Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateWednesday 20th June 2018
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberCourts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, the Bill is a vital first step in delivering legislation to underpin our ambitious and far-reaching programme to create a modern, world-class courts and justice system that is swift and straightforward and that works for everyone. Our programme of reform will also foster innovation and cement our reputation for global legal excellence.
In our manifesto, and in last year’s Queen’s Speech, the Government committed to modernising our courts and tribunals so they are fit for the 21st century. The way justice is administered and delivered in our courts and tribunals cannot stand still while the world changes around them. The justice system must embrace new technologies and seize the opportunities of the digital revolution. It must work for, and fit in with, the way people live their lives today. But modernisation must also ensure that the judiciary and staff who work in our courts and tribunals are empowered to deliver smooth and efficient justice. We have a world-class judiciary, and through the Bill we want to enable it to continue to deploy its time and expertise where and when it is most needed.
The Bill will assist in a number of different ways. It will allow suitably qualified and experienced staff to be authorised to handle uncontroversial, straightforward matters under judicial supervision. This will free up judges’ time to focus on more complex matters and will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the courts and tribunal system. The independent procedure rule committees will determine which functions staff may exercise in each jurisdiction. These judicially led committees are the right bodies to take these decisions, and this will ensure that the powers are properly scrutinised by judges, practitioners and other interested parties.
The Bill will make it possible for staff to carry out judicial functions in the Crown Court, where the activities of court officers are currently restricted to “formal and administrative matters” only. The Crown Court judiciary currently spends far too much time on routine tasks which could be delegated, such as changes to the starting time of a hearing, or changing the pretrial preparation hearing date, even if the parties are all in agreement about these matters. The Bill also removes the post of justices’ clerk, to enable the creation of a more flexible, cross-jurisdictional leadership role for authorised staff.
All this is subject to a robust framework of authorisation that affords the court and tribunal staff who exercise these functions the right protections and safeguards. Most significantly, the Bill makes such staff independent of the Lord Chancellor but accountable to the judiciary. Courts and tribunal staff will be able to exercise judicial functions only once authorised to do so by the Lord Chief Justice or his nominee, or the Senior President of Tribunals or his delegate. The judiciary will grant such authorisation only when satisfied that the relevant staff have the necessary competence and experience to exercise these functions. The Bill also applies to authorised staff the same protections that currently apply to justices’ clerks and assistants to justices’ clerks carrying out judicial functions in the magistrates’ and family courts. This includes protecting them from costs in legal proceedings and indemnification in respect of anything they do, or do not do, when exercising judicial functions in good faith.
Alongside these changes, the Bill includes measures to ensure that the system of judicial deployment is as flexible as possible. It will give the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals greater flexibility to make the best use of our judges’ experience, expertise and time. The judicial measures in the Bill include enabling recorders to sit in the Upper Tribunal and senior employment judges to sit as judges in the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal. This will broaden the pool of expertise that the tribunals can draw from to help them meet business needs. They also include extending the range of High Court judges to act as arbitrators. This will help meet the growth in demand in recent years for arbitration—for example, to resolve cases in the Chancery Division of the High Court. They will also remove the restriction on a judge being the president of more than one chamber of the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal. This will give the Senior President of Tribunals greater flexibility to manage the leadership of the tribunals without having to recruit and appoint a new chamber president immediately that there is a vacancy. Taken together, these measures will enable the judiciary to respond to the changing demands of the case loads of different jurisdictions and will make the best use of the existing cohort of judges to benefit all users of our courts and tribunals.
We are delivering the court reform programme in partnership with the senior judiciary. I am pleased that the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals have welcomed the Bill, commenting that its introduction is,
“a positive first step in legislation to deliver reform”.
Most of the measures have already been before Parliament as part of the Prisons and Courts Bill, which fell when the general election was called. The Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill is very much a first step, and we will bring forward further courts legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows.
We have not stood still waiting for this Bill; we have been pressing on with reform in areas where primary legislation is not required and we are making significant progress in enabling access to justice through online and digital means. In May, we rolled out nationally an online divorce service, allowing couples to apply for uncontested divorce digitally for the first time. People can also now make pleas online for low-level offences, such as traffic offences, and they can respond to jury summonses, track social security appeals, and issue and respond to civil money claims, all online. Over 16,000 people have already engaged with these pilots and are getting straightforward, digital access to the courts for the first time. The Bill supports that wider reform by making sure that we make best use of our judiciary and courts staff as we develop these new approaches to delivering justice.
The Bill, and our wider package of reforms, will ensure that our courts and tribunals system is fit for the 21st century and the digital age. It will help to ensure that both the judges and staff of our courts and tribunals are able to respond to the changing demands of a reformed system and, ultimately, to deliver better services for court users. The Bill marks an important first step in delivering a reformed courts and tribunals system and I commend it to the House. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, it is perhaps too late to bring our court system into the 20th century but this is the opportunity to take it into the 21st century. This may be a small step, but a small step on a long journey, when properly directed, will take us closer to our goal, and that is the intention of this legislation. To that extent it has been welcomed around the House. Let me address some of the points raised by noble Lords in the course of this helpful discussion.
First, we have seen the development of digital access, by way of pilots and its wider use, in conjunction with the issue of redundancy within physical court buildings. That means that there has to be a balance between the development of that digital provision and the closure of courts, as anticipated by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. That will continue. However, it has to be a balancing act—we appreciate that—and judgments will have to be made. We should not allow one aspect of digitisation to run ahead of the necessary demands for physical court buildings, and we have that in mind.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, spoke of the need for legislation so that we could review what was happening with the digitisation process. However, with respect, the purpose of primary legislation is to implement law, not to review that which we can already do. Of course, there are means and methods by which we can keep in mind and review the progress of the changes that we are taking forward.
The noble Baroness also referred to Clause 3 of the Bill and the delegation of official functions. There are two aspects to this: the delegation of judicial functions and the provision for legal advice. The two are distinct and have to be understood as being so. One should not confuse the two or push them together.
On the question of legal advice, justices’ clerks and assistant justices’ clerks are highly qualified individuals who, for a long time, have been in a position of tendering legal advice within the magistrates’ courts and the family courts. That, essentially, will continue; there will be no fundamental changes. It is hoped that these senior and well-qualified individuals will be able to deploy their talents beyond the magistrates’ courts if necessary. That is one aspect of flexibility that is being considered. However, when determining their qualification and function in the provision of legal advice, it is intended that these provisions will be specified by the Lord Chancellor in regulations in order that we can maintain the present system with one or two developments to it.
The staff who will be authorised to carry out certain judicial functions—the “box work” of district and circuit judges—will be determined by the independent jurisdictional rule committees, which are the appropriate bodies to take these decisions and ensure that the powers are properly scrutinised by judges, practitioners and other interested parties. It will be part of the role of the rule committees in determining the functions to consider whether staff should be required to have particular experience or qualifications. That is the level at which this should be done.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, also referred to the use of temporary judges. We consider that there are appropriate safeguards in place with regard to the deployment of temporary judges. We have to remember that there are some highly experienced members of the legal profession who would prefer to maintain their position as temporary judges rather than go forward to a permanent appointment because of the flexibility it provides for them. That is an extremely useful resource and not one that we would wish to imperil.
The noble Lord, Lord Beith, reminded us that there were provisions in the Prisons and Courts Bill that went well beyond the provisions in this Bill. I fully accept that, and in particular the issue—also raised by my noble friend Lady Newlove, who is the Victims’ Commissioner—of the cross-examination of victims of domestic violence. It does not fall within the purview of this Bill but we have it at the forefront of our minds and are determined to take it forward. It is an issue of parliamentary time.
The noble Lord also referred to the use of consolidation Bills. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern alluded to the difficulties that sometimes arise in ensuring that the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills is quorate. That is not because of the availability of Members of this House but possibly because of the non-availability of Members of the other House, given that it is a Joint Committee. We see the usefulness of consolidation as a way forward with regard to sentencing. I am aware of the work that the Law Commission has been and is still doing on this matter, but it will be necessary for some primary legislation to be brought forward in order, as it were, to establish a pathway for such consolidation provisions. We are conscious of that and again, we have it in mind. It is to be hoped that we will see some further developments in this area. Reference was also made to the utility of the Law Commission procedure for its own Bills, and again we are conscious of that when parliamentary time is limited.
My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern also alluded to the fact that while Scotland very sensibly managed to retain a Supreme Court, England and Wales rather lost their way in that regard. I am not privy to how it came about, but they agreed to cease to be a supreme court and became a senior court instead. It may be that there is room to revisit that issue at some point, but whether in the context of this Bill or otherwise is a different matter.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, welcomed the Bill and I thank him for that. He referred to the importance of flexibility in the deployment of judicial availability, and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, is one I agree with entirely. While clearly wanting to have flexibility in the deployment of our judicial asset, we do not want to lose the benefit of the specialist expertise that has been built up in areas such as family law, mercantile law, and the example he gave us of the Technology and Construction Court. We and the Lord Chief Justice will be conscious of that when taking forward the powers here with regard to cross-ticketing, as I believe it is sometimes called.
My noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts raised the question of the judicial retirement age. What I would say at this stage is that we are awaiting the report of the Senior Salaries Review Body, which I think is due in the late autumn, with regard to judicial salaries and pension conditions. I am aware that there have been issues with the judicial pension situation in particular. Once we have the report, it may be possible to look again at the judicial retirement age. My understanding is that at present, the average judicial retirement age is 67 or 68, so it is not a case of the judiciary actually going as far as the existing ceiling. There may be other explanations for that, including the desire of some in judicial office to contemplate an alternative career structure when they cannot proceed beyond 70 on the judicial Bench. It is clear that that requires further consideration.
My noble friend Lord Flight raised the issue of a dedicated housing court. I am aware of the discussions that have taken place on this. Sir Geoffrey Vos recently alluded to the fact that property disputes can take place anywhere between the county court, the First-tier Tribunal Property Chamber, and the High Court. We intend to consult later in the year, I hope, on the provision of a housing court so that this issue can be addressed.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, referred to the Family Drug and Alcohol Court. I do not have up-to-date details on what is happening with the funding for that but I undertake to write to him in due course. I will place a copy of the letter in the Library.
On the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, particularly that we should engage and consult widely before taking further steps, the danger is that that will engender further delay in the implementation of a courts modernisation process, which should not be unduly delayed if possible. We consider that there is general consensus about the need to move towards a more effective, modern and efficient courts system, involving the digitisation of the courts process but remembering the risk that some people may somehow be excluded from access to justice unless their needs and requirements are catered for. We are conscious of that.
With that, I hope that noble Lords will accept that, as I said, this is a small step but a step in the right direction that takes us closer to our goal. I therefore ask the House to give the Bill a Second Reading.
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 10th July 2018
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberCourts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 108-I Marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 76KB) - (6 Jul 2018)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury (CB)
My Lords, I will just add a footnote to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said. The Lord Chief Justice’s annual report is laid before Parliament, so the information about judicial training will be laid before Parliament in so far as the Lord Chief Justice considers it appropriate, he being responsible for training.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness said, this amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to publish, within 12 months of Clause 1 coming into force, a report on the availability of training for judges that will enable them to be flexibly deployed.
As has been noted, the Lord Chief Justice and indeed the Senior President of Tribunals already have far-reaching powers of deployment. The measures in the Bill seek to amend and build on existing powers in legislation. Of course, it is the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals who are responsible for arrangements for the training of the judiciary. As the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Neuberger, observed, it will be for the Lord Chief Justice, who is responsible for training, to report on these matters, as he seeks to do in his annual report. It would not be appropriate in these circumstances for that responsibility to pass to the Lord Chancellor.
With regard to funding for training, the Lord Chancellor is committed to providing suitable funding for the judiciary; that includes funding in the area of training, particularly by the Judicial College. I add only that that is in accordance with the arrangements that have to be made for resourcing under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. As I indicated, the Senior President of Tribunals has an equivalent responsibility in relation to judges and members of the tribunals within the scope of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Those responsibilities are exercised through the Judicial College.
The report that the Lord Chief Justice provides with regard to judicial training is a report to Parliament, so it will be available to Parliament in due course. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the Lord Chancellor to report to Parliament on the availability of judicial training, a matter that is properly for the senior judiciary.
In these circumstances, I venture that the amendment is unnecessary. We can be confident that all our judges are recommended for appointment by the Judicial Appointments Commission following a rigorous process. At a minimum, they will have met the statutory eligibility criteria for the relevant office. In relation to the offices in Clause 1, in many cases the judges will have already met the statutory eligibility criteria. In addition, when it is required, they will have also demonstrated specialist expertise—for example, where judges are appointed or authorised to specific jurisdictions, such as the Commercial Court, the Media and Communications List and the Technology and Construction Court or TCC.
The Judicial College strategy for 2018-20, published in December last year, states:
“All newly appointed and newly assigned judicial office holders will receive induction training”.
It says that, over this period:
“The College expects to deliver more induction training to support increasing flexibility of judicial deployment across courts and tribunals when workload fluctuates”.
The Judicial College has also been devising more cross-jurisdictional training in skills required for all jurisdictions because of the flexibility in deployment that will be available.
On whether or not the provisions in Clause 1 will make a significant contribution to what has been referred to as the recruitment crisis, I cannot say that on its own it will make a significant contribution to recruitment, but certainly the flexibility that is being introduced into the system may assist in that regard. We recognise that more needs to be done with regard to that matter. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will be aware that the terms and conditions of the senior judiciary will be the subject of a report later this year. I look forward to that so that we can consider how the matter can be taken forward.
The noble Lord, Lord Beith, raised the rollout of digitisation with regard to the court process. Of course, we hope eventually to bring all these developments together. They are complementary to each other. I acknowledge that we have not yet been able to introduce further provision within the narrow confines of this Bill, but it is our intention that the provisions anticipated by the Queen’s Speech, and indeed laid out in the original Prison and Courts Bill, will be brought forward when legislative time allows.
I hope that I have gone some way to reassuring the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the appropriate training arrangements are in place to support flexible deployment of the judiciary and that she will see fit to withdraw her amendment. I pause to observe that the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, arise in respect of later groups. Perhaps I may address them at that time.
Baroness Chakrabarti
I am grateful to the Minister for that reassurance as to process and to other noble and learned Lords for their exposition of the responsibilities on the Lord Chief Justice, the Judicial College and so on. I have yet to be reassured, however, about the adequacy of funding for this training or the adequacy of funding to the MoJ to deal with, among other things, this recruitment crisis. I fear that we may have to return to this matter but, for the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.
The Earl of Listowel (CB)
My Lords, on the matter of meeting the new challenge of litigants in person, particularly in the family courts, I highlight the value of the family, drug and alcohol court national unit. While the national unit supports these drug and alcohol courts for children in the public law system, the same judges—and I imagine the same clerks—also work in public family law. The wonderful thing about this unit is that it supports judges, clerks and the administration in family courts to become better at their job; better at managing these cases which are often very difficult and troubling.
So when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, writes to me—I am grateful to him for his letter today on the matter of the Family Drug and Alcohol Court National Unit—and says that the responsibility is now passing down to local authorities, I hear what he says and understand why he says it. However, there is a distinct benefit to the judiciary and the courts in training them to be more effective in working with these families, particularly now that they are often litigants in person. I therefore hope that he may keep an open mind, and that perhaps he will be persuaded that some money should come from central government for this special national unit for supporting family drug and alcohol courts.
We have a challenge with regard to the many families in this country who are struggling to stay together or to manage amicably and effectively a separation with the least damage to their children. Having well-equipped judges and clerks in the courts to help this process is vital, and I suggest to the noble and learned Lord that this special national unit can help with that.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, Amendment 3 relates to the power in Clause 3 for the Secretary of State to make consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions in relation to the authorised staff provisions by way of regulations. It provides that they are subject to a process of negative resolution by Parliament, while the amendment seeks to apply the affirmative resolution procedure.
We believe that it is necessary to take the power in Clause 3(2) to avoid any implementation difficulties or legislative inconsistencies that could arise from changing the law. We have already identified consequential amendments to primary legislation and have made provision for them in the Schedule to the Bill. The necessary changes to secondary legislation may not become apparent until after the provisions in the Bill are implemented; therefore, this power is needed so that the authorised staff provisions can be given full effect. However, I emphasise that it is not concerned with making consequential amendments to primary legislation, for which provision is already made in the Schedule, and so this is a narrow power. As I indicated, the power cannot be used to amend primary legislation, so in these circumstances we considered that the negative resolution procedure is entirely appropriate.
