the right balance. It will avoid what the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) referred to on Second Reading as
“the constant arguing and bickering on this issue year after year when we should be seeking consensus in the face of the terrible threats that terrorists bring”.—[Official Report, 7 June 2011; Vol. 529, c. 84-85.]
The Bill will be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny, according to the usual timetable, which will allow such a settled position to be reached. That is in contrast to the control orders legislation that it replaces, which was pushed through with little opportunity for debate, making annual renewal an appropriate safeguard—but one that we do not believe is necessary for this Bill.
Renewal every five years therefore provides an appropriately balanced approach. It reflects not only the seriousness with which we take these powers and the need to build in effective safeguards to ensure that they do not remain in force longer than necessary but the competence of this House and the other place to apply intense scrutiny to legislation and to arrive at a position that will not need to be reviewed annually. It also recognises the sustained nature of the threat and the fact that, sadly, these measures are likely to continue to be necessary for the foreseeable future.
I thank the Minister for giving way and for accepting the idea I floated in Committee. Will he give me some reassurance that if in five years’ time he and his party are part of the Government they will approach the question in the spirit of carrying out a full review, as this Government did? That would enable detailed analysis and preparation before any further votes were taken.
As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, one Parliament cannot bind another. It would not be appropriate for me to suggest or require that a future Government act in a particular way when addressing such points. It would be reasonable and appropriate, however, to consider these matters carefully and in a measured and appropriate way, examining the security issues at that point in time in the same way as this Government sought to do in our counter-terrorism review, which led to the creation of this Bill. We consider that a five-year renewal period, allowing each Parliament the opportunity to take a view on this important issue, strikes the right balance.
I join my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) in welcoming this measure. May I probe the Minister a little further on the spirit of the renewal every five years? Will he give some guidance about whether, in his view, we should have a thorough and complete review of these measures every five years rather than sending them through on the nod for another five years, saying that they seem to be working? Many of us would have liked to have seen the Government go further to undo some of the damage done by the previous Government and it is important that we hear whether the Minister anticipates the review every five years to be more thorough than the annual on-the-nod review.
As I said to the hon. Member for Cambridge, I would certainly anticipate a considered review of counter-terrorism powers when the time arrived. That would be the appropriate way to proceed and to examine the renewal. The time period will also allow further and broader consideration of the security position at that point and of what measures might be required, necessary and appropriate to deal with the risks, challenges and issues that face our country.
I do not wish to detain the House, but I should explain briefly that amendments 11 and 13 make necessary technical changes to clauses 19 and 20 in consequence of Government new clauses 3 and 4. Amendment 11 ensures that the Secretary of State is not under a nugatory duty to report on the exercise of her powers under the Bill at a time when her powers have expired or been repealed. Similarly, amendment 13 ensures that the independent reviewer is not under a duty to report on the operation of the Act for periods when the operative powers are not in force.
Amendments 8 and 20, which were tabled by the Opposition, relate to when the Bill may come into force —currently, the day after it receives Royal Assent. It has been suggested, and I have consistently and strongly refuted such suggestions, that the police and the Security Service will not be ready to implement the new system when the Bill is expected to receive Royal Assent because the additional investigative resources that will complement the new system will not be in place. On that basis, and on the basis of wider suggestions that the powers under the new system will be insufficient to protect the public, it has also been suggested that the new system should not be introduced before the 2012 Olympics.
Does the Minister recall that when Deputy Assistant Commissioner Osborne gave evidence to the Committee, he said:
“To get the resources that we anticipate we need will take more than a year, in terms of being able to get people trained and to get the right equipment. Until we have got that, we will not be able to start to bed things in and see how it works and how it transpires”?—[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 9, Q27.]
Clearly, the Minister is rejecting DAC Osborne’s evidence that it will take more than a year to get the agents trained to have the necessary skills and to get the electronic equipment that will be required to meet the increased risk that will inevitably be caused by the Bill. Does he believe that Mr Osborne is entirely incorrect?
I will certainly come to that point because it is at the crux of the amendments relating to this part of the Bill and to the points that the right hon. Lady and other right hon. and hon. Members made in Committee. The Metropolitan Police Service has confirmed that arrangements will be in place effectively to manage the transition from control orders to TPIM notices when they become effective. During the summer I had a number of conversations with the Metropolitan Police Service and I went to see the team that has responsibility for managing those who are subject to control orders and for managing terrorists who have been released from prison and are subsequently being managed. It has been very humbling to see the work that they do on a weekly basis to ensure that we are all properly protected. I have spoken personally to those who will be involved in managing the transition and the new regime. I cannot go into detail about the plans that are at hand, but I assure the House that I have been impressed by the range of excellent work that is under way. I reiterate that the Metropolitan Police Service has confirmed that arrangements will be in place effectively to manage the transition from control orders to TPIM notices when that change takes place.
I have no doubt that the Metropolitan Police Service is doing everything it can to try to ensure the risk to the public is properly managed—it would absolutely be committed to doing that. However, we have on record DAC Osborne’s evidence to the Committee that it would take more than a year to get these resources into place. If the Minister is now saying that the Metropolitan police have revised their view and that it will not take a year, may we have something similar in writing, as evidence, for all Members who are concerned about these matters, so that we can see that DAC Osborne’s original statement was incorrect?
The right hon. Lady has consistently made this point and we debated this issue at length in Committee, but I have been quite clear to the House about the statements that the Metropolitan Police Service has made to the Home Office. It has confirmed that arrangements will be in place effectively to manage the transition from control orders to TPIM notices. I am being quite specific and explicit in relation to that and the work that has been undertaken to prepare for that transition. Although I accept the points that the right hon. Lady has made, I have been quite clear about the assurances that we have gained in that regard and, similarly, the work that the Security Service has developed in its detailed plans for its additional allocation over the next four years, which it too is implementing.
The Minister will recall from Committee that one of the issues regarding additional resources was the fact that we are talking not just about money but about the extra surveillance officers who will be required to meet the increased risk under the TPIMs regime, which did not exist under control orders because we had relocation and longer curfews. DAC Osborne was clear that it takes about a year to train the extra surveillance officers. Will the Minister explain how that will be truncated and how the training will now take less than a year?
Let me make it clear that the additional resources are not simply about providing additional human surveillance capacity. The police and Security Service will use the additional money to enhance their use of a range of covert investigative techniques, including human and technical surveillance. It is not simply about that one point. Although I am unable to go into the detail of the preparations that are in hand, the police service and the Security Service have been engaged in work to ensure that appropriate measures are in place to provide us with the assurance that the TPIMs regime will work as we intend, so that we as a Government can fulfil our responsibilities and provide assurances on this important point.
This crucial point came up in Committee. I understand what the Minister is saying. He sought reassurances from the Met, as we would expect, but we had the evidence of DAC Osborne. If the process is to work, surely we should have before us a letter of confirmation from the Met stating what the Minister is telling us and assuring us that the Met have revised their position as set out in DAC Osborne’s evidence to the Committee, and that they are happy with that. I fully respect the Minister’s word and I understand what he is saying, but for the benefit of the process that should be put in writing from the Met to the Committee or to the House.
I have made clear the assurances that we have received. I know how the hon. Gentleman approaches these matters, and we have had numerous debates on numerous issues over the years. We have sought assurance. In preparing the Bill and the change to current practice, the Government have proceeded by seeking to assure ourselves that appropriate measures are in place to mitigate the risk posed by those who are suspected of being involved in terrorism but cannot be deported or prosecuted. As I have said consistently in relation to TPIMs, the legislation and the enhanced capabilities that the police and the Security Service will have ensure that there is a balanced package of measures that will operate as we intend. We are satisfied that the preparations in hand will lead to the changes envisaged by the Bill following Royal Assent.
I commend the Minister for the visit that he made to the Metropolitan police, but his assurances this afternoon go nowhere near far enough. Since his visit to the Metropolitan police, has he had a chance or has his right hon. Friend the Home Secretary had a chance to talk to the Prime Minister about the matter? On 11 August, when Parliament was recalled, I asked the Prime Minister to consider delaying or preferably cancelling the new provisions, particularly in relation to relocation. The Prime Minister said:
“I will certainly look very carefully and closely at what he says.”—[Official Report, 11 August 2011; Vol. 531, c. 1074.]
I have not had a chance to speak to the Prime Minister about that, but I am sure the Minister has. Will he update us?
I am aware that the right hon. Gentleman had that exchange with the Prime Minister and has subsequently written to him. He raised the point in a fair and balanced way and, from my reading of the record, the Prime Minister said that he would look carefully and closely at what he said. I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that we have looked carefully and closely at what he said, but the approach that we are taking is as I have set out in relation to the Bill and as I set out this afternoon.
Right hon. and hon. Members will appreciate that we cannot provide detailed breakdowns of what money we provide for specific security activities. This could provide detailed information about our capabilities and techniques, which could undermine national security. But the Government continue to consider that the TPIMs regime and the additional resources for the police and Security Service for covert investigation provide an acceptable balance between the needs of national security and civil liberties, and that the overall package mitigates the risks that we face. Indeed, the additional resources for covert investigative techniques could increase the opportunities for the collection of evidence that may be used in a prosecution.
It would be irresponsible of the Government to introduce the new system when it was not safe to do so. I am sure that there is absolute consensus on that, and I appreciate that the proposed changes are intended to ensure that the Government are not able to take such a risk with public safety, but I have been clear in what I have said and about the assurances that we have obtained, and, on the introduction of the new regime, the Government would not take such a risk if they were not satisfied about the steps and approaches being taken by the Metropolitan Police Service and Security Service.
I have moved new clause 3, and I look forward to further debate about the other new clauses and amendments.
May I welcome the Minister formally to his place? It is a pleasure to continue on Report the debate that we had in Committee.
I shall speak to new clause 7 and amendment 20, which stand in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation of the Government’s movement in relation to the introduction of new clause 3 and new clause 4, which, as he explained, envisages a five-year sunset clause and moves us somewhat further on than did our debate in Committee.
New clause 7 would replicate the position under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which brought in the control order regime, and the amendment would limit to 12 months the powers under the TPIMs regime and would, therefore, require their annual renewal by Parliament.
Our new clause began in Committee as an amendment, which I moved, and was based on oral evidence given in Committee by Liberty, Justice and others. It was introduced to reflect our concerns that the Government’s legislation will mean fewer checks and balances on what are exceptional measures. Many in the House agree that they are undesirable and in an ideal world we would not have to have them, but they have proved necessary, given the serious terrorist risks that we face.
I do not often agree with Liberty, particularly on control orders, because our starting points for the debate are different, but I was struck by its evidence in Committee, when the organisation made it clear that it would rather—to be fair to Shami Chakrabarti, she said that she would choke on these words—take existing control orders, with their annual renewal, meaning a 12-month limit on their power, over the new TPIMs regime. The reasons for that—and why I agree with that position—primarily relate to the importance of bringing such exceptional measures back to the House for regular, annual review and, if Parliament deems it appropriate, for renewal.
I was not on the Committee, but in the evidence I noted Lord Carlile’s comments about the point of annual renewal. He said that
“annual renewal has been a bit of a fiction, to be frank,”
and went on to issue a challenge, stating that
Parliament should have the courage of its convictions and decide whether it wants a regime like this or not.”—[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 23-24, Q70.]
How does the hon. Lady square that with her view of annual reviews?
I am grateful for that intervention, and I will come to Lord Carlile’s evidence in Committee. He clearly did not think that annual renewal was needed, but recent developments, in particular the introduction of the Government’s draft Bill four days ago, make annual renewal even more necessary than before. I will turn shortly to the reasons why.
May I ask the hon. Lady the same question that I asked the Minister? If the measures before us are passed and there is a five-yearly cycle, and if the Government then include her and her party, will she commit to a full and proper review of the entire counter-terror strategy, as this Government have?
I am afraid that I have to give the hon. Gentleman exactly the same answer that the Minister gave, which is that obviously one Parliament cannot constrain another. I imagine that most new Governments would want to look carefully and responsibly at what are exceptional measures. We have all stated on many occasions that in an ideal world we would not need these powers. The risk is developing all the time and I would hope that any Government would keep these matters under continual review, rather than just saying that they will do it every five years. I think that that clearly sets out our position.
I am interested in my hon. Friend’s answer. Does she not think that we should move in the direction of using criminal law in all cases, rather than going down this endless route of special legislation? I have been in this House long enough to have voted against most of these pieces of legislation, starting with the renewal of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. I did so because it departed from the criminal law and essentially involved the executive powers of Ministers, which I am sure she will agree is a dangerous thing.
Wherever possible, we should clearly proceed down the criminal justice system route. If that is available in the irreducible minimum number of cases that we have, it should be pursued. I expect the police and responsible prosecutors to ensure that prosecutions take place wherever possible. I think that all Members on both sides of the House share the view that it is far better that individuals involved in terrorism-related activity are prosecuted, convicted and banged up. However, there are cases where it is not possible to convert the evidence that we have, which is intelligence based, into evidence that would be admissible in a court of law. For those cases, it is necessary to have a different system to deal with the risk. If we could avoid being in that position, of course we would, but it is just not possible because of the nature of the evidence and the intelligence sources that it relies on. I am afraid to say that it will not always be possible to resort to the criminal justice system and that a different kind of system for dealing with this risk is therefore necessary.
I have immense sympathy with the views that have just been expressed by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). Equally, I have some sympathy with the notion that we should look at this legislation on a more regular basis. However, the hon. Lady has not addressed the issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) a moment ago. The reality is that with Northern Ireland terrorism before 2005, the annual reviews were entirely a fiction and the powers went through on the nod. I have some sympathy with the Minister’s view that a five-yearly review allows for a proper review, provided that the safeguards are in place. Although an annual review might sound like better protection on the face of it, it becomes largely a fiction.
I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman would describe parliamentary debate and holding the Government to account as a fiction. I do not think that having an annual debate is a fiction. It is important that we give right hon. and hon. Members the chance to hold the Government to account, to review how the powers have been used throughout a particular year, and to take a view on whether the risk is such that we still need an exceptional system of rules outside the criminal justice system. I do not believe that those debates are a fiction.
Does the hon. Lady accept that using intelligence-based evidence, such as evidence obtained under torture, evidence from foreign countries or unchecked intercept evidence, leads to a greater chance of a miscarriage of justice? The reason I raise that point now is that we did not once, in the course of all the so-called reviews of the control order legislation, hear about any miscarriages of justice. Of course, there were several, as was demonstrated by the courts.
I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention. In the end, we must accept that there is an irreducible minimum number of cases in which the intelligence tells us that a serious risk is posed by an individual and they have to be dealt with, but they cannot be brought within the criminal justice system. We must accept that we need a system for mitigating that risk and for bringing those individuals under some form of control to prevent them from attack planning, which might lead to the loss of innocent lives.
I thank the hon. Lady for giving way; she is being very generous. I was interested in her answer to the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) about alternatives. Does she agree with the shadow Home Secretary that:
“There are cases where police bail can, of course, be used”?—[Official Report, 7 July 2011; Vol. 530, c. 1688.]
Alternatively, does she prefer the line that she used in the Public Bill Committee that police bail is not the way to deal with such cases?
I note that the hon. Gentleman’s amendments on police bail did not make the selection list today, so we cannot continue the debate on it that was begun in Committee. I simply repeat to him the position as it was stated in Committee. There may well be some cases in which it is possible to consider whether police bail might be an answer, but I do not believe that that would be possible in the vast majority of cases. That is not the view of the experts, including the individuals who looked into the matter under the last Labour Government. That was why the control orders regime was deemed necessary.
I am going to make some progress. I have been quite generous, and I will take some more interventions a little later.
On annual renewal, covered in new clause 7, there is a symbolic and practical importance to Parliament asking itself every year whether the powers that it has given the Home Secretary are still necessary and in holding the police and the Government to account for how those powers are used. That is an important measure of checks and balances. As we discussed in Committee, it also concentrates the mind. It requires the police and everybody else to consider regularly whether we truly need these powers, whether the risk is such that we cannot do without them and whether some mechanism might present itself that would enable more people to be brought within the criminal justice system rather than be kept outside it.
Our debate in Committee featured the idea of exceptionalism—the idea that these powers are an exceptional part of our legal framework and should not be permanent. Of course, the Bill did not originally have the provisions of new clauses 3 and 4 in it, and I am grateful that the Government have made some movement and taken on board some of the arguments made in Committee in support of more regular review and renewal of the powers. However, I do not believe that the new clauses go far enough, or that review every five years would meet our concerns about how the Bill and the new TPIMs regime will operate in practice.
There are a number of reasons for our concerns. The first, which the Minister touched on, is about resources. We have real concern about the additional resources that the police have said will be required under the new regime because there will be a higher risk under TPIMs. We are concerned about how they will be deployed and come on line ready for the police to use. Given that uncertainty, annual renewal and an early opportunity for Parliament to consider how the new TPIMs regime is getting on would be very welcome. It is necessary also because of the draft Bill that the Government printed only about four days ago as it would bring control order powers back into the system by way of emergency legislation. We have a number of questions about how that alternative regime may operate, which we will come to in the next group of amendments.
I am fascinated by what the hon. Lady says about her desire to review the legislation. It seems that we are perhaps talking at cross purposes about the role of a sunset clause. I would like one because I would like TPIMs to go the same way that I want control orders to go. It sounds like she wants a review so that she can bring the subject of TPIMs back up and make them more draconian. Is that why she would like a review?
A review is an opportunity for Parliament to take stock of how the regime has operated over the course of one year, and to decide whether it wants to give the Home Secretary those powers to use for another year. Obviously, Parliament is the right place to debate any new circumstances that bring about the need for more powers.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the way to approach such issues is to consider the balance of risk, rather than simply to adopt a fixed position, as the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) appears to have done? We should then consider how to get to a position in a series of steps. Clearly, the questions are these: what risk faces the nation from a terrorist threat, and what are the appropriate, proportionate powers to protect the public? That ought to be the analysis. We should not seek constantly to chip away at powers when that might expose us to a greater risk.
I agree with my hon. Friend on the starting point for debate. When Parliament considers such matters, it must consider the balance of risk and ask serious questions about how that risk is managed. That should always be the starting point of hon. Members as responsible parliamentarians when we consider exceptional powers that do not exist in other parts of our legal framework. We are also committed to saying that in an ideal world, we would not need such powers, but unfortunately, we are not in an ideal world—[Interruption.] Does the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) want to intervene?
The right hon. Gentleman does not, so I shall press on.
I spoke of the draft Bill that the Government published a few days ago, which seeks to introduce control order powers by way of emergency legislation. That Bill, which we will discuss at length shortly, raises many questions, and an early opportunity for Parliament to take stock of the operation, implementation, practice and working of that regime will be welcome.
