Public Office (Accountability) Bill

Tom Morrison Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 3rd November 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

That day in September 2012 remains vivid in my memory: the day the independent panel, chaired by Bishop James Jones, finally confirmed that public officials had hidden the truth about the Hillsborough disaster. It was a day the families had waited for so long for, a day they had worked tirelessly to bring about. It was the first day that their persistence prevailed, the first breakthrough in what would become a chain reaction that has led us here today.

During that time, I was a councillor in Liverpool. I remember knocking on doors that evening and being met by absolute relief on people’s faces—the tide was starting to turn. The families came that day to speak to the council. The emotions in that room were among the strongest that I have ever experienced. For the first time, the families felt that power could be held to account and justice might one day be served.

However, to this day, no one has been held accountable for the Hillsborough disaster. The 97 and their families are still living without the justice they deserve. Yet the families remain selfless, motivated by the greater good, working to protect others in the future—people unknown to them. Their campaign has continued for three decades, but it must have felt like a lifetime. The truth has taken so long to be uncovered that key campaigners like Anne Williams, Phil Hammond, Rose Robinson and Barry Devonside are sadly no longer here to see the legislation come before the House, but their fortitude and determination were nothing short of astounding. They have mine and the nation’s utmost respect.

To be wrongly and publicly shamed, smeared and blamed for a tragedy of such scale is something that no one can imagine experiencing. Then to face the institutions of state in court, without the means to navigate the law and our complex legal system professionally, is nothing short of devastating. The fact that public bodies that can effectively silence citizens, who must find millions of pounds to stand up against them, is simply unacceptable. To not only endure but passionately oppose lying, victim-blaming, delays and denials for years takes unwavering strength.

What the fans and their families endured is all too familiar to many others across this country. The Bill is not about only one place or one group of victims; it is about how we can hold power to account. Those who have suffered, both directly and indirectly, from the state-driven scandals that have been mentioned are familiar with the feelings of powerlessness, grief and justified anger. The infected blood scandal is just one example of unimaginable suffering—people endured not only physical harm but haunting social stigma and lasting damage. Children as young as seven were told that they would die. Some lost multiple members of their family, only to be left in social isolation. That is not to mention a serious lack of transparency and years of delays, and many victims dying before justice or compensation even began. Sir Brian Langstaff rightly called the delays for the blood scandal victims

“an injustice all of its own.”

No Government can be allowed to act on serious state failures behind closed doors, without a legal duty of candour. People who bravely seek justice must no longer be ignored and pushed aside by successive Governments. It is admirable that those affected by the multiple tragedies since Hillsborough have continually come together to fight for prevailing and lasting change. The Hillsborough Law Now group is a formidable force. Yet it should not be that way. People should not have to sacrifice their lives to see change. Successive Governments should not be pushing back and dragging their feet at every turn.

This Bill should have been introduced to the House far, far earlier than the 36th anniversary of Hillsborough. If it had been in place 36 years ago, all the pain, trauma, repeated legal proceedings and investigations would never have happened. I join the Hillsborough Law Now campaign, Inquest, the Law Society and numerous other groups that have expressed their relief about this law finally being put in place. Although compensation for those scandals is crucial, victims and the British public want to see justice and change. That is why the Bill is a victory for sufferers of all the state-caused scandals in our recent history. It is owed to each and every one of them.

Although we must all ensure that the Bill retains its strength during its journey through Parliament, more can be done. We can push for stronger whistleblowing protections, robust enforcement mechanisms, non-means-tested legal aid for survivors, and a Leveson 2 inquiry to hold the media to account. The Bill will ensure that silence in the face of wrongdoing no longer prevails. Public organisations will no longer be able to place reputation management above the truth. The Bill will be a legacy for the 97 who never came home, and their families, who will never walk alone.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (First sitting)

Tom Morrison Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Ian Byrne]

With the strengthening amendments.

Pete Weatherby: Yes. There is no silver bullet or absolute answer, because if people choose to lie, they choose to lie. What we are doing here is putting in so many deterrents—we are not interested in locking people up; we are interested in deterring them in the first place. The answer to the second question, building on the answer I gave Maria Eagle, is that the Bill goes a long way to solving the problem, but the amendments would make it much better.