I hear what noble Lords and noble and learned Lords have said about moving from the negative to the affirmative procedure, and I will give further thought to that. However, at this stage I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, and in particular to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for their kind encouragement. In the light of all that, I am happy at this stage to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
My Lords, the noble Baroness is right to be concerned about the expertise and experience of the people who make decisions. My concern about the amendment is that it puts a potential straitjacket on the ability to appoint the appropriate people to make appropriate decisions. There will be many decisions where people with her requisite experience would be appropriate, but there will be others where less experience would be adequate for the decision-making.
Given that the rules which will set out the requirements will have to be laid before Parliament, and that many of the decisions outside the rules are made, effectively, by the Lord Chief Justice, while what the noble Baroness said has considerable force in some circumstances, it would unsatisfactorily reduce the flexibility of these proposals. They are largely not concerned with the problems of judicial recruitment which have been canvassed in the House today—which any self-respecting former judge, such as myself, is concerned about—but, none the less, the proposals in the amendment would unduly constrain the flexibility which the measures in the Schedule sensibly envisage.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Earl and the noble and learned Lord for their contributions.
There are two strands to this group of amendments, and it is important to differentiate between them at the outset. Amendments 5 and 6 relate to the qualifications for staff providing legal advice; Amendment 7 relates to the qualifications for staff exercising judicial functions. For those staff authorised to provide legal advice to judges at the family court and magistrates, the measures in this Bill replace existing statutory provision for legal advice to be provided by justices’ clerks and assistant clerks. In future, the function of giving legal advice will be exercised by a member of court or tribunal staff authorised by the Lord Chief Justice, or at least a party nominated by him.
Currently, there are different provisions governing the qualifications required of justices’ clerks and assistant clerks. The qualifications required of justices’ clerks are set out in statute. Those for assistant clerks, however, are provided in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor under the powers in Section 27 of the Courts Act 2003. Broadly, an assistant clerk must be a barrister in England and Wales, or a solicitor of the senior courts of England and Wales, or have passed the necessary exams for either of those professions, or have qualified as a legal adviser under historical rules that were in place prior to 1999. The vast majority of legal advice is currently provided by assistant justices’ clerks.
The position in the Bill is that the qualifications required for staff to be authorised to provide legal advice to justices of the peace and family court judges will also be specified by the Lord Chancellor in regulations, and the regulations must be made with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, which provides a further important check on this power. The Government take the view that regulations will provide a flexible and proportionate approach to establishing the right qualifications for those authorised staff providing legal advice to judges of the family court and magistrates. I note the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, about avoiding a straitjacket so far as these matters are concerned.
I understand the desire of the noble Baroness to see more detail of how our proposals will work in practice. In order to assist the debate on this matter, yesterday we published a draft of the regulations setting out the qualifications for those authorised staff giving legal advice. These regulations broadly reflect the legal qualifications currently required by assistant clerks, with the important addition of fellows of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives or those who have passed the necessary examinations to be a CILEx fellow. While the Government do not envisage that the regulation-making power will need to be exercised regularly, it would allow us to reflect any developments in the legal profession as to qualifications required to practise. The addition of CILEx fellows is an example of where this flexibility might well be needed.
I should add that Amendments 5 and 6 would impose a much stricter requirement than the current arrangements. Some of our legal advisers qualified through a scheme which has not been available since 1999 and which did not result in qualification as solicitors, barristers or fellows of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives. In addition, those who have completed the necessary examinations to become barristers in England and Wales or solicitors may become assistant clerks. The current practice works well and demonstrates that assistant clerks are appropriately qualified and experienced for the role they undertake, and we intend to retain these provisions in the new regulations. However, the approach taken by Amendments 5 and 6 would exclude some of our best and most experienced legal advisers. That, I would suggest, cannot be right. I want to be very clear about the Government’s intention. Legal advice will continue to be provided by authorised court and tribunal staff with appropriate legal qualifications as it is now. The draft regulations, which we have published, seek to confirm this.
Turning now to Amendment 7, as I have said, the powers in Clause 3 and the Schedule are not entirely new. For example, in the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal there is already a power for rules to provide for the exercise of judicial functions by staff. The most basic functions, such as issuing standard directions at the commencement of a case, can be carried out in some tribunal jurisdictions by authorised staff with no legal qualifications. Slightly more complex functions, such as applications for postponements of hearings, extensions of time, withdrawals and reinstatements, can be undertaken by caseworkers who have legal qualifications. The most complex of the delegated functions, such as the consideration of late appeals, are generally reserved to registrars who are legally qualified and have legal experience. It is not necessary for all authorised staff exercising judicial functions to possess legal qualifications, as many will be carrying out routine, straightforward tasks. Where powers currently exist, rule committees are already used to determining the qualifications needed for staff to exercise particular functions, and this works well. Again I note the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, about not placing these matters into an unnecessary straitjacket.
The Bill will allow the relevant procedure rule committees to set requirements relating to the necessary qualifications or experience of such staff. The committees are best placed to assess these requirements for their jurisdictions in light of the functions that they are authorising staff to exercise. As a further safeguard, a member of staff will not be able to exercise judicial functions until they have been authorised to do so by the Lord Chief Justice or his nominee, or by the Senior President of Tribunals or his delegate. Authorisations are therefore ultimately the responsibility of the judiciary, and they will not authorise staff unless satisfied as regards their competence.
As with Amendments 5 and 6, setting the qualifications bar as high as in Amendment 7 would rule out a large proportion of courts staff from exercising judicial functions, even though they might have been doing so for a number of years. Such a loss of expertise would render the provisions in Clause 3 and in the Schedule essentially unworkable. Based on that explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will feel able not to press her amendment.
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury
My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with these amendments, in the sense that, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has said, the idea of a decision being made by a non-judicial person and not being referable to a judicial figure is inconsistent with justice. Whether it is right to provide in such clear terms, and such uncompromising general terms, for the circumstances and requirements for such an appeal seems to me, again, to be questionable. While I absolutely see the requirement for a right of appeal, I would have thought that, again, it would be better to leave it to the rule committee, which, as the noble Baroness has said, consists of experienced people from all aspects of the justice system.
Having chaired the Civil Procedure Rule Committee for three years, I can say, as has been quoted in relation to its criminal equivalent by my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas, that considerable care is given to ensure that all the requirements of justice are met. It is very rare, if ever, that I can remember a decision being arrived at which was not arrived at by consensus. To my mind, in those circumstances, while it is essential that there is this right, it is a right whose details should be worked out, at any rate, by the rule committee—the rules of which, as I have said, sounding like a scratched record, are put to the House.
Lord Keen of Elie
Again, I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and other noble Lords for their contributions on this matter. Of course, the purpose of the amendments is to give a party in a case the right to request in writing that any decision of an authorised person exercising the functions of a court or tribunal be considered afresh by a judge.
The Schedule to the Bill ensures that the functions of a court or judge that authorised staff may exercise will be determined, and be given appropriate scrutiny, by experts in the form of the independent procedure rule committees. The purpose of these provisions is to enable authorised staff to undertake straightforward case management and preparation duties, thereby freeing up judges to focus on more complex and contentious matters. We are not proposing that these officeholders will undertake, for example, the determination of the final outcome in a contested case. It is our view that a statutory right set out in the Bill to have any decision made by an authorised person considered afresh by a judge would be inappropriate and disproportionate.
I have some sympathy with the intention behind the amendments and the desire to provide protections for court users. Our view, which I believe is reflected in the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, is that a decision about whether a right to reconsideration is needed should be left to the experts on the rule committees who are best placed to understand the circumstances in which a review mechanism may be required in their particular jurisdictions. It is not a case of one size fits all. To that extent, I would take issue with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The committees should also consider any appropriate time limits for review and the way in which any application should be made. Again, that is essentially a matter for the committees.
These provisions already exist in our procedure rules. Practice Direction 2E of the Civil Procedure Rules makes express provision for review in civil money claims of a decision by a legal adviser. Under the tribunals procedure, in accordance with Rule 4(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, there may be a review of a decision made by a caseworker. In the magistrates’ court, there is provision for an application to be renewed before the magistrates where it has been dealt with previously by a caseworker. In the Crown Court, there is an inherent jurisdiction to hear such applications at the time of an appropriate hearing. I seek to emphasise that there is a diversity of approaches, all of which generally apply their mind to the question of the review of the decision of a caseworker, and those reflect the views of the relevant rule committee as to what is appropriate for the particular tribunal, court or level of court. That is what we feel should be left open and which would be lost by this amendment.
I go back to an observation that was made earlier, quoting the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, at Second Reading, that,
“detailed restrictions on procedure are a very real fetter on the administration of justice”.—[Official Report, 20/6/18; col. 2039.]
That is what we want to free up here. It is appropriate that these decisions should be made by the procedure rule committees. I hope that in the light of those observations, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will see fit to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Chakrabarti
Once more, I am grateful to the Minister and other noble Lords for engaging with this argument. I do not wish to bore your Lordships’ with this, but there are some really serious concerns at play. I am told to be reassured by the rule committees, and of course I hold the rule committees in enormous esteem, but the rule committees cannot provide the funding that would avoid pressure to overdelegate to underqualified people in the future. When I raise these concerns, I am told that I must not worry because of the rule committees.
My second concern is that the public have a real and reasonable expectation that significant contested decisions in a court will be made by a judge; or, if not, at least that there would be a right of appeal or review before a judge. In the light of the repeated reassurances in the context of different attempts to constrain delegation in the Bill, we will have to return to this issue on Report. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 16th October 2018
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberCourts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 108-R-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (12 Oct 2018)
16:55 - Division on Amendment 8 - Ayes: 146 / Noes: 236 - Amendment 8 disagreed.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, we are dealing here with a very sensitive subject: that of authorising court and tribunal staff to exercise judicial functions. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, emphasised that the question may well be the scope of the Clause 3(2) power to make consequential provision. I am still puzzled as to why the Minister says that it is a power only to amend subordinate legislation, because that is not what it says. It states:
“The Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor may, by regulations made by statutory instrument, make consequential … provision”—
that is the part that concerns me—
“in relation to the Schedule”.
I understand the Minister seeking to reassure the House, as he sought to reassure the Committee, that the power may be validly used only to amend subordinate legislation, but I would welcome an explanation as to why that is so.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions that have been made with regard to this matter. Your Lordships will be aware that the power in Clause 3 allows the Secretary of State to make consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions in relation to certain provisions for staff by way of regulations.
I say immediately that I am most obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, because it would appear that we are being briefed by the same Bill team. That is hardly a surprise, but I am in a position to say that he has eloquently and clearly expounded the rationale for these provisions being in the Bill. I accept his point about how they are intended to operate as set out between Clause 3 and the schedule.
The power that we are talking about is constructed narrowly, both in regard to the nature of the amendments that it provides for and being in respect only of secondary, rather than primary, legislation. However, there seems to be some confusion about the extent of the provision. Perhaps noble Lords will allow me briefly to explain the interaction between the substantive power in paragraph 32 of the schedule and the consequential power in Clause 3(2).
The key substantive power in paragraph 32 is that the rules of court may provide for the exercise of judicial functions by authorised court and tribunal staff. It will therefore be the procedure rules that set out the details of which functions authorised staff may exercise, the qualifications and experience that they may require and any specific right of reconsideration should the relevant rule committee consider that one is needed. Rules are made by independent committees to govern procedure within courts and tribunals. All rules are made by statutory instrument subject to negative resolution in Parliament.
However, the procedure rules cannot be used to make all the necessary amendments to other secondary legislation, such as consequential changes to remove references within existing secondary legislation—I take as an example those to “justices’ clerks”, which will become redundant once these provisions are in force. For that, we will use regulations under Clause 3(2), which will in turn be subject to the negative resolution procedure. We could not use this consequential power to make substantive provision in relation to judicial functions.
Further, I refer to the width of the provision itself. The concept of an amendment that is consequential, transitional, transitory or saving is well understood, with many precedents. I should note that these terms are construed strictly by the courts. The power in Clause 3 is a narrow power so, although the rules may provide for a wide variety of functions to be exercised by authorised staff, it does not follow that the consequential power has wide application. In our case, this power is needed principally, as I say, to amend references in secondary legislation from, for example, “justices’ clerk” to “authorised officer”. So far, I think that we have identified about 200 references in over 60 pieces of secondary legislation that would need amendment; there may be more.
I come to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as to which legislation may be amended. It is normal practice in legislation to say expressly when a power is to be used to amend primary legislation. The Government have no intention of using this power to amend primary legislation, so there is no express provision for such amendments in Clause 3. We have identified consequential amendments to primary legislation for these provisions, which are provided for in the schedule. We do not need, or seek, any further power to amend primary legislation in the Bill.
In drafting the Bill, we thought carefully about the extent of the power in Clause 3(2). The Prisons and Courts Bill, from which the clauses originated, included powers to make consequential provision and for such powers to be able to be used to amend primary as well as secondary legislation. As we have now identified the consequential changes needed, as I say, we do not intend to make any further changes to primary legislation. In drafting Clause 3, there was therefore no inclusion of the express provision to make such changes to primary legislation.
I am happy to give noble Lords an undertaking in Hansard that the power in the Bill will not be used to amend primary legislation. If a future Government attempted to do so, I would expect the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments to bring this to the attention of Members of both Houses. I am content to give that undertaking without qualification, for the purposes of Hansard.
Lord Pannick
Can the noble and learned Lord not merely give the House an assurance that the Government do not intend to use the power to amend primary legislation but also tell the House that the Government’s intention and understanding is that the scope of this power in Clause 3 is such that it could not validly be used for that purpose?
Lord Keen of Elie
I endeavoured to set that point out in my previous observations, but I am happy to repeat them. If the Government’s intention had been to seek the power to amend primary legislation then, in accordance with precedent and court decisions on interpretation, they would have included the express power to do so in Clause 3, as they did in the Prisons and Courts Bill. There is no intention of doing that and they have not included that power. I do not consider that such a power is available to the Government, in light of the way in which Clause 3 is carefully framed, so I have no difficulty with that.
The provisions that we have now made within the Bill for dealing with this by way of the negative procedure found approval with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which is of course charged with reporting on such provisions. It noted in its 29th report that there was nothing in the Bill to which it wished to draw the attention of the House. I am aware that in the past the Magistrates’ Association raised a point similar to that raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I understand that once we—by which I mean the Bill managers—had explained the position, as they did to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, it withdrew its concerns because it appreciated the narrow scope of this provision. With that explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
“but does not include a function to which any of the following subsections applies.(2) This subsection applies to any function so far as its exercise involves authorising a person’s committal to prison.(3) This subsection applies to any function so far as its exercise involves authorising a person’s arrest, but it does not apply to the issue of a warrant (whether or not endorsed for bail) for a person’s arrest in order to secure that the person attends court proceedings relating to an offence of which the person has been accused or convicted in a case in which no objection is made by or on behalf of the person to the issue of the warrant.(4) This subsection applies to the function of making an order to recover possession of a building, or part of a building, which is occupied as a dwelling by—(a) the person against whom the order is made, or(b) the person’s spouse, civil partner or dependent child aged under 18,but it does not apply to the making of an order in a case in which no objection is made by or on behalf of the person against whom the order is made to the making of the order.(5) This subsection applies to the function of granting an injunction under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.(6) This subsection applies to the function of making an order under section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act 1997 (order for preserving evidence etc).”
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, in moving Amendment 5, I will speak also to Amendment 12, standing in my name. I am most obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his engagement, not only with me but with the Bill team, in consideration of the issues he raised in Committee and the time he took to discuss how we could address the concerns he mentioned during the debate on earlier amendments. As he indicated, the purpose of these amendments is to place in the Bill a limit to the functions that authorised staff may carry out by specifying certain functions that they will not be permitted to undertake. We consider that there are certainly judicial functions that authorised staff should not be permitted to exercise, particularly where these relate to deprivation of liberty or repossession of residential property. We have therefore brought forward amendments in response to the concerns that were raised.
Amendment 12 would prevent the Tribunal Procedure Committee enabling authorised tribunals staff to carry out functions that involve authorising a person’s committal to prison or arrest, or the granting of an injunction. Amendment 5 provides that similar restrictions will apply in the courts, subject to certain exceptions. Amendment 5 also prevents the relevant rule committees allowing authorised courts staff to make orders for repossession of residential property where the case is contested, and making search orders. Whether authorised staff may exercise other functions beyond those prohibited by this amendment will, as indicated, be for the independent rule committees to decide.
I hope that these amendments will find support across the House. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has indicated that we support these amendments, and indeed they respond to concerns that I raised. I indicated in Committee, and in discussion and correspondence with the department since, that I did not see the need to restrict the ambit of delegated functions in a way that could prevent authorised officers extending time for the service of documents, or making consent orders of a procedural nature in substantial civil claims.