The hon. Lady is being extraordinarily generous in giving way. The question that I should like to ask is from the perspective of the people who are under control orders and similar restrictions. Such people have not been brought to trial and no evidence has been presented to them to substantiate the reasons why they are under such restrictions. She is advocating annual reviews, and increases as well as decreases in powers, but has she considered the commentary on the mental health implications for the people who are subject to control orders? In that regard, does she believe that some period of certainty for those people on how they will be treated will be welcome?
The first part of the hon. Gentleman’s intervention makes my point for me. This is about the balance of risk. It is in the interests of those who are under control orders for Parliament to look at such measures at regular intervals rather than once every five years. His intervention supports rather than goes against my point.
I shall make some progress, because I am about to wind-up on new clause 7.
The Minister spoke of the comments made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) on Second Reading. My right hon. Friend spoke powerfully on the merit of reaching a settled position on such measures, but I should tell the Minister that given what has happened in the past few days, we are clearly not at a settled position on the Bill. In fact, the Government unsettled matters further by introducing the draft Bill a few days ago. For that reason, the Opposition believe that an annual renewal measure is merited and needed now more than ever, and we shall later seek to press new clause 7 to a Division.
I am grateful for the Minister’s comments on amendment 20, which is in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. He updated the House and told us from the Dispatch Box that the police say that they will be able to meet the increased risks that we face under TPIMs with the additional resources, but I am afraid that I do not feel reassured by what he said, and we need to consider the matter in greater detail in the House this evening.
By way of background, I should add that amendment 20 began life in Committee, as the Minister noted, and was introduced following evidence given to the Committee by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Osborne, the national co-ordinator for counter-terrorist investigations. It is important to consider his evidence in detail. He was asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) about the time scales that he was working to in relation to the TPIMs regime, given that we have the Olympics next year, which is a particular concern. He said:
“To get the resources that we anticipate we need will take more than a year, in terms of being able to get people trained and to get the right equipment. Until we have got that, we will not be able to start to bed things in and see how it works and how it transpires. It also depends on how many people actually go on to the TPIMs regime and how many people come off it. There are a lot of inter-dependents there. The control order put people in the protect and prepare part of the Contest strategy. TPIMs moves them back into the pursue element of the strategy, which is a slight paradox because it was only due to the failure to get sufficient evidence to prosecute them that we moved them into the control order in the first place
He was asked further questions about resources by the hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips). He asked why Mr Osborne was saying that it would take a year for the new regime to bed in, to which Mr Osborne replied:
“I think I said it would take a year to procure and train sufficient additional assets before it would be ready to do that. We have to order some of the assets so that they are made in advance. To train a surveillance officer and then have them fully able to operate in a challenging environment probably takes at least 12 months before they are deployable. Once they are deployable, they have to work within the environment under a new set of regimes that will need to bed in.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c.9-10.]
That important evidence is the reason I moved the amendment in Committee and why I tabled amendment 20 for debate today. I was extremely concerned about the position on resources. The evidence from Mr Osborne was obviously stark, and it raised in my mind the spectre that if the Bill were passed by the end of this year, as we anticipate it will be, we would create a concerning situation: the additional resources required to meet the increased risk might not be deployable, and if they are, it seems they might be only partially ready. That is not, to my mind, a satisfactory state of affairs. The amendment therefore seeks to prevent the Bill from coming into force until the resources are online and would put in place a mechanism by which to get agreement between the national co-ordinator and the Home Secretary on the additional resources required and to get them ready and online.
My hon. Friend, who is making a forceful point, will remember Lord Carlile’s evidence to the Committee about the cost of surveillance. He said that the new TPIMs regime will increase the amount of human surveillance and that we could be talking about £18 million. We have not heard anything from the Minister about Lord Carlile’s evidence. Is that another area of concern for her?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. I entirely agree that the additional costs of the TPIMs regime are of concern, given the much lower cost of the control order regime, and I invite the Minister to explain how that correlates with the draft emergency legislation. Presumably, the additional resources might not be required in those circumstances. We need greater clarity about the costs that might arise in that situation.
When I asked the Minister, in relation to amendment 20, about the one year that it takes to train up a surveillance officer, he said, “We’re not just looking at human resources”, but it is clear that Mr Osborne—this is why I read out his responses—was not just talking about human resources either. He was talking about hardware, software and money resources too, and it was his considered opinion, put on the record of the House, that all those resources would take more than one year to come online.
I have to say that the Minister’s explanation—that not only are we looking at surveillance officers, but somehow this process can be managed with technology as well as anything else—does not give us the reassurance that we need that all the resources will be available, a point that I put to the Minister in Committee as well. I am not a very technical person—I often describe myself as a “tech-know-nothing”. However, after we have worked out what hardware is required, it will then need to be designed, procured and made, a process that I imagine would also take some time and could not happen overnight. Again, we do not have any clarity that those assets will be ready by the time the Bill comes into force.
I, too, think that my hon. Friend is making a powerful case on resources. This is a practical issue, irrespective of the principal differences that we might have on different sides of the House. Does she regard the assurances that the Minister has received from the Metropolitan police as sufficient in the circumstances? Would she welcome some written evidence from the Minister and the Metropolitan police about the time that it will take to procure those resources, both human and electronic, and the period in which they can be ready to meet the increased risk caused by the TPIM legislation?
I entirely endorse my right hon. Friend’s comments. The House needs much more detail, given that there now seems to be a big difference between what Deputy Assistant Commissioner Osborne told us in Committee and what the Minister is telling the House today. A written explanation needs to be put before the House when we are working out whether we buy this new line that the resources will, in fact, be ready. If that information is forthcoming, it is important that it should be about not just the human resources, but the hardware, software and other assets, as well as the money. I appreciate that some of that information might be constrained, but surely it would not be too difficult to allay any fears that the House might have about the time that it takes for such resources to be either trained up or procured and developed.
The hon. Lady is making a fair case, but in view of the fact that we are now 11 months in advance of the Olympic games, which is clearly the big cloud in the sky when it comes to these issues, is she really suggesting that we should keep to the control order regime until the Olympics are behind us and only then change, or does she think that there is any chance of the procurement that she is looking for taking place within that time frame, such that the process will be “online”, as she puts it, before July next year?
The short answer is yes. We have retained the control order regime until the end of this year, which was a decision that the coalition Government took to give themselves a chance to bring forward their legislation. I do not think that an amendment that seeks to make that legislation better—or at least allay concerns that the public might have about the dangers that it poses—should somehow mean that we dump control orders and just have a gap. We could quite easily carry on with control orders until the new resources were ready to be deployed, which is exactly what the amendment envisages.
I have been a watcher. It takes a heck of a long time to train someone to become proficient in watching an individual. I fully support what the hon. Lady is saying. We cannot just do this overnight; it is going to take a long time. I am really worried by what the Minister said about the Metropolitan police saying that they could do all this now, when Mr Osborne said that it would take a minimum of 12 months to establish.
In that case, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will support amendment 20. He has made my case for me.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me that indication. I am also grateful for his support. He was of course a fellow member of the Public Bill Committee.
Does not this go to the heart of the issue? It is risky enough to legislate, as the Government are proposing, to give terrorist suspects increased freedom of movement and increased access to mobile phones and the internet, and then to admit, as the Government do, that this will put increased pressure on the police and the security services, without also trying to implement the legislation before the police and security services are fully ready to cope with the increased risk. Does my hon. Friend agree that, if the Government do not produce better evidence of the capability of the police and security services to meet this increased risk, they will be adding irresponsibility to increased risk for the public?
I entirely endorse my right hon. Friend’s point, which reminds me that, under the Bill, access to electronic communications must be provided to suspects. One of the justifications for that is that the suspects will be monitored in that way, and the equipment will be provided by the Home Office. Presumably, some kind of software or hardware wiring will be needed to enable the suspects to be traced, and to listen in on conversations. Again, I do not believe that those technical assets could be procured overnight, especially given the different kinds of asset that might be needed to deal with different kinds of risk.
I fear that Opposition Members might be trying to scare Members of Parliament when there is no real justification for doing so. In Committee, the hon. Member for Bradford South (Mr Sutcliffe) spoke of increased threats, saying:
“I visited some of our prisons and I saw some of the terrorists who had been prosecuted, and they really are scary people. Next year, a large number of them will be released on licence, and they will be back in society, so the threat is always there.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2011; c. 55.]
Does not that show that our police and security forces are constantly having to meet these threats? If the police feel comfortable managing people who have been convicted and are coming out of prison, this modification of control orders into TPIMs is a minor issue in comparison. The hon. Lady is building this issue up into something that it is not.
I entirely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. In fact, he almost makes my point for me. The police do an incredible job of trying to protect us from the serious risks that we face, not only from the individuals who are or have been subjected to a control order, but from the many hundreds, possibly thousands, more who are of interest to them in their investigations into potential terrorism offences. The risk is always there, which is why we had to bring in the control order regime and why we believe those powers are necessary. Elements of the Bill decrease those measures in such a way as to increase the risk. We are told that the risk can be mitigated by the additional resources, but it cannot be eliminated. We have a real fear that those additional resources will not be ready by the time the Bill comes into force. For that reason, amendment 20 would reassure the public; its purpose is really no more than that.
No, I am about to finish my speech.
I note that the Government have made some movement in the right direction in relation to the review and the sunset clause, but I do not believe that that goes far enough. We need the extra check and balance that would be provided by annual renewal, so I am minded to press new clause 7 to a vote, and unless the Minister gives us further reassurance about the resources, I shall also be minded to press amendment 20 to the vote.
It is tempting to spend a while talking about risk, as that is a theme that lies behind this debate. Opposition Members have not mentioned the risk we create by treating people who have not been convicted of an offence as though they have been so convicted. In some cases, people who have been found not guilty in a court of law have immediately had a control order slapped on them. There is a risk involved in such cases. We have also heard the slightly lazy assumption that all the people who are suspects in these circumstances are dangerous. We know that some people have been completely exonerated. For example, Cerrie Bullivant, to whom I spoke earlier today, was not a risk, yet he was punished as though he was, for a very long time. Instead, however, I will talk about the purpose of sunset clauses.
Before my hon. Friend leaves the issue of risk, may I suggest that we need to tackle this matter head-on? During the course of the control order regime, the number of people of interest to the security services started at 1,600 and grew by 25% per annum, until the numbers rose above 4,000 and the agencies got too embarrassed to announce them. Does my hon. Friend accept that the control order regime and everything that went with it were so heavy-handed that they actually increased radicalisation rather than reducing it?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. That speaks volumes about how ineffective control orders and the whole panoply of tools used by the previous Government were. It also highlights why the points about the extra resources needed by the police do not really matter. If there are 1,600 or 2,000 or 3,000 people of great interest to the security services, I hope that the services are occasionally looking at them; otherwise, their interest cannot be very great. If those people are actually dangerous, resources should be available, as the extra resources to deal with a relatively small handful of people are a drop in the ocean.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s point about control orders, but will the TPIMs regime be any better?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his excellent question. My short answer is yes; my longer answer is: by a bit. This is not the solution that I would most like to see, but it is a step in the right direction. I wish that we could go further, and perhaps the other place will be more able to achieve that than we are here. Perhaps the more enlightened Labour peers will take the hon. Gentleman’s perspective on this matter, rather than that taken by those on his Front Bench.
I move now to the subject of this group of amendments, which deal with sunset clauses. I argued in Committee that there were four reasons for having such clauses. One relates to debating the issue in question every year; another is about having a vote every year. As we have said, that method has not turned out to be very effective. It has been very much a token gesture. Although it is nice to see it in place, it has not really delivered. We still have the ability to debate this matter at any time, if some other change takes place. particularly in the light of the Government’s new approach to Back-Bench debates, Similarly, the Government could get rid of TPIMs at any time, as could any future Government. Five years is a maximum, not a minimum. The annual review has simply not been an effective tool, which is a great shame. It does not work very well, and Parliament should look at how effective it is at doing things like that.
The Government think that the review provisions are a really good thing. I would like to see them happening seriously and in detail, but the level of review that has happened under this Government cannot happen every year. It did not do so in the past, to that level. There was a quick look, and a quick renewal. That is not what we want. We want to look underneath what is happening, rather than simply taking the easy option.
I have asked the Minister and the shadow Minister whether, if either of them is in the next Government, they will ensure that a proper review is carried out. If I am in the next Government, I will do my very best to ensure that that happens—[Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] I am delighted to hear that that has support on both sides of the House; we will have to see what happens. I would do my best to ensure that there was a review that moved us closer to the position that I would like—namely, a lower-risk solution that was also better for civil liberties.
Does the hon. Gentleman not realise that this gets to the nub of the problem—that there is a distinction between would-be or former members of the Executive, whose view is almost “If only you knew what I know now”, and many other parliamentarians and indeed the public outside? That disconnect is one of the most dangerous elements of the entire debate.
The hon. Gentleman is right. I have always been uncomfortable when someone says, “I know better, so just do exactly what I say.” I am never comfortable with that as a form of argument, partly because it is very hard to rebut. In many ways, it is the central argument behind control orders—when the state tells someone, “I know what you’ve done, but I’m not going to tell you what it is or how I know; we’re just going to assume that you have done this.”
I will take one more intervention, but then I would like to make some progress.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for intervening a second time, but on this point of “We know better than you”, the real problem with reviews has not been the timing so much as the quality of the information provided. We know that there have been miscarriages of justice, as the hon. Gentleman has mentioned, but these are never mentioned in any reviews. We also know from the evidence of the last few days that the control orders were used in effect to immobilise Libyan dissidents to suit our foreign policy in dealing with Colonel Gaddafi. This is the sort of thing we in the House should know about; the failure is not about time, but about the quality of the information provided to us.
Indeed. I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his comments. He pre-empts something I was planning to say later about the Libyan issue, which is a very serious one, as it seems that the Government might have acted perhaps using some of these tools on behalf of another power. I hope that the Minister will be able to assure us that that has never happened, and also assure us later than none of the evidence under which people have been subject to control orders has come as a result of torture in Libya. We have heard some astonishing stories; I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments about this either now or later, if he has time to check the facts.
The other purpose of a sunset clause is to flag up the fact that something is exceptional and should not be a regular part of our law. We do not have a sunset clause on theft and we do not have one on the vast majority of things because they are standard. This is an exceptional measure and we need to flag it up. That is why I am so pleased that the Government have accepted the argument. We should be very concerned when we step outside the normal bounds.
I disagree entirely with the comments made by the hon. Member for Bradford South (Mr Sutcliffe), who I believed to be a shadow Minister but who appears to be sitting on the very Back Benches. I do not know what that says about his position and standing. [Interruption.] I hope he will move towards the front rather than withdraw to the back. I withdraw any aspersions I may have cast on the hon. Gentleman in what I said; I was merely surprised by his location. In Committee, he said:
“Unfortunately, there are times when people have to be outside the legal framework.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2011; c. 57.]
I disagree with him completely and utterly on that. I think we have a legal framework for a reason, and once we start saying that people should be outside it, we are on very dangerous grounds.
Throughout the Bill’s passage through Committee, my respect for the hon. Gentleman grew.
Credit where it is due! I think the hon. Gentleman takes his own very principled position. He does not believe that Executive orders should be made in an administrative capacity but that we should use the criminal justice system for every eventuality. That is a principled viewpoint and a perfectly legitimate one to hold. I would, however, press the hon. Gentleman, because some of the language his party has used is redolent of a totalitarian regime. We have heard about internal exile, house arrest and goodness knows what. There is judicial oversight at every step of the process relating to control orders. There are judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, special advocates; and the people subject to the orders have to be given the gist of the case against them. We have had a series of legal judgments. We are not operating in a kind of totalitarian regime without intense judicial scrutiny. Surely the hon. Gentleman would agree that this legislation has been subject to more litigation, examination, test, test and test than any other legislation in our legal system. His principled position is perfectly arguable, but I hope that he is not saying that this country does not have intense, high-level judicial scrutiny of these very contentious and important matters.
I thank the right hon. Lady for her kind comments. It is clear that we come from very different principled positions; we disagree at the level of principle, not just at the level of detail. She is absolutely right to say that there is indeed a lot of judicial oversight and a number of checks and balances, not all agreed to entirely voluntarily by the previous Government. The judges sometimes had to take quite active steps about the gist of the case. I do not think special advocates provide the best way of doing this; I would like people to know what they are accused of. I will agree to the right hon. Lady’s request and try to remember to talk about “internal exile with judicial oversight”. I will try to remember to use that full phrase if it would please her.
These powers are exceptional. They are not what we want. We should strive harder to find ways that fit within the legal framework to make this case. I would have liked to talk later in great detail about police bail, but I am afraid I shall not be able to. I still think it is the right way forward. [Interruption.] It sounds as though there is some support from others. I hope that their lordships will have a chance to look at that. I still think we could make that system work extremely well.
I am pleased to see the Government new clauses 3 and 4 and consequential Government amendments 11 and 13. I am delighted that the Government have accepted the need for a sunset clause. I thank the Minister for doing that. It is always a great pleasure when the Government take up something that a Back-Bench Member has argued for. I am very pleased indeed.
I deal now with new clause 7, proposed by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood). She has tried to come up with this sort of amending provision on a number of occasions. It is good to see that there are no obvious flaws in this one, but I just disagree with it. I would love to have a proper, carefully thought-through review every single year, but I do not think it will happen. It has never happened in the past and I believe it is more valuable to have a serious piece of work, seriously looking at whether we could reduce the amount of extraordinary legislation, carried out every five years than it is to have a token review every year. I respect the hon. Lady’s position in wanting a review every year, but I disagree with her in that she wants to revise it upwards every year—
Indeed. I definitely disagree with the idea of it going up every year. I accept her principles, as I say, but I think that doing it properly every five years is better.
I disagree in principle, however, with amendment 8, which has not yet been spoken to, but may be later, and amendment 20. These are, I am afraid, a last-ditch attempt to keep control orders going for as long as possible. We do not want that to happen. We do not want control orders, and all the problems associated with them, lasting longer than they have to. They should be stopped as soon as possible.
Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the amendments, as drafted, envisage that the TPIMs regime will come into force and that they seek only to delay it until the resources are ready? They do not seek to keep control orders for ever more.
I accept that these are delays; they are not about permanently keeping the orders. We will, of course, see how the vote works out. The amendments are nonetheless a last-ditch attempt to keep the orders going for a few more months or a couple more years or a little bit further. I do not want that.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Is he satisfied by the Minister’s response about the assurances from the Metropolitan police? The hon. Gentleman will accept that this was a key point that we all raised in Committee. Is he prepared to accept the Minister’s words as outlined? Would he not prefer to see some written evidence or some written response from the Met to confirm that it is or can be ready?
