(7 years ago)
Commons ChamberI hear the hon. Lady’s case that somehow the charter is not necessary, which is very much the case that Ministers have made in the past, but she has conceded that there are differences that the charter can apply. She characterises those differences as very small, but what she perceives as small or minuscule rights are not necessarily small or minuscule rights to our constituents, to members of the public or to the most vulnerable in society, who may depend on the very rights provided by the charter in crucial circumstances.
Does the hon. Gentleman find it odd that we are transposing all EU law into our own law while taking away the thing that underpins all EU law? We are taking away the fundamentals and foundations of the body of EU law. Is that not an odd way of going about things?
I agree. I find it odd that Ministers are saying that, somehow, the charter does not matter but are then saying that we must delete the charter in the Bill. They would almost die in a ditch to defend clause 5(4), which simply says:
“The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not part of domestic law on or after exit day.”
If the charter is so benign and so irrelevant, why not have the report? It may be tedious to some, but the report is necessary to explain whether those rights do or do not offer protections. If the charter is so ineffectual, and if this is supposed to be a copy-and-paste exercise to transpose EU law, I do not see the argument for deleting the charter.
I know that my hon. Friend is an expert on these matters because of her time in the European Parliament. I shall be addressing data protection directly, but I shall be happy to give way to her again in due course.
The other argument that has been made about the charter is “If it does nothing wrong or does nothing by itself, where is the harm in keeping it?” However, as was pointed out by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, the charter applies to member states only when they are acting within the scope of EU law. Indeed, it is a specific device intended to codify—not create—rights, and apply them to EU member states and other EU institutions operating within the framework of EU law. It would be curious, if not perverse, to incorporate that instrument directly in UK law, or implement it, at the very moment when we ceased to have the relevant obligations as a member of the EU.
I will make a slight bit of progress, and then I will give way.
Seeking simply to transplant the charter into our domestic law as it stands, dislocated from EU membership —given all the other points that Members have made about the way in which it would apply in practice—would not be appropriate, and, indeed, could introduce needless complexities that all of us, on both sides of the House, should legitimately seek to avoid.
With respect, we have all that at present. The status quo is that the ECHR and the charter of fundamental rights are part of domestic law, and I do not see any legal chaos in our courts, although I do see an awful lot of political chaos.
Does the hon. and learned Lady agree that there is some kind of misunderstanding here, and that it is the gaps that we are addressing? We are not creating uncertainties. The situation proposed by the Bill will create gaps, and that is the main problem that we are addressing.
The hon. Lady makes her point eloquently. Some of those on the Government Benches say that incorporating the charter into domestic law would cause uncertainty and chaos, but our point is that not incorporating it while we are incorporating everything else at the point of the snapshot is what will cause uncertainty. I do not know whether I would go so far as to call it chaos. After all, there is going to be so much chaos around after Brexit, and a difficulty in establishing the difference between fundamental rights and general principles might not be the biggest example of that chaos. However, there will be legal uncertainty. The Minister himself said that one of the Government’s guiding purposes in the legislation was to avoid legal uncertainty.
No, I will not, because, as the Chair will appreciate, I have taken a lot of interventions, as I did last time, when I took six or eight. It is impossible to get the arguments out in reply to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, with whom I have been discussing this for an extremely long time—for the best part of 20 years—if I am constrained in this way, so I am not going to take any further interventions.
What lies behind these amendments is not only the charter itself, but the whole role of judicial interpretation and jurisprudence in its application to the UK; by virtue of the way in which the amendments would apply, the Supreme Court would inherit the power to invalidate and disapply Acts of Parliament. This is a matter of the gravest constitutional significance and it goes to the heart of the stability of this country and its rule of law. In turn, that goes to the heart of our democratic system and the right of the British people to govern themselves, whichever party they come from, in respect of how they vote in free elections, exercising their freedom of choice as to whom they decide to govern them until the next general election.
All this is intrinsically bound up with the claimed virtues of the European Court itself—it is not impartial. As I said in the previous debate, when the European Court adjudicated on the Van Gend en Loos case and Costa v. ENEL in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case, it was doing so on its own initiative, without any basis in EU treaties, until the Lisbon treaty, which we on this side of the House, including my right hon. and learned Friend, opposed. That is what did this. We opposed it. He opposed it. I simply make that point to put it on the record.