However, I was extremely concerned that an authorised officer should not have the power to: make orders taking away the liberty of the subject; make a possession order that would have the effect of depriving someone, or their family, of their home; take the serious steps and risk the far-reaching consequences of granting injunctions; or make orders to preserve evidence—which, as I said earlier, could involve searches of private premises.
I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, and to the Bill team, for their consideration and acceptance of the principles I have made. Amendments 5 and 12 respond fully to our concerns and we support them.
Lord Keen of Elie
“67BA Exercise of relevant judicial functions: reconsideration of decisions (1) Before making rules of court that provide for the exercise of relevant judicial functions by authorised persons by virtue of section 67B(1), the authority with power to make the rules must take the following steps in relation to each of the functions in question.(2) The authority must consider whether the rules should include a right for the parties to proceedings in which a decision is made by an authorised person exercising the function to have the decision reconsidered by a judicial office holder.(3) If the authority considers that the rules should include such a right, it must include provision to that effect when it makes the rules.(4) If the authority does not consider that the rules should include such a right, it must inform the Lord Chancellor of—(a) its decision, and(b) its reasons for reaching that decision.”
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 7, I shall speak also to Amendments 9, 10 and 13, which stand in my name. When the Bill was in Committee, there was a general desire to see more safeguards on the face of the Bill and greater transparency around the process of making court and tribunal procedure rules. The Government have listened to these concerns and, after further discussion, we have tabled these amendments.
The purpose of the amendments is to require the committees, when making any rules to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions, to consider whether the rules should include a right to judicial reconsideration of decisions made by authorised staff exercising those functions. This means that the rule committees would have to consider whether each judicial function should be subject to a right to reconsideration. Furthermore, the amendments require that, if a rule committee decides against the creation of such a right in the rules that it makes, it will have to inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and the reasons for it.
The amendments should be read alongside existing statutory provisions relating to the making of court and tribunal rules. The committees are under a statutory obligation to,
“consult such persons as they consider appropriate”,
before making rules. If, following consultation, a rule committee chose not to include a right to reconsideration in its rules, it would have to inform the Lord Chancellor of this and, as I indicated, it would also have to give reasons for the decision. The Lord Chancellor would then have two options: either to ask the committee to reconsider its decision, as he has the power to ask the rule committees to make rules, or, if he agrees with the committee, to lay the rules in Parliament. In doing so, we would expect the Lord Chancellor to set out, in the Explanatory Memorandum to accompany the statutory instrument containing the rules, the committee’s rationale for not including a right to reconsideration. The amendments would therefore ensure much greater transparency in the decision-making process.
Our amendments would ensure that the jurisdictional rule committees continued to play a full part in determining the most appropriate mechanism for reviewing decisions by authorised persons. I hope that in the light of these amendments the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will consider her position with regard to her Amendments 8 and 11, which fall within this group, but perhaps I can defer that and allow her to state her position with regard to those amendments.
Lord Pannick
Before the Minister sits down, can he give the House a practical example of the exercise of relevant judicial functions by someone who is not a judge in respect of which it would not be appropriate to allow for a review by someone who is a judge?
Lord Keen of Elie
One obvious example is the issuing of a summons. Such persons issue about 2.5 million summonses at the instigation of public authorities each year. If every one of those applications for a summons was the subject of judicial reconsideration, with the kind of time limits alluded to in Amendments 8 and 11, the delays involved would be enormous. There are other means by which, in due course, a party may seek to challenge the issuance of such a summons. I take that as one clear example of where it would not be appropriate for there to be judicial reconsideration.
Baroness Chakrabarti
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 8 and to Amendment 11, which is consequential, both of which were drafted by the Bar Council.
Clause 3 and the Schedule to the Bill provide for judicial functions to be delegated to authorised staff across the criminal, civil and family courts and tribunals. This would allow decisions that are currently made by independent judges to now be made by employees of Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service. The Bill provides that authorised staff will be independent of the Lord Chancellor when carrying out these delegated judicial functions, but they will remain court staff and will not take the judicial oath of independence.
Amendments 8 and 11 would ensure that a party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of relevant judicial functions or of a tribunal—by virtue of Section 67B(1) or paragraph 3 of Schedule 5 respectively—may apply in writing within 14 days of the service of the order to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.
A statutory right of reconsideration allowing any party to a decision by an authorised person to have that decision reconsidered by a judge was recommended by Lord Justice Briggs in his 2016 report Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report. That right is currently already provided for, for example, in the tribunal procedure rules. Lord Justice Briggs said:
“The creation of an extensive right to have the decisions of Case Officers considered by a judge has from the outset been regarded as the natural safety valve for concerns about what was … described as the delegation of judicial functions to persons who are not judges”.
As a minimum safeguard, the right of consideration has the benefit of freeing an authorised person from the obligation to produce detailed reasons for every decision, as would be the case if the right of appeal were, for example, created. It is important to point out that this consideration on the papers by a judge is not the same as a full right of appeal. It has the additional benefit of going further than a right of review, guaranteeing judicial oversight of a decision which a right of review would not ensure.
Crucially, this statutory right would also ensure compliance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights—the right to a fair trial—surrounding decisions affecting people’s rights by an independent and impartial person, which is not a member of court staff. It is a proportionate safeguard relevant to the new powers created by the Bill. Your Lordships are aware that Article 6 provides that the determination of a person’s civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge against them must be undertaken by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
The requirements of independence apply not only to the tribunal but also to any judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power. As the Ministry of Justice acknowledges in its memorandum on the Bill,
“In considering independence, … guarantees against outside pressures are relevant – as is the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence”.
In that human rights memorandum, the MoJ suggests that it is intended that,
“case management decisions which it is proposed these authorised members of staff will be able to take will be uncontentious and not of sufficient importance to engage Article 6”.
However, case management decisions can have a significant impact on shaping the issues, progress and ultimate outcome of the case. For example, a decision on the appropriate timescales within which a party should take a step in proceedings may be significant, as failures to comply with that timescale can subsequently lead to some or all of the party’s case being struck out.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice’s fact sheet on the delegation of functions to non-judicial staff states:
“In future, we expect that authorised staff will be able to carry out a range of functions and responsibilities, including case management powers and some mediation roles”.
This suggests that it is envisaged that such staff will have a role beyond merely making non-contentious decisions on purely procedural matters in future.
The Government’s welcome amendment excludes some functions from delegation, but there are still others that may be significant to the progress and outcome of an important case. Such functions—for example, the issuing of an arrest warrant to secure a person’s attendance in court—can still be delegated to non-judicial staff.
In Committee, the Minister argued that a blanket right to reconsideration across all jurisdictions will not work in practice, as it will add significant cost and delay to the process on the basis that a dissatisfied party will inevitably apply for reconsideration by a judge, thereby negating the benefits of delegating decisions to staff. However, this objection was dealt with by Lord Briggs in his Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report. He accepted that,
“an unfettered right of reconsideration will be a necessary long-stop”.
He also cited evidence from real-life precedents, suggesting that where such a right exists elsewhere, the number of reconsideration applications is low. Surely that should continue to be the case, particularly if, as the Ministry of Justice suggests, the decisions being made by authorised staff are properly non-contentious.
The Government’s concession, placing an obligation on the relevant rule committee to consider a right to judicial reconsideration for delegated functions, does much less to satisfy our concerns than their concession on delegated functions themselves, such as the safeguard in relation to a person’s liberty in their home. In fact, the Government’s concession here replicates the fundamental problem with the effect of the Bill. Placing the obligation on the rules committee, which ultimately does not have the budget to fund the Courts Service, delegates a legislative duty to an unaccountable body.
We on this side of your Lordships’ House strongly believe that Parliament has a legitimate role in ensuring that the new system of delegation proposed in the Bill includes a backstop protection for the right to a fair trial. Consequently, I urge noble Lords to support our amendments, which have already been endorsed by the Law Society, the Bar Council and the Equality and Human Rights Commission. They propose a statutory right to judicial reconsideration for any party to a judicial decision made by an authorised person, or non-judge. This would afford stronger protection for the right to a fair trial and guarantee the independent and impartial determination required by Article 6.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I support what the Government seek to do and urge a substantial degree of caution in respect of the proposal put forward by the noble Baroness. The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee and the other ones—the civil, family and tribunals committees—are independent bodies. They look at and scrutinise everything with a great deal of care. They are representative of all interests in litigation. For example, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee has a number of defence lawyers and people from other aspects of the criminal justice system who proceed with great care to look at what is before them. It was suggested that they are unaccountable. I say on this amendment that the provisions for having to consider the right of reconsideration and then reporting that to the Lord Chancellor informing him of the decision and reasons is a traditional form of explanatory accountability.
Secondly, we ought to take into account the fact that, in our system of justice, the operation of the criminal, civil, tribunals and family procedures rule committees has enabled us far more than any other state to keep our rules up to date. I urge the greatest caution in trying to put into primary legislation anything that restricts in this way the powers of the rule committees. For example, there are areas where it has proved difficult to modernise and to reform the system—for example, for extradition appeals, where provisions put into primary legislation made the system almost unworkable. Certainly what was in the primary legislation in relation to videolinks and the protection of vulnerable witnesses proved a great obstacle.
I therefore urge your Lordships to consider that this amendment, as my friend the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, provides the right balance. It gives discretion to a body that knows and has a lot of experience, but it contains that degree of explanatory accountability that will make sure that it does not do anything—even if we were to worry that it might—that goes outside a proper and just delegation. It is always difficult to think of issues on the spur of the moment but, for example, one of the areas that troubles courts quite often is the short time limits if you have a recalcitrant party. It might be that, in very restricted circumstances, a rule committee would say, “This is the kind of area where a reconsideration is not necessary when a final extension has been given”. But the important point is that I urge your Lordships to trust the rule committees, particularly now that there is this additional safeguard.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to all noble Lords for their contributions. The Government’s position remains that the independent procedure rule committees, comprised of experts and practitioners from each jurisdiction, are best placed to decide whether a right of reconsideration is needed for each judicial function that staff are permitted to exercise. Similarly, they are best placed to determine what such a right should look like. In that context, I gratefully adopt the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, the former Lord Chief Justice, and of the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
The approach taken in Amendments 8 and 11, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would impose a blanket right of reconsideration across all jurisdictions, with arbitrary deadlines. It simply would not work in practice. For example, the amendments would allow a person 14 days to apply for reconsideration. Why would a 14-day limit apply across all jurisdictions and for every judicial function that authorised persons are permitted to exercise, some of which are entirely straightforward case management and preparation duties? Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to time limits. What happens if you have a request to adjourn a hearing due to take place the following day? If it is refused, you then have 14 days for reconsideration. In other words, it would automatically be successful because of this blanket provision. That is just one of many examples.
Each jurisdiction has its own ways of working and needs mechanisms for reviewing decisions that can respond to this. For example, the rule committees in the civil and tribunals jurisdictions have already built in a specific right to judicial reconsideration of decisions made by authorised staff. The magistrates’ courts and the family court have their own existing mechanisms for reviewing various decisions. These amendments, as proposed by the noble Baroness, would cut across all those existing provisions.
I mentioned an example in response to a query from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The magistrates’ courts issue something in excess of 2 million local authority summonses every year. If there were a right to reconsideration in every one of those cases, where would we begin and end with regard to the administration of such applications? Indeed, in the magistrates’ courts, there are already a number of ways for a defendant to challenge a case in which a summons has been issued. He or she can make an initial argument to the court hearing the case that the summons should not have been issued. You can contest the substantive application made by the local authority. There is even the possibility of judicial review. The matter is already covered.
Creating a mandatory right to apply for judicial reconsideration of the decision is not only unnecessary but would also be burdensome and ineffective. It is in these circumstances that I reiterate that it is appropriate, as other noble Lords have observed, that these matters should remain with the independent procedure rule committees and that I again commend Amendments 7, 9, 10 and 13. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, not to press her amendments in this group. I cannot commit to reflecting any further between now and Third Reading on these matters, so if the noble Baroness wishes to test the opinion of the House, she should do so now.
Lord Keen of Elie
“Schedule 5 (Tribunal Procedure Rules) is amended as follows.”
Lord Keen of Elie
““function” does not include—(a) any function so far as its exercise involves authorising a person’s committal to prison or arrest;(b) any function of granting an injunction;”
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 13th November 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberCourts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 108-R-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (12 Oct 2018)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I shall not trouble the House for long. Notwithstanding some differences of principle between us, I am very grateful to the Minister and his Bill team for the limited movement towards safeguards in the Bill, but it is a shame that the Bill was not a possible vehicle for the prohibition of cross-examination of domestic violence victims in the family courts. It is government policy and it would surely command cross-party and non-party support, so I hope the Minister will talk to his colleagues in government and make time for this discrete but vital measure before too long.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, we are conscious of the need to address this measure and have of course addressed it in the past. I note what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said on that topic but, nevertheless, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
The noble and learned Lord has pre-empted me but I wanted to add to what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, with our thanks for the co-operative way in which this Bill was handled. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, his ministerial colleague the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, and the excellent Bill team who did so much work on it. We on these Benches are very grateful for the way in which new Sections 67A and 67C of the Courts Act 2003 were inserted, limiting the functions of delegated officers and providing for judicial reconsideration of delegated decisions. They were dealt with co-operatively and it is a tribute to the way this House can deal with matters co-operatively and achieve improvements to the Bill. We are content with the Motion.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I apologise to the House for pre-empting the noble Lord and I am obliged for his observations. Again, I move that the Bill do now pass.
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [Lords]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 27th November 2018
(6 years ago)
Commons ChamberCourts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 108-R-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (12 Oct 2018)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Mr David Gauke)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
It is a great pleasure to move the Second Reading motion. It is possible that in Westminster at the moment other matters are catching Members’ attention and that the focus of the House has not been sufficiently on the Bill, but I am delighted to have the opportunity to move the motion. The Bill has already been considered in the other place and takes an important step forward for our courts system.
Our judiciary, together with our courts and tribunal service, are rightly regarded as among the finest and most independent in the world. However, the way our courts and tribunals work cannot stand still. They must be able to meet the demands of delivering modern-day justice, meet the needs of the society they serve, and administer justice in the most effective and efficient way.
The justice system must work for all those who use it, as well as for the judges and legal professionals who work in it. That means realising the huge potential of new technology and the law tech revolution to improve people’s experience of and access to the justice system and to open up new routes to justice. It is certainly my determination that the UK should be seen as being at the forefront of adopting new technology, whether in our courts and tribunal system, which is the issue before us today, or more widely, with legal professionals making use of technology. That is one of the reasons that we have instituted a law tech committee, led by Christina Blacklaws of the Law Society, which is designed to take us forward in that area. It is an important part of what we need to do.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
My right hon. Friend may be aware that I did an Industry and Parliament Trust fellowship in the law with judges, and my experience of the different courts I went to showed the enormous gap between the commercial courts, which were technologically very superior, and the tribunal system, where we might as well have been using a quill pen. Is this reform going to solve that problem?
Mr Gauke
Our court reform programme as a whole, which I will come on to, will ensure that we use technology wherever possible. It is right that we embrace that. The Bill is part of the process—it is not all of the process—that will ensure that we modernise. I have cited in the past ways in which artificial intelligence, for example, is being used within the legal profession. An example I have given is a case where AI was used to check a number of contracts to spot potential errors. The rate of success of the AI was somewhat better than that of the experienced lawyers, and if I remember rightly the task was done in 26 seconds rather than 92 minutes. I make that point to illustrate the opportunities in terms of technology and the law.
Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)
Innovation and modernisation are vital, but will the Secretary of State take this opportunity to recognise that the single most important strength of our judicial system is the judiciary who work in it and that everything must be done to ensure that we have a broad pipeline of talent so that they continue to be the best in the world?
Mr Gauke
I very much agree. We have a judicial system that is widely respected around the world for its independence and excellence, and that must long continue. I suspect that my hon. Friend is hinting at the question of how we can get more outstanding candidates to apply to the judiciary. It is right that we should address that challenge. He is right to suggest that this is one of our strengths as a country. It will be important in the years ahead as we leave the European Union that our legal system should continue to be widely respected. I believe that there are great opportunities for the UK to become even stronger as a legal centre, and I am keen for that to happen.
Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
Will the Secretary of State give way?
Robert Neill
The Secretary of State makes an important point about the balance that needs to be struck in these areas. He has given an example of the use of artificial intelligence being appropriate for the checking of documents, and work on dealing with disclosure parameters has already been successfully piloted by the Serious Fraud Office. Would he concede that there is a distinction to be drawn between those essentially transactional but important operations, such as disclosure searches, and the application of human judgment that should be brought to, for example, a charging decision by the SFO? Does he agree that any determination of the facts or issues of a case should clearly be done by a human judge, having heard the arguments, and that their workload could be slimmed down but not replaced by the use of AI?