I thank the shadow Minister for his comments and apologise again for any criticism I might have made earlier about his seating. I do trust the Minister on this one. I am sure he would not have told the House something that the Metropolitan police had not told him was the case. I am sure he will be able to confirm that. I do have faith that the Metropolitan police have said this, if the Minister says they did.
I see amendments 8 and 20 as an attempt to keep control orders going for that last gasp. The gasp is not very long; it might not be a full five or 10-year gasp, but it is still a gasp and one gasp too many. I shall not support those amendments.
I believe we have made progress. The Government amendments take us a stage further. I am delighted to support them and look forward to hearing other contributions to the debate.
It is a real pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), a member of the Home Affairs Select Committee, and to wish him well in his ministerial career. I know that the hon. Member for South Ribble (Lorraine Fullbrook) and I, who are with him every Tuesday, will want that to happen as soon as possible—but not before tomorrow, when, as he knows, we start our inquiry into the London riots.
In four days’ time, on its 10th anniversary, we shall remember the events of 9/11. The weekend newspapers were full of terrible accounts of what happened that day and of the stories of the survivors. The House discusses terrorism and its prevention in a measured, careful and sober manner, and I hope we shall do so today as we consider amendments and debate important issues.
I was not a member of the Committee that considered the Bill, and—mea culpa on behalf of the Home Affairs Committee—I am afraid that our agenda has been so full over the past two years that we have not had an opportunity to scrutinise this aspect of policy properly. We hope to make up for that next Tuesday, when we begin our inquiry into the roots of radicalism. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) talked of the need to understand why people become radicals. Next week our Committee will take evidence from the chairman of the United States committee on homeland security, Congressman Peter King. We hope to be able to present to the House in six months’ time—this will be a long and weighty inquiry—our views on what constitute the causes of terrorism, and on how we can deal with them.
I welcome the inquiry that is to be undertaken by my right hon. Friend’s Committee. May I ask him also to consider the fact that the country has had renewable emergency anti-terrorism legislation for 37 years, that the legislation has always been renewed six-monthly, annually or after whatever period has been specified, and that on each of those occasions we have moved further from the principles of absolute equality and transparency before the law and further towards a degree of Executive power? Does my right hon. Friend not think that it is time to turn the clock back in favour of openness and transparency, through the use of criminal law and criminal law alone?
I am sure that we shall touch on that subject. We are, of course, primarily concerned with the question of why people become radicals and what system makes them behave as they have behaved, but the way in which legislation is—in my hon. Friend's view—rushed through Parliament might well be one of our considerations.
I think it healthy for the House to have heard the comments of my hon. Friend, of the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) and of the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr Field), who observed that when Parliament discusses these matters the measures concerned go through on the nod. I believe that the role of the Opposition—my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood) did a very good job in this regard—is to scrutinise and probe the Government, and that is exactly what happened when this Minister was the shadow Minister. Perhaps we regret not being more robust on issues of this kind when we are in opposition, but I hope that that will happen now. The five-year period for the review is probably too long; we need to consider it earlier and much more objectively, and that might be one of the issues that we can examine as the debate progresses.
I have three points to make. The first concerns the process that the Government appear to have adopted. I hope that the Minister will reassure me about something about which he did not manage to reassure me when I probed him earlier, namely the role of Lord Macdonald. I understand that Lord Macdonald was appointed by the Government to review legislation. As a former Director of Public Prosecutions and a distinguished lawyer, he is someone whom I think we ought to consult as we present new proposals. Has he seen the Bill, and, if so, what were his comments on it and on the changes that have been made in the last few days?
The same applies to Lord Carlile, who gave evidence that was diametrically opposed to that of Lord Macdonald. He wants to keep control orders, but, as colleagues will recall, when he appeared before the Select Committee he proposed a three-tier structure that he felt could replace them. Will the Minister enlighten the House on the process that was adopted, and confirm that there has been widespread consultation with the very people—Lord Carlile and Lord Macdonald—whom the Government believed could contribute to the discussion?
it is a pleasure to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), who always speaks with great wisdom and judgment on these issues, and who chairs the Home Affairs Committee.
I do not intend to detain the House long. We have already had a good debate on the amendments. The Minister quoted remarks that I made on Second Reading; he quoted them accurately, and I stand by them. I believe that the terrorist threat that we face is one that we are likely to face for a considerable time, that the emphasis should be on trying to reach a consensus on what we should do about it, and that, if we can reach such a consensus, we should make provisions and make them permanent.
I do not think for a minute that making provisions permanent means that everyone will forget about them; far from it. There would still be an opportunity for Government reviews if Ministers felt that that was appropriate. My right hon. Friend would still have his Select Committee inquiries, and he might well pick counter-terrorism as one of the issues to be discussed. I venture to suggest that no one would silence my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) if there were not an annual debate on the renewal of counter-terrorism provisions. All those things would still happen—and, as the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) pointed out, legislation could be repealed at any time. That option is always open to the Government. Therefore, in saying that I believe that such provisions should be made permanent, I do not believe that we should take our eye off the ball or stop considering and scrutinising those things, although I tend to agree with Lord Carlile that the sense that annual renewal is part of the scrutiny process is a “bit of a fiction”.
It is evident, however, that we do not have consensus on the Bill. In fact, I venture to suggest that the gap between us is larger now than when we started to consider the Bill. We have seen the issues that are at stake, so the differences between us are quite substantial.
I welcome the steps that the Minister has taken to bring forward the opportunity for review and renewal by each Parliament. I also welcome the amendment proposed my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood) that calls for annual renewal. Even more important, I support her amendment 20, which would not allow any of the provisions to come into operation before the resources were clearly in place and the police and Security Service were signed up to that.
My amendment 8 is intended to be a practical amendment to give absolute clarity in relation to the implementation and commencement of the Bill. My concern throughout the passage of the Bill—on Second Reading, during the Committee stage, during the summer and still now—is that the Bill weakens protection. It is not as robust as what went before it. When we add that to the likely threat and risks that we will face next year, the year of the Olympics, which we celebrate and want to be a great success, we have a toxic mix that could put lives at risk.
Let us look at the facts. We know that 12 individuals are subject to control orders. We know from the Minister’s latest report to the House that three of those individuals already reside in the Metropolitan police area. We do not know where the other nine would call their home, but we suspect that a large number of them are from the London area, so that would be a huge move back to London by people who are very high risk individuals indeed, when terrorists who have been convicted of serious crimes are coming out of prison. I have had answers from Ministry of Justice Ministers showing that 45 convicted terrorists will have a release date in 2010-12, or at least that is the earliest release date. Add those potential 45 to the potential 12 and all their associates, and we have a substantial risk. To take that risk when we could delay the implementation of this Bill is a risk too far.
Surely anyone under a control order or under TPIMs is under surveillance. It would be very silly for someone under surveillance to do something related to terrorism because it might be found out. I would have thought that, once someone was under TPIMs or under control orders, their chances of being an active terrorist were hugely reduced. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree?
I commend the hon. Gentleman for his earlier comments on surveillance, the need to ensure that people are properly trained and the need not to pretend that we could introduce the level of skill that is required in a very short time. It takes time to train an individual. There is no perfect solution, because someone who is under surveillance can, if they are very skilled, slip that surveillance until such time as the people carrying out the surveillance catch up with them.
Some people have got away from control orders, and that is likely to happen again under TPIMs.
If the hon. Gentleman is referring to people who have absconded from their control order, I think he will remember from our discussions in Committee that that relates principally to the very early days of control orders. From recollection, there has not been an abscondence for four years, and that related largely to foreign nationals who were the subject of control orders. However, he made a powerful point earlier on the need to ensure that people are properly trained to carry out surveillance.
Given the toxic mix that I described, on 11 August I raised with the Prime Minister the possibility of delaying this Bill—certainly some elements of it in relation to relocation. He said that he would look “carefully and closely” at what I said. I have written to him since. I have not yet had a reply but I hope that I will soon. I will look carefully at his argument if he, as the Minister earlier suggested he would, sticks to the Government’s current position, because I think that that is a risk too far.
I am happy to pay tribute to the principled position that the hon. Member for Cambridge holds and sticks to doggedly. It is different from the principled position that I hold but, because he is consistent it allows us to have a good debate. He accused me of using amendment 8 as a last-ditch attempt to keep control orders going. I humbly put it to him that that is not the case. I believe that the risks associated with the early introduction of this weakened legislation, in a year of great risk, are too great. I join hon. Members on both sides of the House when I put public safety above all else.
Listening to the debate and arguments about the comparative merits and demerits of TPIMs compared with control orders, and listening to the exchanges on whether a sunset clause for five years is better than annual review and renewal, I am reminded of what Talleyrand is meant to have said about Voltaire and Robespierre: when I think of either, I prefer the other. We are all caught in a situation where there are clearly problems with control orders, but we should be under no illusions: there will be serious problems with TPIMs too—problems of principle and of practice.
May I deal first with the sunset clause and the question of renewal? I have a lot of sympathy with the argument of the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) and others that the practice of Parliament in annual renewal and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 has not exactly inspired huge confidence in the robustness of that challenge or the thoroughness of that review. But just because Parliament has perhaps had a habit of being derelict in its duty in relation to annual reviews, we do not have the right to dismiss the case for subjecting measures as exceptional as these are to annual review.
We are always told that one Parliament should not bind another. When it comes to exceptional measures, one Parliament simply should not discharge itself from due consideration. It is not enough for us to say, “If we go for the five-year sunset clause in the absence of annual reviews, Members such as the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and other concerned Members will be diligent enough to create opportunities for themselves by way of Adjournment debates or use of the Backbench Business Committee to subject these things to review.” There are things that we as a Parliament should hold in common responsibility. The due protection of civil liberty, alongside the due protection of public safety, are among them.
I accept that these measures—whether control orders or TPIMs—will be put through, but for exceptional measures that depart from the normal criminal law and give Executive power to use secret intelligence and to deploy strict controls on an individual’s freedom, this Parliament should not just say, “We are content to let that run for five years and see where we stand thereafter.” If Parliament is going to approve these measures, it should at least give itself the duty to look again in a year to see whether they are still needed in this form or whether there should be improvements.
Annual review is just a veneer; to see that, we need only consider the number of Members present to debate it. I also believe that it is always whipped through by the Government party. The people under these control orders have never had the advantage of having been brought to a proper trial, and what they want is some certainty. They want certainty that this Parliament will handle its responsibilities thoughtfully and thoroughly, and that would require conducting a thorough review that could then be used to advise the Government and inform Parliament in a real debate. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that that would be a major difference?
I am sorry to disagree with the hon. Gentleman, but I do not believe that it will be a tonic to the mental health of people under these orders if they know that Parliament will not seriously discuss the matter for another five years. I do not see what relief or redress that offers them. I agree with the hon. Gentleman, however, about the issue of our pretending that annual review will somehow of itself offer comfort to people under these orders in that it might result in their being reprieved from their exigencies. I would not give that false comfort or promise, and nor should we.
Based on the experience that we have all had of the many previous annual renewals, the hon. Gentleman also makes a valid point in saying that the Chamber might take its responsibilities in this regard somewhat lightly, but let us therefore be exposed to condemnation for such dereliction of duty and for not turning up every year to consider renewals duly and properly, rather than pretend that it is sufficient to do that on a five-yearly basis. Considering the issues at stake under this Bill, the attendance for the current debate is not particularly unimpressive in comparison with the likely attendance, which the hon. Gentleman indicts, for an annual review debate.
We should not kid ourselves about the false merits of a five-year sunset clause as opposed to an annual review, and nor should those of us who might vote in a Division to keep a version of annual review delude ourselves about the extent of the impact of annual reviews. However, annual reviews might ensure that the various other parliamentary means of scrutiny—whether through the Backbench Business Committee or Select Committees—are used to condition such reviews and, perhaps, explore more of the alternatives.
In the context of our deliberations today, I and others regret the fact that good amendments that were submitted on police bail and the conditions that could be attached to that are not available for us to discuss. Through discussing them, we would have been able to consider possible restrictions in cases where the police so far have only limited evidence that is not amenable to their taking the case to full prosecution. For such cases, there are means within the standard criminal law that can be deployed and developed, and amendments were tabled that offered that option. Through having annual reviews, some such alternatives might build up more of a head of steam. I am not saying we need annual reviews in the same style as in the past, but if we were to use annual reviews and the other parliamentary means now available to us, we could make more of this system.
Focusing now on the substance of the Bill, control orders are a poor tool and a crude weapon, but whereas TPIMs might appear to be softer, even when looked at through the bubblewrap of all the claims that the Government make for this Bill, they are also a poor tool and a crude weapon. Some of us have experience of how counter-terrorism measures can be deployed in counter-productive ways. They can act as grist to the mill of those who would radicalise others and try to spread subversion and dissident tendencies. They can also be used in ways that get in the way of good police work, and good police interface and engagement with communities whose sympathies and confidence are essential in holding the line against terrorist and subversive tendencies. We should therefore always tread lightly in relation to measures brought before us and offered as necessary and justified on the basis of countering terrorism.
Parliament should be particularly wary when we are given the assurance that these powers will not merely be activated on the basis of secret intelligence by mysterious Executive servants who may or may not appear before Select Committees or anybody else in Parliament, because there will be a degree of judicial oversight through posts such as special advocates. We should be very wary about being casual about any provisions that involve constant reference to words such as “special” and features such as “secret,” but that is precisely what we have in the TPIMs cocktail that is before us, and it is the same cocktail that was before us in relation to control orders. We as a Parliament should at least be trying to provide some sort of antidote to that, or diluting it through putting in place the kind of scrutiny and challenge that an annual review might provide.
I have listened to the arguments for and against these amendments. I am not impressed by the Government’s arguments, including those of the Liberal Democrats, in favour of their proposed measures. I support the Opposition on annual renewal, while not being under any illusions that that will be any great shakes in itself, but I certainly do not support the Opposition in trying to insinuate that somehow this legislation is dangerous in itself and exposes us to new risks because it damages control orders. I do not believe control orders have been necessary or effective in the way that they have operated. In fact, that has been dangerous in some regards, because sometimes both the terms and conditions of control orders have been interpreted randomly and capriciously, so that not only have people’s movements been restricted, but people have been made amenable to prosecution, and the threat of it, for supposed breach of unreasonable conditions.
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Just today, I heard from somebody who used to be under a control order who said that there were a number of such instances. On one occasion he had to wait to sign in because there was a queue at the police station, which led to him signing in two minutes late. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is important that this Government also look at such details, because unreasonable conditions will make the whole system completely ridiculous?
Yes, I fully agree with that point about the ridiculously pedantic and capricious use of conditions to get something on these people, when they demonstrate no greater threat than the fact that they find it difficult to cope with increasingly bizarre conditions. Therefore, I do not hold the same brief as the Opposition for control orders and the existing legislation, which is why I do not support them on the amendments that suggest that control orders are somehow better; but neither do I fall for the Government’s false argument that TPIMs are substantially different, because they involve a large part of the same mix as control orders. I never bought the product “I can’t believe it’s not butter” and I am not going to buy “I can’t believe it’s not control orders.”
I want to speak briefly in favour of new clause 7 on annual reviews, but only because it is the least worst option on the table. It is deeply concerning that, despite pre-election promises and having voted in the past against the massively controversial and now, I would argue, totally discredited control order regime, the coalition Government are trying to push through a Bill that in so many respects simply rebrands the very worst aspects of that failed regime. Despite the spin that was put out when the Bill was presented, it contains the same fundamental mechanism of detention. Restrictions on a terrorist suspect while further investigations continue will in many circumstances be reasonable and in the public interest, but what is so offensive about control orders and their close relatives, TPIMs, is that both are imposed by the Executive, not by a court. The continuation of a system of Government detention entirely outside the rule of law is neither effective nor just, and that is why I hope that, as the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) said, we can make these annual reviews more rigorous. Perhaps we can use them in the way I imagine people on control orders hope they will be used: for proper, rigorous scrutiny.
Today, I was in the same room as the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) and I, too, heard from somebody on a control order. I heard some shocking stories, and not just about that person waiting to sign in at a police station and being deemed to be two minutes late and therefore, supposedly, in breach of a control order. There were even more ridiculous accounts. People are being written to because they have not kept properly clean the flat in which they are supposed to be in internal detention. All kinds of ridiculous methods are being used to misuse the kind of tools being put before us today. That is why, at the very least, we need the option of an annual review.
Everyone agrees that public safety requires that terrorists be held in prison, but let us not forget that this regime is about terrorist suspects, some of whom will be entirely innocent—as, indeed, was the gentleman we spoke to today. So, when considering these matters, which are central both to our security and to our core democratic values, it is critical to remember that the concern is not whether we would like to see terrorists subject to punitive restrictions, but whether we want a system that allows innocent people to be treated outside the rule of law. It is not the action of a democratic state to hold someone without telling them what they are charged with. That is the definition of a living hell: to hold someone without telling them what the evidence against them is, leaving them with no opportunity to defend themselves. The many past miscarriages of justice should weigh heavily on our consideration of these matters.
I am disappointed that the amendments I co-signed with the hon. Member for Cambridge, on police bail, were not selected for debate. I realise that I cannot now debate them, but I would simply say that public safety is best assured when suspects are charged with a crime and, if found guilty, imprisoned, rather than left in the community to abscond—as a number of controlees have done—or, crucially, to act as an advertisement for extremism because the regime is so unjust and impacts not just upon them but on their families and communities. Police bail would have enabled us to get away from that and properly to investigate people who are suspected of a crime, rather than leaving them in this no-man’s land, which discredits us enormously as a country.
I had not planned to speak in this section of the debate, but I was moved to do so by the eloquence of many of the contributions to it. We are debating TPIMs versus control orders, and the House will have heard in my intervention on the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) that I do not see a whole lot of difference between their underlying principles. I do not welcome TPIMs any more than I welcome control orders. I voted against control orders in the last Parliament and will continue to do so in this Parliament—and against TPIMs—for much the same reasons as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) has eloquently explained to the House.
We are getting into a debate about sunset clauses versus a review. I would prefer a sunset clause on the Bill; indeed, any special legislation should automatically have a very short sunset clause attached to it as a matter of course. We are passing major legislation that has a huge effect on the civil liberties of everybody. However, if we cannot have that—I do support the Opposition Front Benchers in this respect—we should at least have a 12-month review.
