Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Third sitting)

Tom Morrison Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Seamus Logan]

I welcome the Minister’s response. Having heard what she said about working with me about how we might operationalise the issue, I am prepared to withdraw the amendments. However, it is important to remember, in that conversation, that justice delayed is justice denied.

We have seen so many examples of inquiries and investigations that take years, when months would be much more appropriate. In the circumstances we are speaking about—in this case and the many others that this law will apply to—we must give chairs and leaders of inquiries and investigations some sense of what is reasonable when it comes to public authority responses.

We heard from the hon. Member for Morecambe and Lunesdale about the health service; I worked in it for 33 years. There is no good reason why it should not be able to respond in if not 30 then 90 days. Some backstop needs to be applied in relation to these responsibilities. I am happy to continue the conversation with the Minister and beg to ask leave withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Application of duty of candour and assistance

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 35, in schedule 1, page 25, line 23, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

See Amendment 38.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 36, in schedule 1, page 28, line 38, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

See Amendment 38.

Amendment 37, in schedule 1, page 31, line 34, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

See Amendment 38.

Amendment 38, in schedule 1, page 34, line 15, leave out from “direction” to the end of the sub-paragraph and insert

“should be given to a public official working for an intelligence service or the head of such a service pursuant to section 2(4) and section 2(5) of the Public Office (Accountability) Act 2025 as applicable to any other public authority, but may not be given to any other public official if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence, within the meaning of section 1(9) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and any such public official is not required to provide any such information in response to a direction given in breach of this sub-paragraph.”

Amendments 35 to 38 would extend the application of the duty of candour and assistance to the intelligence services but would disapply it to individual officers.

[Mr Morrison]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. These amendments do nothing more than fix something in the current draft of the Bill, which seems inadvertently to have carved out the security services—an area that could be strengthened, as we heard during the evidence session last week. The amendments seek to extend the duty of candour and assistance to the intelligence services as organisations, ensuring that they as bodies are required to be open and co-operative with the inquiries and any investigations. The amendment balances accountability with national security, by stating that direction will not be given to public officials

“if it would require the official to provide information relating to security or intelligence”.

Several of our witnesses last week gave evidence that laid out various examples of how the security services had failed to be fully candid, disregarded accountability, and, at times, misled inquiries. We also know that the Government assured campaigners, Members and other interested parties that there would be no carve-out for the security services in the Bill. The security services do an incredible job in keeping us safe and ensuring that our country’s interests are protected. It is right that their work is covered by the secrecy Act; no one wishes to change that. However, because of that power they should be held to highest standards of accountability. We know that in recent history that has not been the case.

Last week we heard from Pete Weatherby, who, as well as working with the Hillsborough families, supported several families impacted by the Manchester Arena bombing. He said:

“There was a major failure of the intelligence services and the way they dealt with the aftermath of the bombing…MI5 then put an incorrect narrative—a false narrative—to the inquiry itself. The judge, the chair of the inquiry, found that the corporate case that it had put was incorrect.”––[Official Report, Public Office (Accountability) Public Bill Committee, 27 November 2025; c. 6, Q3.]

The amendment would ensure, as much as any law can, that that could not happen again, by explicitly ensuring that the security services are accountable to this Bill and therefore to a public who willingly consent to how these organisations work to protect us and our country. This amendment would not endanger national security. It would not impact the way in which some evidence is required to be provided in closed sessions. It would provide the security services with the necessary safeguards to ensure that secret and classified information is protected.

This is what happens now. We heard from the journalist Daniel De Simone, who worked on the agent X story, where the security services tried to mislead and were found out. His testimony stated:

“I do not think it is wrong that there are special advocates in closed material procedures; it is now an established part of a court process. What it does do, though, is place a special responsibility on MI5 to be candid, because their evidence is often very important in very significant cases, where there has been significant loss of life, where people’s citizenship is being removed or where people are being deprived of their liberties.”––[Official Report, Public Office (Accountability) Public Bill Committee, 27 November 2025; c. 95, Q138.]

Because of that, it is vital that we do not allow any carving out, intentional or otherwise, of the security services, to ensure that they, too, are held to account and must tell the truth. That will strengthen not only their work, but the trust that we place in them.