Mr Gauke
I agree. I note that my hon. Friends are all quick to make the case for the importance of the skilled human being in these circumstances, and rightly so. We must remember that technology is our servant and not our master.
I make these points because our court reform programme is being undertaken in the context of an embracive technology and the Bill is an aspect of that programme. I will digress no further because it is not essentially a technology-based Bill. However, to follow up on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), the importance of skilled individuals will continue to be key, and the Bill will ensure that the time of our most skilled individuals—our judges—is deployed as efficiently as possible.
Nigel Huddleston (Mid Worcestershire) (Con)
I have to say that innovation and modernisation are not normally things that we associate with our courts. Given the feedback that has already come in on things such as making responses on juries online, does my right hon. Friend agree that this is not only useful to the courts but makes life easier for the public?
Mr Gauke
Absolutely; that is a key point. Perhaps my hon. Friend has set my Department the challenge of ensuring that people associate the modernisation of technology with the court system. We will know that we have succeeded when he tells us that that is the case. He makes the strong point that this is ultimately about delivering justice. We need to have strong support for the process involved and ensure the satisfaction of those who need to resolve a dispute or to undertake a process. The early signs from our work with online divorce processes are encouraging, and the feedback has been very positive.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
I rise as the co-chair of the Justice Unions Parliamentary Group. I am interested in what the Secretary of State is saying about artificial intelligence, but it seems to me that one of the driving forces behind the Bill is not necessarily to improve the administration of justice but to cut costs by pushing workloads down the grades so that staff will be taking on additional work above their current grade without additional remuneration. Surely he should recognise that making savings in the application of justice comes at a cost to staff and to the public’s experience of justice.
Mr Gauke
I do not think that the hon. Lady is correct in the association that she makes. The reality is that we have to ensure that our resources are deployed as efficiently as possible. That is to the benefit of the system as a whole. I will make the case in more detail as to why the steps taken in the Bill to give authorised staff greater responsibility to undertake some roles that they are currently unable to undertake will be to the benefit of the system as a whole. I make no apology for wanting to find efficiencies within the system, but this is in the context of a £1 billion court reform programme. Those efficiencies can improve the experience of the users of the system, and could also ensure that judges will be able to use their time in the areas that are most useful to them. Indeed, the experience of authorised Courts and Tribunals Service staff will be a more positive one, as they will be able to make a greater contribution to the efficient running of the court system.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
Setting aside the whys and wherefores of the Bill, may I invite my right hon. Friend to confirm from the Dispatch Box that the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers between the judiciary and Parliament will be absolutely sacrosanct and at the heart of everything that he, his ministerial colleagues and the Department will do? This is an issue of great concern to many people, irrespective of the Bill, and people always need to have faith that this central pillar of how we are governed in this country will remain intact, protected and preserved.
Mr Gauke
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving me the opportunity to respond to that point. The independence of the judiciary is at the heart of our system and a long-standing part of it. It is as important, if not more important, than it has ever been that we reiterate that and support those institutions. As I was saying a moment ago, this is a big part of what our nation is about, and in the years ahead, after we have left the European Union, one of the most important institutions to us will be our independent judiciary. It is a large part of what the UK is about and of how we should project ourselves around the rest of the world.
Jeremy Lefroy (Stafford) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is making a strong case. Perhaps this is for another time, but in the context of having a strong, independent judiciary, will he look again at the rather arbitrary cap of the age of 70 for magistrates? We have many really qualified people who wish to contribute to the independent justice system of this country but who are prevented from doing so simply because of their age.
Mr Gauke
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point, although he takes me away a little from the terms of the Bill. I realise that there is a debate about that matter, and there are arguments either way about the current age limit. I have certainly received representations calling for an increase on the current age of 70, and we continue to look closely at those arguments. I believe that there has to be an age limit, and it is a question of judgment as to what it should be. I would be delighted to discuss this with my hon. Friend in the Tea Room if the opportunity to do so should arise.
Alex Chalk
Building on the point that was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) about independence, may we have an assurance that under the Bill the procedure rule committees that decide what the authorised staff can do will be able to exercise that discretion free from any interference from the centre, so that they can ensure that only those jobs that ought properly to be delegated to those staff are so delegated, and that extraneous considerations such as cost need not be forced upon them when they make their decisions?
Mr Gauke
My hon. Friend brings me back to the Bill and makes a good point—one which came up on several occasions during the deliberations in the other place about the extent to which we should be prescriptive, or whether powers should be left with the rule committees. I share his instinct that as much as possible should be left to the rule committees, because they are best placed to make such assessments. Indeed, that leads to points made by distinguished retired judges in the other place about not being over-prescriptive. Such matters may be a point of discussion this afternoon or at the Bill’s later stages.
I now turn to the Bill in greater detail. The measures will help to provide the greater flexibility and responsiveness that we need within our court system. That includes freeing up judges’ time from the most routine tasks associated with court cases. The Bill will build on existing powers that already enable staff in most courts and tribunals to be authorised to exercise some of the functions of judges. It will continue to allow appropriately qualified and experienced staff in the civil, family and magistrates courts, the High Court, the Court of Appeal, the Court of Protection and tribunals to be authorised to carry out uncontroversial and straightforward judicial functions under judicial supervision. The Bill will enable those arrangements to be extended for the first time to the Crown court, where court officers can only currently undertake formal and administrative matters. Allowing court and tribunal staff to exercise a wider range of judicial functions will potentially free judges up from undertaking more regular tasks, such as changing the start time of a hearing or changing a pre-trial preparation hearing date, so that they can focus on the more substantive matters of the case.
Sir Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD)
I welcome the Government’s amendments in the other place to paragraphs 32 and 44 of the schedule, which were secured by my noble Friend Lord Marks, because they ensure that only a judge will have the power to deprive people of their liberty or eject them from their family home. As we give court staff some more powers, it is important that we set down some markers for the types of decisions that should be reserved for trained professional judges.
Mr Gauke
Indeed, and I will turn to that point in a moment. I hope that the clarification provided by those amendments will be widely welcomed in this House. The passage of this Bill in the other place was characterised by a constructive and co-operative approach from both sides, and I hope that that will continue to be the case—I suspect it will, but we shall see—because the point of those amendments was to provide particular protections. Other issues debated in the other place included suggestions about being more prescriptive. As I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), it is right that we use the judicially led rule committees in many of those areas, but the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Sir Edward Davey) makes a perfectly fair point.
Luke Hall (Thornbury and Yate) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is being generous in giving way. He is talking about the use of judicial time, so will he explain in a bit more detail how the measures will address the problem of the backlog of cases and what effect the Bill is likely to have on improving the current situation?
Mr Gauke
My hon. Friend raises a good point that comes back to how we ensure that judges’ time is used most effectively, freeing them up from the most routine tasks, such as changing the start time of the hearing, and enabling them to focus on more complex matters. They could then ensure that case preparation and management was resolved proportionately and at an appropriate level. That could also help to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the court tribunal system. There is an opportunity to ensure greater consistency in the current arrangements, and it is right that we strengthen safeguards, as has already been touched upon.
It is important to guarantee the independence of all authorised staff when they are exercising judicial functions. Clause 3 will bring authorised staff under the leadership of senior lawyers. Although we are removing the post of justices’ clerk from the statute, the functions that such clerks undertake will continue to be carried out by heads of legal operations, who have a much greater leadership role across all jurisdictions. The change will ensure that we make all authorised staff ultimately accountable and subject to the direction of the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals.
John Howell
My right hon. Friend is being generous with his time. The place where these changes can have the most effect is in the tribunal system. I have sat through tribunals that have lasted for days for no good reason, tying up three independent assessors. Surely, it is there that the changes he proposes can have the biggest effect.
Mr Gauke
My hon. Friend may well be right. The Bill of course relates to courts and tribunals, and it is important to bear in mind the impact on tribunals. Tribunals perhaps do not always attract the attention that they might, but they play a vital role within our justice system. If we can find ways to improve their efficiency, we should all welcome that. That is a key part of what this Bill is about.
Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)
My right hon. Friend mentioned the start times of hearings. As he will know, Northallerton magistrates court, which serves many of my constituents, is due to close under these reforms. It is important that people can get to a hearing on time, so will requiring people to travel further to a more distant court be taken into account? Will there be mitigation, such as video links, and will those things be in place and operating before the court closes?
Mr Gauke
Journey times are taken into account. I am conscious that substantial issues can arise in rural areas, but journey times are considered. As for technology, if I remember correctly, the change at Northallerton magistrates court is conditional upon ensuring that the technology is properly in place. In the context of this Bill, authorised staff will be able to play a bigger role in determining start times, for example, and one hopes that that might enable the process to run as smoothly as possible and ensure that people’s concerns about when they can get to court can be properly considered.
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
With the distance between courts being a factor not just for claimants and defendants but for witnesses, does the right hon. Gentleman agree that witnesses may sometimes choose not to go to a court if it is too far away, which can cause hearings to be cancelled?
Mr Gauke
The hon. Gentleman takes me further in the direction of the debate about the court closure plan, but we need to ensure that our resources are deployed as efficiently and effectively as possible. In that context, we have reduced the number of courts, but that money makes a contribution to our overall finances and can be reinvested as part of the court reform programme. We have to take every opportunity to make use of new technology to ensure that the experience of the justice system—the hon. Gentleman rightly highlights that witnesses are important in many cases—is as positive as possible.
I have touched on this already, but safeguards are important. Clearly, the delegation of certain judicial powers to court and tribunal staff needs to be done sensitively and sensibly, and with appropriate safeguards. Independent, judiciary-led procedure rule committees, which govern the rules within courts and tribunals, will determine which functions court staff may exercise in each jurisdiction and what qualifications and experience they will need. Those rules will then be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. All staff authorised to exercise judicial functions will ultimately be accountable to, and subject to, the direction of the Lord Chief Justice or the Senior President of Tribunals.
I am grateful for the valuable insight that Members of the other place brought to debating and scrutinising the measures in the Bill, particularly in relation to the exercise of judicial functions. Many of them drew on their own wealth of judicial experience and expertise in considering the practical issues of implementation.
Concerns were raised in the other place about the safeguards in delegating judicial functions to authorised staff. For example, concerns were raised that certain powers, particularly those that affect the rights and freedoms of citizens, should only ever be directly discharged by the judiciary. Indeed, the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton raised that point.
We have listened to those concerns, and we tabled amendments in the other place that will prevent specific judicial functions from being undertaken by authorised staff, including authorising a person’s committal to prison; in most cases, authorising a person’s arrest; granting certain injunctions; making orders for repossession of residential property, where the orders are contested; and making search orders.
We tabled amendments that will require the procedure rule committees, when making rules to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions, to consider whether the rules should include a right to judicial reconsideration of decisions made by such staff. The amendments will also require that, if a procedure rule committee decides against the creation of such a right, the committee will have to inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and of the reasons for it. This will ensure much greater transparency and accountability.
The measures in the Bill strike the right balance between creating a framework for the delegation of judicial functions to authorised staff, with appropriate safeguards, and giving discretion to procedure rule committees and the senior judiciary to make the arrangements work in practice.
Alex Chalk
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the principle of delegating functions to authorised staff is not, of itself, new? There has been a successful history, particularly in the magistrates courts, of delegating powers to justices’ clerks to carry out a number of functions, which even include such matters as issuing summonses or requesting pre-sentence reports. The principle is in place but, of course, the execution is vital.
Mr Gauke
My hon. Friend is right, and his experience is a benefit to the House. He knows of what he speaks. This principle is not new, but it is one where we think we can go further, to the benefit of the courts and tribunals system and of the users of that system. He is absolutely right.
A balance needs to be struck on the safeguards, and we believe we have found the right balance. Indeed, the position was strongly supported in the other place by Lord Thomas, the former Lord Chief Justice, and Lord Neuberger, a former President of the Supreme Court, both of whom have a wealth of experience in this area, having chaired procedure rule committees. The combination of Lord Thomas, Lord Neuberger and my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, very distinguished lawyers all, is one that should reassure the House.
Lord Thomas warned on Second Reading against putting too much detail into the Bill:
“Experience has shown that detailed restrictions on procedure are a very real fetter on the administration of justice.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
Similarly, Lord Neuberger warned in Committee of placing
“a potential straitjacket on the ability to appoint the appropriate people to make appropriate decisions.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 882.]
Lord Marks also warned against setting too high a bar on the qualifications of court and tribunal staff exercising judicial functions:
“It seems…that the purpose of this part of the legislation is to increase efficiency and…to everybody’s advantage…the speed of decision-making… Having a legislative requirement that all delegated decisions must be taken by qualified lawyers with a minimum experience requirement runs the risk of frustrating this objective.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 414.]
I make those points in anticipation that this may be an issue that we debate further this afternoon, but I think the case is persuasive.
Kevin Hollinrake
Will the Bill make it easier to set up a new tribunal? I speak in the context of my role as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on fair business banking and finance, which has the idea of setting up a financial services tribunal. We are not seeing a level playing field in our courts between banks and small businesses, and we feel such a tribunal may be a solution. Will the Bill make it easier to establish such a tribunal, or will it not have any relevance in that area?
Mr Gauke
As it stands, and I do not want to encourage my hon. Friend to table amendments, the Bill will not necessarily do that. He has taken a great interest in this issue, and he has been speaking to my hon. Friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury. I know my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) will pursue the matter with his customary tenacity, and I do not wish to discourage him from doing so, unless he considers that the best way to manifest it is by tabling amendments to the Bill, in which case I would urge him to look elsewhere. I thank him for his intervention.
I draw the House’s attention to additional important safeguards in the Bill. It will provide a guarantee of the independence of staff and their decision making, by applying the statutory independence and immunities that currently apply to justices’ clerks to all authorised staff when exercising judicial functions. A member of staff will be able to exercise judicial functions only once authorised to do so: by the Lord Chief Justice or his nominee, for the courts; or by the Senior President of Tribunals or his delegate, for the tribunals. The Bill includes protections for authorised persons from legal proceedings, costs in legal proceedings and indemnification in respect of anything they do or do not do when exercising judicial functions in good faith.
The Bill also includes measures to enable greater flexibility in the deployment of judges across our family and county courts, the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal. For example, it will permit recorders to sit in the upper tribunal, enable senior employment judges to sit in the first-tier tribunal and upper tribunal and enable presidents of the employment tribunals for England, Wales and Scotland to sit in the employment appeal tribunal. This will make best use of the experience and skills of serving judges, and it will give the senior judiciary more flexibility to respond to sudden changes in demand and to manage case backlogs in particular jurisdictions. It will also allow judges to gain experience of different types of cases, which will help with career progression. The Bill also contains provisions relating to the amendment of judicial titles, which will ensure consistency and will help to avoid confusion for court users.
The measures in the Bill are an important part of our wider £1 billion reform programme, which will see our courts and tribunals modernised for the 21st century and our digital age. New online services are already providing new routes to justice for many. For example, of all applications for divorce from unrepresented citizens, more than six out of 10 are now made online, after the new service was launched in May. That amounts to more than 20,000 people in just over six months. It has saved time, cost and effort for them and the system. Reforms in the criminal justice system—from making pleas online for low-level offences, to the piloting of a new digital system to allow the police, Crown Prosecution Service, courts, judiciary and defence to have a single shared view of case information online—are making it work better for everyone, too.
The Bill is an important part of our wider reforms to make our justice system work better for those who use it and those who work in it. It also makes an important first step in the legislation that will underpin our reforms. We will introduce further courts legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows. With the appropriate safeguards in place, the Bill will allow our judiciary, courts and tribunals to operate more flexibly, responsibility and efficiently, and it will ultimately improve people’s experience of justice and put our courts and tribunals on a sound footing for the future. I commend the Bill to the House.
Mr Gauke
The hon. Lady is right to raise the importance of our judiciary, but I hope that we can reach a consensus on that. Does she not recognise that the Bill has the support of the judiciary? Senior retired judges have spoken in support of it in the other place, and it has been welcomed by the senior judiciary.
Yasmin Qureshi
I accept that the senior judiciary, some of whom are in the House of Lords, have said that the Bill is a good thing. However, practising lawyers, barristers, solicitors, the Bar Council and the Law Society have said that it is not right, and that the amendments that we will propose should be considered.