This Lisbon treaty, as the European Scrutiny Committee also demonstrated, was the Giscard d’Estaing proposal for a European constitution by any other name. It is part and parcel of the other characteristic of the European Court, which is the drive towards political integration and its interpretation of law by the purposive rule, even when the wording in question is neither obscure nor ambiguous. Furthermore, many different purposes may, from time to time, be in conflict with one another, but the driving force for them is the integrationist road map from which it never deviates and never will. It is the ultimate engineer of European integration. Equally, it has adopted a method of interpretation that neutralises the principle of the conferral of powers that were meant to be limited under articles 4 and 5 of the treaty on European Union. By doing so, it has extended the range and effect of European law by leaps and bounds. With that comes the extensions of competence, which in turn are everlastingly overarching and limitless. The European Court has never once annulled a general EU legislative act, except on one occasion, and when it did so, it was re-enacted almost immediately. It is permanently on the march in favour of political integration and by any standard is therefore more a political than judicial court.
Yes, my right hon. Friend made that fair point in an earlier intervention. I am happy to say that I am open and willing to hear what the Government have to say on that, and I look forward to the Minister’s contribution later.
The concept of amendment 10 sounds reasonable to me—not least if we are to get rid of the charter—and I shall be listening carefully. However, I agree that the charter has significantly added to the complexity of human rights applications and that in removing the charter the Bill will provide an opportunity to simplify things outside the EU. The Minister has promised to deliver to the Exiting the European Union Committee a memorandum on charter rights, and I note the idea provided by new clause 16, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), of a report to review the implications of removal of the charter. I would happily accept Ministers’ assurance on that, rather than to legislate for it, and I hope that the document to be delivered to the Committee by 5 December will cover the two issues, as I think the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), said earlier.
My underlying acceptance of the Bill’s position is premised on there remaining, as now exists, a significant and meaningful body of human rights legislation in this country. That would include common law and the Human Rights Act and would be underpinned by the European convention on human rights. I am therefore pleased that the Minister took the opportunity to accept the need for retention of the ECHR in the post-Brexit period.
I rise to discuss new clause 78 and the amendments that are designed to retain the charter. I listened carefully to what the Minister said earlier, but if the Government are not inclined to retain the whole charter, I urge him at least to look again at new clause 78, because it would protect some equality rights.
Conservative Members like to argue that, when Britain decided to join the European Economic Community in 1975, what the British people voted for was an economic union—no less, no more—and that only afterwards the EU became a political union that we should now leave. However, if one looks at the fundamental role played by the British in drafting the European convention on human rights in 1950, this is not true. The convention aimed to protect fundamental freedoms for all Europeans and was driven by British values.
The hon. Lady rightly speaks of our living in a global environment, but she will acknowledge that, as has been said by Members on both sides of the House, Britain leads the way in laws for equality? Therefore, what is her concern, particularly as the Human Rights Act 1998 will remain operative?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for making that point. Legal experts the Select Committee has listened to have made the point that there are gaps, so what is the point of not taking the charter into our retained EU law as a whole, because we are taking everything else, and making sure these gaps do not exist?
Does the hon. Lady agree that it is hard to substantiate the claim that Britain leads the world in equality rights, given that we have so often had to fall back on the charter to fill gaps in our equality laws, as, for example, in the Walker case before the Supreme Court in the summer?
The hon. and learned Lady makes a good point. I am proud of the British legacy of fundamental rights, but as is clear, and as seems to be stated in a lot of legal cases—as I say, I am not a legal expert—lawyers are using different kinds of law because different laws apply to different cases. That is why we have this charter and we would lose a fundamental protection if we did not have it.
I do not wish to criticise the UK Government, because in many ways and instances they do lead the way in signing up to the UN conventions. As Ministers made clear last week, in terms of international law the UK adopts a dual system. So it is all well and good for the UK Government to sign and ratify UN conventions and treaties, but they do not actually become part of our domestic law unless there is an implementing Act of Parliament, because of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. So we send out a signal that we lead the way but in terms of enforceable rights the hon. Lady is quite right: rights for the children are not enforceable before our courts.