One has to remember the atmosphere in this House in which we considered the question of special legislation. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 was passed after the Birmingham pub bombings. They were appalling, they were disgraceful, and in that fevered atmosphere the House passed that Act, which it renewed at six-monthly intervals for a very long time. The only time when anti-terrorism legislation was passed in an atmosphere of relative calm was in 2000. All other such Acts were passed in respect of some awful event somewhere. At those times, the House met in a fevered atmosphere and said that it was important that, because of the nature of what had happened—be it 9/11, 7/7, Canary Wharf or any of a host of appalling incidents around the world or in this country—we had to pass the legislation because it would deal with the problem.
Let me begin by addressing the points made by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), who cut to the heart of a number of arguments surrounding this Bill and the measures that we judge appropriate. We would all like to live in a world where the measures contemplated in the Bill were not needed. The sad reality is that they are, as a continuing threat will be posed to this country and its citizens by people who we cannot prosecute, deport or take other action, against, so preventive measures are required. I wish that that were not the case but it is, which is why we are introducing the measures in this Bill. They follow on from the counter-terrorism review and are in recognition of this continuing risk to the citizens of this country. The Bill is certainly not about protecting the security services; it is about protecting the public. That is the driver behind these measures.
Let me deal with the duration of the legislation and the Government’s sunset clause. Our starting point was that this legislation was not being considered in a fevered state but in a measured way so, like other legislation, it did not require a sunset clause. However, we listened carefully, we reflected on the Bill’s measures and the impact they could have on individuals, and we judged it appropriate that each Parliament should be able to review the measures in the context of the security situation at the time and consider whether their continuation was appropriate. That is why we have introduced the five-year sunset clause in the way that we have.
It has been interesting to hear this evening’s debate about annual renewal. The hon. Member for Islington North has been a consistent participant in these debates—I respect the contributions that he has made year on year—and he implied that some of them have been “perfunctory”. That is not what we would wish in relation to legislation such as this, which is why the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) about the need for a serious and considered review of legislation was well made and strongly put. We took that approach when we sought to conduct a counter-terrorism review in preparation for this Bill.
I understand the point that the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) makes. In some ways, she sympathises with the line of argument taken by the hon. Member for Islington North. She makes a point about Executive action, but I repeat that circumstances and situations continue to arise that mean, sadly, that legislation of this type is necessary and continues to be required. She made a point about secret evidence, and the Government will shortly be introducing a Green Paper to consider further its use in court and to consider this matter in further detail, given a number of associated issues that have been raised.
Will the Minister explain why he is so certain that the TPIMs regime will be effective, given that it is very similar to the control orders regime and nobody who has been placed under a control order has ever subsequently been prosecuted for a terrorism offence?
In some ways, this relates to the package of the measures before us. This is about not only this Bill, but the capabilities and resources being made available to the police and security services to allow them to monitor people and seek to bring them to justice. I absolutely agree with the hon. Lady, and it is our preferred option, that people who commit acts related to terrorism should be prosecuted and brought to justice in the normal way. However, the Government need to assess risk and seek to protect the public, and we judge that, for a number of reasons, it is not possible to achieve that aim in all circumstances. That is why preventive measures of the type contemplated in this Bill are required and will continue to be needed for the foreseeable future. We therefore argue that it is for Parliament to consider, on a per-Parliament basis, the necessity of these types of measures. I am aware that the hon. Lady has raised the issue of bail in this context, and we considered it in the counter-terrorism review. However, we had clear guidance from the police who recommended against bail being available for terrorist suspects because of the risk to public safety that might be involved.
If I may, I will pursue the point raised by the hon. Lady. Will the Minister tell us why he thinks that the number of convictions in this country is so low? In the 10 years or so since 9/11 there have been about 230 convictions relating to terrorism offences, which is less than 10% of the number in the United States during the same period, and similar comparisons can be drawn with other countries. Why does this country have such a low conviction rate compared with everybody else?
My right hon. Friend has taken a very consistent line on ensuring that those suspected of terrorism offences are brought to justice and that the courts are used appropriately. We need to do all we can to ensure that that happens, which is why we are taking forward measures such as post-charge questioning, which he has advocated clearly, and why we are continuing to examine the way in which intercept evidence might be usable in the courts and how the Privy Council review continues in relation to that. I agree with him that we need to be looking at a package of measures, that this is not about one instrument in itself and that it might be appropriate to take a range of steps. I would not want to suggest in this evening’s debate that this is about one issue. The Government are taking forward a range of measures as part of their counter-terrorism review and this Bill is just one part of that.
Before the Minister moves on, may I ask about the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas)? The hon. Lady mentioned that there had been no convictions of people on control orders. By supporting the Government today, we will be extending the TPIMs regime by five years. What comfort can the Minister give us that that record of no convictions will be improved by a more thorough prosecution of the evidence and by bringing to trial the people under control orders? Can he say anything to give us some assurance that that system of containment rather than prosecution will change to one of prosecution and bringing to justice rather than one of just containing a problem and leaving people on one side?
I would point my hon. Friend in the direction of the Bill’s provisions, which clearly underline our desire to prosecute people when the evidence is available. That is part and parcel of the additional investigative capabilities intended to be available to the police and the security services. I believe that this approach will contribute to our being able to achieve the sorts of steps that he is advocating in terms of seeking to prosecute where there is admissible evidence that could be brought before the courts.
I deal now with some of the other issues raised in this useful and constructive debate, which has been a symbol of some of the other consideration of the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge raised the issue of Libya and he will doubtless have heard clearly the comments made by the Prime Minister during the statement preceding this debate. It is the Government’s long-standing policy not to comment on intelligence matters, but I can make it absolutely clear that the Government’s clear policy is not to participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture or inhumane or degrading treatment for any purpose.
May I just finish the point? We have published the consolidated guidance to intelligence personnel, including on the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees. The Government took early and decisive action to set up the Gibson inquiry, precisely to examine whether Britain was implicated in the improper treatment of detainees so that we can better understand what happened and allow all involved closure.
I thank the Minister for giving way and I am grateful to him for allowing this point to be made. Is he concerned that the exchange of letters made by former Prime Minister Blair with a number of countries that allowed removal to those that had not signed the convention on torture should be ended? We should only ever remove people to a country that recognises the relevant sections of that convention and that would not carry out the death penalty against those people.
The hon. Gentleman will have heard what the Prime Minister said in his statement about the investigation being undertaken by the Gibson inquiry. These matters will be looked at closely, but I certainly do not intend to expand this debate to cover them in such a way because time is pressing and we have a number of other issues to do with this mini-debate to get through.
The right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) asked me about a couple of issues. The first was to do with the role of Lord Macdonald, who was not appointed to review counter-terrorism legislation generally or on an ongoing basis but was asked to oversee the counter-terrorism review, which completed in January. It is obviously open to him to look at and comment on the draft Bill; we have published it with the purpose of allowing it to be considered.
Let me turn to the central issue raised by those on the Opposition Front Bench as well as other Opposition Members. I want to make it very clear that the TPIM system will provide appropriate, proportionate and effective powers for dealing with the risk posed by suspected terrorists whom we can neither prosecute nor deport. The new system introduced by the Bill will be accompanied by an increase in funding for the police and security services to enhance their investigative capabilities. As I have said, this will complement the new regime and, we believe, maintain public confidence. To repeat what I have said, the Metropolitan Police Service has confirmed that arrangements will be in place effectively to manage the transition from control orders to TPIMs. I have heard what Opposition Members and other Members have said and I can say to the right hon. Member for Leicester East—or I would have done, if he was in his place—that I will take the issue away and consider further with the police what further information may be provided.
As right hon. and hon. Members will recognise, there is a challenge here and we do not provide detailed breakdowns of what money we provide for specific security activities as that would provide detailed information about our capabilities and techniques that could undermine national security. There is a delicate balance to be struck, but I will certainly consider carefully the comments that have been made during this debate and consider with the Metropolitan police what further information might be appropriate.
I thank the Minister for giving way and for the indication that further written evidence will be available. I am still minded to press amendment 20 to a vote later this evening, but I have been advised by the Clerks that if new clause 3 is passed we cannot have a vote on new clause 7. May I clarify that although we would have liked to vote on annual renewal—we still believe it is an important measure—we will not oppose new clause 3? However, Labour Members will take the issue forward when the Bill reaches the other place.
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s clarification of the official Opposition’s stance. I have given the House clear assurances about the preparations for the transfer from control orders to TPIMs and we will reflect on the debate further, but we believe that the Government’s amendments for the review are appropriate, and, on the basis of the assurances we have received, we do not believe that the Opposition amendments are required. Even at this stage, I ask the hon. Lady to reflect on the debate and to consider withdrawing those amendments.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 3 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
Section (Expiry and repeal of TPIM powers): supplementary provision
‘(1) This section applies if the Secretary of State’s TPIM powers expire or are repealed under section (Expiry and repeal of TPIM powers).
(2) A TPIM notice which is in force immediately before expiry or repeal is to—
(a) continue in force for the period of 28 days beginning with expiry or repeal; and
(b) be treated as if revoked by the Secretary of State at the end of that period.
(3) Subsection (2)(a) is subject to—
(a) any variation under section12(1)(a) or (b), and
(b) any revocation or quashing.
(4) Except as provided for in subsection (5) or (6), TPIM proceedings may neither continue nor be begun after expiry or repeal.
(5) TPIM proceedings of a kind set out in subsection (7) may continue, or be begun, after expiry or repeal, but only for the purpose of determining one or more of the following matters—
(a) whether a TPIM notice should be quashed;
(b) whether measures imposed by a TPIM notice should be quashed;
(c) whether to make a declaration under paragraph 4(4) of Schedule2.
(6) Proceedings for an award of damages or other relief arising out of any TPIM proceedings of a kind set out in subsection (7)(a) to (c) may continue, or be begun, after expiry or repeal.
(7) The TPIM proceedings referred to in subsections (5) and (6) are—
(a) a reference made under paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 before expiry or repeal;
(b) a hearing in pursuance of directions under section 8(2) or 8(5);
(c) an appeal under section16;
(d) an appeal, or further appeal, relating to a decision in any proceedings mentioned in any of paragraphs (a) to (c).
(8) If, after expiry of the Secretary of State’s TPIM powers, the powers are revived under section (Expiry and repeal of TPIM powers)(2)(b)—
(a) all TPIM notices, including any which were in force before expiry, are to be taken into account in determining whether there is new terrorism-related activity for the purposes of section3(6);
(b) the expiry of those powers does not prevent them from being exercised after revival in relation to any TPIM notice which—
(i) expired or was revoked before the expiry of the powers or during the relevant 28 day period, or
(ii) is, in accordance with subsection (2)(b) of this section, treated as if revoked at the end of the relevant 28 day period;
and for this purpose “relevant 28 day period” means the period of 28 days beginning with the expiry of the powers that is mentioned in subsection (2)(b).’.—(James Brokenshire.)
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 5
Temporary power for imposition of enhanced measures
‘(1) If the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary to do so by reason of urgency, the Secretary of State may make a temporary enhanced TPIM order during any period that—
(a) begins with the dissolution of Parliament, and
(b) ends with the first Queen’s Speech of the Parliament which first meets after that dissolution.
(2) A temporary enhanced TPIM order is an order which makes provision for, or in connection with, giving the Secretary of State power to impose enhanced measures by notice on individuals whom the Secretary of State is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, are, or have been, involved in terrorism-related activity.
(3) An enhanced measure is a requirement, restriction or other provision which is of any of the following kinds—
(a) a restriction on an individual in relation to the residence in which the individual resides, including—
(i) a requirement to reside at a specified residence in the United Kingdom;
(ii) a requirement not to allow others to reside at that residence without the permission of the Secretary of State;
(iii) a requirement, applicable between specified hours, to remain at that residence;
(b) a restriction on an individual in relation to leaving a specified area;
(c) a requirement, restriction or other provision which corresponds to provision within any of these paragraphs of Schedule1—
(i) paragraphs 2 to 6;
(ii) paragraph 7(1) and (2) and (4) to (6);
(iii) paragraphs 9 to 12;
(d) a requirement, restriction or other provision which corresponds to provision within paragraph 8(1) of Schedule1 (as read with paragraph 8(3) of that Schedule), including—
(i) a requirement not to associate or communicate with other persons without the permission of the Secretary of State, which includes provision allowing the individual (without seeking permission) to associate and communicate with such persons or descriptions of persons as the Secretary of State may specify;
(ii) a requirement to give notice to the Secretary of State before associating or communicating with other persons, which includes provision allowing the individual (without giving notice) to associate and communicate with such persons, or descriptions of persons, as are specified.
(iii) a requirement of the kind referred to in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 8(2) of Schedule1, which may in particular relate to association or communication which is allowed by virtue of provision of the kind referred to in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii) above;
(e) provision which corresponds to provision within Part 2 of Schedule1;
and for this purpose “specified” means specified by the Secretary of State in an enhanced TPIM notice.
(4) Except as provided for in subsections (5) to (10), the provision made by a temporary enhanced TPIM order must correspond to the relevant provisions of this Act.
(5) A temporary enhanced TPIM order—
(a) must secure that enhanced TPIM notices and standard TPIM notices are separate notices;
(b) must secure that, at any particular time, an enhanced TPIM notice and a standard TPIM notice are not both in force in relation to a particular individual; and
(c) may secure that the application of a temporary enhanced TPIM order to a particular individual does not affect the application of this Act to that individual (and vice versa).
(6) The provision of a temporary enhanced TPIM order which corresponds to section 3 must include appropriate variations from the provision contained in that section to secure—
(a) that condition A is replaced by a condition which secures that the enhanced TPIM power may not be exercised in relation to an individual unless the Secretary of State is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity; and
(b) that condition D is replaced by a condition which secures both—
(i) the same result as condition D, and
(ii) that the enhanced TPIM power may not be exercised in relation to an individual unless some or all of the measures imposed by the enhanced TPIM notice are measures that may not be imposed by a standard TPIM notice.
(7) The provision of a temporary enhanced TPIM order which corresponds to section5(1) must include appropriate variations from the provision contained in that subsection to secure that each enhanced TPIM notice ceases to be in force at the time when the enhanced TPIM power ceases to have effect in accordance with section (Temporary power: supplementary provision)(1) (subject to earlier revocation or quashing of the notice).
(8) The provision of a temporary enhanced TPIM order which corresponds to Schedule 1 must include appropriate variations from the provision contained in that Schedule to secure that it is enhanced measures which the Secretary of State has power to impose.
(9) A temporary enhanced TPIM order may make appropriate provision (including appropriate variations from the provision contained in the relevant provisions of this Act) in consequence of, or in connection with, the creation, in accordance with this section, of the enhanced TPIM power.
(10) A temporary enhanced TPIM order may make appropriate provision for the purposes of securing that transitional and saving provision relating to a temporary enhanced TPIM order ceasing to have effect may be made (including provision for enhanced TPIM notices to continue in force for a period, which does not exceed 28 days, after the enhanced TPIM power ceases to have effect).
(11) The provision that may be made by a temporary enhanced TPIM order includes—
(a) provision amending any enactment (including an enactment contained in this Act);
(b) provision applying (with or without modifications) any enactment (including an enactment contained in this Act);
(c) provision conferring functions on the Secretary of State or any other person (including, in the case of the Secretary of State or any other Minister of the Crown, functions of a legislative nature).’.—(James Brokenshire.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 6—Temporary power: supplementary provision.
Amendment 1, page 22, line 31, in Schedule 1, at end add—
‘Additional measures
12A (1) The Secretary of State may impose measures additional to those contained in Schedule 1 if—
(a) there is a serious terrorist threat; and
(b) they are necessary for the protection of the public.
(2) Any measure under paragraph 13(1) can only be imposed if the Secretary of State is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the individual is involved in terrorism-related activity.’.
Amendment 2, page 22, line 31, at end add—
‘Additional measures introduced by Secretary of State
12A (1) The Secretary of State may by order introduce measures additional to those contained in this Part.
(2) An order under sub-paragraph (1) may be made only if a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.’.
Amendment 3, page 22, line 31, at end add—
‘Emergency additional measures introduced by Secretary of State
12A (1) The Secretary of State may by order introduce measures additional to those contained in this Part.
(2) An order under sub-paragraph (1) shall have immediate effect but must be approved retrospectively by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(3) If either House declines to approve a resolution under sub-paragraph (2), the order shall cease to have effect on the date of such disapproval.’.
Amendment 4, page 22, line 31, at end add—
‘Additional measures introduced by Secretary of State during dissolution of Parliament
12A (1) The Secretary of State may by order introduce measures additional to those contained in this Part during a dissolution of Parliament.
(2) An order under sub-paragraph (1) shall have immediate effect but must be approved retrospectively by a resolution of each House in the new Parliament.
(3) If either House declines to approve a resolution under sub-paragraph (2), the order shall cease to have effect on the date of such disapproval.’.
This group of amendments relates to the enhanced TPIM provisions and the circumstances in which measures additional to those contained in the Bill might need to be imposed. The Government and Opposition are taking different approaches.
The Government have made it clear that we believe that in future there might be exceptional circumstances in which it is necessary to introduce additional and more restrictive measures to those contained in the Bill. I emphasise that we hope never to need them, but, in the event of a very serious terrorist risk that cannot be managed by any other means, it would be irresponsible of the Government not to act to protect the public appropriately.
Will the Minister make it clear that he and the Government would not consider the Olympics, in and of themselves, to be such an emergency risk? There might be circumstances that would become such a risk, but will he confirm that the simple fact we are hosting them would not be sufficient to trigger the new legislation?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for highlighting that point. The security arrangements for the Olympics are being planned on the basis that the additional powers envisaged under the enhanced TPIM Bill will not be needed. This is about considering exceptional circumstances and exceptional risk, which is why we have sought to take the approach that we have. In exceptional circumstances we will, where possible, bring forward emergency legislation to introduce such powers. That is why we have drafted and published in draft the Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, which will now be subject to pre-legislative scrutiny. That will give Parliament the opportunity to examine its terms closely. In some ways, this underlines the point made by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) in the previous debate about seeking to do this in a considered and measured way rather than in a febrile atmosphere—the draft Bill has been introduced to facilitate that.
If the enhanced TPIM Bill is introduced while Parliament is in recess, Parliament can be recalled to debate it, but there is a small gap in our ability to introduce this emergency legislation in periods where Parliament is dissolved and where a new Parliament has been appointed but the first Queen’s Speech has not been delivered. This gap was identified during pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft emergency Bills to extend periods of pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects to 28 days.