There is disagreement in the judicial community about the Bill. [Interruption.] I will just wait until the Lord Chancellor has dealt with his question. The Lord Chancellor and the practitioners here must be aware that, when judges are involved in delegated functions or non-court sitting judgments, they are making judgments on difficult issues and complex matters of law—for example, a case management hearing, or even something such as asking for an adjournment. We do not know, but, at the moment, the Bill suggests that such work could be done by delegated staff.
When someone asks for an adjournment, all kinds of complications could be involved; there could be issues relating to failure of disclosure and so on. According to the Bill as it stands, many issues would be given to a delegated person. That is one reason why we are asking for clarification about who those people will be, what powers they will be given, and, more specifically, what training they will be given. Although some senior members of the judiciary in the other place have said that the Bill is a positive development, the practitioners on the ground, at the moment, do not agree.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lucy Frazer)
It gives me great pleasure to respond to the debate on this Bill, which, as many have said, is a small but important step in our court reform programme. As the Lord Chancellor set out in his speech, our courts together with our judiciary are respected throughout the world, but our courts and tribunals need to move with the times, and we have heard some excellent points today on how this Bill will improve our efficiency. I wish to respond to some of them.
As the excellent Chair of the Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), said, the Bill’s measures are important technical reforms that require a statutory base. He highlighted the importance of the judicial process in general—the importance of each case to the individual whose case it is. These are important points that the Ministry of Justice must always bear in mind.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent South (Jack Brereton) was right to point out, as I have, that this is but one part of a suite of measures of court reform. I was grateful to the hon. Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire) for saying there is a great deal that is good in this Bill, and she asked a number of questions that I am happy to answer. She said it is important that there be no reduction in justice over all, and was concerned about court closures. As 41% of our courts are used at less than half their available capacity, we must think about whether it is sensible to spend more money on the court estate as opposed to other things; at present a fifth of our budget is spent on the court estate. The hon. Lady suggested that we were pushing through this legislation at a time when the House is thinking about other things. That is patently untrue; its measures were included in the Prisons and Courts Bill, which was going through this House but fell at the general election.
The hon. Lady also raised concerns that must be addressed about the immigration tribunals. I highlight to her the measures we are introducing to give court staff the ability to undertake some judicial and other functions. They are already in operation in some tribunals. In the first and upper tier tribunals, for example, there are already three tiers of staff authorised to exercise different judicial functions; the most basic functions of issuing standard directions at commencement of a case can be carried out by authorised staff members at some chambers; slightly more complex functions are undertaken by caseworkers; and the most complex of the delegated functions are generally reserved to registrars, who are legally qualified. The hon. Lady asked whether I have read “The Secret Barrister”, and I am happy to confirm that the Lord Chancellor and I read it many months ago, just as we read many other publications that affect our Department.
The hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) thought the measures were a cost-cutting exercise. They absolutely are not; we are asking ourselves how to use resources in the best way possible, how to deploy our judges as efficiently as possible, and how to ensure people get fair and swift judgment. That is not just our view; this is the view from Members across the House. As Lord Marks said in the other place,
“It seems to us relevant that the purpose of this part of the legislation is to increase efficiency and—hopefully, and to everybody’s advantage—the speed of decision-making within the court and tribunal systems, while making some cost savings in so doing.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 414.]
There are three key clauses in this Bill. One is clause 3 on authorised functions, which allows appropriately qualified and experienced court staff in civil, family and magistrates courts and the High Court, Court of Appeal, Court of Protection and tribunals to continue to carry out uncontroversial and straightforward judicial functions under judicial supervision. My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) made an important point that I highlighted to the hon. Member for Bristol West: some court staff in these jurisdictions are already carrying out certain of these functions, but we are extending that to the Crown court and freeing up judges from the most routine tasks, ensuring that case preparation and management tasks are distributed at the appropriate level, or reserved to judges when that is proportionate.
As the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Sir Edward Davey) highlighted, the Bill prevents certain judicial functions—for or example, committing someone to prison or serving injunctions—from being undertaken by authorised staff. As his colleague Lord Marks said in the other place, it is right that these should not be delegated.
The hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) suggested that there would be limited scrutiny of officers. This ignores the reality of the Bill, because their tasks will be set by the rule committee, which will be independent, judicially led and therefore best placed to determine the functions of staff. The committee will have a broad membership, including judiciary, representatives of court users and legal professionals. Lord Thomas said in the other place that
“it is important to stress the degree of control inherent in the Bill by the use of the rule committee. I was a member of and chaired…the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, which I can assure you is a highly representative body with many representatives of the legal profession.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
The hon. Lady asked for three years’ post-qualification experience, but qualifications for staff giving legal advice should be set out in regulations, as they have been since 1979. Qualifications ought to depend on the functions involved, and many of the functions that staff currently exercise are straightforward and routine and do not require a legal qualification. An example would be the fixing of hearing dates. She also said that she wanted a statutory right for reconsideration, but many rule committees in the civil and judicial jurisdictions already have a right to reconsideration built in. Magistrates and family courts already have mechanisms for reviewing decisions. This is up to the rule committee, and if it decides not to create such a right, it must give its reasons to the Lord Chancellor, as the Bill states.
My hon. Friends the Members for Cheltenham and for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) talked about the independence of staff. The Bill introduces a statutory guarantee of independence from the Lord Chancellor for authorised Courts and Tribunals Service staff in all jurisdictions, and makes staff answerable to the Lord Chief Justice or the senior president of the tribunal, rather than the Lord Chancellor.
This has been a wide-ranging debate in which the technical matters of the Bill have been raised along with a large number of other matters, which I shall mention briefly. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst talked about the wider Bill; I should stress that the Lord Chancellor and I are keen to bring forward wider legislation in relation to courts, and we will do so as soon as parliamentary time allows. My hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) rightly advocated for the industry and parliamentary placement scheme, which the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) also raised with me in oral questions recently. It is an excellent scheme, and I encourage all those who are interested in joining it to do so.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham spoke about the importance of the judiciary, and he was absolutely right to highlight that point. Our judiciary is respected throughout the world, and we need to continue to attract the best talent to it. My hon. Friend the Member for Henley mentioned the importance of digitisation. We have a number of schemes in which we are bringing digitisation to our courts. For example, people can now apply online for probate, and petition online for divorce, and we are also bringing a significant amount of technology to the social security tribunal.
I would like to end by responding to the points raised by the hon. Member for Bolton South East and the hon. Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain) on the shadow Front Bench. They suggested that we were not addressing the bigger issues, but I would like to remind the House that we have been looking at the important question of legal aid for a number of months. We are in the middle of a legal aid review, and we are aware of the issues that are being raised. We will report on that by the end of the year. Hon. Members also raised the issue of domestic violence. As they will know, we have recently consulted on that issue, and we will be bringing in a domestic violence Bill. As they are also aware, cross-examination in the courts will be covered by that Bill.
Finally, we recently consulted on our approach to court closures, and I would like to clarify a number of matters raised today in relation to court closures and finance. The hon. Member for Bolton South East suggested that petty sums were being raised by our court closure programme, which is not true. Since 2015-16, we have recovered £122 million from the court closure programme, all of which is being reinvested in our justice system, and have spent approximately £170 million on capital maintenance.
The Ministry of Justice is committed to continuing to protect the individuals who go through our justice system, and to making their experience better, speedier, fair and just, and it is on that basis that I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 4th December 2018
(6 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCourts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 4 December 2018 - (4 Dec 2018)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Chair
We will begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list, which shows how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate, is available in the room. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same issue, or similar issues. Decisions on amendments will not take place in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. The selection list shows the order of debate; decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects. I will use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following the debates on the relevant amendments.
Clause 1
Deployment of judges
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lucy Frazer)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Henry.
A key element of our reforms in relation to courts is ensuring that we have a justice system that works better for everyone, which includes making the best use of our judges’ experience, expertise and time. I should make it clear that the deployment of judges is a matter for the judiciary, and the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals already have far-reaching powers to ensure that the right judges are deployed on the right cases, taking account of changes in case loads of different jurisdictions. However, there are five areas in which clause 1 would amend current legislation to increase that flexibility to deploy judges where they are needed.
The first change is about the temporary appointment of deputy judges to the High Court. The Lord Chief Justice already has a statutory power to appoint a person meeting the eligibility criteria as a judge of the High Court if their appointment is urgent, temporary and there are no other reasonable steps that could be taken to fill the gap. Those temporarily appointed judges are ordinarily existing, serving judges who have been appointed to a judicial office via the independent Judicial Appointments Commission process. Current legislation allows those appointments to facilitate business in the High Court or Crown court only. Clause 1(1) would widen that so that the person appointed could sit in any court or tribunal on which an ordinarily appointed deputy judge of the High Court could be deployed, such as the county court, the family court, the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal.
The second change in clause 1 relates to the upper tribunal. The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 sets out which judges are judges of the upper tribunal and may therefore hear cases there. The definition comprises a number of different types of judge, such as circuit or district judges, but does not currently include recorders. As fee-paid judges, recorders have equivalent powers to circuit judges, and may sit in the Crown court or the High Court with appropriate authorisation. Allowing recorders to sit in the upper tribunal would allow the judiciary to make more use of recorders’ experience, expertise and skill, and would provide greater flexibility to meet business need.
The third change in clause 1 relates to chamber presidents in the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal. Currently, there is a restriction that prevents someone from presiding over more than one chamber of the first-tier tribunal or of the upper tribunal. Subsection (4) would allow a chamber president to be appointed to more than one chamber in the same tribunal. That would enable the Senior President of Tribunals to use the existing and future complement of chamber presidents to provide continuous leadership across all chambers without having to recruit and appoint a new chamber president immediately if there were a vacancy.
The fourth change in the clause relates to senior judges of employment tribunals. Currently, there are restrictions on where senior judges of employment tribunals may be deployed. The Bill will enable the presidents of employment tribunals for England, Wales and Scotland to sit in the Employment Appeal Tribunal, which will provide additional capacity for experienced judges to hear appeals. The Bill will also enable leadership judges— the presidents and vice-presidents of the employment tribunal Scotland, and regional employment judges of the employment tribunals—to hear cases in the first- tier tribunal and the upper tribunal, making more use of their experience and skill where needed.
The final part of the clause relates to flexible deployment with respect to arbitration. The Arbitration Act 1996 currently provides for certain judges of the High Court to sit as judge-arbitrators. That allows cases falling within the relevant jurisdiction of the High Court to be resolved via arbitration with the Lord Chief Justice’s permission. The clause extends the range of High Court judges who can sit as judge-arbitrators, and would also allow the Lord Chief Justice to delegate his functions in agreeing that judges can be appointed as judge-arbitrators. That will allow, for example, judges in the chancery division of the High Court, which has seen a growth in demand for arbitration in recent years, to resolve cases in that way. Those provisions, taken together, will contribute towards a modern and responsive justice system.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Henry. While we accept the necessity for the clause, we have some concerns, which we hope the Government will take on board.
We accept that there are practical arguments for expanding the flexible deployment of judges, including temporary judges appointed outside the usual Judicial Appointment Commission selection process, to a wider pool of courts and tribunals. The appointment of temporary judges as a principle, however, should be approached with caution. It is important to view flexible deployment generally through the prism of the Government’s wider reforms and cuts, and plans for savings on judicial salaries.
We are concerned about that being used regularly as opposed to on an occasional basis. [Interruption.] Sorry, the Minister was looking very confused. We are concerned about the potential for a trend of too much reliance on temporary judges. The provisions should be used only to deal with urgent matters in the case of a shortage of judges, and the deployment of judges across different sectors should not become the de facto position.
Clearly, one of the things that the Government have not mentioned is what training provisions will be provided for judges moving out of their normal area of activity. If a Crown court judge is transferred to a tribunal, for example, what kind of training would they receive to deal with issues unique to the tribunal system—for example, on issues of disability, reasonable adaption for the purpose of disability legislation, and what could be considered discriminatory under equality legislation. Those are key issues unique to employment tribunals. We want to know and ensure that there are training provisions for that.
As a consequence of the clause, civil judges might come into the criminal courts and Crown courts. What training will be provided for them to deal with specific issues that are unique to the criminal court, such as admissions of previous convictions, which can sometimes be brought in against defendants, and go against the normal rules? What about issues of disclosure? If a failure to disclose material information is ruled inadmissible, it can cause the whole case to collapse. Those are some of the things that are unique to particular courts. I have used the example of the Crown court and the employment tribunals to demonstrate that there are things that are unique to those courts. While we will not oppose the clause, we ask the Government to provide some assurance that the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor will make proper financial provision for those judges to update their skills and to receive professional training when they go into a different area of judicial function.
Lucy Frazer
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making some important points. She can rest assured that the temporary appointments are temporary, and they can be made only if they are urgent and temporary and if no other reasonable steps can be taken to fill the gaps. I can also assure her about training: where judges are asked to sit in a new jurisdiction, further induction will be provided in line with the directions of the senior judiciary. The Judicial College is in charge of training, and it will continue to train our judges. Judges will also attend continuation training for all jurisdictions in which they sit.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Alteration of judicial titles
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Frazer
No amendments have been tabled to the clause and no issues at all were raised in the other place, or on Second Reading in this place.
In summary, the clause is part of our reform to modernise our courts to ensure that court users know who is hearing the case, and what sort of case the matter is about. The clause therefore provides for amendment of judicial titles to reflect a change in the name of the court in which those judges sit. It also ensures that the title of that office and similar offices can be changed through secondary legislation in the future.
Subsections (1) and (2) change the title of chief bankruptcy registrar to chief insolvency and companies court judge. That reflects the change in the name of the other judges of this court and of the court itself. In 2017, the name of the court dealing with bankruptcy matters was changed to the insolvency and companies court to better reflect its work. Earlier this year, the titles of the more senior judges in that court were changed to reflect the change in the name of the court. The Bill therefore changes the title of the office of the senior judge to bring it in line with other judges of the court.
Subsection (3) enables the judicial titles of other senior masters and district judges of the senior courts to be changed in future by secondary, not primary, legislation, should it be necessary to do so. Changes of title may be required, for example, because of organisational changes in the courts and tribunals. The clause will correct an anomaly that prevents some judicial titles from being amended by ministerial order. Such judicial measures, while relatively modest, will contribute towards a more modern justice system.
Yasmin Qureshi
The clause seems to be a sensible one, so the Opposition have tabled no amendments to it.
Yasmin Qureshi
We tabled the amendment because the existing drafting of the clause appears to allow the delegation of judicial functions to authorised persons without going through an affirmative process—that is, without using secondary legislation. As the Bill stands, that would be done automatically. Bearing in mind that we have expressed concern about the whole system of the authorised person being delegated judicial functions, we believe that that should be done, if it comes to that, by means of a statutory instrument so that Parliament has a chance to discuss it. We would be able to make observations and it would not go through on the nod.
The issue of delegating judicial functions to authorised persons is important to us. At the moment, the Bill does not talk about who such people will be, what their qualifications are, what they will do, or what subjects and issues they can deal with. As the Bill is drafted and from what Ministers have said, the procedure committee is expected to make all those decisions. We do not accept that that should be the case. There are real issues that need to be determined through parliamentary discussion. These measures should be introduced through statutory instruments and not just be decided by the procedure committee as envisaged in the Bill. The procedure committee should listen to our concerns. We want more parliamentary scrutiny of this part of the legislation, through a statutory instrument.
Lucy Frazer
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bolton South East for raising the issue and giving me the opportunity to respond, so I can satisfy her that her concerns are unfounded, I hope.
The power in clause 3(2) seems to have caused considerable confusion here and in the other place, so it might be helpful for me to explain how it works. That power does not permit the delegation of judicial functions to authorised persons—that is a matter for the procedure rules made by the independent rule committees. The power in clause 3(2) could not make such changes because it is a narrow power that is very clearly restricted to consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions—a concept that is well understood with many precedents. Those terms are construed strictly by the courts.
The power in clause 3(2) is needed because the procedure rules cannot be used to make all the necessary amendments to other secondary legislation—we will use regulations made under the clause to do that. The power is needed principally to amend references in secondary legislation from “justices’ clerk”, a post abolished by the Bill, to “authorised officer”. So far, we have identified more than 200 references in more than 60 pieces of secondary legislation that would need amendment, and there may be more.
The Government do not intend to use this power to amend primary legislation. Lord Keen gave an undertaking to that effect on Report in the other place. Therefore, there is no express provision for such amendments in clause 3. To accept this amendment would set an unhelpful precedent and would mean that valuable parliamentary time would have to be set aside to debate minor and consequential changes to secondary legislation. In a busy parliamentary Session, that would delay implementation of the provisions in the Bill. I hope that the hon. Lady is reassured and feels able to withdraw the amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
Although I hear what the Minister says, we are not reassured and we will push the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Yasmin Qureshi
My observations relate to when judges are dealing with an individual case. Of course, we know that they are independent, but when someone becomes part of an administrative body, a procedure committee or an arm of the state—I mean that in a loose way, not in terms of a formal relationship—sometimes the criteria that they look at are different from when they are dealing with an individual case presented before them.