On the question of international partners, let me deal with it this way. If the head of the French secret service were sitting in Paris, reading the BBC reports of the Daniel De Simone case, in which it is clear from the High Court that the security services misled two different constitutions of the High Court and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, or reading the account of what happened with the misleading of the Manchester Arena inquiry, would they think, “Well, it’s good that the British secret services are doing that,” or would they think, “Next time we have a dealing with them, can we believe what they say?” The more candid that we can make this, the better the relationship with international partners. There is no threat here; that is a completely false road to go down.

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

Q Thank you for your evidence so far, Pete. You touched just then on how this will be a deterrent, but for that to be needed, there needs to be a culture change in public services. In the Bill, there is a lot of talk about trying to create codes of conduct. How do you envisage that working? Do you think that one standard code of conduct would go across all public services, or should each organisation be responsible for building its own code of conduct and then implementing it?

Pete Weatherby: I think there should be a mixture. There have to be central tenets to it; otherwise, we will fall into the problem where a local authority or police force will have its lawyers lawyering up a code that does not do what it should do. I think there should be a mixture on that front.

[Lizzi Collinge (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Lab)]

Q I would just like a little more detail—thank you for your briefing—on the difficulty of proving intent and recklessness in a corporate body. For those of us who are not legally trained, could you explain a bit more about why that is difficult to prove?

Pete Weatherby: We have set the standard very high indeed, because we are not interested in criminalising people and we are certainly not interested in scaring people. One example thrown at us during the discussions with the Government was that we might be criminalising junior civil servants who turn up late for work—absolutely not. Intent and subjective recklessness are high hurdles, but they are individual hurdles. A corporate body cannot easily act recklessly. It is not a legal impossibility; you do have health and safety or companies law offences, where there are corporate offences and you prove the mens rea—mental state—through the directing minds, but that is an incredibly difficult complication, and it does not really work with the offences that we are looking at here.

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[Lizzi Collinge]

Q Thank you. That is very helpful. Mr Guest, you talked about some of the guardrails against unmeritorious or vexatious prosecutions. One of the things that we have seen in previous cover-ups is that junior members of staff have felt the burden, either when they try to tell the truth or because they are punished when the truth has not been there. I have been told—although I disagree—that the Bill could create a fear of unreasonable prosecution, or could cause junior members of staff to take responsibility, rather than senior members of staff. Do you consider that a risk? Does the way the law is set out mean that it will work as intended?

Tom Guest: When I mention that risk, it is to guard against the risk of unmeritorious prosecutions. Before there is a prosecution, there has to be an investigation. Again, you can have private investigations or police investigations. We at the CPS do not see a prospect of unmeritorious police investigations, and we do not see a present risk, although we see some risk, of unmeritorious private investigations. The DPP’s consent comes in at the point of asking, “Is this going to go into the court system or not?” At that point, we as the CPS are assessing whichever investigation has happened against the standard tests of, “Is there sufficient evidence to prosecute the suspect?” and, “Is a prosecution required in the public interest?” Whoever the suspect is, we will assess that against those standards.

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

Q This is for Tom Guest. The new offence of misleading the public would not apply for the purposes of journalism. How clear do you think the meaning of that exception is? I will give two examples: would it count if a Minister was writing a piece for a newspaper column or if a public servant was briefing the media after an event?

Tom Guest: It is fair to say that it is quite widely drawn, and there can be good policy reasons for that. Clearly, it is important to uphold the freedom of speech and protect the interests of journalism—not having a chilling effect on journalism is important. We understand why it is drafted in that way, but it is drafted quite widely. It would appear to cover those examples. Again, I am giving that at a very broad level. In a real-life scenario, the police would have gathered much more evidence for the prosecution to consider, but it potentially would cover those situations.

[Douglas McAllister (West Dunbartonshire) (Lab)]

Q My question is to Tom. Under the clause 12(5) defence of reasonable excuse for a seriously improper act of misconduct, what do we regard as the “sufficient evidence” described in clause 12(6)? You said that the defendant simply needs to raise that, but to what standard? What is sufficient and, in a jury trial, who decides that? Is it for the jury to decide if the defence has been laid out, or will there be judge guidance to the jury? The standard of the burden of proof falling on the Crown to disprove it is pretty high—it is “beyond all reasonable doubt”. That is my concern.