Government new clauses 5 and 6 take the same approach to addressing that gap as we are proposing to take with pre-charge detention. They introduce a power to the standard TPIM Bill that would allow the Secretary of State—where necessary by reason of urgency—to bring the enhanced TPIM regime into force by making a temporary enhanced TPIM order. This power would be exercisable only in the periods I have mentioned: while Parliament is dissolved and in the period between the appointment of a new Parliament and the first Queen’s Speech. A temporary enhanced TPIM order would make provision directly equivalent to that in the enhanced Bill. I shall not delay the House by reciting the detail of that Bill’s provisions; it has been published and is available to all Members to read. It will be subject to rigorous pre-legislative scrutiny, following which it will no doubt be amended and improved.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way and for the way in which he has managed so far to present the enhanced TPIM Bill. Would he not accept that the TPIM legislation, like the control order legislation, is in and of itself exceptional legislation that we have all said should be used as a last resort? It is not something that any party would want to adopt; it is outwith the normal criminal justice system and it is not part of the normal legislative process. Why, for goodness’ sake, does not he include the enhanced measures in the existing legislation—not so that they are required to be used by the Home Secretary, but so that she would be able to use them if circumstances were to arise in which it was necessary to have a power of relocation, curfew, association or exclusion? This is the most convoluted, awkward, difficult and strange way of legislating that I have ever seen. We are going to have exceptional legislation to exceptional legislation in exceptional circumstances. Why cannot the Minister legislate properly and put these powers into existing legislation?
I think that underlines the fundamental difference between us on the nature of the powers that are contemplated and their impact on individuals and counter-terrorism. A number of contributions have been made about radicalisation. Given the stringent nature of the powers that are contemplated under the enhanced provisions, we believe it is absolutely right that Parliament should determine whether the circumstances are so exceptional that emergency powers are needed. That is the right way to do things, rather than seeking to suggest that this is all business as usual and that the powers should be on the statute book. That is why I disagree with the right hon. Lady.
Does the Minister have any idea just how ridiculous the Government look with these enhanced TPIM measures and, more importantly, how disappointed civil libertarian groups are with the Government? The system is probably worse than what the previous, anti-civil libertarian Labour Government proposed. Why cannot we have proper legislation, and why cannot the Government continue the good work they started instead of going down this route?
I absolutely reject the assertion that this Bill is in some way more draconian and cracks down more on liberty than the approach of the previous Government. That is precisely why we have sought to rebalance the counter-terrorism legislation, and that has been at the heart of the counter-terrorism review. I should have hoped that the hon. Gentleman recognised that. We have recognised the very nature of the enhanced measures and why it is appropriate not to have them as business as usual—why it is appropriate to have them in a Bill that can be subject to pre-legislative scrutiny and can be considered calmly and rationally rather than rushing and not having powers available to deal with extraordinary and extreme circumstances. That is why we have taken the view that we have in the structure of the approach in the draft enhanced Bill and in this Bill.
How does the Minister say that control orders or TPIMs are business as usual?
I am saying that because this legislation remains and resides on the statute book, subject to the new clauses that we have rightly put in place following the previous debate with the five-year renewal. The powers that are available under the enhanced measures are such that they require a further considered approach by Parliament before they are introduced. That is why we have rationally and reasonably, as reflected in the counter-terrorism review, sought to adopt the approach that we have.
I have no wish to add to my hon. Friend’s difficulties, but he knows I have concerns about this issue. The simple truth is that had the 90-day measure been put before the House in July 2005, when the atrocity occurred, the House would have taken a much more emotional, rather than rational, decision. I have a general concern—I know that he is thinking through the legislation—that the House does not make its best decisions in the immediate aftermath of atrocities. There is a risk, in going down this route, that we will get not rational, but irrational, decisions.
I hear that argument, which is why we have sought to produce the draft Bill—to ensure that it can be considered rationally, calmly and coldly by the Joint Committee. Approaching it in that way means that in circumstances similar to those that have, sadly, arisen in the past, there is a defined mechanism and method that has been subject to scrutiny in advance. In many ways, we are seeking to recognise some of the challenges to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) has alluded and to address them by having the draft Bill available now for consideration.
The Minister is being very generous in giving way. May I ask him a specific question? Will we have to wait until this country is subject to exceptional circumstances, which Lord Macdonald has said could be a series of catastrophic attacks in every major city in Britain, until we have a power of relocation on our statute book?
I shall not second-guess the circumstances in which the draft Bill and those provisions would be required. Clearly, it would be in exceptional circumstances in which we were faced with a serious terrorist risk that could not be managed by any other means. That is the sort of situation we are contemplating, but I am not prepared to second-guess future developments in the threat picture. The right hon. Lady and I disagree on this, but, as I have said quite clearly, we believe that the TPIMs regime in its entirety—the standard TPIMs regime and the supportive resources around it—is sufficient to manage the threats that we face. Only in exceptional circumstances would the enhanced measures be required. That is the conclusion we have reached as part of the counter-terrorism review. I appreciate that she and I differ on that, but that was the conclusion we came to. The counter-terrorism review recognised that enhanced measures might be required in exceptional circumstances, which is why we have taken the view we have.
Contrary to the right hon. Lady’s point, does the Minister share my pleasure that we will be able to keep the powers of internal exile with judicial oversight off the statute book for as long as we can?
The counter-terrorism review carefully concluded that there might be exceptional circumstances—a very serious terrorist risk—in which the Government would have to seek parliamentary approval for additional restrictive measures. That is what we are seeking to do and that is why we believe that the overall approach taken by this Bill is appropriate.
With the publication of the draft Bill, the Government have conceded that they have no argument in principle against the extra powers in the enhanced TPIMs regime. What will the Minister say to the victims of terrorism in the emergency circumstances that he sets out and that might give rise to their introduction? Will he say that we had the extra powers but we decided not to use them until the incident happened? Does he really believe that the Government could survive in those circumstances? Does he not see the nonsense of that position?
The right hon. Gentleman’s question is premised on various assumptions that I just do not accept. He can make his point but the Bill and the enhanced measures that sit alongside it have been part of a very considered approach in relation to the overall legislative framework, which has not been rushed but has been considered. It has very much at its heart our responsibility to protect the public, but it also recognises that there is a balance to be struck. We believe that the balance has previously been wrong and that it needs to be adjusted, as contemplated by the Bill, to ensure that our counter-terrorism measures are appropriate, necessary and focused on delivering safety and security in a way that is judged appropriate on the basis of the evidence.
The draft enhanced TPIM Bill contains provisions that mean that if it is brought into force while a temporary enhanced TPIM order is in force, a decision taken under that order should be treated as a decision under the new enhanced Bill. The regime provided by the emergency TPIM order is intended to be the same as that provided by the enhanced Bill. In other words, the new clauses are intended to be complementary. They set out the various provisions and matters that may, or in some cases that must, be secured by a temporary enhanced TPIM order, to give effect to the regime set out in the emergency Bill. This includes in particular setting out the more stringent restrictions that would be available, and the fact that an enhanced notice may be imposed only where the Secretary of State is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. Once made, the temporary enhanced TPIM order would remain in force for 90 days, or a shorter period if specified in the order. It must be laid before Parliament as soon as practicable. While it is in force the Secretary of State can repeal its provisions at any time.
The 90-day period is intended to cover, but not significantly to exceed, the period during which Parliament would be unable to pass the emergency legislation. After parliamentary business resumes, the Government can introduce the enhanced TPIM Bill, if they judge it appropriate, to replace the powers conferred by the order with powers under primary legislation.
These are essential provisions. The power that they provide may never need to be used. Indeed, we would all prefer that the exceptional circumstances for which it and the enhanced TPIM Bill are intended never arise. None the less, it is necessary for a responsible Government to ensure that the enhanced TPIM powers can be brought into force in all circumstances in which they may be necessary.
Does the Minister not recall that when the previous Government introduced the Counter-Terrorism Bill with provision, at that stage, for 42-day detention, which was to be the subject of a parliamentary debate and vote when the powers were activated, the then Opposition rightly argued that it would create dangers for Parliament and eventually for the judiciary, potentially, to activate parliamentary control in relation to measures that were being taken against known individuals? Questions were asked, such as how a parliamentary debate in such a situation would be informed. What information would be in the media and in Parliament, and how could we ensure that, if there was a prosecution, that did not destroy the basis for a fair trial? Exactly the arguments that the Opposition used against the previous Government’s measures surely apply in respect of the arguments that the Minister has just made for his enhanced TPIMs.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s case, and care will be required, but the House often considers topics in relation to which matters are before the courts. The emergency legislation deals with the principles, not with individuals. The House has demonstrated clearly that it is able to do that and to consider and debate matters where care is required.
Amendments 1 to 4 address situations where more stringent measures are needed to protect the public than those available under the Bill. Amendment 1 would in effect place a version of the enhanced TPIM proposals formally on the statute book through the Bill. We debated an almost identical amendment in Committee. It would add a new paragraph to schedule 1, allowing the Secretary of State to impose any measure, in addition to those otherwise specified in schedule 1, on an individual where
“there is a serious terrorist threat”
and where such measures are
“necessary for the protection of the public.”
It reflects the position in the enhanced TPIM Bill that the test for imposing such additional measures would be raised from “reasonable belief” of involvement in terrorism-related activity to being satisfied on the “balance of probabilities” that this is the case.
Amendments 2 and 3 offer an alternative approach to providing for the use of additional measures to that set out in amendment 1. Instead of provision being made on the face of the Bill, the Government would be able to add further measures to schedule 1 by order. Amendment 2 envisages that Parliament would approve those measures in advance; amendment 3 provides for retrospective parliamentary approval and so seeks to address other concerns. Amendments 1, 2 and 3 highlight a difference in approach between those on the Opposition Benches and my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Government Benches.
The Government’s position is that the Bill provides a robust and effective set of measures to manage the risk posed by suspected terrorists whom we cannot prosecute or deport, and it will be complemented by additional funding for the police and Security Service for covert investigation. The Government consider that more stringent powers will be required only in exceptional circumstances. So although the Government agree with the Opposition that there may be a need for additional measures to those contained in schedule 1, we believe, as we flagged up in our counter-terrorism review, it is right that those more stringent powers are not on the statute book or available at all times through an order-making power, as amendments 1, 2 and 3 would provide, but are contained in draft emergency legislation that is introduced only if required. This is also reflected in the Government’s approach to extended pre-charge detention.
Furthermore, the Government consider that it is appropriate for the measures available to the Secretary of State to be set out on the face of primary legislation, and to have been agreed in advance by Parliament. That is the clear approach adopted in the Bill before us, and it is also the approach that we have taken in the enhanced Bill. Indeed, I would argue that the more stringent nature of measures available under the enhanced Bill is an even greater reason for them to be clearly defined and agreed by Parliament, rather than decided on an ad hoc basis by the Secretary of State. The Government are therefore not in favour of amendments 1, 2 and 3. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask hon. Members not to press them.
Amendment 4 is specifically concerned with what would happen if the additional measures are required during a period when Parliament is dissolved. The same issue was raised during pre-legislative scrutiny of the emergency Bills for extended pre-charge detention. The Government have listened to the concerns expressed and new clauses 5 and 6, which I have already outlined, directly address the point. I trust that this means that Opposition Members will be content to withdraw their amendment.
I shall speak to amendments 1 to 4 and voice my support for Government new clauses 5 and 6. Throughout Second Reading and consideration in Committee, I have supported the principle of placing in schedule 1 a list of conditions that would be available to the Secretary of State under the TPIMs regime. Under control orders there is no such list. The Home Secretary can impose any condition, subject to accountability to the court. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) has continued to remind the House throughout the debate, there is that continued oversight over the existing regime.
The problem with schedule 1 is that the list of conditions that it provides is inadequate. For example, it requires that the Home Secretary must—not may, as I hope we will discuss later—allow someone subject to a TPIM to have access to the internet and to have a mobile phone and a land line. There is no option; the Home Secretary must do that. Equally, the Home Secretary has no power to relocate an individual away from an area if she judges that to be necessary. I hope that we will soon debate that aspect as well.
The nagging concern that hon. Members—on both sides of the House, I hope—have is what happens when the Home Secretary has intelligence about an individual that requires a certain measure to be put in place, and she cannot do so because it is not in schedule 1. The good news since we considered the issue in Committee is that the Home Secretary has clearly recognised that there may be circumstances where the list of measures in schedule 1 is not sufficient, and she has now published draft legislation, the enhanced TPIMs Bill, that will allow relocation and curfew and will prevent access to mobile phones and the internet where that is necessary. I support the fact that in that Bill she is giving herself the powers to introduce an enhanced TPIM if Parliament is dissolved and she judges it necessary at the time.
The bad news is that the only way that the Home Secretary could exercise these enhanced powers when Parliament is sitting is via fresh primary legislation. I assume that the Home Secretary intends that there should be a rigorous process of pre-legislative scrutiny in relation to the enhanced TPIMs Bill that has been published. Presumably it will be scrutinised by a cross-party Committee and presumably the Committee will be made up of Members from both Houses. Perhaps the House will consider making the Committee Chair a well-respected Cross Bencher, such as a former Cabinet Secretary with huge experience of Government business. The Committee would be expected to take evidence from all the experts and, on the basis of that evidence, it would then be asked to come to a unanimous view on the matters before it.
I am following the right hon. Gentleman very carefully. Is he arguing that the Secretary of State should be able to do anything that he or she wants, but that, if Parliament later gets around to saying that it disagrees, because of course there is no time limit on when it has to agree, the condition has to end? Until that point, any measure whatever could be imposed on somebody who had not been convicted of any crime. Is that what he is arguing for?
I want the Home Secretary, having the insight, information and intelligence that she has and knowing the risks involved, to have the power to do something about the situation—and to do so immediately. It is important that there is some accountability to Parliament at a later date, and under amendment 3, when Parliament considered the matter at a later stage, it would be possible for either the House of the Lords or this House to decline to give an affirmation, at which point the power would lapse. It is important also, however, that the Home Secretary has the power to act.
This is a very interesting situation. Here am I, an Opposition Member, trusting the Home Secretary to exercise her judgment as the Home Secretary in relation to individual cases, and, by the way, her record on relocation in particular is first-class, and I applaud the way in which she has pursued the two cases that we know about. So I trust her judgment. Interestingly, however, her right hon. and hon. Friends do not seem to share my confidence in her. I trust her to exercise her judgment. She has access to intelligence and information, and she has a huge responsibility. I do not want to tie her hands so that she has a limited range of powers and is unable to exercise her responsibilities properly; I want to give her the powers that she needs.
Government Members seem to forget that because we live in a country that has a proper judicial system, should the Home Secretary exceed the reasonable use of her powers and impose a condition on somebody who is subject to a TPIM that is not justified by the evidence, it would be a matter for the judges. An application could be made to say that the specific measure was outwith the terms of the legislation. In every order, the Home Secretary has to show that the particular measures that she is imposing are necessary for the protection of the public. The idea that the Home Secretary could act in an arbitrary manner, without reference to the information and intelligence that she has, is absolutely ludicrous. The process will be subject to proper judicial oversight in our democratic country.
I am pleased that my right hon. Friend has once again had the opportunity to remind us all of that oversight, which is not flimsy, but stringent.
First, I was going to comment that I have perhaps had experience of more Home Secretaries whom I did not trust on these issues than those I did. Perhaps that will change over the years and there will be more Home Secretaries who are more trustworthy on civil liberties. I hope that that is the case.
There is a point about judicial oversight, but there is also a point about Parliament having the chance to comment on what powers it thinks are acceptable. There is a range of things that the Home Secretary could argue are necessary but that Parliament would find simply unacceptable. Will the right hon. Gentleman also confirm that under—
Order. The interventions in this debate are rather long. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will be generous enough to let the hon. Gentleman in for a second bite.
I am bringing my remarks to a conclusion now, Mr Deputy Speaker. In response to the hon. Gentleman, I have worked with a number of Home Secretaries and I have seen this Home Secretary in operation. They—even those colleagues in my party—have represented a range of different political views, but I have trusted every single one of them with the difficult decisions that they have had to make about terrorist suspects and others. That is bar none, including the current holder of the post. I ask the hon. Gentleman to reflect on that. We have to trust our senior politicians sometimes. That has to be within limits, of course, such as the judicial scrutiny and the powers in the Bill.
Frankly, I think that this Government are in the worst of all places. They have acknowledged that the measures in schedule 1 may not be sufficient in certain circumstances, yet they are tying the Secretary of State’s hands behind her back and will not give her the powers that she needs against the risk posed by a small number of individuals. The Government are in a terrible place and they need to think intelligently to get themselves out of it.
Thank you very much for calling me, Mr Deputy Speaker, particularly given that I went on slightly too long. I apologise for that.
I agree to some extent with the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) in that I am uncomfortable with new clause 5, but it is for completely different reasons, as he might imagine. On the issue of trusting the Home Secretary, it is not a question of trusting an individual; I would not trust anybody with that kind of power unchecked by this Parliament. For me, that is a matter of principle, and it is not a reflection on any individual. I am quite sure, despite what was said earlier in the debate, that I will never have that responsibility—I am sure that he is very glad about that—but I would not trust myself to have those powers either.
I would like the Minister to clarify some issues, because we have not had the chance to go through this in detail in Committee. I am uncomfortable with the idea of having emergency legislation to step up the powers, because I simply cannot envisage any circumstance in which I would want to see it used. However, in the review the Government have taken the line that there are some hard to foresee possibilities where it might be needed. If that is the case, I think it is right to proceed in this way. I do not necessarily agree with the Government and would have liked the review to have gone even further, but I can understand where they are coming from.
If that is where we are coming from, there is clearly a need to have some way of installing the measure when Parliament is not sitting. Some have misunderstood this point as meaning that the power will be available to the Secretary of State when Parliament is in recess. It is clear that if the situation was so urgent that we needed to reduce the civil liberties that we give people during recess, we should be recalled. It would be important that we were recalled. However, there is a difference when there is no Parliament that can be recalled. If there is to be such a system, although I am not happy about it, I am pleased with this system and understand it. I am also pleased that the Government have accepted the need for parliamentary scrutiny. That is a move forward from their previous position, as I mentioned earlier.
I will keep my remarks brief, because I know we all want to get on to the debate about relocation. However, I wish to say a word about new clause 5, which shows the difference between the Bill before us and what the Government know they might have to do. The new clause and the draft Bill on enhanced TPIMs measures published last Thursday represent the Government taking out an insurance policy against the failure of the Bill before us this evening.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) reminded us that we are debating the matter around the 10th anniversary of 11 September. It is important that the House remembers that, because that incident, more than any other, forced Governments around the world to reassess their thinking and their expectations of what terrorists were capable of. It also forced all of us in democratic regimes to look again at the protections in law and law enforcement that we can give our citizens against terrorist activity. That is the basis of this whole debate and the Bill.