I will give an example, albeit not one that relates to judges. The Crown Prosecution Service, an organisation for which I worked for a number of years—I still have friends who work in it, even though I left years ago—has had different people serve as Director of Public Prosecutions. However, prosecutors who have been there for a long time say that, bar perhaps two DPPs who were really concerned about ensuring that the department was fully financially resourced, and who actually fought hard for it to get resources, the other DPPs did not make that sort of effort. People do act for administrative purposes.
The reality is that senior people at the top of organisations, when they are doing administration and are running institutions, look at things such as money and financial administration, try to save as much money as possible, and try to push things along as quickly as possible, because that looks good in their statistics. Because of that, we would say that what we are asking for is not too weighty. We have tabled very reasonable amendments. The people who will make some of these enormous decisions should be legally qualified and—we will come on to this later—we should consider what kind of things they can actually do. I do not think there is anything wrong with giving a steer to procedure committees. They can deal with some of the other rules, but we should have some basic minimum standards.
Lucy Frazer
I, too, propose to deal with amendments 3, 4 and 5 together, as they all relate to minimum qualifications for authorised staff. Amendments 3 and 4 require that any staff member who gives legal advice to lay justices or judges of the family court be legally qualified and have more than three years’ experience post qualification. Amendment 5 makes the same requirement of any staff carrying out judicial functions.
The staff who currently give legal advice in the magistrates court and the family courts are justices’ clerks and assistant clerks. Assistant clerks, who are also known as legal advisers, currently provide the overwhelming majority of legal advice on a day-to-day basis. To be an assistant clerk at the moment one must be a barrister in England and Wales or a solicitor of the senior courts of England and Wales, have passed the necessary exams for either of those professions, or have qualified as a legal adviser under historical rules that were in place prior to 1999.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
The Minister is explaining who will get to decide whether we are flexible on this in the future, bit what I do not hear—what I do not hear in any of this Bill—is how we make sure that these changes mean improvements for the people who use these courts. While the judiciary and the people carrying out these functions certainly seem to have a voice in the changes being proposed, in terms of the changes I would like to see in the family courts, the voices of those people using the courts are nowhere in this Bill.
Lucy Frazer
That is a very important point. We serve the people through justice and the court system. The people who come to the courts to get justice are the people my Department is serving. In all our reform programme, we have a user-centred focus and consistently engage with users to improve our services. All the forms we have recently produced were produced with insight from users, which is why we have an extremely high satisfaction rate for the reforms we are making.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley makes an important and valid point, and I can tell her how users will benefit from this. She will have been in the House when questions were put to me about delays in the court system and about the time it is taking for certain hearings to come before the courts. We want to ensure that there are as few delays as possible and that justice is not only fair but speedily dispensed. These changes will allow functions to be operated by the appropriate people, and will enable us to get more swift, easy and quick justice for those who use our courts.
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)
I am sure the Minister is sincere in her intention. My experience is that there is increasing delay. Part of that is caused by inexperience, perhaps because of the use of lay magistrates as opposed to district judges, who do not take command of the issue and do not timetable matters correctly. I am concerned about any decline in the level of experience. This is perhaps a question not of legal qualification but of experience in being able to manage and seize control of cases. I would rather see the greater control and scrutiny that the amendments would introduce.
Lucy Frazer
I am sorry if the hon. Gentleman has not experienced the appropriate level of judicial engagement or appropriate judgments in courts. I recently went to the family court in London, and I have been to courts across the country, and I have spoken to magistrates who operate in the family courts. The expertise and dedication I see is commendable. We can stand still, do nothing and just let our courts operate in the way they are operating, or we can sit back and reflect on how we can improve our court system. We are trying to do the latter through the Bill. We are trying to improve people’s experience of the courts, recognising that funds and resources are not unlimited and that we need to use them as well as we can. On listing, my Department is looking at a listing programme to ensure that lists operate as effectively as possible.
It is simply not necessary for all authorised staff exercising judicial functions to possess legal qualifications. The qualifications and experience staff need will depend on the nature of the work they carry out. Legal qualifications of the level that would be required by amendment 5 not only are far too high for the routine and straightforward case preparation tasks that we anticipate many authorised staff may carry out, but may not be the most relevant qualifications for staff in different jurisdictions. For example, it is more helpful for a registrar in the tax tribunal to be a tax professional by background than to be a legal professional. Where powers currently exist, rule committees already determine the qualifications staff need to exercise particular functions, and that works well. Such committees can focus qualification and experience requirements on what is most relevant to the work that those staff carry out.
Amendments 3, 4 and 5 would all set the bar for qualification prohibitively high and rule out a large proportion of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service staff from giving legal advice or exercising judicial functions, even though they may have been doing either or both for a number of years.
Alex Chalk
Will the Minister be kind enough to address the issue of the approach we can expect judges to take in rule committees? It is my experience that they show themselves in court to be scrupulously fair and focused on justice. Does she agree that there is no reason to think they would abandon those principles when they sit out of court on a rule committee to make these important judgments?
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes an extremely valuable point. Rule committees are made up of members of the judiciary and legal professionals, who take their roles incredibly seriously. Lord Thomas said on Second Reading in the other place that
“it is important to stress the degree of control inherent in the Bill by the use of the rule committee. I was a member of and chaired…the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, which I can assure you is a highly representative body with many representatives of the legal profession.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 June 2018; Vol. 791, c. 2039.]
It is important to note his experience of sitting on and chairing a rule committee. I actually sat on an insolvency rule committee when I was at the Bar, and I do not think anyone mentioned costs. We were concerned with ensuring that the procedures we used in court day in, day out worked well, and that they worked well for our clients, too.
A loss of expertise would render the provisions in clause 3 and the schedule unworkable. I should add that a member of staff will not be able to give legal advice or exercise judicial functions until they have been authorised to do so by the Lord Chief Justice or their nominee, or by the Senior President of Tribunals or their delegate. Authorisations are therefore ultimately the responsibility of the judiciary, who will not authorise staff unless satisfied of their competence.
The Government’s position is consistent with the approach taken over many decades and is supported by both current and former members of the senior judiciary. Lord Neuberger, former President of the Supreme Court, said that the amendments place
“a potential straitjacket on the ability to appoint the appropriate people to make appropriate decisions.”
He went further, reflecting that there
“will be many decisions”
for which the level of experience set out in the amendments
“would be appropriate, but there will be others where less experience would be adequate for the decision-making.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 882.]
I want to reassure hon. Members that we have listened to the concerns expressed here and in the other place about linking the qualifications of staff to the judicial functions that authorised staff may carry out. That is why we added further safeguards to the Bill in the other place by restricting the functions that staff will be able to exercise. In the light of that, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames said:
“we are not persuaded that it is necessary for the authorised person exercising the remaining powers—some of which are trivial, some minor and some of more substance—to be a qualified lawyer or one of particular experience.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 414.]
Before I close, I would like to respond to a number of the points made by the hon. Member for Bolton South East in putting forward her amendments. She has mentioned for the second time in her submissions cost-cutting. What we are doing in the Bill is trying to achieve a position whereby judges are deployed in the most effective way to bring justice to the people whom they serve. We are trying to ensure that jobs are appropriate for those who carry them out, and that they have the appropriate qualifications. The hon. Lady suggested that only barristers, solicitors and judges—that is, people who are legally qualified—understand justice. That is self-evidently wrong. A large part of our criminal justice system is the justice dispensed by magistrates, who are volunteers and are extremely able. As I have said, many people are already carrying out the functions, and carrying them out well, in courts and tribunals across the country.
The hon. Lady mentioned court closures. Of course, this is not a debate about court closures; it is a debate about who carries out functions in the courts that operate. She also suggested that call centres are having a detrimental impact on justice. Our call centres are actually improving justice, because, as can be seen from the take-up rate, people are speaking to someone who can answer their concerns much more speedily. The satisfaction of people ringing up is improved as the pick-up time is improved, because it is now dedicated people picking up the phone, rather than people in courts, who have a large number of things to do.
I hope that the hon. Lady feels able to withdraw the amendment, based on the explanations that I have put forward.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the Minister for her response, but our position remains the same, and we ask for a vote on the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move amendment 6, in the schedule, page 11, line 32, leave out subsection 67C and insert—
“67C Right to judicial reconsideration of decision made by an authorised person
A party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of the person’s duty as an authorised person exercising a relevant judicial function, by virtue of section 67B(1), may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.”
This amendment would grant people subject to a decision made under delegated powers to a statutory right to judicial reconsideration.
Yasmin Qureshi
We could include the criterion of the impact on someone’s rights. When we look at a case, we can work out whether an adjournment or a particular issue regarding disclosure would have an impact. The legislation should have that as a criterion in determining whether there should be judicial reconsideration. Obviously, we assume that the procedure committee would set out a procedure whereby, when a person writes to the court to ask that something be reconsidered, it goes to a judge, who works out whether this was something that impacted on the person and should therefore be subject to reconsideration. The legislation does not do any of those things.
Although we accept that some administrative functions carried out by judges can be delegated to the “authorised people” defined in the Bill, when a judicial legal function is given to other people, there should be a right to ask for reconsideration of the decision if a litigant is unhappy with it. To avoid anything flimsy, we have helpfully put in the impact aspect, so that reconsiderations are not a matter of course but are limited to appropriate cases. We would leave it to the procedure committee to make rules as to what the procedure would be.
The amendments are perfectly reasonable. The Minister mentioned that some Lords in the other place said that the provisions were okay, but if we look at the Hansard, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, Lord Pannick and others said that they had concerns, not just about the issue of 14 days’ reconsideration, but also in relation to the authorised persons. The Government have put all these things about judicial functions, delegated persons and authorised people into one clause, but concern was expressed in the other place about the need to make the legislation better. Those are my words.
We have gone further than some of the noble Lords in the other place, but we tabled the amendments not for the fun of it, but because we genuinely and sincerely believe that they would ensure that processes were carried out properly, justice was done properly, and properly qualified people would deal with issues. If there are decisions that people are unhappy with, they should have the right to ask for reconsideration within 14 days, if that is appropriate—or 21 days; I would be happy with whatever additional days the Government wished to add.
Lucy Frazer
As the hon. Member for Bolton South East has said, amendments 6, 7, 8 and 9 deal with the right of reconsideration of decisions taken by authorised staff in courts and tribunals, and amendments 6 and 7 would enable a party in a case to request that any decision made by an authorised person exercising the functions of a court or tribunal be reconsidered by a judge. It might be appropriate for there to be reconsideration of decisions, but the Government believe that the independent procedure rule committees, composed of jurisdictional experts and experienced practitioners, are best placed to decide if such a right of reconsideration is needed and if so, the form it should take.
The approach taken in the proposed amendments would impose across all jurisdictions the same blanket right of reconsideration with an arbitrary deadline of 14 days. That would not work in practice, especially for those functions that are entirely straightforward case management and preparation duties. Each jurisdiction has its own ways of working, and it is imperative that any mechanism for reviewing decisions is designed with those jurisdictional intricacies in mind.
The rule committees in the civil and tribunals jurisdictions, for example, already have included in their respective rules a specific right to judicial reconsideration for decisions made by authorised persons. The magistrates courts and the family court, however, have their own existing mechanisms for reviewing various decisions, which the amendments would cut across.
Furthermore, the amendments are unworkable. In the magistrates courts, legal advisers issue some 2.5 million local authority summonses every year. If a right of reconsideration, as laid out in the amendments, were imposed on the court, a defendant could apply to the court against the issue of the summons. That would inevitably delay the first hearing and would mean that the matter would need to be referred to a magistrate who would reconsider the decision to issue the summons alongside a legal adviser, and the outcome of that decision would need to be notified to the parties before the case could start. That would build significant delay and cost into the process.
There are already three ways for a defendant to challenge a case in which a summons has been issued in the magistrates courts. They can make an initial argument to the court hearing the case that the summons should not have been issued, contest the substantive application made by the local authority, or apply for a judicial review of the decision to issue the summons. Creating a mandatory right to judicial reconsideration is therefore unnecessary.
I have some sympathy with the intention behind the hon. Lady’s amendments, which is to ensure that the Bill contains adequate safeguards. For that reason, the Government moved amendments on the right of reconsideration that were accepted on Report in the other place. Those require the committees, when making any rules, to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions and consider whether the rules should include a right to judicial reconsideration of decisions made by authorised staff exercising those functions. That means the rule committees will have to consider whether each judicial function should be subject to a right to reconsideration. Additionally, the amended Bill requires that if a rule committee decides against the creation of a right of reconsideration, it must inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and the reasons for the decision.
The measures in the Bill should also be read alongside the existing statutory provisions, which require the committees to consult such persons as they consider appropriate before they make rules. If a rule committee then chose not to include a right of reconsideration in its rules, it would have to notify the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor could then ask the committee to reconsider its decision, or, if he agreed with it, he could lay the rules in Parliament. We expect that he would set out the committee’s rationale for not including a right of reconsideration in the explanatory memorandum to accompany the statutory instrument. The Bill as amended in the other place therefore ensures much greater transparency in the decision-making process.
Alex Chalk
Those are reassuring words. Will the rule committee have the right to request when, in certain circumstances, an exercise of discretion that might otherwise be innocuous—say, for the sake of argument, granting an adjournment—could lead to a material impact on the rights of an individual, that there could be a right of review in those circumstances? Does the Minister follow? It is important that that flexibility is in place.
Lucy Frazer
I think that is right. It will be the rule committee that will set out the procedure and requirement for any reconsideration. If it considers what my hon. Friend has mentioned as an appropriate way forward, it could make those determinations.
The noble and learned Lord Thomas, the former Lord Chief Justice said:
“I support what the Government seek to do and urge a substantial degree of caution in respect of the proposal put forward by the noble Baroness”—
that is, Baroness Chakrabarti. He added that the Government’s approach provides the right balance:
“It gives discretion to a body that knows and has a lot of experience, but it contains that degree of explanatory accountability that will make sure that it does not do anything—even if we were to worry that it might—that goes outside a proper and just delegation”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 425-426.]
Amendments 8 and 9 relate to the right of judicial reconsideration and the substantive rights of parties to cases in the courts and tribunals. As I mentioned earlier, the amendments we made to the Bill in the other place now mean that the rule committees will, when making any rules to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions, have to consider whether each of those functions should be subject to a right to reconsideration. They would require that, in doing so, the rule committees should also consider whether the function in question would be capable of having a material impact on the substantive rights of the parties.
The amendments appear to have been prompted by concerns about the compatibility of the provisions in clause 3 and the schedule with the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the circumstances, the Government believe the amendments are unnecessary. The independent procedure rule committees have for many years been making rules about practice and procedure which impact on court users. In carrying out this public function, they must ensure that the procedure rules are compatible with fundamental rights, including rights under the convention. I note that the overriding objective of the criminal procedure rules, for example, explicitly refers to these rights.
Other safeguards in the Bill will help to ensure compatibility with the right to a fair trial. Most importantly, the Bill provides that all court and tribunal staff who are authorised to exercise judicial functions will now be independent of the Lord Chancellor when doing so, and subject only to the direction of the Lord Chief Justice or their nominee or the Senior President of Tribunals or their delegate.
The Bill also provides, for the first time, protections from legal proceedings and costs in legal proceedings and indemnities for all authorised staff when carrying out judicial functions, which will further safeguard their independence. We have, of course, strengthened these safeguards by limiting the types of functions that authorised staff will be able to exercise, through the Government amendments we made to the Bill on Report in the other place.
I hope I have reassured the Committee and the hon. Member for Bolton South East that there is no issue of compatibility between the measures in the Bill and article 6 rights, the rule of law or the independence of the judiciary. The Bill strikes the right balance between ensuring appropriate safeguards and transparency of decision-making, and leaving the jurisdictional rule committees the discretion to determine the most appropriate mechanism for reviewing decisions by authorised persons. I urge the hon. Member for Bolton South East to withdraw her amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the Minister for her response, but our position remains the same and I therefore wish to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
Amendments 8, 7 and 9, which have just been debated, can be moved formally by the hon. Member for Bolton South East, or she can withdraw them in the light of the last vote.
Lucy Frazer
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 4, page 4, line 6, leave out subsection (8).
This amendment would remove the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.