Tom Guest: From a practical point of view, in prosecuting misconduct in public office we do not generally have a problem with that—although I will come on to situations in which we do—because you have already shown that a police officer is doing something very serious indeed. The chances of them establishing that they had a reasonable excuse for that are very slim indeed. For context, it is quite rare that that is successfully raised because the prosecution should already have shown that something pretty serious has happened.

To give an example, we did have cases where public officials were providing information in return for money. On one view, that was a form of corruption, but their defence was, “I have a reasonable excuse for that.” Let me just run through how that works. It could be raised in several formats—ideally, by them giving evidence, but there are other ways. They can try to introduce it in the course of the prosecution case. There is a judge filter—the judge will not allow any old reasonable excuse to be put to the jury—but if the judge is satisfied that it is right for it to go to the jury, ultimately it will be for the jury to assess. The juries did assess that in those examples where public officials were providing information in exchange for money.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Third sitting)

Tom Morrison Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Seamus Logan]

I welcome the Minister’s response. Having heard what she said about working with me about how we might operationalise the issue, I am prepared to withdraw the amendments. However, it is important to remember, in that conversation, that justice delayed is justice denied.

We have seen so many examples of inquiries and investigations that take years, when months would be much more appropriate. In the circumstances we are speaking about—in this case and the many others that this law will apply to—we must give chairs and leaders of inquiries and investigations some sense of what is reasonable when it comes to public authority responses.

We heard from the hon. Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale about the health service; I worked in it for 33 years. There is no good reason why it should not be able to respond in if not 30 then 90 days. Some backstop needs to be applied in relation to these responsibilities. I am happy to continue the conversation with the Minister and beg to ask leave withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Application of duty of candour and assistance

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 35, in schedule 1, page 25, line 23, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

See Amendment 38.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 36, in schedule 1, page 28, line 38, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

See Amendment 38.

Amendment 37, in schedule 1, page 31, line 34, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

See Amendment 38.

Amendment 38, in schedule 1, page 34, line 15, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

Amendments 35 to 38 would extend the application of the duty of candour and assistance to the intelligence services but would disapply it to individual officers.

[Mr Morrison]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. These amendments do nothing more than fix something in the current draft of the Bill, which seems inadvertently to have carved out the security services—an area that could be strengthened, as we heard during the evidence session last week. The amendments seek to extend the duty of candour and assistance to the intelligence services as organisations, ensuring that they as bodies are required to be open and co-operative with the inquiries and any investigations. The amendment balances accountability with national security, by stating that direction will not be given to public officials

“if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence”.

Several of our witnesses last week gave evidence that laid out various examples of how the security services had failed to be fully candid, disregarded accountability, and, at times, misled inquiries. We also know that the Government assured campaigners, Members and other interested parties that there would be no carve-out for the security services in the Bill. The security services do an incredible job in keeping us safe and ensuring that our country’s interests are protected. It is right that their work is covered by the secrecy Act; no one wishes to change that. However, because of that power they should be held to highest standards of accountability. We know that in recent history that has not been the case.

Last week we heard from Pete Weatherby, who, as well as working with the Hillsborough families, supported several families impacted by the Manchester Arena bombing. He said:

“There was a major failure of the intelligence services and the way they dealt with the aftermath of the bombing…MI5 then put an incorrect narrative—a false narrative—to the inquiry itself. The judge, the chair of the inquiry, found that the corporate case that it had put was incorrect.”––[Official Report, Public Office (Accountability) Public Bill Committee, 27 November 2025; c. 6, Q3.]

The amendment would ensure, as much as any law can, that that could not happen again, by explicitly ensuring that the security services are accountable to this Bill and therefore to a public who willingly consent to how these organisations work to protect us and our country. This amendment would not endanger national security. It would not impact the way in which some evidence is required to be provided in closed sessions. It would provide the security services with the necessary safeguards to ensure that secret and classified information is protected.

