Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Second sitting)

Seamus Logan Excerpts

Thursday 27th November 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Order. Ian, come back with another question if you wish to, but let the witness finish.

Lord Evans of Weardale: Individual officers do give evidence. If you look, for example, at what is being done at the moment in respect of the case that you will be hearing about later—the Agent X case, as I think it is known—it is being investigated by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which has been completely clear that the service has a duty of candour in that context. I do not believe that the agency is trying to avoid frank and open accountability; I believe that it is trying to square that with the other constraints under which it operates, because of the sensitive nature of almost all the operation information that the service is using.

That is the dilemma, but I recognise that it is a dilemma. You can take different views, but I think you have to give due weight to ensuring safeguarding—not safeguarding the service because of reputation; we should not have a law that does that. What we need is a law that enables the full story to be disclosed, but in a way that allows the agencies to continue to undertake their public functions, and that is compatible with the other legal constraints with which members of the services operate.

[Seamus Logan (Aberdeenshire North and Moray East) (SNP)]

Q Lord Evans, in the fullness of time, the Committee will consider amendments, so the final Bill might be slightly different in its shape. One can readily understand the very persuasive points that you have made, in particular with regard to MI6 and the need for good relationships with other countries on the sharing of information. However, we might consider command responsibility in a different way in the final Bill—the provision of safe mechanisms, for example closed sessions of inquiries or investigations, or possibly reporting mechanisms to the Intelligence and Security Committee of the UK Parliament. Were such arrangements in place, would that enable the head of a particular intelligence service to provide information to a safe place and, in turn, to the chair of an investigation or inquiry?

Lord Evans of Weardale: I would want to see the exact mechanism, but I do not think it is inconceivable that there could be a way of doing something of that sort, which in broad terms is similar to what is done with closed material proceedings in the civil courts. In order for a court to make a just decision, it needs to have access to the relevant information, even if that is sometimes highly sensitive. The closed material procedures ensure that such information can be brought forward and considered by the judge without its being visible to terrorist sympathisers, for instance, or Russian intelligence officers.

Closed proceedings can work. In some ways, they are sub-optimal because you have to work quite hard to give people confidence that they are really getting at the truth for the public. The ultimate safeguard for that is the fact that the judge is in control of their own court; if they do not believe that justice is being done, they can make that very clear. Over the years, those closed material procedures have been refined and slimmed down in such a way that they are quite widely accepted to be part of a proper justice system while protecting the sensitive information at hand.

[Maria Eagle]

Q We heard a concern earlier from Mr Weatherby of Hillsborough Law Now about the current drafting of the Bill effectively carving out the intelligence service from the same responsibility, as it applies to other public officials. He was concerned that schedule 1, which is an amendment to other legislation, meant that there is only corporate liability here. Is that your understanding of the way in which this is working?

Lord Evans of Weardale: My understanding is that the responsibility rests on the agency, rather than any one individual, to proactively provide the information, although the liability on the head of the agency includes criminal liability, should they fail to do that.

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[Natasha Irons (Croydon East) (Lab)]

Q Thank you so much for your testimony and your courage and for fighting for so long. It is a privilege to be on this Committee and to hear from you—and I apologise for our train system. I understand it has been a long journey and it has taken a long time to get here, but my question is: what will success look like in the future? What will it look like if the Bill is a success and does the thing we wanted it to do?

Jenni Hicks: What would be successful to me is getting to the truth more quickly and having a system that does not think it has the right to cover up the people in power, that tells the truth in the first instance, and has a good public advocacy team—I nearly called them the HIP—who help people not only by pointing them in the right direction, but help them get the information that they need and the documentation of that information, just as HIP did. That is imperative.

There are other good things, but you are totally depending on a culture change for the duty of candour, because this culture has been going on for a long time. That is why it has to be duty of candour with really stiff penalties if you are found out to be lying, not just excuses made or clever lawyers being able to interpret it in a different way. There are many versions of the truth out there, and the documentation is the truth, if you like. For me, that is what would be successful.