This is a technical and procedural amendment to remove the privilege amendment made on Third Reading in the other place. The privilege amendment recognises that provisions in the Bill may infringe the privilege of the House of Commons with regard to the control of public money, and amendment 1 will leave out subsection (8), ensuring that the imposition of any charge resulting from the Bill is properly approved. In practice, the new powers the Bill will confer and the cost arising from them will be met by the Ministry of Justice.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Lucy Frazer
Clause 4 is technical in nature but it is important to give proper effect to the measures the Committee has considered. Subsection (1) confirms the short title of the Bill. Subsections (2) and (5) set out the commencement provisions, which will enable speedy and orderly implementation of the measures in it: clause 4 will come into force on the day on which the Bill is passed; clauses 1 and 2 will come into force two months after Royal Assent; and clause 3 and the schedule will come into force on a day to be appointed by the Secretary of State in regulations.
Subsection (4) allows the commencement regulations to make transitional, transitory or savings provision and to appoint different days for different purposes or areas, which will ensure that the rule committees are able to implement the proposals as they best see fit. Subsections (6) and (7) set out the territorial extent. Subject to certain exceptions, the provisions of the Bill extend and apply to England and Wales only. Where the provisions extend beyond England and Wales, this is in relation to tribunals, for which responsibility is currently reserved to Westminster. This is not the moment for debate about devolution matters, but I stress that we have undertaken extensive consultation with the devolved Administrations in preparing the Bill, and they agree with our analysis.
Subsection (8) is the privilege amendment inserted by the House of Lords, with which I have already dealt.
Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Review of the delegation of legal advice and judicial functions to authorised staff
“(1) Within the period of three years from the coming into force of this Act, the Lord Chancellor must arrange for a review to be undertaken on the impact of the implementation of the provisions contained within section 3 and the Schedule to this Act.
(2) A report setting out the findings of the review must be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)
This amendment would require the impact of the delegation of judicial functions to be reviewed within three years of it coming into force.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause asks for a review of the impact of the legislation to be carried out within three years of the start of the Act, and that this be laid before both House of Parliament. The reason for that is, as mentioned earlier and in all debates in respect of the Bill, the Opposition have serious concerns about how the Bill will work out and about its impact on our justice system—in particular on litigants who go into court not legally represented, as often happens.
With the Act, there will be a more rapid use and deployment of judges from one sector to another, and we would like the Government to consider how that is working and its impact on our traditional court system. We believe that the functions the authorised people will be given and the issue of reconsideration will have a clear impact on what happens in both our criminal and civil courts.
Lucy Frazer
As the hon. Lady mentioned, the new clause is about reviewing the impact of the authorised staff provisions within three years of the Bill coming into force.
Reviewing laws is always important. We in the Ministry of Justice do not shy away from that. The question is what the appropriate form of that review is. As the impact assessment for these measures says, we have committed to working with the rules committees and the senior judiciary to monitor the impact of any future assignment of judicial functions and responsibilities to authorised staff. This is particularly important where the Bill enables provisions to be extended to a new jurisdiction; for example, the power of authorised staff to carry out judicial functions will be new to the Crown court. We therefore expect the criminal procedure rule committee to conduct a review of the provisions as it feels appropriate, and to draw on its impartiality and expertise in doing so.
In other jurisdictions, the exercise of judicial functions by staff is already kept under review by the relevant rule committees, by the senior judiciary and by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, where appropriate. For example, the civil procedure rule committee has undertaken a review of a pilot scheme in which a range of functions were delegated to legal advisers in the County Court Money Claims Centre. As a result of that, the committee decided to modify and extend powers. It has also agreed to a further pilot to allow legal advisers in the county court to make unopposed final charging orders. This will run to April 2020 and, again, will be reviewed before a decision is taken to extend it.
Those reviews and this approach to implementation are illustrative of how we expect these measures to be rolled out in the future: incrementally, with the necessary monitoring, and subject to review and evaluation before any further steps are taken. The rule committees are independent of the Government and their membership includes judges, legal professionals and representatives of voluntary organisations. They are best placed not only to make the rules for authorised staff exercising judicial functions, but to conduct the reviews of these measures in the future. I hope that I have provided the hon. Member for Bolton South East with the assurances that she seeks, and that she will withdraw the new clause.
Yasmin Qureshi
I thank the Minister for her response, but the Opposition will not withdraw our new clause. I ask that the Question be put.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [Lords]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateWednesday 12th December 2018
(6 years ago)
Commons ChamberCourts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 12 December 2018 - (12 Dec 2018)
15:15 - The House divided: - Ayes: 246 / Noes: 308 - Question accordingly negatived.
15:30 - The House divided: - Ayes: 243 / Noes: 312 - Question accordingly negatived.
16:19 - The House divided: - Ayes: 302 / Noes: 233 - Question accordingly agreed to.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
I rise briefly to speak in favour of the amendments tabled by my Front-Bench colleagues. I believe that safeguards need to be in place to ensure that people are properly qualified to make decisions and particularly that contentious decisions should be reviewed by a qualified judge. I want explicitly to address concerns about how this might transpire in the family courts. Several of my hon. Friends raised the concern in Committee that the family courts could be the most affected by potential delays and the perverse consequences of the measures in the Bill.
This is particularly relevant given the recent exposure of the case of Sammy Woodhouse. I am sure that colleagues will be well aware of her case. I know that the Minister is, and I am grateful to her for meeting Sammy and me last week. Mr Speaker also welcomed Sammy to Prime Minister’s questions last week. Her bravery in putting herself forward, in risking being held in contempt of the family court and in waiving her anonymity to speak about her experiences, so that we in this place can drive change, is inspiring. We owe it to her and to the many other survivors to ensure that we drive change and ensure that what happened to her and to too many other young women and girls never happens again.
Those young women and girls were failed by the state. They were failed by our legal system, by the police, by the Crown Prosecution Service, by local authorities and by government at every level, and now they are being failed yet again by our legal system. Our entirely permissive system, which allows anyone to make an application through the family courts, means that men who have been convicted of rape—in Sammy’s case, the father of her child, Arshid Hussain, is serving a 35-year prison sentence—can apply to the courts for access or visitation rights. Sammy’s case shocked the nation, but unfortunately it was not unique. Just yesterday, I spoke to another woman who had to respond and attend court after the man who was convicted of raping her and fathering her child had applied through the family courts from prison.
This could be prevented through a simple ban on any man convicted of fathering a child through rape applying to the family courts. I know that the Government are reluctant to bring this forward, out of concern for the convicted rapist’s article 8 right to a family life, but I am afraid that that simply is not good enough. I will always defend our human rights as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights—I say this on the day of the 70th anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights—but article 8 is a qualified right and not one that should override the rights of women and children and their safety. Surely, we should be starting from the presumption that if a child has been conceived through rape, the man should have no parental rights to that child and that we should allow such rights only in exceptional circumstances, not the other way round.
When I speak to victims of rape and survivors of child sexual exploitation in situations such as Sammy’s—women who have an almost uniformly terrible experience of the family courts—their feeling is one of betrayal and despair that every day is a battle in which they have to fight for their most basic rights. They are often forced to relive their traumatic experiences and justify themselves over and over, yet they are so often told about the rights of the men who have abused them and who can now click their fingers and drag their victims back through the courts to traumatise them all over again. Women such as Sammy, who have already given evidence, spoken out in criminal trials and been to hell and back, should not then live the rest of their lives trying to bring their children up in horrendously difficult circumstances with the threat of being dragged back through the courts once again to face the man who raped them. It may be the case that no judge would allow such access in any circumstances, but it is surely intolerable for women in this situation to have to face the man in court all over again, and I believe that we as a Parliament should make that crystal clear.
The family procedure rule committee met earlier this week to discuss the consequences of Sammy’s case and to consider amending practice direction 12C. I hope that the committee will be able to bring much greater clarity, but this is likely to be in relation to local authorities’ duty to notify in the case of a care order. That will not solve the problem, and I worry that, combined with the measures introduced in the Bill, it could bring greater uncertainty to the process and leave victims with even greater uncertainty and fear that their abusers might be able to weaponise the courts against them. As I have said, I am grateful to the Minister for meeting Sammy and me last week, but we were both really disappointed that the Government were not willing to take more immediate action to address this thoroughly intolerable situation. I hope that the Minister will be able to update the House on what action they have now considered and on the implications of the Bill for this important issue.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Lucy Frazer)
It is an honour to take this Bill through its final stages. I should like to start by addressing some of the key points raised today by the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi). She suggested that we were sneaking the Bill through the House. However, it was introduced seven months ago. Not only that, but it forms part of the Prisons and Courts Bill, which was introduced in this House in 2017 and which fell at the general election. The provisions in this Bill have been well known for some time. They have been debated in this House, and they are not being sneaked anywhere at all. The thrust of the hon. Lady’s speech was that this is a Bill about cuts, but it is certainly not. The Bill is part of our £1 billion court reform programme.
Neil O’Brien (Harborough) (Con)
My hon. and learned Friend is making an important point. In 2010, this country faced its largest budget deficit since the second world war, and all that my constituents want is value for money from the Government. The measures that we are taking forward today may not be the most exciting or sexy things that we will do this House, but they are a key part of value-for-money government.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes an important point that has a number of aspects. First, my Department had to make cuts in 2010 because of the poor financial situation that we inherited from the Labour party. Secondly, it is important that we deliver justice fairly to those who are part of the justice system, but as he says, we also have a duty to the taxpayer. Overlaying those two points is a third point. Notwithstanding the position we inherited and notwithstanding our duty to taxpayers, my Department is undertaking a significant reform programme that is investing in our justice system. A couple of weeks ago, the Ministry of Justice held a conference at which more than 20 countries from around the world were represented. They talked about their own reform and modernisation programmes, but ours is one of the most ambitious. We are at the forefront of innovation, and we are investing in our justice system to bring it up to date in the 21st century.
Robert Neill
Is this not also important in the context of the speech by Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd in the other place? He said that
“the operation of the criminal, civil, tribunals and family procedures rule committees has enabled us far more than any other state to keep our rules up to date.”
We need to continue to do that. That is why he stated:
“I urge the greatest caution in trying to put into primary legislation anything that restricts in this way the powers of the rule committees.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 425.]
Lucy Frazer
That is an important point. Our justice system is renowned throughout the world, thanks to its flexibility, which is enabled by the rules committees along with the other measures that allow us to develop our jurisdiction.
The hon. Member for Bolton South East finished by suggesting that we should listen and take the amendments on board, but we have listened and made amendments. We made amendments in the other place to include safeguards and improve the Bill.
Kevin Hollinrake
The Minister makes a good point about our duty to the taxpayer. Irrespective of this nation’s financial situation, we always have a responsibility to spend the taxpayers’ money wisely. As she knows, Northallerton magistrates court in my constituency will close. She has put in place some mitigation measures to help people to continue to have access to justice, but will she ensure that those measures are in place before the closure of that court?
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend and, indeed, Mr Deputy Speaker have campaigned hard about the closure of their local courts, and the dispensing of local justice is important in Northallerton, as it is in Chorley. My hon. Friend makes an important point, because, following campaigning by my hon. Friend and his constituency neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Yorks) (Rishi Sunak), we committed not to close the court on the basis that we would do so only when the technology was in place to ensure that we could continue to deliver justice. We need to move with the times, but we must also ensure that people get fair procedures and justice in the tribunals.
Robert Neill
My hon. and learned Friend is being most generous in giving way. Does she also recognise that modernising and simplifying procedures saves money not only for the taxpayer, but for litigants? Part of access to justice is about reducing needless costs for litigants.
Lucy Frazer
That is an important point, because when we talk about what we have saved, we often mean what has been saved at the Ministry of Justice, but the reality is that ensuring that justice is served for the people who use it is at the heart of our reforms. Many of our changes have received positive feedback. In a recent trial at the tax tribunal, people were able to access justice from remote locations and not have to go to a physical court. That was well received, because people did not have to disrupt their day by physically entering court. Of course, that will not be appropriate for everyone, but we must ensure that we use the advantages of technology in the future.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice for giving way—[Laughter.] That bought us 32 seconds. I am interested in what she has said. Is she able to dilate—preferably at some considerable length—on the benefits that might accrue from people not having to go to court in rural areas, such as North Dorset, where public transport is scarce and where not everybody has access to a motor car? The changes could be of huge benefit to large, sparsely populated rural areas such as mine.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes an important point, and I also represent a rural area. Interestingly, some of the greatest and most interesting innovations at our conference were from Australia, where the geography is an issue, and we can learn a lot from its procedures. Over recent years, 300,000 people have started engaging with our online services, which have been well received.
Simon Hoare
I am grateful. Can we read across from what my hon. and learned Friend says that she is making strong representations to ministerial colleagues at the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, to BT and to other providers to ensure that hotspots, blackspots, notspots—call them what you will—in rural areas that are poorly served by a reliable, speedy, robust internet will be filled to allow all our citizens to access justice and make representations using technology? With the best will in the world, if the technology is not there—I know that my hon. and learned Friend knows this—people will not be able to use it.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes a second important point, which is that we cannot roll out and continue to use technology unless the technology actually works. I regularly talk to Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service and others about the importance of ensuring that the systems that we already have in place work well, so that the technology does not fail us when we are trying to hold court hearings.
Neil O'Brien
Further to the important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) about virtual and online courts and creating hassle-free access to courts for all constituents, can the Minister give us figures for the extent to which the change has helped to unclog our courts? One of the benefits of the Bill for my constituents is not just hassle-free access for them, but the fact that our courts will not be clogged up by the traffic cases and small beer that lead my constituents to wonder why serious criminals take years to be processed. Will the Minister give us some stats about the growth of virtual and online courts and what this Bill will do to those stats?
Lucy Frazer
I mentioned earlier that 300,000 people have already started engaging with our services online. They can apply for probate or divorce online, and many people are doing that. We also have our new online civil moneys claim court, which enables people to apply online and defend online. In one case in the first week after its launch, we had a settlement without people going to court at all. Technology will not only enable us to unclog our courts and get quicker hearing times, but give our constituents better access to justice because more people will be engaging with it. It will be cheaper for them to engage, and therefore more people will be able to access fairness and justice in the resolution of their claims.
I turn to the essence of the Bill and the Opposition amendments. Amendment 1 relates to clause 3(3), which provides for the use of the negative resolution procedure, which the hon. Member for Bolton South East suggested is not appropriate when dealing with the judicial functions of staff. However, the Government think that the amendment is inappropriate for several reasons. First, clause 3(3), which provides for the use of the negative resolution procedure, is not actually concerned with judicial functions. Clause 3(3) is in fact cross-referring to clause 3(2), which allows the Secretary of State to make
“consequential, transitional, transitory or saving”
provisions relating to authorised staff by way of regulations.
In reality, clause 3(3) allows us to amend references in secondary legislation to, for example, justices’ clerk—a post abolished by the Bill—to authorised officer. So far, we have identified over 200 references and over 60 pieces of secondary legislation that would need amendment, and there may be more. It is a standard clause for this type of provision. We know that that is the correct reading of the measure because the power to enable staff to carry out the judicial functions that the hon. Member for Bolton South East is concerned about is actually set out in the procedural rules made by the independent rules committees. This is clear from clause 3(1), which refers not to regulations but to procedure rules. The procedure by which the procedure rules are enacted is set out not in this Bill but in other legislation, namely the Courts Act 2003, the Civil Procedure Act 1997 and the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
Amendments 2 to 4 relate to the qualifications of those undertaking advice or judicial functions under the Bill. Amendments 2 and 3 require that any staff member who gives legal advice to lay justices or judges of the family court must be legally qualified and have more than three years’ experience post-qualification. Amendment 4 requires the same qualifications for any staff carrying out judicial functions.
The Government absolutely agree it is important that those who undertake functions in our courts are suitably qualified. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) said, and as he has said on many occasions, our justice system is renowned throughout the world, and much of that is down to the experience and quality of our judiciary. Ensuring that those who work within our justice system have the right skills is fundamental to justice.
Neil O'Brien
Members on both sides of the House would agree that we have a world-renowned judiciary. In fact, Members are profoundly nervous when we see headlines in our papers calling judges, “Enemies of the People,” which we would all disavow. These are people who, day in and day out, do things in court that could cause them to be threatened. They are taking risks on behalf of the rest of us, and it is a high-quality system. With that in mind, and given the respect in which the judiciary are held by this House, does my hon. and learned Friend agree it is important that we do not accidentally do them down in this debate? Does she agree it is not right for the shadow Attorney General to suggest, I think unintentionally, that temporary judges may be less impartial than permanent judges? All our judiciary are high quality.