This is what happens now. We heard from the journalist Daniel De Simone, who worked on the agent X story, where the security services tried to mislead and were found out. His testimony stated:

“I do not think it is wrong that there are special advocates in closed material procedures; it is now an established part of a court process. What it does do, though, is place a special responsibility on MI5 to be candid, because their evidence is often very important in very significant cases, where there has been significant loss of life, where people’s citizenship is being removed or where people are being deprived of their liberties.”––[Official Report, Public Office (Accountability) Public Bill Committee, 27 November 2025; c. 95, Q138.]

Because of that, it is vital that we do not allow any carving out, intentional or otherwise, of the security services, to ensure that they, too, are held to account and must tell the truth. That will strengthen not only their work, but the trust that we place in them.

[Dr Mullan]

I emphasise that we need clarity on this. Those of us who were able to attend the meeting with the intelligence services will know that they seemed to provide quite a clear account of their individual personal responsibility and all the ways in which they thought the Bill would affect them. That was quite clearly contradicted in our evidence from other witnesses. I am grateful to the Minister for sending round a further note to Committee members this morning, and for our brief chat ahead of this sitting. Even that note raises further contradictions, however, because it says, and I quote, that “the individual public officials working for the UK intelligence services are capable of being caught by the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour”. It lists some other ones, but it includes the duty of candour. Further down, it says, “the Bill specifies that the duty of candour and assistance can only be addressed to public authorities and not individual public officials”.

The Minister was able to give me a brief, informal explanation of that, but I do think this is extremely important. It may be that people are happy for the security services to be excluded to a certain extent, but we have to vote on a shared understanding of what exactly the Bill does in relation to them as entire organisations, as well as to the people who work for them and those who are in charge. I would be grateful if the Minister provided some clarity on that.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank hon. Members for raising those important points. In this Bill, we have aimed to ensure candour while protecting national security. As it stands, inquiries and investigations will be able to demand any information and assistance they require from the intelligence services. Where national security information is concerned, the agency as a whole will provide that assistance to the inquiry or investigation by complying with a compliance direction, rather than individuals directly in their own right.

To balance that, and to ensure that there are no gaps, carve-outs or exclusions, those in charge of the agencies are subject to specific requirements to put arrangements in place for individuals to maintain records of information relating to any acts that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation, and to provide information to the authority to ensure that the duty is complied with as set out in clause 6. Rightly, a failure to have these arrangements in place will result in criminal sanctions.

Intelligence services obtain and retain sensitive security and intelligence information in order to protect the public from national security threats. Vital public interests, including national security, would be at real risk of harm from the unrestricted disclosure of this sensitive information. We all share the same aims here—ensuring that candour is in place while protecting national security and the public.

Taking on board the points raised by Hillsborough Law Now and others, we constructed clause 6 in such a way as to ensure that there is a secure process that the intelligence services can work through so that any information required by an inquiry or investigation reaches that place safely, so that there can be full candour. However, we have heard the concerns from Hillsborough Law Now and from members of this Committee about our provisions. I assure hon. Members that the Government have taken their points on board, and we will commit to working with them and others actively to consider steps to address this in time for Report.

I turn to the other amendments, which set out that the intelligence authorities are to be listed as a public authority for the purposes of the duty of candour and assistance, and the code of ethical conduct in schedule 2. Clause 6 already makes it clear that the duty applies to the intelligence services as it applies to all other public authorities; therefore, it is beyond doubt that they are included, as a public authority, in the Bill.

We have not set out an exhaustive list of public authorities in schedule 2 to avoid unintentionally excluding some bodies by failing to list them. No individual Department or arm’s length body of central Government is included in the list for that purpose. If we begin to list public bodies, there is a risk that we imply that those not listed are not covered, which could weaken the Bill. I urge the hon. Member for Cheadle to withdraw his amendment, but I reiterate my commitment to working with Members on a way forward to capture all the concerns raised both in the Committee and outside of it.

[Mr Morrison]

I thank the shadow Minister for the points that he made; he is spot on that the lack of clarity in the Bill, particularly surrounding what came out of the evidence sessions, raises more questions than answers. However, I am pleased that the Minister has said that the Government are happy to work with us on tightening those gaps before Report. This is not about unrestricted evidence; it is about getting to the truth, which must be our focus throughout. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 3, in schedule 1, page 26, line 30, at end insert—

“(1A) Inquiries under subsection (1) include those designated by the Secretary of State as local inquiries into grooming gangs.”