It would be successful if nobody else in this country had to wait 26 years to get a correct inquest verdict or 24 years to get the truth about how their loved one died, and nobody else had to go through being lied to for all those years about how their loved one died. The mud that the media put out there about what had happened still sticks in some places in this country. That will not help me, Hilda or any of the Hillsborough families, but it certainly will prevent anybody else going through what we have had to go through. That process is cruel; it is not right, and this country should be ashamed of putting bereaved people through it when the truth is as plain as the nose on your face.

[Seamus Logan]

Q I, too, salute your courage in your fight over many years to get to this point. The Bill is a landmark and will be something really good coming out of such a terrible tragedy, but it does not cover everything. We heard before lunch about things that other witnesses might like to see addressed. Hilda, is there anything that is not in the Bill that you would have liked to have seen included?

Hilda Hammond: I would have liked to see the NHS included. I know people have a duty of candour, but I am a retired nurse, so I know the NHS, and at the present time doctors and NHS workers—I will not say they hide behind it—are protected by the law of patient confidentiality. I may be missing it, but I cannot see anything in the Bill that addresses that and makes it clear that in something like this patient confidentiality should not stand in the way. It is a big hurdle, because doctors have been bound by it for years and years, and I do not know how you get around that. The NHS is a huge organisation, and it will be subject to huge amounts of litigation. That is one thing that really needs to be addressed.

We did not find out that Philip had gone to hospital—we did not know—until the following November, when his trainers came back with a hospital tag on. When we questioned them, they were all evasive and gave silly excuses. I said, “Well, did you attempt to resuscitate him?”, and they said, “Oh yes, he had electrode marks on him.” When I spoke to the pathologist, I said, “If a person is being resuscitated, someone puts the electrodes on, someone is getting IV access and someone is protecting their airway. You said there were no puncture marks on Philip.” Do you know what he told me? He said, “I don’t know whether you know this, but there is a cannula now that they put in and it doesn’t leave a mark.” Pure rubbish! Even on neonates you see where they have had the cannulas.

I do not know. Trying to get any information from the medical team is like a brick wall, isn’t it? I really think that is an important part of this law. It is such a good law, and you would not want it to fall at the hurdle of doctor’s being protected from telling the truth.

[Maria Eagle]

Q I would like to welcome Jenni and Hilda, who are my constituents, to the Committee. You have both mentioned the importance of getting to the truth fast, and you said, Jenni, that it was only the Hillsborough independent panel, over two decades later, that actually got to the truth and had it accepted. You received an apology from the Prime Minister of the day about what had happened.

Jenni Hicks: A double apology.

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[Mr Morrison]

Great—thank you.

[Seamus Logan]

Q Chief Constable, I want to follow up on some of the points you made about training. First, this is groundbreaking legislation; we are seeking to achieve a massive culture change, and there will be a code of ethics and a code of conduct. Do you foresee the possibility of additional training requirements for senior and middle managers in the police?

Chief Constable Guildford: I honestly think that what is proposed here complements what we have been doing over a period of years. This is not unexpected for the police service and it is not new for senior officers, but I think your point is a fair one in so far as these are new offences, and a particular number of people will be charged with investigating them. Those people will sit within the IOPC, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and they will also sit mainly within each of the professional standards departments of each of the 43 police forces. Some additional training will be required, but I think it will be very marginal in initial recruit training, because it very much complements what we already teach with that package.

[Seamus Logan]

Q My supplementary to that comes in the light of the earlier point by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills about the number of failings at an organisational level over the years, and there have been many. You have described various mechanisms within the police, but do you think there might be a need for something that sits completely outside the force—across the country, for different forces—to enable individuals, whether middle or senior management, to bring things to the attention of a safe place completely outside the police? Do you think that might assist?

Chief Constable Guildford: To be fair, that is a good question. My reflection, very much, is that we have the Independent Office for Police Conduct, which is completely and utterly independent of the police service, all the chief constables and all the staff associations. That would be the body that an individual—let us say an individual in my position, potentially—could approach, if I had one of those specific concerns. From a police service perspective, I would say that that possibly already exists, but for other members of the public sector, that might be a very legitimate point of reflection and a good point. I think there would be some opportunity and benefit for other members of the public sector, yes.

[The Chair]

Thank you. If Members have no other questions, I thank Chief Constable Guildford for his contribution.

Chief Constable Guildford: You are very welcome.

Examination of Witnesses

Chris Minnoch and Richard Miller gave evidence.