I thank the hon. Lady for making that valuable point. As someone who is not a legal expert, I believe this is about having a safeguard. We are keeping the law in the charter because it fills a gap that we would have otherwise. That is why we should retain the charter.
Let me give an example: the charter provides specific rights for children that are not replicated elsewhere in UK-wide human rights law. It requires that the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration in all actions relating to children; that children’s views may be expressed and shall be taken into consideration; and that children have a right to maintain a personal relationship with both their parents, unless this is contrary to their interests. The latter right was used in a case relating to two British children, whose father’s deportation was successfully challenged by focusing on the major negative impact on the children of loss of contact with a parent. Cases of this kind might become more common if Britain leaves the EU and EU nationals lose the automatic right to reside in the UK, with the consequent risk of family separation.
The charter also contains a prohibition on child labour which is not replicated elsewhere in UK human rights law. Another example of the charter providing greater protection is on disability rights. Disabled people would no longer be able to use the charter to support their right to independence, integration and participation in the community. This interpretive tool in the charter goes much further than the non-discrimination provisions in the Equality Act 2010. On healthcare, as we have heard, the charter was decisive in ensuring that bans on tobacco advertising were permitted. The list goes on, so why not retain the charter? Let me be a bit flippant here: I cannot help but wonder whether the Government are making this obvious omission from our statute books because some time ago the Prime Minister, when she was Home Secretary, had a ding-dong over the charter when she unsuccessfully tried to extradite Abu Qatada and this is a bit of late comeback.
To be serious again, what I worry about most in all the discussions about Brexit is that everything is being done in a big hurry because some eager Brexiteers would rather leave the EU tomorrow and not think about any consequences, even those that would mean real harm for this country. New clause 78, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), would specifically provide an overarching domestic guarantee of non-discrimination by the state. It would be a domestic replacement for the safety net for equality rights currently provided by EU law. The new clause would serve a distinctive and different purpose from the rights protected by the Equality Act 2010, and I urge the Minister to consider it again. It would provide a guarantee that our laws must be non-discriminatory in their purpose and effect, along with a mechanism to challenge them if they were. Currently, that cannot be done under the Equality Act.
Providing greater protection of our human rights has nothing to do with losing sovereignty but everything to do with doing the right thing by our own people. I am fed up with being branded undemocratic or unpatriotic for merely pointing out that the Government will be failing their own people if the Bill passes unamended.
The new clause has been promoted by the Equality and Human Rights Commission. I take it that the commission has done careful research into how it would provide an extra guarantee that is not currently provided. The hon. and learned Gentleman should look at it carefully to understand how it is meant to work, but it is an overarching tool that, as I understand it, we currently do not have. As I said before, as a non- legal person, for me the most important thing is the safe- guarding of our equality laws and the need to match what has been done so far at European and international level.
Brexit is increasingly nothing to do with what leave politicians promised to the people. I fear it is becoming an ideologically driven process to turn this country into some sort of deregulated free-for-all, in which the progress we have made over the past four decades to protect individuals from exploitation and discrimination, in tandem with our European neighbours, is sacrificed on the altar of sovereignty. The British people did not vote to give away their fundamental rights and protections. If Parliament does not amend the Bill, let nobody claim that this is the will of the people.
I apologise for my brief absence from the Chamber during the debate—it was because of the excitement of a Delegated Legislation Committee.
I wish to say a few words about why I feel unable to support the proposals to bring the charter of fundamental rights into UK law, but before I do so I acknowledge the huge importance we should all place on the scrutiny of this historic piece of legislation. The Bill is of course a critical part of the implementation of the huge decision made by the people of the United Kingdom in the referendum last year, and it obviously has a crucial role to play if we are to avoid a regulatory gap in relation to aspects of our law that are currently covered by EU legislation. Although I do not feel able to agree with the new clauses and amendments we are debating, I fully respect the intentions of those who have tabled them.
At a time of great change for this country, it is important that we find ways to work across party divides to come together to make a success of the process of implementing the referendum result and leaving the European Union. My goal for a successful outcome is a new partnership with our European neighbours, with which I hope those on both the leave and remain sides of the debate can be comfortable. It will, of course, be important for Ministers to listen to a spectrum of views before the final terms of our departure from the EU are settled, and I know they are strongly committed to doing that.