We did not get here entirely by choice. We got here partly because of court judgments shaping the regime for us in an involuntary way. The problem is simple: what do we do when we cannot bring someone to prosecution, but we have a good and reasonable suspicion that that person would engage in terrorist activity if they could, and there may be inadmissible evidence that they have tried to do so? There has been an assumption running through this debate that such people are necessarily less dangerous than those who have been convicted. That is not necessarily so. If they were able to carry out their intent, they may in fact be far more dangerous than people who have been convicted of other terrorist events.
The Government have published draft legislation that is an insurance policy against the Bill, and they cannot have an in-principle objection to the measures within their own draft Bill. Whereas the Bill before us states, unbelievably, that the Secretary of State must grant terrorist suspects access to mobile phones and the internet, the draft Bill would give the Secretary of State discretion over that. Whereas the Bill before us disarms the Government from giving the public the protection that relocation can provide, the draft Bill would reinsert that possibility. The question that the public will ask, and which the Minister must believe they will ask very seriously should the draft legislation be needed in future, is why the Government did not include those powers in the Bill before us. Why wait until an incident has happened?
I repeat the question that I put to the Minister before. What would he say to the victims of terrorism in such circumstances? Would he say, “We knew we might need these powers, and we could have legislated for them, but we chose not to because we believed that the balance of civil liberties was wrong”?
Not at the moment.
Let us deal with the point about civil liberties. The Minister has said several times that the motivation behind the Bill was a perceived imbalance in the last Government’s civil liberties legislation. The notion that we are some sort of quasi-police state or overly authoritarian state is complete nonsense. In this country we enjoy freedom of expression, religion and association that is the envy of the world. That is why so many dissidents from regimes around the world have sought refuge here. Indeed, the criticism that is sometimes levelled, and perhaps with validity, is that we have been very generous in accommodating dissidents from other regimes, and that sometimes our freedoms have been abused by some of those individuals. It is simply the wrong analysis and the wrong starting point to say that civil liberties in this country have been fundamentally compromised. That is not the case, but because the Government believe it and have carried forward into government the wrong analysis that they developed in opposition, that is leading to the wrong policy and to greater risk for the public. New clause 5 addresses that to some extent, but people will not understand why it, and the draft emergency legislation, were not put into the Bill.
I am conscious of the time and the fact that we have to get on to new clause 1, on relocation, ahead of Third Reading, so I will try to keep my remarks reasonably brief.
I endorse the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) about the draft Bill. He spoke having been a member of the Committee that considered the draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary Extensions) Bill, the findings of which are important and directly relevant to the draft emergency legislation that the Government printed a few days ago. As he pointed out, although that Committee understood the Government’s reasons for proposing that contingency powers to extend the maximum period for pre-charge detention should be provided in primary legislation so that they could be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, it still found a number of problems. Those problems exist also in relation to the draft enhanced TPIMs Bill, and it is important that we take a moment to remind ourselves of what the objections were.
The first objection was in relation to parliamentary scrutiny of a draft Bill as primary legislation. The debate that would take place would be so circumscribed by the difficulties of explaining the reasons for introducing primary legislation that it would not be possible for the House to be given proper reasons why we needed to proceed along that route. In relation to the 28-day detention powers, the risk was that a court case might be prejudiced. In this case the objection is even more important, because we are talking about intelligence evidence that has been gathered by the security services, which of course cannot be discussed openly. That is the whole reason why we have closed sessions of courts to consider such matters—they cannot enter into the public domain. That rather defeats the purpose of having any debate on the Floor of the House.
The second objection was that there would be an unacceptable degree of risk that it would be impossible to introduce and pass the legislation quickly when Parliament was in recess. Although that objection referred to the 28-day detention power, it is also important in this case. Counter-terror investigations are fast-moving, and it is not acceptable to say to the police that their reaction to investigations should be hampered while Parliament debates the matter, perhaps in a limited way, and decides to pass an Act. That would not be an acceptable way to proceed.
The third objection related to the period when Parliament has been dissolved, but as we can see, that is precisely what new clauses 5 and 6 are intended to address.
I say to the Minister that it is clear from the draft Bill that the Government have no principled objection to the control order powers that would suddenly be available once again. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) said, the draft Bill is an insurance policy that the Government are taking out on their TPIMs regime, which will decrease and weaken the powers available to the police and the Home Secretary to control the behaviour of terror suspects. It is extremely unacceptable for legislation to be conducted in such a way. Control order powers are either needed or they are not. This Bill has used up many hours of parliamentary time to take us round in a circle and bring us back to exactly where we started, with control orders.
Rather than introduce this confused and fudged Bill, which raises many more questions, the Government should have been honest and admitted that sometimes, stringent control order measures such as relocation and 16-hour curfews are necessary. They should therefore have put them in the Bill that we are debating today.
I am afraid that the “argument on context”—that there is a standard context that would require only the standard TPIM, and an emergency context in which the enhanced TPIM might be required—does not hold up to any kind of scrutiny, because control orders and TPIMs, if they are introduced, are at the emergency end of what we do. They are not brought in lightly and have always been emergency measures.
I am not quite sure how to respond to the lack of coherence in the previous contribution—the Opposition fundamentally oppose something, but then say that they support new clauses 5 and 6—but I shall seek to respond to the points that have been raised in the course of the debate.
I again return to the counter-terrorism review. The measures are not a surprise—it is not as though they were not set out clearly back when the counter-terrorism reported in the early part of this year. The review concluded that
“there may be exceptional circumstances where it could be necessary for the Government to seek Parliamentary approval for additional restrictive measures. In the event of a very serious terrorist risk that cannot be managed by any other means more stringent measures may be required.”
Therefore, to suggest that this situation has just happened and that it was not foretold highlights the lack of reading of the counter-terrorism review when it was published earlier this year.
The Government consider that the enhanced powers will not routinely be needed, and that the standard TPIM Bill will provide robust powers to protect the public. We also consider that there may be circumstances in which more stringent powers will be needed. However, such powers should be introduced only at that time—they should not be routinely available on the statute book.
Obviously I accept that there is a clear difference of opinion. During previous contributions from Opposition Front Benchers, I was minded to believe that control orders were the default. That appeared to be the approach taken by the previous Government, which is why this Government undertook our counter-terrorism review and why we have sought to rebalance the provisions contained in the legislation.
I appreciate the points made by right hon. and hon. Members about the term “exceptional circumstances”. As I have said, that would be when we are faced with a serious terrorist risk that cannot be managed by any other means. It would be inappropriate to say, “Would it apply in this or that control order case?” I am not prepared to second-guess future developments in the threat picture, and the circumstances might be hard to predict. However, credible reporting could point to a series of concurrent attack plots, all of which appear imminent, or it might apply in the wake of a major terrorist attack when there is the prospect of further attacks to follow. Parliament will need to approve the emergency legislation for it to come into force. Ultimately, therefore, it would be for Parliament to determine whether the circumstances are exceptional in that way.
In response to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), I would highlight the fact that clearly there are additional safeguards for the new clauses to cover the period during a general election, when the House is unable to pass emergency legislation. The enhanced measures will be subject to a higher legal test. The Secretary of State must be satisfied that the person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity on the balance of probabilities, which is a higher threshold than reasonable belief, which is the test for imposing standard TPIMs.
The comprehensive judicial oversight of standard TPIM notices will also apply to the enhanced measures, including a requirement for court permission before imposing measures; an automatic and full High Court review of the decision to impose the enhanced TPIM notice, and each of the measures specified in it; and rights of appeal against decisions taken by the Secretary of State when the measures are in force. Therefore, the intent is that the broader safeguards will apply in the context of those situations.
I hear what my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge says about his discomfort with the contexts in which we would need such provisions. We are all in that situation. Equally, we have considered carefully the potential of alternatives. He highlighted the possibilities of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. However, careful reflection on both sides of the House leads us to consider that that would not be a useful or usable route in dealing with the circumstances that we are contemplating. The 2004 Act has been considered on both sides of the House, but its mechanisms and its structure do not lend themselves easily to the scenarios and situations in which we would consider using TPIMS—indeed, the Act was in many ways directed more to dealing with floods, epidemics and those sorts of problems. Although I understand why my hon. Friend raises that point, as hon. Members have done in the past, we consider that the 2004 Act does not provide a workable mechanism to cover such circumstances.
We believe that the draft emergency Bill would provide a mechanism to deal with a situation while Parliament was either sitting or in recess, although we accept the need to legislate in this Bill to cover a period during a general election. I am pleased to note that the Opposition are prepared to support the new clauses that are contemplated, although clearly there are differences over the emergency Bill itself. However, a Joint Committee will obviously be established to consider, scrutinise and examine the matter in detail in the way one would expect from the House and no doubt to improve, make suggestions and make amendments to the draft Bill.
The Minister has talked about these extra bat belt powers, shall we say, that might be available to the Home Secretary and activated by a draft Bill. I have a question about the parliamentary situation that would then be created. If those powers were activated in relation to a particular threat, hon. Members would receive all sorts of instructions and advice not to mention specific cases in the Chamber, but the chances are that the media would be full of suggestions and innuendos against particular individuals or locations. In those circumstances, how would Parliament discharge the awkward responsibilities that the clause would give it? The Opposition in the previous Parliament made exactly those valid arguments against the then Government’s measures in respect of 42-day detention activated on the basis of parliamentary approval.
I know that the hon. Member has made that point before. I responded to him then as well. I think that the House is able to debate the principle of the underlying issues, although in relation to detailed, confidential briefings and so on, we would seek to provide more detailed information to Opposition spokespeople on privy counsellor terms, as appropriate, in order to assist debate. However, we believe that Parliament is able to consider emergency legislation in that way. In many ways, it is important to put out the draft legislation now to ensure that there is a mechanism—a tool—that has been considered coolly and calmly outside some of the febrile situations that understandably arise in the sorts of horrendous situations that, sadly, we have seen in the past. That is why it is important that we have the scrutiny that would be applied by a Joint Committee—and obviously it is for the House to resolve the matters around that. That is an important way of ensuring that legislation is considered in a more rational way.
The Minister has been very generous in giving way this evening. He has refused to be drawn on “second-guessing”, as he put it, the level of threat that would lead him or the Home Secretary to believe that these enhanced TPIM powers were necessary. However, he said that part of his consideration would be whether the threat was “imminent”—that was the word he used. An “imminent threat” could mean the next 12 hours, the next 24 hours, the next 48 hours or the next week. How does he square that level of risk with the fact that he is prepared to put measures in the Bill that would require separate primary legislation that might take at least a week to procure—perhaps even longer during recess? How can he square those two things? In my view, they simply cannot be squared.
It was precisely to ensure that legislation could be secured quickly that we have published the draft Bill now—to aid in that consideration and to ensure that matters could be dealt with swiftly. I recognise that the right hon. Gentleman does not accept the principle of emergency legislation, and I know that he has taken that approach consistently. There is a difference of view about the enhanced powers and the basis on which they are set, and I do not think that we are likely to resolve that difference between us.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 2 —Relocation of terrorist suspects (No. 2)
‘(1) The Secretary of State may impose a requirement for relocation on the individual if the Secretary of State has a reasonable belief that the individual will engage in terrorism-related activity if the individual remains at their current location.
(2) The individual may be relocated for residence purposes to a locality deemed appropriate by the Secretary of State and in line with this locality being a place or area of a specified description.
(3) This measure may remain in place for the duration of the TPIM.’.
Government amendment 16.
Amendment 5, page 16, line 21, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.
Amendment 6, page 16, line 24, at end insert—
‘(c) any other premises specified by the Secretary of State under section 2A(1)’.
Government amendments 17 and 18.
Amendment 7, page 18, line 11, at end insert—
‘(3) A specified area or place or a specified description of an area or place may include the individual’s own residence or a locality with which the individual has a connection in accordance with paragraph 1(4)(a) and 1(4)(b).’.
I am delighted that my new clause has been selected. The Minister will know from our lengthy debates in Committee that this is the issue about which I feel most passionately and which I believe is one of the biggest flaws in the Bill. The Government’s decision not to have a power of relocation is fundamentally flawed and flies in the face of the evidence, of logic and not only of my personal views, but of the views of some very, very knowledgeable and experienced people in the police, of Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer, and of Lord Howard, the former Home Secretary—a range of people who feel that the Government are limiting their options for controlling suspected terrorists and providing the public with the security and protection that we, as parliamentarians, have a responsibility to try to achieve.
My new clause 1 is a simple and straightforward measure that would provide that the Secretary of State may include in a TPIM notice the power to direct that a terrorist suspect should reside at a specific address that is not his home address or an address with which he has a connection, as is provided for in current legislation. To tie the Home Secretary’s hands in providing that a suspected terrorist has either to live at home or in the area where his known associates are gathered is absolutely ludicrous. Therefore, my amendment would provide that the Secretary of State may direct that the suspected terrorist is relocated to a different area so that they can be properly monitored and the public protected.
The right hon. Lady made a forceful opening to her comments, and I am interested to listen further. In her advocacy of enforced relocation, has she looked for inspiration to other democratic countries that forcibly relocate people who have not been subject to a trial?
There is a range of examples of countries that have attempted to deal with the threat for international terrorism with different legal provisions. France is often cited as a place where people are brought to trial under the criminal justice system. People are often held for months, if not years, under the investigatory process adopted by an inquiring magistrate. Indeed, the powers in some European countries are perhaps more draconian—the hon. Gentleman’s words, not mine—than any that we have ever had on our statute book. Therefore, to try to portray our country as one that does not accord with the rule of law or have effective judicial oversight, as the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) has on a number of occasions, is an absolute travesty when we look at the real circumstances.
I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for giving way, and I shall enjoy the opportunity to ask her the question again. The question was not about draconian measures. She is advocating a specific measure—forced relocation—and my question was specific. What other democratic countries has she used as her inspiration for this measure—which she makes out to be so important—which involves the forced relocation of people who have not been convicted in a trial?
I have not used any other country as my inspiration. What I have used, as my commitment in new clause 1, is a genuine analysis of the evidence provided by the police and other experienced people in the field in asking what measures we can take to ensure that the public are properly protected from the serious harm intended them by some of the most dangerous people in this country. It is right and proper that our Parliament should decide of its own volition what the appropriate measures are. We do not always look to other countries, which have very different legal systems to ours. I am absolutely convinced that the power of relocation can add to the security of this nation, which is my prime and most important concern when looking at this legislation.
I want to emphasise the point that the kind of people subject to either control orders or, in future, TPIMs are unfortunately some of the most dangerous people we could ever have to deal with in this country. There has been some suggestion that people who have been prosecuted through the criminal justice system are somehow more dangerous than those who are subject to administrative orders. If hon. Members looked at the judgments of High Court or Court of Appeal judges who have seen the intelligence and the information about the people upon whom we seek to impose such orders, they would perhaps revise their position. There are currently only 12 such individuals subject to control orders, and the expressions used by judges in relation to them include “trained soldiers” and “committed terrorists”, determined to be martyrs to their cause and determined, whatever steps we take, to cause the maximum harm to innocent people in this country. Those are statements by judges, not given to florid language, having seen the intelligence that the services hold in relation to some of those people. We are talking about a maximum of a dozen people who are very dangerous indeed. That is the measure that we must use in asking what powers we seek to use, whether they are proportionate and whether they are the right powers. It is my submission that the power of relocation of some of the most dangerous people in our country—committed terrorists—is a proportionate.
I am sure that my right hon. Friend will give more details later about the case of BM, which involved one of the two relocation appeals challenged by the Home Secretary, successfully on both occasions. To underline what my right hon. Friend has just said, BM conceded in the hearing that took place—this was not a point made by the security services; he conceded it—that he is indeed
“committed to terrorism, in particular to terrorism in Pakistan”,
and that he
“wishes to carry out that commitment by travelling to that region”
to take part in terrorist acts himself. It is by his own admission that that is the level of threat that he poses.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right: in that case BM did concede that he was determined to carry out terrorist activity, and it was right that the power of relocation, which the Home Secretary had imposed relatively recently, was upheld as a necessary power to protect the public. This is not a case of draconian Governments, or authoritarian or totalitarian regimes wanting to impose controls for their own sake; it is always a matter of balance, and trying to mitigate the risk and draw the line in the correct place, so that we can maintain essential freedoms in this country, which include the freedom of the public to go about their law-abiding business without being threatened with death and destruction by some of the most committed terrorists in this country.
My right hon. Friend is making an eloquent speech about the reality of the situations that we face. Let me quote to her what the judge said about relocation in the case of CD:
“I have concluded that the relocation obligation is a necessary and proportionate measure to protect the public from the risk of what is an immediate and real risk of a terrorist related attack. While he is living in London there is a significant risk that he will take part in terrorism-related activities, notwithstanding the high level of protection implicit in the obligations which are not under challenge.”
Does she agree that that shows the danger? Will she also speculate about why the Government are so determined to deprive the public, whom we represent, of the protections afforded by the current relocation provisions?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right about the case of CD. We had a long discussion in Committee about the need for a relocation clause and about the judge’s comments. Indeed, the judge in that case said that since CD’s return,
“he has endeavoured to obtain firearms on a number of occasions from a number of associates for the purposes of putting into effect a planned terrorist attack, has held covert meetings with associates in relation to plans to use the firearms as part of his planned attack and has displayed a very high level of security awareness.”
It was on those grounds that the judge decided that the relocation condition was absolutely appropriate in controlling CD’s activities. As for my right hon. Friend’s second question, about why the Government have been so reluctant to provide the Home Secretary with the power to relocate—not the duty to do so in every case, but the power where necessary—I believe that this is part of a political accommodation with the Liberal Democrats and that this will be revealed in all its rather distasteful details in due course.
Everyone in this House knows the wealth, depth and breadth of my right hon. Friend’s experience: she has seen evil in close quarters. However, does she not agree that we would not even need to discuss this issue if many of the people involved were deported and sent back to their countries of origin, as they should be? Would it not be a little more helpful if this multicoloured Government assisted us in that endeavour, in particular with memorandums of understanding, which they oppose so strongly? Then we would not have to worry about how many miles someone was from London, because they would be in Jordan.
My hon. Friend also has considerable experience in relation to terrorism and the necessary laws. We did our utmost to try to negotiate memorandums of understanding with other countries so that deportation could take place. We were successful in a number of cases, albeit perhaps not with as many countries as we wanted. Equally, however, he must acknowledge that unfortunately we now have the issue of domestic, home-grown terrorists—people who cannot be deported and who were brought up in this country. Therefore, we need laws that provide sufficient security for those circumstances, as well as for where terrorists come from abroad.