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[Joe Powell]

Q To go back to your point about coherence, it would be helpful to hear how you foresee your role working with the additional support that will come through this law. Help us understand how it fits together. What does the coherence you might feel is not quite there at the moment look like?

Cindy Butts: I hope that the inclusion of the IPA in law means that organisations understand the IPA’s role of supporting victims, survivors and bereaved families in accessing information and advocating for them for truth—for truth telling. I hope that it is clear that the responsibility of the IPA is to help them to achieve exactly that.

[Seamus Logan]

Q We have not met before, but may I call you Cindy?

Cindy Butts: Yes, please do.

[Seamus Logan]

Q Thank you.

Thank you for your very extensive evidence, which is very impressive from someone who has been in post for just two months. However, I wanted to ask you about your previous experience—we got little CVs for the witnesses—as a commissioner at the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and in the transformation of the Metropolitan police following the Stephen Lawrence inquiry. You have extensive experience in very relevant areas. Can you comment on the scale and size of the task in front of us with this Bill? It is very extensive and lists a large number of public authorities. Can you comment on that?

Cindy Butts: I am not sure that I quite understand your question.

[Seamus Logan]

Q Well, you have got the duty of candour, the code of ethics, the code of conduct and the new offences. Do you feel that that represents a challenge for large public organisations?

Cindy Butts: I think it will present a challenge for them, because it is very different from what we have now and indeed from what has ever existed. That is a testament to those who have worked on the Bill and to what it is trying to achieve. It will be an enormous change for them, but it is a change that is long overdue and desperately needed. Yes, it is challenging, but I would like to think that they see the importance and value of the changes that are coming into being, and that they will rise to that challenge, because the status quo is no longer acceptable.

[Seamus Logan]

Q And you know all about cultural change, following the Stephen Lawrence inquiry—

Cindy Butts: I do, and it is part of the reason why, in my submission, I spoke to the issue of exceptional circumstances, because, of course, my role comes into play following a major tragedy, such as Hillsborough, or the Manchester Arena bombing, or indeed the Manchester synagogue attack, which I am currently deployed to assist with. On the other hand, I also know that there are cases when only one single death might have occurred, but despite the impact of that single death on a family, and indeed the public interest involved with that, such families are left without the kind of support that I provide after major incidents. Trauma should not be measured by numbers, so I think that is a fundamental gap, which is not necessarily in this Bill, although I would not mind if it were addressed through the Bill. You only have to look at what Stephen Lawrence’s family went through or, indeed, more recently with Harry Dunn and the complexity that that poor family had to deal with, largely on their own.

[The Chair]

We have about a minute and a half left if Maria Eagle wants to ask a question.

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[Lizzi Collinge]

Q Do you think it is accurate that some organisations in the NHS still see being transparent, and admitting harm and problems, as the legal risk?

Helen Vernon: They should not, but as we mentioned, there is inconsistency. Part of our collective role is to make sure that people understand its importance, how to do it well and how to deliver candour in practice.

Professor Fowler: You mentioned closed cultures. I spent six months recently working as an interim in the CQC in the gap between chief inspectors. One of the things we recognised is that where we saw organisations with challenges, there was often also a closed culture. To be clear, that is a minority of organisations, but I think the two go together.

Dr Chopra: I recognise your questions, and I agree with what Aidan said. I have seen instances where what you have described is the case—as Helen said, it is inconsistent—and I have seen brave clinicians who have said, “Right, if it is not going to trigger the organisational statutory duty of candour, I do have a professional duty of candour, and I am going to raise it that way.” I hope the Bill will bolster that, as we have said.

[Seamus Logan]

Q I should declare that I worked in the health service for 33 years—not all politicians are political careerists. You are all very senior people, and obviously very experienced, but I want to get behind the corporate and ask for your personal opinions, based on your experience. My colleague drew attention to the fact that so many people in the health service have tried to blow the whistle and suffered serious detriment; in many cases, people have lost their jobs. If someone had blown the whistle on the infected blood scandal, thousands of lives would have been saved and the public purse would have been saved quite literally billions of pounds. Even with all the measures that have been put in place, why are people still suffering serious detriment when they try to blow the whistle? I am asking for your personal opinions. Professor Fowler, I will put that to you first, because you have experience in the Institute for Healthcare Improvement.