[Dr Mullan]

I emphasise that we need clarity on this. Those of us who were able to attend the meeting with the intelligence services will know that they seemed to provide quite a clear account of their individual personal responsibility and all the ways in which they thought the Bill would affect them. That was quite clearly contradicted in our evidence from other witnesses. I am grateful to the Minister for sending round a further note to Committee members this morning, and for our brief chat ahead of this sitting. Even that note raises further contradictions, however, because it says, and I quote, that “the individual public officials working for the UK intelligence services are capable of being caught by the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour”. It lists some other ones, but it includes the duty of candour. Further down, it says, “the Bill specifies that the duty of candour and assistance can only be addressed to public authorities and not individual public officials”.

The Minister was able to give me a brief, informal explanation of that, but I do think this is extremely important. It may be that people are happy for the security services to be excluded to a certain extent, but we have to vote on a shared understanding of what exactly the Bill does in relation to them as entire organisations, as well as to the people who work for them and those who are in charge. I would be grateful if the Minister provided some clarity on that.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank hon. Members for raising those important points. In this Bill, we have aimed to ensure candour while protecting national security. As it stands, inquiries and investigations will be able to demand any information and assistance they require from the intelligence services. Where national security information is concerned, the agency as a whole will provide that assistance to the inquiry or investigation by complying with a compliance direction, rather than individuals directly in their own right.

To balance that, and to ensure that there are no gaps, carve-outs or exclusions, those in charge of the agencies are subject to specific requirements to put arrangements in place for individuals to maintain records of information relating to any acts that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation, and to provide information to the authority to ensure that the duty is complied with as set out in clause 6. Rightly, a failure to have these arrangements in place will result in criminal sanctions.

Intelligence services obtain and retain sensitive security and intelligence information in order to protect the public from national security threats. Vital public interests, including national security, would be at real risk of harm from the unrestricted disclosure of this sensitive information. We all share the same aims here—ensuring that candour is in place while protecting national security and the public.

Taking on board the points raised by Hillsborough Law Now and others, we constructed clause 6 in such a way as to ensure that there is a secure process that the intelligence services can work through so that any information required by an inquiry or investigation reaches that place safely, so that there can be full candour. However, we have heard the concerns from Hillsborough Law Now and from members of this Committee about our provisions. I assure hon. Members that the Government have taken their points on board, and we will commit to working with them and others actively to consider steps to address this in time for Report.

I turn to the other amendments, which set out that the intelligence authorities are to be listed as a public authority for the purposes of the duty of candour and assistance, and the code of ethical conduct in schedule 2. Clause 6 already makes it clear that the duty applies to the intelligence services as it applies to all other public authorities; therefore, it is beyond doubt that they are included, as a public authority, in the Bill.

We have not set out an exhaustive list of public authorities in schedule 2 to avoid unintentionally excluding some bodies by failing to list them. No individual Department or arm’s length body of central Government is included in the list for that purpose. If we begin to list public bodies, there is a risk that we imply that those not listed are not covered, which could weaken the Bill. I urge the hon. Member for Cheadle to withdraw his amendment, but I reiterate my commitment to working with Members on a way forward to capture all the concerns raised both in the Committee and outside of it.

[Mr Morrison]

I thank the shadow Minister for the points that he made; he is spot on that the lack of clarity in the Bill, particularly surrounding what came out of the evidence sessions, raises more questions than answers. However, I am pleased that the Minister has said that the Government are happy to work with us on tightening those gaps before Report. This is not about unrestricted evidence; it is about getting to the truth, which must be our focus throughout. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Dr Mullan]

I beg to move amendment 3, in schedule 1, page 26, line 30, at end insert—

“(1A) Inquiries under subsection (1) include those designated by the Secretary of State as local inquiries into grooming gangs.”

This amendment would apply the Duty of Candour to the five local grooming gangs’ inquiries announced by the Government and any further ones established.

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[Ian Byrne]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr Morrison]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. I am not sure whether this is the right time to ask, but on the amendment paper, amendment 34 is down as a Liberal Democrat amendment, but on the groupings that were sent across to us, it was down as an SNP amendment. I just wanted to clarify where we are with that.

[The Chair]

I understand that that has been corrected online, and the matter is now on the record as well.

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[Ian Byrne]

I thank my hon. Friend for that, and she is absolutely right; a commitment was made not to weaken that. Clause 2(5) of the Bill imposes a duty on the chief officer or chief executive to “take all reasonable steps” to ensure corporate compliance, but that is not command responsibility—I think that is a really important point. It is far weaker, and I feel it will be ineffective. Command responsibility is straightforward and places the responsibility for the discharge of the corporate duty on the head of the body.