I want to cite a bit of evidence, because evidence is important, and otherwise this debate is in danger of becoming a politician’s polemic. I want to quote again from the evidence that DAC Osborne gave us in Committee. I am beginning to feel slightly sorry for the poor man. I questioned him quite vigorously on relocation, and he said:
“The relocation issue has been very useful for us being able to monitor and enforce at the current time. Without that relocation, and depending on where people choose to live, that could be significantly more difficult. Where the choice of residence will be and how many people are within an area will affect the complexities, but there are different environments that make policing easier or more difficult. People could choose to live in an area that was difficult to police in normal circumstances, and that would be even more difficult to police in relation to monitoring control order subjects.”
He was then asked a very good question by my hon. Friend the Member for Newport East (Jessica Morden). She asked whether
“of all the measures available to you, is it fair to say that relocation is the most effective?”
DAC Stuart Osborne, the national co-ordinator for counter-terrorism, replied:
“Overall it probably is, yes.”
That response comes from someone who has been engaged in dealing with suspected terrorists on a day-to-day operational basis. He says that relocation is the most effective measure that he could have to help him to police in these circumstances and to protect the public. That is a very powerful submission indeed. He went on to say of the provisions in the Bill:
“The new freedoms that will be given to individuals will significantly increase the challenges that we have to face”.––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 22 June 2011; c. 5-6, Q10 and 14.]
DAC Osborne is a well respected police officer with considerable experience, and his views should be accorded some importance by the Government.
I have asked this question of the Minister, but I have not yet had an answer. Would not enhanced TPIMs allow some form of internal exile or removal to another place? I ask because I am genuinely not sure, but if they would, we would at least have that provision in the legislation.
I acknowledge that the hon. Gentleman has asked that question but not received a response to it. I have the utmost respect for his experience in these matters. He is almost unique among us in having had experience on the ground of effective surveillance and the need to control terrorist suspects. In Committee, he thought very carefully about these issues, and he has already said tonight that he is concerned about the question of resources and that he might well consider supporting the Opposition’s amendment. I would welcome it enormously if, having thought carefully about the relocation question, he felt able to support us on that as well, given his practical experience and amazing depth of understanding of these issues.
I just want to say a word about why we have ended up in this ludicrous position. I say this with respect to the Minister. I respect him, and he does his job with incredible dedication and commitment, but in these circumstances he has ended up in a position that might well come back to haunt him. I think he knows that that position is untenable. Effectively, his decisions are flying in the face of the evidence of the police, of Lord Carlile and of a former Home Secretary, and they will leave him without the power to order relocation, should he need it.
This brings us back to the language that the Liberal Democrats have used time and again in the debate on these issues. They have talked about house arrest and internal exile. It is my belief that the counter-terrorism review, which the Minister has sought to rely on to justify all the steps that he has taken, is a political accommodation. Before the election, the Liberal Democrats—
I am going to make this point. Before the election, the Liberal Democrats said that they wanted to see the complete abolition of control orders because they were an insult to our civil liberties and to democratic society. They made that decision prior to coming into government and certainly without being privy to the available intelligence about these suspects. In fact, in his evidence, Lord Carlile said:
“I have a concern about the genesis of this Bill. It arose from coalition politics—I am aware of the process that occurred—and it is a compromise…it is the sufficient lowest common multiple, and it will do. However, it does not provide as much public protection as control orders, and it would be foolish to ignore that fact.”
He went on to say that
“my party made a serious mistake in committing itself to the abolition of control orders. It made that mistake understandably, however, because it did not have the information at the time.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 21-22, Q 66-67.]
What we have seen is political rhetoric and a particular stance being taken by the Liberal Democrat part of the coalition, with the Conservative part finding itself in the unenviable position of trying to accommodate that situation. Because of the use of terms such as “house arrest” and “internal exile”, the relocation powers became the centre around which this accommodation has had to be drawn.
Let me say to the Minister that the deal that was done will lead us to bad legislation and it will come back to haunt us. I hope and pray that we do not have an incident in which somebody who has not been subjected to relocation is able to resume his contacts with his co-conspirators, to further a plot to attack this country and to execute that plot because there was no power to relocate that person to another part of the country. I hope and pray that that will never be the case. I would certainly not have made the decision to deny a Minister the right to make a relocation order in order to reach a political accommodation.
In my view—I hope it is shared across the House and I hope the Minister shares it—national security is far too important to be the subject, as Lord Carlile said, of “coalition politics”. This should be about a clear-headed analysis of risk and the steps that need to be taken that are proportionate to mitigate that risk. At the forefront of our minds and reflected in every step we take should be the protection of this country’s innocent people so that they can walk the streets in safety and security.
I do not believe that the decision to deny the power of relocation meets any of those tests. It is illogical. I can only believe that the Bill has no power of relocation because of a political accommodation designed to enable the Liberal Democrat part of the coalition to save face by saying that it had done some kind of deal. That is why the Liberal Democrats are so angry about the prospect of a relocation clause being in the enhanced TPIMs Bill, because that would mean that the principle of a relocation clause had been conceded. I would be interested to know, particularly from the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), whether he will support the enhanced TPIMs Bill when it comes up for scrutiny. Perhaps he will tell us now.
I am happy to intervene; I had hoped that the right hon. Lady would give way earlier. As to the enhanced TPIMs Bill, what we have said is that we would need to consider the extraordinary circumstances that applied at the time. Certainly neither my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) nor I can envisage the extraordinary circumstances that would apply in which relocation powers would be acceptable. We will have to wait and see what scenario might develop.
That is a very interesting reply—that a Liberal Democrat cannot envisage the exceptional circumstances in which a relocation power might be necessary. I look forward to the scrutiny and to finding out whether there will be harmony between both parts of the coalition on this issue. I believe that the fault line that is emerging will go deeper and deeper, and I am sure that it will begin to crack as the debate goes forward.
My amendments are pretty straightforward. Ironically, the relocation power is available if there is police bail, but the amendments on police bail from the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) have not come forward. If police bail is granted, there is a relocation power. This is beyond the power of words to express. I cannot for the life of me see why a relocation power is acceptable if there is police bail, but not when we are dealing with a suspected terrorist, who might be one of the most dangerous people in the country. We can have a relocation power for someone involved in serious fraud or serious crime, but not for someone we suspect wants to harm hundreds of people through a terrorist act. Again, this defies logic. That is why I genuinely believe that this is the result of political accommodation not the result of a logical decision by Ministers.
Amendments 5 and 6 are consequential to the new clause, but amendment 7 is slightly different, and I should welcome the Minister’s response to it. It seeks to ensure that it will be possible to exclude a terrorist suspect from an area although his own residence, or a residence with which he has a connection, may be in that area. At present there is a contradiction in the Bill. It is not clear whether the entitlement of a terrorist suspect to live in his own property, or in a property in an area where he has a connection, will take precedence over the exclusion power, or whether the exclusion power will take precedence over his right to remain in his own home.
For example, if a terrorist suspect’s home were in east London, in the area of the Olympics, would he be allowed to live there, or could he be excluded? In Committee we were told that it would be possible to exclude people from the area of the Olympics—or, indeed, to exclude them from a whole borough of London, or even from the whole of Greater London. It seems to me that, as the Bill stands, if a terrorist suspect had a home in such a borough, or in London as a whole, the right of an individual to remain in his own home would take precedence over the exclusion power, and that strikes me as a gaping hole in the legislation. I must ask the Minister to think about that very carefully, and to consider supporting amendment 7 if he is certain that he wants the power to exclude people from areas of particular danger, which could include that around the Olympics.
It gives me great pleasure to rise to oppose the amendments tabled by the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), and first of all to deal with her oft-repeated allegation that getting rid of relocation is a sweetener for the Liberal Democrats. She quoted Lord Carlile, and clearly that is his view, but I should be interested to know what evidence he has to support his contention. Equally, the right hon. Lady might want to offset his view against that of Lord Macdonald. I think it incumbent on her to produce more evidence to support her allegation that a stitch-up or deal has been done on behalf of the Liberal Democrats. She was, of course, a member of the Bill Committee and she will have heard a number of Conservative Members speak out against powers of relocation, so I think she will know that it is incorrect to suggest that only Liberal Democrats are advancing this argument.
The right hon. Lady says that she feels strongly about the issue. So do I. I wonder whether she has had a chance to talk to some of the people who have been subject to control orders that have subsequently been quashed because it was found that there was no genuine or strong evidence against them. I wonder whether she has heard from those people about the impact of relocation on them as individuals, and on their families. I think that if she wants to be fully informed about all aspects of the matter, she should hear from people who have subsequently been found to be innocent.
As the right hon. Lady may know, I have heard from a reliable source that of the people who are currently held under control orders, probably two or three present a real and serious threat to United Kingdom security. I acknowledge that—clearly—a limited number of people do represent a serious threat, and I think that that is why the Government have rightly announced that the package of measures to get rid of relocation will include additional surveillance resources to ensure that security and safety are maintained.
If one or two people might create a threat, why are we tying the hands of the Home Secretary? The provision does not have to be used, but what worries me is that we might need it for just one or two people. Why should we decide that we cannot use such a facility?
The reason I do not think we should use it is linked to what was said earlier about the term “internal exile”. I know that the right hon. Lady does not like the phrase “internal exile”, but in practice that is what we are talking about. She was asked whether she took inspiration from any democratic countries in adopting the policy of relocation and she said that she did not. I suspect that she may have found it hard to find inspiration in the extent to which other democratic countries allow such a policy, so she has been inspired herself to come forward with the proposal to reinstate relocation.
That gets to the heart of what the debate is about. It is about where the balance between civil liberties and security lies and where we can achieve enhanced civil liberties at the same time as maintaining security. That is where the additional surveillance that the Government are putting in place kicks in.
I am mindful of the time, so I will try to keep my comments relatively brief.
I endorse the powerful contribution made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears). She spoke with great passion about an issue that has concerned her for some time. It certainly concerned her in Committee, and it has concerned Opposition Front Benchers, too.
Relocation has been a central issue in the debates that we have had about the Bill, both on Second Reading and in Committee, and it is one of the most important issues that we are taking forward on Report. New clause 1 seeks to add the power of relocation to the Bill to replicate the position in relation to control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.
It is clear from the evidence that the relocation power has proved extremely useful in disrupting terrorist activity. It is regularly described by police and others as one of the most useful and effective powers that they have under the control orders regime. We know that nine of the 12 current control orders have relocation as part of the control order.
The importance of relocation as a measure to be made available to the police in meeting the terror threat was made clear at the evidence sessions held by the Public Bill Committee. We heard evidence from Deputy Assistant Commissioner Stuart Osborne, for whom, like my right hon. Friend said, I am starting to feel slightly sorry. She quoted him, but I will repeat the important bit of the quote again because it will concentrate the mind of the House:
“The relocation issue has been very useful for us being able to monitor and enforce at the current time. Without that relocation, and depending on where people choose to live, that could be significantly more difficult.”
He added:
“The new freedoms that will be given to individuals will significantly increase the challenges that we have to face, and managing those challenges will increase the resources that we need. The degree to which we are successful in managing them depends on both the extent of the Bill and the additional resources that we get.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 5-6, Q 10 and 14.]
The importance of relocation as a measure was further highlighted by Lord Howard and Lord Carlile. Lord Howard, the former Home Secretary, has described the power as the single most useful power in ensuring that the package of measures that we have is sufficient to keep us safe.
It is clear from the evidence that the police gave to the Committee that the additional risk created by removing relocation from the TPIMs regime could be mitigated by the additional resources, but it would not be eliminated and there are of course degrees of mitigation. In Committee, DAC Osborne was only “hopeful” that the risk would not increase if the Bill were passed, which does not fill me with a huge amount of confidence.
It is clear, and we must recognise, that there is an irreducible minimum number of people who pose a serious threat to our country and we have to have an adequate and effective way to manage that risk. Relocation is clearly an important part of that package of measures. It is our view that, if the new clause is added to the Bill, the policing challenge that DAC Osborne and others will face will be reduced and our collective security protected. It has always been our concern that if this Bill closes off the power of relocation to the Home Secretary—if it deprives her of being able to use that power—that would deprive her of an incredibly important tool in her kit bag for dealing with the threat posed by a very small number of people. For those reasons, we will support new clause 1 in the Division.
It is a pleasure to be able to make a brief contribution to this debate.
I listened to the rhetoric of the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) in her opening speech in support of her new clause, and it made me even more scared about giving Administrations a fiat on the treatment of people in our judicial system, rather than leaving that with the judges. On many occasions, both in this debate and in Committee, the right hon. Lady talked about the importance of balance, but I feel that, in the sharpness of her rhetoric and the blithe way challenges were laid down and comments were made about loosening and potentially putting us at risk, her speech did not betray any balance whatever. That highlights one of the risks in giving the Executive the power to restrain and control people who have not been brought to justice. Both in the specific instance of relocation and more generally in the tone of Opposition Members, a disservice is being done to this Government’s attempts to return us to some semblance of the traditions of British justice that we achieved before the period of the so-called “war on terror”—before 2001—and we should remember that control orders were not introduced until 2005, and that therefore they were not in place between 2001 and the Iraq war, which some would argue was the period of greatest risk.
I wish to make a couple of comments on the specific issue of relocation. I have a lot of respect for the right hon. Lady and I do not mean to pick on her; I am just picking on her point. I challenged her earlier about democratic countries from which she drew inspiration. I could not think of any either, so I did some research on a well-known search engine. I looked up forced relocation of individuals. Kazakhstan featured prominently. There were also a few honourable mentions for Cambodia—not the current Cambodian Government, but I think we can work out which Government—and for Burma. Kazakhstan, Cambodia and Burma are not exactly the paragons of virtue in this respect that I would like our Government to follow as they attempt to strike the difficult balance of maintaining both the security of the nation and the liberty of the individual.
May I also refer to one not particularly tabloid-friendly comment on relocation? A number of Members have talked about meeting people who are subject to a control order or its equivalents and who have been subject to relocation. We must remember that those subject to control orders have not yet gone through full justice in our country. Many other countries, including the United States, have laws against cruel and unusual punishment. Relocation has the most significant negative impact on the mental health of these individuals. In evidence in Committee, Dr Korzinski said:
“What I am concerned about…is the absence of any sort of safeguards with respect to the impact on the mental health of the individuals who are subjected to these regimes. I can say quite unequivocally that it has been catastrophic in all the cases that I have worked on.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 43, Q121.]
That may not be the most popular of reasons to oppose the right hon. Lady’s new clause, but there are also many others, such as support for our justice system and achieving that balance that she advocates, but which I do not think she spoke to today. I shall support the Government on this new clause.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) made some powerful and important points in his succinct contribution.
As I think the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) accepted in her opening comments, we are revisiting a subject that we debated in detail in the Public Bill Committee, when amendments with the same effect were tabled by Opposition Members and the same arguments were made in support of them. As was made clear following the carefully considered counter-terrorism review, despite the aspersions that the right hon. Lady seeks to cast, the Government concluded that it should not routinely be possible under the TPIM system to require an individual to relocate, without consent, to another part of the UK.
The debate in Committee frequently turned to the question of balance—specifically, the balance between protection of individual liberty and security for the wider population. This is an area where there is a very careful balance to be struck, and where views on where the right balance is may differ. The previous Government took the view that compulsory relocation was necessary as one of a wide range of potential obligations under the control order provisions. Our conclusion, as we made clear in January, is that a more focused use of the restrictions available under the Bill, together with the significantly increased funding we are providing for covert investigation, will allow us to protect the public effectively without the need for this potentially very intrusive power to be routinely available. That is where our approach departs from the Opposition’s, and why we are seeking to strike a different balance from that marked out by them.
The Minister used the word “routinely”. Does he mean that this is something that does not normally happen, but could?
To be clear, when I say “routinely” I am talking about powers routinely available under the TPIM Bill, accepting that there is a draft Bill that we tabled last week, and the exceptional circumstances when those powers may be available, which we discussed earlier today. Of course, we will be able to use the robust powers in this Bill to disrupt an individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity by, for example, requiring them to reside and stay overnight at a particular address in their locality, so that they can be easily monitored; requiring them to abide by other restrictions on their movements overnight; banning them from areas or places where they might meet extremist associates or conduct terrorism-related activities; prohibiting their association with individuals of concern and requiring prior notice of association with other individuals; requiring them to report regularly to a police station and to co-operate with electronic tagging; restricting and monitoring their financial activities; and limiting their communications to a small number of approved devices.
That is why I say clearly that the TPIM Bill provides robust measures to address the risks posed by such individuals, allied to the additional resources being provided to the police and the Security Service, and that that is the right package of measures to have in place. Indeed, as the House is aware, the director general of the Security Service has told the Home Secretary that he is content that the TPIM Bill provides an acceptable balance between the needs of national security and civil liberties, and that the overall package mitigates risk.
As someone who had many reservations about the previous regime and the methods that were used, I, for one, can see very little difference between what this Government are doing and what the previous Government did. At the end of the day, despite all the criticism that was made, particularly by the Liberal Democrats in the last Parliament, by and large, what happened before the election is happening again.
I ask the hon. Gentleman with all due respect please to read the Bill. He will see that there are significant and important differences that I cannot address in the two minutes remaining to me. However, we have always been clear that there may be exceptional circumstances where the measures in the Bill, together with the additional resources, may not be sufficient to manage effectively the risk we face. National security is the primary duty of any Government, and we will not put security or the public at risk. That is why we concluded, as announced by the Home Secretary in January, that there may be exceptional circumstances where it would be necessary to seek parliamentary approval for additional, more restrictive measures. The review included a commitment that emergency legislation would be drafted, and that is what we tabled last week.
In a free society, we must challenge ourselves to fight terrorism using a targeted set of powers, safeguarding our hard-won civil liberties and prosecuting terrorists wherever possible. However, we must also ensure that those powers are sufficiently robust to meet the threats we face and sufficiently flexible to protect the public in changing circumstances, including in exceptional circumstances. I believe that the Government’s approach to this difficult issue is the right one and—I come back to balance being the essence—does strike the proper balance in giving us that right mix of disruption and ensuring protection for civil liberties. I am sorry that the Opposition do not appear—
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I would like to begin by thanking the right hon. and hon. Members who sat on the Public Bill Committee. I can genuinely say that it was one of the best Public Bill Committees that I have been involved in. The Bill underwent tough and detailed scrutiny. There was active participation and there were excellent contributions from both sides. I am sure Members who sat on the Committee will agree that it was lively and robust, but good natured. That is when Parliament excels and does its job properly. The Public Bill Committee certainly did that.