Professor Fowler: This is a very complicated issue. A few cases of people who have suffered detriment around freedom to speak up become very magnified. I genuinely do not see that as the experience of most people who speak up, but we do hear about it. In some cases, there is a great deal of complexity. In some cases, a massive breakdown of relationships within a unit that had started to impact the unit is what required the person to act in the way they did. Getting the balance right is a complex business.

In the past, I had cases where I thought, “This is a serious issue and we need to do something about it,” and was encouraged to think otherwise. That is historical—I am talking 20 years ago—and I have certainly not experienced it recently. I am not someone who has felt that there is an impediment to me speaking up, and I see plenty of examples where people are able to do that, but you do occasionally hear of people who feel they cannot, in difficult circumstances. We are working to change that culture and make it clear that there is detriment to not speaking up rather than the other way round, but it is a complex challenge. There is progress, but there is more to do. I hope that this Bill can be part of that, but there are some cautions to getting this right and getting the balance right.

Dr Chopra: I agree. I think it is about the culture. There is that saying that culture eats strategy for breakfast; in the same way, culture will eat many of these provisions. We have to get the culture right, and we need to do anything that we can to tilt the balance to create a culture of openness and candour. The reason people fear suffering detriment is that they have seen examples; we have to recognise that the high-profile cases that Aidan mentioned do have an impact on people coming forward. In fact, we probably ought to be celebrating those instances where people are able to raise concerns and blow the whistle, and things improve. That might help to start shifting the culture.

[Seamus Logan]

Q How would we do that?

Dr Chopra: Going back to what I was saying about our role as a regulator, I have focused on where we have taken enforcement powers where we have seen things that have not worked, but I think we could also do the opposite. As a regulator, we could be talking about those areas that we see as outstanding, and platforming what they have done with their policies, processes and procedures that have made them outstanding. Being a regulator that champions innovation and outstanding organisations is something that the CQC could contribute. That might be one way.

I have worked in other jurisdictions. When I think about how duty of candour works in Scotland, one of the differences is that every organisation in Scotland has to do an annual duty of candour statement. Each organisation is required to set out at the end of the year how many instances of duty of candour have been picked up, the very top headlines of what the issues were, and what they are doing about it. I thought that was a good provision that I saw operating up north. It is not perfect, but it shows how the duty is working in practice. I was working in an assurance body up there, and it allowed me to look across the country to see what was happening and whether there were areas where under-reporting may be taking place. It allowed better monitoring at national level.

Helen Vernon: In addition to what we do in relation to compensation, we have a role in the effective management of concerns about practitioner performance. Recognising some of the things that you mentioned, we did some work on some guidance called “Being fair”, which was about setting out some principles on a just and learning culture and what that looks like. Translating that into practice has meant creating templates and some simple principles that can be shared across different organisations to make it easy for people to speak up safely. That was co-produced with the input of regulators and clinicians who have been through some difficult processes, but it is one of the ways in which we can bring practical guidance to sometimes difficult concepts.

[Dr Mullan]

Q We heard in evidence this morning about a sense that prevention of future deaths reports are made but nothing is necessarily done to follow up on them. Dr Chopra, my understanding is that it is essentially the CQC’s job to take into account anything that is of material interest in an organisation, such as a prevention of future deaths report, and that you see it as your job to follow those reports up and at least attempt to ensure that they are listened to.

Dr Chopra: We get notified of incidents. To be very frank, we are a responsive organisation when incidents occur; when we are made aware of PFD reports, we look at them. Because of the way that we look at things, as I said, we are responsive rather than taking a proactive view, but yes, that is right. One thing that might be helpful is to bring those recommendations to a national body. We are pinning a lot on the National Quality Board at the moment, but it would be helpful to bring recommendations to a central place that would allow their dissemination so that they land not just in the organisation where the incident occurred but across the piece.

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[Mr Morrison]

Q I have a follow-up to Ian’s question. The new offence of misleading of the public would not apply

“for the purposes of journalism.”

That is the wording in the Bill. As has been so rightly pointed out, we know there has been a history of public officials who have been using the media in lead-ups to inquiries and so on. Critics, to a point of view that I might have, would say that any kind of stamping down or work on that would be an attack on freedom of speech. What would you say to that?