Lucy Frazer
That is absolutely right. As a former barrister, I appeared regularly before experienced judges, all of whom were full of integrity, undertaking important roles.
The hon. Member for Bolton South East suggested that all judges need qualifications of some kind. Of course, we have magistrates across the country who are doing outstanding jobs in our justice system. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Neil O'Brien) mentions, temporary judges, just like full-time judges and judges who operate on a permanent basis, are recruited because of their expertise and skill. They are trained, and they carry out their roles as they should.
Kevin Hollinrake
My hon. and learned Friend mentioned the fine work done by magistrates. Is there any way we could relax the requirements in order to increase the number of cases that may be considered by magistrates? I understand that magistrates are the most cost-effective part of the justice system.
Lucy Frazer
Magistrates undertake a significant number of roles, and they have vital responsibilities. In fact, they deal with over 95% of all criminal cases, the majority of which are less serious criminal cases, but they are very important. I am pleased recently to have attended the Magistrates Association conference, where I met a number of magistrates who are doing vital work across the country.
James Cleverly (Braintree) (Con)
I declare an interest, as my wife is currently going through the process to become a magistrate. I am struck by how the role of magistrates is so little understood. There are a number of people in my professional and personal circles who might make good magistrates, but they are unaware of the process or of the importance of the role. What more could be done to highlight the significant role that magistrates play in the criminal justice system?
Lucy Frazer
I am pleased to hear that Mrs Cleverly is undertaking this important role. My hon. Friend is right that it is important, and employers do understand. The Lloyds banking group recently won an award for encouraging staff to take time off to undertake this important role, and we need to do more to encourage employers to encourage their staff to take part in this important function.
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. We need to move on now. I was very generous before, but magistrates have absolutely nothing to do with the Bill, as the Minister well knows.
Lucy Frazer
I am happy to come on to the three reasons why amendments 2 to 4 cannot be accepted. First, the amendments are not necessary. The functions are already being carried out, and carried out well, by those with lesser qualifications than those sought by the hon. Member for Bolton South East. The qualification requirements for legal advisers in the magistrates court and family court are currently set out in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor, as they have been since 1979, and amendments 2 and 3 would raise the qualifications bar significantly higher than the current regulations and would rule out a large proportion of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service staff from giving legal advice in future.
James Cartlidge
There are many people in the Chamber with huge legal expertise. All I can claim is spending my year off as a junior outdoor clerk, for which the only qualifications needed were a ponytail and a cockney accent, as far as I could see. From my short experience I discovered the huge number of staff who make up our courts and keep them ticking along. They might be administrative functions, but we should not be afraid of reforming our courts to give those people greater roles that help them to make more of their career.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend makes an important point. Not only is it important to ensure that the qualifications match the role, but these reforms will ensure good career progression for competent and organised staff. Similarly, in relation to amendment 4, it is already the case that some staff can exercise judicial functions in almost every jurisdiction except the Crown court. The range of functions they can carry out varies enormously, as my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) pointed out earlier, from legally qualified legal advisers in the county court setting aside default judgments to non-legally qualified caseworkers in the lower tribunal dealing with postponement requests and issuing strikeout warnings.
Accepting amendment 4 would rule out a large proportion of those staff, who are already exercising judicial functions and who may have been doing either or both for a number of years. Such a loss of expertise would be particularly damaging and would impact on the service that Her Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service can provide. The hon. Member for Bolton South East suggested that introducing authorised staff was damaging to justice, but I did not hear any examples of inappropriate action by any of our current staff who do not currently have those qualifications and who are already carrying out these roles.
Kevin Foster (Torbay) (Con)
The Minister is outlining well the position under the current regulations. Does she agree, therefore, that specifying the needed qualifications in primary legislation would be unwelcome when we already have a perfectly effective system that does not require such qualifications, which could then in future be changed by further primary legislation?
Lucy Frazer
That is the heart of the Government’s position, and it takes me neatly on to my second point. The Bill, as drafted, already ensures appropriate procedures are in place to ensure that parties are protected. Those points were clearly put by my hon. Friends the Members for Torbay (Kevin Foster) and for Bromley and Chislehurst—the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice always puts things clearly and cogently. The Bill rightly allows the relevant procedure rule committees to set the requirements relating to the necessary qualifications or experience of these staff in the future, depending on the functions they permit staff to carry out.
Kevin Hollinrake
This is an important point. Will my hon. and learned Friend come on to address not only the human cost if these amendments are accepted, with the potential for people in these roles at the moment to lose those jobs, but the financial costs of making those people redundant and replacing them with qualified people?
Lucy Frazer
Yes, those are important points. A large number of people already carry out these important roles and do so very well, and we would like to retain them.
Both the judicial functions that may be carried out by staff and the accompanying qualification requirements will be set out—it is just that they will be set out in the procedure rules, which are made by way of secondary legislation and are therefore subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Neil O'Brien
Progressive politicians on both sides of the House believe in labour market progression; they believe people should be able to act up, do more, learn more, take their career further and earn more. By putting in primary legislation artificial demarcations that stop skilled people doing things they are capable of doing, we would be doing people down; we would be putting a limit on their aspirations. That is why we must reject these amendments.
Lucy Frazer
That is an important point. Some people are already carrying out these functions and doing them well, and they will be able to see a future career progression for themselves. The legal and other qualifications they should have will be set out, but they will be set out by the committees, which are judicially led and independent of Government, and include representatives of the legal professions, and court and tribunal users. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said, the judges placed on those are leading the procedure rule committees and have significant expertise. It is they who are best placed to assess the appropriate level of qualification or experience for authorised staff, in the light of the functions they choose to allow those staff to exercise.
My hon. Friend rightly said that the member of staff will not be able to give legal advice or exercise judicial functions until they have been authorised to do so by the Lord Chief Justice or their nominee, or by the Senior President of Tribunals or their delegate. Authorisations are therefore ultimately the responsibility of the judiciary, and those people will not authorise staff unless they are satisfied as to their competence.
Robert Neill
My hon. and learned Friend will know, and perhaps she will confirm, that the way this works in practice is that either the Lord Chief Justice or the Senior President of Tribunals makes the authorisation. Alternatively, in the case of the civil jurisdiction, for example, this will invariably at least go to the senior presiding judge or the presiding judges of the circuit. We are talking about people who, in their administrative role, never mind their judicial capacity, will have visited and met these—
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. Minister, come on. And you have had three speeches already, Bob, you don’t need to stretch the imagination of the Chamber.
Lucy Frazer
My hon. Friend, the Chair of the Select Committee, was making an important point. The rule committees are—
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. Some might think it is very important—[Interruption.] Order. Would the Minister like to sit down for a moment? In fairness, I am beginning to get a little frustrated with the people who were not here for all the speeches; we had no speakers in, and now everyone wants to come in with interventions. I have only got one Member now down to speak on Third Reading, so if people really want to make a contribution, they know what to do.
Lucy Frazer
I hope that more will put in to speak on this important subject. I wish to pick up on what my hon. Friend was saying, because he cited a number of speeches from the other place, where senior members of the judiciary were highlighting the appropriateness of the Government’s position. Lord Neuberger, former President of the Supreme Court, warned that these amendments would place
“a potential straitjacket on the ability to appoint the appropriate people to make appropriate decisions.”
He went on to reflect that there “will be many decisions” for which the experience set out in the amendments
“would be appropriate, but there will be others where less experience would be adequate for the decision-making.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 882.]
Thirdly, I come to an important point that has not yet been mentioned in the House. The amendments would limit flexibility should new routes to legal qualifications emerge. For example, one key change that we have made in the draft regulations that we published alongside the Bill is to include fellows of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives, or those who have passed the necessary examinations to be a CILEx fellow, among those who can give legal advice. That is a progressive step, but if we were to accept amendments 2 and 3, it would be much harder to respond to such changes in the future, as we would have to amend primary, rather than secondary, legislation.
Furthermore, a legal qualification might not be the most relevant qualification for a particular judicial function. For example, it is more helpful for a registrar in the tax tribunal to be a tax professional by background, rather than a legal professional.
The hon. Member for Bolton South East raised a number of points on independence, and I wish to start by saying that I think the judiciary, whether sitting in court or in committee, has, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) said when he was in his place, the highest level of independence and integrity.
The hon. Lady queried, both here and in Committee, the independence of authorised staff, implying that those with a legal qualification were more likely to be independent. Under the Bill, all court and tribunal staff who are authorised to exercise judicial functions will now be independent of the Lord Chancellor when doing so, and subject only to the direction of the Lord Chief Justice or their nominee, or the Senior President of Tribunals or their delegate.
The Bill also provides, for the first time, protections from legal proceedings and costs in legal proceedings and indemnities for all authorised staff when carrying out judicial functions, which will further safeguard their independence in decision making.
Finally, amendment 5 deals with the right of reconsideration of decisions taken by authorised staff in the courts. I wish to start by acknowledging that the hon. Lady and the Opposition have listened carefully to the points made in Committee; I note there is now no amendment dealing with decisions taken by staff in the tribunals, and I welcome that.
It is right that in some circumstances a party to proceedings may wish to have the decision reconsidered, but we remain opposed to the amendment for three reasons. First, the Bill already ensures that a right of reconsideration will be available when appropriate. We believe that the independent procedure rule committees—comprised, as I and others have said, of jurisdictional experts and experienced practitioners—are best placed to decide whether such a right of further reconsideration is needed and, if so, the form that that right should take.
Indeed, the procedure rule committees in the civil and tribunals jurisdictions have already included in their respective rules a specific right to judicial reconsideration for decisions made by authorised persons in appropriate cases. For example, the magistrates courts and the family court have their own existing mechanisms for reviewing various decisions, which amendment 5 would cut across.
Secondly, the right identified by the hon. Lady is too broad, even by her own admission. In speaking to amendments in Committee, she said that
“we accept and acknowledge that one should not be able to ask for reconsideration simply because one disagrees with the decision of the authorised person; one must have a cogent reason. There must be proper grounds for requesting a reconsideration.”—[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) [Lords] Public Bill Committee, 4 December 2018; c. 17.]
I was delighted to hear those words, because the Government have also been arguing, both here and in the other place, that a blanket right of reconsideration simply would not work in practice. Yet amendment 5 would give a party in a case an automatic right to request that any decision made by an authorised person exercising the functions of a court be reconsidered by a judge, irrespective of the merits.
Thirdly, the approach we put forward is fair and balanced. The Government listened to concerns about ensuring there were adequate safeguards in the Bill. For that reason, we moved amendments on the right of reconsideration that were accepted on Report in the other place. They effectively require the rule committee, when making rules, to allow authorised staff to exercise judicial functions to consider whether each of those functions should be subject to a right to judicial reconsideration. Where a rule committee decides against the creation of a right of reconsideration, it must inform the Lord Chancellor of its decision and the reasons for it.
The hon. Lady also referred to the Briggs report, and I would like to touch on that very briefly. The recommendations made by Lord Justice Briggs are taken from the report “Civil Courts Structure Review”, the focus of which was the courts of the civil jurisdiction. While an unqualified right of reconsideration might have been appropriate to recommend for the civil courts, given their unique way of working it would be ineffective simply to transpose this recommendation on entirely different jurisdictions.
The civil procedure rule committee has built a right of reconsideration into its rules, but this will not necessarily be appropriate for other jurisdictions. It is for each jurisdiction, with the expertise it has within the rule committee, to decide what is right.
That approach has found favour in the other place. Lord Thomas, former Lord Chief Justice and former chair of the criminal procedure rule committee, said:
“I support what the Government seek to do and urge a substantial degree of caution in respect of the proposals brought forward by the noble Baroness”—
that is, Baroness Chakrabarti. He added that the Government’s approach provides the right balance:
“It gives discretion to a body that knows and has a lot of experience, but it contains that degree of explanatory accountability that will make sure that it does not do anything—even if we were to worry that it might—that goes outside a proper and just delegation”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. 425-26.]
The Bill strikes the right balance between ensuring appropriate safeguards and transparency of decision making, and leaving the jurisdictional rule committees the discretion to determine the most appropriate mechanism for reviewing decisions by authorised people.
Finally, I would like to respond to the very important points made by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Louise Haigh). I was very pleased to meet her and Sammy Woodhouse a week or so ago. She raised issues that are outside the scope of the Bill, but none the less what Sammy went through was harrowing and the hon. Lady made some important points. As she knows, I committed to look very carefully at the issues she raised and I assure her that we are doing that.
As the hon. Lady mentioned, we have already taken some steps. We have, as she alluded to, asked the president of the family court to look at the practice directions and he has committed to doing that with the rule committee. My officials have spoken to the Association of Directors of Children’s Services about whether it is appropriate to send further guidance to councils on the circumstances in which they should apply to court not to give notice of hearings to parties, such as happened in the Sammy Woodhouse case. The Department will continue to look closely at those issues.
For all those reasons, this is an important Bill that will ensure that we can bring flexibility to our judges, deploy them in the most flexible way, use their resources where they are needed and not when they are not needed, and ensure that those who operate our court system do so effectively and fairly for the people they serve.
The Ministry of Justice is putting users of the court at the heart of our reforms and of our programme on court reform. The measures will not only save on cost—that is not the primary reason for them, although it is important—but ensure that cases go through the system fairly and well. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 2, in the schedule, page 6, line 36, at end insert—
“(aa) is a qualified solicitor, barrister or chartered legal executive with more than three years’ experience post-qualification, and”.—(Yasmin Qureshi.)
This amendment would stipulate that the minimum legal qualifications for authorised persons should be three years’ experience post-qualification.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
I have now to announce the result of the deferred Division on the question relating to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority. The Ayes were 513 and the Noes were 13, so the Question was agreed to.
Amendment proposed: 5, in the schedule, page 11, line 32, leave out subsection 67C and insert—
“67C Right to judicial reconsideration of decision made by an authorised person
A party to any decision made by an authorised person in the execution of the person’s duty as an authorised person exercising a relevant judicial function, by virtue of section 67B(1), may apply in writing, within 14 days of the service of the order, to have the decision reconsidered by a judge of the relevant court within 14 days from the date of application.”—(Yasmin Qureshi.)
This amendment would grant people subject to a decision made under delegated powers a statutory right to judicial reconsideration.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Consideration completed. I will now suspend the House for no more than 5 minutes in order to make a decision about certification. The Division bells will be rung two minutes before the House resumes. Following my certification, the Government will table the appropriate consent motion, copies of which will be made available in the Vote Office and will be distributed by Doorkeepers.
Madam Deputy Speaker
I can now inform the House that I have completed certification of the Bill, as required by the Standing Order. I have confirmed the view expressed in Mr Speaker’s provisional certificate issued earlier today. Copies of my final certificate will be made available in the Vote Office and on the parliamentary website.
Under Standing Order No. 83M, a consent motion is therefore required for the Bill to proceed. Copies of the motion are available in the Vote Office and on the parliamentary website, and have been made available to Members in the Chamber. Does the Minister intend to move the consent motion?
Lucy Frazer
indicated assent.
The House forthwith resolved itself into the Legislative Grand Committee (England and Wales) (Standing Order No. 83M).
[Dame Rosie Winterton in the Chair]
Lucy Frazer
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
This is a small and technical Bill, but it is a key component of our £1 billion programme of reform that will see our courts and tribunals modernised for the 21st century and, importantly, make access to justice quicker and easier for all. It is also the first step in the legislation that will underpin these reforms, as we will introduce further courts legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows.
The judicial measures in the Bill will enable greater flexibility in the deployment of judges. They will allow the senior judiciary to respond more effectively to changes in demand and to make better use of the skills and experience of the existing cohort of judges. This Bill will free up judges from the most routine tasks by enabling appropriately qualified and experienced staff in courts and tribunals to carry out a wider range of judicial functions than they can at present. Through these measures, the Bill will improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of courts and tribunals and, importantly, it will reduce delays. This will ensure that we deliver a speedier resolution of matters, which is important in benefiting those who use our courts and tribunals system.
As I have said, this is a short Bill, so I will be brief, but I would not want to finish without thanking the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) and other Members of this House for the constructive way in which they have engaged on these issues. I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord Thomas, the former Lord Chief Justice, and the noble and learned Lord Neuberger, the former President of the Supreme Court—they have been widely quoted in this House—for their wise counsel in the other place and for sharing their expertise on how the measures in the Bill will operate in practice.
I thank the Clerks and other parliamentary staff for helping the proceedings on the Bill to run so smoothly, and I extend my thanks to our hard-working Bill team, our private offices, our Parliamentary Private Secretaries and the Whips. It has been an honour to take the Bill through the House, and I look forward to seeing the important measures it contains being implemented in the coming months. On that basis, I commend the Bill to the House.