[Mr Morrison]

Does the hon. Member agree that, when someone is in that position of power over a public body, they have a huge responsibility, not just for the culture but for the training, the personnel, the HR practices and the policies? With that responsibility, someone needs to ensure that that goes throughout the whole of the organisation, and command responsibility focuses the mind to ensure that everything below them is working to clock.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Tom Morrison Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Would anyone like to speak to the other amendment in the group?

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

Yes, sorry. In the last evidence session, we discussed a very similar situation when we heard from both Pete Weatherby and Daniel De Simone, one of whom is a KC trying to get to the truth through his work in the courts, and another of whom is a journalist trying to expose the truth, particularly around the Agent X story. We are not looking for a change to the Official Secrets Act or its operation. We simply want the Bill to encompass the security services explicitly.

There is a list of public authorities on the Bill. The security services are not on there, which begs the question, why? I thank the Minister for saying that further work will be done on that and that she will be engaging with all Members across the House before Report. On that basis, we are happy to withdraw the amendments.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the withdrawal of the amendments. We had a discussion earlier about why we have not listed organisations in the Bill. We did not want it to be an exhaustive list and to miss an organisation out unintentionally, which could lead them to think that the Bill does not apply to it. We have been extremely clear that intelligence services are covered by this Bill, including clause 6. I reaffirm that to reassure the hon. Gentleman.

Clause 6 sets out that the duties in the Bill apply to the intelligence services, but it requires that proper arrangements and protections are in place to safeguard national security. As subsection (2) states, the obligation in clause 2(3) for a person to notify the inquiry or investigation does not apply to

“a person who works for an intelligence service”,

or where doing so would result in the release of security or intelligence information.

To be clear, inquiries and investigations are able to demand assistance and information from the intelligence services under the obligation in clause 2(4), but appropriate arrangements need to be in place for an inquiry or investigation to receive that sensitive information, as is the norm now. Individuals revealing acts or information outside of those arrangements could be detrimental to national security, as I am sure all hon. Members would agree.

Subsection (3) places a requirement on the heads of the intelligence services to put in place internal arrangements to ensure that those who work for the service comply with the requirements to record any acts or any information that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation. They must inform the service if they hold such information that is not already available to it. That ensures that the services have all the information they need to discharge their obligations under the duty as an authority. However, as I have already stated, I am committed to working with hon. Members, external stakeholders and the UK intelligence services to make sure that we have as a robust Bill as possible that fulfils the aims, objectives and intentions of us all.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Transitional provision in relation to this Chapter

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Ian Byrne]

I thank the Minister for that; I beg to ask leave to the withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr Morrison]

I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 9, page 8, line 2, after “work” insert—

“including the retention and disclosure of digital records including messages relevant to their public functions”.

This amendment ensures that digital messages and records are added to the duty of candour in relation to inquiries and inquests.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 3—Offence of wilfully destroying information or records relevant to an inquiry or investigation—

“(1) A public authority or public official commits an offence if—

(a) they deliberately destroy relevant information or records relevant to an inquiry, investigation, or inquest;

(b) they know that, or are reckless as to whether, the information is relevant to or required by an inquiry, investigation, or inquest.

(2) A public official who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);

(d) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).”

This new clause introduces an offence for wilfully destroying relevant records after a major incident that may lead to an inquiry or inquest.

[Mr Morrison]

We spoke this morning about the issues dealt with by amendment 43, but to clarify, WhatsApp messages formed a big part of the evidence in the recent covid inquiry—it seemed to be government by WhatsApp at the time—and yet many of them seem to have disappeared. The amendment would provide an extra way of ensuring that public authorities and those responsible are keeping proper records and preventing that from happening again.

New clause 3 would prevent the deliberate concealment of evidence that could obstruct investigations, hinder fact-finding and undermine public trust. I would like the Committee to consider the element of public trust here. How people perceive what happens in this place, and in the organisations and public authorities that surround us and the power structures that are there, is vital to the legitimacy that we have and that those public authorities also have. By criminalising such conduct, the clause would reinforce the obligation on public authorities and officials to maintain and safeguard records, ensuring that inquiries and inquests can access all the information necessary to understand what happened and hold the responsible parties to account. This is a way to make sure that the truth can be found in those areas and hopefully ensure that WhatsApp messages are not deleted in future.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising an important issue. Amendment 43 would, as he states, make authorities set expectations for staff on how to retain and disclose their digital records in accordance with the obligations under the duty of candour. Proper record keeping is important to ensure accountability and propriety in decisions made by public authorities. That applies where records are on paper or held digitally— for example, in a WhatsApp group—and it is important that organisations have policies and processes in place to manage these effectively.