Nathan Sparkes: In a lot of legislation there are special exemptions for journalism, and often that is justified, but I think it is for the Government to justify that exemption when they bring forward legislation. I do not think it can be justified in this case.

Looking at that offence, there is a six-part test for it to apply. The person must have departed significantly from the expectations of their role, they must have caused harm to someone, they must have been responsible for significant or reputed dishonesty, it must be about a matter of significant concern to the public, it must be seriously improper, and they ought to know that it was seriously improper. That is an incredibly high threshold, and rightly so, but it is inconceivable that there is any legitimate journalistic activity that would satisfy the remarkably high threshold of all six tests that we would want to protect. On that basis, we do not think it is appropriate. The challenge for the Government is whether they could identify a circumstance in which any journalistic activity that would be in breach of those would be legitimate. I do not think they can; I think that is inconceivable.

[Seamus Logan]

Q Ron, it says in our brief that in 2006, you predicted the impending sub-prime/collateralised debt obligation crisis. Should I sell everything? I am only kidding.

Ron Warmington: I do think that everything is hyped, but luckily, I was in Burbank looking at a business that did that, and it was the worst business—at that point— that I had ever looked at, so it was easy to predict what would happen.

[Seamus Logan]

Q What I wanted to ask you about seriously was culture change, because that is what a lot of the Bill is about—about how we ensure that Hillsborough or the infected blood scandal never happen again. How do we achieve that culture change? What are your opinions on that?

Ron Warmington: I have been in this situation in boardrooms where something horrible has happened—a valve has blown up on the ocean floor, a building has burnt down or whatever. There needs to be a contrarian—it does not always have to be the same person—who is prepared to say, “Look, chaps, ladies, what I’m hearing is that you all want to cover this up. Let me tell you why this isn’t a good idea.” A lot of cover-ups stay covered up, but occasionally, one gets uncovered, and then the consequences are much worse than if we had come clean. We need to get the board members to see that balance. I would like to see training in business schools on the consequences of embarking on a cover-up—there probably is none. How do we get the decision makers to do the right thing? It is not religion that is going to persuade them to do that any more—it used to be.

I am used to working in huge organisations that were big enough to have their own independent investigation teams—I used to run them—which would be completely trusted by whistleblowers. We knew that one never burnt a whistleblower. They could safely come to us. That generates in an organisation a unit, a department, that can be trusted to deal with the worst possible things that you can imagine happening. Most companies are not big enough to have such an organisation, and some are big enough but do not want one. Maybe there is a case to be made for some sort of national body to be that independent investigative authority—something that is not quite a public or statutory inquiry.

In my investigation, we should never have been contracted to the Post Office. That was the subject of the investigation thinking that it was paying the piper, and that therefore it could call the tune. There needs to be some body—the National Audit Office does fantastic work—to which people could go and feel in safe hands. I do not know how we change the ethics of the corporate world. I wish we could; I just do not think the ethics are the same as they were when I was a wee lad. I do not know what will bring it back. It is not just this country that is suffering in that way. I am sorry—I am dodging your question.

[Seamus Logan]

Not at all—I thought it was a good answer.

Flora Page: It is about incentives, isn’t it? The incentives have to be aligned for folk to do the right thing.

Ron Warmington: Yes, we have to get people to make the right decision. They will not do it just because it is the right thing to do. Some people will—even though it is costly to themselves, their careers or their companies, they will do the right thing; I have been brought up with people like that. Other people need to be persuaded to do the right thing by threats or by incentives, or ideally both.

I do not think we can just hope for the best that the ethics of corporate Great Britain and civil service Great Britain are going to change. I mean, I have seen Ministers talk utter nonsense because their civil servants parroted nonsense that was parroted to them by people in the organisations that ought to have been subject to review. I feel sorry for MPs and Ministers in those cases.

Jacqui Hames: It is important to point out that the media companies responsible for the industrial-scale phone hacking saga are corporations. They make a profit or loss, and they hide behind the free speech mantra, but ultimately they are creating a culture where this behaviour is acceptable—where criminality is acceptable. There is no doubt that a whistleblower coming from their side of the fence would be treated extremely badly.