(7 years ago)
Commons ChamberDoes the Minister not agree that exactly this argument is creating division between us and our European neighbours, which will make it very difficult to create a deep and special partnership?
I do not accept that at all. When the Prime Minister wrote to the President of the European Council in March, she set in train the defined two-year process of article 50, which, unless extended by unanimity, will conclude on 29 March 2019. That is why the Prime Minister said in her Florence speech that the UK would cease to be a member of the EU on that day. That is the Government’s policy.
I will give way to the hon. Lady, and then to the Minister.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that people voted to leave the EU because they wanted a better future? They did not vote for Brexit at any cost, including the cost of democracy.
There are at least 12,000 regulations, every one of which would have required a whole Act of Parliament, with amendments and stages in both Houses. A transcript would have been available. People would have known who voted which way and why, and known the outcome of what was a democratic process. Instead, as I said to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe—even he conceded that I was right on this—the process is conducted, over bibulous lunches and in the Council of Ministers, in a manner completely lacking in democratic legitimacy, yet, because of consensus arrangements behind closed doors, it becomes part of our law through section 2 of the 1972 Act. It is imposed on us by our voluntary consent. It is therefore up to us and the people of this country to decide, by their voluntary consent and their freedom of choice, to get out of this, just as it was brought in by an Act of Parliament, without a referendum, in 1972.
Has the hon. Gentleman not shown a deep misunderstanding of how the European Union works through consensus and participatory democracy? Rather than one country dictating to another, that is the whole spirit of the European Union. No one country is sovereign, but decisions are taken in the round.
I do not think that matter has been entirely settled, by any means. The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) earlier referred to a lunch she was at, where it appears that she was told we were going to be subject to the European Court of Justice, and my right hon. and learned Friend has made exactly the same point.
I have to say that there are serious questions about the nature of the European Court. The problem is that the European Court is essentially not an impartial court at all. It has never discharged the function impartially, and from the early 1960s it developed a range of principles, such as those of the uniform application and effectiveness of EU law, that it then expanded of its own volition into the general principles of the supremacy and direct effect of EU law over national law. These judge-made principles had no basis in the EU treaties until the Lisbon treaty, which my right hon. and learned Friend, who was then Attorney General, opposed. The fact is that until Lisbon—
I am afraid not, as I really must proceed.
None of these judge-made principles had any basis in the EU treaties, and the principle of the primacy of EU law is a judicial creation recently codified, and no more than that. However, because we have accepted judgments of the European Court under section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, which we are going to repeal, we are saddled with this, and that is one of the things we are going to unshackle.
Interpretation is done in the European Court by what is known as the purposive approach. In fact, as has been well said, there are many different purposes that can be in conflict with one another, and the methods of interpretation applied are anything but satisfactory. I therefore say to those who want to advocate the European Court, whether in the transitional period or in general, “Beware of what you wish for,” because the European Court can create havoc in relation to our trading arrangements.
No, I am not going to take any interventions. I am conscious that we have very little time, and I want other colleagues to be able to speak in this debate.
We have been unable all the time we have been in the EU to have our own migration policy or to decide who we wish to welcome into our country. We cannot have our own fishing policy and we cannot have our own farming policy. We have moved into massive deficits on both fishing and on farming, whereas we used to have a good trading surplus on fish before we joined the European Economic Community and we used to produce most of the temperate food we needed before the common agricultural policy started to bite.
The British people decided in their wisdom that we should take back control, and we will take back control by the passage of this very important piece of legislation. Above all, clause 1 will take back that control. The great news for colleagues on both sides of the House who had different views on whether we should leave or remain is that their genuine passion for democracy, which many on both sides of the argument have expressed today, can be satisfied by agreeing to clause 1, which repeals the original Act. Once that has happened and the repeal has taken place, this Parliament will once again listen to the wishes of the British people and be able to change VAT, our fishing policy, our agricultural policy, our borders policy and our welfare policies in the ways we wish.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that there seems to be a fundamental lack of understanding about democracy? Democracy is not fixed in stone; a decision that has been made once does not have to last for ever and a day. Indeed, our parliamentary democracy is based on people being able to vote every four or five years and perhaps vote for something else. The referendum should not be seen as forever fixed in stone.