This amendment would apply the Duty of Candour to the five local grooming gangs’ inquiries announced by the Government and any further ones established.

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[Ian Byrne]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr Morrison]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. I am not sure whether this is the right time to ask, but on the amendment paper, amendment 34 is down as a Liberal Democrat amendment, but on the groupings that were sent across to us, it was down as an SNP amendment. I just wanted to clarify where we are with that.

[The Chair]

I understand that that has been corrected online, and the matter is now on the record as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Byrne]

I thank my hon. Friend for that, and she is absolutely right; a commitment was made not to weaken that. Clause 2(5) of the Bill imposes a duty on the chief officer or chief executive to “take all reasonable steps” to ensure corporate compliance, but that is not command responsibility—I think that is a really important point. It is far weaker, and I feel it will be ineffective. Command responsibility is straightforward and places the responsibility for the discharge of the corporate duty on the head of the body.

[Mr Morrison]

Does the hon. Member agree that, when someone is in that position of power over a public body, they have a huge responsibility, not just for the culture but for the training, the personnel, the HR practices and the policies? With that responsibility, someone needs to ensure that that goes throughout the whole of the organisation, and command responsibility focuses the mind to ensure that everything below them is working to clock.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Tom Morrison Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Would anyone like to speak to the other amendment in the group?

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

Yes, sorry. In the last evidence session, we discussed a very similar situation when we heard from both Pete Weatherby and Daniel De Simone, one of whom is a KC trying to get to the truth through his work in the courts, and another of whom is a journalist trying to expose the truth, particularly around the Agent X story. We are not looking for a change to the Official Secrets Act or its operation. We simply want the Bill to encompass the security services explicitly.

There is a list of public authorities on the Bill. The security services are not on there, which begs the question, why? I thank the Minister for saying that further work will be done on that and that she will be engaging with all Members across the House before Report. On that basis, we are happy to withdraw the amendments.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the withdrawal of the amendments. We had a discussion earlier about why we have not listed organisations in the Bill. We did not want it to be an exhaustive list and to miss an organisation out unintentionally, which could lead them to think that the Bill does not apply to it. We have been extremely clear that intelligence services are covered by this Bill, including clause 6. I reaffirm that to reassure the hon. Gentleman.

Clause 6 sets out that the duties in the Bill apply to the intelligence services, but it requires that proper arrangements and protections are in place to safeguard national security. As subsection (2) states, the obligation in clause 2(3) for a person to notify the inquiry or investigation does not apply to

“a person who works for an intelligence service”,

or where doing so would result in the release of security or intelligence information.

To be clear, inquiries and investigations are able to demand assistance and information from the intelligence services under the obligation in clause 2(4), but appropriate arrangements need to be in place for an inquiry or investigation to receive that sensitive information, as is the norm now. Individuals revealing acts or information outside of those arrangements could be detrimental to national security, as I am sure all hon. Members would agree.

Subsection (3) places a requirement on the heads of the intelligence services to put in place internal arrangements to ensure that those who work for the service comply with the requirements to record any acts or any information that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation. They must inform the service if they hold such information that is not already available to it. That ensures that the services have all the information they need to discharge their obligations under the duty as an authority. However, as I have already stated, I am committed to working with hon. Members, external stakeholders and the UK intelligence services to make sure that we have as a robust Bill as possible that fulfils the aims, objectives and intentions of us all.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Transitional provision in relation to this Chapter

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Ian Byrne]

I thank the Minister for that; I beg to ask leave to the withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr Morrison]

I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 9, page 8, line 2, after “work” insert—

“including the retention and disclosure of digital records including messages relevant to their public functions”.

This amendment ensures that digital messages and records are added to the duty of candour in relation to inquiries and inquests.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 3—Offence of wilfully destroying information or records relevant to an inquiry or investigation—

“(1) A public authority or public official commits an offence if—

(a) they deliberately destroy relevant information or records relevant to an inquiry, investigation, or inquest;

(b) they know that, or are reckless as to whether, the information is relevant to or required by an inquiry, investigation, or inquest.

(2) A public official who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(d) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).”

This new clause introduces an offence for wilfully destroying relevant records after a major incident that may lead to an inquiry or inquest.