As a victim of phone hacking, as an ex-police officer who had their personal items sold to a news corporation, I know that you have nowhere to go in those circumstances if those corporations are just going to hide behind a freedom of speech defence. It is not freedom of speech to spread misinformation and disinformation that affect the wellbeing of hundreds of people who have already gone through intolerable experiences.

[Tessa Munt]

Q We had a discussion earlier today about whether the powers also cover subcontractors. I think that is probably one of Ron’s questions as well.

Ron Warmington: I have it written down, yes.

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[Tessa Munt]

I suspect my colleague is going to ask you about journalism more generally—surprise, surprise.

[Seamus Logan]

Q Daniel, are you familiar with the proposals from Hillsborough Law Now?

Daniel De Simone: I have read their submissions.

[Seamus Logan]

So you are aware of the proposals regarding command responsibility?

Daniel De Simone: Yes.

[Seamus Logan]

Do you agree with them?

Daniel De Simone: I am not really here to speak on behalf of the BBC about command response or anything else but, as you heard from what I said about MI5, where responsibility can be taken by individuals, that is better than it falling on organisations, because organisations are more slippery and it is harder to hold them to account. Where an individual has to take responsibility, that is better.

[Seamus Logan]

Q Would you accept that there might be circumstances in which the head of a particular intelligence organisation might need a safe place to be able to reveal sensitive information?

Daniel De Simone: Absolutely, and that is why we have closed material procedures within the courts. Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee frequently sits in secret—that is not in public. There absolutely needs to be places where intelligence and sensitive matters can be discussed. Clearly, no one wants harm to national security or for there to be genuine damage to anyone. I think there are ways of dealing with it. When he gave evidence earlier, Lord Evans said that himself, and he is the former head of MI5.

[Seamus Logan]

Q With all that said, do you think the reach of the Official Secrets Act might go a little too far in some circumstances?

Daniel De Simone: In what way?

[Seamus Logan]

It is hard to describe a particular example, but in a way that might prevent a whistleblower from taking necessary action.

Daniel De Simone: I think so, yes. Journalists have been arrested under the Official Secrets Act. I am a journalist who has worked in the area of security and matters to do with terrorism, so I am familiar with there being a risk to journalists with official secrets. Someone might tell you something that puts themselves at risk, or they might put you at risk. In practice we see very few prosecutions under the Official Secrets Act—we do not see many of them now—so this is not something that is happening all the time, but there is a risk.

There is obviously a balance, because security and intelligence agencies do not want to feel that anyone who works there can just go off and reveal things that they think are very sensitive, but equally it is also true that there can be things that are wrong within those organisations, and there is not always an obvious place for someone to go if they feel like that. There is often a big risk to that person for doing that. So yes, it can be too much.

[Ian Byrne]

Q Thanks, Daniel—it has been a fascinating evidence session so far. You have a lot of personal experience with MI5 over the last couple of years. Do you genuinely believe that the provisions of the Bill, as drafted, will drive the cultural change that we feel we need?

Daniel De Simone: For MI5? No, I do not think so. Look at what the head of MI5, Sir Ken McCallum, has said. He said in a speech last month that there are particular responsibilities on MI5 as a secret agency to comply with oversight and be as transparent as it can with these sorts of things. He was talking with reference particularly to the fact that MI5 was found to have given false evidence in our case. So strong words are clearly being said.

The trouble we have in our case is that when we showed that there was false evidence, and they accepted that, the third in command of MI5—the director general, strategy—then came along and gave an account to the court that the court, the Lady Chief Justice, the president of the King’s bench division and the head of the administrative court now say was not an accurate reflection of the closed material. That happened after they said they were going to be very transparent with the court. They really had to be dragged to the point they are now in, where there is an investigation that the court—the High Court and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal—required. That is being carried out under the auspices of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. His organisation was also misled.

In our case, every kind of judicial body charged with holding MI5 to account, or its regulator, has been given false evidence. That is an issue, and it calls into question issues around a duty of candour. Lord Evans said in his evidence earlier that there is already a duty of candour responsibility on MI5 and the Government in the courts, and that is true. In our case, they have admitted that they did not meet that test. It is there; the issue is that it is not always being complied with. As I understand it, the point of the Bill is to strengthen that duty and enforce it. That seems to be why it is there.