However, the Government’s view is that the code of ethical conduct is not the correct vehicle for establishing those processes. The Public Records Act 1958 already places certain requirements on public authorities. Under that Act, the Keeper of Public Records issues guidance to supervise and guide the selection of historic records —including digital records—worthy of permanent preservation.

Disclosure to inquiries and inquests will require the detailed consideration of various factors, including the fact that the authority’s legal obligations include the duty of candour and assistance, the protection of personal or sensitive information, and the relevance to the inquiry’s terms of reference or the inquest. Authorities may also require specific legal advice. Separate and bespoke policies will therefore be required. The professional duty of candour established under clause 9 is intended to focus on what candour means for each public official going about their business in their day-to-day role. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Cheadle withdraws the amendment.

On the point about whether WhatsApp messages are covered, and specifically disappearing messages or those deleted in the course of work, as they sometimes are, the duty of candour and assistance requires all public officials and authorities to provide all relevant information. If a public official was part of a WhatsApp chat in which relevant information was exchanged, they would be obliged to inform the chair of that fact, and if disappearing messages had gone or the chats had been deleted, they would have to provide an account of what was discussed, to the best of their recollection, even if the messages had since been deleted or vanished.

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The concept of a person includes legal persons such as organisations. Therefore, a person commits the offence if they use their position to destroy or conceal information and records that may be relevant to any potential future inquiry, inquest or investigation in an attempt to protect themselves or their organisation from reputational harm, and they know, or ought to know, that such conduct would be seen as seriously improper by any reasonable person. That could include, for example, shredding documents or ordering that any other information be destroyed. With those assurances, I urge the hon. Member for Cheadle to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr Morrison]

I thank the Minister for her comments. In the spirit of cross-party working, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Seamus Logan]

I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 9, page 8, line 12, leave out “may” insert “must”.

I am aware that we have debated amendment 48, although perhaps not as fully as I would have liked. In the interests of getting our business done within the time available, I decided not to intervene in that debate. However, I believe that the particular change in amendment 24 is necessary. Where amendment 48 spoke to the duty of candour, amendment 24 speaks to the code of ethics.

There are legal minds in the room that are much better informed and trained on legal definitions than my own, but amendment 24 addresses the need to replace “may” with “must” in the code of ethics, as opposed to the duty of candour. I believe this is important given my experience in the health service, where there is a responsibility on individuals to report child abuse, or where a colleague might clearly be able to see that a surgeon carrying out procedures is repeatedly doing something injurious or harmful. By replacing the word “may” with “must”, we place a responsibility on anyone to blow the whistle on those particular issues.

In my working life I have experience, as might others present, of consultants who suppressed information relating to child abuse. We certainly heard similar evidence about surgeons during our evidence session. Colleagues will be able to think of many such examples, which is why it is important that the amendment replaces “may” with “must”.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Second sitting)

Tom Morrison Excerpts

Thursday 27th November 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q I want to put on the record that my brother is a senior police officer in the South Wales police. Chief Constable, can you discuss the practicalities and the impact on policing of the new offences, specifically the new offence of misleading the public? How will it be carried out and how will it be policed? What would the impact be if we removed the harm element of that offence? How would that impact policing?

Chief Constable Guildford: Having been consulted on the way through this, having thought about it quite considerably and having spoken to the director general of the IOPC, I think that the drafting at the moment is pitched at the right level, because it says that that harm needs to be of a serious nature. When it comes to setting out harm, it mentions phrases such as “departed significantly from”.

What will the impact of that be from my perspective? I think it will encourage leaders and individual officers to do the right thing. Initially, it may increase the likelihood that a narrative would be corrected earlier. Think back to some of the foundational pillars upon which this legislation rests, and a lot of the narrative that was, let us say, placed in the public domain around Hillsborough—and sometimes around other events where there is knowledge that is known to the police service and is able to be communicated, but which for whatever reason on occasions is not. Sometimes, in my opinion, that does not help with public confidence.