Indeed, although the hon. Member for Stone thinks that our democracy is very much set in stone on this issue. Interestingly, when the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) was asked what would happen if, 12 months from now, 90% of the population felt that a mistake had been made on 23 June 2016, he seemed to say that we would proceed regardless and completely overlook any change in public opinion.
The Liberal Democrats will clearly oppose new clause 49, but one thing I learned during the debate is that the right hon. Member for Birkenhead is apparently not an ardent Brexiteer. I was surprised to learn that, but I welcome the fact that things are evenly balanced for him. However, I was a bit worried to hear him say that we did not need more facts; it is actually quite important to have facts and not necessarily always to act on one’s gut feelings.
I have not tabled any amendments, but I will briefly comment on one set of amendments before making a point about the drafting of clause 6. For me and many of my colleagues, that is the most important clause because the clear definition of being in or out of the European Union ultimately comes down to the Court of Justice’s ability to change the United Kingdom’s laws by direct reference as a result of a clash with European law.
Twenty-five years ago, I stood in almost the same place, during the House’s consideration of the Maastricht treaty, to make the point that the Court of Justice is more political than courts in the UK, even by its appointments and by the nature of its judgments. Judicial activism is a process that came directly from the Court of Justice, and it eventually percolated, to a much lesser extent, into the UK courts.
It is through those judgments that the Court of Justice has widened the concept of where the Commission is able to rule. A good example is that, through Court reference, whole areas of social security that were never in the original treaties were widened dramatically. Rulings have been made on the application of social security payments to individuals from countries that were never referenced in the original treaties, which is a good point about the Court’s power.
This is so critical because, after the referendum, the Centre for Social Justice, the Legatum Institute and others came together to do a lot of polling asking the public why they supported the vote to leave the European Union. The single most powerful reason—more than money and more than migration—was to take back control of our laws. I was slightly surprised because I thought it was an esoteric point for most members of the public, but they said it was their most powerful reason for voting. Some people said that, even if it meant they would be worse off for a period, it was still the overriding principle behind their vote to take back control and leave the European Union.
With that as the key, the Government are right to drive this policy. It is absolutely right for them to make it clear that, on the day we leave, the European Court of Justice will cease to have direct effect in the United Kingdom. I will return to the drafting on how long some of the other principles will continue.
The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) is not here at the moment but, in line with the earlier statement by the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), it would be wrong to support new clause 14 and amendment 278. There is a simple principle behind the Bill, and the Government have now accepted that there will be primary legislation on the agreement, or lack of agreement, as we leave the European Union with regard to our trade and other arrangements. The new clause and the amendment are wrong because they would seek to bind the hand of the Government as they sought to negotiate, and that is not the purpose of this.
Let me give an example. Not so long ago, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union said clearly that his view was that during the implementation period—at the beginning, we hope—we would want to have those elements of the eventual agreement in place. One of those would be a process of arbitration between the UK and the EU. If that was agreed and was part of the process, and then became part of the implementation period, the new clause and the amendment would prevent our being able to make that arrangement—they would be bound into law and we would not be allowed to go into the implementation period with these arrangements. That would immediately knock out any opportunity we have to accelerate the process of where we would eventually be by getting into the implementation period and applying an arbitration process agreed between the EU and the UK for those areas of disagreement on areas of law and other interpretations. That is why these proposals are wrong and would damage the prospects of the negotiations that are likely to take place.
I asked a couple of days ago about this idea of an arbitration court. Now that the right hon. Gentleman is here, will he clarify how it would be different for ordinary people in the street in comparison with what the ECJ is currently doing?
The whole process of arbitration is a natural one in all trade arrangements between two different groups: they agree to an arbitration process when there are clashes of interpretation about what they have agreed. That is standard practice; it has been in pretty much every free trade arrangement.
If we seek a free trade arrangement, the way to have that governed is through such an arbitration process, where differences—when things cannot be agreed between the two—are taken for a final process of examination and some kind of judgment about the matter. That would not be done by the Court of Justice sitting in the European Union, or by a UK court; it would be outwith both of those, but in the agreement.