The Committee benefited from the considerable knowledge and expertise of several Members including my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) and the right hon. Members for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) and for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears). I am grateful for the contributions of those Members and other Members of the Committee to this debate. I also thank the Chairmen of the Committee and the officials, Officers and staff of the House who enabled the Committee’s work to take place. We have had a full and detailed discussion of this important piece of legislation on Report, with many excellent contributions from all parts of the House.
We have made it clear from the outset that we are committed to prosecuting and deporting terrorists wherever possible and that our starting point will always be that terrorists should be behind bars. I know that that is the position of everyone in the House. We recognise, however, that there are likely, for the foreseeable future, to be a small number of individuals who we believe are involved in terrorism but whom we cannot successfully prosecute or deport. The purpose of the Bill is to put in place the measures needed to deal with them.
The Government have thought long and hard about what legislation is needed. We conducted a comprehensive and detailed review of all the key counter-terrorism powers, including control orders. As a result of that review, we concluded that control orders were not properly targeted and not entirely effective, and that they should be replaced with the system of prevention and investigation measures that is set out in the Bill.
The Bill includes all the measures that we believe are necessary to deal with those we cannot prosecute or deport, including an overnight residence requirement; a travel measure allowing the banning of overseas travel without permission; measures restricting individuals from entering particular areas or places; an electronic communications device measure that will restrict the individual’s ability to use communications devices; and a financial services measure that will allow individuals to be limited to only one bank account, for which they will have to provide statements. The transfer of money and goods overseas without prior permission could also be prohibited.
The Bill also includes an association measure, under which a list of prohibited associates would be provided to the individual in advance, with the possibility that advance notice might be required for meeting other individuals; a reporting measure that would require the individual to report to a particular police station at a particular time; and a monitoring measure that would require the individual to co-operate with arrangements, including electronic tagging, to monitor their movements, communications, and other activities.
The Bill includes additional safeguards, including an increase in the threshold for the imposition of a TPIM notice from reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorism-related activity to reasonable belief, and a two-year overall time limit for a TPIM notice. We believe that TPIMs, together with the significant extra resources that are being given to the police and Security Service for covert investigation, strike the right balance between robust measures to protect the public and the protection of civil liberties.
I do not intend to go over the issues that we discussed in detail on Report, but I wish to say something about the draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, which we published for pre-legislative scrutiny on 1 September. Some have claimed that publishing it means that the Government have made some sort of U-turn, and that we are trying to reintroduce more stringent powers through the back door. That is absolutely not the case.
The review of counter-terrorism and security powers that was announced on 26 January made it clear that additional restrictive measures may be required in exceptional circumstances, and that we would produce draft legislation to cover such a situation. That is exactly what we have done. We do not believe it is necessary to have those additional measures in the current Bill, and we sincerely hope that they will never be required, but we think it is right to have the draft legislation available should there be exceptional circumstances that require it, and that Parliament should have the chance to consider it in detail now.
The Government believe that the approach that the Bill sets out is the right one. It protects the public and civil liberties, it is both robust and fair and I commend it to the House.
I join the Minister in commending those who have participated in the debates both in Committee and in the House today. This debate has been serious and important, and we have heard considerable expertise from all parts of the House in the discussions that have taken place.
Counter-terror policies are extremely important. They are vital to public safety, so our approach is, wherever possible, to seek to support the Government in their counter-terror policy. However, tonight we cannot. We cannot vote for the Bill because we do not believe it is the right thing to do for our national security. We do not take that decision lightly, but we are afraid that the Government are taking unnecessary risks with national security and public safety by introducing the Bill, and we do not believe that Parliament should support that approach tonight.
Control orders are not desirable but, sadly, they are needed. That is why they were introduced. However, the Bill, in its response to control orders, raises some serious problems: it weakens counter-terror protection in important ways; it weakens the safeguards—the checks and balances—that are needed to prevent abuse; it does not live up to the promises that were made about it; and it creates a shambolic legislative process and legal framework that will make it harder, not easier, for the police and the security services to do their job and keep us safe.
From the start, concerns were raised that the Bill was simply a fudge. Control orders are being replaced with something very similar. Curfews are being replaced with overnight residence requirements, and restrictions on movement and communications are being replaced with prescriptions on movement and communications. However, in key areas, the Bill weakens the powers of the Home Secretary to deal with very difficult cases.
My hon. Friends the Members for Birmingham, Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood) and for Bradford South (Mr Sutcliffe) set out in Committee a series of our concerns and tabled amendments. Today we heard my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) set out his concerns and very powerfully speak to amendments on additional measures. My right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) spoke to amendments on relocation, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) spoke of specific Opposition security concerns. That is particularly important in Olympic year.
I shall focus particularly on our concerns about relocation—they were discussed on Report, but they are fundamental on Third Reading. In some cases, the courts, the security services and this Home Secretary have agreed that the power to relocate someone to prevent terrorist activity is needed and justified. In May this year, just four months ago, the Home Secretary argued in the case of CD that he needed to be removed from Greater London to protect the public from a terrorist attack. The judge said:
“I have concluded that the relocation obligation is a necessary and proportionate measure to protect the public from the risk of what is an immediate and real risk of a terrorist attack.”
That was just four months ago, but now the Home Secretary believes that those powers are not needed. What has really changed since May?
In July of this year, just two months ago, the Home Secretary said in the case of BM that relocation outside London was “fundamental” to preventing terrorist activity. In that case, BM admitted that he was committed to terrorism. The Home Secretary now believes that those powers are not needed. Again, what has really changed since July?
Ministers claim that they will put more surveillance in place, but the Met expert on this, when giving evidence to the Public Bill Committee, said:
“To get the resources that we anticipate we need will take more than a year, in terms of being able to get people trained and to get the right equipment.”––[ Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 9, Q27.]
It is simply not credible that the security environment has changed so substantially in the past two or four months that the powers were needed then but are not needed now. Are the Government really telling us—in Olympic year, of all years—that the powers are less needed in the coming year than they were last year, when this Home Secretary has felt that she needed to use them five times?
Ministers have conceded that the powers could be needed, but they are promising only emergency legislation to solve the problem. However, that is a deeply disorderly and shambolic response. It is not fair on the police or security services—or, ultimately, on the public—to say, as the Minister has today, that the Government cannot tell us in what circumstances the emergency legislation will be passed. When pressed, he suggested that it might be passed in the case of multiple threats or in the wake of a terrorist attack, but neither circumstance applied in the cases of CD or BM, when the Home Secretary decided that the powers to relocate were needed.
Ministers know that it is hard to predict how long primary legislation will take, even when there is an imminent threat. The Joint Committee on the emergency legislation, which the Home Secretary set up, concluded that it was a flawed response to difficult counter-terror situations. That is not the way to set a stable framework for our security services to operate, and removing powers in one Bill and promising to reinstate them in unspecified circumstances is a chaotic way to treat Parliament.
While the Government are weakening the counter-terror powers, however, they are at the same time weakening the safeguards, the checks and balances and the parliamentary oversight. Our view is that we need strong powers but also strong checks and balances, so the Government are wrong to remove the annual vote and recourse to Parliament. These powers should be treated as exceptional, not routine. If Parliament is prepared for such powers to be used, as I believe it should be, it should also be prepared and required to reflect on those exceptional powers each year, rather than waiting until 2017. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats should reflect carefully on what they have really achieved in this process, because if this emergency legislation is passed, not only will we be back where we started—round the Houses, through two new laws and back again—but we will have restored all the same security powers, but with fewer checks and balances in place than we had when we started with control orders.
Instead of amending or withdrawing the Bill in the face of these problems, the Government have tied themselves in knots because they are still in thrall to their irresponsible pre-election promises. Legislation that began as a political fudge now looks more like treacle. This is not a responsible approach to national security, and nor is it a responsible approach to Parliament. I hope that the decisions that the Home Secretary and the House are taking tonight do not prove dangerous, but on the basis of the evidence and expert advice that we have, the Opposition do not believe that it is right to take the risk. We will not be supporting the Bill on Third Reading tonight.
Order. There are five Members seeking to catch my eye. I know that they are perfectly capable of doing the arithmetic for themselves.
Unlike the shadow Home Secretary, many of us regard this as a lost opportunity to put behind us legislation that is a scar on our constitutional and judicial structures. References have been made to 9/11, which we will be remembering this Sunday. I was in New York on that day, and the memory is still visceral. The event has unleashed a decade of sometimes good, sometimes poorly thought through legislative responses to real and apparent and sometimes not-so-real threats. Over the years, there has been growing opposition to some of those more extreme measures—the push for 90 days’ detention without trial, the preamble to the Iraq war, with the promotion of non-plots, such as the ricin plot, and the sexing up of dossiers as a basis for our going to war, and of course the control orders. These are all part of an approach to the control of terror that says there is never enough doubt.
This is not a point of balance. We need to have a balance for the rights of all people in this country, and one of the most sacred rights is the right to a free and fair trial. That opportunity has been lost today, but I believe that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has done her best to have a thorough and meaningful review of the measures that the Government consider appropriate for the times. This is not a mere nod-through of legislation. The debate has been robust.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I know that he does not have much time. These are obviously incredibly difficult issues for anybody to determine. What would he do with the handful of people for whom prosecution is not an effective route—because of the need to safeguard intelligence—and who cannot be deported or taken through the criminal justice system, but who pose a significant threat to the safety of the decent, law-abiding people in our country?
That is an interesting challenge. I will be brief. I simply would not accept the premise that we cannot take them through the criminal justice system. The whole thrust of my perspective is that we should always seek to do that. That is what I would try to persuade Governments of all hues to do. When people, of any hue, get to the Front Bench, they always have access to more information than the rest of us. It is hard for the Executive branch ever to give up counter-terrorism powers, because they would face the sort of challenge that we have heard from the Opposition Front Bench this evening—that perhaps there is some risk or that someone will be caught out as a result of the changes. However, it was always a risk that something could go wrong, even under control orders. The reason it is wrong to give such powers exclusively to the Executive and why they should rightly be in the hands of the judiciary is that the judiciary can make a fair, non-political response to the matters of fact before it.
However, that opportunity has been lost. We shall again have to go through secret evidence, secret hearings, special advocates and no access for the suspect to the evidence against them. I trust our Home Secretary in her review, as many other hon. Members have said they do. We trust that she has done this for balance, and we hope that she is right. However, let me end with a quotation by Shami Chakrabarti of Liberty, which has been strongest in its opposition to the legislation:
“But under that Act”—
the Bail Act 1976—
“you are heading for a charge…It may be a long process…but at least you can stand outside the Old Bailey saying, ‘Justice has been done’…The problem with these administrative, shadowy, quasi-judicial systems is that they potentially go on for ever and you never know why.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 21 June 2011; c. 50, Q137.]
We will put this Bill to a vote this evening, and I am sure that the Government will succeed. We will review the position again in five years and hopefully lose this part of our legislation.
I thank the Minister for his generous remarks about right hon. and hon. Members on the Opposition Benches. In return, let me say that whatever differences we have had—and we have had a few, in Committee and again today—he has been courteous, generous, thoughtful and constructive throughout. I thank him for that. Indeed, it is quite ironic that Opposition Members keep arguing that he and the Home Secretary should be trusted more. It is Members on the Government Benches who do not seem to want to do that.
When the Bill was first published and when we debated it on Second Reading, some commentators described it as “control orders lite”. Many comments were made to that effect and, indeed, on close examination much of the wording in the Bill appears—shall we say?—to be very similar to the wording of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. However, it has become absolutely clear in our debates that there are substantial differences between us in relation to the two-year limit, relocation, which has been debated again today, access to telephones and crucially—this is increasingly important—the timing of the commencement of the Bill’s provisions. We in the Opposition have tried through amendments to make constructive suggestions.
Let me say that party advantage in this case is cast aside, and I know that the Minister understands and believes that. This is about protecting the public: that is the only thing that motivates me and my right hon. and hon. Friends to get the legislation right. However, I now fear that the Government are in the worst of all places, because in publishing the detailed draft legislation last week they conceded that the provisions in the Bill that we are now debating are not sufficient in certain circumstances. There may be circumstances where the enhanced powers would be required, yet because primary legislation would be required to bring them into force, the hands of the Home Secretary are tied. Time is crucial, and my right hon. and hon. Friends and I would certainly want to give the Home Secretary those powers, so that she can use them when she judges that to be appropriate. I hope that further consideration in the other place will lead to at least some changes, so that the Home Secretary is empowered to protect the nation rather than having her hands tied behind her back.
I would caution hon. Members on pre-legislative scrutiny, because, as I told the Minister earlier, I was on the Committee that considered the draft legislation for pre-charge detention. That Committee came to a unanimous view—that such legislation is unsatisfactory and unreliable —but apart from one concession, I do not think that it found a listening ear among Ministers.
Let me finish. I have paid tribute to the way in which the Minister has conducted these debates, but surely he must find it at least ironic, if nothing else, that two days after we completed consideration of the detail of the Bill in Committee the Home Secretary wrote to the court in the case of BM to say that a relocation condition was essential. Thank goodness she was successful and the judge found in her favour. Relocation may be necessary on occasions; it should be in the Bill, as should the other measures I have mentioned.
On Second Reading, I said that I supported clause 1 wholeheartedly, but that I had reservations about clauses 2 onwards. I feel exactly the same now. We still have the same problems in that Executive power is being used and that it is outside our legal system. I wholeheartedly disagree with the approach being taken by the Opposition. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bradford South (Mr Sutcliffe), has said, astonishingly:
“Unfortunately, there are times when people have to be outside the legal framework.”––[Official Report, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2011; c. 57.]
I find that absolutely horrific. It is possible to do all this within a legal framework, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) has said. In Committee, I tabled amendments on police bail. I proposed a different model on Report, but unfortunately we did not have an opportunity to discuss it. They were slightly different models—the details were different—but they showed that there is a way forward, and that we can find a normal, legal way of pursuing this process.
I do not welcome TPIMs—I certainly do not welcome enhanced TPIMs—but they are a step forward. I thank the Government for taking that step. It is rare for me to quote the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), who on Second Reading used an interesting phrase on which hon. Members might wish to reflect. He argued:
“The coalition is simply giving in to Lib-Dem pressure for this Bill to comply with the Human Rights Act”.—[Official Report, 7 June 2011; Vol. 529, c. 69.]
I am delighted to agree with him on this occasion, although I think that Ministers are actually a bit more sympathetic than he gave them credit for.
The Bill is an improvement. We have already heard Opposition Members describe the benefits that it will bring compared with control orders. Relocation will go. There will be no more internal exile, although there will be some judicial oversight. That move was opposed by the Opposition—or, at least, by the majority of Labour Members; there were some honourable exceptions. Curfews are over, but again that move was opposed by the Opposition. The proposals involve time limits. Nobody will be able to be held indefinitely; there will be a two-year maximum. Again, the Opposition tabled amendments to enable people to be held for longer. People will have regulated access to phones and computers, but again that was opposed by Labour. Those measures will allow people who have not been convicted of any offence to have a semblance of normal life. The Leader of the Opposition has admitted that Labour made errors over civil liberties, but it is clear that his party has not listened to him and has not learned from its mistakes.
The Bill represents a small step forward, but it is definitely a step in the right direction. The addition of the sunset clause makes it a step forward that I am willing to take, and I am delighted—not overjoyed; that would be overstating it—that we can take steps towards improving our civil liberties. I will vote for the Bill tonight.
I believe that the Bill is based on a fundamentally mistaken premise—that liberty in our country was undermined by laws passed by the previous Labour Government in their efforts to protect the public and to combat terrorism. We have heard the Minister advance that argument many times during the debate. It is not, however, the laws passed by the last Labour Government that threaten liberty. Liberty is threatened by the ideology that fed the bombers of the London underground, by the acts that they took part in, by plots including those of the shoe bomber and the underpants bomber, as well as by other plots that have mercifully either not worked or been foiled before they reached fruition.
Both parties in the coalition have in different degrees shared in that fundamentally mistaken premise, and they have now brought it into the Government as the foundation for this Bill. I wonder whether, if we were talking about this in a year or two’s time, the Government would still introduce such a Bill. I genuinely do not know the answer to that. What we have here is a mistaken premise giving us wrong policy that will lead to increased risk for the public. The Bill will give new rights to terrorist suspects. It will allow them freedom of movement. It will grant them access to mobile phones and the internet. It will also put a two-year time limit on even the weakened provisions that TPIMs represent.
I want to challenge the right hon. Gentleman’s point that any form of legislation could prevent a terrorist attack. If someone is convinced that that is what they want to do, wherever they are based in the UK and however they communicate, and whether they target the Olympics or somewhere else, they will conduct that attack, and possibly kill themselves as well. No legislation that we create in this House can prevent that. It is wrong to mislead the House and to suggest that we can somehow over-legislate or protect ourselves by what we do here. We cannot do that.
If that is what the hon. Gentleman believes, he should vote against the Bill because the Minister is pretending that this offers some measure of protection. These measures not only put the public at increased risk, but put the police and security services under increased pressure at the very time that their budgets are being cut. They mean less control and more surveillance. Surveillance itself compromises liberty, but does so simply in a more expensive and riskier way than some of the extra powers that the Government have chosen to reject.
To cap it all, in recent days we have seen the spectacle of the Government taking out an insurance policy against their own Bill by publishing draft emergency legislation but then refusing to add the powers to this Bill. The Government have failed utterly in today’s debate to specify the circumstances under which that insurance policy will be used. It is hard to escape the conclusion that my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) eloquently reached in her speech—that trade-offs within the coalition have shaped this policy. That is not good enough. We should not compromise the safety of our citizens on that basis. I echo the hope and prayer of my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary that none of the terrorist suspects who are granted increased freedoms under the Bill use them to kill innocent people. I have to say in all sincerity that if they do, the public will not forgive the Ministers or the Government who have passed this measure tonight.
There is little time, so I shall try to put my speech in bullet point form. I have no problem with TPIMs being called “control orders lite”. I believe we should think of evolution in security and I certainly think that we should look at experience.
I do not think terrorists will be able to get away with terrorist acts when they are under investigation. I used to watch them in Northern Ireland, but they could not do anything once we had them under proper surveillance. If they are really innocent, they can always fully co-operate with the Government and get off a TPIM, control order or whatever as soon as possible.
The threat comes from unknown people. We all know that, as all these attacks have come from people whom the security services have not been able to identify.
I had a big problem with relocation, but I was reassured by what the Minister said about enhanced TPIMs—that we could do something about the matter quite quickly. I do not think that we have by any means reached a definitive solution as yet. We are in an evolutionary process. No one likes control orders, TPIMs or anything like them, but we do not have any choice.
The threat will change over time and our reaction to it will have to change over time. We will revisit many times in future the problem of what to do with people who want to destroy our people.
Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.