[Mr Morrison]

We spoke this morning about the issues dealt with by amendment 43, but to clarify, WhatsApp messages formed a big part of the evidence in the recent covid inquiry—it seemed to be government by WhatsApp at the time—and yet many of them seem to have disappeared. The amendment would provide an extra way of ensuring that public authorities and those responsible are keeping proper records and preventing that from happening again.

New clause 3 would prevent the deliberate concealment of evidence that could obstruct investigations, hinder fact-finding and undermine public trust. I would like the Committee to consider the element of public trust here. How people perceive what happens in this place, and in the organisations and public authorities that surround us and the power structures that are there, is vital to the legitimacy that we have and that those public authorities also have. By criminalising such conduct, the clause would reinforce the obligation on public authorities and officials to maintain and safeguard records, ensuring that inquiries and inquests can access all the information necessary to understand what happened and hold the responsible parties to account. This is a way to make sure that the truth can be found in those areas and hopefully ensure that WhatsApp messages are not deleted in future.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising an important issue. Amendment 43 would, as he states, make authorities set expectations for staff on how to retain and disclose their digital records in accordance with the obligations under the duty of candour. Proper record keeping is important to ensure accountability and propriety in decisions made by public authorities. That applies where records are on paper or held digitally— for example, in a WhatsApp group—and it is important that organisations have policies and processes in place to manage these effectively.

However, the Government’s view is that the code of ethical conduct is not the correct vehicle for establishing those processes. The Public Records Act 1958 already places certain requirements on public authorities. Under that Act, the Keeper of Public Records issues guidance to supervise and guide the selection of historic records —including digital records—worthy of permanent preservation.

Disclosure to inquiries and inquests will require the detailed consideration of various factors, including the fact that the authority’s legal obligations include the duty of candour and assistance, the protection of personal or sensitive information, and the relevance to the inquiry’s terms of reference or the inquest. Authorities may also require specific legal advice. Separate and bespoke policies will therefore be required. The professional duty of candour established under clause 9 is intended to focus on what candour means for each public official going about their business in their day-to-day role. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Cheadle withdraws the amendment.

On the point about whether WhatsApp messages are covered, and specifically disappearing messages or those deleted in the course of work, as they sometimes are, the duty of candour and assistance requires all public officials and authorities to provide all relevant information. If a public official was part of a WhatsApp chat in which relevant information was exchanged, they would be obliged to inform the chair of that fact, and if disappearing messages had gone or the chats had been deleted, they would have to provide an account of what was discussed, to the best of their recollection, even if the messages had since been deleted or vanished.

--- Later in debate ---

The concept of a person includes legal persons such as organisations. Therefore, a person commits the offence if they use their position to destroy or conceal information and records that may be relevant to any potential future inquiry, inquest or investigation in an attempt to protect themselves or their organisation from reputational harm, and they know, or ought to know, that such conduct would be seen as seriously improper by any reasonable person. That could include, for example, shredding documents or ordering that any other information be destroyed. With those assurances, I urge the hon. Member for Cheadle to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr Morrison]

I thank the Minister for her comments. In the spirit of cross-party working, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Seamus Logan]

I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 9, page 8, line 12, leave out “may” insert “must”.

I am aware that we have debated amendment 48, although perhaps not as fully as I would have liked. In the interests of getting our business done within the time available, I decided not to intervene in that debate. However, I believe that the particular change in amendment 24 is necessary. Where amendment 48 spoke to the duty of candour, amendment 24 speaks to the code of ethics.

There are legal minds in the room that are much better informed and trained on legal definitions than my own, but amendment 24 addresses the need to replace “may” with “must” in the code of ethics, as opposed to the duty of candour. I believe this is important given my experience in the health service, where there is a responsibility on individuals to report child abuse, or where a colleague might clearly be able to see that a surgeon carrying out procedures is repeatedly doing something injurious or harmful. By replacing the word “may” with “must”, we place a responsibility on anyone to blow the whistle on those particular issues.

In my working life I have experience, as might others present, of consultants who suppressed information relating to child abuse. We certainly heard similar evidence about surgeons during our evidence session. Colleagues will be able to think of many such examples, which is why it is important that the amendment replaces “may” with “must”.