The point I am making is that if such an arrangement was agreed in a free trade arrangement, we would want to start it as soon as possible, because if there is an implementation period, we would want to start implementing what we have agreed as soon as possible. The hon. Lady needs to look up most of the other trade arrangements to see what I am saying. We want to give the greatest flexibility to the Government. It is crucial that as we leave, we leave the Court of Justice in that sense.
I want now to deal with some of the arrangements in clause 6. I say to Ministers that there is a certain amount of confusion over where the courts are meant to reference the ECJ, including in respect of its previous judgments. As has been mentioned by some of my colleagues, including my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), there remains a confusion as to where the courts will reference judgments from the ECJ, both past and existing. I come back to the point of clause 6(2), where they are told not to have regard to anything. However, the Bill later goes on to modify that quite a lot. I am particularly concerned—this has been raised elsewhere—by the definition that
“’retained EU case law’ means any principles laid down by, and any decisions of, the European Court, as they have effect in EU law immediately before exit day and so far as they”.
The Bill goes on to reference exactly how that will work.
My point is that those principles will themselves be modified by the European Court of Justice as it goes forward. My question really is: as they are modified, at what point will UK courts consider those principles to be no longer relevant to their judgments as they refer to them? I do not expect an answer right now, but I hope to get one as we go forward. Lord Neuberger has made the point that it is unclear to the courts how strong their reference should be—whether they should reference the principles or not. The point about the principles is the more powerful point, because I have no idea when the cut-off comes or whether it ever comes—whether we will ever break free, as it were, from continuing judgments and changes to the European Court principles.
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Commons Chamber“Democracy” and “the will of the people” are terms often used and—dare I say it—abused in connection with leaving the European Union. I have been listening to this debate for many hours now, and I am puzzled by the arguments of those who support the Bill’s progress. As has already been said this afternoon, we are here to debate not whether we leave the EU but how we do it. Over the past two days of debate, it has been eloquently proven by Members from both sides of the House that what is in front of us is deeply flawed, because it threatens to write into law a substantial loss of our parliamentary democracy and set an alarming precedent. It is therefore frustrating to be accused of undermining the will of the people if I do not support the Bill’s progress. I will not support the Bill, because it threatens a fundamental principle of British democracy—the supremacy of Parliament and the division of powers—and gives sweeping powers to Minsters and bureaucrats. The right to make laws in this country was given to Parliament after many hard-fought battles.
Will the hon. Gentleman hear me out?
The supremacy of Parliament is a proud tradition that all of us should defend. I find it perplexing that, for example, the hon. Members for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) and for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer), both of whom I know to be thinking people, are so eager to see us leave the EU that they forget everything else in its path. Democracy matters, and whoever tries to suspend democracy to enact the will of the people should think again.
The will of the people is of course a pretty mixed bag and is not fixed forever. On 23 June last year, almost 70% of my constituents voted to remain in the EU. In June this year, I was elected on the basis of my opposition to the Government’s Brexit line. That was the will of the people in my constituency at that point. True to form, Bath had one of the highest voter turnouts, and active engagement in Bath is not limited to election time; it is evident every day. Protest groups, demonstrations and lively debates are testament to how much people in Bath care about how our country is run. Another principle of democracy that they want to see practised is that I can speak on their behalf about their concerns about when and how we leave the EU without being labelled as a remoaner, a reverser, unpatriotic or undemocratic. Democracy is about the right to debate freely and voice an opinion without being labelled or bullied. If we truly want to achieve the best for our country, we need to be able to discuss all outcomes freely, including that people—leavers or remainers—can change their mind.
The Bill adds another level of madness to the Brexit process, betraying not only those who voted remain, but those who chose to leave. One of the leave campaign’s strongest arguments was about taking back control here in Westminster, but instead of giving control back to this Parliament, which the leave campaign championed, the Bill is a power grab by Ministers. One of my constituents said to me:
“When people voted to leave the European Union, they didn’t vote to swap backroom deals in Brussels for more of the same in Whitehall. They voted for Parliament and the British people to have more of a say.”
As the MP for Bath, I will fight this attack on our democracy. I will not sit idly by as this Government try to erode our rights and change our laws behind closed doors. How can anybody support this Bill? My only conclusion is that those who support it want their version of Brexit at any cost, including democracy. Come on, let us stand up for democracy and stop this flawed Bill in its tracks. I dare say that the will of the people will be right behind us.