Going back to the question, I think this will encourage the clarification of issues at an earlier stage. But I suppose, on reflection, from a professional perspective, we have to balance some of that with an individual’s potential reluctance to say too much too early. Of course, the public quite rightly have an expectation that facts will be clarified and that information will be shared and placed in the public domain, and that is absolutely the right thing to do. That is the balancing act. It is important that it is pitched at the right level, which in my professional opinion it is. The “harm” is economic, physical or emotional, and I think it says it should be not inconsequential, which is important. On occasion—you will know this from your family perspective—we absolutely do get things wrong, but the legislation is designed to allow us to correct those things fairly expeditiously.

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

Q You have already mentioned the code of ethics and code of practice, and we have had a lot of people talking about potential codes of conduct. Can you describe how your various codes filter through to the workforce, and how everyone is made aware of the codes they should be working to? As an organisation, how do you measure the success of the codes?

Chief Constable Guildford: They obviously occur over a period of time. Certainly in my service—I have done over 30 years—they have come in the second half of my service, rather than the first. However, the way that we train them is very explicit: it is done on a values basis through initial training. We recruit and assess new candidates on the basis of values. We do recruit training, which in most forces happens over a period of 20 to 22 weeks, and recruits have a specific input on values-based decision making. We have something called the national decision model, which allows them to think about the consequences and the options they have in making their decisions.

The code of ethics absolutely underpins what we do. It sits in the middle of our decision-making circle. It is trained, really, from day one. I am trying to bring it to life a bit: this sits in the middle of all the specialist public order training, post Hillsborough, for commanders at public events, particularly football, and their accreditation and training. For all our bronze, silver and gold commanders, the code of ethics sits inside the wheel in which we make our decisions. To reinforce the point, the other aspect is that whenever there is a misconduct meeting or hearing for police officers, there is always reference to the code of ethics—the ethical behaviours that are expected of officers and staff.

The third bit of your question was about how we measure this. I would say that we measure it in three ways. The first is the training at the beginning. The second measure is around outcomes from our misconduct proceedings, as well as the proportionality of our misconduct proceedings and how they are used and referred to. The third measure —this is particularly important—is the measure of public opinion. As organisations, we respond to that, and we openly and candidly answer those questions.

In the consultation, we have gone through certain elements in relation to which we have said that, operationally, we may not express candour at certain times: for example, in a live situation in which we lawfully employed the services of, say, an undercover police officer or an undercover officer online; or in a live firearms operation, a live kidnap operation or a product contamination operation. In those cases we may seek to use a little bit of subterfuge to make sure we gain the lawful aim and the right public outcome for the victim at the end of it. Does that explain it?

[Mr Morrison]

Great—thank you.

[Seamus Logan]

Q Chief Constable, I want to follow up on some of the points you made about training. First, this is groundbreaking legislation; we are seeking to achieve a massive culture change, and there will be a code of ethics and a code of conduct. Do you foresee the possibility of additional training requirements for senior and middle managers in the police?

Chief Constable Guildford: I honestly think that what is proposed here complements what we have been doing over a period of years. This is not unexpected for the police service and it is not new for senior officers, but I think your point is a fair one in so far as these are new offences, and a particular number of people will be charged with investigating them. Those people will sit within the IOPC, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and they will also sit mainly within each of the professional standards departments of each of the 43 police forces. Some additional training will be required, but I think it will be very marginal in initial recruit training, because it very much complements what we already teach with that package.

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[Ian Byrne]

Q We are here today for the journey of legislation to stop the culture of state cover-ups in this country. Certainly at the heart of the state cover-up of Hillsborough was the media and the role it played. There was a hugely powerful headline in The Sun by the dreaded Kelvin Mackenzie—“The Truth”—which resonated around the world, shaped the narrative and did so much damage to our ability to get truth, justice and accountability. I have a simple question for Nathan and Jacqui: are there any areas you would both like the Bill to go further with, and if so, where?

Nathan Sparkes: As you point out, there was a phenomenon of police officers briefing The Sun newspaper after the Hillsborough disaster, which was a huge part of the cover-up. Police officers were not the only public officials involved in that; the local MP was, and there is a disputed allegation that a representative of the Thatcher Government was as well. There was a huge amount of public official impropriety in that media cover-up operation. Unfortunately, that is not the only case; after Orgreave, similarly, there was a cover-up perpetrated between public officials and the media.

The history of the phone hacking scandal is a 15 to 20-year series of occasions where overwhelming evidence of criminal activity being carried out on behalf of News UK was presented to the Metropolitan police force, and every time it failed to properly investigate until it absolutely had to. That was during a period where a succession of Metropolitan Commissioners enjoyed excessively close relationships with News UK; it included a time where even an editor for News UK was hired by the Met, and there were records of eight dinners between heads of the Met and News UK editors over that period.

In more recent years, there are allegations that police fed information about the victims of the Manchester bombing to the media. Christine Flack, the mother of the late television presenter Caroline Flack, believes that police were briefing the media in relation to her case. Mazher Mahmood was a News UK reporter, and there is an allegation in a recently published book that the Met protected him from prosecution and exposure during the noughties on account of the closeness of that relationship.

I could give many more examples—I will not sit down and list them all—but the point is that there is a specific and persistent issue with corrupt relationships between public officials and the media. Our concern about this Bill is that it does not have anything substantive to address that. The long title of the Bill is very clear; it will

“require public authorities to promote and take steps to maintain ethical conduct within all parts of the authority”.

Our submission your Committee is that the Bill cannot achieve that unless it also addresses the specific phenomenon of corrupt relationships. Our proposal is that the best way of dealing of that is with a public inquiry.

[Mr Morrison]

Q I have a follow-up to Ian’s question. The new offence of misleading of the public would not apply

“for the purposes of journalism.”

That is the wording in the Bill. As has been so rightly pointed out, we know there has been a history of public officials who have been using the media in lead-ups to inquiries and so on. Critics, to a point of view that I might have, would say that any kind of stamping down or work on that would be an attack on freedom of speech. What would you say to that?

Nathan Sparkes: In a lot of legislation there are special exemptions for journalism, and often that is justified, but I think it is for the Government to justify that exemption when they bring forward legislation. I do not think it can be justified in this case.

Looking at that offence, there is a six-part test for it to apply. The person must have departed significantly from the expectations of their role, they must have caused harm to someone, they must have been responsible for significant or reputed dishonesty, it must be about a matter of significant concern to the public, it must be seriously improper, and they ought to know that it was seriously improper. That is an incredibly high threshold, and rightly so, but it is inconceivable that there is any legitimate journalistic activity that would satisfy the remarkably high threshold of all six tests that we would want to protect. On that basis, we do not think it is appropriate. The challenge for the Government is whether they could identify a circumstance in which any journalistic activity that would be in breach of those would be legitimate. I do not think they can; I think that is inconceivable.

[Seamus Logan]

Q Ron, it says in our brief that in 2006, you predicted the impending sub-prime/collateralised debt obligation crisis. Should I sell everything? I am only kidding.

Ron Warmington: I do think that everything is hyped, but luckily, I was in Burbank looking at a business that did that, and it was the worst business—at that point— that I had ever looked at, so it was easy to predict what would happen.

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[The Chair]

We have about three minutes left.

[Mr Morrison]

Q This question is about your profession as a journalist. Obviously, you rely on sources—you have talked about that—and there is a balance to be struck between relying on your sources and the fact that throughout history, in respect of Hillsborough and other shocking scandals, journalists have probably been briefed with bad intent. How do we fix that in the Bill? Also, what holds you to account as a journalist? If you did a story about me that was dreadful, where could I go to hold you to account?

Daniel De Simone: As I understand it, the Bill is aimed at public authorities—Government Departments, the police and others—so, as things stand, media organisations are not part of it. I do not know whether there is a proposal to make them part of it, but as things stand they are not. You ask what can be done if I do a story about you that is wrong and you want to hold me to account. I work for the BBC, and there is a complaints process for the BBC that can go even to Ofcom, if necessary, so there are ways of correcting a story or getting an apology if something is wrong.

As a journalist, I work on difficult and challenging stories, and I obviously abhor some of the things you have spoken about today: false information being presented as fact and leading to really harmful consequences for people. I try to take personal responsibility and do the right thing, and I think that is the point—that is why it is important. The more you can foster a culture of people taking personal responsibility, the better. That is why, when there is an exemption for an organisation, and it is not about individuals in an organisation, I think that does weaken it.

[The Chair]

That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you for your evidence. That brings us to the end of today’s sitting. The Committee will meet again at 9.25 am on Tuesday 2 December to begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jade Botterill.)