No, I will not give way—absolutely not! I do not have time and I am enjoying myself. I am representing my constituents and my country. I am speaking up, at last, for Great Britain, and not for a bureaucracy that is going horribly wrong. The great thing is that when the Bill returns to the House, we can scrutinise it—we can do our job. That is what we are here for.
The Scottish National party wants independence and to rejoin the EU. The EU would nail Scotland to the floor if ever it got the so-called independence that the SNP desires. SNP Members would rue the day, as they headed to economic ruin, trapped in the euro—if indeed the EU let Scotland have it.
The Bill is good for our country. Ministers have not got it all right; I would be the first to concede that, and I am sure they would concede it, too. It can be debated and changed in Committee—of that I am certain—but a vote against the Bill tonight is a cynical ploy that our constituents, who sent us to the House, will not accept. I shall vote with the Government.
Today and last Thursday, a number of speakers on both sides of the House stated that this Bill is not about whether we leave the EU, but about how. That should be something on which we can all agree, although today we have heard speeches from those who clearly take a different position. For example, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) made it absolutely clear that he was fighting against leaving the EU at all. The hon. Member for Lewisham East (Heidi Alexander) made an equally passionate speech, saying that she was voting to stay in the European economic area, and the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) started his speech by stating that he would not vote for the Bill this evening, and then looked for reasons as to why he would not do so, which is broadly the position of almost all his colleagues.
If we look at the Bill objectively, surely everybody can agree that we are where we are, and that we must have arrangements in place that suit every organisation in this country, including the prospect of knowing what the law of the land is at the end of March 2019.
I am tempted to give way, but I will not because are so many other people wish to speak. Will the hon. Lady forgive me?
It is all about what the process will be. Interestingly, some of us have had the chance to look at a House of Lords report, which recommended some elements that this Bill should include. The report made it absolutely clear that delegated powers will be necessary in some cases, because the sheer volume of legislation needed—some 12,000 pieces of legislation—means that unless we use those powers effectively, the job will simply not be done in time.
The House of Lords Constitution Committee, which is not known to be a warm friend of this Government, made two specific recommendations. It recommended that
“a general provision be placed on the face of the Bill to the effect that the delegated powers granted by the Bill should be used only: so far as necessary to adapt the body of EU law to fit the UK’s domestic legal framework; and so far as necessary to implement the result of the UK’s negotiations with the EU.”
When the Secretary of State introduced the Bill on Thursday, he made it absolutely clear that that was broadly what the Government hoped to achieve. He went further and specified what the legislation would not be about. He made it clear that the powers in clause 9 would be for only two years and that they would make “technical and legal corrections” to deficiencies in the law. He also made it clear that Ministers will not have the power to make major policy changes and that changes will still be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and oversight.
Several Members, mostly on the Opposition Benches, have questioned the definition of significant, what restraint there will be on the Government when deciding what is and what is not important, and what constitute technical and legal corrections. Therefore, there has been a debate, with Members on both sides of the House offering suggestions as to how things can be improved. The Secretary of State has said that he is in listening mode and that he is happy to talk about mechanisms for making sure that the process is fully democratic and open. All that is encouraging and in tune with what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) referred to on Thursday during his important contribution to the debate. In particular, he said that it is important
“to have an established parliamentary system of scrutiny to ensure that the different types of statutory instruments that will be needed are correctly farmed out. I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend”—
the Secretary of State—
“is right that the vast majority of them will be technical and of very little account, but some will be extremely important and will need to be taken on the Floor of the House. We need to have a system in place to do that.”—[Official Report, 7 September 2017; Vol. 628, c. 407.]
My right hon. and learned Friend did not recommend a specific system, but it seems relevant to suggest here that we already have what is, effectively, a body for precisely this task: the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. We also have a different model, or possibly an additional one. I am talking about what the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions is obliged to go through as a statutory requirement: the Social Security Advisory Committee. Some of us believe that we could use a combination of both those bodies. We could use an advisory committee to provide the technical analysis of proposed changes, and the Joint Committee to go through them and approve or disapprove the recommendations.